join american history tv on sunday night as a former next and aid describes his -- nixon aide describes his time with the -president. sunday night at 8:00 p.m. on c-span3 american history tv. >> a panel of authors and historians talked about the significance of the 1864 battle of spring hill, franklin, and nashville, the last campaign of the civil war in tennessee. they examined how john bell hood was written history and the u.s. colored troops compared to the sherman marched to the sea. this 90 minute event is part of the series organized by the

tennessee sesquicentennial. >> thank you for attending this session featuring our same topic of the day, the last campaign in tennessee. my name is van wes, i am the tennessee state historian. and a professor at middle tennessee state university. it was an easy drive over to join this event today. for our expert historians, they have all come quite a way to join and be part of this event. i'm appreciative of that. the way i would like to do this, so we have plenty of time for questions and comments, i am going to introduce all three speakers now in alphabetical order.

they all come up in that order. ok. our first speaker will be chris lawson. i have known chris for 30 years. it goes back to his excellent work on frank cheetham, and his confederate division in tennessee's forgotten warriors. that came out in 1989. he has been involved with us and been very generous of his time here for different civil war and franklin battlefield symposiums that we have worked with. welcome back.

our second speaker will be james lee mcdonagh, the sign of the times we all have been working with each other for many years. jim is a professor emeritus from auburn university. he has a native of nashville. he taught at pepperdine before going to auburn. those of us involved with tennessee history no mcdonagh has worked so well through all of his pivotal studies, from the study of shiloh, to stones river, to franklin, that he co-authored, the parable campaign and of course, recently, in the last decade, the study of nashville and the major battle. our third speaker is wily sword. he is an award winning author.

his book, "embrace an angry wind" was all about the hood campaign and won an award in 1992 for the best book on the civil war. he understood the western theater extensively in his book on shiloh, bloody april. i highly recommend that as well. we have three experts who are also intimately knowledgeable about franklin and its impact, as well as the battle of nashville and its importance. that is one of the things we want to make sure we bring out this afternoon, these last two battles did constitute the last campaign in tennessee and it is really important for us to go explore that and understand what that meant for the civil war not only in the south, but for the entire civil war and its outcome.

it is a brief introduction a very distinguished historians. i'm going to turn the mic over to chris. [applause] >> thank you. it is a great honor to be here today. today represents work of dozens of individuals and organizations. we are profoundly grateful. it is always a great treat to come to tennessee. the 10 hour drive was worth it. according to your program, but we're supposed to do today is offer insights, on the portions of the campaign that are particularly illuminating. i'm going to do two things. the first one deals with spring hill. most of you know the campaign no -- -- well enough that it is

before the battle of franklin, a lost opportunity to attack union troops. what happened is a profound mystery in many ways. good planned a flanking movement which was successful. there were federal troops that were going to come at the pike at night. then they failed to do either of two things. they could have launched an attack supported by artillery. they did not do that. it was not the larger fight that other generals had contemplated. the other thing they could have done was cut off the pipe so that as troops came from columbia they would be met by confederate resistance. the thing that always start me about this is that it is always deemed as a confederate failure, but there is assumptions made about what the federals would have done, that they would have been ensnared and destroyed.

at spring hill they had an of destroying or mangling a large part of the union army. that is possibly true. what is lost and never get the attention that is due is that the yankees in this case. are simply accomplices. these were veteran federal soldiers. these were battle hardened veterans of the atlantic campaign and elsewhere. the idea they would simply encounter confederate troops and meekly hand over the weapons is preposterous. there could have been a battle. it could have been at spring hill. i think the idea that the federals would have been dispatched with ease is simply nonsense. you can do what i did with my toy soldiers. you can do whatever you want with your imagination.

both sides would have suffered casualties. if an attack taken place it was fraught with danger. there could have been a battle. it could've been fought somewhere else. the idea this would change the course of the war seems simply false. the second thing i briefly want to talk about, there is an elephant in the room. john bell hood. i went to visit his boyhood home. he is associated with texas but he was born in kentucky. i went over to see john bell hood's boyhood home. looking for inspiration. there was none.

there is a nice carport. he left when he is so young, i could not imagine him in the driveway. there has been a new book published by a man who goes by the name of sam. what mr. hood says, he believes historians have formed an inaccurate portrayal of hood, ignored positive views of him during the war and postwar. he believes historians have accentuated negative and britain things that are false. he believes the story and seth copied anecdotes from others without going to the original source to takes statements out of context, cherry pick that the -- defame hood. frankly there is a long line of

historians, he bust my chops about an antidote about the betting $40. i should have known better. mr. hood tells me that in prewar 1850's america it would've been $68,000. if i used the anecdote i should've counted in terms of something to the effect like he was viewed as aggressive and this anecdote, even though it is preposterous, illustrates it. other people he takes on more. there is the tennessee connection. wily sword is particular of his target. i do have the impression that sam hood would like to get all of us in a big room and just beat the hell out of all of us.

