it's also a test for china. now there is no easy exit for china to put such two ends meeting. >> about your first point, what it was not nine but became 11 in 1982. >> 11-9 in the eyes of chinese no difference at all because it is just [ inaudible ] and china concludes successfully we say delimitation. so then that kind of the two dashes really [ inaudible ]. >> okay. thank you very much. i still have a couple of

questions in my hands but then we really run out of time. i'm sorry that these questions are not going to be addressed at this session. i want to congratulate our speakers and discussers for their excellent job. thank you very much for your participation. [ applause ] >> coffee break for 15 minutes. thank you.

c-span live today been hearing a discussion about the relationship between south korea, china and the united states with experts from all three countries participating today. you can see earlier session online shortly. also in the news today former florida governor jeb bush announcing plans to actively explore a campaign. we should have an update shortly. want to let you know they are

taking a short break here, 15 minutes. we will be returning for the next panel of the day at brookings institution.

c-span 3 live here at brooks institution. the next panel expected to start in about 10, 15 minutes will be on korea and the major powers. also that news update, former

florida governor jeb bush announcing today via facebook that he plans to actively explore the possibility of running for president in 2016 and that he will form a new political operation to allow him to raise money for like-minded republicans. he posted the announcement on facebook and tweeted out a notice saying that he discussed the future of our nation and potential bid for the white house with members of his family over thanksgiving. he told "wall street journal" ceo council that he is thinking about running for president recently and talked about sacrifices for running for office and how a republican candidate can win without violating principles. we will take a look here while we are at a break. >> it is kind of like any other year. >> i'm thinking about running for president. i'll make up my mind in short order. i don't know the exact timeline. it's the same decision-making

process that i have always had which is do i have the skills to do it in a way that tries to lift people's spirits and not get sucked into the vortex. that sounds easy, it is easy to say, harder to do. do i have the skills? i have to do a lot of soul searching to really make that determination and perhaps more important can i do it where the sacrifice for my family is tolerable. every person that runs for office at any level it's a big sacrifice because it is a pretty ugly business right now. i'm not saying woe is me here. there is a level under which i would never subject -- it is my life. i think people kind of appreciate that. i'm sorting that out. i don't know if i would be a good candidate or a bad one. i know -- i kind of know how a republican can win whether me or somebody else.

and it has to be much more uplifting, much more positive, much more willing to, you know, be practical now and lose the primary to win the general without violating your principles. >> and here at the brookings institution in a break during this conversation about south korea, china and the united states and the relations between the three countries. the next panel that we are expecting is on korea and its relationship with major powers. and, again, news that former florida governor jeb bush announcing on facebook that he will actively explore possibility of campaign for president in 2016. while we are in this break here at the brookings institution we will take a look at one of our conversations from this morning on washington journal about some news abroad, shootings in pakistan at a military school for children. we will take a look at some of the details now.

>> this hour prom washington post.com, taliban storm elite army high school in pakistan. the death toll has been rising throughout the morning. now 136. joining us on the phone is tim greg. the pakistan bureau chief for the washington post. appreciate you being with us. what is the latest? what happened? >> well, the latest is that after about six hours the siege at an army high school in northwest pakistan appears to be over. about 10:00 a.m. local time here about six to eight taliban militants stormed into the school heavily armed many wearing suicide vests began to start shooting students and teachers. they took a number of hostages. as the day unfolded the death toll continued to rise. we are now up to 134 students

and teachers have been killed. one of the bloodiest terrorist attacks in pakistan in history. >> a couple of points. you say the carnage has struck at the heart of pakistan's military. can you elaborate? >> yeah, because this was a high school that was on a pakistan military base. pakistan soldiers are revered in this country. they are sort of the top tier of social status in many ways. they have their own schools. the school is open to students of military families as well as other students who attended. the fact that militants were able to penetrate shows the brutality and resolve in order to carry out such an impact. many pakistan army soldiers and officers presumably lost children today in this attack. in many ways this is sort of pakistan's version of 9/11.

walking around today people see people crying. they were sort of shocked. this is a country pretty used to terrorist attacks. there has been a bloody picture of terrorism but nothing grows nearer to this level. >> known as malala. she said she is heart broken by this latest attack. of course, she has been a victim of taliban attacks in the past. why 14, 15, 16 year old kids? >> well, that's a question everyone has been asking a large part much of the history of this war children have still sort of been offlimits. malala was shot by the taliban. you didn't hear about major attacks against students and children. the only thinking is this shows

the militants are sort of up against a wall. they are searching for softer targets, easier targets. the military has been conducting a pretty substantial military operation for the past six months against the militants. the thinking is that they are now more desperate and really lashing out in any way they can to cause as much blood shed and brutality. >> who are these taliban militants? what is motivating them? >> it gets sort of confusing because pakistan taliban and afghan taliban. this is believed to be the pakistan taliban. they are a group of militants formed in the after math of september 11 when former military dictator here began aligning of the u.s. and campaign against al qaeda and the afghan taliban. they sort of rose up domestically inside pakistan.

they say they operate independently of the afghan taliban but there is some coordination. they sort of live and harbor on the same border region but their focus is more on pakistan's government and military. over the years they have been responsible for killing tens of thousands of civilians and pakistan military officials. >> any reaction yet from the pakistani government? >> yes. there has been -- i mean, just really horrified. the prime minister has said this would strengthen the country's resolve to take the battle to the taliban and try to eradicate the problem. as we know judging from the u.s. experience in afghanistan this is a very complicated, very long battle and effort that is unlikely to resolve anytime soon. >> tim craig here in the u.s. we saw what happened, a different

situation but still a terror attack in sydney, australia. should we be concerned about the taliban here? >> well, over the years the fbi knows concerns about the taliban could be capable of carrying out an attack outside of pakistan borders. it has not been much evidence so far that they have been willing to do that or that they are capable of doing that. they have been sort of under siege in many ways. u.s. drone strikes do target pakistan taliban, as well, because they are viewed as a threat. i think the broader concern for u.s. and western nations is as we saw in sydney, australia and canada a few weeks ago that there could be sort of copy cat attacks, lone wolf attacks of militants who take it upon themselves to carry out repeat attacks. >> finally, this is --

