coal and energy policy and a discussion on'j how+6&w)q u.s. protects critical defense information.2áf president obama announced that the president will restore full diplomatic relations withohvwb cuba. the deal was negotiated over 18 months of secret talks hosted largely by canada. here's part of what president obama said.z >ñ c

and to address cuba's interest in the release of three cuban agents who have been jailed in the united states for over 15 years. today, allen returned home. reunited with his family at long last. allen was released by the cuban government on humanitarian grounds, separately in exchange for the three cuban agents, cuba important intelligence agents that the unite áes has ever had in cuba, and who has bee#/, in prison for nearly two this man whose sacrifice has been known to onlyh< few provided america information that allowed us to# 1 arrest the

net wrk of cuban agents that included the men transferred to cuba today as well as other spies in the united states. this man is now safely on our shores. kyk%u÷z s leading republicans reacted to outrage over thejcfz obama administration's move to normalize relations with cuba with some catching it as blackmail by the -- -- a likely 2016+4 perhaps the most ardent voice in the administration. he and others in the gop tried to derail the white house's efforts. here are part of senator rubio's

comments. >> this president is the single worst negotiator weeó $kr(t&háhp &hc% the white house in my ó@htimerç;w who has basically gimpven government anything it asked for and has received no assurance of democracy in return. let mekh lose bye!úm reminding everyone that god the cubani that he did on every man, woman and child that has e&zmsw5r9t lived. the inalienable rights spoken about in our founding documents. like all people repressed around the world, they looked to america to stand up-é+o to these rights, to live up to our commitment t4z the god given right of every person, grñ life liberty and pursuit of happiness. people born in7d&t theuoth( continental united states, but for"f0u people everywhere. it is unacceptable that the only

do not know democracy, and have hy %zó÷ known democracy for at least five decades are the people29 cub)3hir(t&háhp &hc% that should be our overriding objective, ul bring all that we can to bring%qc-p!out political democratic openings in cuba and the cuban people can decide every economic model they vhywant. but the measures today will do nothing to bring about that day. significantly bring it back. today by6 oppressor oppressors, this president and the administration have let the people of cuba down.c d& >> but the "new york daily news" t "á$r&e the u.s.'s new policies on cuba normalizes thenu6)ç traditionally tense relationship, there are still strict limits on tobacco and travel. visitors will bej0pñ allowed to bring back $100 worth of cigarsd(ici between') one andand won'tuap be able to

sell them states bound. you can seey of events today at cspan.org.p?y1hñ& this?rybz on q&a, author and town hallj on what she perceives as a war on women rhetoric. p>ñbaú >> what is your problem back to >> it goes back to where the idea of this book came from which was the 2012 w[ñañ convention where they were showing this tribute video to him because he had passed away and portraying him as a/b&ó women's rights champion when he left a young woman to drown in his car;mjñ and if he had not gone back for nine hours and tried to save hisañçj behind she would have probably survived. and5ñ6ñ you can't do an entire video at a convention claiming to be preaching and fighting about the

war on women anlx like that while not that part of his live in a videoua."about his women's rights record. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern and pacific. on cspan's q&a a5bv@p to mark teny years of q and a, we're airing one program in each year starting december 22 at 8:00 p.m. eastern on cspan.óxs up next an update on nuclear dm(dñ uju control andp under secretary of state for arms control saidcäñ that despite u.s.-russia tensions over ukra-p[l russia continues to implement the new"d1,"e) yv treatyah1ib even though at a[lbt recen4l house + cruise missile that the u.s. hasx?qñ charged violatese yky;m another nuclear treaty. house lawmakers appears to be violating sevenfx treaties including the951p5 y5xtreaty.

she spoke at the brookings institution for an hour and a half. >> good morning and welcome to the brookings institution, i'm steven.ñ# piper, fellow here where i direct the?"v÷ arms controló nonproliferation initiative and it's my pleasure to ---who's american arms control policy? before continuing with my introductio6 @=etuá$sr)q o express the gratitude of brookings to they carnegie -- which+ like today's when president obama took office in(ptr 2009 he set out aúr verya ambitious agenda for arms control which hent9 speech in'9i(g÷ april in fwooin2009 in prague.

over the course of that year, the administration set out significant x->ñachievements. in april of 2010, it signed the new strategic arms -- which set hrb,e objective of reducing the role of a number of weapons in american human policy and!gm itizl&ylìáhp &hc% launched the nuclear security summary process. sárq %'c"ent even laid out even more ambitious goals so on'y9: signing the u.s.bé z flee4ká40ñ also to expand that n khçk )jjuz include both tactical -- in a way that for the first time would have had the united states and russia negotiates on their entire nuclear arsenals. the administration also talked about the possibility of ratification of a p!ñ comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. and when nato and russia discussed the cooperation onrkgñ missile defense. things have slowed sincefr=ñ then. certainly in the last year+ had the crisis in the ukraine,

