government's reach abroad? how is that happening? >> i'll start and then turn to my colleague. much of this is diplomatic. it is working in conjunction with the americans and regional partners and others to encourage and support the new iraqi government, which needs to encouragement and support of friends. it's also engaging and so on in the political process going in syria. the military contribution to that. is first containing isil because if isil is not contained, then these political processes will not have the space to develop and it is well, fundamentally creating if you like the space in which politics can work.

>> you asked about where defense fits in this. clearly, outreach. the profoundly a political activity. there is a bit to the offer that we in the americans and others are involved in. i think our principal task is likely involved in trading the army and developing the capacity of the army to ensure that the armeded forces are balanced, credible and as non sectarian as can be. the army was a sunni army. had been undermined by corruption and appointing by

then prime minister and building something that has more substance, that is more balanced and trusted across the communities is clearly the aim. >> we can create the space for the politics to gain ground, but if it doesn't gain ground, we are kugting a very different military campaign. there are elements of pressure -- not to encourage them to split those pressure b in tehran, tied in of course to other iranian ambitions there, but to convince them that an inclusive goth that brings the kurds and sunnis in is better than being on the front lines against isis. and there i said the gulf states to help us do part of the sunni outreach and reach out a bit to

abad as long as he repays that confidence. but in the meantime, of course, add gordon said, the key as we know is to try to enable the kurds, peshmerga, particularly and the isf to regain the confidence and to have enough capacity and capability to take that fight. everybody's been absolutely clear. nobody wants western combat boots on the ground, but the enabling activity we bring in terms of intelligence, strike assets, driving for instance, and just general training, is what will actually allow the isf plus the peshmerga, plus the national guard drawn from the tribes, plus the shia militia to try to take the fight back to isil.

but iraq is the place where we have the best chance both to turn both the momentum and the narrative of isil and this extremist ideology. it's that combination of politics and military in combination. >> i understand what i'm not hearing perhaps, this is just my inability to read, but i'm not hearing much in terms of still how that would happen other than diplomatic and just a sort of asking them. now, there must be something behind that. is there not, and just as the final question, would you accept that the, the failure to, the failure that has created the vise of isil. that is not down to the fate of the maliki government alone. it is our fail year to have reconstructed luckily. >> it's the fate of -- syria and

iran. it was not a wonderful state about to flourish. maliki who came along and put it back to sectarianism. we did not do the kind of things ipg you are talking about. >> sunni tribes and the shia, iraqi army deteriorated significantly. >> in terms of incubates isil, probably the most direct one was the civil war in syria and like the ungoverned space in syria where isil was able to develop

and then the second factor is the difficulties in the northwest of iraq, which resulted from the alienation of the sunni tribes and so on as the result of the sectarian policies might have disrupted. >> thank you. >> let me ask you about the -- taken place so far. anything approaching a conventional -- such thing ever exist again, forces on the ground would have direct contact wi with, ask for targets to be assign assigned i'm really value your your view as to the degree of isil and hearing the last few

days, new players have arrived, possibly in iran, actually conducting air strikes in iraq and how that is all coordinated and up to date assessment on how you see that. >> air strike, we believe, have contained the momentum that isil once had. isil are able to generate localized tactical advances in certain areas, but by and large, they are on the defensive and the momentum has swung to the kurdish and iraqi security forces. we believe that is largely because of the air strikes that have come. what we are not saying is that the air strikes will be decisive, be a major

contribution to containing and limiting momentum that isil had. the iraqi security forces are much more able to holding ground, were able to provide a good liaison that has coordinated with air strikes then air strikes can go in support of those iraqi security forces and kurdish forces operations. the effect on the morale of both those organizations has been significantly enhanced by those air strikes. the impact on isil i think again, we've seen an equivalent,

what they have done has been forced to change their tactics. they're much more out in the open. they've even held military parades out in certain areas. that is stopped. they are resorting to more asymmetric tactics, including the use of ieds and they're using quite extensive countermeasures to avoid being struck. moving at night, using weather, avoiding grouping in big areas, so their tactics, techniques and proce procedures have been disrupted by them. i wouldn't want to overplay that capab capability, degradation that the air strikes have done. we've obviously struck quite a few pieces of equipment, vehicle, weapons systems and the like, but there is still more there and there has been some limited capability and and as a result of that, pressure, which as i said we're starting to use morale drop, more specifically

