which is the committee that pulses legislation onto the lore, so she had her hands on a lot of important developments in the house, but she also had a national >> she was someone who was very outspoken. , who served for a couple of terms in a house in the 1970's and would later go on to be elected mayor of new york unsuccessfully, these were women who spoke their minds. panel of authors and historians talked about the significance of the 1864 battle of spring hill, franklin, and nashville, the last campaign of the civil war in tennessee. examined how john

bell hood was written history and the u.s. colored troops compared to the sherman marched to the sea. this 90 minute event is part of theseries organized by tennessee sesquicentennial. >> thank you for attending featuring our same topic of the day, the last campaign in tennessee. , i am the van wes tennessee state historian. and a professor at middle tennessee state university. it was an easy drive over to join this event today. for our expert historians, they have all come quite a way to join and be part of this event. i'm appreciative of that. this,y i would like to do

so we have plenty of time for questions and comments, i am going to introduce all three speakers now in alphabetical order. come up in that order. ok. be chris speaker will lawson. i have known chris for 30 years. it goes back to his excellent work on frank cheetham, and his confederate division in tennessee's forgotten warriors. 1989.me out in he has been involved with us and

then very generous of his time here for different civil war and franklin battlefield symposiums at we have worked with. welcome back. our second speaker will be james the son of the times we all have been working with each other for many years. jim is a professor emeritus from auburn university. he has a native of nashville. pepperdine before going to auburn. those of us involved with tennessee history no mcdonagh has worked so well through all studies, from the study of shiloh, to stones river, to franklin, that he parablered, the

campaign and of course, recently, in the last decade, the study of nashville and the major battle. our third speaker is wily sword. winning award author. " embrace in angry wind" was all about the hood inpaign and won an award 1992 for the best book on the civil war. he understood the western theater extensively in his book april.oh, bloody i highly recommend that as well. we have three experts who are also intimately knowledgeable about franklin and its impact, as well as the battle of nashville and its importance. that is one of the things we want to make sure we bring out this afternoon, these last two battles did constitute the last

campaign in tennessee and it is really important for us to go explore that and understand what that meant for the civil war not only in the south, but for the entire civil war and its outcome. it is a brief introduction a very distinguished historians. i'm going to turn the mike over to chris. [applause] >> thank you. it is a great honor to be here today. today represents work of dozens of individuals and organizations . we are profoundly grateful. it is always a great treat to come to tennessee. the 10 hour drive was worth it. according to your program, but we're supposed to do today is offer insights, on the portions

of the campaign that are particularly illuminating. i'm going to do two things. the first one deals with spring hill. most of you know the campaign no enough that it is before the battle of franklin, a lost opportunity to attract -- attacked union troops. is a profound mystery in many ways. good planned a flanking movement which was successful. there were federal troops that were going to come at the pike at night. then they failed to do either of two things. they could have launched an attack supported by artillery. they did not do that. it was not the larger fight that other generals had contemplated. the other thing they could have done was cut off the pipe so that as troops came from

columbia they would be met by confederate resistance. start me that always about this is that it is always deemed as a confederate failure, but there is assumptions made about what the federals would have done, that they would have been ensnared and destroyed. at spring hill they had an opportunity of destroying or mainly a large part of the union army. that is possibly true. and never get the attention that is due is that the yankees in this case. accomplices. these were veteran federal soldiers. these were battle hardened veterans of the atlantic campaign it elsewhere. the idea they would simply encounter confederate troops and meekly handed over the weapons is preposterous. there could have been a battle.

it could have been at spring hill. i think the idea that the federals would have been dispatched with ease is simply nonsense. you can do what i did with my toy soldiers. you can do whatever you want with your imagination. both sides would have suffered casualties. if an attack taken place it was fraught with danger. .here could have been a battle it could've been fought summerhouse. the idea this would change the course of the war seems simply false. the second thing i briefly want to talk about, there is an elephant in the room. john bell hood. i went to visit his boyhood home.

he is associated with texas but he was born in kentucky. i went over to see john bell hood's boyhood home. looking for inspiration. there was none. there is a nice carport. young, ihen he is so could not imagine him in the driveway. there has been a new book who goes by a man the name of sam. it is a reprise of. , he believes says historians have formed an inaccurate for trail of hood, ignored positive views of him during the war and postwar. he believes historians have accentuated negative and britain things that are false.

he believes the story and seth copied anecdotes from others without going to the original source to takes statements out of context, cherry pick that the famous hood. frankly there is a long line of , he bust my chops about an antidote about the betting $40. i should have known better. mr. hood tells me that in prewar would've been it $68,000. if i use the anecdote i should've counted in terms of something to the effect like he was viewed as aggressive and this anecdote, even though it is preposterous, illustrates it. other people he takes on more. there is the tennessee connection.

