next, former journalist and harvard university kennedy school professor marvin kalb reviews presidential decision-making in the post-vietnam era and discusses military conflicts as well as declared war including the wars in iraq and afghanistan. the national press club hosted this event which is about one hour, 15 minutes. >> good evening. welcome to the national plus club. i am the club's 107th president. it is my honor to welcome all of you here this evening and those watching via c-span as part of this american history series. for a discussion about the impact of vietnam war has had on presidential decision-making over the past five decades. we could not have a more appropriate guest of honor tonight than marvin kalb, the award winning journalist for cbs and nbc news. he was last news man recruited

by edward r murrow to join cbs news, becoming part of the generation known as the murrow boys. for the mass 20 years, he has been they moderator of the kalb report and conducts interviews with well-known public figures who often do not consent to public hour-long interviews, but they do with marvin kalb. earlier this year, he interviewed at the national press club, justices scalia and justice ginsburg. he followed that coup by interfering bob woodward and carl bernstein, drawing them out about the recollections of washington post editor ben bradley in what turned out to be the eve of ben bradley's death. tonight, the press club turns the tables on marvin tell. -- on marvin kalb. as to distinguish members of the club interview him, they are bill klein, who was president of the club when the kalb reports begin in 1994 and was chair of the history and heritage

committee, and kendall leckie, the commander of the clubs post and former deputy managing editor at the washington kiplinger editors where he covered foreign and military affairs among other subjects. tonight, i'm not going to turn over the floor to these three very distinguished guests, but first i will start with deal, can, and you take it from there. thank you all for being here tonight as a guest of honor and thank you all for being here in person and via c-span. >> thank you very much. as a journalism professor at the american university's washington program, i would like to thank all of my students for coming tonight as well as the rest of you in the audience today. as the chairman of the club's history and heritage committee, or elected to your little bit about the historical significance of the american legion post. founded on november 19, 1919 by club for support in the war, it

was called the persian post in the blackjack post in honor of the american expeditionary force commander general john blackjack persian, who was an associate member of the club. in world war ii, it hosted a series of campaigns that offered free hot dogs and beer and a little entertainment to servicemen. at one of those, then vice president harry truman told his wife that he was going to the club. he was going to see the soldiers. he did not get in any trouble because back then it was an all men's club, what could go wrong? and a compass piano player, he said donna the upper apn oh entertaining the troops that day. lauren bacall was there that day. her agent knew it good thing when he saw one, hosted her on top of the piano, she draped her legs over, look downloading the harry. the photographers went wild. when that photograph appeared on

the front page of every newspaper in the country the next day, his wife was not amused. 50 years later, when margaret truman, his daughter, spoke at the club and recounted the story, those truman women had no sense of humor. that became the iconic photo for the press club circulated to the media when lauren bacall died last summer. follow none that great tradition, i turn this over to a current american legion post commander, can do like he to tell us why we're here tonight. >> thank you very much. i can't top the harry truman story. i want to thank you marvin for joining us this evening. you have been a great friend to the national press club for many years. the american legion post has been a part of the national press club for 95 years,

actually as of this month, this is a 95th anniversary. it is one of local many partners in the vietnam war commemoration, which is a program authorized by congress and organized by the department of defense. it is a multiyear program key to the 50th anniversary of the war. as a partner of the post, conducting several programs each year to focus on the legacy of the war that to the lives of over 58,000 americans. this is the first of those programs. i want to thank vice commander of our post, tom young, for all the work he has done in setting up's tonight event. the commemoration recognizes the nearly 3 million men and women

who served in vietnam. some nine million served during that. period, 3 million in country, including our president of the national press club and we are delighted to also have him as a member of our post. the discussion of the impact of the war on post-vietnam use of u.s. military power is a great way to start our partnership program. there is no better to this there is no better person to discuss that issue than marvin cal. -- marvin kalb. cal. i should note that it is fitting that we are meeting in the murrow room of the national press club, room named in honor of edward r. murrow, who hired marvin kalb at cbs news. would you start with the first question? >> certainly.

