[ applause ] i like that. >> we've done this sort of thing before.

i will ask you questions and you will say whatever you darn well please. president bush, mrs. baker, we're very honored to have you here as we kmem rate the historic 25th an verse rid of the fall of the wall and the liberation of eastern europe. let me start with a broad question. when did you feel certain that the wall would fall? even if you didn't know when? what was that moment when you were sure? >> i'm not sure i could pinpoint a moment, ryan. i mean, as far as i was concerned, it became somewhat of a surprise that it happened so quickly. we did know that things were moving in that direction. that a lot of east germans were going to hungary and then hungary was letting them go through to austria. so the wall had, in effect, been

circumvented, not reached, perhaps. so it looked like things were going in that direction. and, of course,

>> well, i can give you one specific example that illustrates it. when the wall was falling, in effect, we didn't know exactly what was happening. a press adviser came in and told the president, you know, you need to go on television. and we sort of hesitated for a

while, but then they brought the press corps in around the president's desk in the oval office. >> and you were all seated? >> well, no, they weren't all seated, i don't think, because it was -- it was crowded in there. but anyway, the president described what we knew that it looked like the wall was opening but we weren't exactly sure. the first press question was, well, mr. president, you don't look very elated. we would think you'd be wanting to jump -- or dance on the wall. and he said, well, i'm not a dancing kind of person. but what he was trying to do was back us off so it wouldn't put gorbachev in a kind of hole he

couldn't get out of. that was the overall strategy. >> the president got a lot of flak for that, ryan. i mean, the press were saying, you know, what's the problem with this guy, we've won a 40-year conflict here, we've been victorious, and he doesn't show any emotion whatsoever. he doesn't show any sign of having the vision thing, which is what the president used to call it. but that's just one example. there were other examples. we had -- there were -- you know, no administration is uniform in their approach to these problems because the problems are very complicated. and we had some in our administration who wanted to be

more forceful with gorbachev and -- who were more pessimistic about their chance as reformers. it's fair to say the president and brent and i wanted to work with them because we thought they were yen genuine reformers. as it turned out, we were correct. and by working with them and not sticking it in their eye when the wall came down and at other times, we were able to go forward with german unification with the consent of the soviet union or with the acquiescence of the soviet union and the acquiescence, frankly, of united kingdom and france. none of those countries were ecstatic about the idea of german unification. but by handling it the way the president did, he was able to achieve that german unification within a very narrow window of opportunity. if we hadn't moved when we did,

i'm not sure we could have achieved unification the way we did. >> i think that's true, because right after the wall came down, gorbachev's attitude changed dramatically. he had been sort of on our side because he was practicing perestroika and glasnost. he wasn't trying to democratize the soviet union by any means, but he was trying to reinstill some sense of discipline and working it. and so he was encouraging what was going on in eastern europe till the wall came down, and then he got scared. >> talk a little bit about if you will, again, the diplomacy of this whole process. you touched on the reservations that mitterand had, thatcher had, clearly that gorbachev had. how did you handle those? >> well, we -- we have always been the leader of the alliance and the president, even as a new president, was the leader of the alliance. and we were able to bring both france and the united kingdom over.

the toughest nut was the soviet union. we came up with a concept of a two-plus-four negotiation, that is the two germanys would negotiate the internal aspects of unification and the four occupying powers would negotiate the external aspects. and it worked. it worked pretty darn well. you know, in the final analysis, i think that the soviet union acquiesced because they really didn't have a whole lot of other alternatives. and i'm conscious of the fact, and history will attest to this,

that the german -- the federal republic of germany gave the soviets 55 billion deutsche marks, which didn't hurt, helping get their acquiescence in german unification. but there were a lot of other -- there were a lot of obstacles along the way to get there, and it was intensive diplomacy led by the president but, again, taking advantage of a very narrow window of opportunity and getting it done. >> you know, some people were against unification, but our position was, wait a minute, we've been talking about this

for 40 years. now we have a chance to try and implement it. you mean we're not going to do that? and so it worked. >> i want to tell you one part of this where jim and i disagree and he turned out to be right, and that's the two plus four. i understood the two. that's the two germanys. the plus four were the occupying powers. but for me, three of the four didn't want german -- evaluate his role in the run up to the moment of in the aftermath of

the -- >> if chancellor kohl and president bush hadn't been on exactly the same wavelength, german unification would never have happened. those two individuals more than anybody else made it happen because we had the reluctance of france and the uk and certainly the soviet union. chancellor kohl came to camp david in february of 1990. i think that's right. >> that's right. >> and we had a sort of a come to jesus session up there where he said i really want your help in unification and we said fine, we're all for it, but we want to know from you that you're not

interested in a neutral germany in the heart of europe and you're not interested in a germany that's going to lean eastward and that you will support us in making sure that the unified germany is a member of the north atlantic treaty organization. he said i will. that bargain was struck there. both leaders lived up to it and got it done. >> one of the things we were really worried about in this whole thing was that gorbachev would promise kohl german unification if they would vote neutrality, get out of -- get out of nato, because that was -- that would have been awfully tempting. they never did really promise -- i don't think kohl would have

done it anyway because he had a scheme for unification, he explained it to the president and the president said go for it. >> you made the point -- you both made the point that although you could not predict the moment you could see the process. and, again, the gorbachev meeting i think made it pretty clear to the world. did you have any nightmare moments in the run-up to this when you could see the possibility of something going terribly wrong, something that could not only undermine the reunification process but endanger world security? >> well, ifshl one instance in which -- probably leaning more peace and cooperation with the west than gorbachev. i remember one session, may have been in germany or some other capital, some other country where he started parroting some of his talking points.