wily sword is particular of his target. i do have the impression that same foot would like to get all of us in a big room and just beat the hell out of all of us. tell you sam hood has lots of supporters. i went on amazon and there were 60 comments. 44 gave him either a five star or four star rating. i do think there are people who have felt that john hood has been maligned unfairly. that he deserves better. if it was a failed campaign, maybe john bell hood has been wronged by historians. that is what historians do. andake historic events figures, interpret the past, and there are misinterpretations. i'm glad to have you here. i hope you enjoy the festivities. thank you. [applause]

>> it is a pleasure to be here as we commemorate the sesquicentennial of the civil and the middle tennessee campaign of 1864. to be ond, and honor the program with these distinguished gentleman who have been studying the civil war for many years. said, we are chris appreciative of your presence here today. thank you. theevents leading to confederate march into central tennessee begin with a conclusion of the atlanta campaign. in september 1864, the united states military forces led by

atlanta,herman entered which had become a major southern city, the railroad center and symbol of confederate resistance. the victory climaxed a four-month long 100,000 man strategic offensive. the confederate army pulled out of the city just before being trapped by the federals. the atlanta news electrified the nation. dramatically and undeniably demonstrating the united states war effort was at last succeeding. the grand achievement contributed significantly, possibly decisively to president lincoln's campaign for reelection. the success of which virtually assured the ultimate doom of the confederacy. to minimize the united

states victory, john bell hood love the southern army northward in late september disrupting the western and atlantic railroad between chattanooga and atlanta. which served as the sherman supply route. although sherman pursued hood with a portion of his forces, the unique commander had no intention of relinquishing the initiative to the enemy. who soon moved into north alabama. altogether another campaign in mind. , he 60,000 veteran troops determined to march across georgia from atlanta to charleston or savannah living roads,the land, breaking destroying all manner of water , heurces, leaving a trail remarked, that will be

recognizable 50 years hence. resources on southern and morale he believed would be more devastating than the capture of atlanta. it could continue to move west and north into metal tennessee rather than following sherman, nashville,omason in who was amassing separated troops and also reinforced by thousands of sherman's veterans from the atlantic campaign, would defend against the rebel defensive. in mid-november, sherman began the march for which he will ever be remembered. while hood and the army of tennessee, a set of pursuing sherman, prepared to cross the tennessee river and drive northward toward nashville. the resulting campaign in central tennessee highlighted by event said springhill, franklin,

and nashville, and characterized , anger andand misery turmoil, suffering, slaughter, became and ever after remained a subject of in less controversy. was aninghill affair intriguing in the pneumatic episode -- in the medic episode, and has been the focus of much attention. franklin has attracted even more attention. nashvilley battle of has a highly significant feature which neither springhill nor franklin can claim. ira for to the participation of african-americans. in aal thousand strong

combat role for the union army. the black regiments had come to be officially known as united states colored troops. they fought both days of the engagement. this is a major reason why the battle of nashville deserves to be commemorated. the experience of serving as a member of the united states colored troops, a block soldier in a blue uniform, was not easy. as you may expect. when the civil war began lincoln rejected any idea of abolishing slavery or seeking black military assistance for the war effort. action wouldh alienate the border slave states which have remained loyal to the union, arouse the racial whites,e of northern

and further harden confederate resistance. 1862, thee summer of president had come to believe undermining slavery would significantly weaken the confederacy and should become a major priority overriding any negative factors. after the emancipation proclamation was issued, the union army with lincoln's full support launched a drive to recruit african american soldiers. end, 180,000 blacks would serve in the u.s. ct. 80% of them coming from the confederate states, and most of those former slaves. officers majority of

of those black troops were white men. order to provide the inexperienced african-american soldiers with leadership by combat veterans. partso reflected in considerable part, a bow to rachel prejudice -- racial prejudice, because it was believed few white soldiers would take orders from black officers. their pay was $10 per month, while a white private received $13 per month. many union generals thought the u.s. ct should be used only as laborers or garrison troops. having no faith in their fighting potential. when black troops dig into

combat, they sometimes carried inferior weapons, and if they got sick they well might receive inferior medical care. if they were captured, they often were mistreated or even murder. nashville,le of general george h tomas harbored doubts about the combat prowess of african-americans. available,troops thomason decided to use them. on both days of the battle, the united states colored troops make a diversionary tactic against the confederate right flank. the african-american infantry were serving in a division commanded by james stephen composed of two black regiments and one white regiment, and numbered approximately 7500 men.

