politics less disruptive, less harassing to our relations. china is a very unique system. it is a popular figure but never heard any positive assessment so far in the western media. how such a gap can be overcome? gently and adequately i think is a test. another thing is a lot of americans are very suspicious china will see u.s. as a declined power. yes, we have a lot of chinese paranoia. i can assure you they are not sitting mainstream. it is fully in shape. your government is really in trouble. without the politics the united states is fabulously -- so i

think the chinese is struggling to take out some sort of very adequate understanding of the western but i don't think china sees any window of opportunity to [ inaudible ] and china should take advantage of this and move in. i think it's totally misperception. there is a point i would like to respond to the presentation is mutually assured destruction that would be a new cornerstone principle. china never do that. feel very satisfied [ inaudible ] china is oversensitive to u.s.-initiated asian missile defense system.

it will collapse because maintain such a big arsenal is so expensive and so costly so i think china will continue to follow up with a limited nuclear deterrent, just don't try to make it small and more efficient. i don't think the issues coming back and laying out some sort of new security line between the both sides. another point made very, very intensely is how to maintain -- the question is we also see some sort of equation about states power and the revisionist of power. to me i think status quo is some

sort of evolution then the key criteria on whether or not the status quo change will hurt or undermine the regional security is not how it is. that is how the evolution of change could just build up in a time of the joint efforts and corroboration. for example, in the eyes of chinese u.s. initiative tpp is some sort of status quo change to regional integration. my view is that don't just very statically and rigorously see the china's behavior as status quo change. let me come down to my

conclusion. [ inaudible ] by extreme critical force. i think it's a very illuminating point. my view is that china remain far behind the u.s. power transition very powerfully demonstrate very, very rich. probably the perception feeling now pouring out see china now is a very, very strong competitor. for our chinese view we continue to see china is just the imposition to cooperate while competing for some sort of co-interest. co-interest is sovereignty, political safety, china's unfinished evolution. from this point i would also

like to see bilateral relations should be based on very virtuous action and reactions. china shouldn't just [ inaudible ] then the question for u.s. is washington also shouldn't overreact to a rising china. let me stop here. >> thank you. > . thank you very much. let me focus on the challenges to the international security order in northeast asia and the u.s./china relations. my task here is to make my colleagues on the podium speak more.

let me highlight four factors that are important. first is the future of bilateral relations between the united states and china. second is north korea nuclear issue. fourth, china's new diplomatic initiatives. let me be straightforward by asking instead of explaining [ inaudible ] before the apec summit meeting there were growing criticisms in the united states over the positive attitude on china's new title measure of power relations. it seems to me the outcome was the eclectic whether there is a united states to really embrace the concept. what are the prospects for the new type of rate power seen in

the u.s. perspective? this is my first question. second question is about the north korean nuclear issues. well elaborated north korea's increase over its nuclear capabilities. there has been a rising criticism in korea and around this academia. the united states has [ inaudible ] so how would you respond to this kind of criticism? few months ago general curtis in the command of the u.s. forces in korea said the north korea has the capabilities to build nuclear tip missiles. south korean defense minister confirmed this. in the near future we will face

north korea's nuclear proliferation and capable of icbm. it will dramatically increase nuclear proliferation in the region. many experts anticipate north korea is likely to explode nuclear device in the first half of next year. then i am going to ask my friend what is china's policy to deal with this kind of issue? is there any specific policies? seems to take new initiatives in the north korea policies. if north korea tested the nuclear device how will china respond to it? my fourth question is related to russia's return. we also face new factors in the northeast asia. there is a prospect for the

cement meeting in 2015 between putin and kim jong-un. and is it helpful or negative? the last question is about china's new initiative and their foreign policy. we are witnessing great transformation in china's foreign policies which is very different. what is the new normal diplomacy of china? what is the meaning of the new normal and also what is the implication to the world? my last question is about the -- under this initiatives of new

diplomacy and rebalancing they are saying in south korea, south korea faced [ inaudible ] yes or no? it means we are living the yes or nos era. the difficult cases of the aiib south korea is under tremendous pressure from the united states and china. how do we handle these kinds of issues? i would like to get advice from my respectable chinese scholar as well as the americans. thank you very much. >> thank you very much. actually, we started 20 minutes

late so at least i think we should get 10 to 15 minutes back. i'm negotiating. i'm like a house wife trying to keep up with how much money the household has. i try to manage and in the end i end up with no money in the deficit. maybe we should entertain three questions. i will read them. one is to professor, could you summarize the prc strategic goals in the south china sea? how do these goals shape china's concept of its future relations with regional neighbors? this is from michael marsh, global peace foundation. the second question is if this

question is not censored by the moderator. has north korea nuclear program served china's strategic interests by distracting u.s. and enabling beijing to play role of responsible stakeholder? this is for everybody. the third question is china's population has peaked and is now declining. has there been a case of rising power with the shrinking population? that is the question to ponder.

