. one of the good things about this for me is the quality of the communication between intelligence, between the national security council staff in particular is a very intense give-and-take. we get thank-you notes, we get questions, we get kicks from time to time. but i'm impressed but the stream of thank-you notes. often the thank-you notes say thanks for doing this in 12 hours. they're more about timing than about quality, but this is an administration that seems very receptive to intelligence. that doesn't mean they necessarily follow our advice if there is advice, or believe what we say, but we're heard. i think that's the main thing

you can ask if you're trying to do intelligence to make better policy. on ukraine, i haven't really looked hard at it. it was kind of in motion when i got there so i don't think i have a very tutored view of how well we did or didn't do it. of course it depends a lot on what you think mr. putin's time horizon and decision making was like. >> i think we'll make this the last question with one wrap-up question from me. then i think you're all then, after then, invited to a reception outside, too. >> joe marks from politico. want to follow up on the cyber security issue that you mentioned a couple of times. you said it was one of the things you were looking at most in the long range. i'm wondering how nic looks an issue like cyber where you are

looking at technological change over a series of 10 or 15 years as opposed to one nation's national interest. well me pile on to that since this is the closing question. let's take that one, and also your expanding to -- and this is not entirely cyber. it's broader in technology issues but you are including a new national intelligence officer that focuses on civil technology. maybe you can also talk to us about where that decision comes from and how well, particularly in the spirit of your new book, does he actually do in following science and technology trends and how important is that going to be going forward as well. those two things. >> on the cyber issue, obviously there is a lot of forward looking work to be done but there is a pretty stead of stream of questions as well. we're in touch with the people

in private sector so there is a steady stream of current stuff happening there, too. not a lot of policy making meetings on it, but it is not just trying to think more strategically, though i think that's real important in the cyber realm. on s and t -- >> the reason i ask is we've done some big reports on disruptive technologies, whether it's bio, big data, added manufacturing, human enhancement, there is a lot coming at us. that's the sort of context of this question. >> yeah. he mostly does space now so we're trying to fill an io that focuses mostly on science and technology. mostly on civil though it is kind of hard to separate these anymore. i.t. is the most obvious example. my impression -- no more than that -- is that the community does a pretty good job at following military technology -- military-specific technology.

a much less good job at following civilian and dual-use kinds of technologies or ones that not too much dual use. we probably do a pretty good job of those. but ones that are inherently on that fuzzy line between civil and military can be used for both. so trying to beef up that capacity for us. lot of people are out there doing scans of science and technology. it's always interesting to me. i feel like i've been hearing about nano technology for a very long time, and nothing much has quite happened. i suppose the proposition there is that technological breakthroughs or technological changes have more effect once they go through the social fabric but may take longer to go through the social fabric than you think. the internet is a nice example. where it took 40 years, i suppose, b.e.oth for the technoy to develop and the social

arrangements to coalesce around it to make it really useful. i think it makes -- technology forecasts i find fun to do, but one of my colleagues who is a long-term planner says if thinking about the longer interpret doesn't effect that you what do, it is only entertainment. i like the entertainment, but i don't get to do entertainment at my current job so trying to make it useful to our work today is critical. >> sometimes relatively simple technologies -- fracking -- has geopolitical consequences you wouldn't foresee. >> if we had this conversation in 1950, we've have all said well, energy will be cheap, free by this point, because of nuclear energy but it didn't quite turn out that way. i'm intrigued so much by the dogs that never bark as the interesting ones that do.

>> great. thank you so much. let me just close this by quoting your boss, general clapper, one more time. the right man at the right time. you can see by the intellectual quality with which he handles these questions and the experience you bring to the job and we wish you the best of luck and we'll be helpful wherever we can. >> well, thank you very much. thanks for doing this. >> c-span3 is live today at the brookings institution in washington, d.c. be here for a discussion about the relationship between korea, experts from all three regions

parts pay thing e in participate sessions today. state department's assistant or east asia is 's assistant expected to give the keynote address here today. we've been hearing of problems with the local metro train service so we could see some delays in the start this morning. >> good morning, everybody. i have the honor to work for the scholars of the brookings institution. and it is a particular pleasure to welcome all of you to a discussion on the issue and the interests that are of extreme importance to many countries in the world but particularly to the three who are are being featured here this morning. that's the united states of america, the republic of korea, and the people's republic of

china. the brookings center on east asia policy is proud in this event and in other events to work very closely with the korea foundation for advanced studies and the school of international we're grateful for the leadership and of course the participation of ambassador park and cook. the president of the kfas, and his board chair. we're also very pleased to have with us a good friend and an old friend, the dean of the school at badah as we regard as a brookings alumnus because he participated in our center's

visiting fellows program, as did several other of our guests today. this event is in the category of what is often called track to diplomacy since it brings together scholars and experts who are intimately knowledgeable of their government's policies and who can, therefore, supplement the exchanges of diplomats and officials. i'm sure that today's conference -- which we call a trilogue, because it is a three-why dialogue, it contribute to peace and prosperity in a very important region of the world and it can also stimulate, inform and elevate public debate on risks and opportunities that policymakers in washington, seoul and beijing.

to get us started we have an american official very much involved in policy making here in washington and also in the stewardship of u.s. relations with the republic of korea, the people's republic of china, and other important nations in that region. danny russell, whom i've had the honor of knowing and working with for many years, is assistant secretary of state for east asia and pacific affairs. he recently, just within the last couple of weeks, returned from travels with president obama to china, burma, and australian. he is going to provide us with an overview of u.s. interests and policies in the region. so, danny, welcome back to brookings, and thanks for giving us the view from washington and

the view from track one diplomacy. well, thank you very much for the introduction. i have had the honor of working for you at the state department. in fact, i vividly remember as a young officer getting the bad news that after ten years serving overseas i had to come back to washington. but the good news that i was being brought back to work for the then-undersecretary of state, peter tarnoff, then later tom pickering. so thank you very much for all you've done as a diplomat, as a journalist and as a thinker, particularly in this great institution. it's an honor to be at

brookings, an iconic forum in the u.s. foreign policy arena, development. and thanks to jonathan pollack and others. i see richard bush and a lot of very familiar faces here. i also want to say thank you to ambassador park, whom i know well, and underscore the importance that we place and the administration places on the role of think tanks, of scholars. you are very important contributors to the policy dialogue, to our formation and to the implementation of our policy, not only in washington but in the republic of korea and in the people's republic of china, and elsewhere. in that vein, i'm pleased to participate with kfats and the peking university school of

international studies. many years ago -- many now -- when i worked for first-senator and then ambassador mike mansfield, i frequently heard him pronounce that the next century, the 21st century, will be the century of the pacific. and i remember thinking at the time that it sounded a little hyperbolic. fortunately, i kept my mouth shut. because now we all accept how prescient marks were and he was. mansfield, i know, was profoundly interested in the affairs of northeast asia because he believed, as president obama and secretary kerry believe, that america's well being, security, economic future and prosperity, are all deeply affected by developments in the region. and the obama administration has

placed tremendous importance on northeast asia, on our relations with china, our relations with the republic of korea, and we, too, understand the tremendous impact that the relationships and policies in northeast asia have on the united states, and have on the world. since 1977 when mansfield left the senate and took up his ambassadorial post in tokyo, and certainly since january of 2009 when president obama came into office, the pace of change in northeast asia has been extraordinary. while it's stable relative to certain other parts of the world, as the invitation of this conference mentioned, that cannot, and must not be cause for complacency. the stakes for the global economy, for the regional and

world stability are simply much too high for that. so the individual and the collective challenge for chinese, for koreans, for americans, for others, is to help build an inclusive, stable and sustainable regional order. the question is, in northeast asia, what will be the tenets of that order, and how can we build from that to create a base from which we can help preserves the peace, advance human dignity, promote prosperity and opportunity in the wider region, and ultimately in the world. that's the question. let me know what you come up with. the fact is, our countries have a tremendous ability to shape that future. we are major world economies, we are home to some of the world's most innovative companies. we're home to great thinkers.

