those, there's a trade aif between flexibility and transparency and clarity. and so things to think about. another component that could be in an aumf is a geographic limitation. where can force be -- where may force be used? where should be e force be used. and so the current 2001 aumf gave authority, essentially, had no geographic limits. had no certainly other provisions of international law that limit your ablt to use it. but, within the statute itsz, no limitation mpblt e. and you could have a time limit on any aumf. the current the e 2001 and umf to 2002 iraq aumf. neert contains a time limit. glooinchts

glooinchtsds. certainly there could be a future statute, mr. e whether there's sunset clause or a re-examination. that's kind of a coverage of the domestic legal basis for using force that i look at as a military lawyer when i advise my cliebtsds. we also pay very close attention to the use of force within the conflict itself. what we would call yugs use in bellow. irt's not just what law gets you into conflict in the first place or aut rihorizes you to be in conflict in the first place. but also, what authorizes that conflict it. also, we're very involved with drafting concise and clear rules of engagemented so that that he has e those operators who do go to combat terrorism know what their left and e and right limits are. they know what they're

authorized to do. they understand the limits of their authority to act so that commanders at the operational level and operators and the troops that we send out to do these missions understand when they can use force and when they can't. and those would become very, very critical. and then, included within rules of engagement, obviously, we have to make clear policy on things as wide ranging as detainee operations when we can detain, whom we can detain and for how long we can hold them in the conditions underwhich they're held. we have to have clear policy in place in our orders that we direct, send down to the combatant commands for them to go out and take on terrorism. all of them are critical roles of military lawyers, certainly at my level and the joint staff and so forth. now, even operationally and ta tactically, there are military lawyers involved in counter terrorism operations and that

provide a critical role, as well. we have military lawyers who review operational plans. and they review in the drafting of those plans and helping operators and commanders think through who they're going to take on these missions to combat terrorism in order to make those operations legal. and to keep them within the authorities that they have. we have military lawyers dra drafting supplemental rules of engagement. as we pass down rules of engagement there our level down to the soldiers's, the commanders in the field, then lawyers look at that and say what else do i need? what other authority do i need. what clarifications on these rules of engagement are necessary for us to do our mission. so we'll often have lawyers at the operational, tactical level come back to us and ask for supplemental rules of engagement. we have military lawyers reviewing the techniques, tactics and procedures that are in use out in the field. all the policy and all the rules of engagemented in the world

aren't good, are worth anything if they're not doing things that comply with those. so you have military leaders who comply and insist commanders are doing the right things. we have military lawyers briefing and training rules of o engagement. we found that it's critical not to just throw up a power point slide and say here's your rules of engagement. i hope you remember them a month from now when you're in afghanistan. that just doesn't work. and the closer you can replicate come bats conditions and training and test and train those rules of engagement, the better those some jers will be able to protect their own lives and do the right thing. and then, of course, when there are civilian casualties that right-hand turn included in the

rules of engagement, when there are situations that require an i believe investigation in the afterman when things haven't necessarily gone the way they should have. so there are military lawyers involved all up and down the chain in helpi ining commanders operators fight terrorism. i've talked a lot about lawyers. because i am a lawyer and, you know, that's the focus of what i do. but i think it's important that we shift as a panel back to the operators. back to the service members, the troops, who are out in the field risking their lives every day to combat terrorism. that's really where i think we need to focus the bulk of our time here today that. 's what's important. i'm very much looking forward to the dialogue. i'm looking forward to my panelists comments and i look forward to, if there are already questions, yona said i can take a few questions nand now and i'l

be around for the rest of the panel, as well. [ applause ] >> some questions? >> absolutely. you're in charge. >> let's limit it to six questions. six or less. >> okay. go ahead. >> no speeches. >> no speeches, just questions. >> sir, george michaelson, policy consultant for counter terrorism and special operations. you talked about statutes and everything else. a former dni, a couple of years ago, mentioned we've got title ten to e that mentions the military. we've got title 50 that measures the agency, different rules and restrictions about the need for a h a title 60. can you speak to that? >> first of all, i've had people say hey, can you bring title ten down to my office? and if you're a lawyer, you know that hitle ten is enormous. title ten covers everything from the salary of a second lieutenant to the authority the