and more syria related, the air strikes have taken down some of the infrastructure in which syria have been gaining revenue and some of those revenue streams have been disrupted by the strikes against the infrastructure in eastern syria and the financial position of isil is not as strong as it was as a result of that. i think it is face to say they have contained the immediate tactical threat of isil to large parts of iraq and the momentum has shifted as a result. >> i think we have had a

complete collapse on air strikes. lost beneath the dam, which was been disastrous. ramadi, falluja, that sort of almost predates. i think it's had a huge effect. gordon's talked about the negative effect on isil. it's had a huge morale effect on the peshmerga and isf and has created conditions on which they were unable to advance from te crete to beijing. the huge advances in uavs and(xs

that is where if we talk about training, we have a capability we can offer that will really enable this. all of it, tied back to the politics of it, because if we can't get the politics right, it doesn't is a military campaign and get a huge amount of traction.

we've known it for a long time and known that iran has had forces deployed in to iraq for some time. as to the presence of coordination that was reported this morning, i can't comment on that. certainly, we as a nation, do not deconflict with iran in anything we do. >> there is one adverse political consequence, that these air strikes potentially help us out. i mean, within iraq, though the

coalition in part to syria, actually assisting anymo ining . >> that has been alleged. he has a number of enemieenemie. >> opposition as well. >> you said you had gotten a policy of containment in the long-term is too ambitious, so let's see what you would regard as a satisfactory regional submission in an ideal world. so, let's imagine that people of good will from all the participating sides in this multifaceted conflict were to sit down and negotiate in good faith, how likely do you think

it is that one could arrive at a regional solution which would presumably have to involve some sort of agreement between iran on the one side, saudi arabia and turkey on the other and we know how much they love and admire each other. what progress has been made so far or is this just a pipe dream? >> i think from the defense's perspective, this is very much something for our colleagues in the far office, i'm not sure that it's really our business to be pursuing satisfaction solutions in an ideal world. defense ministries exist because we don't live in an ideal world. what we obviously would like to see and what we would regard as a sign of success and i've referred to this before, is a

sufficiently inclusive government in baghdad and iraq, which basely gave removed the maneuver of organizations like isil. they would not be able to prey on alienation and discontent the way they do at the moment. we would like to see a similarly inclusive government in syria. so, basicallbasically, you woul two governments in those two countries which were able to manage the complex ethnicities in those countries not leave ungoverned space, but organizations like isil can thrive in. >> okay. and of course, you're naturally not wishing to tread into the territory of the foreign commonwealth office, but never the less, i would return to the document, written evidence you gave us and the two of which i say are sensible that the other

one which is defeating isil, which i regard as unrealistic rather than containing it and in that document, under that practical objective, you say the following. we have been clear that the syria conflict can only be resolved through a political segment that brings together the moderate opposition and element of the regime. the sad cannot be a partner in the fight against isil and he must step down. do you really regard that as a practical possibility? given the support for assad by iran and ultimately by russia?

>> i think assad has become such a devicive figure that it is almost impossible to imagine they put forth the settlement if he is still on the stage. >> but isn't it also impossible to imagine the ukrainirai irani russians to accept --yánm >> such changes can happen. such a change happened in baghdad in september. >> isn't it possible to see the present aligning of forces in the region. of the thousand years of conflict and therefore, isn't it more sensible to recognize that

the best thing you can do in such a snake pit is to try and keep the lid u on things rather than imagining that there is some solution, which has alluded humanity. >> let simon comment on the 100 years of history comment. what i do know is that the current degree of tension between the sunnis and shias is really quite extreme. there have been long periods when the two communities have managed to live alongside each other reasonably well, so i would not accept your premise as it were that they must you know, automatically, inevitably be at each other's throats. >> we hear horrific figures, killed and wounded in syria. up to 200,000.