but even before that crisis, it was clear thatñr on major questions of arms control the russians had still made up the processes processes. but the obama administration nevertheless has two years left to go, and we're delighted to have under secretary to talk about what's0& ñ to be expected in that period she has a long and distinguished career with the u.s. government. we actually first met in q990 when we were on the severe yet desk of the state department. and she went to her first start negotiation, s)d2uñ also served at the national security council, seniornbyç positions at thewsfb depa÷j& were among other things she led the negotiation of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, and sheumw holds the position of under secretary of state for arms control of national security. i should also say that in addition to beingúf

was w a6 russia-ukraine negotiations,á2vxz strategic command has offered to(ú?vñ take meç---and thin to go)fñ down todh canaveral on a trident submarine, would you like to come along? was this a trick question? we then had 2 1/2 days seeingçz both how kings bay was preparing to conduct the mdb inspections that it was required to ed tod to accommodate under tám[n new s.t.a.r.t. where we visited every! compartment, went?!f perry scope drove the sub man.8v÷ a7r2 onezq point got to climb inside an armed missile. for an armsjze!lc@xv1 this was a dream date. >> what steve didn't mention

about that day was/lh e

copenhagen summit. critical, kind of ways most meeting in the negotiation of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty and we came back to washington to8bp wrestle with some very important issues here, which resultedmh3in another very important way postájfzñ meeting inhb+gçbzbujanuary. when admiral mullen went to moscow with a team from acrossñ the sj]0y-4ja-u tk to again press forward the progress in the k+$r(t&háhp &hc% negotiations so this period in the negotiationsml important and then on december8rykyy 22, of 2010 theiy ÷ new s.t.a.r.t. treaty was ratified, the senate gave its advice andayv consent to:gxl the new start treaty. so i always feel pretty special about this time of year for a number of jvqp's in our arena, in addition to the normal good fun that ensues. as#plíll of you mig r(t&háhp &hc% been traveling quite a bityñ =õ lately, and just gotf]v% back actually from a trip to the

hague to visit the [cfitopcw continue our work on syria chemical to do a speech on again, our disarmament agenda going forward,?1u and i'll replace some of those points today, but also expand on +xfbés your attendance in the following two days, onra humanitarian impacts on nuclear weapons use to all of that will be beholden to what i have-aú tos] but this third stopz]sñ the recent trip of mine was the ukraine. i had the unite to go to kiev actually the anniversary was the anniversary of the budapest memorandumá on december 4 of 1994 so i had an opportunity to speak to ukrainian audience and as you can imagine, there were harp sharpfçb of the budapestb áqñ gj memorandumd1iñi i wil

that on our question and answer period, but it's q) reason very important one. what i would like to say about the ukraine in beginning my6pv$ remarks today, is first of all, that there we see a government that is #&p focussed on9"uáñ problem sol solving and p intenv4h on moving strongly forward with the reform agenda that they have, i thinká)vi9h @r(t&háhp &hc% failed to fulfill over so many years now, so i'm actually very hopeful after thisu ukrainejif and hopeful for the and also not only hopeful, but convinced of their continuing partnership in thet6 ration treaty machine with strong commitments voiced to ú their nonnuclear prohibitions status. i come back to you1áhá washington with many recent and important impressions and look forward sharing them with you in addition to hearing your thoughts and your questions this morning.h#ysñ i will say here to begin with

what i said in prague, first of all, there should be no doubt the u.s. commitment to achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear help weapons is unasalable. we continue to pursue puck clear pace with our commitments. our responsiblel0úñ@ the reduction of fissile weapova nuclear material and weapons inthat structure. this has led us.-0

reductions, our focus must be oneufwy achievable and verifiablei measures that all interested parties, nuclear states and nonnuclearéle states alike can trust. our past experience both successes and addition appointments will determine5e how and when wesç. proceed each step building on the last. it is clear that our path has been the right one. we have accomplished so much and ify'#d2hut had all been gatt evered@of/o cf1 o together in this room for a?íg 4a0t&a9u1 policy event at brookings in 1985, i don't think anyone in the room=çfdv could have imagined orr we were able to accomplish.íb i was right@m4

among this group who miss him as much as i do. but his legacyndb is truly a great one, and i did want to stay a word in tribute to ted warner this 'b9@ng because he was a great colleague and a great friend. within that decade of sf washington and moscow would conclude the intermediate range nuclear forces dñf%cty the strategicq'3hu arms reduction tr0éui s.t.a.r.t., the presidential nuclear neshives and to the heu purchase agreement. these various bilateral anda$x parallel unilateral issue enoughs l%n3k an array oféwñ long reaching weapons, banning long range missilesy weapons reducing the united states andnsj by 11,000 weapons drastically reducing tactical nuclear weapons while deployment and converting

material to gñ astounding 20,000 nuclear weapons into fuel for nuclear power plants. these effortsqz wer'$9x(4rxibj the strategic offensive reductionsd call the moscow treaty.i &háhp &hc% and of course, in 2010, the united states andxifñ ru5#4ñ signed the new s.t.a.r.t.kó? treaty, whene,tñ 9 it is fully inchmplemented, new s.t.a.r.t. l issue deployed -- new s.t.a.r.t. is# strategic and security stability betw;cbp! russia. both nations'ñyt areew> implementing the treaty's inspection regime, and i note, even during the severefnv crisis with the russian federation the russians are continuing in a bd("(iness like way to implement the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. current tension with to the russian federation highlight the durability of the american#ñ;pd -- and the important confidence

