find out where c-span's local content vehicles are going next. you are watching "american history tv". every weekend on c-span3. >> president george hw bush's of state, james baker, and his national security advisor, brent the fall , talk about the berlin wall. this thirty minute event was hosted by the bush school of government and public service. >> welcome, to all of you, to this dialogue. we have done this sort of thing before. i will ask you questions, and done ill say whatever you please -- darn well please. to have you here

as we commemorate the historic twenty-fifth anniversary of the fall of the wall and the liberation of eastern europe. let me start with a broad question. when did you feel certain that the wall would fall? even if you didn't know when. what was that moment when you are sure? >> i am not sure i could pinpoint a moment. i mean, as far as i was concerned, it came as somewhat surprise that it happened sso quickly. we do know that things are moving in that direction. a lot of east germans were going hungry. -- going to gry hungary. the wall had been circumvented, not breached. so it looked like things were going in that direction and, of

had gone to achev early october and said -- policy for east germany is set in berlin, and not in moscow. a pretty poor signal that they were willing to cut them loose. that they were not going to use to maintain the empire in force in central and eastern europe, pparticularly with respect to the gdr. so i think those events, at me to think that it was very possible that it was coming, but we did and, as far have any concerned, concrete sense that it would happen with the dead. >> i would say that it really event in a series. when we came into office, there ferment in eastern europe.

ferment and that said -- we want to make this than the earlier one in 1953 in hungary -- we that on a courage level with a have cracked down on before. we didn't know what that level to do was e we tried encouraged this kind of freedom attitude, without straying off. was -- the wall -- going over to s hungary from germany -- were all parts of this overall thing we had in mind. touch on a very

portant point of calibrating our actions in a way that would the results we sought, -- you know to another soviet crackdown. bit d you talk a little about your strategy toward gorbachev, in particular, and the soviets in general. the diplomacy that led to the outcome that we got. >> i can give you one specific that illustrates it -- with falling, in effect, we didn't know exactly what was happening. in our press advisor came and told the president, you need to go on television. we sort of hesitated for a the e, but then they got press corps in. >> and you were all seated.

>> well, there were no seats, i don't think. it was crowded in there. anyway, the president described what we knew -- it looked like the wall was opening, but we were not exactly sure. the first question was -- well, mister president, you don't look elated. we would think you want to go dance on the wall. he said -- well, i am not a dancy kind of person. was trying to do was in a kind of hole for that matter. that was the overall strategy. >> the president and while aflac for -- got a lot of flak for that, ron. they were saying he doesn't show any emotion whatsoever. he doesn't show any sign of

having the vision thing -- ich is what the president used to call it -- but that is just one example. there were other examples. -- you know -- no m in istration is unifor approach to these problems because of problems are very congregated. d we had some, in our administration, who wanted to more forceful with gorbachev. pessimistic about their chances as reformers. work with them -- i think it is fair to say that and grant and i wanted to work with them because we felt they were genuine performers. as it turned out, we were correct. but by working with them and not sticking it in there i when wall came down -- their eye the wall came down and at times, we were able to go

forward with german unification of the soviet ent union. with the acquiescence of the soviet union. and the acquiescence of, frankly, the united kingdom and france. none of those countries were static about the idea of german unification. but by handling it the way the able to t did, he was unification german within a very narrow window of opportunity. moved when we did, i'm not sure we could have achieved unification. >> i think that is to. wall came down, gorbachev's attitude changed dramatically. he had been sort of on our side practicing -- he wasn't trying to democratize by any means, on,

but he was trying to re-instill some sense of discipline. so he was encouraging what was stern europe a until the wall came down. that he got scared. it about, if tle b you will, the diplomacy of this whole process. on the reservations -- clearly, r had that gorbachev had -- how did you handle those? -- well, we -- we have always been the leader of the alliance. and the president, even as a the leader nt, was of the alliance. and we were able to bring both the united kingdom over. the toughest nut was the soviet union. we came up with the concept of

that is gotiation -- powers negotiating the external politics. worked pretty it darn well. that the soviet union because they really a whole lot of other alternatives. conscious of the fact -- and history will attest to -- that the federal republic of germany gave the 55 billion deutsche marks, which didn't hurt helping get the acquiescence. but there were a lot of other were a lot of obstacles along the way to get there. it was intensive diplomacy.