i will tell you sam hood has lots of supporters. i went on amazon and there were 60 comments. 44 gave him either a five star or four star rating. i do think there are people who have felt that john hood has been maligned unfairly. that he deserves better. if it was a failed campaign, maybe john bell hood has been wronged by historians. that is what historians do. we take historic events and figures, interpret the past, and there are misinterpretations. i'm glad to have you here. i hope you enjoy the festivities. thank you. [applause] >> it is a pleasure to be here as we commemorate the

sesquicentennial of the civil war, and the middle tennessee campaign of 1864. it is good, an honor to be on the program with these distinguished gentleman who have been studying the civil war for many years. certainly, as chris said, we are appreciative of your presence here today. thank you. the events leading to the confederate march into central tennessee began with a conclusion of the atlanta campaign. in september 1864, the united states military forces led by william sherman entered atlanta, which had become a major southern city, the railroad center and symbol of confederate resistance.

the victory climaxed a four-month long 100,000 man strategic offensive. the confederate army pulled out of the city just before being trapped by the federals. the atlanta news electrified the nation. dramatically and undeniably demonstrating the united states war effort was at last succeeding. the grand achievement contributed significantly, possibly decisively, to president lincoln's campaign for reelection. the success of which virtually assured the ultimate doom of the confederacy. desperate to minimize the united states victory, john bell hood led the southern army northward in late september disrupting the western and atlantic railroad between chattanooga and atlanta.

which served as sherman's supply route. although sherman pursued hood with a portion of his forces, the commander had no intention of relinquishing the initiative to the enemy. who soon moved into north alabama. sherman had altogether another campaign in mind. with 60,000 veteran troops, he determined to march across georgia from atlanta to charleston or savannah living off of the land, breaking roads, destroying all manner of water resources, leaving a trail, he remarked, that will be recognizable 50 years hence. the impact on southern resources and morale he believed would be more devastating than the capture of atlanta.

if hood continued to move west and north into metal tennessee rather than following sherman, george h thomason in nashville, who was amassing separated troops and also reinforced by thousands of sherman's veterans from the atlantic campaign, would defend against the rebel defensive. in mid-november, sherman began the march for which he will ever be remembered. while hood and the army of tennessee, instead of pursuing sherman, prepared to cross the tennessee river and drive northward toward nashville. the resulting campaign in central tennessee highlighted by events at springhill, franklin, and nashville, and characterized by mystery and misery, anger and turmoil, suffering, slaughter, and tragedy, soon became and

ever after remained a subject of endless controversy. the springhill affair was an intriguing enigmatic episode, and has been the focus of much attention. franklin has attracted even more attention. the two-day battle of nashville has a highly significant feature which neither springhill nor franklin can claim. i refer to the participation of african-americans. several thousand strong in a combat role for the union army. the black regiments had come to be officially known as united states colored troops. they fought both days of the engagement.

this is a major reason why the battle of nashville deserves to be commemorated. the experience of serving as a member of the united states colored troops, a black soldier in a blue uniform, was not easy. as you may expect. when the civil war began, lincoln rejected any idea of abolishing slavery or seeking black military assistance for the war effort. he feared such action would alienate the border slave states which had remained loyal to the union, arouse the racial prejudice of northern whites, and further harden confederate resistance. by the late summer of 1862, the president had come to believe undermining slavery would

significantly weaken the confederacy and should become a major priority overriding any negative factors. after the emancipation proclamation was issued, the union army with lincoln's full support launched a drive to recruit african american soldiers. by the war's end, 180,000 blacks would serve in the u.s. ct. 80% of them coming from the confederate states, and most of those former slaves. the great majority of officers for those black troops were white men. this was in order to provide the inexperienced african-american soldiers with leadership by combat veterans. it also reflected in part

considerable part, a bow to racial prejudice, because it was believed few white soldiers would take orders from black officers. their pay was $10 per month, while a white private received $13 per month. many union generals thought the u.s. ct should be used only as laborers or garrison troops. having no faith in their fighting potential. when black troops did get into combat, they sometimes carried inferior weapons, and if they got sick they well might receive inferior medical care. if they were captured, they often were mistreated or even

murdered. at the battle of nashville, general george h tomas harbored doubts about the combat prowess of african-americans. but with black troops available, thomas decided to use them. on both days of the battle, the united states colored troops made a diversionary tactic against the confederate right flank. the african-american infantry were serving in a division commanded by james steadman composed of two black regiments and one white regiment, and numbered approximately 7500 men. through no fault of the blacks, as the fortunes of war dealt with them harshly, the diversionary tactic resulted in heavy casualties.

the situation was even worse on december 16 when corps commander wood launched an assault in hope of carrying the formidable rebel right flank. it was a blunder. a hastily conceived affair that cost the union troops clearly. both white and black. the attack exacted proximately one third of the total union casualties for the two days fighting at nashville. suffering the greatest loss of any regiment, the 13th u.s. ct, a regiment raised in nashville, which lost approximately 40% of its men.

once more, as so often in the civil war, glory hungry commanders and frontal assaults against strong defensive positions proved a lethal combination. there were numerous accolades for the fighting prowess of the black troops. some of them from southerners. confederate brigadier general james t holdsclaw commanded a brigade whose fire devastated the 13th u.s. ct, he was deeply impressed by their furious and desperate assault. he reported how the blacks gallantly assaulted. again and again they charged, right into the activity. but, they came only to die.