let's just go around and with the questions. maybe you answer the last one. >> i agree very much with the richard comment that for america the will is probably more important than its capacity. about two things, comment. i think china's nuclear strategy is reactive, modest, gradual and still evolving. and given the reactive nature of it it is relative, in other words, whatever u.s. is planning to do with developing china will respond therefore china's strategy will change. i think it will be unwise to think china's nuclear strategy

will be fixed even in the need to long-term. i think china is much smarter than that in my view. and then north korea's nuclear. i think what we should do now is to prevent from having more bombs, better bombs and prevent from exporting bombs overseas. in order for us to do that we need to talk. that's exactly where we are stuck. if we want to talk because we have long experiences of talking. so if for the talk to be effective it has to be trust -- there has to be a principle to channel folk for communication which are not going to be possible. second, this whole process of talking is premised under the assumption that it is still at some point going to abandon this

nuclear weapons program. and i'm not quite sure whether that is a well-grounded assumption. third, whether or not there is going to be a very high level of coordination among the parties involved just to get rid of this nuclear weapon. i'm not sure whether that is going to be forth coming therefore we are stuck without a very good solution. we all know that six party talks are not effective as far as fundamental. still we don't have alternative. now, finally about the stability of the u.s./china relations. i think this is truthful almost all bilateral relationships, how to prevent domestic politics from getting involved. i have done some research on many of the survey studies in the united states on american's

views of china. this year for the first time china is perceived as america's number one enemy for the first time since 2001. so i think there are certain changing perceptions of china because of many changes that happen to china. finally one point. i think most of the united states and china are asking, posing this particular question to regional states in east asia. that is are you with us or against us? for instance, the asian investment bank, the asian security valuations and so on and so forth, i think the more frequently u.s. and china ask the question the more fatigue

regional states will have about these states. i do not think this is going to be helpful. thank you very much. >> thank you. i was asked, i think in the common -- some other questions about and i just want to say a couple of things. i think the new model of power relations is useful if it is a means of discussing fundamentals. the problem is it has not become that. there has not been a discussion on those different visions and therefore it becomes a way of muddying the waters. and we distract. so i care much of that about

what it is called and much more about what the substance of those strategic dialogues tale are. one thing that came up a little more sort of attention is a few times that china's position is evolved and it will evolve over time as it rises. this is something that china ought to be careful about. that is what the region worries about is that it is sort of changing. if your power is rising you need to in a way if you want others to be assured about your rise you need to sort of impose limits so they won't worry that it would evolve to a point where it would threaten their interests. to me this is quite an old problem. this is sort of an old model of major power relations. when germany was rising in the 1870s bismarck had his ambitions but after he accomplished his

goal of unifying germany he imposed strict limits on those ambitions. one of the problems in southeast asia is there is no sort of clear sense of limits on what china's ambitions are. now, there are ways to go about doing that clarifying or adopting a binding code of conduct. but they are quite unlikely. i think over the medium to long term sort of showing that there is giving some predictability as to what the evolution will be is sort of a very important step of reassurance. i think it will be very difficult to get there, though. >> there are several points to make. the first one is about the discussion. you discussed about american capability. i think i agree with you that the united states is in good shape and still the most powerful country in the world.

if you look at the u.s. policy you will find it defers from what it has been in the past. the last ten years or 20 years ago. i understand such a way either past united states is so powerful it always uses a force. the result is that they won the war. they aimed politically and did not benefit a lot. they learn a lesson from that. so today they use the power more smartly. more diplomacy rather than force. will is more important, i agree with you. the second point is about the nuclear issue. i think the pullacy of every country today might be how to prevent north korea from another nuclear test rather than what you have. this is the policy not only for

china but united states and north korea we are trying to prevent it from happening. i think as a scholar i'm not here predicting rather than promising. you predict the chinese behavior after the third nuclear test that foreign minister called north korean ambassador a strong protest and chinese government in joining [ inaudible ] to impose sanctions on north korea. i think what i envision is a nuclear test and chinese government will further join and determine it to import more sanctions. this is wais what i think will happen. it is about a new normal policy, a new normal relations, a new term. it is very new.

i think if you look there are many different dimensions as was said. they spoke a lot, spoke about the chinese difference and about chinese policy and other issues. there is also new changes and took his ideas about -- put about a lot of ideas. the other point is about whether nuclear program serves interests. i think this is a misunderstanding. north korea's nuclear program and imposed more immediate threat towards china and south korea who are close neighbors of north korea. chinese more concern that it may be to achieve nuclear arm race.

the challenge is more determined, we are equally determined as south korea and as the united states to de-nuclearize north korea. i think to not is detrimental because look at chinese periphery. our relation with neighbors have been improving a lot. the only problem around chinese neighbor is north korea nuclear issue. we do not have to guarantee peace and stability. it is not in chinese interest. >> thank you very much. maybe you can respond to the question that is addressed to you.

supposed to work. >> so thanks for question for me. south china sea strategy, of course, is a very controversial subject of controversial issue. so then i see some sort of main components of the strategy is easily identified. first is beijing would like to -- some sort of claim to rocks in the islands. yes some would say it's not -- i think there is a strong urgeance for -- the controversy of

[ inaudible ] so on the other hand [ inaudible ] safe guarding become more political than international. the second component is china's growing maritime cautiousness. 18 party congress picked up the new key concept. that means china building into maritime power. what does maritime power mean? i think it is still unanswered question. either way south china sea is spontaneously complying with the

new concept initiated by 18-party congress. so this other one is i think beijing now emphasized growing portion in the national economy from sea and from ocean. so then recognize maritime economy will be some sort of leading driver for china's future economic growth. so then such a new passion is also automatically spilled over to china's maritime area. then last one is naval capability also leading because china ways for rebalancing. beijing needed to build up some sort of measures. so we see multiple reasons now just to drive in china for some

sort of maritime endorsement. but to the problems as i mentioned south china sea strategy so far is very questionable and even problematic. i think i see tension with regards to south china sea. first is mismatch between real action over south china sea issue. rhetorically we emphasize we should have a good neighbor policy. how the south china sea safe guarding china's rise were not just undermining china's foreign policy principle. i think it is a bigger test. second is one way china could, for example, confirm the chinese claim while alsot