,hrough no fault of the blacks as the fortunes of war dealt with them harshly, the diversionary tactic resulted in heavy casualties. the situation was even worse on december 16 when cork member -- corps commander john thi launchd an assault in hope of carrying the formidable rebel right flank. it was a blunder. affair thatnceived cost the new troops clearly. both white and black. exacted proximately one third of the total union casualties for the two days fighting at nashville.

suffering the greatest loss of ct,regiment, the 13th u.s. a regiment raised in nashville, which lost approximately 40% of its men. once more, as so often in the civil war, glory hungry commanders and friendless strong defensive positions proved a lethal combination. there were numerous accolades for the fighting prowess of the black troops. some of them from southerners. confederate brigadier general commanded asclaw brigade whose fire devastated the 13th u.s. ct, he was deeply andessed by their furious desperate assault. he reported how the blacks assaulted.

again and again they charged, right into the activity. die,".ey came only to the magnificent effort of the black troops seem to deserve a better fate but the battle of nashville did prove that african-americans would fight, would fight offensively and aggressively, even one assaulting a heavily defended and naturally strong enemy position. [applause]

>> thank you. i am the counterpoint to stephen sam's book on the resurrection of john bell boyd. preference, my aim hood, to get john bell but in a tragedy such as the battle of franklin represents, responsibility should not be overlooked even in a modern sense in terms of our generation. bear with me. the many specific points of controversy about the events at springhill and franklin, as ordered by john inl hood on november 29 1864, the most critical part of the reasons for the key

decisions that he may. ofan attempt to explain some its actions that affected major aspects of the crucial events, we have heard of his alleged use of laudanum, the opium derivative taken for pain but with during the civil war era was regarded as an aspirin rather than a mind altering drug. theoretically, from a modern if he was on a substance, he would not be reasoning with a normal lucid new. would notecisions necessarily be wise or proper. laudanum should be a

nonissue with john bell hood in the springhill and franklin events. why? betterre much explanations for the key events at springhill and franklin as orchestrated by general john bell hood. springhill, the confederate army in the majority of the opposing union army trapped in the vicinity of columbia tennessee -- columbia, passssee, let the march without a major fight. is has been debated and analyzed with blame apportioned

to several commanders. the truly critical aspect which had been generally overlooked by some modern generation historians was that john bell hood advocated his command responsibility by turning over ontrol of active operations the afternoon of november 20 9, 18 exceed four two general frank cheatum. the rationale and reason for this is not often explained. good went to the absalom thompson house, which he established as his headquarters at 4:00 p.m. thompson house was more than a mile distance from the frontline operations at springhill. good was absent from the andical area of observation

decision-making by his own doing. up commandesses gave at the very critical moment in the springhill series of events likely relates to his physical fatigue at that point. good had been in the saddle sense 3:00 a.m. that morning, and with a missing leg and a formerly severely injured arm, he would logically have experienced fatigue and weariness. as general stephen dealey later wrote what was so physically incapacitated while acting in of commander, he never should have been selected as army commander. his vulnerability to fatigue

makes far more sense and explaining why he wasn't on the front lines at spring hill to make critical decisions when needed. a succession of generals and couriers had to make their way back and forth from code datauarters just to convey and get instructions. boondoggle for the confederates at springhill. while hood would give authority to frank cheatum, these operations he could not delegate the responsibility. hood was directly to blame for what happened despite the confusion, mistakes, and admissions of others, particularly frank cheatum, who was very much a culprit.

the dire result of the army resultedhood's travel in the obvious cause of the second major decision controversy. make a determined to mast assault on the entrenched union army at franklin on november 30. hood's angeron was of the events of the previous evening, the troops having escaped without difficulty. this matter is crucial to the entire story. hood was described by an observer as angry as a rattlesnake. striking out at anyone and anything on the morning of

november 30 when he found out the extent of the union army escape from under the very muzzles of the confederate guns. his reported i in discussions with other generals that morning only confirm that hood was bitter and very highly upset. while on the road to franklin, he solved the debris and the stragglers from school feels army strewn all over the landscape. an obvious disarray. logically, he would have concluded that the enemy was distressed and perhaps demoralized in their retreat. then, overlooking the vast john bellnterplay, hood solve the flimsy

fortification and suppose the enemy was attempting to further escape. moments spur of the m decision to make a grand attack was rooted in what he believed was strong evidence that the yankees could not resist an overwhelming spirited mast assault. it was not lot number that induce this rationale. it was likely his anger over springhill and the circumstances involved. at this command decision, one of the worst of the war, evident before the attack began. nearly all of his

artillery, there were two batteries present with hoods army since the rest had been left behind at columbia with general stephen dealey, and good had less can fire covering his attack. a third of his army was missing. they were marching toward franklin at a leisurely pace. stephen lee had been told by hood not to hurry his troops forward. the enemy had seemingly escaped. was primarily a evidence of hood's spur of the moment decision to attack at

franklin. vast,gly, he ignore the open terrain at franklin. two miles of which across his [indiscernible] headlongthe lines of entrenchment's, some fashion with briars of orange. a further indictment of his hasty decision-making. it was a commanders responsibility to use his properly, and throughout his career, john bell hood never seemed to learn the evolving lessons of the battlefield. even in a farewell message to said he, in 1865, he

hoped the men might be supplied with more bayonets because it was the bayonet which gave the soldier confidence in himself and enabled him to strike terror into the enemy. outmoded, good was recognized for his failures by a grieving confederate officer when he wrote after butchering 10,000 men in atlanta and as many in tennessee, good had betrayed a whole army. brigade andmand a even a division. but to command the army is not the man. to call him a general is a disgrace to those generals who are worthy to be so-called.