he was getting a lot of heat at home. there was a big tug of war going on within the soviet union. the military and the intelligence apparatus thought that gorbachev and he were selling the country out and so forth. i remember this meeting on german unification and what he said at the table was so different from what we had heard before, i thought, uh-oh, this whole thing has been knocked into something, we're not going to get it done. that was one instance i can remember very well. >> i think -- we had a strategy and i think we were generally

confident it would work but didn't know how long. as i said, when we came into office it was east germany. and up until then u.s. policy toward the satellites, eastern europe, had been we tried to help and cozy up to those who were making the most trouble for the soviet union. so our friend this morning -- romania was our favorite because they were always probing the soviet union. but when we came in, we said no, that's not the right measure, the right measure are those who are trying to liberalize. so romania went from the top right down to the bottom. and poland went to the top because they were trying to change the system. so we had a general sense of where we wanted to go and how,

but there were lots of parallels and we worked toward it. >> you know, it was such a sensitive topic at the beginning that there was some debate within our administration and some reluctance to use the term reunification or unification. brent will remember that, and i'm trying to remember what it was we called it for a little while, something -- a different name. >> no. we wanted to stay away from that again, because we didn't want -- we didn't want gorbachev thrown out. we didn't want a coup or any -- there was a coup later on as jim said, but it was after it was too late. >> mr. secretary, you mentioned edward shevardnadze. you spent a lot of time with him both before and after that particular period.

i recall that you were actually out shooting sheep with him in mongolia when -- >> no, he wasn't shooting sheep. i didn't say i wasn't shooting sheep. >> yeah. would you say that again? >> although the fact of the matter was i really wasn't shooting sheep because the national security advisor we had at the time told "the washington post" i wanted to hunt sheep and they wouldn't let me do it. >> so those opening days of desert storm, you and edward shevardnadze were doing something in mongolia. >> no. we were negotiating arms control in siberia. we're sitting there. i got a call from bob kimmitt, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs. he said we're worried about what intelligence is reporting to us about iraqi on the border of kuwait and you might check with your interlocutor there to see what he knows about it.

at that time, iraq was a client state of the soviet union. so i turned to him and i said, edward, before we break for lunch, we've got this report that saddam might be thinking of invading kuwait, and he said, oh, he would never be so foolish as to do that. i said, well, you might want to check with the kgb because the cia tells us that the reports are genuine, there are lot of troops up there. he said, well, i will check at lunch and come back. no chance, he said, saddam would not be so cruel to do this. i then fly off to mongolia and we break up -- when we break up our visit, and so then he invades, okay. and shevardnadze is so

embarrassed that he agrees after the invasion to meet me in moscow and stand shoulder to shoulder with the american secretary of state and condemn the actions of the soviet client state. that's why i said in my view that's the day the cold war ended is when that happened. and he did that, by the way, without gorbachev's okay and without the okay of the -- his foreign minister, which is what i meant by further leaning forward. >> that was the essence of the question i was going to ask, whether you believe that the way you and the president handled the soviet union at the time of german reunification, the way you handled eastern europe, the way you handled reunification itself, whether that had an impact on the ability less than

a year later to form an effective coalition to push saddam out of kuwait. >> i think it did. i really do believe that. but then you've got to remember, too, ryan, at that time we were the sole remaining superpower. and everybody wanted to get close to uncle whiskers. i mean, we had a lot of moxie because everybody wanted to get close to the united states. but i do think the fact that the adroit way in which the president handled german unification and some of those earlier foreign policy issues in the administration made a difference in what we were able to do in pulling together that coalition to kick iraq out of kuwait. >> let me -- >> please. no. no. >> let me use that to fast forward. as you recall, general scowcroft, your friend and counterpart, dr. touchet was asked this morning as we look at the current state of u.s./german relations what would he recommend.

he had a great one-word answer -- talk. i'd like to broaden that just a bit. as we look at the crisis in the middle east, the efforts of the administration to put together a coalition, just as you did, to confront it, that has to be both regional and international, what do you think we need to do regionally and internationally to succeed against this new enemy? drawing -- >> you looking at me or are you looking at him? i know you're going to try and dodge this, sir so, i'm looking at you. >> no, i'm not going to dodge it.