we're home to imaginative and efficient manufacturers. thanks, in part, to our investment in each other. thanks, in part, to our tight financial and supply chain links. just thank apple iphone. just think samsung galaxy. just think lenovo thinkpad. we're not only linked by investment capital, we're linked by human capital. over 40% of international students in the united states come from northeast asia. likewise, klein has risen to be the fifth-most popular destination for american students studying overseas. and last year saw significant increases in american students in japan and korea. so the blending of our cultures and the sharing of knowledge is seen from everything from food to film to sports to music to this very conference. now i know international

relations isn't quite "gangnam style," but this conference is not going to break youtube. even though you've clearly got a good audience. but i do lope, and i do believe, that working together you'll be just as creative as psy. you'll be able to drive a thought wave to the kind of future we're trying to build. i know i'm setting the bar pretty high with "gangnam style." i know jonathan organizes a good conference. so given our commonalities, it is natural that we seek opportunities to collaborate. trilateral groups of nations working together are increasingly an important force in global policy making. by definition, they're more

inclusive than bilateral partnerships, and in practice, i can attest that they're much more nimble than large membership international organizations. for example, the u.s., australian, japan trilateral security dialogue which is baltimore than a decade old is an arrangement that just last month in brisbane saw president obama host trilatd reral meetin with prime minister abe, prime minister abbott. it shows the three nations are moving beyond regional issues to jointly confront global challenges, to kick-starting the world economy, to battling isil and ebola, to humanitarian and disaster assistance to strategies on development that can transform societies. and the trilateral collective of

the republic of korea, japan and the u.s. is another grouping that does extremely important work. president obama hosted a trilateral meeting in march in the hague where he and president park and prime minister abe consulted on the north korean threat and other concerns. those groupings are based on shared values like democracy, human rights and respect for international law, and they're based also on shared interests, both in the pacific and across the globe. and the group that i'll be joining tomorrow -- i head to new delhi -- is a periodic u.s.-japan-india tri consultation. these are just a few examples that attest to the possibility of plural lateral, multi-lateral engagement. they attest to the utility of a flexible geometry involving

northeast asian countries with the united states. so in that vein, we welcome president park's call last month for a resumption of the trilateral foreign ministers meeting among china, the republic of korea and japan. i think there is a widespread hope and expectation that after the meeting of the three foreign ministers, a meeting of the leaders will also resume. that would be a very good sign for peace and stability in northeast asia. regardless of format, i think we can all see the critical importance of communications among the major players in northeast asia, klein, the republic of korea, japan, as well as with the united states, because we need to build on areas where our interests converge and manage the issues in the areas where our interests may conflict. our collaboration to counter

ebola, as i mentioned, is a good example. so is the crisis management mechanism that china and japan agreed to in principle last month in beijing and which we hope will become operational soon. conversely, last year the abrupt declaration of an air defense identification zone in the east china sea was an abject lesson in how not to handle a sensitive issue pertaining to overlapping national interests. the coming year, 2015, presents us with a particularly sensitive set of issues. the anniversaries we'll mark. it is the 70th anniversary of the end of world war ii. it's the 50th anniversary of normalization between seoul and tokyo. 1945 saw the creation of the u.n. it saw the dropping of the atomic bomb in hiroshima and nagasaki.

the united states' occupation paf japan. korea's independence and also its division. and nationalist china's decision to recognize mongolia as an ind fe independent country, a year that next year celebrates 25 years of democracy. navigating all of these aen verseri verseri anniversaries, working through these remembrances, this is going to require restraint. it is going to require good judgment. it is going to require political and diplomatic skill. and frankly, i welcome your advice and your counsel from this conference on not just how to handle the anniversaries but how to build on them as well. because the record of the past 70 years in northeast asia has been one of extraordinary progress. as i've said before, progress in 2015, particularly in the relationship between tokyo and

seoul, and the relationship between tokyo and beijing, and turn what are historical millstones into historical milestones. this is not a theoretical proposition. china, south korea, japan are major players in the region's security and economy. all three are increasingly active and influential players on the global stage. far from asia for the asians, it's now asia for the world. we can't afford to have the three major countries in northeast asia operating in anything less than a fully cooperative manner with themselves and with us, let alone working at cross purposes. one important way to support good relations among neighbors is support for the well established regional order. that includes utilizing aipac.

utilizing the east asian summit and other asean-centered fora. that is built on the strong foundation of u.s. alliances and u.s. security partnerships that have kept the region safe and stable. this architecture and the system that the u.s. has championed, that's fostered trade and investment, economic and political linkages, educational and technical -- technological exchange, and rapid development r enriching countries across the region. it's help lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. and as each country in northeast asia has developed and found its social and economic and political footing, first japan, and then the republic of korea, it has paid back the system in spades and worked to further strengthen that system and

expand benefits. now it's china's turn. just look at the period from richard nixon's historic visit to the normalization of relations 35 years ago, to china's ascension into the wto. for decades, the world has supported china's peaceful rise. we've worked to avoid strategic rivalry and to narrow or, at a minimum, to manage our differences. but china's rise is, by no means, the only significant development in the region. the entire asia papacific. india is not only looking east, it is acting east. asean is becoming more

integrated. indonesia's democracy is flourishing. burma's reformers are pushing and pushing ahead. america's rebalance is continuing and our alliances are modernizing, growing stronger, growing more capable. this is all to the good. but the shifting regional dynamics generate tensions as well. tensions that pose potentially serious risks to stability and prosperity to all of us. let me ask -- is the construction of man-made outposts and the continual encroachment of ships and planes and oil rigs, is that going to be the way that asians deal with maritime boundary disputes? will asean's long-standing effort to negotiate just a basic code of conduct in the south china sea require another decade of diplomacy?