even the veteran enemy soldiers who knew the wisdom of the battlefield were amazed at the lack of common sense which the confederates now used in making so many headlong frontal assaults against defensive positions. we kill a great many in the fight now brought a union corporal. more so than ever because they come out from their work and charger men, which is useless to them. good, only do any get their men slaughtered. in all the decision to attack at franklin was a disaster in the making of wine man. this despite the arguments of

other commanders who pointed out the danger, loss of life and failure involved, but to no avail. , and somake the attack it was. ,s he confided in his memoir the decision was made on the following. the discovery that the army after a forward march of 180 unwilling seemingly to accept battles unless under the protection of [indiscernible] cause me to experience grave concern. i questioned whether or not i would ever succeed in eradicating this evil. it seemed i had exhausted every

means in the power of one man to remove this stumbling block to the army of tennessee. amazingly, in atlanta had orchestrated major headlong frontal attacks to the battle of atlanta and beyond. hood hasmoirs, suggested the valiant army of tennessee wouldn't fight unless behind grass works. this was a veiled reference to the lack of a major confederate attack in springhill. it reflects upon hood's state of reasoning. some have attempted over the years to soften the consequences

of his attack orders. valid, there is no evidence. the wasteful sacrifice of 7000 men of his army was the consequence. of his, as evidenced recklessness, as a combat army commander, we have his directive to attack in mass again on the morning of december 1, which was prior to his learning of the union army's withdrawal from franklin on the night of the 30th. , the extentemained of disaster would have been 1mpounded on december furthering hood's legacy of too much lion, and not enough fox. despite these enormous

, this story is one of the most dramatic and poignant of the civil war. my biggest concern is that the controversies engendered by a away fromnd to take the essential facts and story itself. the unimpeachable focus of these battles should be that the valor and grit of the union and confederate soldiers who fought at franklin and nashville indeed, their valor and character will stand forever as a fine representation of the inherent spirit and commitment of the american people and its

soldiers. thank you. [applause] >> ok. now, we want to open for lessons. in thewe have mics passageway. this is being taped. that is why we want you to use them. if you can line up behind those in start that process, i will do privilege ofs asking the first question. , i would just like to throw out for your consideration . another figure that is not really talked about much today,

we have talked about the confederate command. we have talked about john scofield. let's talk about george tomas. strategyssment of his for and his effectiveness at the battle of nashville. >> i will start off. quite a bit of research on george tomas. ,n terms of his military career character, so forth. many of you probably know the circumstances involving tomas at nashville, which was that he was very, very close to being removed from command by general ulysses grant in the east because in his estimation, he wasn't moving fast enough.

things't doing the right in terms of preventing the confederate army from perhaps advancing across the river into ohio and the northern territory. to, this is i think a key tomas' character. he was certainly going to do everything he could not to delay . he was not going to make a move livesisk his soldiers' without a fair prospect of winning the battle that he knew he should. deservesmy estimation an enormous amount of credit for resisting. orders were perhaps being prepared even have he began to fight the battle for his own removal. yet, he would not be pushed. he would not be shelved into

doing something he knew was wrong, that could be corrected and rectified by his actions in terms of fighting the battle when it was proper to do so. add, i think that is a point that certainly deserves emphasis and it made me think as he was talking about general winfield scott, in command of the union army at the beginning the union, after disaster and bull run, scott that i oughtffect to be removed from command because i knew that army was not ready and i did not stand up and oppose the advance and what

resulted in the battle bull run. tomas was under tremendous attack, to move out, to and yet he waited until everything was sent. if that men he would be removed from command, so be it. i might also add in regard to grant, he didn't really understand the situation at nashville. from hundreds of miles away, to direct things as he did, it was not quite there. of controversyot , bute confederate side there is controversy on the union side with the franklin campaign as well.