i'm not going to dodge it at all. i'll tell you what, in my view, i applaud the administration's efforts to put together a broad-based coalition and that's great and is what we did in the first gulf war. but our coalition had muscle, and our coalition -- the members of our coalition contributed and contributed substantially. many of them contributed troops. i mean, we even had egyptian troops, syrian troops, saudi troops, you name it, not to mention 500,000 american troops. you're not going to -- in my view, you're not going to win this war just from the air. i don't see how you hold territory just from the air. so you've got to figure how you're going to get boots on the ground. you're going to have to have them. yes, we're sending more special ops forces in and that's really

good to guide the air strikes. but where are the boots on the ground coming from that are going to take territory? i have serious doubts about whether it can come from iraq. and as far as moderate syrian opposition is concerned, i think most of them are in the salons of london and paris. i don't know that there is any such thing anymore. but where are the troops going to come? >> i think the one thing that is clearly missing is talking, talking to our friends. you mentioned touchet. i hat a telephone on my desk. i picked it up, it rang on his desk. we used to talk almost every other day, the same with our allies. we tried to get wit the soviet union but we couldn't. president bush frequently called his counterparts around the world just to talk to them, what are their problems, what can we do to help, so on and so forth, so that our friends were willing to help us. we needed them because they saw us and they knew what we were after. i don't think we have that kind

of communication anymore. and you don't draw tcatiou anym. and you don't draw them out, you know. egypt has the troops we need on the ground. turkey does. they're not disposed to come to our help. >> i agree with what brent just said. and, you know, in that first gulf war, one of our strongest allies and biggest contributors was turkey. turkey had been a 60-year ally of the united states and a nato member. one of the nirngss we asked them to do was cut off the oil pipeline from iraq through turkey. that cost turkey tremendously economically, but he did it. and so my solution for what it's worth as far as the question i posed earlier about ground troops is why don't we really make an effort to see if we can't convince the turks, okay? the turks don't like isis. no country they know wants to abide a continuing isis presence. and the turks don't like assad. but our president has said assad must go, and we're engaged in a war with isis. why don't in their conversion of interest there, we go see the turks and we say, okay, we'll

supply the logistics and the intelligence and the air and you supply the troops and we'll give you that buffer zone, which is what he wants in syria. i mean, that to me is -- might solve the problem. i don't know any other troops in the region that are going to do it, and i sure don't support the idea of putting brave young american men and women on the ground in iraq and syria. >> i agree with you. one of the additional problems the turks have, though, are the kurlds. there are several different kinds of kurds. and the kind of kurds that are more or less at war with the turks are the ones in northern syria. so, you know, there are syrian kurds, turkish kurds, and iraqi kurds and they're all different.

>> and there are iranian kurds. >> and that role really complicates this. >> and, ladies and gentlemen, i would just say that that depth, breadth, and detail of understanding on a fairly arcane issue is why you were part of the best national security team in history, and i mean that sincerely, because i was a bit at the time. let me ask the other dimension of that question. what would you be saying to our european allies and particularly the germans at this time as we look not only at the unfolding crisis in the middle east but as we look at a russia that obviously is very different than

the russia you dealt with and then the problem with ukraine? what should we be saying? what kind of dialogue should we be having? what kinds of policy should we be proposing with our european friends starting with the germans? >> well, i think we're having those conversations, and that's why we've instituted some multilateral sanctions against russia that are showing every indication of working. the rubles and the tank capital gone through the roof. a lot of that is due just to the drop many-in the price of oil because that russian economy is so dependent upon that commodity. but i think we're having those conversations with the german leadership. what's happened there -- and i don't think we have to convince the germans or any of our other western european allies that

what has happened in ukraine and crimea is totally inconsistent with any concept of a stable world order. if you don't like what's going on next door, you can't just roll the tanks. or you can, but if you do there ought to be some consequences. >> i think, again, one of the problems is we're talking but i don't think we're talking enough, more frequently, enough, because we do have problems. we have problems with snowden, especially with germany, and it turned out that the recording we got of chancellor merkel talking was from our embassy. those kinds of things we can do more of to really understand each other and why we're doing this. you can't just call and say, hey, we want to invade here,

will you help us. you've got to build groundwork and you've got to show what we're going to do, how we're going to do it. so i'm not sure that we're spending enough time doing that. >> i would agree with that, but we are talking to them about sanctions, and so far that's worked a little bit. >> well, i wish we could continue this incredible dialogue. time is finite. we have all been privileged to not only listen to the men who were witnesses to a most critical period in world history but who helped the president of the united states shape that history for the better. thank you both very much. >> thank you. >> thank you. [ applause ]

sunday afternoon on reel america, we feature tried by fire, a 1965 episode of the u.s. army's the big picture narrated by paul newman. december marks the 70th anniversary of the battle of the bulge and the film chronicles the story of the 84th infantry division. that's sunday at 4:00 p.m. eastern time here on cspan 3's american history tv. throughout 2014, c-span's