secretary of defense has to run the department. it's an enormous. it's often used as code words for title 10 is the authority that the military has to conduct operations and hitle 50 is the authority that other agencies have to conduct covert action. so i think there's -- there's clear roles and responsibleties for the military, clear roles and responsibleties for the intelligence community and others. and i think there's a value there to keep in those roles and responsibleties careerer. and there are certainly times when we all work together. the interange e agency, plr e particularly since 9/ 11 has gotten very, very good at working together. but i don't see a need to merge those. when the military acts, we act under the law of our conneflict under hitle ten of domestic law. mergers might not guilrez e rer those critical distinctions.

>> thank you. >> i understood the law in the war apply if and only if the combatants were recognized as such. that is if one party either takes off their uniform or does not put one on, they forfeit their rights under the geneva convention and generally understood the laws of war. is that still the case? well, it actually never was. that's some of the mythos of the geneva conventions. the first thing is we have the law of armed conflict governs our actions. we were in international armed conflict and non-international armed con flikt. so there are a set of law with each of those types of conflicts. irrespective of how we determine whether it's an international or

a non-international armed con flikt. i think what you're speaking of is do certain combatants get certain protections that you would have as a uniformed armed soldier under the law of armed conflict. do you get p.o.w., prisoner of war status. do you get combatant immunity. it's a case-by-case basis. you ever to look at the facts. typically, if you're not fighting and complying with the geneva conventions, complying with what's required under the law of armed conflict, you're clearly in civilian clothes, then you probably won't have combat tant community and you won't be treated as a prisoner. but we treat everybody. we go in as a policy matter assuming that we're going to treat everybody as -- and then we sort it out as we go. yes, ma'am. >> thank you. to polish embassy. two quick questions.

first of all, we see bits and pieces in the press about the discussion between the congress and the white house with all the new au, how do you call it, aumf, exactly. what's your feelings now about that? do you need e need anyone while you're combatting isis and what the process is? that's the first question. and the second one, about the air strikes in syria. iraq is quiet clear, but syria might have -- yeah, i don't understand. >> so the first part of your question is do you e we need a new aumf. the president has determined he has the authority for the actions taken against isil in both iraq and syria under the current 2001 and 2002 aumf under international law. so he's determined that there's a war powers resolution that's following available on line and kind of lays that out and then i believe there's a letter from

doctor -- from samantha powers to the u.n. stating our basis for use of force and a report under article 51 of the u.n. charter. so those documents are out there and i refer you to those. for the international legal basis of our actions in iraq, we're using the collective self defense of iraq. we've had the request of iraq, obviously, so we have the consent there. and so there's self defense plus the consent of iraq. we've got the 2001 and 2200 arksz22002 aumf. yes, sir? >> yes, mike kraft. in 30 some years, i've been dealing with terrorism, the use of armed drones and should we say inknow vablgs e vagss. could you describe the rule of the jags and tar getting

information with the krchc.i.a. determining the limiting of tar gets and limiting of collateral damage. >> what i can address is the role of jags and d.o.d. operations. the first thing i would tell you is that a drone is a weapons platform. it's no different than an f-16. in fact, often, the video di display of a particular weapons system, which e whether it was manned or unmanned, it would mean that the pilot's 20,000 feet overhead or 20,000 miles away. it's a weapons platform. i say that not to be clever or cute, but it does make a difference in the analysis as you look at it. and so as we see more and more that there are jags involved irrespective of the platform. i had a congressman ask one time how many lawyers, military lawyers, review this before it gets to the white house. and i think i said five as i sat there and counted them up.