after the near miss at springhill, i think he realized how tirelessly close his men had come to being entrapped. controversy, there was a letter that appeared in the herald written by one of scofield staff officers. it said george tomas had botched the campaign and really came close to losing the good part of his army. george tomas was preparing that article when he fell dead. think there is an answer about not answering your critics. james islle, i think right. i do think washington authorities were panicked. he knew there was a major confederate army. i didn't think they realized how badly damaged it had been at

franklin. all they knew is that there was still an army in middle to the city -- mental tennessee. tomas was prudent in not attacking. the weather was terrible. if they had attacked a couple of days earlier it would have been through snow and sleet. civil war generals, especially those who were educated west point, they have this idea they could annihilate a and army at several times. robert lee was upset because they could not do it. albert sidney johnston would have liked to have done it. the only person who came close to it was george tomas at nashville, who just pummeled the had -- ite army and he would notf

have taken care of the course. there are several biographies that have restored him to a stellar place in the pantheon of union generals. he did well. not just well. he did extraordinarily well at nashville. >> thank you. we will open it now to the patient gentleman who has been waiting to ask a question. >> hello. thank you for your scholarship and willingness to accept question. my question refers to general tomas. it seems to me another major missed opportunity was at the atlantic campaign. thomas reed wanted to push on it jonesboro. he could have destroyed him. as i recall, sherman said no. it seems like they could have

prohibited a lot of the tennessee campaign from even happening at that point. it seemed also that sherman never really liked the army of the cumberland. he was an army of the tennessee guy. i'm this interest on your thoughts of what happened it , how that impacted the tennessee campaign. thank you. >> jonesboro is a battle that i don't really know a lot about. frank cheatham was absent. it was part of the core that belonged to him. it was a battle with the confederates badly outnumbered. the goal was to sever the last rail line into atlanta. which they did. i didn't know that thomason wanted to continue on and follow-up the victory. sherman thought he had gotten the objective, the railroad.

for him that was good enough. a difference of philosophy, i would say. think by that, i stage of the war, through the entire atlantic campaign, sherman increasingly saw the benefits of the maneuver, and he was sick of the killing that was taking place. believed that he had what he wanted, and he was not inclined to initiate more bloodshed. sherman, thishat has been a controversial issue. i'm not sure of sherman health tomas in particularly high

regard. he and grant were somewhat akin in that respect. any other comments? .> i agree i think sometimes in analyzing the relationship between some generals, a senior insubordinate, it is often easy to overlook the personalities of the generals involved. a personality,of he certainly wasn't over in terms of his maneuvering like .herman was sometimes, i think a relationship between individuals. we have seen it in civilian life, it is influenced somewhat , and thersonalities

generals involved. without getting in just this they are ajonesboro, technical aspect. i would say that it may have had something to do very much with the personalities. >> thank you for coming. i would like to reflect on what you said and aim it to the battle of nashville. didn't do very well at springhill. good had endorsed him from promotion. on december 6 he sent a telegram to beauregard indicating he was withdrawing the recommendation for promotion.

prelude to my question, on the first day of the battle of cheatham appears to have been quite slow in responding to the order to send toops from his position over the left flank. the question i'm asking is do you suppose beauregard -- that hood revised his withdrawal of , and if he did tell cheatham, with that account for what appears to be a slow response to cheatham to send troops when ordered by hood to the left flank early in midafternoon along hillsboro road? in seeing thatt

hood recommended him for lieutenant general. he withdrew that recommendation and then later said let's forget about it. sure that carried over to nashville. it was like postwar development. i think the general, they worked that fairly well together. cheatham was slow and sending men over, like james lee talked about, there was a demonstration headed by the u.s. colored troops, and it did what it was designed to do, keep his men occupied. they were successful. he cannot strip men away without endangering that portion of the battlefield. you're right he doesn't send them for a while. he feels he cannot spare them. he needs to have them. when he feels the threat has ien eliminated he does it

don't think it is because he has a bone to pick. >> any other comments? >> in considering general george tomas nashville, it would be useful to consider why he is here. general sherman ordered him here. to me, that suggests an extreme amount of confidence on the part of general sherman as to general tomas' ability. had tom is failed at nashville, sherman would have shared a great deal of the blame for that for having separated his armies. it seems to me in looking at why tomas is here, one should consider may be sherman show the

ultimate confidence when he sent him here. >> i will start out with a comment in general in terms of .omas as we mentioned tomas is not going to move unless he is convinced everything is in a reasonable place. especially my opinion, i studied for many years, i was an active collector in military weapons. well, as the civil war soldiers pointed out, there's a tremendous difference between a spencer rifle and a springfield 58 caliber firing a weapon single shot. one of the reasons that thomason was to makeashville who played aemen

major role in attacking the fortifications and courts were armed with spencer's and spencer rifles shot repeating type rifle. it was one heck of a weapon as where thed confederates were driven out of by spencer redoubts armed troop calvary. that sherman, whether right or wrong, so, says a solid , stable, dependable commander did not think that he have the confidence in him to

maneuvering aspects, the flanking that he did in james mcpherson. thinky reading of it is i he may have had more confidence in schofield then tomas. tomas in putting ,harge of defending nashville he felt he had a very solid general. as you pointed out, if tomas had failed, the decision to take 6000 men and marched to the seeing wit and look nearly as good as it did later.