the sharpening of tensions over the maritime boundaries in the region underscore the importance of maintaining a regional system based on adherence to rules, not adhesion to rocks. a system where claims are based on international law, not a sense of entitlement or muscle. a system based on interdependence and peaceful dispute management and resolution. but while changing dynamics drives some of the tensions, the greatest threat to the region is a chronic one -- north korea. the dangerous outlier in asia. the good news is that north korea's an area where the u.s. and the rest of northeast asia cooperate closely. we do so because the risks posed to all of us by the dprk's pursuit of nuclear weapons and

intercontinental ballistic missiles, we do so because of the risk of north korea's rejection to its international obligations, its broken promises and its sudden provocations. i just gave a speech last week at an institution that will go unmentioned, addressing north korea's illegal programs, its nuclear program, and its abominable human rights record. i won't reprise the whole policy laydown. you're familiar with it. but i would mention something that happened at the event, namely the very first question i got from the audience was basically, hey, china's the problem here. right? i mean isn't the problem that china's preventing progress on north korea? i gave an eloquent answer that can be probably boiled down to simply -- no. the fact is that china has

sentist mistakable signals of its concern and indeed its displeasure with north korea's policies. president xi's decision to visit seoul before he had gone to pyongyang or ever met with kim jong-un speaks very loudly. now of course, the u.s. and some of our partners believe that there is more -- much more that china can do to apply pressure and i can attest that china believes there is a lot more that the u.s. can do to engage diplomatically. but overall i see a very broad alignment in strategic interests, in strategy, and a strong commitment to cooperation, beijing, seoul, washington, tokyo are united, and russia as well, on denuclearization of the korean peninsula. and at the same time, we pursue a free and whole and nuclear weapons-free korean peninsula, we're working with our northeast

asian partners in many other ways. because each of us has a significant role to play in addressing the myriad and significant ongoing challenges we face in the world. in a still-sluggish global economy, rewith twe are the eng growth. within the g-20 and working with aipac we are poised to do even more. fta. negotiating a bilateral investment treaty with china. finishing the transpacific partnership, the tpp, with japan and others. all of these will provide a huge lift to the global economy. china's ftas. korea's ftas. trade proposals like rcep. these are all an important part of the conversation as well. now the u.s. and china, as is well flown, are the world's greatest emitters of greenhouse

gases. but our recent action on climate change, on targets, show we're determined to address it. so do president obama's and prime minister abe's pledges to the south korean-hosted global green climate fund of $3 billion and $1.5 billion respectively. and our countries are indeed's manufacturing capabilities will keep us at the clean of the clean-energy forefront. our tremendous experience from the bird flu and the sars experience helps ensure that our nations are key contributors to dealing with ebola response and it's certain that we'll need to do more in the future. and we're major providers of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from syria, to iraq, to the philippines after

the super typhoon. we are also tackling closely interrelated issues of food security, water security, energy security. challenges for example in the mekong river basin. challenges in the pa sicific islands. challenges in africa. our expertise, our capital, our efforts are needed to meet all of these challenges. i want to save some time for questions so i'll stop here but my basic point is this. whether it is plural lateral or trilateral or multi-lateral. the fact is, we have entered the age of networks. essentially, we have no choice but to interact and to collaborate. major northeast asian powers and the united states need each other as much as the rest of the world needs us. it needs us to work together. needs us to jump-start the

global economy, to preserve regional stability, to enhance global security and to protect the global environment. so if i can channel my former boss, mike mansfield, u.s.-northeast asia relations are the most important plural lateral relations in the world, bar none. you know that. that's why you're having this conference. keep up the good work and i very much look forward to hearing not just your questions but, in due course, your conclusions. thank you very much. danny, on belaugh of ahalf us, thank you very, very much for your wide-ranging remarks. i loved your appeal for flexible geometry.

it is what we ghknow intuitivel but you have to practice it every day. assistant secretary russell has volunteered to take some questions, so i will recognize them as hands go up. please keep them brief and identify yourselves. yes, in the back. >> joe bosco, formerly with the defense department. as the person who asked the question last week about klein's role in north korea, i wonder if you could elaborate on what seeps to be a suggestion of moral equivalence, that china thinks we need to do more, we think china needs to do more. in the same speech last week you said we've bent over backwards to solve the north korea issue. do you think china has bent over backwards or come anywhere near what the u.s. has done? >> well, i consider myself blessed, joe, to get two questions from you in two consecutive speeches. thank you very much.

and it is roughly the same question. i think the constructive and useful way to look at this is in terms of common objectives and a iterative process to reconcile our strategies for getting there. the u.s. with the republic of korea is cooperating with china on the challenge of the korean peninsula. we're cooperating as well with other partners, including japan. we, the united states, have experimented with bilateral negotiations with north korea. i myself was part of the negotiating team led by bob galucci that ultimately reached an agreed framework.

as is well known, north korea cheated on that deal. they welched on that deal. we have the distinguished bob einhorn in the room. bob is the architect of an important agreement with the north koreans on missiles that fell apart because the north koreans will not honor their obligations. we have tried quadrilateral talks and certainly we've tried six-party talks. i just heard my friend and former boss and predecessor, chris hill, give a talk on his new book "outposts" in which he describes the efforts and the frustrations of reaching an agreement with the north koreans, only to see it unravel as they start negotiating again from scratch and consider commitments the way that famously italians considered red

lights, as merely a suggestion. we're not giving up because our objective -- and i would venture, although diplomats aren't supposed to do this, to speak for the chinese, in saying this is a shared objective, is to find a peaceful path to halt, roll back and ultimately eliminate north korea's nuclear and nuclear missile program and ambition. of course we want to do this peacefully. the fact is -- simple and unfortunate fact is that, that's not what north korea wants. north korea is laboring under the illusion that it can simultaneously pursue and solicit growth and assistance from the international community while also preserving an ongoing nuclear program. than can't be done.

and i venture to say that not only do leaders in seoul and tokyo share that view, but leaders in beijing, as well. so we are embarked on a continual effort to sharpen the choice faced by north korea's leaders. the only path to security and prosperity that north korea claims to seek is a path of denuclearization, beginning with a freeze. and that pathway must run through negotiations. now we make on the basis of experience a distinction between talk and negotiations. negotiations have to begin from an agreed premise that we are putting the issue of concern on the table, that we are entering into an effort to reach binding

outcomes. that has chronically been north korea's problem. the willingness to put forward significant benefits to north korea for honoring its obligations is not in question. that has not been a problem for us. now the chinese, in their recipe, may use more dialogue and less pressure. but fundamentally we're both trying to bake the same cake. it is a peacefully, denuclearized korean peninsula. >> thanks so much, secretary russell. if i could follow on joe's question, are we hearing and

hint, at least, of the possibility that the u.s. is thinking or rethinking what seems to be a policy of no bilate rb bilaterals with the north koreans unless denuclearization is the agreed upon outcome. just a second ago you said the talks have to agree that -- in a sense, whatever the outcomes are will be binding. am i reading too much into that? are we trying to look for a way to break, in a sense, this deadlock on bilaterals, as long as denuclearization is the only goal that we will agree to talk with them about. thanks. >> no, i don't think that's an accurate recharacterization of what i said or what i meant to say at least. the united states has never had -- or at least in most administrations we have been willing to speak directly to

north korea. certainly the obama administration has never hesitated to talk directly to the dprk. we believe though that given the stake that the republic of korea, first and foremost, has in the future of the korean peninsula, that any process with the dprk must include the republic of korea. i believe that relations between washington and seoul are better than at any time certainly in my professional lifetime. i've served in seoul and worked the korea issue for going on 30 years. that's something that we are all very proud of. we place tremendous importance on synchronizing and consulting with the republic of korea. we listen very carefully to the