but you have at the operational level, you have lawyers looking at the operational plans, at the targeting data. and all the various things. and that goes up in a package for approval. then you have as it goes up through the layers, you have the combat tant command. so you have a colonel, either an africon or a sencom. and then it goes through my office, and i look at it. and then it goes through the general counsel for the department of defense and his attorneys and he looks at it personally. so multiple layers of legal review as well as policy review operational review and commander review. so there's kietquite a bit of skroo skrutskru scrutiny on those type of packets. yes, sir? >> i'm on the advise rid board for terrorism research. i had a question.

in actual operational situations, who may decide that a person may be detained and how common is it that that decision is reviewed by somebody other than the first person who decides to detain someone? >> typically, let's say afghanistan or iraq, let's start there. so typically, it will literally be the senior person at whatever level of command is involved in the operation. so it may be the squad leader, if it's a squad out. and they encounter an individual to detain. and then it would be the squad leader who mike e might make that decision. it mielgts be a platoon leader. it might be a kpaeb. company. it just depends on who's the highest ranking person there. although the decision literally might be on the soldier or the marine. so the first point that that raises, thank you again for

raising it, is that, you know, we've got to make sure that we've given them clear rules of engagemented. and they've been trained on that. they know who they can detain and whom they shouldn't detanl. and so they know their rules. they know when to detain and when to release. and so the other thing is it's temporal. so if somebody detains somebody, then certainly the next level of command is that they can ae say okay, that person needs to be released right now. or they've screened them and determined that they're not a threat, they're not a combatant or an enemy and so they release them. there's almost continuous review to make sure we're continuing to detain only when when he should e should. and then if not, that i had're transferred to, in some cases, in afghanistan they'd be transferred to the afghan government. they might be released through the international committee of the red cross and so forth. we've got almost a constant review i would say, not a formal

review but an informal. and then we have formal reviews that go on as they get into the theater in a place like iraq. is that a hook or a question, sir? >> question. >> and i hope it's not a hook. you know, i heard you, general gross, and, once again, i'm enormously impressed. two inc. thisethings, operatorse lawyers. my second point is a profound shame as to the world that does not realize how important lawyers are or how important law is. i used to be chairman of the aba. the moest impressive were the jg generals. >> i do take opportunities to

speak at places and to share, you know. we do care very passionately about the law. we care very passionately about doing the right thing. here's how you get away with something that's wrong. it's not what we did. our job is to say to the commander, hey, sir, hey, man, you can't do this. but here's another way to do what you want to do that is legal. that is et k58. that is moral. and we're not their ethical and moral advisors in a sense, but we had this perspective. my hitle is legal counsel. i've been blessed with clients who are willing to take that council. fit's counsel, if it's just here's some thoughts that aren't

legal, then i recognize and they recognize it's one opinion among many. but it's a perspective from somebody who thinks about these issues. >> thank you very much. >> our next speaker is dave responsibleties who works with us here. he's got a long and distinguished background, principally in logistics and what that means. but what e when you real isle eely understand what logistics is all about, there's no more

important aspect in operations. i worried about two things. who was going to run the 18 dhield care centers back on the basis. the warriors took care of everything else. but dave has probably as much experience in dealing with any american in dealing with the tribal chiefs and all of that in iraq. i think you'll find what he has to say very, very interesting. >> always dangerous to follow a lawyer. in dealing with this topic, there are rules that guide what

the military can do. and then there are perceptions what the american people, what the military, should do. also, what's remembered is that there are limits to what the military is able to do. both there a capability stand point and from the vantage point of what is required to be accomplished. enthusiasm is not a capability. the military does possess a wide array of skill sets. simply, when given a mission, the military puts a single

person in charge and focuses on mission accomplishment. anything short of this is failure. the complex issues of declaring war on terrorists, offensive or defensive oplations. are all factors that need to be carefully considered. most feel that the preemption is relative.