large proportion in the regimed forces. community is about 12 to 15% of syria. very important, a bit like the sunnis were under sudan. there is a real calling of military aged men. there are people within there who will -- kill majorities and come to an agreement. certain certainly, a lot of people are looking for this and -- in the future. political settlement in syria. you do find that the russians and iranian find it would be to their advantage if we work out what you have to illustrate the family. you begin to change. the balance of power between

some of the villages and the military aged men that you are doomed demographically to a position where you can't see a future. there is a represented government, sort of regime, al maliki was going that way. that is the place to turn the situation around. while at the same time, working on the other streams that might have at least convinced the regional players. there's no win win solution. there may be a no lose no lose, washington, who can come to some some way through this. i don't think we've killed enough people to think the same

way. >> the line of question, which is one shouldn't be talking about defeating in victory. win should be talking about in a sense, deescalating or using a sort of balance of power solution. and taking on board completely about the idea the idea that th adversarial communities have long periods where they're not killing each other. doesn't this suggest that instead of idealized solutions, a more sensible strategy is to recognize that one has to hold these communities in check and just prevent the more unpleasant manifestations on either side becoming to dominant. >> i would say for us, we don't use the word, destroy isil. we use the word defeat and part of that defeat is of course breaking away the -- nation. if you can remove the sunni

tribes, those who work in the moderate syrian opposition, but for a number of reasons, moved across through intimidation or inticement into the isil camp, so this is not a military one. it's removing the basis, the funding. attacking the cohesion of it as a movement. so, for us in the military, if somebody said destroy isil, i think we'd say i don't think that's right because based on political moves, the term dee feet for the military is very much a comprehensive approach through economics. politics. so that's how i would defend that expression. >> if assad is speculative had been overthrown, do you really believe that we have had a moderate representative government or would we not have

had another islamist regime talking over from another authoritariandictator? speculation. i think a lot would have depended on the timing. if assad had been overthrown quickly, i think at that stage in 2011, a moderate, reasonably moderate government would have stepped in. obviously, over time, the situation in syria has become more complex and in many ways, more radicalized. >> very good. diane. >> can i ask you about what we're actually doing in terms of training and equipping and those sorts of questions.-pppxyaé >> my understanding is and it comes largely from the evidence,

>> we're talking about finding ways of the evidence here, several hundred personnel probably integrated into the u.s.-led program to help the syrian moderates. we are doing things in jordan, we have been doing things in jordan for some time and lebanon for some time and there's money been spent since 2012, so there's a range of training and different types in different parts of the country surrounding as well as within the borders of modern iraq and themselves. we've got detail about that and will publish that. i'm interested command in control is also something that's going to happen. i think in a public perception, we're doing things just in kurdistan, which is why i mentioned this. the complications side of iranin

the ground. training the peshmerga, which is one thing and rest of these iraqi forces and arrangements, there must be a great difference and what are the points of trying the make that coherent process? >> been recently, this range of activities that may seem quite disparate is a different way of contributing to the same strategy, so, clearly, we're providing a particular form of training and provided a lot of equipment to the peshmerga. we're looking at certain niche training that we can provide to the iraqi security forces. at the same time, one of the objectives about strategy is to mitigate the consequences of what's happening. and and therefore, we have been

concerned about the potential pressure on jordan and lebanon. and therefore, the training there has a different purpose. it is to build up their resilience and we've set out in the memorandum, the sorts of things we're doing and in some cases, they've built upon sport for a long time. >> so, i think initially before the coalition had fully formed, it was essentially was working on a by lilateral bases and tha was where we saw things first, but i think now, it's very much a part of a national coalition endeavor. and the training, support we're providing is being requested by both the kurdish and the central iraqi governments. and what we are seeing and you asked about the difference about

the -- we're trying to limit those differences, we're trying to view this as a national program. you're probably aware that the americans see the establishment of four big training bases. or rather utilization of existing training bases across iraq. one of which will be b in erbil. as part of that, we see ourselves delivering a niche specialist training in the area, which is much needed particularly in -- and we're still scoping the exact nature of that, but we hope to have some concrete proposals in the coming days and we're also looking at through the american office for security operation in iraq, hope you'll be able to speak to when you go out to visit, where else we might be able to advance.