we are pleased to have with this martin kalb trade as you all know, i have worked with him for 20 years on the award-winning kalb report. marvin is both a great journalist and a great scholar at the international correspondence of cbs news he was in the thick of what happened in the nixon and ford ministrations. among his many books are haunting legacy, vietnam, and the american presidency from four to obama, and just recently, six months ago, the road to war, presidential commitments honored of the trade. just to start us off marvin, can you put us in 1975? what were you doing then as the war was coming to a rather disappointing and? -- end? >> first, let me thank the post and the national press club for

inviting me to speak about this very important subject. i want to start by saying that there are many better people than me to be doing this, but i am happy to do it. 1975, i was the chief diplomatic correspondent for cbs. i was based here in washington. i was absorbed with the fact that in my own lifetime there were -- there had been three major events that affected this country in a profound way. one was the depression. i know i look 39, but i'm really 84. [laughter] the depression was a very large part of my life as a kid. then there was world war ii. my brother went off to war. my brother-in-law went off to war could we all knew as a nation that we were involved in a war that we had to win. then, there was watergate. and then, there was the vietnam war.

two other massive events affecting the way in which this country up to today thinks about going to war, the way we go to war, the commitment by president or congress, never since 1941, both have led american forces to fight, an important issue. in 1975, this great country, united states of america, on april 30 was ignominiously defeated by north vietnam. my god, how could that conceivably have happened? it did not make any sense. a great nation is not defeated by a country composed of what we used to disparagingly call little men and black pajamas. how can they beat united states of america?

but they did. it raised profound questions for the military. many did not want to acknowledge that they had participated in a lost war. but they had. what you do about that? what impact does that have on the military? what impact does that have upon the political system of the country? i country that always thought of itself as predetermined to win wars. we don't lose them. in world war ii, we called for unconditional surrender and we got it. it was as if it was coming to us. and, after 1975, there were big questions to be answered, the likes of which we are still very much involved in today. >> marvin, one of the first issues that i covered when i first started covering congress

in the early 1970's was the war powers resolution of 1973. >> excuse me. forgive me. >> it was a long time ago. >> no, no, no. i thought you were getting into the resolution of congress in 1964, giving johnson the right to fight and self it now. you're talking about the next one. please. >> it was probably the most direct legislative reaction to the war in vietnam. of course, it was designed to prevent the kind of mission creep that got us into vietnam. it passed overwhelmingly. it was vetoed by president next and. -- nixon. his veto was overridden. it was a very popular piece of

legislation. the resolution remains on the books, but has been virtually ignored by our commerce and presidents. i would like you to talk about what happened. >> in 1973, again, i stand corrected. in 1973, remember that the war between united states and north vietnam formally came to a close in january, late january, 1973. theoretically, we were at peace. the war continued. on both sides there were violations. the american people were fed up with the war. there were very few people who still supported fighting on behalf of south vietnam against the north vietnamese. with people and open rebellion against the war, with the war

itself a distinct political liability for many of the people running for office, they wanted to get us out. the resolution that formally got us out in 1973 of course never did. it was violated almost from the date that it was signed. the white house was never in favor of it. so the white house tried to endow it all with an illegitimacy, but the congress was up in arms because it had passed this resolution, wanted it signed into law. what the resolution said was that within six months the united states would stop sending all military supplies to selfie a noun -- south vietnam, would stop providing them with military assistance of all kinds, that, the assumption

went, would in the war. would end of the war. because they could not fight without american support and that was correct. on that resolution was passed, south vietnamese lost in the north the enemies one. of thes not the intent legislation but that was the result of the legislation. about the system that was set up to require congress to take a vote when our troops were committed overseas in a foreign conflict. and fuzzyeen ignored repeatedly and is a relevant issue today. why do you think congress is ,illing to allow any president

there have been multiple presidents involved in this issue, to basically ignore? that law >> let history. when the united states was attacked by the japanese, there was no question that the president was going to ask congress for a declaration of war. that is written into the u.s. constitution as one of the president's powers. one of the issues of united states of how it works when the issue is defending the american forces abroad to fight in a war. we fought in the korean war. we had numerous small wars leading up to the beginning of the vietnam war.