this is expensive and difficult. our military forces lay on the ground to shape behavior and gain insight that could do harm to the u.s. or do we watch engaging country y which just happens to be engaging in country x. when do we act? and if the actions are conducted too late, the average american will ask you knew about this and you didn't stop it because of -- you fill in the blank. there is lastly the unwanted imagery. our nation should be aware of deceptions. there is a delicate balance

between assisting and a military being perceived as the emperor's force. and this balance is timeless. there also a knee jerk reaction. but common cause is a willing coalition to put together at times. whether the military is the right or wrong approach, i'd reich to offer a thought relative to the fiber of the young men and women who are performing these tasks. we have an all-volunteer, all-recruited force. in dealing with terrorists, the high visibility forces gained attention in the news media with high profile rates. they are superb.

there are simply not enough of these forces. they are superb, also. they need no training and demonstrate care and compassion. this can be articulated by state department generals. by the impact via example and demonstration of righteousness is powerful and lagsing.

our young men and women will never let us down. this applies to the applicability of skills that are potentially priceless in taking the fight to the terrorist and creating the most robust tool set possible. thank you very much for the inviet today. >> as i mentioned, we had the one seminar yesterday from the biodefense. and, again and again, the role of the military became so critical. i mean, we talked about the civilian, but can you make any comments on that?

for example, and the present ebola situation. and, also, in general, the weapons of mass destruction, how the military is prepared to respond to such an attack. >> yes, thank you. first of all, the military responding, sometimes, it's the only entity that can get there the most and the quickest. that's a unique capability. and that's tapped by our national command authorities for those reasons. the ebola case is an instance where i think we leveraged the military capability and the train i traini training along with some of the inter anyonen sill on board.

once again, that's one of those capableties for the sbant response. but i want to go back across the interagency. obviously, that's been highlighted since 9/11. that's critical. we still see instances where sometimes intelligence is not shared properly. that could be firewalls and just clearances as much as anything else. we'll get better. we continue, probably, and will need to get better on those lines. but it's those catastrophic threats, ebola, that some people consider one of those things. or the wmd that we are going to need a capability be it inside or outside conus, where the military will respond. i know the marine corps has a force called the c force, that's deployed in support of the olympics and several other things.

those capableties are tapped in a defensive mode. not offensive, obviously. and those walls that govern all of those things. the military can just do it sometimes and that's why they're asking. >> dr. wallace? >> general, i think you put your thing on everything. i mean, you've explained the milita military, the american military, tremendous capacity and all sorts in every variety. to me, the question is this. should it be our military or someone else's? and i see a total dilemma. what the u.s. military has is probably unparalleled in history. but the fact that we had that may not necessarily work that well in some parts of the world where, as you suggested yourself, we're not loved.

the short answer is we'll train them up. but i do think that is a key issue. but what i saw in iraq, and i think most of us have seen everywhere, they might not like a country. but when you put that person on the ground, they relate. our corporals, our lieutenants, that's where our message needs to be. and i don't -- i would offer

that we don't try to overcontrol or oversupervise that. we let our young men and women be themselves and they will never let us down. i watched that time and time again. they were absolutely superb. notwithstanding, sometimes, it's better not to put aist face there for whatever reason. for fear of being grabbed, a thousand things. and there's where our allies can be far better at this game than we will ever be. there was one in the back? p.k.? >> jentle men, you raised the issue of mass destruction. we have exactly one case, the aq con network, where we've seen now the government operates. no u.s. military forces were involved. the department of defense didn't know about it. et cetera. et cetera.

as a matter of policy, do we want to be able to have the kind of teams necessary to do that sort of takedown? >> way above my pay grade. those on the ground looking in their own neighborhood. we all grew up in different neighborhoods. we all knew what was going on in that neighborhood. woe all knew who the good and the bad kids were. when bad kids did stuff, hopefully, somebody turned them in and parents took care of things. what i witnessed in iraq was the locals knew exactly who was in the area. now, the leverage that those bad actors put on the locals not to talk, and that's an issue that you can only appreciate if you live in their shoes. or, potentially, if you come from a very bad neighborhood in our country.