>> i have a question about jefferson, who had a campaign. post-civil war writings, davis implies that he did not approve of hood's move-in to tennessee. some other reading which says that he did. wondering what your opinion was. it, or didn'tove he? thank you. >> well, i'll start with my terms of you're asking, in essence, about the jefferson-davis hood relationship. one of the things we didn't get was talking about john bell hood, was his surreptitious correspondence with the davis administration,

particularly hood ingratiated davisf very much with the administration, and particularly hiserson davis during convalescence period. go to the western reserve historical society, the braxton-bragg papers, and bragg was, of course, jefferson davis's special military advisor, giving davis the advice about the theanders who he knew in and you find that john bell secretiveeeping a correspondence with the administration through bragg and others that was, in effect, spying on joe johnson in terms of his conduct of the army

during the initial atlanta campaign. find, i think, that there trustcertain measure of between jefferson davis and john hoodhood, because really was jefferson davis's man, so to speak, in the west. president's watch dog, as i termed in one of my chapters. giveot that he couldn't hood advice, because he did give hood advice during the atlanta that he was losing perhaps too many men and he'd terms be circumspect in of the casualty figures that he was enacting, because of his offensive concepts, so i think, in my estimation, there was a favoritism on the part of jefferson davis to the

command situation of general hood in the west. made a coupleavis of trips over from richmond to thetheater, one was after battle of chicag chickamauga. other one was after the fall of atlanta. by that time, the confederate palmetto.oved out of and i think he comes basically to see for himself what's going on. he says to the confederate troops there that essentially they're going to go into they will make moscow.a perfect and northern newspapers got wind of it. to say that jefferson davis did not approve hood's tennessee campaign is incredibly do you duplicity, if that's the case, did and hecertainly told the troops that. >> just following up a bit on

relationship with thatond, one of the things has disturbed me for a good many years was that he was -- i toieve this was in a letter bragg. i'm not certain. i would have to check that. talking about how johnston would not attack and and again urged again that the confederates should atlantauring the campaign, almost to the point, he had become -- i don't think obnoxious was the sorthe used, but anyway, of a sore thumb to a lot of the confederate officers, because he continued to urge attack. wasn't true.mply retreat.sed he advised johnston to retreat

from the river. he advised him to retreat from kennesaw mountain. him to retreat from chattahoochee. comment perhaps, some of the discomfort from on hood might have been because he was a virginian. >> i didn't understand that. >> i'm just making a comment. >> he made a general comment. understand. >> should you repeat your question? they didn't catch it. i'm sorry. >> he's saying that general was a virginian and you wonder if some of the washington based upon him was that. >> that is true. >> okay. that.t know about john was a pennsylvanian.

of course, he didn't fare too either. you know, thomas's family disowned him. i don't think that they ever again.cated with him and i don't know that the used that authorities against him. i think what they thought was was slow and too methodical and waited too long. really knowing the situation, particularly in nashville. know, i think there were people in the north maybe who were somewhat suspicious of him. after chickamauga, how anyone could doubt george union's devotion to the is just beyond me. and i don't think washington -- i don't think that was a factor, to be honest with you. >> any jobs, i think, in the the administration in washington was early, very early dissipated by the victories of and hisarly in the war

excellent combat record. he may have been criticized as being slow and methodical, but they knew he was fighter and not only a good fighter but he was certainly committed to the fighting on the winningldiers' part, battles. add, another factor in the nashville situation, it me, with grant and washington worrying that thomas attacking, they couldn't conceive -- i don't believe they of how inadequate hood's logistics situation was, intoing about him going kentucky and on up the ohio river, he couldn't have begun to do that. theust didn't have logistics situation to do it. and i think grant probably found

difficult to believe that he would have come all this way central tennessee with such poor logistics. >> we all know that general forrest had a lot of problems with his commanding officers. what i would like to ask is, withof his relationship general hood? how did he get along with him? any comments or thoughts from him regarding spring hill, franklin, regarding the battle of nashville? [whispering] >> okay. the question was, how forrest each otherlated to at the spring hill situation? is what what i understand?

>> and niceville. >> and niceville? franklin,egard to ha -- forresta did not agree with hood's attack there. hill, it seems to me that forrest was never fully clear about hood allegedly pike, and block the instead was coming in and attacking the union troops that there, maybe some 6500, rather than trying to concentrate on blocking the pike. i think there's misunderstanding

certainly between hood and forrest at spring hill. i don't know that that particularly affected what happened the next day at franklin. forrestthat probably just disagreed totally with the aea of a frontal attack, frontal assault at franklin and, of course, wanted to try and blank the federals out of their position. >> i think another interesting that what happened in the nashville circumstances, detached and sent , you wouldhe idea presume, that per se the bear on theught to rosecransison at fort and the murphysborough area force the union army to come out of their entrenchments

armyttack the confederate in their fortified areas and so forth at nashville. out thatdidn't work way. fact, forrest took a pretty good beating. matter isint of the that -- and i've never seen discountshat per se the relationship in terms of theest after the campaign, tennessee campaign. he was so upset with the command and the command of the wanted tennessee that he to go to richmond. in fact, he asked permission to go to richmond. to go and set the toord straight, according his concept versus that of john of why thereterms had been so much failure and