>> schools everywhere have always been viewed -- second session of today's -- in the name of bilateral conference on northeast asia and the united states. especially we are talking on topic of korea and major powers. basically my goal is -- but to make our discussion more interactive i would like to introduce two points. first point is that this year we celebrated 20 years anniversary of the geneva agreement which

was signed 20 years ago in 1994 between united states and north korea. during the last 20 years it has been crystal clear that north korea totally lost their credibilities. and still is striving to get factor of nuclear powers. the talk has been [ inaudible ] as everybody is aware of it. unfortunately, time is not on our side. north korea's nuclear capability has demonstrated a drastic upgrade and sophistication of the last 20 years. now, it is high time the member

states of six-party talks to come up with new ideas to make a new break through. at the same time next year as this morning's mentioned we will celebrate 50 years anniversary of the mobilization of diplomatic relations between korea and japan. also 70 years anniversary of independence from [ inaudible ] to u.s. allies korea will be at the cross roads. so with this kind of new development in mind i would like to invite three prominent presenters and also three

discussants to talk on these issues. my first presenters will be professor jie, dean of international scooting at peking university. and also he -- he works as professor at college university and university of california at san diego. and he actually study -- he actually joining as researcher twice in this institution from '85 through '86 and 2001 through 2002. and one of the interesting characteristic features is he

has a special status as a member of the standing committee and foreign affairs committee of the national committee of chinese people's conservative conference. and also, he has some membership of political party that is not chinese or communist party. his party is china democratic lead. it's kind of -- u.s. version of, you know, democrats. now it's your time. >> well, thank you very much, ambassador park, for your kind introduction. i guess i might talk or focus on

evaluation of what's going on trilaterally relationship between u.s., china and south korea. how should we evaluate the trilateral relationship between these three countries during the past year? the answer is that it is mixed with positive and negative developments. in terms of the positive developments, one finds that the u.s. and south korea relationship is quite stable, despite some small grudges and misgivings. as dan russell just point out, has never been better. china/south korea relationship,

also compete in that sense, has never been better. our two leaders, president xi jinping and president park chung-hye, they have very good relationship. signing of the fta is very significant in terms of our relationship. in terms of china/u.s. relationship, i think after suffering the repeated setbacks, the relationship appeared to be back on track again with xi/obama summit in beijing. they had extended talks. the two governments agreed.

specific targets on climate chan change. also they agreed on acceleration of negotiation of the b.i.t. between the two countries and also they agreed on reductions of tariff on information technologies and also there were two mous between the two military on confidence-building measures on maneuvers on the high seas. u.s. pressed south korea on issues like deployment of the fat system in south korea and also participation in -- south korea's participation in aaib are really making south korea quite frustrated either way.

they don't want to offend china, allegedly, chinese are opposed to this. and also try to invite south korea to join the aaib. also chinese efforts to enlist south korea to join the aib are making south korea's life a little bit more uncomfortable. at the same time. and also despite the success of the xi/obama summit in beijing, i think differences between china and u.s. on a whole lot of issues remain ranging from how

to deal with north korea more effectively on the nuclear issue to how to address the south china sea maritime disputes. we have a lot of differences. and both governments are a bit concerned about -- quite concerned about the other country's approach. the three countries cannot agree on how to deal with north korea's nuclear issue, which is allegedly sparing no time -- i mean north korea, quietly developing nuclear weapons and planning to have another nuclear test. how can we explain the negative developments? we can explain the positive developments, but how can we better explain the negative developments? i think first there is the deepen strategic suspicion

between china and the u.s. on the one hand, and also between these three countries and north korea. so, there is a lot of suspicion as to what the other's intentions are. the second factor is the rise of china. the rise of china means that china now -- china is in the middle of the rise. in the middle of the rise means that china has dual identities, interests on many fronts. for example, china is both a developing country and a developed country. a weak country, a strong country. a poor country and rich country. ordinary power and civil power, in a way. chinese have two sets of interests on many issues. as a result, the chinese are confused in terms of how to define their interests, let

alone to carry out a coherent foreign policy. so when china sends out conflict, incoherent signals, the u.s. gets confused. the u.s. wants to know what the chinese really want, what the chinese are really up to. the problem is, if the chinese don't know, americans cannot find out. so, the americans adopt this hedging policy. and, of course, china -- when chinese look at u.s. adopting a hedging policy, they adopt their own version of the hedging policy. so, as a result, the interaction between china and the u.s. can easily get into a negative cycle. and on top of this, we have the domestic politics problem. in china you have rising

nationalism. you know, people suddenly realize that china is no longer that weak. they thought that china behaved in restraint because china was weak in the past. now they think china is no longer that weak, so they push the chinese government to defend china's allegedly legitimate interests in a more forceful way. and, of course, on the part of the u.s., you have politicians to try to capitalize fear and frustration with china out of ideological concerns or self-interest. this is a time, you know, to make china case so as to be successful in elections. what to do about this? first of all, i think we need to exercise caution. china is in the process of

transition. a lot of things are in flux. so, we do not want to make hasty -- i mean, draw hasty concludes and adopt hostile policies toward each other that one may regret in the days to come. especially between china and u.s. this problem is really acute. and the two countries should give each other the time and chance to put rhetoric into practice. china needs more time to figure out what its interests are. and i believe chinese are wise enough to make the right choices over time. china and u.s. should think about welcoming each other to participate in their own respective pet projects, like ttp, rcep.

aid, b.i.t. anyway, somehow we need to make accommodations to each other, to be flexible and innovative. the u.s. and south korea, i mean, they need to spend more time to explain the system to the chinese that it cannot weaken china's limited nuclear deterrence capabilities. think of deployment of another system that chinese think less threatening. china and south korea -- china should probably give more consideration of south's concern over aib, decision-making structure. south koreans want to have more say in the aaib.

china and, of course, cooperation on north korea, i think the three countries should start working more closely together to form sort of a united front to encourage north korea to give up nuclear weapons. finally, we need those of pragmatism. whatever action each country takes, they should address the concern of the other two countries if it was to be successful. the u.s. and south korea should try to alleviate china's concern over regime change of north korea. china and the u.s. should probably alleviate those concerns over its relationship with the other country, you know, whether it's china or the u.s. don't push too hard. and china and south korea should probably try to alleviate washington's concern over the nuclear threat from nuclear and

also attempt to minimize the role of the u.s., allegedly the efforts to minimize the role of the u.s. in the region. so, if we try to be innovative and practicing mattic and cautious at the same time, i think the relationship should be less bad if not much better. thank you. >> thank you for your presentation. just my personal comment on your argument on aaib. there might be some pressure from your side. i don't know if your side pressures on our shoulders, but if i -- if i can correct, the biggest problem on aaib is that china wants to take 50%

shareholders based on tpt base, a little higher than gdp per capita. if china take 50% of shareholders, korea has some difficulty. so, that is my initial understanding. maybe this could be discussed, you know, in the session because we deal with economic issues. my initial brief response to your argument on chinese, you know, government attitude towards north korean nuclear issues. as we discussed, you know, since 2009, china became more authoritative, you know, theoretical terminologies. since then there's some clearer