by the president, but again, taking advantage of a very narrow window of opportunity and getting it done. you know, some people were against unification. but our position was, wait a minute, we have been talking about this for forty years. now we have a chance to implement it. do mean we are not going to do that? so, it worked. >> i want to tell you one part of this regimen i disagree. he turned out to be right. and that is the 2+4. understood the two -- the two germany's. the plus four were the other powers. believe it was my side who

said that i love joni so much, i think there ought to be two of them. [laughter] so there were some risks in but jim said -- we need to go ahead. it worked. >> the national security advisor tells a story about a ving come -- having gone to meeting between call and thatcher -- cole and thatcher. thatcher turned to him and is just so german. [laughter] >> let's talk, for a moment, who is so german -- and i think the very best of the word -- the one who represented the west -- chancellor kohl. how would you evaluate his role of, he run-up to the moment and the aftermath, of the fall of the wall. kohl ll, iif chancellor and president bush hadn't been

on the same wavelength, german unification would've never happened. we y made it happen because had the reluctance of france and the uk, and certainly the soviet union. chancellor kohl came to camp david in february of 1990 -- i and we right -- to jesus t of coming session there, where he said i really want your help, but we you to know from you that are not interested in a neutral germany in the heart of europe. and you are not interested in a germany that is going to lean eastward. and that you will support us in ng sure that the unified germany is a member of the north atlantic treaty association. he said, i will. lived up to it and got it done.

we one of the things that were really worried about in thing was that gorbachev would promise kohl unification and neutrality -- because that would have been awfully tempting. really have a -- i don't think kohl would have it anyway because he had a scheme and the implication. he explained it to the president, and the president -- go for it. >> you made the point -- you made the points that although you cannot predict the moment, you could see the .rocess and again, the gorbachev meeting made it pretty clear to the world.

have any nightmare moments in the run-up to this -- when you consider the possibility of something going terribly wrong? something that cannot only undermine a reunification but endanger world security? one ell, i remember incident in which the soviet foreign minister and, who, by the way, was leaning probably more forward for peace and cooperation with the last thing i remember ven -- on -- i think we may have been in germany, we may in some other capital where other country -- he started parroting some of his talking points. there was a big tug-of-war within the soviet

union. we are not going to get it done. that was one incident i can remember very well. we had a strategy think it was generally, but they didn't know how long. we came into office -- up then, u.s. policy towards eastern europe had been -- we

had tried helping close it up to those were making the most trouble in the soviet union. but when -- when we came in, we said no, that is not the right measure. the right measure of those who are trying to liberalize. so, romania went from the top right down to the bottom. and he went to the top, because they were trying to change a system. so, we had a general sense of to go and how d -- bbut there were lots of rils. >> you know, it was such a topic at the there was some debate within our

administration and some reluctance to use the term reunification. he will remember that -- we called it for a little while, something by different name. to stay away from -- we didn't want gorbachev thrown out. was a coup leader later on, but it was too late. >> mister secretary, you mentioned edward. time with him -- you went out and shooting sheep -- i didn't to sheep.

[laughter] i really wasn't shooting sheep, the national security advisor leaked it to the "washington post" that i wanted to hunt sheep, and they wouldn't let me do it. [laughter] days of hose opening storm, you and he were doing something. know, we were negotiating arms control in siberia. we were sitting there and i got a call from the state -- bob kennedy -- he are really worried is ut what intelligence reporting to us about iraq you troops amassing on the border of quit. and you might check to see what he knows about. at that time, iraq was a state of the soviet union. edward, before we break