that's something that might sound all too easy. we'll just tell on them. it doesn't work that way. that's too simple. the sbel side and the alignment with allies and potential u.s., we're going to get that sbel. and, mope e hopefully, we'll get it before we have to do what you've got to. [ applause ]

he retired from the naval reserve as a captain. as you know, he was the boss of manpower in the penalty gone. that controls about 70% of the pentagon's budget. he's a distinguished author who has ed itted or helped with over 20 books or probably a hundred articles in the like. i can go on and on and and you'll find him very interesting. >> got any red skskin fans here?

bruce allen was the general manager and susan rice. guess who was dan snyder. obama. and then, of course, if you follow it, carter is coy. so, anyway. let me kind of put this in poer spective. we're talking about combatting terrorism. terrorism is about an attack. you have to say which groups are you going after. and i think this is how we got ourselves into trouble after 9/11.

we started the war on terrorism, but we've got to combat terrorism. you're never going to win. you know what's interesting, i was talking to someone in the f.b.i. when i was on cnn the other day and he said we still have neonagnanazis. hitler is dead. you're never going to get rid of it. the other thing is, yes, the generals of talk are out, we have a lot of challenges, but we don't have an existential threat. okay? in other words, i hope iraq turns out well. if it duchbt, not the end of the world. now, during the kolgd war, you had an existential threat. i came on active cue i duty right at the time of the cuban

missile crisis. and we were lucky. we had something like 600,000 soldiers or marines in florida getting ready to go to cuba. and the soviets had delegated to the on-scene commander, the authority to fire nuclear weapons if we invaded. and we came very, very close. fortunately, you know, we got out. i think that's important to keep in mind. and it's already been mentioned here, yes, the military is important. but it's not the only thing. all the tools have to be there. and, for years, i've argued we ought to have a unified national security budget. you tell me how much you we believe the e want to spend on the pent gob, gone, state, homeland security. you come up with the amount and let me see if we can allocate it better. okay. so in terms of do we need more soldiers or do we need more aid workers or whatever it might be. do will want to buy a new weapons system or do we want to provide aide.

i think that's important. when we've done that, i'm not saying the fence is too high or too low. you tell me. you give me what's in your budget and i can tell you how to spend it better. what you have to do is undermine the etiology. now, if the military degrades them, undermines their narrative, yeah, that helps. you've got people who are going to buy that etiology for whatever, you know, whatever reason because their lives are terrible. they've not getting the opportunities, you know, that they want. look at all of the folks that are going over there to fight with them. okay? some from our country, a lot from european countries. so i think, you know, we have to be careful. the other thing is, and it's already been mentioned here, we

can't do this by ourselves. because of the fact that they give us legitimacy. now, we're an exceptional nation. we're very good. but we're not per spect efect. we make mistakes. and we think when we go into a country, that, you know, we're going to be greeted as liberators. no, okay? i remember the first time i went to a rave, blumsfeld put a group of us together to evaluate the situation in the fall of 2003. and i was talking to this guy at sadham hussein university. he said do you know who else came? he said general mawr, the british. >> why did you say it again? >> i don't know, the president said it, i hoped somebody would have told him that. that's what you have to understand.

i remember when ifgs a kid in vietnam, one of my last jobs was to coordinate the air tactics. it's one of the scariest things i have ever done in my life. but anyway, so wurn day, we went over and we talked to him and we're coming back. we got lost. we're not even arnled. so i saw a sign there, my french was better then. i mean, i had gone to catholic schools and everything. and it said behave yourself because tonight you might meek e meet your maker in french. i said commander, let's go there. maybe they can give us directions. so we went in and the monks were really nice and they talked to us and my french was better. then we get back in the jeep and he said you guys talked a lo,

why? i said commander, i'll tole you what he said. he said why do you think you're foik to make out any better here than the french. i remember in 2004, with bill o'reilly, which is worse than going to combat. so anyway, we're on there and we're talking about coming up with bush's military service, you remember dan rather lost a job. so he said to me what difference do you think it would have made if bush and cheney had been in the military and gone to veet nap. and i said to him the same thing. they would have recognized you not going to be greeters, as liberators in these countries. okay? and it's tough on these young kids when they go there. they really want to do the right thing. but that's not how we're perceived, unfortunately, in many of these counsel ris.