change of the chinese attitude toward korean peninsula policy. that is, up until now, up until that time, you know, there is some balance in the two. one is denuclearization and the other is peace and security of the korean peninsula. since that time, korea emphasize when. these two common objects, you know, in conflict. since -- i was told china, you know, prioritized peace and security of korean peninsula over denuclearization. so maybe i wonder if there's any changes of basic chinese policy on this. maybe you could respond or, you know, professor chung. my next speaker is qingming

zhang. he founded human liberty center deal with human rights issues with special reference to north korean human rights issues. he's very famous political commentators. >> thank you, president park. let me first say i greatly appreciate the korea foundation for advanced studies, the brookings institution as well as peking university for this great opportunity to exchange very frank dialogue. it's been a revelation and very helpful

helpful process. the panel he's title is major powers. as far as i know, there are four major powers but i was made aware of the fact that we have ten minutes to discuss korea's relations with these major powers. that gives me after this introduction about less than two minutes per major power, which is a mission impossible, so i've taken the liberty to eliminate two of the four major power statuses, russia and japan, for no better reason than, well, i don't particularly like mr. putin because i think he's a -- he's a bully. i'm not particularly fond of -- sorry if there are japanese in the audience -- mr. abe because i think he lacks compassion. i'll be focusing mainly on korea's relationship with the united states and china.

first, let me turn very quickly to korea's relations with the united states. well, let me first say that both korea/china relations and korea/u.s. relations, if we are able to isolate the two and look at them independently, it's as good as it can get. i mean, you know, we've heard it. from the chinese delegation here. we've heard it from the american delegation here. in fact, during the summit between president obama and president park geun-hye, obama was saying korea/u.s. relations is more than just an alliance. this year in june, u.s. congressional report was saying that korea -- i keep saying

korea/japan. korea/america relations is at their best state since the establishment of the alliance in 1953. earlier the key note speaker, dan russell, was also saying that in his career in the state department, that it's really at its best state. we've had multiple summit meetings already and counting. we've had a good number of -- i can count seven foreign ministerial meetings. we're not even into two years quite yet. we've had two plus two meetings. and, of course, the security consultative meetings, the scm. in fact, the 46th scm at shangri-la, the defense minister's meeting in may this year, the united states and

south korea agreed to postpone the transfer of the wartime operational control. no date set this time. the transfer would take place when the condition is appropriate. and then on the views of both countries, i guess in particular in terms of the threat from north korea. so, this is a very positive development in korea/american relations. now, that's not to say that everything is rosy in korea and american relations. there are some outstanding issues that needs to be ironed out between the two. one, of course, is the nuclear agreement, which i guess will move into 2015. that's -- you know, it's a very complicated issue. and it's not an easy issue. there's the ongoing issue of the

u.s. relocation of the bases in korea, but having said that, overall, i think the bilateral relations is in really great, excellent shape. likewise, south korea's relations with china, also in very good shape. and everyone's been talking about the personal chemistry between president xi jinping and president park geun-hye. they met for the first time when president park was the president of the grand national party. at that time the grand national party was the ruling party. not the opposition party. and xi jinping was governor at that time. so probably safe to say that both of them were not at the height of their stature, which probably reinforced their chemistry because they're undergoing some issues at the time. and that friendship has lasted.

and, you know, very fortunate for the korea/china roolelation that both of them ended up becoming leaders of respective countries. of course park geun-hye made the state visit in 2013. we had return visit by president xi jinping this year, early july, which i think was already mentioned. that was a very significant visit because first -- for the first time, chinese leader visiting south korea before visiting north korea. i might also add that, you know, president park geun-hye's meeting because to date bilateral summit has not taken place between prime minister abe and president park geun-hye. also, we've had six times of the

summit meeting at both bilateral and multilateral settings between the two leaders. but the china/korea relations goes much further than just the personal link. the bilateral trade is now over -- you know, well over -- last year it was $230 billion. they're pushing for $300 billion at some point. now we have over 8 million travelers between the two countries. in 1992, when the two countries normalized relations with each other, there was only 130,000. and mostly, of course, recently the fta was concluded. the two countries also seems to have a common front in targeting japan's -- mr. abe's revision. i don't know if that's a good thing or a bad thing, but in terms of korea/china relations, it has contributed.

now o an independent basis, great relationship, but when you start to look into this respective bilateral relations within the larger context of u.s./china relations, things are more complicated. things don't look so rosy. this is despite the denial from both china and united states, there is some logic does not apply in their relations with south korea. i think they do. what do i mean by that? well, i think there's a juxtapositioning of the old traditional order in east asia and the emergence of a new order. where the united states plays a

central role. the asia pivot is supposed to reinforce this old order which has existed since the end of world war ii. and the success of this pivot is contingent on a very close alliance relations. especially with south korea. but other variables, it's not like they're just in a constant state. i think the economic term is caters paribus. one of the variables is making some tech tonic noise. that's rise of china. china rising. in particular rise of china as an emergence, as a maritime power in this region. now, you might say it is challenging in the asia-pacific region, but even if you deny that, there's no question that china is trying to carve out a

greater role and influence in this region. you might call that grand strate strategy. this is a very significant development because if you look at it, if you look at the new silk road vision, it does represent a massive loop linking three continents with china playing a central role within this loop as provider of goods, information, as well as infrastructure. roads, railroads, so forth. what is the end game for china? the expansion of the economic interaction eventually spilling over into cultural and political sector to create a cultural economic bloc where china plays a leading role. and china wants, i believe, korea to be out of this bloc.

and herein lies the dilemma for south korea. we are very much entrenched in the old order, but there is this new order emerging where china wants korea to play a significant role. now, this is a problem because the new silk road, i may be wrong in this assessment, is not seen as being complementing but, rather, competing with u.s.-controlled sea lanes, not to mention ttp. and china's push has already been mentioned, push for south korea joining the aaib and also the open opposition to t.a.d. where as far as south korea is concerned, t.a.d. has nothing to do with china. it has everything to do with north korea. that's not the view of china.

china looking at it from the perspective of u.s./china relations. this is the background -- >> well, time is over. >> okay. this is the background where there is this discourse over the dilemma of south korea. but as far as to come to an abrupt conclusion, really as far as i'm concerned, there is no dilemma. at the end of the day, the fact is, united states is south korea's ally. china is not an ally. it is a very important partner of south korea's but not an ally. and, therefore, in order for that die mention and matrix to change, there has to be some significant changes in china, particularly as a soft power. i will leave it at that. thank you. >> thank you. you covered these issues in very

micro -- microscopic issues, but i like to give you some microscopic questions. based on your -- on human rights issues. two weeks ago u.n. general is bemably took ground breaking resoluti resolution. even though china and russia is expected in security council, these issues will be new headache to china. now, do you think this kind of new approach will increase the chinese, you know -- on north korea nuclear issues? maybe you could -- well, chinese colleague make some answers.