the magnificent effort of the black troops seem to deserve a better fate but the battle of nashville did prove that african-americans would fight, would fight offensively and aggressively, even when assaulting a heavily defended and naturally strong enemy position. [applause] >> thank you. i am the counterpoint to stephen

sam hood's book on the resurrection of john bell hood. i will second preference, my aim is not to get john bell hood, but in a tragedy such as the battle of franklin represents, responsibility should not be overlooked even in a modern sense in terms of our generation. bear with me. in examining the many specific points of controversy about the events at springhill and franklin, as ordered by john bell hood on november 29 in 1864, the most critical part of the reasons for the key decisions that he made. in an attempt to explain some of his actions that affected major aspects of the crucial events, we have heard of his alleged use

of laudanum, the opium derivative taken for pain but which during the civil war era was regarded as an aspirin rather than a mind altering drug. theoretically, from a modern perspective, if he was on a substance, he would not be reasoning with a normal lucid ness. thus his decisions would not necessarily be wise or proper. laudanum should be a nonissue with john bell hood in the springhill and franklin events. why? there are much better

explanations for the key events at springhill and franklin as orchestrated by general john bell hood. first, at springhill, the confederate army had the majority of the opposing union army trapped in the vicinity of columbia, tennessee, let the march pass without a major fight. this has been debated and analyzed extensively with blame apportioned to several commanders. the truly critical aspect which had been generally overlooked by some modern generation historians was that john bell hood advocated his command

responsibility by turning over control of active operations on the afternoon of november 29, 1864 to general frank cheatum. the rationale and reason for this is not often explained. hood went to the absalom thompson house, which he established as his headquarters at 4:00 p.m. the thompson house was more than a mile distance from the frontline operations at springhill. hood was absent from the critical area of observation and decision-making by his own doing. why he in essense gave up command at the very critical moment in the springhill series of events likely relates to his

physical fatigue at that point. hood had been in the saddle since 3:00 a.m. that morning, and with a missing leg and a formerly severely injured arm, he would logically have experienced fatigue and weariness. as general stephen dealey later he was so physically incapacitated while acting in the role of commander, he never should have been selected as army commander. his vulnerability to fatigue makes far more sense and explaining why he wasn't on the front lines at spring hill to make critical decisions when needed. a succession of generals and couriers had to make their way

back and forth from hood's headquarters just to convey data and get instructions. this was the boondoggle for the confederates at springhill. while hood would give authority to frank cheatum, these operations he could not delegate the responsibility. hood was directly to blame for what happened despite the confusion, mistakes, and admissions of others, particularly frank cheatum, who was very much a culprit. the dire result of the army escaping hood's trap resulted in the obvious cause of the second major decision controversy.

why hood determined to make a massed assault on the entrenched union army at franklin on november 30. the real reason was hood's anger with the events of the previous evening, the troops having escaped without difficulty. this matter is crucial to the entire story. hood was described by an observer as angry as a rattlesnake. striking out at anyone and anything on the morning of november 30 when he found out the extent of the union army escape from under the very muzzles of the confederate guns. his reported ire in discussions

with other generals that morning only confirm that hood was bitter and very highly upset. while on the road to franklin, he saw the debris and the stragglers strewn all over the landscape. an obvious disarray. logically, he would have concluded that the enemy was distressed and perhaps demoralized in their retreat. then, overlooking the vast two-mile, john bell hood solve the flimsy fortification and supposed the enemy was attempting to further escape.

thus his spur of the moment decision to make a grand attack was rooted in what he believed was strong evidence that the yankees could not resist an overwhelming spirited massed assault. it was not laudanum that induce this rationale. it was likely his anger over springhill and the circumstances involved. at this command decision, one of the worst of the war, evident before the attack began. being without nearly all of his artillery, there were two batteries present with hood's army since the rest had been left behind at columbia with general stephen dealey, and good had less can fire covering his attack.

a third of his army was missing. they were marching toward franklin at a leisurely pace. stephen lee had been told by hood not to hurry his troops forward. the enemy had seemingly escaped. of course, this was prime evidence of hood's spur of the moment decision to attack at franklin. amazingly, he ignored the vast, open terrain at franklin. two miles of which across his columns must cross to reach the

lines of headlong entrenchment's, some fashion with briars of osage orange. this was a further indictment of his hasty decision-making. it was a commander's responsibility to use his men properly, and throughout his career, john bell hood never seemed to learn the evolving lessons of the battlefield. even in a farewell message to his army, in 1865, he said he hoped the men might be supplied with more bayonets because it was the bayonet which gave the soldier confidence in himself and enabled him to strike terror

into the enemy. outmoded, hood was recognized for his failures by a grieving confederate officer when he wrote after butchering 10,000 men in atlanta and as many in tennessee, hood had betrayed a whole army. he might command a brigade and even a division. but to command the army is not the man. to call him a general is a disgrace to those generals who are worthy to be so-called. even the veteran enemy soldiers who knew the wisdom of the battlefield were amazed at the lack of common sense which the confederates now used in making so many headlong frontal

assaults against defensive positions. we kill a great many in the fight now, wrote a union corporal. more so than ever because they come out from their work and charge our men, which is useless to them. they do not do any good, only get their men slaughtered. in all, the decision to attack at franklin was a disaster in the making of one man. this despite the arguments of other commanders who pointed out the danger, loss of life and failure involved, but to no avail. we will make the attack, and so it was. as he confided in his memoir,

the decision was made on the following. the discovery that the army after a forward march of 180 miles was seemingly unwilling to accept battle unless under the protection of [indiscernible] caused me to experience grave concern. i questioned whether or not i would ever succeed in eradicating this evil. it seemed i had exhausted every means in the power of one man to remove this stumbling block to the army of tennessee.