you go on listening to the stuff and say my goodness. now, in fighting this war, in e which is going on one form or another since 9/1 and we're talking about the brave, young people and these kids are terrific. but let me tell you something. when we set up the volunteer military, people forget there were three components. number one a come par tiff etively small, active force because now owe oor if fo're going to have to pay people. you and i remember what we used to get. they said $200 a month, for, you know, things like that. so you have to pay a living wage. so their power is going to be exz pence ef. so you have to have a smaller, active force. then, as the general mentioned, you're going to have to have a garden reserve that's ready to go. i mean, up until we had a

volunteer military, the guard or reserves was a place to go to get away from home on the weekends. we weren't serious about it. but now you're going to be serious and be able to call you. and the third was draft registration. . we still register. people forget that. one of the things that i have to do when i was there was to persuade president reagan to keep it. he had campaigned against it. you know, libertarian and all of that, that type of thing. and one of the arguments i made was, look, you may have a prolonged conflict. and you want to be able to move on. all right. now, we did not do that at the height of the wars in iraq and afghanistan. to me, that was a flipping disgrags. and yes, we had great people. but do you know the army and the marines gave 80 x 000 moral raefers to give in? yes, you had great people. but look at some of them.

anybody know e know who private steech green is? he's serving a life imprisonmented now in a jail in kentucky, he had three misdemeanor convictions, was a high school dropout and had a personalitity disorder. while he was over there, he raped and killed a 14-year-old. he got life in prison. do you know how many people read the classified intelligence about the war in iraq? okay? before they voted.

remember, only members can read it. only members, okay. okay? 20 senators. the rest of them -- let me tell you, if you had conscription, they would have gone in and read that thing. i have not read it. obviously, i'm not a member. but i think, akoording to the chairman of the intelligence committee, he said if you read that, you'll know the case for going to war in iraq is somewhat shaky. so i think, you know, is this contingency, if this gets worth it? let's go and act vat this ele elective service system to get a stand -- crystal said get american people with skin in the grain. let me conclude with this. we talked about this fight and the climbing defense budget. let me tell you something, defense is spending plenty of money. in real terms, even with

sequestering, i'm talking about the base budget. do you know in the middle of the '70s in today's dollars where we were for a base bumgt? 350. we're at 500 billion. and, again, bob gates, he said, you know, you called me. everybody wants to talk to you on the way up, nobody wants to talk to you on the way down, you know. and he talked about how when he was on the joint staff, all of the money was flowing. we weren't worried. well, you've got to worry about the money. and, you know, the money is plentiful if you management right. now, we can sit down and tell you about the things that we need to do.

are they going to be done? are they hard, you know, to do? and i've got to tell you, one of the lobbies, everyone talks about lobbies in washington. let me tell you who, in my view, is one of the worst lob wills. that's moa. coyou know what admiral ryan makes who runs that thing? any idea? close to 700,0$700,00. whenever something comes up, oh, we're going to chak it. it's now a hundred per cent. chuck h arks gragel wanted to t down to 95. oh, you're taking veterans and this type of thing. and when he tried to say working-age retirees until you're of 62, they were dragging out enlisted and talking about them, not talking about the fact that these people, they were tired when they come in, it was

40% and they made it 50% and all of these other things. so it's tough, too. they said oh x you're hurting all veterans. how many enlisted ma leans retire? you guys are like running backs in football. you want the list of people in the infantry that don't retile in tire in high levels, either. so we need to do that. and, if we don't, and if we don't, because the budget may go up a little bit, but it's not going to go up a lot. the military who is going to be fighting this war on, you know, this battle against groups like isis. you're not going to have the resources. and then, of course, it's not going to map e matter. let me read you this. hereto we have a fact. sequestratioll kwequestration w department going unaddressed for

too long. i witnessed the emergence of a military and industrial congressional conquest. this system can now be said to be successful in only one respect. turning billions of taxpayer dollars into weapons systems that are con sis at the present timely delivered late, flawed and vastly overbudget if that is the systems are delivered at all. john mccain. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> something general reiss mentioned. as i understand it quite often, young cap paintains were thrown the role of acting i have e villages with national guard.