my next speaker will be katharine moon, president of asia studies. she is inaugural holder of korean studies in this brookings institution. >> thank you very much. i would probably -- if i introduce myself -- flip the order around. first and foremost, i'm the sk-korea foundation chair in korea studies for east asia policies program and i am very frlt to have an incredibly wonderful, intellectually and personally, wonderful set of colleagues on the fourth floor of this building. and our fearless leader, richard

bush is here. he sets a tone for a certain kind of integrity and quality of work and dedication. i'm proud to be part of that group. many thanks to be given but everyone has given the traditional thanks to the traditional people. i would like to give an untraditional thanks to my research associate paul park here at brookings. many of us work with staff members who are just outstanding. as outstanding as the senior scholars are. and they're often the unsung heroes. so, he was very much a part of preparing for my presentation and also discussing together some of these ideas. i'm going to take a different approach from the conventional approach when we talk about the koreas, or especially south korea in the context of the major powers.

i don't know if i can stomach another conference on asia pivot. another panel on how korea feels sandwiched between china and the u.s. or another intense seminar on the history issue between japan, korea and china. so, i would like to try something new. it's part of a book project i am beginning. and i tend to be a mid to long-term thinker. i think it's the right crowd to be doing that kind of foreshadowing or more in-depth thinking about the larger future of northeast asia. so, i'd like to talk about demographic, domestic politics but demographic change that leads to domestic politics and, therefore, leads to foreign policy, possibly changes to foreign policy priorities, including the relationship, korea's relationship with the united states, with china and also the nonmajor powers in east

asia, which we have tended to leave out in our discussions. we know they're very important for a variety of reasons. my basic question is this, how might the domestic, demographic changes that are rapidly occurring in south korea, in particular, going to affect korea's role and relation in east asia in the future? south korean society is in the throes, in the midst, in the struggle of demographic change, socially, politically, culturally, that have serious implications for economic performance as well as national security priorities and foreign policy priorities. there are two major factors. one is the very low birth rate and the fast aging society that most of you know that characterizes south korea.

it is the lowest in terms of the birth rate. the lowest birth rate among all oecd countries and the fifth lowest in the world. south korea's fertility rate is lower than japan's. south korea, as we all know, tends to catch up very fast. i'm not so sure this is a good area south korean should have caught up so fast, but nevertheless, statistics are statistics and they tell us certain facts. the second area is the demographic change happening from migration, both from defectors from the north coming into the south, who amount to approximately 30,000 at this point. the number seems low compared to a near 50 million south korean populati population. they hold much more potential clout, especially in interkorea

relations and china than we might give them credit for at this point. i'm not going to focus on that. i have papers i'm working on and i'm happy to talk about it during q&a. i will focus on another area of demographic change, which is the transition from an ethically, culturally and phenotypically, meaning our facial features, homogenous society in south korea and one that's multiethnic and, quote, multicultural, what south korean, the government officially labeled as -- speaking foreign language ] translated as multicultural family. for many of our chinese speakers. [ speaking foreign language ] it's literal translation. when i first read that in korean language, i thought, what on

earth does that mean? then i realized, it's the literal translation from multicultural family, multicultural society, which has never existed. that notion, concept, never existed in south korea until very recently. but the striking thing about this phenomenon is not that it's taking place. migration takes place all over the world but how rapidly the south korean government has picked up this issue as a major policy priority both for increasing the population, increasing the labor pool potentially and also to accommodate -- make accommodations for the newcomers so they might try to integrate better into south korean society. it's an assimilationist policy which many south korean ngos and advocates of these groups and the immigrants themselves criticize because they are not in favor of assimilation per se. but nevertheless, it is a serious attempt. i would say a laudable attempt,

to pay attention on the part of the government to the pressing welfare, educational, job, technical skills and other needs of integration required because of this growing presence of foreign nationals and their children who are what some people might pejoratively call korasian. so, they marry korean asians so they become of multicultural, multiracial backgrounds. these children are approximately 200,000 in numbers. they are korean citizens by birth. why? in 1997 south korea did something that some south korean newspaper commentators called ethical change. it was in the korean term.

fa nomin if he nam natural revolution from father's side to bilineage. so a korean mother, korean citizen that's a female and mother, can bestow citizenship on her non-korean child. this is brand new. nevertheless, south korea has been changing legally, normatively and, of course, in terms of phenotype and culturally and policywise. just to give you a couple more statistics, south korea, in terms of its population projected into the future, by 2013, about a quarter of south korea's population, currently at around 50 million, will be 65 and older. by 2045, this is really not long -- it's not long in the

future. by 2045 -- by 2045 the average age in south korea will be 50 years old. that's what i am now. i feel very young. that's an aging population, technically speaking. this is important when it comes to economic productivity and the labor force that is able to sustain a fast growing asian population. by 2060 the south korean population will plummet to between 34 million and 44 million from the current 50 million or so. there are, as some koreans know, these wild projections that in about 100 years south koreans will have disappeared from the face of the earth -- rather, koreans. if no other -- nothing else changing. i don't believe in that. of course, i'm not adding the

potential unification scenario but i don't believe unification will solve the demographic problems and that can also be saved for q&a. >> ten minutes. >> i'm sorry? >> ten minutes. >> my ten minutes are up? >> yep. >> okay. >> a few more minutes. >> give me two more minutes, please. i'm the only female on this. i'm talking about minorities in korea. i can claim all sorts of crazy things, but i shant. i respect my colleagues too much. impact on economics. the total size of south korea's labor force is expected to peak in 2016-17 and decline thereafter. economic growth would be reduced by about half of what it is now by 2050. that is a significant concern to be had. for korea to maintain political,

cultural power an increase in the birth rate is needed. needed at an increase of at least 1.8 from the current 1.25 over the next decade. and i predict it will not happen. not by south koreans alone. national security implications. over the past five years the number of men aged 18 to 35 and eligible for mandatory military service has dropped by over 120,000. there will be a shortage of 84,000 by 2030. and a shortage of 123,000 by 2050 due to the low birth rate. these are figures from the korean -- relevant korean ministries. this would result in a shortage of 30% man power, woman power in 2030 and a 45% shortage by 2050. what is very interesting is that military officials are aware of the declining number of

potential recruits in south korea. and have put into place reductions of army troops from 552,000 to 387,000 by 2020. that is, again, very soon in the future. if the rok is to maintain the current level of personnel, fighting personnel, the government needs to recruit 276,000 people per year. again, this is not tenable. it's not sustainable. under current conditions. i have other statistics on that but i'll leave it aside. what is interesting is the south korean government has been responding quickly to these changing demographics, such that in february 2012 the draft law, the military service law was changed to recognize and formalize the demographic diversification of koreans.