that is inspections under the treat you, as well8ak as the security and predictabilityj, ñ provided binew limits onb central strategic forces that are verifiable in nature ,'ljozuhp &hc% none of these achievements could have been predicted back in jtf 1985, n/i% laid out in a long-term time bound process. on the contrary it was the faithful implementation of each individual initiative that provided trust and xñconfidence, and the1h/iq% opportunity to move ahead to the next phase. under pinning all of our#é&m efforts, stretching back decades, it's been our clear understanding and r÷@ the humanitarian consequences of the use 04@0 these weapons. that is thenaat/e united states delivered in vienna last.÷oç weekq conference on thekl.í humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. w testimonies and statements of the participants there including manydt= victims of nuclear radiation contamination, while we acknowledge the views of

thosegí& negotiation of a nuclear weapons ban treaty the united 1aotj cannot and will not support efforts to pursue such a ban.2añ we believe the practical path that we haveh'"a÷ so successfully followed in the past only realistic route to our goal of a nuclear weapons free world. .gleke)áuáu e remembered that we share the same goal b÷ we just have different ideas about how to process to that goal. the international community cannot ignore or wish away the onbstacles facing us on arms control and ínonproliferation efforts. we must all acknowledge thatoi)] not every nation is ready? or being to pursue2!yx arms control and nonproliferation efforts. we are &ñ ensuring new andyxf6ñ -- pressures that threaten global &ity. we are seeing nations turn,g?÷ away from cooperation, turn away from the common good of nonpro fuápáion efforts andx clinging'kvkç more tightlydt to their

nuclear arsenals. as we push thoseaknz nations to accept their global and ethical responsibilities, the united states will maintain a save, secure, and effective arsen5f2ui for the defense of our nation and our allies. this is not a stance that is mutually exclusive of u.s. disarment goals by nof $4 means. it simply5-4ñ recognizes that the international security environment in which we find ourselves is3hjtj one in which we must take account of andjwx pursue further progress in a very difficult,r overarching situation. we aren5y confident of our obligations and responsibilities and we are meetinghñ them. the united states also knows it has a responsibility to lead efforts towardrz [ isarment and i canbh)% -- xn)41÷ relechblt in this pursuit. there are people here in washington and people around the world who see t0e)ky landscape and see that we cannotlr control the7cr

spread of weapons of mass destruction nor further limit stockpiles. they are wrong. it was in prague that president fatalism is a deadly b8#adversary, for if we believcq that thet4x r(t&háhp &hc% spread of nuclearl&q÷ weapons is inevitable, we are admitting to ourselves that the÷d nuclear weapons is inevitable. again the united statesçvñ(jju and will not accept this. when we failed to pursue b the presidíiy also said, it stays bi$- oure eñ cooperatiq z easy but also a cowardfhnwlyl. thing to do. the united states will press ahead even in the face of many on stack ( accomplished much over the ac91 five al +áák we push forward. we have no intention of diverting from oursyñç active efforts to reduce the @ nuclear weapons, increase confidence and transparency, we will do soukra pursuing all

available and practical avenues.-y&í0i> comprehensive test ban treaty organization in jordan the so-called ife 14 integrated field exercise 14. such practical efforts helped to ensure that the international community will have ani verification regime in plies for the dairy when the cbt enters the force. the united states has made it# ' @r(t&háhp &hc% clear that we are prepared to engage with 1÷russia, and there are real and meaningful steps we should be taking that can contribute to a more predickable, safer security environment. given thatk b÷ the united states and russia continue to possess over 9 "4ífç the world, this is an important and worthy 50-o&.bo2vi z june of 2013 inv%

president obama stated, u.s. willingness to negotiate a reduction of up to 1/3 ofo:" our strategic nuclear mr progress requires a willing partner and a strategic environment. on the boarder world stage, progress towards disarmament requires that stateskaeq- beath responsibility to resolve the conflicg sy>: ut rise to arel[ ufxive rationbeu danger sqs,o---er requires that we make progress elsewhere when web ]ñ can. this importantly includes in the middle east, where we will spare no effort to convenenevm historic+. conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and y tjjt their delivery and

our assistant secretary for proliferation thomaszxhk countryman is slngaged in this as well as our envoy adam shooinman. as1çvñy the united states considers mon h.)guprolive -- closely with our allies and partners every step of the way, ou security and defense and theirs is simplyfv9]b nonnegotiable. we are in a difficult crisis period j ith to the russian federation, i began with that. the matters include not only ukraine, but also russia's violations of the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty, the imfw9 x treaty.5&3ñ address with specific regard to>tp thesrmóm russian v continue to resolve u.s.eio6nñ conc'ó< our objective is for rc return to verifiable compliance to nuclear treaty negotiations.

