>> thank you, chairman, members of the committee. it is an honor to appear again before this committee to provide an update on the global campaign to degrade and defeat isil. before discussing the state of the campaign and where we're going, i'd like to reflect on how far we have come in the six months since the city of mosul in iraq fell. i was in northern iraq on june 10th, six months ago today, when mosul collapsed. over the next 72 hours isil formations poured through the tigris valley, entire army divisions collapsed and isil threatened the northern approaches to baghdad. to the west, a lesser noted but equally devastating offensive took place from across the syrian board we are isil capture the strategic border city of al kind. isil poured down the western valley. in baghdad during this period, just six months ago this week, there was a growing panic within the population, the government, security services, and the

diplomatic community. at the embassy we prepared for the worst-case scenario and e c evacuated 1,500 people moving them to imam, kuwait, or irbil. we also prepared to help the iraqis fight back. within 72 hours of mosul's collapse, the president ordered four initiatives to hold the line and set the conditions for a possible counteroffensive. first, we surged intelligence over the skies of iraq. we went from flying one platform per month to 60 per day, gaining a more granular picture of the isil network essential to the future of any military campaign. second, we established joint operations centers in baghdad and irbil, restoring critical relationships with iraqi and kurdish commander, gaining new insight into their capabilities and needs. third, we deployed special forces teams to assess iraqi and kurdish security formations with a focus on the defense of baghdad. and finally and perhaps most importantly we supported the iraqis as they worked to stand up a new and more inclusive government following national elections. throughout the summer months we

worked these four tracks sultly, lohsing more about isil, its locations, movement, and leadership patterns, restored relationships with iraqi commanders and learned more about the deficiencies within their security services while supporting iraqi political leaders as they stood up a new government. for all these reasons, on august 8th, when the president first ordered u.s. military forces to conduct air strikes in iraq, we were able to act with precision and efficacy. on september 8th, one month later, the iraqi parliament inaugurated a new iraqi government with a new prime minister and new and very different leader ace cross nearly every key cabinet position, including oil, finance, and defense. this new government, led by prime minister abaddi, represents a bulwark against isil and a significant break from the past in three key respects. first, its governing philosophy is decentralization or a functioning federalism with authorities and resources delegated to provinces and regions within the structure of iraq. last week's historic oil accord

with the kurdistan region is an outgrowth of this new policy. second, the new government has committed to significant security preforms including a smaller, more agile army, strengthened security forces at the local level including tribal forces and ultimately provincial-based national guards. third, the new government is committed to a policy of restoring relations with regional capitals and maintaining iraq's strategic independence and regional balance. even in its first hundred days the new government has made or exchanged breakthrough visits with jordan, saudi arabia, and others. nonetheless, despite this progress, the challenge of this new government are truly enormous. isil has thousands of fighters controlling territory in three may major cities in iraq where state structures have collapsed. the iraqi economy, which had been growing at 4% per year, is now predicted to contract due to falling oil prices. this new government, despite the promise, simply cannot defight isil and stabilize iraq on its own. it will need the support of the

united states and of the world. that is why we have established a global campaign to prosecute a comprehensive effort against isil. last week in brussels, secretary kerry chaired a historic conference that brought together 60 coalition partners to affirm a common and shared commitment across five lines of effort. this conference for the first time formalized the global coalition to defeat and degrade isil. the lines of effort include military support to our partners, countering foreign fighters, countering isil financing, humanitarian support, and delegitimizing isil's ideology and messaging. we're seeing progress along each line. on the military side there are seven countries flying come bat air missions over iraq and five over syria. to date we've conducted over 1,200 air strikes against isil terrorists. as a result, isil's offensive has been halted, its ability to mass forces degraded, its command and control and supply

lines severed. in the past 60 days alone iraqi forces have retaken ground at mosul dam, a refinery in southern baghdad. they've held the line at other areas. efforts to generate new forces, including three peshmerga kurdish brigade, will soon begin across multiple sites in iraq. in syria, kurdish and arab fighters under the cover of our air strikes have blunted a massive isil assault leading to significant attrition of isil fighters. they are now losing more than 100 fighters per week including top commanders and top foreign fighters. moderate opposition forces are also holding their ground against isil north of aleppo. on combatting foreign fighters, we now have in place a chapter 7 security council resolution calling on all member states to stem the flow of foreign fighters to syria. members of the coalition are increasingly criminalizing foreign fighter-related activities, and in the past