until that law, only korean -- a full korean ethnic heritage, parentage, could join the military. it has been and still is a highly ethno nationalistic society. i give no judgment to that. just policies are based on that assumption of ethno nationalism. since 2012 all male citizens, regardless of ethnic background, are expected to perform the mandatory military service expected of all able-bodied korean men. i have other things i can raise during q&a. i will just leave these questions for you to think about because these are the important implications for foreign policy. if these foreigners and the 200,000 growing children who come of age in south korea, who are south korean citizens but are heavily marginalized and discriminated against in south korean society do not get integrated into the society and are not able to develop a

national identity that is in accord with the larger society, we need to ask questions about what south korea's national interest will become in the future? how tight will the alliance with the u.s. be? how feasible will it be to improve or potentially to see setbacks in relations with china? the overwhelming majority of foreigners in south korea, who are laying down roots as koreans, residents and citizens, come from china, both of han and korean ethnicity. but they, too, are marginalized in south korea. on the other hand, we have defectors from the north who are at the vanguard of activism, criticizing chinese foreign policy regarding refugees, economic migrants, what have you, from the north. so, we have diplomatic tensions between the south and china because of the defectors'

activism, south korean's left activism and the south korea's right activism on refugees and human rights. we have multiple ways that we are watching -- i am watching south korea diversifying its foreign policy. park park geun-hye invited as first head of state from south korea the current president of the philippines, the young mr. ba neen notice, and she made it a priority to visit all the southeast asian states in her first year of presidency. she has a new foreign policy called v.i.p. vietnam, indonesia, the philippines. so, south korea's diversifying its foreign policy and it is not a coincidence that the demographic changes that are occurring in south korea happen to draw heavily from a population in vietnam, philippines, indonesia, thailand, et cetera.

so, i leave open the question of, how might the domestic demographic changes in south korea affect domestic identification, identification in terms of political identification with south korea's current interests versus future changing interests? how might these youngsters who are of mixed background grow up to help lead south korean society in ways that are aimed toward peaceful, cooperative relations in the greater east asian land mass and sea mass? thank you. >> thank you for your very creative new approaches on korean issues. i hope we can have another very lengthy lecture time here in seoul. now, it's high time for us to

invite three discussants. my first discussant will be mr. robert einhorn, who is a senior fellow at this institution. and he served as special adviser for nonproliferation and arms control of the u.s. department. also served as secretary of state for nonproliferation a long, long time ago. he's usually well known watching dictionary on north korean nuclear issues since the first nuclear crisis. if you don't mind, i will give you a very quick two questions. you know, this year iran made some new options. iran/u.s., you know, dialect, bilateral negotiation, which was very helpful. so i wonder if this kind of new

formula could be applicable to north korean case? there is some -- today some comparison with today's argument on that issue. and, you know, since the agreement failures, you know, strategy colors were prevailing in u.s. side. i want to know the longevity of the strategy tolerance. thank you. >> okay. i'll answer the iran question first and then in my comments i'll go into strategic patience and whether we're impatient with strategic patience. on iran, if we don't know if there will be agreement with iran in the b5 plus 1 countries. if it is, it's going to limit you iran enrichment program. people have asked, what's the precedent for keeping with the

dprk nuclear program in any agreement with the north koreans? i believe it would not be possible to permit any enrichment or reprocessing program. the dprk has a long-standing track record of violating its commitments. one of the early commitments it violated was in north/south denuclearization agreement in 1992 when the north explicitly agreed not to have any enrichment and reprocessing capability. so, i don't -- i wouldn't regard any iran agreement assist a precedent. i do believe if the b-5 plus 1 countries manage to achieve an agreement with iran, this would improve prospects for a productive negotiation with the north. on the other hand, failure to

reach agreement between b-5 plus 1 and iran would further reduce the probability of effective negotiations with the dprk. but the subject of this panel is korea and the major powers. picking up on your cue, ambassador park, i'll talk about north korea and the major powers. of north korean relations, clearly its relation with china is the most important. china is the main supplier of food and fuel to north korea. its its biggest trading partner. and china has made a conscientious and persistent efforts to get north korea back on the path of denuclearization.

china has been terribly frustrated in its dealings with north korea over recent years. it's been frustrated by -- more than frustrated by the provocations, the deadly provocations by north korea against the rok, by north korea's continued nuclear and missile programs and by its renunciation of commitment to denuclearization in the september 2005 six-party joint statement. clearly, there's been a cooling of relations between china and the dprk. and i understand in, and our chinese colleagues can elaborate, that there's a fairly lively internal debate within china about whether the -- whether the dprk is more of a strategic asset or more of a

strategic liability. to china. china has been prepared from time to time to apply pressures against north korea but it's reluctant. it's been reluctant to use all of its leverage. all of the leverage available to it in order to press the north koreans. and i think the reason for that is a fear that too much pressure could end up destabilizing the regime in the north and lead to instability on the peninsula and in northeast asia. the north koreans are now and have been for some time engaged in a very active diplomatic outreach efforts. part of a kind of charm offensive by the pyongyang regime. it's released the american

detainees. it sent a high-level delegation to meet with south korea at the time of the asia games. they visited european capitals. high-level delegation recently visited moscow. there have been bilateral discussions between north korea and japan on the abductee question, although i don't expect anything useful to come out of that. what are the motivations for this diplomatic outreach activity by the north? i think one of the motivations is the desire at present to blunt pressures against the pyongyang regime on the human rights front. the concern the u.n. security council might refer the north korean regime and its leadership

to the international criminal court. i think the outreach is designed to try to -- to dissipate those pressures. i think the outreach is also designed to try to divide the major powers from each other and to try to get assistance for the north in pursuing its economic development objectives. but to get that assistance without having to make compromises, sacrifices in terms of its nuclear weapons program. i think it's very important for the major powers, for north korea's partners in the morbund six-party process to remain united and continuing to make very clear to the north that it can't achieve two objectives simultaneously. the objectives of strengthening

its economy and the objective of continuing to pursue its nuclear and missile ambitions. but in the meantime it's clear that north korea's nuclear and missile programs are progressing. i agree with you, ambassador park, time is not on our side. the north koreans have recently increased, i believe they've increased the amount of plutonium they have available for the nuclear weapons. they've doubled the size of their enrichment program at pyongbyong and in my view are enriching uranium and probably producing highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapons program and continued to work on long-range missiles, including an icbm range missile that would eventually be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to

the united states. so, i think it's very important that we act to stop this momentum in north korea's destabilizing nuclear and missile programs. i think the only way we can stop that momentum is by engaging with north korea. but we can't engage on north korea's preferred terms. its preferred terms is to have discussions among countries armed with nuclear weapons, designed to perhaps limit those capabilities. that cannot possibly be the objective. the world community cannot accept north korea as a permanent nuclear weapons state. on the nuclear issue is to

recommit rekorea to the girl of denuclearization of the korean peninsula. and it's important north korea take tangible steps of restraint to give credibility to that commitment. i don't think it's realistic for north korea to take tangible steps of strength before six-party talks have commenced. they've made it clear they're not prepared to do that. and i believe that to be the case but i think we can engage, and when i say we, north korea's neighbors, can engage them in informal exploratory discussions to test whether the north would be willing to commit to certain steps once the six-party talks have reconvened.