amazingly, this came from the commander who in atlanta had orchestrated major headlong frontal attacks to the battle of atlanta and beyond. in his memoirs, hood has suggested the valiant army of tennessee wouldn't fight unless behind grass works. this was a veiled reference to the lack of a major confederate attack at springhill. it reflects upon hood's state of reasoning. some have attempted over the years to soften the consequences of his attack orders. really, there is no valid evidence. the wasteful sacrifice of 7000 men of his army was the consequence.

further, as evidence of his recklessness, as a combat army commander, we have his directive to attack in mass again on the morning of december 1, which was prior to his learning of the union army's withdrawal from franklin on the night of the 30th. had the troops remained, the extent of disaster would have been compounded on december 1 furthering hood's legacy of too much lion, and not enough fox. despite these enormous controversies, this story is one of the most dramatic and poignant of the civil war. my biggest concern is that the controversies engendered by a

few will tend to take away from the essential facts and story itself. the unimpeachable focus of these battles should be that the valor and grit of the union and confederate soldiers who fought at franklin and nashville indeed, their valor and character will stand forever as a fine representation of the inherent spirit and commitment of the american people and its soldiers. thank you. [applause] >> ok.

now, we want to open for questions. i know we have mics in the passageway. this is being taped. that is why we want you to use them. if you can line up behind those and start that process, i will do the moderators privilege of asking the first question. this one, i would just like to throw out for your consideration. another figure that is not really talked about much today, we have talked about the confederate command. we have talked about john scofield. let's talk about george tomas. your assessment of his strategy for and his effectiveness at the battle of nashville.

>> i will start off. i have done quite a bit of research on george tomas. in terms of his military career, character, so forth. many of you probably know the circumstances involving tomas at nashville, which was that he was very, very close to being removed from command by general ulysses grant in the east because in his estimation, he wasn't moving fast enough. he wasn't doing the right things in terms of preventing the confederate army from perhaps advancing across the river into ohio and the northern territory.

but, this is i think a key to tomas's character. he was certainly going to do everything he could not to delay. he was not going to make a move and risk his soldiers' lives without a fair prospect of winning the battle that he knew he should. tomas in my estimation deserves an enormous amount of credit for resisting. orders were perhaps being prepared even as he began to fight the battle for his own removal. yet, he would not be pushed. he would not be shelved into doing something he knew was wrong, that could be corrected and rectified by his actions in terms of fighting the battle when it was proper to do so. >> i might add, i think that is

a point that certainly deserves emphasis and it made me think as he was talking about general winfield scott, in command of the union army at the beginning of the war, after the union disaster at bull run, scott said to the effect that i ought to be removed from command because i knew that army was not ready and i did not stand up and oppose the advance and what resulted in the battle of bull run. tomas was under tremendous pressure to move out, to attack, and yet he waited until everything was sent.

if that men he would be removed from command, so be it. i might also add in regard to grant, he didn't really understand the situation at nashville. from hundreds of miles away, to direct things as he did, it was not quite there. >> there is a lot of controversy on the confederate side, but there is controversy on the union side with the franklin campaign as well. after the near miss at springhill, i think he realized how close his men had come to being entrapped.

there was a controversy, there was a letter that appeared in the herald written by one of scofield's staff officers. it said george tomas had botched the campaign and really came close to losing the good part of his army. george tomas was preparing that article when he fell dead. i think there is an answer about not answering your critics. [laughter] at nashville, i think james is right. i do think washington authorities were panicked. he knew there was a major confederate army. i didn't think they realized how badly damaged it had been at franklin. all they knew is that there was still an army in middle to the -- tennessee. tomas was prudent in not attacking. the weather was terrible. if they had attacked a couple of

days earlier it would have been through snow and sleet. civil war generals, especially those who were educated west point, they have this idea they could annihilate an enemy army at several times. robert lee was upset because they could not do it. albert sidney johnston would have liked to have done it. the only person who came close to it was george tomas at nashville, who just pummeled the confederate army and had -- i don't know if he would not have taken care of the course. -- corps. there are several biographies that have restored him to a stellar place in the pantheon of union generals. he did well.

not just well. he did extraordinarily well at nashville. >> thank you. we will open it now to the patient gentleman who has been waiting to ask a question. >> hello. thank you for your scholarship and willingness to accept question. my question refers to general tomas. it seems to me another major missed opportunity was at the atlantic campaign. tomas wanted to push on it jonesboro. he could have destroyed him. as i recall, sherman said no. it seems like they could have prohibited a lot of the tennessee campaign from even happening at that point. it seemed also that sherman never really liked the army of the cumberland. he was an army of the tennessee guy.