you might want to at this report -- he said, i will check at lunch and come back. he came back after lunch. he said., saddam would not be so foolish to do that. fly off to mongolia break up our -- and then he invades, okay. he was so embarrassed that agrees, after the invasion, to meet me in moscow stand shoulder to shoulder

with the american secretary of state and condemn the actions et plan state. in my view, that is the day the cold war ended. en that happened. he did that, by the way, without gorbachev's okay. the without the okay of arabic foreign ministry. which is what i meant by leaning further forward. >> and that was the essence of the question i was going to ask believe that the way you and the president handled the soviet union at the time of german reunification, you handled eastern europe, the way you handle the reunification itself -- whether that had an impact on the ability less than a year later form an effective coalition to push saddam out of kuwait. >> i think it did. have to remember, too, at that time, we were the sole remaining superpower.

to get close.ted a lot of -- because everybody wanted to get close to the united states. that the fact that the way in which the handled german unification -- and some of those earlier foreign-policy aand his administration -- made a different and what we're able to do in order to kick iraq out of kuwait. >> let me -- llet me use that to fast-forward. in you recall, your friend was asked this morning, as we look at the of u.s. german relations, what would he recommend. he had a great one word answer -- talk. i would like to broaden that just a bit.

in the ook to the crisis middle east, the efforts of the put together n to a coalition -- just as you did -- to confront it -- that has to be both regional and international -- what do think we need to do -- regionally and internationally -- to succeed against this new enemy? >> aare you looking at me or are you looking at him? >> i know you are going to try and arduous, sir, so i'm looking at you. >> no, i'm not going to dodge it at all. i applaud the administration's efforts to put together a broad-based coalition. that is great. but our coalition had muscle. and the members of our coalition contributed, and contributed substantially. many of them committed troops. we even had an egyptian troops, slavic troops, you name it.

not to mention, 500,000 american troops. , you're not going to win this war just from the air. i don't see how you hold territory just from the air. have to figure out -- how are you going to your boots on the ground. you are going to have to have them. yes, we are sending more special ops forces in, and that is really good to guide the airstrikes. but where are the boots on the ground coming from to take territory? i have serious doubts about whether they can come from iraq. syrian as moderate opposition is concerned, i think most of them are in the salons of london and paris. i don't know that there is such thing anymore. but when are the troops going to come? >> i think the one thing that is clearly missing is talking. talking to our friends.

you mentioned -- i have a telephone on my desk. it rang on his desk. and we used to talk to most every day -- the same with our other allies. we tried to get the soviet union, but we couldn't. it with bush -- frequently called his counterparts around the world just to talk to them. what are their problems? what can we do to help? and so on and so forth. friends were willing to help us when we needed them. because they saw us and they knew what we were after. i don't think we had a kind of communication anymore. and -- and you don't draw them out. egypt has troops we need on the ground. turkey does. they are not ssupposed to come to help. >> i agree with what he just said.

you know, in that first gulf war, one of our strongest and biggest contributors was the president of turkey. turkey has been a sixteen year ally of the united states and a nato member. one of the first things that we ut off the o do is c oil pipeline from iraq through turkey. that caused turkey tremendous economic problems, but he did it. >> so my solution, for what it as the question earlier, is why don't we really can an effort to see if we convince the turks? okay? turks don't like isis -- no country that i know wants to abide a continuing isis presence. and the turks don't like assad.

why -- isn't there conversion of interest to their? we go and see the turks and say, okay, we will supply the logistics and the air, and you oops.y the tr and we will give you your buffer zone -- wwhich is what he wants. that, to me, might solve this problem. i don't know any other troops in the region that are going to do it. and i sure don't support the young f putting our brave men and women on the ground in iraq and syria. >> i agree with jim. one of the additional problems the turks have, though, is the kurds. there are several different kinds of kurds. kind of kurds that are more less at war with the turks the one in northern syria. there are syrian kurds, there are turkish kurds,

and there are a iraqi kurds. and they are all different. >> and there are iranian kurds. >> and that is really are getting it, especially with the turks are concerned. >> ladies and gentlemen, i would just say that that level and depth of detail and understanding on a fairly issue is why you are part of the best national security team in history. i mean that sincerely because i was a big player at the time. let me ask that of the question would you be saying to our european allies, and germans at y the this time, as we look not only in the unfolding crisis at dle east, but as we look a russia that, obviously, is very different than the russia you dealt with, and the problems in ukraine? wwhat should we be saying?