indeed, we need cooperation with russia and other nations to address new threats first and qñ foremost, the threat of terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon or nuclear material.;z )zñn]s÷ they need this cooperation for their own f?u ecurity, as well asw for the security of other countries around the globe. as i have ñódqoutlined here this morning, there's no way to skip to the end and forego the hard work of resolving the nuclear disarmament challenges that lie ahead. i{5(not enough to have theb8po$(t&háhp &hc% political will toqj6ñ pursue this ageneral darks we@hfzq have to have a practical way to pursue this agenda. we can all acknowledge that verification will become increasinglyçk numbers of nuclear weapons -- as we lower the number of nuclear weapons while reqw7fk'ents for$vh'ñ actively determining compliance will dramatically increase. everyone who shares a world free

of nukeclear weapons will be devoting al3m+ct of time and energy, with that idea in mind, i announced in prague, a new initiative, the international partnership for nuclear disarmament(l:c verification. the united states proposes to work with both @ñ8l states and 6&;çñnonnuclear weapons tec9-(s problems ofocy verifying nuclear disarmentf 59 tos!>s u r solutions, the united kingdoma> and norway have already pioneered this type of work. the new initiative will build on that experiment to create ab nontraditional partnership that /nf1 o ddh on the expertise(ff and talq,brjt people around the world both in and out of6 government. and i am delighted that the.5my nuclear threat initiate-to-will @ñ:"qhip r(t&háhp &hc% provide a nrt never. we are+z with them on it andj muq hope to work with2i5k more of you on this initiative as so i do hope that we'll have md

going discourse as we roll out the agenda for the initiative fu(p the process side,:gs5ñ procedural side or actually# technology side as well. we truly do want a wide ranging>?+xx partnership with the nongovernmental community..#(v+h beyond this effort, w=(w will continue to work+mh r2t(v!( with the mp-5 a @r(t&háhp &hc% and -- sixthbxh-ó annual p-5 conference in london. the regular e and trust building that are happening now in this p-5 forum/6j# a2nay1the basis on what future p-5a negotiations will stand. in closinoñ78 i would like to make it clearqñ thatsq( has plans and and twonl wl]@ú2ñ

times to e tñ ut weapons. radiation and contaminatiotcz4ad economic problems as well.j !vmg that is why the united staten sent a delegation9

>> let me take the questions and rf1ok -- approximate welñ1é have an÷ga about hour or two to grill you now. when you're looking at the j overall u.s.-russia relationship over the past year obviously there's the crisis over the ukraine that's been a big shadow. and you did l )jz that despite that, theá3axy russians have3#rp@ v worked in a]dwn cooperative way in the implementation of new s.t.a.r.t. but you have been to moscow you have met with deputy -- how ÷ has that/rebáamñ >]ted those v÷exchanges dorg >> =41;jjz quite honestke and there are a lot of you know,á!$ speculations out there=,÷ that

things have gone/1q%x severely worse since the crisis inúród the ukraine and i would say that the -- some of the hesitation we saw from the russian federation about1gv7 disarmament agenda had emerged&- wellgcrñ:am> before the crisis overl%x(qhax e ñ ukraine. there were concerns about and many of you remember, there were wz@!j5&qwq)ies of issues they said were of ce they wanted to engage in any further separate ; reductions negotiations. including mississippi valley= ñ>pñ defenses-conventional global strike, a nib of issues were out there, which i saw as serving a blocking function to any further discussion of nuclear disarment measures in the periodz$< entered into force. and oh by the way, another key through3:h@f that period in the runup to the ukraine crisis,k!h was

that essentially h implemented afv fó they womk(]z have toaa mw proceed with any new negotiations. g7jñ3?á=u new sn4k).t. will be fully y implemented onool january 1 of 2018. but i have been arguing regularly to my russian c7myñ6gues, that not only is the berlin proposal in their security interest as well as ours and no country enters into anas arms control treaty unless interest. but furthermore, it'so of proposalff that could be implemented that wefd=u1 implement new s.t.a.r.t. and immediatelyk@/build out from that and implementing- proposal. so i.pjo just wanted to make people aware that we had i would=lzú say hesitations and barriers in the way evenqf% before ukraine crisis emerged. since the ukraine crisis emerged, the situation has been#6f4

complicated, by the severity of that terrible crisis. however, i would also say that i think continuingex5&y signs out there of pragmatism and a business=@ic like start treaty k8&rimplementation, but prior;g6g success with the syria51 weapons project, getting fénkñ1,300 tons of chemical weapons qn f z period bet1c& and september of 2014.4gym>0arj +a(ñry fnp that was assigned with)ñ chemicalja1:ñ weapons out of the country.ç1÷ there's still more work to8jq our concerns about the capabilities that the syrians may not havezrcd declared to the kxlwç