thinking and initiatives coming out of president park's blue house. we also recognize that china for a variety of reasons has a tremendous influence to bring to bare and a significant role to play, as does japan, as does russia. and so the short answer is, no. we are not of the view that the pathway to a denuclear identifies peninsula is through bilateral u.s.-dprk negotiations. the negotiations we seek must be, i believe, based on the significant agreements already reached and captured in the 2005

joint statement of the six-party tal talks. >> thank you very, very much for those clarifications. i think everyone appreciates that. yes, in the back of the room. >> sir, let me play a little devil's advocate since nobody from peking university wants to stand up. let me see if i can play the devil's advocate on that. united states negotiation of united states is often it's like the wild, wild west. the big gangster who goes around around to the teeth and raids the village and shoots at whoever shows up to oppose him. so -- >> i haven't seen that movie. >> you saw them long time ago and i'm really amazed that united states sill seems to

behave like that on international forum. so isn't there a need for united states to also reduce its war mongering that it does all over the world while negotiating -- while saying we want peace. yes, the military option is there if you don't accept our proposal, we're going to kill you. so given that kind of situation, wouldn't you want to change some of your positions? >> well, first of all, let me make clear that i came to this event unarmed. secondly, as the child of peacenicks, brought up going on ban the bomb marches and advocating for world peace, i slayer your objective of a peaceful and disarming world. the good news is that the military presence of the united

states in the asia pacific region has been an extraordinary and an essential force tore growth, for stability, and for peace. that's something for which we can all be proud, and something for which we must all continue to work. with respect to china, i'm also proud to point to the very significant strides that the obama administration has made with are the prc, particularly under xi jinping, in proving and establishing a new military to military engagement, dialogue, and even cooperation. the pla and navy participated in the rim pac, the pacific rim exercise this year for the very

first time. general dempsey, secretary of defense, has visited beijing and elsewhere in china, very successful, very important visits. and chinese military leaders have reciprocated. and just last month when we were in beijing, president obama and president obama xi announced two very significant agreements with regard to the notification of major military exercises and standards of conduct for our naval ships at sea. this is very meaningful because as china's military capability continues to grow dramatically, if not exponentially, as klein's interests continue to grow, dramatically if not

exponentially, and as china finds itself abutting, if sometimes bumping up against, the interests of its neighbors and the interests of the united states throughout the indo-pacific region, this kind of military to military communication, often in the form of hotlines and codes of conduct and confidence building measures, represent essential ingredients to maintaining stability and maintaining security in the 21st century. so i'll stay away from the wild west movies and leave it there. >> yes. front row.

>> from peking university. that gentleman said that he wanted to play the devil's advocate. first of all, peking vtuniversi professors are not devils. secondly, we don't need an advocate. i just have one question for you. that is, you know, there are many people who talk about china should support u.s. in its efforts to fight isis. what exactly does the administration hope that china can play a role in this regard? thank you. >> well, thank you very much. i'm appreciative of all of the work that you personally and the

institute does. this was a topic, of course, of conversation between our two leaders when president obama was recently in beijing, and certainly between our two systems. i've joined secretary kerry in meeting with the foreign minister and state minister on this topic. there are different ways of parsing it but i think the issue goes beyond isil or isis. and it pertains to the common interest that both china and the united states have in preventing the spread of radical jihadism, the interest in protecting the global infrastructure of finance

and transportation from being utilized and hijacked by terrorist groups. it is our interest in preventin violent extremists from particularly those returning from conflict zones in middle east from conducting operations from recruiting or fromjfywc attacking us or our neighbors. and it also pertains to the objective that we share on the necessity of sharing information and on coordinating. so the chinese government has indicated more than once that it's not in the business of joining somebody else's coalition. that's fine. but in the areas where we have a common interest and specifically a region such as afghanistan or

pakistan where we share an interest in helping to maintain security and helping to create the indigenous capacity to defend against the threat of terrorism, we can, should, and are expanding our operation. china is increasingly faced with the large expansion of overseas citizens throughout the middle east. that gives china a new type of stake in the affairs of regions that perhaps ten years ago or 20 years ago were of little concern to policymakers. china and its western province and its western borders faces the threat from organizations

like the east turkmenistan movement, etm. this is not a theoretical proposition for china and remains an area in which we want to cooperate. so the form -- the formula for looking at this issue is not the u.s. as demander and china aiding us. the correct formula is the objective identification of common interests, the pooling of information and resources. and the identification of areas where coordinated and in some cases join a collective action will prove to be most effective. >> there's a gentleman in the front row who has a question. >> danny, you mentioned that you're going to be going to new

delhi. will you be good enough to say a word or two about what you see as the role of a major south asian country in east asia and since you emphasized the importance of regional structures now that india is more participatory in the asean regional forum, would you see the further opportunities for india to play a constructive role in east asia? >> thank you. without a doubt, there is abundant space for india to play a greater and a constructive role in the affairs of all of east asia, including and particularly southeast asia. in the five years now that the u.s. has been participating in the east asia summit, i have worked as the senior official

involved, and i've participated in -- at both the foreign minister's level and in the leader's meeting, in those discussions that have included the indian leader, including in november. and i can attest that india brings an important perspective and characteristic to the discussion among the asia pacific countries. my consultations in the first instance are part of an ongoing dialogue that my colleague and i have with senior indian foreign policy makers about what and how india can do and do more in terms of east asia. first and foremost, india as the world's largest democracy, as an

extraordinary pluralistic society that has an important tradition of tolerance and very strong institutions is a voice that needs to be heard in east asia. india has something to say and something to say based on its own experience. and whether the issue is democratization in burma, myanmar, or human rights in cambodia, in vietnam, or the peaceful handling of border disputes, we want india's voice to be heard. secondly, india has extraordinary economic capacity, extraordinary unfulfilled economic capacity both as a producer and as a market. so develop iing the silk road o

new silk road or new silk road/ maritime band, there are abundant names for it. but develop iing artists for trade, expanding trade, removing barriers to trade, this is a project in which we very much want and need india's full participation. and india has an impressive record in terms of u.n. and international peacekeeping, in terms of regional organizations and regional architecture. as i said, this is a voice that needs to be heard. what is appealing to me is that

the prime minister has taken a look east policy to an act east policy. he has shown in word and deed, has interest in involving india in the thinking and the affairs of the broader region, engaging in political term, engaging in economic term, engaging in the dialogue about future security arrangements. that's very much to be welcomed and answering that i'm going to hear more about. >> we have time for one last question, if it's brief. the gentleman, yes? >> cti-tv of taiwan. mr. secretary, congress has voted to authorize the sale of four frigates to taiwan, and the president is expected to sign it

into law any day now. what is the significance of this? do you -- are you concerned that this may have any impact on u.s./china relations, particularly the mil-to-mil exchange so exchanges? thank you very much. >> i'm not going to speak to a pending issue other than to say the united states under the obama administration follow the same policy as the proceeding seven or eight administrations since normal situation in beijing and washington. we have a one-china policy. we have a one-china policy base on our three joint communiques. we also have important unofficial relations with taiwanment a taiwanment. and in that regard, our policy is guided not only by the

one-china policy but the taiwan relations act, so on. in that context, we remain committed to helping to ensure that taiwan retains the ability to prevent coercion and defend itself, and that is a commitment that we take very seriously. it's an ongoing effort. that said, the significant progress that the world has witnessed over the last five years in dialogue and agreement is something that we all value and welcome. so our policies and goals aim at

enhancing the stability across the straits and in the region. and the quality of the dialogue that we maintain with the dialogue, the defense establishment and pla in particular, and the quality of dialogue between our leader is a critical element in ensuring that there are no misunderstandings and no misapprehensions about u.s. actions and intentions. and so on that basis, i'm confident that the dialogue and mil-mil cooperation between the u.s. and the prc will continue on a very steady path. >> danny on, behalf of everyone here at brooking and, of course,

the much larger audience, all of us are deeply appreciative of the time that you've given to us this morning and the candor and openness with which you've addressed any number of questions whether we never know exactly what questions will be forth good coming. thank you very much. [ applause ] good morning again. i'm jonathan pollock, senior fellow in the john l. thornton center and center for east asia policy studies. i'd like to welcome you again on behalf of all the institutes represented here this morning, but i welcome now a few words of introduction from the two collaborators that our center for east asia policy study studies has. first, the chairman of the board of the korea foundation for advanced studies.