so, when you put that as the sort of contribution to a large scale venture and you lay on that, things we have been doing for a while with the kurds on both the -- puk side, i think that's an appropriate contribution, but importantly, it's demand-led, what we're not doing is force feeding training. we're delivering types of training these forces have asked for and need. and we're doing it in a coordinated fashion. and the osci, the american-led osci, the engine room for that coordination. >> i mean, some of the statements in the memorandum are about we indetend to do this. we are going to do a a lot of different things. there's a program presumably of application here, some of which will be dependent on iran.

can you give us some insight as to what the process of development is likely to be b? >> so, iraq, which is based around these four big bases, i think the americans are just moving into that format at scale. they've established a divisional headquarters in background that is survrounding that and envurig that at the time our trading is needed, we'll be out there to deliver it. i can't give you the numbers that are going to be part of that because we're still looking at sort of light and heavy options and that will be driven by the exact nature of the trade. you mentioned the syrian opposition program. certainly, we have given commitment to the u.s. that we wish to con tribute to that in a meaningful way, but therefore again, it's difficult for us to be specific about the numbers and timelines in which it might

deliver. >> in the public imagination, people will say all of a sudden, now, there are british troops appearing here, there and everywhere and if they come as a surprise, that won't be terribly helpful and the petter they understand the process, the better it will be. the previous iraqi army, there's a lot of talk about why it fell apart. 50,000 soldiers, corruption, whatever. i mean, you're going to have to work with militia. you're going to have to work with the fact that there are irg on the ground and for some time, decon flek of airplanes. how are we going to get a grip and make a ko hernt process out of a series of different groupings who are joined in the fight? >> so, i think that the again, this four big trading basedy, is going to be quite controlled. i think it's going to be very intentionally focused. a number of nations have signed up pledging their support to it.

and it's output is going to be the reconstitution of three divisionals of the iraqi army and that is quite formalized, quite structures, so you describe a situation which is quite haphazards in a different control. i don't think we envisioned that in a trading model the americans have put in place. >> are you going to have to incorporate people into that progress. seems to me there was a lot of weapons systems training, $2 billion or whatever by the americans by the time they left, in teaching them to use systems they were selling them, but there was no training of any degree in a sensible way. is that what we're trying to do instead of what we're seeing now? >> the emphasis is on collective training. in some cases, it's about bringing existent units out of the line and new recruits with existing soldiers and building

them into a more cohesive hold and batallion sized influence and putting them back into the line trained as a cohesive unit. >> the stuff we've been doing in jordan, on the border in lebanon, that continues in any event, so, are we going to pull iraqis out of iraq and train them in bretten again? >> the intention is to use the four bases. we looked at ideas of taking out the peshmerga or actually training them somewhere for example, jordan, using the existing. i think we've settled now on those four big bases in iraq. >> thank you very much. >> such an interesting subject. have a lot of colleagues to bring in -- has to leave us

at -- answers could be kept concise, that would be helpful. >> i only have one question, maybe substantive question. i think it's one that would be uppermost in the mind of great proportion of the british public and it is this. how can you, we, and the british parliament avoid the charge of mission creep as we embed troops with iraqi security forces to advise and assist. >> first of all, whatever we do has to be guided by the objectives that we set out in the first place. and i think in the discussion we've had so far, i think the committee gradually accepted that two of those objectives are fine. the questions, the middle one,

so, i think if we remain guided by the objectives, then we can avoid mission -- we have some pretty previce objectives here. we're not trying to create perfection in either iraq or syria. we've accepted, but certainly not trying to do that. so, i think that's the big assurance. >> so, if there was mission creep, that would be the direction of politicians here? >> it's the ministers to decide what objectives we seek to carry out and how we don't -- seeking to do so. >> thank you chairman. >> i'd like to go back to the issue of training. that mr. havard started to explore because you talked

about, you said that the counter ied scoping that you were doing and you hope to have some decisions in a few days. now, i gather we have been employing private companies to p r(t&háhp &hc% we've paid 250,000 for 18 peshmerga to have four weeks of training. why are we using a private company rather than british armed forces? >> well, that was a foreign office program designed to deliver very quick effect into a peshmerga on the back of a request by the peshmerga and as i say, that was a foreign office program. i think what i have described is something that is much more institutional, widespread and designed around a collective training, which is why our military counterexperts, we see very much a part of that.