opcw, never the less, i think?sí that's a good sine of a continuing attitude in moscow. and the' colleague went yes sherman and fgt is the so calledqchz p-5 plus one talks. where again, there's been< (÷ a very business like attitude by the russians and they continue t$g&l help move that agenda forward. soñ it's anb interestingbr@ mixed picture, i would say, and people have askedñ /ñjdb mexqw÷ why iz?g continue to be optimistic, despp 1ky the negative trend 8qoelines, part of it is assocfd like attitude thatn%c i have scene when the russians have clearly>8!ñ @r(t&háhp &hc% decided that it is in their national security interest to continue to cooperate.7c+é >> let mejw6 ña3 a second t/question when you mentioned the violation of the imfc7!> xik[treat9 $;ó and theñeha÷ russians came out and said, well, we:+v have three concerns where we agree with the united states in terms of use of

drones, targ c#v!ñmissiles for the sm-3"mñhqdç interceptor and a questiont about the vertical lock boxes inc@ poland. how do you respond to those charges?>)4h >> first and foremost what thewu cf]pz statemento the united states remains fully in compliance with the imf treaty, and furthermor uhás i talk about thepd(áq very substantive -- the defense department has the lead for those assessments, but neverthelessv consultation with other agencies of our government so0@ we say we have a careful process and weh come toúz@). careful determination and we say to the russians, don't you have such a process of wealth? essentially that's part of my discourse with them to talk about thec9leózñ necessity of compliance being whole of government type of issue. i'll put

i will c qsay,@ i know there's been a lot ofoi÷ interest in this and takingn0!÷ from(2zvy the interest we have heard from the nongovernmental$x cñ> let me go ahead and open up[9iñ the questions to the audience.8exd state your name and affiliation should be something resembling a question markr añ at the end, there in the front.&x

>> good morning, madam secretary. q 5 -- seeing as we're speaking about the dangers of nuclear weapons, i wanted to ask you about the u.s. modernization+ program, and specifically, ipf+f wanted you to comment on a newsm article by the professorllv2] from -- so i@itwá read you two brief the information. and i would like you to comment on those. close analysis ".qsreveals a technical and#u effort to use nuclear sources for a direct confrontation with russia, as point number one, and onnpointnrjsñ ,) number two. it'síé disturbing indication that to the use.o of nuclear against russia can be fought and won. any grtfghts on that?

>> gñ disagree profoundly on both i have made repeatedly to my interloc!1 ñ cutev zap;z fors in moscow, we have been through this before the last thing we need to do now is repeat the &n>mistakes of to the coldcç ç sm

the ss-19s, they have passed out of their servicex4 life, soiot russia.añ has had -- russia,íp3z has been yçc focusing on.[int modern nicization of strategic 3?h second deczkñ of the 20th zlylb century, now under s>, he united states is puttingj resources into stu judicious modernization of our strategic forces. so there's a bit of a lag-time here, but i would say bothñ moscow and making some decisions about again what i consider to bebrbf judicious modernization war era systemsyp/ going outó1:mn of their service life.é%aylñ >> rose, thank yougq( ranging brief. one of the challenges out there.$cr mw

that you mentioned is the growth of nuclear3 arsenals in asia i was wondering if you could expand a bit on that z+; (u&ar problem and how yourz>p/et of the administration is thinking about dealing with that long-term problem. and01hf more specifically, if you can give'u+mçk5coz sense of the quality of our3e> discussions with the chinese on these particular issues, not just in the p-5 context, but bilaterally on the question/oñh?1jñ of strategic@:acç stanltbility. i remember the very first meeting inzirw london in september of 2009 which was i considered it a pro toe meeting, it was one of those meetings where you9;z4 have been/h. g2fáñ"sf iú]x in government, you reck recognize that people exchange their scripts. but in the five years since, there has been a steady increase in the amountg

interaction in thesee ñ ,ykykyz0meetings, and aih mature ration and$s new the interactions among all of the )!b@tp-5. so i very(/b1ç much welcome m/ax÷again, uk host of the first p) meeting and returning at the end of the first cycle know the discussion will be verù!yq rich andd actually we iá(?v i think, putting a lot of issues on the o#j%1%qeo &ñ having to air them and exchange viewings on

lot ofñ interesting vu developments i would say in those settings with the chinese being willing to talk about details of verification regimes and that type they had not been able to historically to really touch on those topics or had simply beenmr inr aji" listening mode and not willing to come outlk(-ñ or participate in these proje,2 and theser activities are reflected on the particular practical, i would>:fí say, developments, i mentioned the ip-14 in jordan a coupleuddáutt)j ago i was there for the vip day and/h got to see a number of thewip various sensor systems1e and so forth that have been brought. one of the most impressive inñ sensor=%0nnsensor that theicz?÷ chinese text kl teams havez'ñ worked on and brought, they had it there and showing how it would operate for the vips, many of us not

knowing anything technically, it was good to see at chinese tickle thñm technology that they had brought by the rest1ys"át 0xgá$u(jo&mv good to seeík on an international basis. andmkz(xm of you who know the ambassador, he was there as well representing china as and he was one of the negotiators of the him