good morning, everyone. colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, i'm delighted that the trilateral conference on northeast asia and united states reconvenes here in washington, d.c., for a second time. the inaugural collaboration among the brookings institution, the international study at peking university and korea founding for advanced studies successfully took place in last april in seoul, korea, attracting a large audience and encouraging highly interactive sessions. the trilateral conference has

certainly met the first approach to matters in the asia pacific region. but i believe that three siri of collaborative efforts among leading intellectual institutions from the united states, china, and korea highlight the potentials and importance of this event in making public diplomacy as the locomotive for peace and security building toward common prosperity in northeast asia. ladies and gentlemen, northeast asia is a region of pair dock marked by the co-existence of extensive economic cooperation and pronounced the region tensions simultaneous ly. first, asia as a region has moved from the periphery to the center of the international stage with the robust economic

growth and enlarged political presence during the recent decades. second, the unequivocal rise of china has made the u.s./china relations the most important bilateral relationship in the contemporary world. many efforts have been made to define the u.s./china relations. term like responsible stakeholders, g2, and amazing consensus have optimized the moral action of it role of china. on the other hand, china has recently suggested a new model of major power relations as an effort to define her own vision of new world order based on the spirit of coordination instead of confrontation. the details of this new model are not laid out in full, but we must note that the concept is

useful in this season of fresh new outlook for international relations and global governance. having china as a moral participator in the action. when we take a closer look at northeast asia, however, we start to notice that the region faces some major challenges despite enjoying unprecedented prosperity and economic clout. for example, korea and japan face unprecedented tensions between remarkable economic coupling with china, and military alliance with the united states. another feature is the volatile north korean region. despite numerous efforts to denuclearize the korean peninsula, north korea refuses to show any sign of giving up its nuclear ambition but continues its belligerent provocations. there are also tensions between japan and its neighbors because

of japan's abrupt attempt to take a more assertive role in the region since its leadership change in 2012. exacerbated further by its revisionist views on history. another source of regional tension is maritime territorial disputes. now that we have zoomed in on northeast asia, let's take a look at the big picture. the world itself is also facing many challenges and uncertainties. as all of us know, upheavals across various parts of the globe such as isis, syria, iran, and the ukraine are affecting not just those regions and their surrounding country but the entire world. the economic and financial system, global trade, and the

revolution have not just interlinked the members of the international community, but effectively intertwined all of us together. the current crisis in the ukraine, for example, is very closely watched by the south koreans because we know that north korea is also watching to see how the u.s. and china are reacting to it. what is happening in the middle east has consequences for northeast asia because its member countries are heavily dependent on energy resources and experts of manufactured goods. incidentally, last week, i had invited a professor of howard university to come to our foundation in seoul and give a special lecture under the title of is the american century over.

during the talk, the professor said that the obama policy of rebalancing toward asia is a wise policy to reinforce the pre-existing asian beir base baf power and the -- asian balance of power and that there can be a positive sum of relations with china rather than falling into the fallacy of jealous game mindset. i agree with his projection, and i believe that the u.s./china relations will continue to improve and mature in the future in many constructive ways to provide peace and stability in northeast asia and the world beyond that. overcoming global and regional problems requires collaboration among great powers. although great powers are useful in modernizing corporations,

their efforts are insufficient to coor nig-- coordinate all th actors. it requires middle powers to play a greater, more active role for our medium sized states with the capability and willingness to employ proactive diplomacy with global visions. given the geographic location among powers of china, japan, russia, and the united states over the pacific, korea has a long history of coping with the daunting challenges of navigating among the power players. this enables korea's national interest to be aligned with regional interests of building peace and security for common prosperity in the region. borrowing from the cover of the "economist" a few weeks ago, i

want to highlight the important role of korea as a pivotal bridge over the troubled world in east asia. as a staunch ally of the united states and the indispensable economic partner of china, korea is well poised to take the initiative in middle power diplomacy in facilitating consensus building and revitalizing momentum for corporations. ladies and gentlemen, at this critical juncture in global politics, i believe it is high time for the united states and china to come up with a new modus operendi. as we cannot solely depend on government-to-government cooperation, nongovernmental entities including think tanks

and academia must pool resources to help usher in a new era of peace and co-prosperity. it is not just for northeast asia that georgia part of, but the world and nations. i hope this conference by the brookings institution, the school of studies in peking university and our founding, will be instrumental will in taking the necessary steps toward decor. i also hope that this platform will be a timely opportunity for us to look at the northeast asian region from a truly global perspective with far-sighted objectives. along with yesterday's closed meeting among participants, i hope today's conference will have a fruitful outcome for the future peace and prosperity of

global society as well as east asian region. thank you again, distinguished participants, who share their valuable ideas for the conference. and i would also like to thank the audiences who participated, who have participated in the conference today. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> yes, dean, and then we will proceed to the first panel. >> good morning. it's my great pleasure to be back at the brookings where i am supposed to be alumni. i think we are very happy and honored to be part of this enterprise, to study the issues

of northeast asia on a trilateral basis. we are very happy to work with the korea founding for advanced studies and also the brookings institution in this enterprise. i cannot keep up with dan russell's very comprehensive speech and also the professor's very eloquent statements. i just want to mention two things. i think the region is very important. it deserves our focus and attention. dan russell just said that the century according to mansfield is the pacific century. and i think northeast asia is probably if not the most

important, it is one of the most important areas of the asia pacific, of the pacific region. so it deserve our focus and -- deserves our focus and attention. there are many issue that we need to explore. many problems to sort out. many areas of cooperation need to be identified. the other point i want to make is that as china rises, china has a lot to learn. its rise has been too fast for the chinese and probably for the rest of the world to get used to very quickly.

and not familiar with a lot of issue in the world, especially, including a lot of issues in the region. so we need a lot of foreigners, trilaterals, bilateral, whatever, meetings, dialogues, to get ourselves familiar with the issues and also to learn how to manage these issues in cooperation with other countries and other partners. i truly value this opportunity and want to thank ambassador park for his initiative and also jonathan pollock for his hard wo

work, and we are very glad to be part of this meaningful and i hope very important exercise. thank you. [ applause ] >> could i ask the first set of presenters to come to the stage. thank you.