>> okay, well, we had before that, provided the same course for the iraqi army, so it wasn't a sudden decision. we've done it once before. were you surprised that the peshmerga weren't asked to provide the training rather than foreign office going out to contract? >> i think that the use of contractualized support like that tied in a legitimate way to build capacity and when we look at the needs and requirements of the trade audience and that's when we decide how best to do it. it's also linked to our capabilities and how available they are to do it, but i certainly don't have a problem with the legitimacy of using private security companies. >> specific training. >> quite specific. predates it. the events in office.

>> they predate it. >> bilateral military engagement through the pool we've seen id. when they went to -- they had been training in background in certain areas. before collapse of the isf and looking for a part of that in our view to be non contentious then it moved up to -- this is now much more a considered response to the threat being met by an increase of iraqi government in which the peshmerga and the isf will be hopefully conducting a national defense security policy that's enabled by kurdish partners in a train and advise role. >> you say that the contract was left at least for the iraqi army training prior to the voting parliament. i went out there as the envoy

and we, this contract had been b running in baghdad. up in -- at the time. this counter id is something all armies need to have as a capability. >> if you recall, the idea was originally with the kurds because we, to use david pa line, an all iraq response. but my own understanding was that that was a part of our bilateral mill to mill engagement with the government. which we use in a number of areas to give ourselves influence and conduct conduct. >> that we do with a number of

countries around the world. it's not normally subject to parking lotment. >> so, you're saying we frequently use private military companies. >> we don't frequently use private military companies. ourselves -- in a fairly -- way as opposed to an institutional program of the sort, but just described. >> this was a foreign office contract, is that correct? >> we understand it was left with a foreign office, correct. >> who else would it be? if it wasn't defense then it wasn't the foreign office, who else could it be? >> one or other. >> so, we don't know whether it was a ministry of defense contract or a foreign office contract? >> it was a foreign office contract. >> this is none of us believe that what we, what you've described is unusual activity. it carries on elsewhere and

perhaps we haven't got the facts, but if you would like us to provide those to you -- >> please do because it would be useful to know that the foreign office is setting and letting military contracts. it would be extremely useful to know that. >> so, if we could then please ask perhaps these if we could get a full notes. the details. >> then can i move on to ask you how soon do you think that the iraqi forces will be able to carry out any significant attacks on mosul to regain mosul and will they be able to do that without -- >> in materials of iraqi forces activity, conducting offensive operations to relieve the refineries preparing for operations in eastern anbar

province and there are ongoing offensive operations being conducted by the iraqi forces, but you're right to highlight that there are some challenges. much bigger than that and it will take time before they are sufficiently capable of doing so. that's as much about as you describe building the capabilities of the military out of a number of year of deterioration. but it's also about the sectarian and ethnic balance, difficulties of being a shia, militia or armed force with a bankrupt reputation playing into a deeply sunni area and that's something the iraqi government will have to determine how best to do it. but it's quite clear that having a balanced, credible, non sectarian national armed force is at the heart of that. you'll also be aware that as

kings promote the national guard, that he sees as an important part of inclusive government and a way to overcome some of the sort of sectarian challenges that he experiences. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> will you accept the discussions so far this afternoon of themselves. ranging a degree of uncertainty about why we are doing things in iraq and also about the means of which we are trying to achieve them. >> is that helping the case two things, do not first of all indicate that it is if that's the case, what door do you set by the commitment in the house

of commons motion that we are looking for and there would be no kind of ground rule. in other words, if it is unclear how can we be certain there's no place for a search? >> it's uncertain why we're doing it, so i think -- >> we were discussing defeat isil and destroy isil. certainly an interesting discussion. written what we agreed to do, get rid of these dreadful people. >> no, which is why it's one of the objectives set out in the

strategy in the memorandum, it is to defeat isil. >> it is to defeat isil. in terms of the situation on the ground, ministers have been really clear that there is, there will be, they will not deploy british ground troops, british combat ground troops, but we're not saying this situation cannot be revolved without the use of ground forces. it is that in this sort of campaign, those ground forces are best provided by the iraqis. >> what we're currently doing would not be much more than containing. we certainly, we may not