1964, in 1964, lyndon b. johnson had in his pocket for the better part of the year a resolution by congress authorizing him to have absolute authority over sending american forces abroad. on august 2, an incident took place in the gulf of tonkin. at that time, six or seven north -- enemy's torpedo boats north vietnamese tokyo boats attacked an american destroyer. it was late at night and stormy . commander herick was a commander and sent to mcnamara that they were being attacked. torpedoes were being launched and he wanted help. and the uss, the aircraft

carrier was nearby. planes went to the defense. on one of those planes, a man named james stockdale, who became a vice presidential candidate later on, he was a pilot at that time. he went over the area is down and he fired away at folks and he thought he may have hit but two and sank two, but he knew that 4 others were badly hit. he went back thinking he had done a good job. an american ship was being attacked by the north vietnamese , he came to their defense and shot it up and went home and had a good night's sleep. lyndon johnson at that time was ready to take his resolution out of his pocket and gave it to his friends on congress and say "give me the authority to go to

war." he was very unhappy as a former master of the senate where he felt he got to know america and very unhappy that harry truman in 1945 had promised leadership of the congress that if he ever had to go to war, he would inform them in advance and seek their approval. he did none of that. he went to the u.n. instead. only by a fluke of the russian delegate being absent did he get the resolution passed. johnson said he would not make that mistake again. but he still did not do it because he was in the middle of a presidential race.

he wanted to look like a man of peace but firm. he sent another destroyer. the two american ships were there, and lo and behold, two days later, the commander sent reports to the pentagon saying the north vietnamese are back and they are firing at us. but none of the torpedoes hit. after a while, he began to wonder, could it be there is no attack at all? it is something else? and he put his ships into sharp turns and the radar picked up blips off the ocean water hitting the side of the vessel. and i think they are called skunks or bogeys, but they are not torpedoes. he sent a message to washington

saying i think i am totally wrong. there is nothing happening here. even though there was nothing happening according to the american commander on the scene, lyndon johnson had the idea that they attacked me on august 2, they are attacking me again. later on he said, it is probably those -- i do not -- quote him directly. [laughter] he said he did not think to clean up the language that these navy boys got quite right. but, he said this is my moment. and he called in the leadership of the congress and gave them the resolution he wanted. the republican leader was a guy named halleck on the house, and he said mr. president, it is for you to write the resolution and

for us to approve it. and johnson said, you have to be very clear what the resolution says. it gives the president that absolute, uncontested right to use american military force and in defense of american national interest. he didn't say in southeast asia and he certainly did not save vietnam. it was sort of across the globe. question -- and by the way, the following day congress voted on this. the vote was 88-2 in the senate and 416-0 in the house.

very important point here -- can you imagine that kind of vote today? unimaginable. there was still in those years a belief on the part of both parties that when he foreign to foreign policy, and certainly to war, both of us had to get together in the interest of the country. that does not exist today. it may exist in rhetoric, but that does not exist in action. and lyndon johnson at that time, the following day right after, called in a group of reporters. i remember very clearly. he said, "i want you all to be aware that what the congress did today was provide all, all, all authority to the president." he said the word "all" three

times. he wanted to build it into the psyche of the nation that the president had the right to go to war whenever and however he chose. since that time, in every war the u.s. has fought, it has been as a result of a presidential backed in most cases by a congressional resolution but no , longer a declaration of war. we have put that out of the historical vocabulary. lyndon johnson talked at the time about why he did not ask for a declaration of war. it is very interesting. he said during world war ii, the when there was a declaration of war, the entire nation was asked to contribute to a victory and in that case, an unconditional surrender of the enemy.

it was a national commitment and johnson and nixon and ford, did not matter whether democratic or republican, the president does not want to be in a position of asking the country for a total engagement. you always want to way out and be a limited war. what is happening now in the ukraine, for example, could very well be only a limited war. but it does have the capacity to avo. sarah we do not know because we cannot read the future.