i'm interested on your thoughts of what happened it jonesboro, how that impacted the tennessee campaign. thank you. >> jonesboro is a battle that i don't really know a lot about. frank cheatham was absent. it was part of the corps that belonged to him. it was a battle where the confederates badly outnumbered. the goal was to sever the last rail line into atlanta. which they did. i didn't know that thomas had wanted to continue on and follow-up the victory. sherman thought he had gotten the objective, the railroad. for him that was good enough. a difference of philosophy, i would say. >> i would add, i think by that stage of the war, through the

entire atlanta campaign, sherman increasingly saw the benefits of the maneuver, and he was sick of the killing that was taking place. i think he believed that he had what he wanted, and he was not inclined to initiate more bloodshed. i think also that sherman, this has been a controversial issue. i'm not sure of sherman held tomas in particularly high regard. he and grant were somewhat akin in that respect. any other comments? >> i agree. i think sometimes in analyzing

the relationship between some generals, a senior and asubordinate, it is often easy to overlook the personalities of the generals involved. tomas was more of a personality, he certainly wasn't over in terms of his maneuvering like sherman was. sometimes, i think a relationship between individuals -- we have seen it in civilian life, it is influenced somewhat by the personalities, and the generals involved. without getting in just this affects of jonesboro, they are a technical aspect.

i would say that it may have had something to do very much with the personalities. >> thank you for coming. i would like to reflect on what you said and aim it to the battle of nashville. cheatham didn't do very well at springhill. hood had endorsed him from -- for promotion. on december 6 he sent a telegram to beauregard indicating he was withdrawing the recommendation for promotion. the prelude to my question, on the first day of the battle of nashville, cheatham appears to have been quite slow in responding to the order to send

troops from his position over to the left flank. the question i'm asking is do you suppose beauregard -- that hood revised his withdrawal of that promotion, and if he did tell cheatham, with that account for what appears to be a slow response to cheatham to send troops when ordered by hood to the left flank early in midafternoon along hillsboro road? >> you are right in saying that hood recommended him for lieutenant general. he withdrew that recommendation and then later said let's forget about it. i'm not sure that carried over to nashville.

it was a postwar development. i think the general, they worked fairly well together. cheatham was slow in sending men over, like james lee talked about, there was a demonstration headed by the u.s. colored troops, and it did what it was designed to do, keep his men occupied. they were successful. he thought you cannot strip men away without endangering that portion of the battlefield. you're right he doesn't send them for a while. he feels he cannot spare them. he needs to have them. when he feels the threat has been eliminated he does it i don't think it is because he has a bone to pick. >> any other comments?

>> in considering general george tomas at nashville, it would be useful to consider why he is here. general sherman ordered him here. to me, that suggests an extreme amount of confidence on the part of general sherman as to general tomas's ability. had tomas failed at nashville, sherman would have shared a great deal of the blame for that for having separated his armies. it seems to me in looking at why tomas is here, one should consider maybe sherman show the ultimate confidence when he sent him here. >> i will start out with a comment in general in terms of tomas as we mentioned.

tomas was not going to move unless he is convinced everything is in a reasonable place. especially in my opinion, i studied for many years, i was an active collector in military weapons. well, as the civil war soldiers pointed out, there's a tremendous difference between a spencer rifle and a springfield 58 caliber firing a weapon single shot. one of the reasons that thomason delayed at nashville was to make sure his horsemen who played a major role in attacking the fortifications and forts were armed with spencer's and spencer

rifles shot repeating type rifle. it was one heck of a weapon as they proved where the confederates were driven out of very strong redoubts by spencer armed troops, calvary. >> i think that sherman, whether right or wrong, so, says a -- saw tomas as a solid, stable, dependable commander but i do think that he did not have the confidence in him to lead the maneuvering aspects, the flanking that he did in james mcpherson.

also, my reading of it is i think he may have had more confidence in schofield than tomas. so far as putting tomas in charge of defending nashville, he felt he had a very solid general. as you pointed out, if tomas had failed, the decision to take 6000 men and march to the seeing -- sea wouldn't look nearly as good as it did later. >> ok. >> i have a question about jefferson davis, hood's campaign.

in his post-civil war writings, davis implies he did not approve hood's movedits -- -- to tennessee. i was wondering what your opinion was. did davis approve it? >> well, i'll start with my answer in terms of you're asking, in essence, about the jefferson-davis hood relationship. davis-hoodn relationship. one of the things we didn't get into, when i was talking about john bell hood, was his surreptitious correspondence with the davis administration, particularly hood ingratiated himself very much with the davis administration, and particularly jefferson davis during his convalescence period.

prior to being assigned as a core commander in the west. and if you go to the western reserve historical society, the braxton-bragg papers, and bragg at the time was, of course, jefferson davis's special military advisor, giving davis all the advice about the commanders who he knew in the west and you find that john bell hood was keeping a secretive correspondence with the administration through bragg and a lot of others that was, in effect, spying on joe johnson in terms of his conduct of the army of tennessee during the initial atlanta campaign. so you find, i think, that there was a certain measure of trust between jefferson davis and john bell hood, because really hood was jefferson davis's man, so to

speak, in the west. he was the president's watch dog, as i termed in one of my chapters. but not that he couldn't give hood advice, because he did give hood advice during the atlanta campaign that he was losing perhaps too many men and he'd better be circumspect in terms of the casualty figures that he was enacting, because of his offensive concepts, so i think, in my estimation, there was always a favoritism on the part of jefferson davis to the command situation of general hood in the west. >> jefferson davis made a couple of trips over from richmond to the theater, one was after the battle of chickamauga.