ultimately defeat isil, certainly won't destroy them. say defeat them or destroy them is by some force ground war surged. our role to play for division strength invasion. >> first of all, i think one should be very weary about drawing parallels with what happened in the past. say 2006, 2007. it was a very different situation. and we do not believe that that sort of simple approach is the one that would work. which is why we have set out a strategy that has a number of strands and puts particular weight on the police strand, so from that point of view, i don't

think any sort of surge concept is very likely. the other factor that has to be brought in is that we were able to help the iraqi government maintain iraq's integrity and therefore, it is what the iraqi government wants that is the key and the iraqi government, they do not want large offers of western troops on their territory. >> of course that's the case right now. my question was simply one possible military strategy would be you know, significant ground war. significant troops on the ground. to which you said you don't think that's very likely. there are no -- in the future that you can consider the possibility of a ground war occurring. but you said you don't think it's very likely. well, afraid to say it's -- ahead of policy says ground war in iraq not very likely.

>> is it impossible? a bad thing to do? is it a rule for -- or not. now or in the future? >> as i said earlier, the prime minister, defense secretary as i've said we will not deploy. >> i know perfectly well. the question is whether or not -- for the motion. the question is whether or not we're going to do it. the question is whether or not it would be a military role or a reason for doing it. can you conceal reasons why that would be a good idea? >> the moment, i can't, because we have set out a strategy. in which we are providing specific and limited military support and military activities in support of that strategy. one aspect of which is enabling and equipping the iraqi forces in a way the rule has set out

so, no, i do not see it. >> what about the swrens? >> i think you know this. we absolutely agree that there is a need for grand operations. if you're to defeat isil. we believe it's the indigenous armed forces that should be conducting those and that's entirely the half of this. a very important part of what we do there is not making things worse by our actions. we have to be very, very clear of that. and we have to in many ways, air on the side of caution, so if you ask me whether or not i can contemplate it, i cannot. >> i am confident if we get the right confidence in baghdad -- largely conducted by the indigenous forces, enabled by technical training, we can defeat isil in iraq. no doubt about that at all. the key of course is to strip away from the isil leadership

and the fanatics and foreign fighters. the indigenous support and i think that's doable a, but that is a political aspect with the right circumstances politically, i have politically, i have no doubt what we can do will fulfill the capacity and embrace the militia and the franchise of disaffected sunni tribes and build on that. we could be back, but as i say, it does need the conditions set by the politics, that's why i say it's multifaceted, but the indigenous forces are quite capable in the right political circumstances of defeating isil in iraq, and thereby setting the conditions enabling them to defeat isil across the region, but it will take time. >> the committee will have to move. to conclude and wrap up the

essence, you have put a very, very large emphasis on a very modest account of the u.k.'s role. you have talked about it being a long, drawn-out process, the u.k. playing a small part. you said we have want used the word victory. we have never presetended we cod do it quickly, we're not doing it on our own. isn't there a serious risk that the more you talk like that, the less there's anybody in charge, the less there's anybody taking responsibility, waking up every morning and driving this through? because we have had evidence where people said, hey, not my game. that's the foreign office or that's going to be done or we think that's going to be done by the united states, or we're a small part of this. who is owning this? who in the british government is waking up every morning gripping this? >> first of all, just because we are one country that is contributing to a large international cooperation, a

coalition doesn't mean that we're not trying to do it very seriously. and i hope in the evidence we have given we have shown that we have thought about this in a comprehensive way. that we see a number of activities which are mutually supported and the military activities are very much calibrated and synchronized to support them, but that doesn't mean we're not taking them seriously. it gets very high-level attention in government all the time. this is very much an area that is under the watchful eye of the national security council. and the national security council is the primary organ that brings together the contributions of the different departments, so we work very closely together under, as i said, that sort of oversight. >> so peter, just to take you at your word that you're doing this very seriously, it's difficult for the public to see this.