that's one of the non-kinetic roles of pent gone been forced to play. do you think it did it add kwetly. did it perhaps spend more resource to training people for this type of thing? it's not of the usual pattern. >> yeah, two things, one, a lot of people say, you know, why do you use the military if i need a person, an 5:00 ka agricultural specialist and i call up a e a.i.d., is someone going to have to volunteer? i can go to the reserves and say report to active duty. in other words, it's got to be something where people, you know, can get ahead if they don't proceed that, it's not going to -- it's not going to happen. nobody else, huh? yes, sir. professor.

>> this is what i get paid to do. to ask easy questions. our program, military and terrorism, i'm not going to say anything about the military. you know everything and more. a. on the terrorism side, the global war on terrorism, blah blah blah, you went on to say it's not existential comparing to the cold war. i think that's something someone wants to think about. of course it's not like the cold war. for one thing, these guys don't speak russian, they speak arabic. you have to look at the american side. morale is always a big issue. morale is the key. the morale of the american civilian, like me, we tend to be scaredy cats. we exaggerate the good and the bad. i think this is important. because this explains how -- it's certainly not the cold war. i think using the weaponry of the cold war is preposterous.

but we are going to rely on the military, because it's the instrument at hand, but i think what we think about what's happening i think is important. >> well, i don't disagree. but i think what you have to be careful of is when you decide, okay, are we going to send men and women into harm's way, okay? and is it worth -- you know, is it serious enough that we have to worry about it. and the other thing that i think is interesting. and you see it in the debates now. who is helping us in iraq right now? the iranians. okay? don't want to admit it. at the versailles conference there was a british academic, harold nicholson, and he told me something that was the first thing i learned in international politics, nations don't have permanent friends or enemies, they have permanent interests. there was a story in the paper, you know, yesterday, about them bombing with us.

on 9/11, i was working with new york. at the council on foreign relations. and i had this title, you know, vice president, director of studies, i'm only telling you that, because i got a call from the iranian ambassador. they're at the u.n. in new york. he said, i'd like you to come over for dinner and bring your scholars who work in our part of the world. so i went over for dinner. my son is still mad at me, it was during the yankees-red sox play-off game. so anyway, i went over -- late september, 2001. he said, look, we condemn the attacks of 9/11. they had a candlelight vigil, tehran. we hate the taliban. okay? we're willing to work with you, make sure your government knows that. okay. so we let condi rice know. i assume they already knew. according to ambassador dobbins, without the iranians, i wouldn't

have got in, because they had the northern alliance, they persuaded them to support karzai. january 2002, what happens? bush puts him on the axis of evil. the ambassador calls me up like, what the -- you know, no dinner this time, okay? and so when you talk about, you know, in other words, you've got to do the best that you can here. what i like to get rid of assad? sure. he fought with us in the first gulf war, remember that? syria was on our side. so the idea that we've got to wipe them all out, and it's a zero sum game, no. i think that's the point i'm trying to make. and, you know, if isil controls syria, for example, five years from now, is that more of a threat to us than assad was, or less of a threat? i mean, those are the type of things that you have to ask yourself, where in the

existential, you've got to take it on whether you want to or not. so yeah, it's threatening, okay? but is it existential that you have to sacrifice a lot of other goals to do it, you know? i think that's the real issue. i think you have to put it into perspective. would we be were off if saddam hussein was still in iraq now as opposed to isil? okay? yes, sir? >> lawrence freeman from executive intelligence review. since you opened up with a joke about secretary hagel, i wanted to follow up with a question. there are many people in washington, and in the military, who say that the reason secretary hagel was removed is because he stood with general dempsey on the fact that there has to be a clear mission in this fight. his argument with susan rice and