>> okay, i think we should start. the first session is the emerging challenges to international order and to u.s./china relations. we have three speakers and also three discussions. before we start, i want to outline the rules to establish some kind of order. each speaker is to have ten minutes maximum, and then each discu discussant is supposed to have seven minutes maximum. i'll try to interrupt if you

exceed the limit all for the q&a period, according to the arrangement, we will ask you to write your questions down on the index cards. hand it to a -- people. if we don't have any confusion, then we should start now. our first speaker is professor ho from seoul national university of korea. i'm not going to go over the credentials. you have the documents in your hand. you can go through their bios. so professor, please. >> thank you. i'd like to thank the

organizers, particularly the korea founding for the value study. this is a worthy platform conflicts, historical controversies and classes of identities, particularly in the context of east asia. of course we also have new types

of crises, pandemics, cybersecurity, global climate changes, what have you. on top of that, we also have this so-called return of geopolitics. the most prominent case of which, of course, concern the possible for a power transition between the united states and china. and speaking of that, my personal view is that the debate has been overblown. perceptions of the people are running ahead of the realities. for instance, the myth of gdp -- of course, it was shocking to find that the gdp of china surpassed japan in 2010. about 20 years ahead of the projection by goldman sachs in 2003. however, if we go back to late 19th century, it was 1872 that

the gdp of the united states surpassed that was the u.k., and the u.k. was clearly aware of the fact. however, the real power tradition between the u.k. and u.s. only took place in 1931 or 1944. 1931 is the year when the u.k. finally aborted the scheme or packing the pound with gold. we can also take the 1944 as an alternative watershed in which the system was established. so in the former case, the power tradition took 59 years after the gdp of u.s. surpassed that was u.k. and it took in the latter case, it took 72 years. now the gdp of china has not yet surpassed that was the united states. the case of the 20th century cannot automatically be applied to the 21st century.

still, you can say 40 to 60 jeers ne years is needed before the that pr traditions take place. that's why i say perception runs ahead of realities. what i said is only applicable to the global context. if we look loat east asia, the dynam dynamics are quite different. speaking about the differentials in the united states and china, the nature of the u.s./china relationship will be increasingly transformed from one of competition based upon white cooperation toward a cooperation based on a frequent

competiti competition. according to global issues or other geographical regions, i think the room for cooperation between washington and beijing will be much, much smaller in the case of east asia because east asia's so much more important to the strategic goal of china. there seems to be a new trend in which china appears to be feeling increasingly more nostalgic about its glorious past. particularly the set of vocabularies that the chinese leaders choose to use make many people wonder whether china is really nostalgic about its glorious past. finally, i think there was also a sort of trend in which a strategic competition is being increasingly locked in east asia. for instance, the united states

has been saying t returning to asia. china has been saying the u.s. return is not necessary because its rise will be peaceful in nature. for that purpose, the u.s. is relying on the extinction of alliances of traditional allies. -- on the extension of alliances of traditional allies. china is extending its relationship to many communities. as far as the economies, asia pacific, in terms of the military we have a 2 battle, washington consensus versus beijing consensus in terms of norms and values. so at different levels and domains, there seems to be some strategic competition poised for the future. two key regional issues that are have very important ramifications for u.s.u.s.-chin

relations. one, japan. looking at the strategic and military upgraded. it can be used in the case of certain regional contingencies. at the same time, the united states wants to rein in japan because that is in tandem with some of the expectations of the regional states. but whether or not the u.s. can actually make a healthy balance between these two seemingly contradictory tendencies remains to be seen. another one is north korea. 20 years ago, we asked ourselves the question whether north korea had any materials -- we don't ask that kind of question anymore. we now ask about miniaturization or whether they have the technologies to load those nuclear devices on to missiles and so on and so forth. according to some estimates, as of now, north korea is

supposedly possessing 24 to 42 kill grahams of plutonium-based material, possibly 150 kilograms of uranium-based materials compared to almost none ten years ago. north korea already had three nuclear tests, excluding the supposedly -- the underground test, undertaken in 2010 compared to zero ten years ago. now north korea is estimated to have four to eight plutonium based weapons compared to zero ten years ago. so this isn't exactly the area where we really need u.s.-china cooperation. but whether or not that kind of cooperation would really be forthcoming to a very successful and satisfying level remains to be seen. just because of the deficit of trust between washington and

beijing. all these issues are strategically embedded in u.s.-china relations. whether or not you have a maritime code of conduct is not really an issue. having one is one thing, and actually following through on that particular principle is another. finally, i'd like to draw your attention to a much more alarming trend which is potential for a significant arm race because of the u.s.-china strategy confrontation and competition in the region. as i mentioned earlier, there is this sort of a -- a battle versus a280 competition between washington and beijing. this basically comes down to countersurveillance technology. of course, there others are dimensions, as well. also it includes a sort of missile defense which also has

crucial ramifications for arms races and so on and so forth. also it has unsettling ram sfik for t sfik -- ramifications for nuclear competition. competition or stability has two different dilemmas for the regional states. if both washington and beijing are true believers of the mutual assured destruction principle -- that means there is a been of terror at a high level -- then the question is does that give both washington and beijing more leverage to make use of conventional weapons because there is very -- it is very unlikely for them to use nuclear weapons. but does that make the use of conventional weapons more likely? second, if both washington and beijing are true believers of

the m.a.d. principle, therefore they will not rely on nuclear weapons. or if they are not true believers of the m.a.d. principle, therefore there is a high likely of escalation. therefore, they want to prevent any possibility of escalation. does that mean -- does that mean regional states will be drawn into a sort of proxy competition? just like we saw in the cold war era. is there between for the regional states? so in conclusion, the u.s.-china relations can be a solution to many problems. at the same time, u.s.-china relations can be a good coast of provisions for the region. hopefully this will provide food for thought for this session. thank you. >> thank you very much, professor. are you right on time. -- you are right on time. our next speaker is professor of

peking university. please. >> thank you very much. i'm very, very pleased and honored to be here. i also want to thank the korean foundation for advanced studies for giving me this opportunity to come to the distinguished brookings institution to share my part about the topic. when i was asked to talk about the topic of the challenges to international order and the china-u.s. relations, i began to think about the question what are the problems facing the world and are facing china. but just now when i listened to the assistant secretary's speech -- and he talked about the many positive side of the world and u.s.-china relations. here i tried to find the problems. i think we are addressing very, very drift aspects of the world in u.s.-china relations. i think there is a big difference between scholars and

officials. officials trying to focus on the promising aspect, where we scholars always try to find problems. if we don't have problems, we might lose our job. i will focus on those challenges. people from different backgrounds might look at a world differently and their understanding of international order or relations might also differ. so i'm here in the capacity of a professor. i will like to look at the international -- the channel of international order and u.s.-china perspectives. from a structural realist perspective, it refers to the order that shapes country, shapes the national power. the liberalist foinstitutional norms that govern behaviors, and

that is the perspective of the diplomatic studies. how the folks, they're actors of diplomacy and how that challenges u.s. international order and u.s.-china relations. first look at from the structure or realist perspective. i think that today's challenger for international order is that we are experiencing a power shift rather than power transition. the impacts of a economic development has changed the geopolitical landscape of the world to and sustained a high growth rate in india and china, the two most populous countries, has rendered them much more political clout. and they wanted to play a more important role. and the economic dynamic in asia also made people to think about, talk about their asian century. at the same time, we have

noticed that just now the assistant secretary directly discuss american power. america is still the most powerful country, but if you look at the u.s. foreign policy and compare it with the past, we will notice that the u.s. today is not so -- look the capacity to do whatever it wants to do as a deed 10 years ago or 20 years ago. what does that mean? that means that today's international system which is a bilateral system has lost its constraints and countries' behaviors? why testimony of such implication is a crisis, a small crisis exists around the globe. and at countries that could not find solutions together.

