-- out of thee digital realm into the physical world. it was unique, designed to increase and slow the speed of the centrifuges. while it was doing that, it also did this remarkable trick which was to make the operators at the plant think that the operations were perfectly normal. it recorded normal activity on the computer's first and played back that normal activity to the monitoring machines. >> monday night at 8:00 eastern on "the communicators" on c-span2. presidency,he president george h.w. bush's secretary of state, james baker and brent snow croft talk about the 1989 fall of the berlin wall and american involvement in eastern europe's liberation. this event was hosted by the bush school of government and

public service in texas. you.lcome to all of we've done this sort of thing before. i will ask you questions and you will say whatever you don well please. we are very honored to have you the as we commemorate historic 25th anniversary of the fall of the wall and the opening of eastern europe. when did you feel certain that the wall would fall even if you didn't know when? what was that moment when you were sure? >> i'm not sure i could pinpoint a moment. as far as i was concerned, it came as somewhat of a surprise that it happened so quickly. we did know things were moving in that direction.

a lot of east germans were going to hungary and then hungary was letting them go through to austria. so the wall had been circumvented, not breached, perhaps. it looked like things were going in that direction. gorbachev had gone to berlin in early october and said the policy for east germany was set in berlin, not moscow. they were willing to cut him loose, they were not going to use their army to maintain their empire in force to eastern europe with respect to the gdr. i think those events led me to think that it was possible that

it was coming but we did not get a sense that it would happen when it did. >> i would say there was one event in a series. when we came to office, there was a ferment in eastern yufrp. -- eastern europe. we looked at that ferment and said, we want to make it different than the other ones. we want to encourage it. but at a level underneath that that would cause the soviets to crack down as they did before. we didn't know what that level was. what we tried to do was encourage the kind of freedom attitude without stirring up the soviet union.

so the wall was -- the wall was vacationers going over to hungary, to germany were all parts of this overall thing they had in mind. >> general, you touch on a very important point of calibrating our actions in a way that would produce the results that we sought but not lead to another soviet crack down. can you talk about your strategy towards gorbachev in particular, the soviets in general, the diplomacy that led to the outcome that we got? >> i can give you one specific example that illustrates it. when the wall was falling, we

didn't know exactly what was happening. and a press advisor said to the president, you need to go on television. we sort of hesitated for a while. then they brought the press corps in around the president's desk in the oval office. >> and you were all seated? >> no, it was crowded in there. anyway, the president described what we knew, it looked like the wall was opening but we weren't sure. and the first press question was you don't look elated. we thought you would want to jump or dance on the wall. he said, i'm not a dancing kind of person. [laughter] what he was trying to do was back us off so we didn't put

gorbachev in a hole he couldn't get out of. >> the president got a lot of flak. the press was saying, what's the matter with this guy? we've won a 40-year conflict here. we've been victorious and he doesn't show any emotion whatsoever. he doesn't show any sign of thing, whichsion is what the president used a call it. that is just one example. there were other examples. we had -- you know, no administration is uniform in their approach to the problems because the problems are complicated. we had some who want to be more , who waswith gorbachev more pessimistic about their chances with the informers.

the president and brent and i wanted to work with them because we thought they were genuine reformers. as it turned out, we were correct. and but by working with them and not sticking it in their eye when the wall came down at other times, we were able to go forward with german unification with the consent of the soviet union, or with acquiescence of the soviet union and the the acquiescence of the united kingdom and france. none of those countries were ecstatic about the idea of german unification. by handling it the way the president did, he was able to achieve that german unification within a very narrow window of opportunity. when we did,moved i'm not sure we could have achieved unification the way

that we did. >> right after the wall came down, gorbachev's attitude changed dramatically. he had been on our side because he was practicing perestroika and glastnost. he wasn't trying to redemocratize but he was trying to reinstill some sense of discipline and work ethic. so he was encouraging what was going on in eastern europe until the wall came down. >> talk about the diplomacy of the process. you touched on the reservations that thatcher had, gorbechev had. how did you handle those? >> we have always been a leader of the alliance.

the president, even as a new president, was the leader of the alliance. we were able to bring both france and the united kingdom over. the toughest nut was the soviet union. we came up with the concept of a two plus four negotiation. the two germany's would negotiate the internal aspects of unification and the occupying powers would negotiate the external aspects. it worked. it worked pretty darn well. you know, in the final analysis, the soviet union acquiesced because they didn't have a lot

of alternatives, and i'm conscious of the fact that in germany will testify to this, the republic of germany gave the soviets 55 billion deutsche marks which didn't hurt helping to get their acquiescence in german unification. there were a lot of obstacles on the way to get there. it really tested diplomacy led by the president and taking advantage of a narrow opportunity and getting it done. some people were against unification but our position was, wait a minute, we have been talking about this for 40 years. now we have a chance to try to implement it. you mean you're not going to do that? >> one part of this where jim and i disagreed and he turned out to be right. and that's the 2 plus 4. i understand that's the two germany's.