month alone foreign fighter networks have been broken up in austr austria, malaysia, and asia, and prosecuted in germany and the uk. we're working to cut the avenues of revenue and destroying refinery capacity, denying its main source of revenue from oil trade. these efforts are having an impact. on the humanitarian front, much has been done but far more is needed. and this was a key focus of our conference in brussels last week. finally, on countering isil's message, we've begun an aggressive campaign led by partners in the middle east region. we've seen fatwas issued from religious leaders in egypt and saudi arabia declaring isil a direct threat to islam. other coalition partners are work to form operations rings to combat the message in real time. as president obama's envoys to the anti-isil coalition, general jon allen and i have visited 16 capitals over the past few months to discuss cooperation across these lines of effort. we have found the coalition strongly and firmly you nighted,

particularly when it comes to the way forward in iraq. the situation in syria is more complex and our tools for the moment more limited. general allen and i hear a common set of questions about the best way forward in syria and also a divergence on how to proceed. many of our coalition partners do not envision themselves as having signed up to bring about a political transition in syria through military force, considering such a transition potentially even more destabilizing than the situation we face now. at the same time, other coalition partners are urging strikes against the assad regime, considering the regime a central source of instability in the region. our message to all these partners has been clear -- we believe there must be a political transition in syria during a negotiated political process. we are firm in our commitment any future government cannot include assad, who has forfeited legitimacy to govern and remains a magnet for terrorism in the region. a political transition will also require a strong counterweight to extremists like isil. that is why the department of

defense the leading an effort to train and equip moderate opposition forces subject to authorization and funding from congress. this process of course will take time, and throughout we will constantly assess how we can best ensure moderate forces in the field are able to protect themselves against multiple threats including isil and the syrian regime. in conclusion, looking back from six months ago at this very hour, we have indeed begun to make progress against isil. but i want to emphasize this will be a long-term, multiyear campaign. we are now in the earliest phases of phase one. and as we move into a new phase and require a global effort in addition to the ongoing support from this congress. so i'm honored to be here to discuss with you today to the state of the campaign and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you, ambassador. i think i'll start with my questions and then when elliott arrives he can give his opening statement and we'll go down the line. ambassador, you know the syrian

city of aleppo is the last major city there, the last refuge of the syrian middle class. it's under the partial control of moderate syrian opposition as it pushed by isis. this is an absolutely critical city for the opposition, for both symbolic and strategic reasons. it is through this city that most foreign, humanitarian, and military assistance to the people of northern syria and the model opposition flows. yet over the past year, as the moderate opposition has struggled to maintain its defense of this city, as better resourced fighters from isis, you know, as many a 40 air strikes a day from the assad regime hit them, they've had to contend with assad's use of hezbollah fighters against them, and so you see a situation where isis is gradually captured an

increasing portion of the city, as have other -- as have those who want to extinguish this last representation of the syrian middle class efforts to hold on. and they're encircled. and they're defending it from within. and most observers agree with alep po falls out of moderate control it will have catastrophic consequences for the free syrian army. so they're already on the ropes after years of anemic support. when we meet with them, we hear the same thing you hear from them -- they can't get the equipment that they need to fight back against isis. so in late august, a team of state department briefers met with committee staff, which had requested a briefing on the situation in aleppo. the state department official said it was a question not of when it would fall but -- it was

a question of when if not when aleppo would áihzsfall, their w. when our staff asked if the administration viewed preventing the fall of aleppo as a strategic priority, the state department said that the administration was still trying to decide if it was. which sounded like diplomatic speak for no. >> before i do, let me add my appreciation to both u.s. chair and senator corker as ranking member for the way you've led this committee and for the inclusiveness with which you have treated all of the members. i have very much appreciated that, and your working together and your encouraging of all of our working together i think has been very helpful. so thank you very much for that. what i wanted to say in response to your comments, senator

corker, i guess i would disagree that we haven't heard a strategy from this administration pip think there may be disagreement about whether that strategy is the correct one, but i feel like -- and i do serve on the armed services committee so i may have had a few more classified briefings and other hearings than some other members of this committee. but i do feel like we've heard a strategy and, as i said, we may not all agree on that strategy, but i do think there is one in place and so, this is for me, this authorization is not about trying to address that strategy. it's about trying to make sure that we do exercise our right of oversight and that, in particular for me, i think it's important to weigh in and limit the ability without coming back to congress to put tens of thousands of troops on the ground to fight isil.