>> inside the pentagon i wasksdç just a littleymv%ç curious about the international partnership, i was3c;y wondering is that something that needs funding and would that go in the fy-16 7á i was also weiring when we might see results from the partnership and what kind of reception you have heard from our internationalawt partners on the partnership? >> are you talking about the global partnership? for nuclear árdp[scñdisarmament. >> the verification partb&#v)r( i beg your pardon. we are starting small with this we have someíp particular -- some particular early projects that we are engaging, we are working very, veryñdá#closely with thej@j uk and? to emphasize andnahgñg focus on war head verification, because it is tackled as a true international matter and part of the rationale here is tor"b$ convey to nonnuclear

weapons states theelg plex si ofá#áa this nuclear disarmament agenda. that is monitoring and verifying the reduction and elimination7warheads, that's a very, veryäár complicated matter because the huge(% sensitivity obviously of war head arsenals and it has to be handledú!%q a way that doesff!cf1 o not allow sensitive8"tñ information to get out and contribute to any proliferation threat. we'll be concentrateing on building on: eñ norway-uk experience and expanding out from that. and i should give full credit towyq the bilateral acts wezle -- between the united states and russia. at that time there was some really decent work that was done on information barriers and that type of thing.[ x so again there are other )jz stones thatnz(ff@?p we can

build on but i don't want to limit it, because that's a set 2 of projects that were li#x at the time, but they're[= u now over a6@z@xp)b;v decade old.qa bñ ng/f3&omorning, madam"bfyñ secretary. i was wondering if there had been a date set for the next discussion with russia about zúár and what that engagement would entail on the >> i would never ever talk about our quiet diplomatic scheduling in any detail.f>xr(t&háhp &hc% but i can assure you that the interactions are ongoing.gqk1gñwrjp8 z-vcdig -akhfñ a(s!jf÷

>>r5iz you referred to theá ambassador in south korea.c how do you see thatged cms prospect? >>paúç first of all, with regard to x v north korea we are verü£q interested, of course, in returning to the0ck@ñ process of denuclearization of the korean peninsula. but that process)q%9 can only take place if north korea re-establishes it's bona fides%bç between the international community. we need4xú to

concrete indicators that are serious aboutf negotiations, they÷%;

effect on the north korea situation and that it will be a kind of signal that it's time2 to move forward with somew$s problem solving also on the korean korea's nuclear weapons. so wexfja÷ will see howzn( that works. buto some momentum that results, perhaps from a number ofriql-dft different directions in the comingrññ9d4x e÷5ey but that is one that i think is worth zlqd j on your second question, are%, ñ youo04tñ referring to the"ykyi31-2-3 agreement? the 1-2-3 agreement, the agreement for nuclear ---i don't diplomacy that's going 9"'2on but i will say we have made excellent pz-zess in the negotiations and i don't see anyglzvl reason why we should not be able to completeú1óìáhp &hc% it in á short order. again, i don't want to talk about any details of3w"d meetings)n. y and so forth.2

>> thank you very much, rose, for our overrule. thanks for pressing tough+qs issues5fi and ilñchallenges. question about the upcoming :z review conference and the humanitarianazn zñ÷:/bimpacts dialogue. first, very pleased to see the united states participating in that meeting. as you.e?÷ know, one of the disappointment about the progress on the disarmed action and oneú raised at ther meeting was concern aboutjyh÷ñ the incompatibility of the potential use of nuclear weapons with international humanitarian law and the laws of war. are you thinking about or planning on engaging with some of the non-nuclear weapon:ñqeñ states through the p5 process to discuss how .ñ the united states and other nuclear arm53qi;

have reduced the role of nuclear weapons and is the united states willing to thinking about providing its rational for ho}#x the u.s. nuclear war plans are compatible with the;t laws of war as the 2010 or[9"5 i should say theeh]ñ 2012 nuclear reviewzeve suggests. >> first of all, the guiding principle here is a policy that i have opt repeatedzc but has the been repeated froma4uñ the president all the way downt"boñ to level and on. that is thatdli the legacy/h÷ of the practically over -- near,ácf 70-year non-use of nuclear weapons must be extended forever. that we must continue to do everything we can to ensure that dzz weapons are never used again. that is at the heartbo0 of u.s.

policy in this regard and in our ownákz ational arsenal that was -- and in our own inter.x@hnal doctrine that w?ì put forward in the nuclearr,0ñ posture review and in the implen mentation study that ensued from the nuclear posture review.=™ñ so, we will continue to bes definitely(+%9 points that were$m! made in the 'ñnpr and in the$ publicly as well.h4&fth that's actually a good ]'nñreminder+t)! iz7 international community of the veryúg(ñ significant in my view, policy steps and initiatives that thee=bñ administration has undertaken since it came into office to really put in place the

structure for de-emphasizing nu9=z@p weapons in our doctrine and policy and in our overarching militaryñ0fu arsenal. so, good >> tds$ you.7tñ leann, russian press. specificallyte3rjz the inf treaty in a hearing with congress last week you wereçvzau pressed toxjy+n makeúr@# the statement 1yesf,yóu it is the united states' 3< russia is non-compliant in the treaty. so very%nfis exactly is -- whatu=ñ exactly is the reasoning for its o8ésa e4mñ

non-compliance. is it the?x is it the x 101 cruiseci67 missiles and where ú3 ly location wise is it nonyhfv-comenon-compliant? is itag&-÷ x