who should hold these exploratory, informal discussions with the north koreans? i think clearly the south koreans should. they're an interested party and have -- should have every right to explore bilaterally with the north. but also the united states should. china has served as an intermediary between the u.s. and the north for quite some time, but it's important for the u.s. to sit down directly, face-to-face with the north, to -- and in an unfiltered way to get its points of view across. and after ul, it's the alleged u.s. hostile policy against the north which is the primary north korean justification for its nuclear program. i believe the united states is prepared to engage the north in

these informal, exploratory talks. this morning assistant secretary danny russell mentioned that the u.s. has long been willing to have these talks. he also mentioned that the u.s. should not be the exclusive interloqutor. and i agree. it's very important, i think, that the u.s. do engage with the north. but i think so far it's been the north that's been reluctant. ambassador park, you talk about strategic patience. if there was patience, it's worn off a long time ago. i think the u.s. has been ready to engage with the north. but it's been the north of late that's been very reluctant to have this dialogue. i think it's very important for the major powers of the world,

including north korea's neighbors, to make very clear to the north that unless it's prepared to engage in these kinds of exploratory talks leading to a recommitment to to de-nuclearization, then it will only face additional pressure. thank you. >> thank you, bob. next speaker, professor during t -- presenter during the first session. he is a professor at pecking university. board members of foreign policy analysis and hague journal of diplomatic studies. >> thank you for the introduction. this is a very important topic. when i was asked to discuss this, the first idea that came into my mind was that. we look at a map, look at korea, and korea was located in any

other place in the world, whether it's europe or latin america or africa, it is a big power. but unfortunately, it was located in such a place and surrounded by countries which are all powerful or bigger than korea. though there is a problem that korea has developed relations with all bigger powers. but having said that, i think korea is also in a very important position. if we look at the change of international structure in east asia, asia, korea has always been a vital place. the first time, was in 1894 after the china-japanese war when china was defeated in the korean peninsula. they started the japanese dominance in the area. the second time east asia and international relations changed, it was after the second world

war when the cold war started. you know, the cold war was along the parallel. today i think developed asia in the korean peninsula will demonstrate where the international regime in east asia will go. it is very, very meaningful in this regard. so they all have very interesting views. professor lee discussed the complex relations in their area, but it remind me, you talked about the relationship between china and south korea. both at their best time ever. but if you look at china's relationship with north korea and america's relationship with north korea, it should be the worst time ever. yo you see there is some kind of

relationship between south korea with other big powers and north korea with other big powers. so i'm thinking, what will south korea do, china and the united states now play the role that they're now playing in this area. so what kind of preference would south korea like to proceed. and another important relationship in this area, if you see south korea has developed a very, very substantial economic relationship with south korea. more than south korea trading volume with both united states and japan. but at the same time, south korea has developed very close military alliance relations with united states.

south korea's friends tell me there are two reasons. the reason i think some friends tell me that americans try to prevent south korea from participating. an example of that, in this year, an air show. said no, you cannot go, but you have high-technology with fighters. this shows that south korea is in a very difficult position, and wanted to develop a close economic relationship with china, but on the other hand, there was a big political barrier. east asia, different from other countries, other areas. for other areas, it's economic integration to political

integration. in east issue, the political obstacle -- it's the other way around. so it's very difficult and very interesting phenomena in this area. the last point i want to talk about, very, very good perspective. very new. it reminds me of my research, professor who wrote about the imbalance and the impact on a country's foreign policy. do not have the time to elaborate how those demographic changes will impact south korean foreign policy, exactly because there might be a lot of work to do. but it reminds me the situation in this area in south korea.

international relations in east asia, much more constrained by the domestic policies of the countries in those areas. more than the change of the balance of power. it's not about nationals in china. it's in south korea. that is another perspective to analyze the international development in this area. i think that is a very, very interesting topic, and i think i would love to read your book once you've finished. i think i will stop here. thank you. >> thank you for your presentation.

my last speaker will be a professor at seoul national university and director of the institute for japanese studies. one of the best renowned japanese specialists in korea. maybe i hope he will speak on behalf of japan. >> i will never speak on behalf of japan. i will always speak on behalf of korea. but during the break, ambassador park gave me a freedom of speech. i can tell whatever i want to. and then the professor saved japan for me for the reason that he doesn't like abe. so i will talk about -- first i will introduce my take on the recent japanese relations and how it affects the major power relations in northeast asia.

it is certain that abe's general election was a victory for him. but i do not agree to the position that that was a landslide victory for abe. he just barely maintained a status quo. you shouldn't forget that the voting rate was only 52%. it was 69% in 2009. 59% in 2012. so the smaller number of voters went to the ballot. which means they are not interested in abe. and then voters gave much more votes for the balance within the ruling coalition. i checked it, the voting rate was 52, but the proportional representation votes, only it's 33% of the votes went to the

ldp, which means about 17% of the entire electorate supported the ldp. that means less than one out of five in japan. so i think abe should be careful about the reading the election results. it's not a landslide victory for him. but it's for sure that it made the opposition very, very weak as time goes by. only opposition that gained a lot is the japan communist party, because people had no choice. in the third area. so i'm a little bit relieved to look at the results, in that ishihara's party lost 17 seats. they only have two seats left. so this means the right wing element in the japanese societies is weakening. so that's good news.

then after this, abe's victory, he secured more than 2/3 majority in the diet, in the lower house. i think he will try his best to gain more than 2/3 majority in the upper house election in july 2016. i hope he can be much more cautious in order to achieve that goal. but i don't know. but what does it mean for the asia power relations in this region? i think it's good for the united states, first of all. because abe will strongly push the collective self-defense issue, and abe will be much more forthcoming in the issue-related tpp. so in terms of voter security, it's good for the united states. but i think you should be carefully -- you should watch carefully the location issue.

more hurdles are there, because in okinawa, there are four electoral districts. none of the ldp candidates were elected in okinawa, which means the relocation will have a hurdle there. and even though collective self-defense issues will be pushed forward, yesterday, according to a news agency, the opinion survey, 55% of the respondents are against abe's security policy. that means you shouldn't navigate through a resis tapt domestic public, even though you won the election.tant domestic public, even though you won the election. as for the relationship between china and japan, i'm not that much optimistic. it was very interesting.