others is, they didn't have a clear mission, because the mission was also overthrowing assad. is that the case? because we have a new secretary of defense being nominated today. if the military, general dempsey and secretary of defense say, we want a clear mission, and the president ends up resigning that person, how does that affect it in terms of the military campaign? >> well, again, i think you raise a terrific point. one of the worst things about -- remember harry truman's old saying, you want a friend in washington, get a dog. look, they'll throw anybody under the bus for political reasons. i worked in the obama campaign. i worked -- dennis mcdonough used to work down the hall from me, and called me a lot. in fact, we wrote the thing one day about if -- we get intelligence that al qaeda is in pakistan and musharraf won't act, we will, remember how

controversial that was in the campaign? so basically, what you have is a president who's taken more and more control of the foreign policy process. probably the most since nixon and kissinger did, all right? if you are a cabinet officer, you have two choices. you can say, hey, i'm secretary of state, or defense, this is not what i signed up for and i'm out of here. like george schultz went to reagan, because the white house was trying to keep schultz out because he wasn't, back then kind of the neo cons type of thing. he said to the president, i don't need this job, i'm out of here, okay? and basically -- so they were trying to show that, okay, and you hear all these stories about hagel. he's lazy. i mean, come on, you know? they're trying to demean him. at the staff meetings he agreed with kerry and general dempsey. they were right, why not. in other words, there are some

pen people who say, i've got to say something whether it agrees or disagrees. i think we're trying to show that they're shaking things up because things are not going as well as we would like in the middle east, like, you know, we were surprised by isil, okay? oh, general clapper's fault. do you want to fire him? no. so hagel was easy sacrifice because he's a republican, who the republicans don't like. and, of course, he was weakened by the confirmation hearing. and again, you know i've known chuck, we worked together in the reagan administration, and what people don't know about him is he was the number two in the va. he was about 35 years old. a pretty big job. the head of the va at the time said, agent orange is no worse than teenage acne. can you believe that? so hagel said either he goes or i go. he went. that was pretty tough. i said, boy, i've got a lot of

respect for this guy. but at the confirmation hearings, you're taking money from the north koreans, and he gave a speech at rutgers with an iranian professor, i mean, horrible, horrible stuff. carter's not going to have any problem, okay? because the republicans like him. you took money from north korea, senator hagel, carter recommended bombing them in 2005. is that who you want? maybe some people, you know, do, okay? but if you didn't want to get him in, those are things that you could -- that you could use. so i think it was, well, we're going to shake things up to show you that we're not going to just keep things going, so we threw him under the bus. and i've got to tell you, it was the worst handled resignation i have ever seen. you're going to fire someone,

you better have the other person picked. not only did they not have it, then they listed people, all of whom turned it down, you know? that's why i used the colt mccoy analogy here before. everybody turned it down. so i think, you know, that that's why, you know, hagel went under the bus. chuck brought to that job skills. he was a wounded enlisted person from vietnam. you want to take on military compensation? that helps. because you've been there, and you've been a trooper. he obviously had the congressional experience. very successful in the private sector. he worked in the va. so he brought a lot to the job. but he wasn't part of the inner circle. so we've got to throw somebody -- you can't get rid of kerry because he's involved in 400 things at the same time, running all around, doing these things. so it was easy to, you know, to

go. he's a real gentleman. but one thing he did figure out which i thought was really interesting, his accomplishments when he was secretary of defense, i've never seen anybody who's been fired put that out, a list of his accomplishments. so it's not a good -- it doesn't do him or i think the country or obama any good. you know, the other people turned it down, because how much are you going to get done? okay? the '16 budget's already up there. you're going to work on the '17 budget, who's going to be president? okay? yeah? >> it's not often i agree with the executive intelligence review. but i've got to at this time. i like many of the things you said. but i think one of your initial statements that isil cannot be destroyed is a misnomer. the ideology behind it t