frustration. he, forrest, seemed to be, from what i've read, very, very, very upset with the campaign as conducted from the very beginning of the tennessee campaign. isthe only thing i would add that in hood's book, he criticizes forrest for spring hill particularly. forrest allegedly had a meeting with him. couldod asked him if he send troops. and take the road north-of-spring hill. men havest said, my been fighting all day and we're short of ammunition and apparently stewart's men gave him ammunition and the pike wasn't block. what hood really desired to do, and part of that controversy, somebody, don't worry about it. general forrest is going to cut off the road. happen.rently it didn't we know it didn't happen. personalir relationships, i don't know. it always struck me that forrest

a superb commander of raids. he should have been put in charge of the army of tennessee. athink he would have been miserable failure. he didn't like criticism, was his owndoing things way. i just think that's not his forte. , you know, he doesn't get criticized very often. if we ever perfect time travel, i would like to go back and go say get cheatham and across the damn road and let's see what happens. [laughter] they had done that, at least we would have had a little different topic to talk about. >> yes, sir? >> yes. this is less a question and more a plea for help, i guess. my wife purchased this for me about 25 years ago. it's a swagger stick. it from the veterans home in california, in napa

valley. the name of qheerl on it and -- wheeler on it and the of palmer and a date of '65. if anyone wants to take a look it, i'd some light on be most appreciative. >> make sure you're standing in we can find you when this is over. >> how about the museum? >> yes, sir. >> general hood seems to get shrift in everything i ever read. seems to me that, number one, he was ordered by president davis army of tennessee on the offensive. number two, the only thing that made any sense was what he tried to do, namely to retake the confederacy and go join lee in virginia. deserves criticism for, i guess, the rashness of the attack on franklin.

littleother hand, it's a different than what general lee did at gettysburg and yet he virtually no criticism for that. so i guess it just surprised me the history doesn't seem to find anything favorable about the general. >> okay. a little i have different perspective, to say think thereecause i are tremendous differences between gettysburg and franklin. artillery, forf one thing, in terms of he lights out ofday the line on cemetery hill. and hood didn't. but those are technical points. to put things in context, the way i see it. you've got to put it in context sense that hood had a tremendous responsibility. he had the hopes of the

on hisracy really riding troops in terms of what he was do, the desperation circumstances that he was in as result of atlanta. the south was losing the war. weren't going to do anything about bringing in black so on and so forth. so the whole scenario was unfavorable. in a desperate strait. thestill, in terms of decisions that you make as a cannot, on the basis of desperation and the basis of a circumstance that doesn't look favorable, you can't just commit men in terms a frontal assault like at franklin without paying the in terms of the consequences, not only then but

now. and i think it's a disservice, to be honest with you, to bring fact that john bell hood should not be regarded as than a tremendous failure in his responsibility that attack. that will stay with us, in my opinion, forever. >> i'm more sympathetic to john than wiley. [laughter] >> here's why. he takes over the command of the army of tennessee in in a no-win situation. he's taken over for a commander 100has sur rended about miles of north georgia. as an aside, if you want somebody who has taken a beating historically, there's not a soul anything nice to say about johnson anymore. byjust gets battered historians, left and right. so hood takes over, and he knows

that thisond thinks strategy of falling back has to and has to stop now. so he fights three battles, around atlanta in about eight so, and none of them go the way he wants. tactically, none of them go the partly because there's new commanders in unfamiliar positions and trying this responsibility in ways that they have not grown into. so i think he loses those battles in part because he just do quite the army to what he wants, and part of it is commandthe army is in shuffles. if you want to give the best hood,onstruction for here's what he says. scofffield was there. he goes all the way to nashville numbersugments thomas's no, in nashville. this is your only opportunity to get him before he withdraws an way to the capital. so he makes this decision.

impulsivet an decision? i don't know. i know that franklin cheatham him against it. and other officers had grave doubts about it. but i just don't know that he felt he had much choice, in the scofffieldif you go, this is sort of a dammed if you do, dammed if you don't. the battle starts, to be honest with you, and i see it primarily through cheatham who closer to the battlefield, he sent his staff officers in one of them ever came back. once the smoke and darkness came, those generals had no idea what was transpiring. all they knew was that there was a long period for of time. there was obviously a lot of fighting taking place, but they ghastly thehow casualties would be, particularly on the confederate side.