in the past, big powers could coordinate to solve the problem very easily, but today with so many big powers, the countries need to thoesht negotiate to fi solution. this will slow down the process of a settlement of problems. and from a liberalist perspective, i think of international order also exists -- experiences a transitional period of time. for all international institutions, organizations like a united nations, the wto or like nato in the west, the world bank are still playing a very important role. but we see the new institutions, new things like a g20 organization, apec, they are becoming prominent, more and more prominent in settling international affairs. and they have a strong voice. at the same time, we noticed that the international norm is

enshrined in the united nations' charter, are still important and indispensable to solving problems around the globe. we have noticed there are new rules which are being strongly proposed like what was proposed in the westment and according to the united nations, the charlotcharter, it is a linchpin in the international organization. we do see today interference in the internal affairs of other countries is a common practice today. so how to reconcile the norms and rules with the new norms and rules. how do we, you know, trade managing relations between the old institution and new institutions? does the new institutions, will they replace or are they supplementary or complimentary

with the old existing institutions which find a solution? and this gap before we find new norms, new upgraded norms, and the world we face a lot of challenges. and thirdly from the perspective of diplomatic, we see more and more actor in diplomacy. in the past, nations used to be the chief actor in international d diplomacy. now with international organizations and transnational cooperations, private sectors are playing very, very important roles. so in the past when countries compete with each other, they try to show that they are the historical rights side and to show that they are on a moral standard, moral highlight. to we see isis, terrorist

groups, you could not find that -- you want a dialogue, deal with them. you cannot fine them. in today's international relations we see it is a complex web of -- net of different actors, different interests, different preferences, different dimensions in international relations. so there are three different charities for international work out there. there are three different perspectives that can be employed to look at u.s.-china relations. i think today the government propose for a new -- the early days of the chinese declined the idea of g2. it is my understanding that the china and united states are two big countries that toopt. we may not find a solution to all the problems we've faced today, but what is sure that every channel in the united states do not cooperate. now the problem we face today globally can be solved. so in this regard, the u.s.-china relations are very important. even though this is important,

we still face some challenge. one of the challenges is from the realist perspective. that is the challenge opposed by the shift of power, the changing power barriers. for example, as early as the early 1990s, as soon as the cold war ended, chinese city was finally about a 6.7% of that the u.s. last year china's gdp is more than half of the u.s. gdp. and the imf, according to ppt terms, the chinese gdp is already a match that was the united states. this might not complect a reality, but that does lead people to think about how writing powers and challenging powers, how that is a trap. so in today's relations between china and the united states, we all -- all lords and scholaeade

realize the importance of relations. at the same time there is deficit of trust. one example. on the u.s. side, the u.s. says clearly, and the u.s. is a welcome rising communication channel. but we see a lot of u.s. foreign policy toward the channel does -- toward china does not support such rhetoric. it enhances, aligns east asia, increases around china, and -- >> one minute. >> okay. so i think from a realist perspective, we face a deficit of trust. from a realist perspective, we need to find new rules and try to find greater rules to set a problem of our common concern. and because a limitation of time, i think the last point i want to make is that the u.s.-china is not just a state

toe sta state-to-state relation but country to country. there are american in china, about ten times of that number of american students in china. but at the same time, we do see that there are forces here that you have a term as a china barber -- barber. we do not have a term. they hate each other, but theydent on -- theydent on each other. i think for the two side, they need to manage the better relations so that it will not become a victim or victimized or hostage of the forces on both sides. i will stop here. >> okay. thank you very much, professor. the next speaker is dr. tom wright. he's a senior fellow at the

brookings. tom, please? >> thank you very much. i will like to thank you, am park, and the korea foundation for advanced study, as well. it's a great time to be here on this panel. our topic is challenges to the international order in u.s.-china relations. it seems to me that there are two very different ways of assessing what the international order is and what the challenges today are. the first is to say the international order are the things we normally think about as being a part of it. the international institutions, the understanding, the imf, the world bank, all the different alphabet soup of organizations and that we rely on to deal with the global economy, international security. another aspect might be all of the different problems that countries have in common. so tackling terrorist organizations, climate change, pandemic, the global economy.

all of these different types of issue that don't really -- aren't really traditional great power issues but are problems of the 21st century. and on this sort of category, this sort of single sort of category of issues that i think are really global issues, you know, the global -- the international order, the global order is doing pretty okay. i mean, there's not -- you know, a great sort of solution to those secular nation that's we're in or climate change is still a problem. but broadly speaking, pragogres has been made in an incremental fashion. the major powers disagree sometimes on how to handle problems, but not familiarly. there isn't an alternative sort of chinese system of the international order that it wish to impose and sort of destroy the current institutions and replace them with different institutions. that doesn't existment the. there are differences in the institutions and differences

about what they might do. fundamentally, the bake sort of contours that was order are relatively the same. we've seen some alternative institution building with the brits bank and asia investment infrastructure bank. and there will be different conversations about that, and we can talk about those later. i think there's some reason to be concerned. in the broader sweep of things, i think these are quite manageable problems. this isn't -- countries don't fight over voting rights at the imf or brits bank. that's not going to result in a conflict between the united states and china. and for the most part, i think u.s. leadership in these institutions is broadly accepted. again, you know, there are differences about maybe exactly, you know, what type of influence different countries have. but china, you know, india, russia evening, they're not wanting to take up more of the burden to tackle sort of these

collective action problems. there isn't a movement in beijing that's leading the fight against isil in the middle east. that's not a prize anyone will want. so i think that on that first category, the global order, things aren't that bad. but there's another way sort of to look at the international order. it's to say it's not really about these international institutions is fundamentally about interstate peace. and particularly peace between the major powers. and you know, why is it that that relies on what are the fundamental foundations of sort of that aspect which is very much on the minds of, you know, churchill, stalin, and roosevelt, and they sort of designed the -- you know, the sort of post-war order in the 1940s. it was mainly about trying to prevent another great power war, and it was a mixed success obviously because it broke down and led to the cold war. what does that rely on? and to me, what that relies on

more than anything else are sort of healthy or at least stable regional orders in strategically important parts of the world. and the reason why we have great power peace is because the in order europe has been pretty stable. the order in middle east less so, but generally pretty stable for several decades because it's sort of the authoritarian allies there. they had problems for sure. but it was relatively stable. then asia which has been east asia which has been fairly unstable since world war ii. and to me, this year particularly but even going back a few years, what's happening is each of those sort of healthy or stable world orders are under severe pressure for very different reasons. but simultaneously. so there's sort of pressure points on what we -- on that aspect of the international order. and in the middle east, it's the weakening of the state, sort of

hollowing out of the state. the rise of terrorist organizations, you know, the arab awakening. all of those different things that place the entire region in flux. that's probably the most traumatic but may be the least strategically consequential of the three challenges ironically. but it is the one that takes up much of the news. the second is in europe where we see russia really trying to revise the status quo. russia is -- over the long run a declining power, but history shows us that you probably have more to worry about from declining powers than rising powers because they worry that the window of opportunity is closing. and they want to try to act before it's too late. but that's a very fundamental change. we wouldn't have thought that 12 months ago if we were talking here. i don't think anyone would have expected the deterioration in sort of the eastern european security order that's occurred since the demonstrations of last year.