so i very much appreciate the opportunity and the debate that we're having right now. >> mr. chairman. >> senator corker. >> if i could, i understand there's a difference of feelings there. just for what it's worth, i think we have a pretty good sense of some of the sensibilities that people are trying to express that are goi'x to vote for. i also think the administration may have a pretty good sense of a way to bridge that, and so at the end of the day, in spite of those comments -- and i would like to hear late l bit more about how we are actually going to move ahead. we really don't have a way to deal with the ground at present. i'd like to understand more fully how we're going to go about doing that. but just know that as we take this up, this is one step in the process and i hope that together we're going to figure out a way to bridge the differences in such a way that people can come

together an authorization that we feel good about and that we can actually try to pass in both the house and senate. >> i appreciate that. thank you. >> senator johnson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i have a number of things i'd like to talk about. let me say at the heart of my opposition to this particular authorization to use military force is that i don't believe it really commits us to victory. and i don't think i would ever vet foran authorization to use military force, in other words, put the finest among us at risk for their lives, if we as a congress and the commander in chief isn't fully committed to victory. an example that has always weighed in my mind was when president obama announced the surge in afghanistan, in the same speech said he's going to withdraw in two years. that really provides comfort to our enemies. and in our testimony -- in senator kennedy's testimony, i

asked him can a question, does the president really believe we no. why would we want to put that restriction? why would we authorize the use when we're not fully committed to victory? i just think that's the wrong thing to do. another deficiency is we're really not defining what defeat is, which i would argue is -- you know, what is the end goal? what is the achievable goal we're trying to achieve? as i look through the authorization, about the only goal i see stated in here is to counter the threat of regional instability. that's not the same as degrading and ultimately defeating isis. i would say that was a deficiency of the 2001 authorization. we authorized the use of military force, but we did leave it pretty open ended. and i agree with those individual who is certainly have a question as to whether or not that current authorization really is applicable in this

situation. now, the way we handled it in world war ii, and i think we should look back to the past history, totally different circumstances, the nation-state, but there actually was a stapted goal. it was to bring the conflict to a successful termination. it didn't necessarily totally define, that but back then against nation states people pretty well understood what that was -- unconditional surrender. now we have a totally different circumstance, so i don't think you have to say too much more other than to thank the chairman for holding this. i think this was a very good discussion. i think it's a necessary discussion. we're not going to bring this to conclusion. but this is a good first step. and as we reopen the discussion, reopen the debate next year, i'm really going tone courage my colleagues here toll -- if you're going to have a strategy, that there's really a says to going through to developing one. you have to first recognize

reality. and sometimes that's not very easy to do. by the way, we had an excellent hearing the other day with senator boxer, and the witnesses that the majority called described reality -- let me give you a couple of their statements real quick. the witnesses said that isis is gaining strength. they're worse than ever. bombing's not doing much. we're having very ineffective aid efforts. the military mission is not sufficient. isis will be around for the foreseeable future. now, that's painting a pretty ugly reality that we're not really recognizing in this authorization. so if you're going to have a strategy, you have to recognize reality, then you have to set yourself an achievable goal. people need to understand what is the goal. again, president obama has laid it out -- degrade and ultimately defeat isis. we haven't really described what defeat looks like. and i would argue that then

limiting actions, first of all, not particularly wise. i don't know why you'd ever signal to your enemy what you will or will not do to defeat them. you're limiting that activity. i would urge, let's understand reality, which is going to require hearings, require the participation of this administration, let's understand what the achievable goal is. let's understand what it's going to take to achieve that goal and then let's craft the authorization for use of military force specifically to achieve that goal, not tie the hands of the commander in chief, who's going to be charged with that awesome responsibility of committing the finest among us, putting their lives at risk. let's make sure the commander in chief, the president of the united states, has the full authority to achieve the goal that we all agree on. that's the way to proceed in this. but, again, i appreciate this hearing and appreciate the thoughtful discussion and

debate. ? thank you, senator jones. before i recognize senator koonce, let me say we are committed to victory. we are collectively committed to a victory to defeat isil, and we say that in the second page of the aumf in the fifth "whereas." it is the policy of the united states to work with regional and global allies and allies to degrade and defeat isil. it goes on to talk about other elements of how that is achieved. now, there is a difference between a commitment to victory and what some would be committed to maybe an endless war with tens of thousands of ground troops. that can be a fundamental difference. but a three-year authorization ultimately creates the greatest accounting of the administration, this or any future one, to the congress to come back knowing that authorization can be renewed and

may very well will need to be renewed if the fight has not been fully achieved to degrade and defeat isil. but without that end date, there would be no real accountability no matter how much we try, only the necessity of an administration to have that authorization would do that. i don't see the three years we're only going to fight you for three years. it means in three years we're going to make sure we've defeated you or we're going to recalibrate to make sure we do whatever is necessary to defeat you. so i think there are different ways of looking that the three years. senator koonce. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to all the members for your engainment in this vital and important debate pip think how we ensure our security, how we demonstrate our collective commitment to fighting and defeating isil and how we sustain our core values is by engaging in this open and democratic debate.