so the best case for john bell i think, at franklin, is they're there. i've madehem go, things worse for myself. in nashville, i've got to can,ct as much damage as i and i'm going to roll the dice. and, you know, it's easy for us sit here in 2014 and say, man, what a terrible decision. i think whatever decision he makes is bad, you know. that.hink >> and we've got two more greg and then... >> thank you all for being here. work for aed your long time. i've always enjoyed and appreciated what you've done. along thea question lines of the prior gentleman about general hood. about four years ago, several boxes of documents previously up previously unknown, i think, were discovered as

hood's personal papers. guys have hadu the chap chance to review thosed changed your thoughts in any way about hood's performance? >> i never have had any see those papers. >> some relatives said, hey, we've got these old things. out, this treasure trove of papers, i mean, it's the thing that we all would die know.ou and it happens very rarely. frank cheatham's papers are burned, i'm afraid. what they -- if you want to know, sam hood has written a book about them, taken the editedts and, you know, them and things like that. if you want to know what's in there -- i don't have that book. of histhe study ancestor. if you really want it, it's think.le, i and it is widely available, i think. so you can buy it. and see what -- and make up your own mind.

>> well, again, as i say, i don't want to beat a dead horse terms of myt in view, my view is, again, you look at john bell hood, what did he have access to when he wrote memoirs.cos? papers thatthese were found? i presume he did. why didn't he -- if there's any -- whydously ex scu didn't hood utilize him in his defense? based on hiss perspective. why wouldn't he use these papers important ando me memoryn terms of the he wrote?

certainly haven't examined the papers. maybe there are some great there.l i presume that there's a lot of the-war material in collection. probablyure that there is some material of very much value. but, again, in terms of hood's himself, ifterms of he had access to these papers to that with, it seems to me he certainly would have utilized his defense in book.g that >> the only thing i want to say that hoodn is i think died really before that book was fully fashioned. died of yellow fever. he may have had access to documents. the advance and retreat has this feeling of -- it's not really polished, not that it

necessarily would have been. it's almost like an incomplete work that he would have gone through and revised. i don't know that he wouldn't have made better use of those documents, but yellow fever came away, so...ok him >> yes, sir? >> in the aftermath of the franklin, the federal troops leave in the middle of night, leaving behind all the severely wounded men, thousands of confederates and union wounded are there. them when theo confederates move on to nashville? they just told to go home? there's very little transport. what happens to these people? >> the really severely wounded franklin.e in franklin. >> , like a lot of towns, vast hospital for wounded men. and robert hicks novel, that's

basis of his novel. i would think that some of the ife slightly wounded, they're confederates, would have gone on to nashville to reunite with their commands. an awful lot of people here. the other problem is what to do with the dead. with thehat they did union dead, there were two lines. they simply through a lot of them into one of those lines, took the dirt they piled up and put it on the bodies. those bodies sometime after the taken to nashville and cemetery. national se the confederate bodies were moved after the war. space betweenthe graves is so small, and that's because even though it had only after the years battle, there really wasn't that much left. theseuld put them in -- human remains you could put in boxes about this size. so that's what happened to them. backthe yankees came through, they basically reclaimed franklin and took care well ass as confederates who were here. and some of the union probably

beenthat they had not cared as well as the confederates had been, but i'm accurate to say. you know, confederate medical doctors and personnel probably did -- my guess is as good as they could with what they had to work with. to squeeze in that last one. but to be like george, you've seconds. >> shouldn't take that long. basically this is a two-part question. first, in reality, is it possible that the south could nashville? and what would have been the strategy implications had they nashville? thank you. i'll give a simple answer. i don't think they had a chance of taking nashville. now, to speculate then on what been the strategic implications of something that i have happened,ld i find rather difficult to deal with.

completely agree with ates, because you look the -- from any aspect, the the ordnanceect, aspect, there was really very little chance, unless there was some major, major mistakes made by thomas and the union command, very littleas chance of nashville falling to the confederate forces, after they had been so greatly devastated at franklin. question -- the old saying "if" is the biggest the english language. if nashville had fallen, what difference would it have made? i think, indeed, that's probably question.rable but in my question, the concentration that would have hood and his army somehow had managed to take

nashville, the concentration that would have been brought against that army through the influence of grant and others have been such that, i think, they would have had no even after the, shall we conquest or victory at nashville. >> i think it was one of the int heavily fortified cities america. let's say hood had come with his army intact and everything. didn't have the men to cover it. i don't think you could storm nashville. grant tried to storm it and was unscwefl. i just don't think that could have happened. the best that hood probably could have done is wait for thomas to come out, and if he had been lucky, could have of toms' thomas's army. that would have been a gateway to the city. highly unlikely. i don't think it would have happened.

>> well, let's give our round ofs a big applause. [applause] every civil war airs here saturday at 6:00 and 10:00 p.m. eastern time. civil warore of our programming anytime, visit c-span.org/history. watching american history tv, all weekend, every weekend, on c-span 3. >> sunday afternoon, former press secretaries from the ford, reagan, george h. bush,e, clinton and obama the manyations discuss challenges they faced while trying to work for the white house and serve the press. ists include mccurry and gibbs. that's sunday at 4:25 p.m. eastern time, here on c-span 3's american history tv.