the third which i want to focus on for the rest of my time is asia where the power transition and the rise of china, the reaction to that rise is, i think, putting that -- putting that under pressure. now the reason why this is important i think is regions, as someone referred to it earlier, regions are where major powers are most concerned about. like of course countries have been more concerned about their own neighborhood than they will be about a far away place or institution. i think sometime we can say the global order's okay because everyone's cooperating on these sort of different sort of issue. but actually it's the regional one that i think is probably most important. to me the cause for concern in asia is that the united states and china have very different visions of what that order will look like. and there is this concept of a new model of major power relations, but it tends to obscure more than it clarifies. for the united states, what that

new model, major power relations means is that as a new power rises, it will integrate into the existing order, accept the status quo, but have a much greater say over the excess over the functioning of the order and the governance of it and taking responsibility and having more of a role. but that essentially the order would be sort of unchanged. that's when u.s. official talk about it, you know, u.s. presence, a persistent presence in the asia pacific and the sanctity of the alliances and so on. with for china, i think it's much more about that the united states should accommodate china's core, vital interests as it rises. almost make way for it in some -- in some way. and this i think is inherently above sort of different rock s d and disputes and problems. this is pretty much an old story about spheres of influence, and it's about china saying that it will like a sphere of influence,

you know, in its region over time as it rises. now i think there are, you know, we hear from our china colleagues that china is sort of more reactive and isn't actually trying to change the status quoment a quoment status quo. and whether it's the reaction with japan and changing the status quo or with vietnam and the south china sea. i think there is some reason why china's neighbors do get concerned. and i'll just mention a couple. the first is we do see changing facts on the ground that have been happening earlier this year. i think that may be, you know, those may be isolated instancesmeinstance s. but countries worry that there are no national limits to them. what is the point at which those actions will hit the wall, that they won't go any further? phrases like making up for lost time or having to we'll do a

prolonged period or provocations by other countries sort of suggests it's not a tit for tat thing. that it may be more ambitious than that. and then there is a concern about where is the is a concern negotiating space. so where can we deal with what is on the table and how can settlement be concluded? let me conclude with some comments on why i think the influence approach is worrying. you may say and it may come up that it isn't such a bad idea. the united states had this approach for much history. in the cold war it worked pretty well. i think that setting ideals or values aside there are a couple of problems. if we had a spheres of influence system it probably would be pretty stable. we don't. the problem is how to get from here to there and the transition i think is impossible because it is destabilizing.

so to create it it is different from having one and wanting to keep it. i think that the process between these two systems is something we need to focus more on. the second, of course, is that these countries, there are other countries involved and they have agencies and a say and a voice and a vote. the days are gone when major powers can get together and simply divide up the map. that's not the way the world works anymore and probably isn't the way the world should work. i think that means it is a very different environment than the 19th century or 20th century. my final comment is that i think these are very significant challenges. most of them are manageable and most of them are with more reassurance and trust building are manageable. the one i worry most about is territorial spheres of influence one because that is not really a trust problem. it's not going to be solved by

simply by more dialogue on these other issues. we need a way of trying to figure out what that looks like and what the risks are. >> thank you very much. now we turn to our discussions. >> i think we are going to -- >> okay. >> i'm going to speak from up here. i would really like to thank each of the three presenters for their outstanding presentations. each of them is a distinguished scholar. as a relatively older person i have confidence in the next generation based on what i have heard today. i would like to just stress a couple of points because to me they are very important. first is the point that was made

about the lag between a country's arrival as a major economic power and its behavior as a political and military power. there is a lag time. and that's going to be true in east asia. second emphasized the very important distinction between the global dimension of power transition and the regional dimension of power transition and different regions have different sets of issues, have their own dynamic, have to be dealt with on their own terms. east asia is particularly interesting in this regard, almost unique because it is china's home region but also one where the united states is to use the phrase a resident power. so it becomes pretty complicated because of our alliances,

because of our sort of long held approach of having an active presence. and there are different visions between the united states and china about the future of the order. i think what will be very important and tom and others alluded to this -- is the way china and united states react on a host of issues inside the region and outside the region. how we interact will contribute in a cumulative way how each country assesses long term intentions of each other and acts on the assessments. whether maritime issues or north korea or some others it becomes very important that we work hard every day to get those right. i agree very much with professor

jung that we are in a very transitional period no matter which scholarly approach you take. and i agree with him in a specific way. transitions are plastic. nothing is inevitable. and nations have the liberty of choice. and so how you make your choices and the factors you take into account become very important. that's true of the government in washington, beijing, tokyo and seoul and one hopes those choices are made well. not only in the big picture but on the specific issues that i talked about. i think that with respect to east asia itself the goal of beijing and washington is to do everything we can to in the american term avoid strategic rivalry and the chinese term build a new pattern of relations

or interaction between us. there is strategic mistrust but it is important to think about the different sources of mistrust. it can be from misunderstanding, bad implementation, from serious conflicts of interest. each source of mistrust has to be dealt with in different ways. how countries interpret the actions of the other and it becomes very important. finally, let me say one thing about the u.s. role. that is i don't think it's really a question of our capacity. i think we're a very rich and resilient country. we have the capacity of the problem right now is our will. and the mechanisms that define our national will and our national interests. i hope that we can get these right and then i hope that we

can use our enormous capacity in a wise way. thank you very much. >> thank you. a professor from peking university. >> thanks for inviting me. it is truly an honor. i can't tell you how much i enjoy. i totally agree with richard on his insightful comments. just a couple of points. firstly is i think there was a great point so for the entire region u.s./china relations may be a ceiling in terms of all demands and interests and calculations. the problem is how to keep the

china/u.s. relations stabilized seen as growing diversity. then we see another type of response pack in the countries. they want to keep them in line. making them competing and make them just getting along well with each other. from my perspective how the relations can really reform into some sort of -- just a shoulder

of all expectation. so diversified. answer the text. it is not some sort of job between the two giants. it is a job of the entire region. given some sort of growing diversity is not easy for u.s. and china to [ inaudible ] the problem is i think as was mentioned the china and u.s. should stay away from some sort of new cause of regional tension. it may not be possible and easily to look at. i think it is alarming reminder

all the players to have in mind. recent cases to get china and u.s. intention is some sort of small and middle power trick. then there is a question coming up, a great power game along with a small -- then regional security pictures has never been more complicated. of course, at the top layer endorsement is china/u.s. so we needed to compete and cooperate. we need to develop some sort of shared vision. everybody knows we each have a shared interest.