and i for one think we should stay and continue this debate until we have crafted an aumf that can succeed in being taken up and passed by the congress and that we should have on the table in this debate and discussion another issue that hasn't yet been raised. i filed an amendment to the aumf for this debate and discussion today, a provision that would call for a plan for how the funds required for the conduct of our war against isil would be offset through reduced spending, increased revenue, or both. all of this debate, this discussion today about revigs to the aumf from 2002 or 2001 to geographic restrictions or time restrictions or the scope or the strategy are done in the context of a nation that is weary of 14 years of war in iraq and afghanistan and wary of not understanding at the outset the scope and the costs and the challenges in front of us. and i think all of us share a goal that we secure from the administration a clear strategy

in what is a very difficult region where clear strategies are hard to come by, and that we have a sense of the scope and cost of the conflict which is already under way and which i believe we should authorize. paying for our war against isil is not just fiscally but also i think morally responsible. it is not right to expect the men and women of our armed forces and their family, our rhett vanns, to bear the full cost of war and have no discussion about how we will either raise the revenue or reduce the spending that will achieve an offset of those costs. soy'd like to say i'm grateful or the the chairman for including in the manager's amendment a provision that calls on the administration not just to present a military strategy but a fiscal strategy so that those of our constituents who question what is our path forward can have a full and informed insight into the strategy, the costs, the scope, and the duration of this. as we try to work together to achieve a broadly supported

bipartisan aumf in this debate and in the debates to come. it is my hope we will also keep right in front of us how we will pay for that war. >> senator rubio, then senator durbin. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first, i am grateful that we're having this discussion. it's an item of extraordinary magnitude not just because of national security implications but because of the power we would be -- we're authorizing the president to pursue, perhaps the most important power he has, and that is to commit men and women into combat pip think it's important at the outset to remember why we're in this to begin with. isil, despite the horrifying acts that they've committed and we've certainly been outraged by them, the reason why the nation is engaged in this conflict is because we have correctly surmised and concluded that left unchecked this group poses an unacceptable risk to the national security of the united states. this is perhaps the best armed and best funded terrorist organization in the history of the world who seeks not simply

to carry out insurgencies and attacks but to control territory. and their aims are not simply limited to syria and iraq nape seek to establish a caliphate that extend into places like lebanon and jordan and potentially -- and israel as we know today, obviously that would be a big fight, but that would be something they would endeavor to do. we already see them springing up in plays like north africa. we already see groups in southeast asia beginning to pledge allegiance to isil and their aims and goals. the point is that left unchecked, if we didn't get involved and if we're not involved this group will destabilize. many of our regional ally, and they would do so rapidly. i don't think i need to convince anyone on this committee how important our relationship is with jordan, what an important position jordan plays in the region. and what could very quickly happen to jordan had isil's progress that they were making through iraq gone unchecked. so we've concluded, and rightfully so, and the president's concluded that this group, left unchecked, poses an unacceptable risk to the

national security of the united states and therefore they must be destroyed and defeated. that is the objective. senator johnson was talking about that a moment ago. but when i read through this aumf and some of the amendments that are filed here, it strikes me that what we're saying if they're to be approved is we are committed to defeating isil but only if we can do it with air strikes alone. or we are committed to defeating isil but only if we can do it in three years or in some cases in a couple of the amendments in one year. we're committed to defeating them but only if they stay where they are right now or if they stay organized the way they are right now. i recognize that doesn't fully describe the manager's amendment and what the chairman has proposed. i'm also including some to have amendments that will appear before us today. and i just think what that basically says is unless we can beat them with only air strikes in three years and where they're currently located then isil gets to stay? and this to me sounds like an unacceptable position for us to take. by the way, i am not in favor -- i am not call farg ground war,

although i do recognize ksh and we have ask ourselves this if we're being honest -- we all hope the ground forces currently there now, the iraqi army, the myly shas, although some have big problems we should be concerned about as well, some of the rebel groups engaged, we would hope regional partners engage in this conduct. turkey is more impacted by this sfr a geographic perspective than the united states would be. we would hope they would get more involved. but if they do not, if the ground forces that are available today are unsuccessful, does that mean that isil gets to stay and continue to grow? that's an important question for us to answer. and if you want to take this to a level of absurdity, think about this. if we pass this proposal here today or any of the other amendments associated with it, what we would be saying is we're not allowed to use ground troops but you could use nuclear weapons? there's no prohibition against using nuclear weapons in this aumf or any of the other proposal, and i would imagine some would say amendments are in order, so perhaps someone will