the other one was after the fall of atlanta. by that time, the confederate army had moved out of palmetto. and i think he comes basically to see for himself what's going on. he says to the confederate troops there that essentially they're going to go into tennessee and they will make atlanta a perfect moscow. and northern newspapers got wind of it. to say that jefferson davis did not approve hood's tennessee campaign is incredibly duplicitous, if that's the case, because he certainly did and he told the troops that. >> just following up a bit on hood's relationship with richmond, one of the things that has disturbed me for a good many years was that he was -- i believe this was in a letter to

bragg. i'm not certain. i would have to check that. but he is talking about how johnston would not attack and how he had urged again and again that the confederates should attack during the atlanta campaign, almost to the point, he says, that he had become -- i don't think obnoxious was the word he used, but anyway, sort of a sore thumb to a lot of the confederate officers, because he continued to urge attack. well, that simply wasn't true. hood advised retreat. he advised johnston to retreat from the river. he advised him to retreat from kennesaw mountain. he advised him to retreat from the chattahoochee. >> the general comment perhaps,

some of the discomfort from washington on hood might have been because he was a virginian. >> i didn't understand that. >> i'm just making a comment. >> he made a general comment. >> we didn't understand. >> should you repeat your question? they didn't catch it. i'm sorry. >> he's saying that general thomas was a virginian and you wonder if some of the washington distrust of him was based upon that. >> that is true. >> okay. i don't know about that. john was a pennsylvanian. of course, he didn't fare too well either. you know, thomas's family disowned him.

i don't think that they ever communicated with him again. and i don't know that the washington authorities used that against him. i think what they thought was that he was slow and too methodical and waited too long. without really knowing the situation, particularly in nashville. you know, i think there were people in the north maybe who were somewhat suspicious of him. but after chickamauga, how anyone could doubt george thomas's devotion to the union is just beyond me. and i don't think washington -- i don't think that was a factor, to be honest with you. >> any jobs, i think, in the mind of the administration in washington was early, very early dissipated by the victories of thomas early in the war and his excellent combat record. indeed, he may have been criticized as being slow and methodical, but they knew he was a fighter and not only a good fighter but he was certainly

committed to the fighting on the union soldiers' part, winning battles. >> i might add, another factor in the nashville situation, it seems to me, with grant and washington worrying that thomas is not attacking, they couldn't conceive -- i don't believe they could conceive of how inadequate hood's logistics situation was, worrying about him going into kentucky and on up the ohio river, he couldn't have begun to do that. he just didn't have the logistics situation to do it. and i think grant probably found it difficult to believe that he would have come all this way into central tennessee with such poor logistics.

>> we all know that general forrest had a lot of problems with his commanding officers. what i would like to ask is, what of his relationship with general hood? how did he get along with him? and do we have any comments or thoughts from him regarding spring hill, franklin, regarding the battle of nashville? [whispering] >> okay. the question was, how forrest and hood related to each other at the spring hill situation? is what what i understand? >> and nashville. >> and nashville? well, in regard to franklin, certainly -- ha ha -- forrest

did not agree with hood's decision to attack there. back at spring hill, it seems to me that forrest was never fully clear about hood allegedly wanting to block the pike, and instead was coming in and attacking the union troops that were martialed there, maybe some 6500, rather than trying to concentrate on blocking the pike. i think there's misunderstanding certainly between hood and forrest at spring hill. i don't know that that particularly affected what

happened the next day at franklin. i think that probably forrest just disagreed totally with the idea of a frontal attack, a frontal assault at franklin and, of course, wanted to try and blank the federals out of their position. >> i think another interesting point is that what happened in the nashville circumstances, forrest was detached and sent down with the idea, you would presume, that per se the pressure brought to bear on the union garrison at fort rosecrans and the murphysborough area would force the union army to come out of their entrenchments and attack the confederate army in their fortified areas and so forth at nashville. well, it didn't work out that way. in fact, forrest took a pretty

good beating. but the point of the matter is that -- and i've never seen anything that per se discounts the relationship in terms of forrest after the campaign, the tennessee campaign. he was so upset with the command staff and the command of the army of tennessee that he wanted to go to richmond. in fact, he asked permission to go to richmond. he wanted to go and set the record straight, according to his concept versus that of john bell hood in terms of why there had been so much failure and frustration. he, forrest, seemed to be, from what i've read, very, very, very upset with the campaign as conducted from the very beginning of the tennessee campaign.

>> the only thing i would add is that in hood's book, he criticizes forrest for spring hill particularly. forrest allegedly had a meeting with him. and hood asked him if he could send troops. and take the road north-of-spring hill. and forrest said, my men have been fighting all day and we're short of ammunition and apparently stewart's men gave him ammunition and the pike wasn't block. what hood really desired to do, and part of that controversy, hood says to somebody, don't worry about it. general forrest is going to cut off the road. and apparently it didn't happen. we know it didn't happen. as to their personal relationships, i don't know. it always struck me that forrest had been a superb commander of raids. some say he should have been put in charge of the army of tennessee.

i think he would have been a miserable failure. he didn't like criticism, was used to doing things his own way. i just think that's not his forte. but, you know, he doesn't get criticized very often. if we ever perfect time travel, i would like to go back and go to frank cheatham and say get across the damn road and let's see what happens. [laughter] because if they had done that, at least we would have had a little different topic to talk about. >> yes, sir? >> yes. this is less a question and more a plea for help, i guess. my wife purchased this for me about 25 years ago. it's a swagger stick. and i got it from the veterans home in california, in napa valley. it's got the name of wheeler on it and the name of palmer and a date of '65. if anyone wants to take a look and shed some light on it, i'd be most appreciative. >> make sure you're standing in a good corner so we can find you when this is over.