5,500 kilometers, so it matter whether they're deployed or development, then they are not compliant with the inf treaty. it is that concernúfa] that we raised in ther compliance report in july of 2014f:a2l and i have beeng,/zk continuing to raise with the russian federation. it is a ground-launch cruise missile. it is neither of the systems that you raised. 100 s n it& is? i'm seen some of those reflections in the press and it's not that one. so i think it'sv#é% really r ycw important to focus down on you know, a good discussion of this&! matter. that's my basic point. the russians have made certaint0fñ allegations against the united iz

states. steve already raised that this morning. we believe that we are complete compliance with the -- with the infa: ó sorry. and were willing tow ys talkxdáñ about that with the russian federation but we need to hear rt russian side as that's the3) y most importants .ñ thing from our perspective. this can't be a ñ&one-sidedr!cñighg÷ conversation.é(ur++rq$çmñí6trzy% jdq >>ñbñxñ thank madame undersecretary, i'm@ mqñ fleck. one point)au i want to totally 4$"s(hasize is that we've asked you to send a delegation to the vienna conference and/ thank you on behalf of your members all over the country, also asking you to do so, thanks to you, thanks to secretary kerry, thanks to president obama for making the decision.

i know it wasn't easy. nonproliferation there was -- i think thatn united states policy mav&ñ be out of step with theu

moving to live up to its article vi. so my question, what's1sqñ my question? it's really a favor. wouldl+uáu ask the president to put the brakes on thebkñ to improve the opticsc÷ as we go into the i0pnpt dñj♪qreview? >> well, me say a few things. first of all, about our deciájqex to attend the vienna conference we really saw ityen< as an opportunity to makeouz case that i've made to youp this morning and( good discourse and debate with broad spectrum of views and i welcome the opportunity to hear other viewsd@ó in this room this81 morning, but these wmq@sbe a continuing so @r(t&háhp &hc% and f1 o there's no question about it. but our coreflmnj'fs rational for going to vienna was to make sure that our story was out there kú to because i do want to make sure that fromba $85%

reduction in the u.s.┌d arsenal of strategic --a full stop since 1967 is a significant step on thew q road to disarmorment and we areg6!çp continuing further elimination and cé single day. so the notion -- i just don'txah accept the notion that things si,eìáhp &hc% have stalled. i want that message to be very clear for this32 audience. we will continue to press thatár message forward and weátéç can &-bf1 o debate it and this matter of, you know5)ñ whether our modernization is judicious or not i'm sure will also be strongly debated. i welcome thehñ((ñ debate. but our reason for going to the conference was a practical one and thatjh is we felt it very importap8yz get our side of the story out there. and i hope opportunity to continue, you know with openp] mindedness among the community to hear what0 have to say as uptwell. and so i think that's how i'll answer your %0tdñ#, )szquestion.

so thank you.eet >> hi, my nameññ4ñ is rebecca gibbons.xjnu"tr provide contractor support for with that) yw in .iñmind,w/%m i want to ask you about thepzp 9 m!%aforyy:úñ verification< will be involved in that effort and if it's going to be an innerioiqñ agency effort. >>h0 [x9c interagencyr effort. for those you have served i-0"z the government, you know how delicious that is.jçrp÷ it's necessary. we are welcomingczsóy i said in myv)ú. remarks, we want to work with nonnuclear weapon states as well asl!fw nuclear weapon states and so we're at this point open minded about who will be participating.

ihx!ñ also want to sa"ndñç)y however that £n hope!e>ñ,3f? invigorate the work the p5 because we also think it's very important that the nuclear weapon states develop some sophisticated #%simq9 9 ofigfod these mao2. in the last year, we have had success in establishing a p“é7zs working group1cfgh that meets in 6rt vienna at the same time that working group b is thevx&ó÷ verification working group that deals with a comprehensive test treaty and looks at technical verification issues in that i think it's fine for the p5 to begin$$ work- ñ focussing on ctbt verification because that provides a lot of veryn technical information that can then in the future be broadened out in other directions so the verification initiative is a great new approach, i think, but i don't want you to

say orv@ abandoning our efforts to discuss these matters among thex 3 5 o >> i thinkshvñ that's the first time as delicious. >> hi rose. stability. one isp share about efforts in south asia to share bestxb2f&117g practices, confidence building measures with couf?dwcs outside the ÷'nrp5. andókwv second types as well as numbers obviously matter to stability. have any thoughts on prospects for constraining or discouraging land based nerves in the longer term. >> well, that's one point i wanted tol stabilizinoúáactivityrzlñ over the last generation@,j really has been"5ñ our move to hlw÷demerv sit.[i