offer that. my point is this is a big problem for us because if we put forth something that basically says we are willing to fight isil but only up to a certain point after if which they get to stay, potentially, i think we've created a big problem for ourselves in terms of putting together the kind of coalition we're going to need to success. my last point -- congress does play an important role in all of this, and here's the role we play. the role we play is in deciding whether or not we should go into war. but our role is not to decide how to go to war. our goal is to decide whether or not to go to war and to pay for it, to fund it. it is up to the commander in chief to carry out this war and the tactics associated therein. the truth is if he does a poor job doing, of course the united states would pay a price, but that's why we have elections and oversight. i think we've extended -- when we do this, i think this effort to micromanage the tactical pursuit of the objectives that we've laid out is a grave error. and i hope that we'll continue to work on this. i echo the sentiments of senator

koonce and others that we would stay here as long as possible so we could come up with a document that empowers the commander in chief of the united states to achieve the objective that we all agree is so critical. and that is the deg regags and ultimately the defeat of isil. thank you. >> let me turn to senator durbin. >> thanks, mr. chairman. this is my last mark-up for this committee for now. i hope someday to return. but i'm glad it's on an issue and subject of this historic moment. i can recall many sleepness nights as a congressman and senator contemplating decisions on war, knowing that at the end of the day my vote would result in the loss of life, even american life, fighting valiantly on our side. and i'm glad we're taking this seriously and we have good attendance to debate it.

it is true the commander in chief has authority and we give it to him or her, if the case may be, to protect our nation. there's never any question that a president needs to respond quickly to protect our borders, to protect our people, to protect our vital national interest. but the constitution goes on to say that when it comes to war congress -- let me take that back. when it comes to war, the american people through congress will make that decision. it is a limitation on the power of the president. it is a limitation on the commander in chief. it is written in the constitution that we have all sworn to uphold and defend. by our nature we limit this commander in chief. that is who we are. and if we forsake that constitutional responsibility and say to a president it's yours, report to us how much it cost, i think we have walk aid way from a basic responsibility. we tie the hands of the commander in chief regularly when we exercise our

constitutional responsibility. i think about the cost of this war. there's one cost that has not been mentioned. yo beyond the cost of human life, 4,484 died in iraq. hundreds of thousands came home injured. a lesser number in afghanistan but still a trtranlally high numbers. we will pay for those two wars for a long, long time. and we should. we promised those men and women we'd stand by them. so when it comes to cost of war, i know we're all sensitive to that. but i think about it, and i think that's why weed need to sit here and make this an important and relevant debate. there was a moment after 9/11 when someone in the white house under another president said the most important thing we can do now is to invade iraq. we need to show those people in the middle east once and for all just what america has to offer if you want to challenge us.

look what happened. look what happened. after years of engagement there, searching for weapons of mass destruction that didn't exist, after deposing a terrible dictator, we made another enemy, iran, even stronger. and as we left the country realized they couldn't maintain their own. we had to come back. this is not -- this debate is not, in my mind, about the current isil crisis. we all agree they're bloodthirsty, ruthless people, and they need to be stopped. but if you put it in the context of history and get to altitude and look down, this controversy started 35 years ago with the deposition of the sha of islam. that triggered extreme islam in our time, in our generation, and it has been unfolding ever since

in country, in stage, and it will continue to. as the people of the islamic faith fight within their own rank ranks about true orthodoxy, as countries question whether or not their firstallegiance is tor view of guard or to a nationality, as they challenge boundaries written by colonial empires decades ago that p of them don't believe are valid, so as we engage now in this conversation about isil, today, trust me, i'm afraid 10 or 20 years from now another senate foreign relations committee will be viewing the latest chapter in this unfolding saga. i think the president is right in one key element, and i hope we'll give him credit. he has built a coalition. it is no longer the united states doing it alone. he has said i am going to engage the arab and muslim states.

if you do not share our belief that there should be stability in your region, and if you're not prepared to sacrifice your lives and your treasure to achieve it, we cannot do it. the united states cannot do it alone, as we have shown. so i think it's important we have this debate. i would hope, and it probably won't be the case, that at the end of the day we will have a common view on what we should do here. i don't view a three-year deadline as the end of any commitment. i view it as the renewal of our responsibility to review what has occurred and under the constitution decide on behalf of the american people how we go forward. >> senator murphy, then senator