the plus four were the occupying powers. but for me, three of the four didn't want german unification. i think margaret thatcher said, i like germany so much, i think there ought to be two of them. [laughter] risks but weme needed to go ahead and it worked. >> margaret thatcher's national security advisor tells the story about having gone to a meeting between cole and thatcher. after they came out, she said, charles, he's just so german. [laughter] >> let's talk for a moment about someone who is "so german" in the best sense of the word. the one who represented the

west, chancellor cole. how would you evaluate his role in the run-up to the moment of and the aftermath of the fall of the wall? >> if chancellor cole and president bush hasn't been on the same wavelength, german unification would never have happened. those two individuals more than anybody else made it happen. we had the reluctance of france, the u.k., and the soviet union. chancellor cole came to camp david in february of 1990. right? >> that's right. >> we had sort of a coming to jesus session. he said, i want your help in unification.

he said, fine, you're all for it. and we want to know from you you're not interested in a neutral germany in the heart of europe and you're not interested in a germany leaning eastward. and you're going to support us in making sure that the unified germany is a member of the north atlantic treaty organization. he said, i will. both leaders lived up to it and got it done. >> one of the things that we were really worried about in this whole thing was gorbachev promised cole reunification. because it would have been tempting. they never really did promise. i don't think cole would have done it anyway because he had a scheme for reunification. he explained it to the president, the president said, go for it.

>> you both made the point that although you could not predict the moment, you could see the process. again, the gorbachev meeting made it pretty clear to the world. did you have any nightmare moments in the run-up to this that you could see something going terribly wrong, something that could not only undermine the reunification process but endanger world security? >> i remember one incident in which the soviet foreign minister who, by the way, was leaning probably forward for peace and cooperation with the west than gorbachev, even.

i remember one session, it may have been in germany. it may have been in some other capital, some other country. where he started parroting his talking points. he was getting a lot of heat at home. there was a big tug-of-war going on within the soviet union. the military and the intelligence apparatus thought that gorbachev and the foreign minister were selling the country out and so forth. particularly the foreign minister was under a lot of pressure. i remember this meeting on german unification. and what he said there at the table was so different than what we had heard before. i thought, uh-oh, this whole thing has been knocked into a -- we're not going get it done. that was one incident that i could remember very well. >> we had a strategy.

we were generally confident it would work. we didn't know how long. when we came in to office, there was a ferment in east germany. up until then, the u.s. policy toward the satellites, eastern europe, had been, we tried to help them cozy up to those making the most trouble for the soviet union. so our friend this morning, romania, romania, josh escue was our favorite. because they were always probing the soviet union. when we came in, we said, no, that's not the right measure. we're trying to liberalize. romania went from the top right down to the bottom. poland went to the top because

were trying to change their system. we had a general sense of where we wanted to go and how. but there were lots of parallels that we weren't sure would work. >> it was such a sensitive topic at the beginning that there was some debate and reluctance to use the word "unification." friend will remember that. i'm trying to remember what we called it for a little while. some different name. >> no, we wanted to stay away from that. again, because we didn't want much of thrown out. gorbachev't want thrown out. there was a coup later on. it was too late. >> you spent a lot of time with

him before and after that period. i recall you were out shooting sheep with him in mongolia. >> no, he wasn't shooting sheep. [laughter] i didn't say i wasn't shooting sheep. ask you again -- again?d you say that >> the fact of the matter is, i wasn't shooting sheep, because the national security advisor we had at that time leaked it to "the washington post" that i wanted to hunt sheep and they wouldn't let me do it. > the opening phase of desert storm, you were doing something in mongolia. >> we were negotiating the security.

bob dole, secretary of state for clerical affairs. he said, we're worried about what intelligence is reporting to us about iraqi troops on the border of kuwait. and you might check with your interlocutor there to see what he knows about it. about that time, iraq was the client for the soviet union. i said, before we break for lunch, we have a report that saddam may be thinking of invading kuwait. and he said, oh, he would never be so foolish as to do that. you might want to check with the kgb because the cia tells us that the reports are genuine, a lot of troops out there. he said, i'll come back after lunch. no chance, he said, saddam would not be so foolish as to do that.

i fly off to mongolia and we break up. then he invades. and the foreign minister is so embarrassed that he agrees after the invasion to meet me in moscow and condemn the actions of the soviet client state. in my view, that's when the cold war ended, is when that happened. he did that, by the way, without gorbachev's ok. and without if ok of the arabist in his foreign ministry which is what i meant by leaning further forward. >> that was the essence of the question i was going to ask, whether you believe that the way you and the president handled the soviet union at the time of german unification, the way you

handled reunification itself, whether that had an impact with the ability less than a year later to form an effective coalition to push saddam out of kuwait. >> i think it did. i really do believe that. but then you have to remember too, ryan, that we were the sole remaining super power. everybody wants to get closer to uncle whiskers. usehad a lot of moxie becas everybody wants to get closer to the united states. the early foreign policy issues in his administration made a difference in what we were able to do to pull together the coalition to kick iraq out of kuwait. >> let me, please -- >> ok, let me use that to fast forward. your friend and counterpart dr.