>> how about the museum? >> yes, sir. >> general hood seems to get short shrift in everything i ever read. seems to me that, number one, he was ordered by president davis to take the army of tennessee on the offensive. number two, the only thing that made any sense was what he tried to do, namely to retake nashville for the confederacy and go join lee in virginia. certainly he deserves criticism for, i guess, the rashness of the attack on franklin. on the other hand, it's a little different than what general lee did at gettysburg and yet he gets virtually no criticism for that. so i guess it just surprised me that the history doesn't seem to find anything favorable about the general.

>> okay. well, and i have a little different perspective, to say the least, because i think there are tremendous differences between gettysburg and franklin. lee had a lot of artillery, for one thing, in terms of he bombarded the day lights out of the line on cemetery hill. and hood didn't. but those are technical points. you've got to put things in context, the way i see it. you've got to put it in context in the sense that hood had a tremendous responsibility. he had the hopes of the confederacy really riding on his troops in terms of what he was trying to do, the desperation circumstances that he was in as a result of atlanta.

the south was losing the war. they weren't going to do anything about bringing in black soldiers, so on and so forth. so the whole scenario was unfavorable. so hood was in a desperate strait. but still, in terms of the decisions that you make as a commander, you cannot, on the basis of desperation and the basis of a circumstance that doesn't look favorable, you can't just commit men in terms of a frontal assault like at franklin without paying the responsibility in terms of the consequences, not only then but now. and i think it's a disservice, to be honest with you, to bring up the fact that john bell hood should not be regarded as anything other than a tremendous failure in his responsibility for making that attack. that will stay with us, in my

opinion, forever. >> i'm more sympathetic to john bell hood than wiley. [laughter] >> here's why. when he takes over the command of the army of tennessee in 1964, he's in a no-win situation. he's taken over for a commander who has sur rended about 100 miles of north georgia. as an aside, if you want somebody who has taken a beating historically, there's not a soul who has anything nice to say about johnson anymore. he just gets battered by historians, left and right. so hood takes over, and he knows that richmond thinks that this strategy of falling back has to stop and has to stop now. so he fights three battles, around atlanta in about eight days or so, and none of them go the way he wants. tactically, none of them go the way he wants, partly because

there's new commanders in unfamiliar positions and trying to take on this responsibility in ways that they have not grown into. so i think he loses those battles in part because he just can't get the army to do quite what he wants, and part of it is because the army is in command shuffles. if you want to give the best case construction for hood, here's what he says. scofffield was there. he goes all the way to nashville and he augments thomas's numbers in nashville. this is your only opportunity to get him before he withdraws an gets all the way to the capital. so he makes this decision. now, was it an impulsive decision? i don't know. i know that franklin cheatham advised him against it. and other officers had grave doubts about it. but i just don't know that he felt he had much choice, in the sense that if you let schofield go, this is sort of a damned if you do, damned if you don't.

when the battle starts, to be honest with you, and i see it primarily through cheatham who was closer to the battlefield, he sent his staff officers in and not a one of them ever came back. once the smoke and darkness came, those generals had no idea what was transpiring. all they knew was that there was still going on for a long period of time. there was obviously a lot of fighting taking place, but they had no idea how ghastly the casualties would be, particularly on the confederate side. so the best case for john bell hood, i think, at franklin, is they're there. if i let them go, i've made things worse for myself. in nashville, i've got to inflict as much damage as i can, and i'm going to roll the dice.

and, you know, it's easy for us to sit here in 2014 and say, man, what a terrible decision. i think whatever decision he makes is bad, you know. i do think that. [laughter] >> and we've got two more questions, so greg and then... >> thank you all for being here. i've followed your work for a long time. i've always enjoyed and appreciated what you've done. i do have a question along the lines of the prior gentleman about general hood. about four years ago, several boxes of documents previously up known, i -- previously unknown, i think, were discovered as hood's personal papers. i wonder if you guys have had the chance to review those, and if so, has it changed your thoughts in any way about hood's performance? >> i never have had any opportunity to see those papers. >> some relatives said, hey, we've got these old things.