we see thatx-it:/ey steps. yes, as a we constantly focus onek he jtr(t&háhp &hc%>omm%qe of4hhj avoiding multiple warheads oìtpñ2y4 missiles because they createñmp speaking of valuable targets. and that is what you want to avoid if you want to have a stable strategic relatd[o#ip. so that is a constant of our discourse on these/m internationally and will continue to be so. with regards specifically to!khd south asia, i want to sayg% again really great track 2, track 1 1/2 activities with both india i commend those of you around the roomjev that in fañthem. i think they've been very interestingygñ sometimes productive from what i've been able to see when people have briefed or told me about them or sent me trip reports and so

forth. i think there have been-h=c some really, really solid discussions bringing up the issues youk![ñ talk about the classical issues of strategic -:8kility. we do have discussions of these÷e matters on an official level as well. we have atñ strategic dialogue w[êq!india. we also hiv%no the so-called snap+ talks with''j pakistan. iyj&ir always forget what snap stands for, security, nonproliferation and strategic stability n0 which take place as welljqv with d áj (jip r(t&háhp &hc% so we have opportunities to raise these+ well. i will tell you one of myi ñ goals in the coming year is to broaden this discussion/&ry kind of regional ghetto, to be honest. these issues, such asúpaz conventional global strike they affect the whole asian international community. i think we needed to be talking about themm+c:i in a broader community of countries who are ÷

xther deployi@r to deploy these kinds of capabilities. it's the same with any of the other systems you might name, including something like a k< "÷merve system. soé to broaden these discussions andu regionalan important as a direction for policy. i hope 9 we canj> good morning, madame t3q secretary. mark sheland. i'm interested in your statement on÷=a weapons-free zone conference and would ask youâ on practical goal setting howfsbrc=yt prepared is israel to engage and be transparent in some measure, how prepared is egypt in terms of its current governmentkv structure tor z engage andf oç2bujsu(r

the iran >> that's an interesting -- you knowh(fnp%6q been quite -- we had a preparatory process goingb4& thr i don't want to again get into t details of diplomatic exchanges, but it's been quite positive preparatory process that has, i think, dealt with some of the initial tensions and anxieties over this middle east#n(%] weapons of mass destruction@p free zone conference that emergedh9otfrom the npt review conference inlhm jq qh!2010. we have brought the core;w actorslsh&÷ together, the arabs the israelis and irah] ñ have1qbjparticipated. i don't see that as acm big kind of negative influence"arg on this. the necessity now is on all states interested in thisb"ç÷ to get together and agree on an agenda. our view iske(pq ifñ=: get together and agree on an agenda, there's no reason why we shouldn't be able to convene

this conference prior to the review conference in so, i have you know, reason to say there iséâgnificantr @> @r(t&háhp &hc% progress since 2010. our view is4 #ñ we are right ongñy+ the cusp of jtç to conveneeçñóz this conference. we hope that the$i)q) in everybody's interest to agree on an 06n8genda. that's where it(l,vszh stands at the moment.q>b,çty@ =sph >> hi. thank morning. you mentioned that the russians have been x[k2unwilling to discuss0]= further reductions until new start is implemented. what are thesm berlinp/f0é÷ewi hitting its mark betweenm

2018? thank you. >>u on in this case broader political issues. i did take note that president putin which united states in many,÷dl many ways butvq)e wasgp one key paragraph% e said that ita/ indicative of some russiank"÷ cjz f1 o flexibility ink course we haveqásszc + to make the case in our own political environment that it is a wvuq thing to4

historically throughout the ups anddqbwi downs of the u.s./soviet cold war c. strategic arms reductionsm5qcyd!ç was inq] our interest, in the interest of the u.s.s.r. at that time and in the interest of the entire global community in the contet!ñ of the dñh/x m;spñnon-proliferation treaty and our responsibility to pursueqh9v)bv @r(t&háhp &hc% disarmorment under the article vi commitment.) so, i believe there is both apd solid historical rational for" proceeding despite the severe crisis &a=bilaterally and i believe that there is a interest requirement as well or a strategic interest rational? would sayf reductions would not only be67o in the u.s.iw(

>> thanks. i just wonder could z financial conditions inweyç russia and united states for thewuñ politics andsz nuclearz3(nq talk on ""ótñtjìáhp &hc% negotiation. >> yes. i believe that you'reswñ]iy talking about the cost modernizationg%tíkt/ba÷$] time?.qbxñmá>ñcçyá> okay. i understand now.##: the question is with regard to whether the economic crisis in the russian federationu affect their further modernization efforts, as i#y understand, and whatdviy the impact

of ówq jowz?pnu jar but i was reading with interest this morning the financial times has an on what'sqízzpoñ happening with the russian economy right now. one of theh+' points that was made is that putin severalv signed outo% federation's national budget for fyus 2x6]xx assumption underpinning it that oil would be at c9çbarrel. and today as we know, oil is --é well, it's going up2lw8 som #7 but i think the trend ishr$lx÷hmñ pretty much z8gddown,a"! heading belowç $60-k ÷ barrel. not going to be viable for6u!bw supporting the russian economy. so tagain, it's not up to me and certainly i'mozlruu÷ inkp t“aie department+@5 ministry, but ii!rf p do think that there's bound to be some mñezimpacts on thej@mh goals thate>k the russian

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