i think the strategy rivalry between japan and china will never come to an end, and still lingering suspicion on both sides, especially about territorial issues and history issues will continue, and much more, china is ready and willing to play the history card much more actively than before, as the emerging anniversary suggests. this is a very convenient card in northeast asia, because if you play the history game maximally, korea and japan can hardly get together. china and korea get together much more. i think china executive knows what he's doing. so that's a kind of concern for me a little bit. so then what about the korea-japan relations. abe's victory is not good news

for us, for korea, but i don't think it's bad news either. because he will -- finally know that when i told the policymakers that abe will continue to be there until 2018, they were suspicious. now everybody believes me. he will be there until september 2018, and we have to deal with him. but i have to be clear that korea, unlike the perception from looking from our side, korea is willing and ready to talk to japan. and from this september, korea became much more flexible in dealing with the japan issue. first of all, we opened all the channels of communication, except some talks. i accompanied the speaker's visit to japan.

that means according to our constitution, an important person. so we saved the meeting, but all the other talks are going on. and unlike the previous approach, we make a parallel approach, that rather than making history in front of all the problems, we know that history issues are there, but all the other issues are discussed. at many levels. so i think we are positive, and getting -- we are much more flexible than before. i don't think the president park will make a convenient compromise about the comfort woman issue. as for this issue, there's a lot of different interpretations and perspectives about comfort woman issue, but i think a comfort woman issue is a serious japan problem. i don't think nobody can advocate the comfort woman issue

from our side in japan, but internally, inside japan, there's tons of people, right-wingers try to say that they didn't make any mistake in the past, which is a grave mistake. so i think the mood in japanese society is not that much sanguine, in the sense that there is a korea bashing, especially throughout the weekly magazines. i've heard of kind of anti-korean september. in japan, even though i watched japan for more than 20 years. they are talking about anti-japan, korea bashing. but they begin talking about anti-koreans in japan. kind of the mood of the society is not that much bright. also, i don't know whether abe can deal with the comfort woman issue very smartly, considering the domestic and political context in japan.

so three factors will influence the future course of korea relations. first of all, domestic politics. we talk about that in the area of domestic politics. korea relations, a story about domestic politics. so you can hardly get away from it. whether korea will celebrate the anniversary of a korea-japan normalization, or celebrate the anniversary of liberation from japan. we don't know. so that's one factor. the other factor is china. whether china will continue to play history card and then try to cut the korea-japan ties. or come up with kind of a trilateral format created in

china. so my question to the professor is what is china's take on the promotion of the trilateral summit meeting among japan and korea and china. so i wanted to hear your view on that. and finally, i think the u.s. should play a role. i don't think the u.s. can determine this situation, but as for the comfort woman issue, i hope the u.s. can take a much more stronger take on that. very smartly, silently. thank you. >> thank you, professor park. i would like to test your tolerance before lunch. i will just have two questions. one question is why -- the chinese pressure on north korea lead to destabilization. if pyongyang believes beijing is serious, would it not cooperate and reap the benefits of the

western economic aid? maybe somebody could make some of these points. or this could be discussed in the third session. second question is, seoul and moscow are working together with north korea on development project. despite u.s. demands that south korea confront russia and north korea, will this piece of development succeed? the same categories which could be discussed. but if anybody could respond, it's up to you. but anyway, there is a question to you. >> okay. >> just one and a half minutes.

sorry. >> i think north korea believes that china is serious. but the problem is it also believes it to have nuclear weapons. it's very important. it's extremely important to north korea. that's the problem. that's why it hasn't been able to give up. actually, i want to say a few words on professor park's comment, that china is playing history card. i don't like the term. we're not playing it. it's an issue that has been unfortunately becoming very large between china and japan. it's not somebody trying to play this up for some end. many people have their own secret agendas. but i don't think the chinese government is playing this in

order to make south korea and japan separate and cannot cooperate. i don't think it ever occurred to the chinese government officials that this would be the end game. there are allegations that the chinese government is playing this for domestic political support, legitimacy. there maybe you can have -- you establish some causal relationship. but to say that china wants to play this card in order to alienate japan and south korea together, i think that's a bit farfetched. with regard to china's position, i think the share issue -- south koreans are concerned about

china's overwhelming position in terms of decision making. i think some chinese also are concerned. some chinese are saying -- i heard people in serious positions saying that if we decision-making power, we would find it very difficult to say no to friends who demand lending, okay? right? it's like maybe pakistan will say well, maybe let's have $5 billion, we want infrastructure project. should china say yes or say no? probably if more democratic decision making would say well, you know, other shareholders cannot agree. you make decisions, more on the commercial basis rather than the political basis.

probably that would alleviate chinese anxieties in that regard. so i think there are different opinions as to how much voting share china should have. to maximize its own interest, there are differences. and finally, china's priorities on north korea, peace and stability versus denuclearizati denuclearization. i think china used to prioritize peace and stability. but in recent years, there has been shifts. i think now we are not sure. my guess is, you know, china is balancing between the two. but the trend of change is toward prioritizing

denuclearization. but if you ask different people, you may get different answers at the moment. but over time, i think the priority is certainly on denuclearization. thank you. >> i think we've talked quite a lot about the chinese growth as a new leader, the new order. i think in order for china to become a bona fide genuine g2 global leader, it has to take on certain values that are universally accepted, and i think in that sense, the chinese position on north korea will be a litmus test as to whether china is able to go beyond the hard power that it already is.

whether china becomes a soft power, i think its position on north korea will be very significant. i understand why china takes the position that it's taken right now, because north korea still serves a purpose in terms of strategic buffer. but i think the longer china helicopter couldn'ts to be a patron of this rogue state, that continues to commit crimes against humanity, the nonproliferation regime of the international community, it's going to be a huge burden on china increasingly. so i believe in the mid to long-term perspective, the sooner china is able to shed this headache, the sooner china will become a bona fide leader that will earn its respect and certainly from south korea.