what kind of dialogue should we be having? what kinds of policies should we be proposing with our european friends, starting with the germans? >> well, i think we are having those conversations. and that is why we have multilateral me sanctions against russia that are showing every indication of working. the ruble has gone to the roof. most of us think that is just because of the drop in the oil, but i think we are having is conversations with the german leadership. has happened there -- aand i don't think we have to convince the germans or any of western european allies -- that what has happened in the ukraine and inconsistent ally with any concept oof a stable world order.

if you don't know what is happening next door, you just can't rule the tanks. you can, but there will be consequences. of the ink, again, one problems is we are talking to europeans, but i don't regret talking enough. or frequently enough. because we do have problems. have problems with snowden, especially with germany. turns out that the of chancellor ot merkel talking -- that is not, those kind of things really do more of to understand each other and why we are doing this.

you cannot just call and say, hey, we want to invade here, will you help us? you have to build groundwork and you have to show what we are going to do, how we are going to do it. i am not sure that we are spending enough time doing it. >> i would agree with that, but we are talking to them about sanctions. so far, that has worked a little bit. we could i wish continue this incredible dialogue. time is finite. we have all been privileged to not only listen to the man who were witnesses to a most period in world history, but who helps the president of the united states ship that history for the better. thank you both very much. >> thank you. [applause]

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> join us today at 2:00 pm discussion e for a on ronald reagan, remembered as the great communicator. panelists look at reagan's skills as a communicator and how it contributed to his success as president. as a discuss his work spokesman actor, and for general electric, and the influences of these experiences on his political career. that is today at 2:00 pm here on c-span3's "american history tv". each week, "american history artifacts visits historic places. >> i am farar elliott, the curator. that i take care of

a lot of the artifacts, the artwork, the objects that is rich the house heritage. matthew wasniewski. we answer reference questions in our office that come from on aand off the hill. story of y to tell the the house, wwhich is this very big, very old institution in a way in which people can kind of connect with it on a human level. too telling t or through l stories clips from oral histories. poster is a campaign for shirley chisolm, the first african-american woman in congress. because it it says

-- unbought. >> it was actually four presidential campaign that she waged in 1972. she went to the democratic convention and rounded up about 10% of the vote. she is the first african-american woman to run for president, and she did it on a shoestring budget and had a very admirable showing. had a reputation -- a national reputation well before 1972. is elected to congress in t that om a distric encompasses much of brooklyn. she becomes very prominent in that campaign. in the general election on the republican ticket was james farmer, one of the great civil rights leaders. and there is this back and n these two. runs on the idea that, you know, brooklyn needs

a man in congress. shirley chisolm, boy, she fires back. -- her campaign theme is unblocked and unbossed. i am fighting. i'm here to be a congresswoman. she embraces this advocacy role. she is elected, she becomes the first african-american woman in congress in 1969. and to serve as a career that come in a lot of ways, is symbolic. she is the first. the helped establish congressional black caucus iin 1971. then she also gives a very prominent committee assignment -- she is the first african-american woman to serve on the house rules committee. which is the committee that pulses legislation onto the floor. so she had her hands on a lot development in the house, but she also had a national reputation. who is very one

outspoken, which is -- which lot of nts, really, a the women who were coming in the congress at this point. new york ague from city was bella, who served for house in terms in the the 1970's and would later go on and try be elected mayor of new york, unsuccessfully. but these were two women who spoke their minds. >> "american history tv", a foreign relations marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the fall of the berlin wall. kissinger discusses the impact of the events surrounding the fall of the wall, aand he talks about her current relationship with russia and whether we are seeing a renewal of the cold war. the conversation is moderated by richard haass. this is about an hour.