this is a situation in iraq and syria which is presented to us by you as being one of the most dangerous situations the united kingdom has faced for two decades. more dangerous than the situations potentially we faced in afghanistan, yet the resources committed to it are minimal. we put 10 billion pounds into afghanistan, and when we look at through what you have put down on paper of your commitments and resources on the ground, we see you boasted of the fact you're putting 1 million pounds into jordan. that's not 1% of the resources, it's 0.01% of the resources we would normally put into this. so there seems to be a huge mismatch between us talking about this an existential threat to security and the government and the actual resources going in on the ground. 14 machine guns, 1 million

pounds into jordan. 14 people deployed in training. one assistant defense secretary. i understand this isn't a surge, not 150,000 people, but surely, if we were really serious, we would be having much larger teams. much more investment, much more focus, it's all well the foreign minister is putting his time in, but where are the resources? how can we believe you're serious if we don't see the resources? >> i don't think this is the sort of strategy or campaign where one should take the simple approach to the resources. this isn't a problem that one can solve just by throwing enormous amounts of manpower and money at it. it is a very complicated situation, as we described, we're seeking to work with the government of iraq in particular and also with other governments, so what we are providing is very often relatively loose support where we know we can add value,

and as the messenger said, we don't run the risk of making things worse. i think this is very much an area where you should be judging what we do not by simple quantitative metrics but by the quality and the precision of what we're offering. >> i would argue that it's going to be very, very difficult for us to judge this at all because you say we shouldn't judge it by resources but at the same time you're saying we're part of a broader coalition. and you're claiming credit for inclusion in the iraqi government and it's difficult for us to say that britain played much role in it as opposed to the united states, iwron ir iran, or any other player. >> i wouldn't say that we claim credit for everything that has happened. but we are a participant in a broad coalition, and we are contributing. and that's what we should not

expect to be doing everything. it would be inappropriate to do everything. >> perhaps we could ask you to put on paper a statement of how you would expect to be measured. how we can really judge the seriousness. it's not going to be by resources. how do we know if you're really leaning into this? how do we really sense if this is a priority? how do we really get the sense of that, if that's not something you can do today, perhaps on paper to give us a sense of that. >> well, i would hope you would have a sense of it from the range of things we're doing, which, as i said, are all designed to contribute and support the various strands of the strategy. >> okay. well, that brings the public session to a conclusion. we're now moving to a private session. if the public could please leave

the room and if the witnesses could please stay. thank you. >> this week on prime minister's questions, british prime minister david cameron paid tribute to the embassy staff in kabul, who were recently killed in an attack. he also took questions from members on the u.k.'s national economy, the national health service, and immigration policy. prime minister's questions airedandy night at 9:00 p.m. on c-span. here are some of the programs you'll find this weekend on the c-span networks. saturday at 11:00 a.m. eastern on c-span, live coverage of the memorial service for former washington, d.c. mayor marion barry, and sunday at 8:00, ann compton, who recently retired after 40 years of abc news white

house correspondent. saturday night at 10:00 on book tv on c-span2, university of new hampshire assistant professor on how the northeast u.s. wasn't always the haven of racial equality and supportive of african-american civil rights. and sunday at noon, our live three-hour conversation with author and american enterprise president arthur brooks with your phone calls, e-mails, and tweets. and c-span3 saturday night at 8:00 on lectures on history, martha jones on female slaves and law. and sunday at 8:00 on the presidency, president george h.w. bush's former secretary of state on the fall of the berlin wall and the liberation of eastern yoeurope. find our complete question and let us know what you think about the programs you're watching. call us, e-mail us, or send us a twe

tweet. join the c-span conversation. - like us on facebook, follow us on twitter. with live coverage of the u.s. house on c-span, and the senate on c-span2, here on c-span3 we complement that by showing you the most relevant congressional hearings and on weekends, c-span3 home to american history tv with programs that tell our nation's story including six unique stories, the civil war's history, american artifacts, touring museums and his toring sites to reveal america's past, history's bookshelves, the presidency, looking at the policies and legacies of the nation's commanders in chief, legends in history. and our new series, reel america, featuring archival films through the '30s to the '70s. c-span3 created by the cable tv industry and funded by your

local cable or satellite provider. watch us in hd, like us on facebook, and follow us on twitter. tonight on c-span3, american history tv, a look at u.s. strategy in the vietnam war. then author donald miller on how new york became the country's cultural capital in the 1920s. writer elizabeth hoffman discusses the history of u.s. foreign policy, and later, a look at james madison's role in creating the constitution. next on american history tv, colonel gregory daddis discusses u.s. military strategy during the vietnam war, featuring on william westmoreland, he argues that the general's ideas were sound, but an inability to i implement them led to failures in south vietnam. itn