>> professor moon. >> yes, a pressing priority for all of us. very short-term thinking on my part, which is lunch. >> thank you all. a big hand. [ applause ] >> we will reconvene at 2:00. >> we are running late. we appreciate your patience. we will reconvene at 2:00.

and here at the brookings institution, back after a lunch break, approximately 2:00 eastern time, continue this discussion with economic ties with south korea. let's take a look at some news. former florida governor jeb bush says he discussed the future of our nation and a potential bid for the white house with his family over thanksgiving. he spoke recently to "the wall street journal's" ceo council. we'll take a look at some of that now. >> i thought, '16 is like any other year. >> kind of like any other year. >> so i'm thinking about running for president. i'll make up my find short order. you know, not that far out into the future. i don't know the exact timeline. it's the same decision-making process that i've always had, which is can i do it in a way -- do i have the skills to do it in

a way that tries to lift people's spirits and not get sucked into the vortex. and that sounds easy -- it's easy to say, harder to do. do i have those skills? and i've got to really do a lot of soul-searching to really make that determination. and perhaps more important, can i do it where the sacrifice for my family is tolerable. and every person that runs for office at any level, it's a big sacrifice because it's a pretty ugly business right now. so i'm not saying oh woe is me here, don't get me wrong. but there's a level under which i would never subjugate my family. because that's my organizing principle. it's my life. and i think people kind of appreciate that. so i'm sorting that out. and i don't know if i'd be a good candidate or a bad one. i know -- i kind of know how a republican can win, whether it's me or somebody else. and it has to be much more uplifting, much more positive, much more willing to, you know,

to be practical now, in the washington world, lose the primary to win the general without violating your principles. >> and the former florida governor saying he plans to actively explore the possibility of running for president in 2016, announcing that today on his facebook page. and that he's going to be forming a new political action committee to allow him to raise money for like-minded republicans. we'll bring you any updates on this story here on the c-span networks. and live today here on c-span 3, participants in the conversation about south korea, china, and u.s. relations. they're in a lunch break right now. and they ended that just a moment ago. going to take you back to that conversation, expected to end their lunch break at 2:00 eastern time for the next panel on the regional economic future. during the break, we're going to take a look back at this morning's keynote speech. this is by the saassistant

secretary of state for east asian and pacific affairs. >> good morning, everybody. i have the honor to work for the scholars of the brookings institution. it's a particular pleasure to welcome all of you to a discussion on the issues and the interests that are of extreme importance to many countries in the world. but particularly, to the three who are being featured here this morning. that's the united states of america, the republic of korea, and the people's republic of china. the brookings center on east asia policy is proud in this

event and in other events to work very closely with the korea foundation for advanced studies and the school of international studies. we're greateful for the leadership and of course the participation of ambassador park, the president of the kfas and his board chair. we're also very pleased to have with us a good friend and an old friend, the dean of the school at bay da, who we regard as a bro brookings alumnus, because he participated in our center's visiting fellows program, as did several other of our guests today. this event is in the category of

what is often called track two diploma diplomacy. since it brings together scholars and experts who are intimately knowledgeable of their government's policies and who can, therefore, supplement the exchanges of diplomats and officials. i'm sure that today's conference, which we call a trial log, because it's a three-way dialogue, can contribute in that fashion to peace and prosperity in a very important region of the world, and it can also stimulate and form and elevate public debate on the risks and opportunities that policymakers in washington, seoul, and bay i didn't think are dealing with. to get us started, we have a distinguished american official, who was very much involved in

policymaking here in washington, and also in the stewardship of u.s. relations with the republic of korea, the people's republic of china, and other important nations in that region. danny russell, whom i've had the honor of knowing and working with for many years, is assistant secretary of state for east asia and pacific affairs. he recently just within the last couple of weeks returned from travels with president obama to china, burma, and australia. he is going to provide us with an overview of u.s. interests and policies in the region, so danny, welcome back to brookings, and thanks for giving us the view from washington and the view from track one diplomacy.

[ applause ] >> thank you very much for the introduction. i have had the honor of working for you at the state department. in fact, i vividly remember as a young officer getting the bad news that after ten years serving overseas, i had to come back to washington. but the good news, that i was being brought back to work for the then undersecretary of state, peter tarnov, and later tom pickering. so thank you very much for all you've done, as a diplomat, as a popularly in this great institution. it's an honor to be at brookings. an iconic forum in the u.s. foreign policy arena. thanks to jonathan pollack and

others, i see a lot of very familiar faces here. i also want to say thank you to ambassador park. and underscore the importance that we place and the administration places on the role of think tanks, of scholars. you're very important contributors to the policy dialogue, to our formation, and to the implementation of our policy, not only in washington, but in the republic of korea and in the people's republic of china, and elsewhere, and in that vane, i'm pleased to participate. many years ago, many now, when i worked for>0f& first senator an then ambassador mike mansfield,

i frequently heard him pronounce that the next century, the 21st century will be the century of the pacific. and i remember thinking at the time that it sounded a little hyperbolic. fortunately, i kept my mouth shut. because now we all accept hthos remarks. mansfield was profoundly interested in the affairs of northeast asia, because he believed, as president obama and secretary kerry believe, that america's well-being and security, economic future and prosperity are all deeply affected by developments in the region. on our relations with china, our relations with the republic of

korea. and we too understand the tremendous impact that the relationships and the policies in northeast asia have on the united states and have on the world. since 1977 when mansfield left the senate and took up his ambassador post in tokyo, and certainly since january 2009 when president obama came into office, the pace of change in northeast asia has been extraordinary. while it's stable relative to certain other parts of the world, as the invitation of this conference mentioned, that cannot and must not be cause for complacency. the stakes for the global economy for the regional and world stability are simply much too high for that. so the individual and the collective challenge for

chinese, for koreans, for americans, for others, is to help build an inclusive, stable, and sustainable regional order. the question is, in northeast asia, what will be the tenets of that order? and how can we build from that to create a base from which we can help preserve the peace, advance human dignity, promote prosperity and opportunity in the wider region and ultimately in the world. that's the question. let me know what you come up with. the fact is, our countries have a tremendous ability to shape that future. we are major world economies. we're home to some of the world's most innovative companies. we're home to great thinkers. we're home to imaginative and efficient manufacturers. thanks in part to our investment in each other.

thanks in part to our tight financial and supply chain links. just think apple iphone. just think samsung galaxy. just think thinkpad. but we're not only linked by investment capital, we're linked by human capital. over 40% of international students in the united states come from northeast asia. li likewise, china has risen to be the fifth most popular destination for american students studying overseas. and last year saw significant increases in american students in japan and korea. so the blending of our cultures and the sharing of knowledge is seen from everything from food to film to sports to music to this very conference. now, i know international relations isn't quite gangnam style. but this conference is not going

to break youtube. even though you've clearly got a good audience. but i do hope and i do believe that working together, you'll be just as creative as psy. you'll be able to create a thought wave that will help drive the kind of future that we're tie trying to build. i know i'm setting the bar pretty high with "gangnam style." i know jonathan organizes a good conference. so given our commonalities, it's natural that we seek opportunities to collaborate. strobe called this a trialogue. increasingly they're an important force in global policymaking. by definition, they're more inclusive than bilateral partnerships. in practice, i can azest that they're much more nimble than large membership international

organizations. for example, the u.s., australia, japan trilateral security dialogue, which is more than a decade old is an arrangement that just last month in brisbane saw president obama host trilateral meeting with prime minister abbott, prime minister abe. it showed that the three nations are moving beyond regional issues to jointly confront global challenges. to kick starting the world economy to battling isil and ebola, to humanitarian and disaster assistance, to strategies on development that can transform societies. another grouping that does ex