tolchek was asked this morning as we look at the current state of u.s.-german relations, what would he recommend? he had a great one-word answer -- talk. i would like to broaden that just a bit. as we look at the crisis in the middle east, the efforts of the administration to put together a coalition as you did to confront it regional and internationally. what do you think we need to do regionally and internationally to succeed against this new enemy? >> looking at me or him? >> i know you are going to try to dodge this, sir, so i'm looking at you. >> i'm not going to dodge it at all. i tell you what, in my view we need to do.

i applaud the idea -- the administration's effort to put together a broad based coalition. that's great. that is what we did in the first gulf war. our coalition had muscle and the members contributed and contributed substantially. many contributed troops. we even happened egyptian troops, syrian troops, saudi troops, you name it. not to mention 500,000 american troops. in my view, you're not going to win the war from the air. i don't see how you hold territory from the air. how are you going to get boots on the ground? you have to have them. yes, we're sending more special ops forces in, that's really good to guide the air strikes. where are the boots on the ground coming from that are going to take territory? i have serious doubts about whether that really can come from iraq, and as far as

moderate syrian options, i think most of them are in the salons of london and paris. i don't know if there is any such thing anymore. but where are the troops coming from? >> one thing that's clearly missing is talking -- talking to our friends. you mentioned telchek. i have a telephone on my desk. i pick it up. it rang on his desk. we used to talk almost every single day. same with the other allies. we tried to get it with the soviet union and we didn't. president bush called his counterparts around the world just to talk to them. what are their problems? what can we do to help, so on and so forth? so that our friends were willing to help us when we needed them

because they saw us and knew what we were after and so on. i don't think we have that kind of communication anymore. you don't draw them out. egypt has the troops on the ground. turkey does. they're not disposed to come to our help. >> i agree with what brent just said. and you know in that first gulf war, one of the strongest allies and biggest contributors was president ozal of turkey. turkey has been a 60-year ally of the united states and a nato member. one of the first things they do was cut off the oil pipeline from iraq through turkey. that cost turkey tremendously economically, but he did it. my solution for what it's worth is, why don't we really make an effort to see if we can convince the turks, ok?

the turks don't like isis. no country i know wants to abide a continuing isis presence. the turks don't like assad. why don't we say we'll supply the logistics and the intelligence in the air and you supply the troops and we'll give you your butter zone, which is what he wants in syria? i mean that, to me, might solve this problem. i don't know any other regions that will do it. i don't support the idea of men and women on the ground in iraq and syria. >> i agree. one problem is the kurds, several different kinds of kurds.

and the kinds of kurds that are more or less at war with the turks are the ones in northern syria. so there are syrian kurds, turkish kurds and iraqi kurds. >> and iranian kurds. >> that complicates this, especially where the turks are concerned. >> that depth, breadth, and detail of understanding on a fairly arcane issue is why you were part of the best national security team in history. i mean that sincerely. i was a bit player at the time. let me ask the other dimension of that question.

what would you be saying to our european allies and particularly the germans at this time as we look not only at the unfolding crisis in the middle east, but as we look at a russia that 1 of -- a russia that obviously is very different than the russia you dealt with and the problem of ukraine. what should we be saying? what kind of dialogue should we be having, what types of policy should we be proposing with our european friends starting with the germans? >> i think we're having those conversations. that's why we've instituted some multilateral sanctions. the ruble is in the tank. a lot of that is due to the drop of the price of oil because the russian economy so dependent on that commodity.

we're having those conversations with the german leadership. what's happened there -- i don't think we have to convince the germans or our other european allies -- that what has happened consistent with any concept of a stable world order. if you don't like what's going on next door, you can't just roll the tanks, you can. but if you do, there ought to be consequences. >> i think, again, one of the problems is we're talking to europeans, but i don't think we're talking enough -- we had problems with snowden, especially with germany. and it turned out that the

recording we got of chancellor merkel talking was from our embassy. that's not -- you know, those types of things we can do more of to really understand each other and why we're doing this and what -- you can't just call and say hey, we want to invade here, will you help us. you have to show what we are going to do, how we are going to do it. so i'm not sure we're spending enough time doing it. >> i agree with that. we are talking about sanctions. so far, that's worked a little bit. >> i wish we could continue this incredible dialogue. time is finite. we have all been privileged to whoonly listen to the men were witnesses to a most critical period and world

history, but who helped the president of the united states shape that history. thank you both very much. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> every sunday at 8:00 and fromght, you can learn leading historians about presidents and first ladies, their policies and legacies, here on the presidency. to watch our programs or visit our tv schedule, visit www.c-span.org. you are watching american history tv. all weekend every weekend on c-span3.

>> american history tv is joining our time warner cable partners to showcase the history of waco, texas. to learn more about the cities on our tour, visit www.c-span.org. we continue now with our look at the history of waco. this is american history tv on c-span3. >> it is hard to imagine an essentially modern-day town where our grandparents or great-grandparents could have lived -- it wasn't that long ago -- where something like this could take place. events spectacle lynchings. they took place mostly in the late 19th century and early 20th century. one of the interesting aspects of this horrendous lynching is that it didn't occur at some little backwoods