as i turned out, this treasure trove of papers, i mean, it's the thing that we all would die for, you know. and it happens very rarely. frank cheatham's papers are burned, i'm afraid. what they -- if you want to know, sam hood has written a book about them, taken the documents and, you know, edited them and things like that. if you want to know what's in there -- i don't have that book. i have the study of his ancestor. if you really want it, it's available, i think. and it is widely available, i think. so you can buy it. and see what -- and make up your own mind. >> well, again, as i say, i don't want to beat a dead horse to death, but in terms of my view, my view is, again, you look at john bell hood, what did he have access to when he wrote

his memoirs? did he have these papers that were found? i presume he did. why didn't he -- if there's any really tremendously exculpating -- why didn't hood utilize him in his own defense? his memory was based on his perspective. why wouldn't he use these papers if they were so important and critical in terms of the memory he wrote? -- in terms of the memoir he wrote. i certainly haven't examined the papers. maybe there are some great material there. i presume that there's a lot of post-war material in the

collection. and i'm sure that there probably is some material of very much value. but, again, in terms of hood's defense, in terms of himself, if he had access to these papers to begin with, it seems to me that he certainly would have utilized these papers in his defense in writing that book. >> the only thing i want to say in addition is i think that hood died really before that book was fully fashioned. he died of yellow fever. he may have had access to documents. the advance and retreat has this feeling of -- it's not really polished, not that it necessarily would have been. but it's almost like an incomplete work that he would have gone through and revised. so i don't know that he wouldn't have made better use of those documents, but yellow fever came along and took him away, so... >> yes, sir? >> in the aftermath of the battle of franklin, the federal

troops leave in the middle of the night, leaving behind all the severely wounded men, thousands and thousands of confederates and union wounded are there. what happens to them when the confederates move on to nashville? are they just told to go home? there's very little transport. what happens to these people? >> the really severely wounded stayed here in franklin. franklin, like a lot of towns, became a vast hospital for wounded men. and robert hicks novel, that's really the basis of his novel. i would think that some of the more slightly wounded, if

they're confederates, would have gone on to nashville to reunite with their commands. but there are an awful lot of people here. the other problem is what to do with the dead. i think what they did with the union dead, there were two lines. they simply through a lot of them into one of those lines, then took the dirt they piled up and put it on the bodies. those bodies sometime after the war were taken to nashville and put in the national cemetery. the confederate bodies were moved after the war. it looks like the space between graves is so small, and that's because even though it had only been a few years after the battle, there really wasn't that much left. you could put them in -- these human remains you could put in boxes about this size. so that's what happened to them. when the yankees came back through, they basically reclaimed franklin and took care of theirs as well as confederates who were here. and some of the union probably felt that they had not been cared as well as the confederates had been, but i'm not sure that's accurate to say. you know, confederate medical doctors and personnel probably did -- my guess is as good as they could with what they had to work with. >> i'm going to squeeze in that

last one. but to be like george, you've got 30 seconds. >> shouldn't take that long. basically this is a two-part question. first, in reality, is it possible that the south could have taken nashville? and what would have been the strategy implications had they taken nashville? thank you. >> well, i'll give a simple answer. i don't think they had a chance of taking nashville. now, to speculate then on what might have been the strategic implications of something that i don't think could have happened, i find rather difficult to deal with. >> i completely agree with james, because you look at the -- from any aspect, the technical aspect, the ordnance aspect, there was really very little chance, unless there was some major, major mistakes made

by thomas and the union command, that there was very little chance of nashville falling to the confederate forces, especially after they had been so greatly devastated at franklin. but indeed, the question -- the old saying "if" is the biggest word in the english language. if nashville had fallen, what difference would it have made? i think, indeed, that's probably an imponderable question. but in my question, the concentration that would have been -- if hood and his army somehow had managed to take nashville, the concentration that would have been brought against that army through the influence of grant and others would have been such that, i think, they would have had no chance, even after the, shall we say, the conquest or victory at

nashville. >> i think it was one of the most heavily fortified cities in america. let's say hood had come with his army intact and everything. he still didn't have the men to cover it. i don't think you could storm nashville. grant tried to storm it and was unscwefl. i just don't think that could have happened. the best that hood probably could have done is wait for thomas to come out, and if he had been lucky, could have destroyed a part of thomas's army. that would have been a gateway to the city. but that's highly unlikely. i don't think it would have happened. >> well, let's give our historians a big round of applause. [applause] >> the civil war airs here every saturday at 6:00 and 10:00 p.m. eastern time.

to watch more of our civil war programming anytime, visit c-span.org/history. you're watching american history tv, all weekend, every weekend, on c-span 3. >> join american history tv .unday night with frank gannon we will see clips of interviews with richard nixon and here topics including vietnam, china, watergate, and nixon's resignation. it 8 p.m. eastern on c-span3 american history tv. >> monday night on "the communicators" -- >> i think all of us as someone

who uses a computer every day, we have certain expectations when we fire up our can is about who sees what we are doing, who shares information when, and it any moment -- if the expectations i have are shifted because i realize there might be another party who sees what i am doing -- say for example, if a , saying if iup want help making a purchase -- there are certain lines we do not know we have crossed them until it is too late. that is true for researchers and true for companies. loudly intoalking her cell phone has no problem with someone listening to that conversation on a bench. at the same time you can have someone trying to have a conversation and they will go to somewhereth to be

that is completely secluded. we are dealing not only with the cultural context. we are looking at individual experiences and needs for privacy. >> monday night on "the 2.mmunicators" on c-span coming up next, old dominion university professor timothy lord talks about how world war i was different from previous wars and highlights some of the major battles. this introduction is just under half an hour. >> at this time, i'd like to bring up dr. timothy orr, who will lead all of our sessions today. dr. orr is a professor of history at old dominion university and specializes in american military history and the history of the civil war era. in particular, he's written on union mobilization and the lives of union soldiers. his latest research focuses on partisan conflict within the