for example, article five of the north atlantic treaty organization says an attack on one is an attack on all. if putin decided tomorrow morning to move a small regiment of the army up to the border of estonia, where 23% of the people are ethnic russian and so ethnic russians hounded to death by people who do not like us or the russian language or religion, i cannot allow that to happen you have to use it. what with the united states do? if estonia asks us and invokes article five, what would the u.s. do? what with the president do? will he be consistent with five? would he back away from it?

i do not know. it all goes back to the precedent that lyndon johnson said in 1964. >> the other side of the war and i was struck in reading or in the short timeframe between nixon and resignation, who wanted peace for honor the lucky one it and the collapse of vietnam -- now, it is a fool's errand to ask a hypothetical question. that has never stopped me. with the vietnam war have come out any different? >> it is a good hypothetical. my gut feeling is that it would've ended pretty much the way it did. for one, overpowering reason, we tend to look upon the vietnam war, and i been talking about it

nonstop as an american exercise, , but it was a north vietnamese exercise, too. they were driven by a powerful sense of nationalism. they wanted all of vietnam to be united. i do not think -- they wanted united as vietnam. it happened to be run by shrewd, unscrupulous communist leaders who were determined not matter what the cost, and the north vietnamese paid a tremendous cost -- price rather.

they were going to get their way. they did not care how many got killed. they knew that if they killed a limited number of americans, it would have an extraordinary impact inside of the u.s., but it didn't. so my answer to your hypothetical question, i think it would've been pretty much the same. >> marvin, some of us in the room are old enough to remember the draft during vietnam and was incredibly unpopular and the last time the draft was used. you might say that in the draft was one of the casualties of the vietnam war. we have an all volunteer and much more professional military. how does that affect the way presidents make decisions on the use of military force? >> i think in a very significant way. two points. one, if there were a draft during the afghan war and the iraq war, i think the united

states president would have been obliged to conduct in a different way. the war, in both wars, they started off with a very dramatic american use of power. and both times in afghanistan where they kicked out the taliban government and in iraq where they kicked out saddam hussein's regime -- in both cases, the united states did it as a result of our overwhelming military force, conducted brilliantly, especially in afghanistan at the beginning and in iraq in the first couple of months. it began to fall apart after that. but when it began to fall apart , and more and more troops had to be sent, the people being sent were drafted people, there

would've been objection and political pressure to bear on the president. he would not have had the freedom of action he has had. my second point is that freedom of action, however, is not conducted as if the president were a medieval european king having a personal army that he could send wherever he wished. this is still the united states of america, and there has to be some legislative constraint on the action of the president when he is committing the united states to war. that is why i think it is an excellent question, and it hooks back to the 1973 resolution at

nd the 1963 resolution of congress. i think, i can't stress this enough, i think that when a nation like the united states goes to war, it should not be the responsibility of just a president and a limited number of congressional backers pushing the majority. to give the president what they both decide is the authority to send troops to war. i know there is a counter argument. who else should do it is not for president? i do not have a quick answer. i have suffered over that for many years. i know in my gut that it is not right for there to be no visible, apparent constraints on presidential behavior. and action. >> let's talk a little bit about how the vietnam war impacted the

various administrations. president carter, in his dealing with the iranian hostage situation, and and in thinking about what happened in vietnam play into how limited it was? >> absolutely, it played in a very significant way. jimmy carter never wanted to use force, never, never. he said when he first went into , he said the one thing i will not do is send american forces to war. nixon did that, johnson did that. i am not going to do that. and then the hostage crisis happened, and he had to do something. he did not know quite what to do. the argument at the white house and the pentagon was very much, if you are going to use military force, on the one side, use enough military force to

accomplish your goal. if the goal is to go in there to liberate the hostages, great. will there be people killed in the effort? yes. at which carter turned to the point generals and said, you did not hear me, generals, i do not want anybody killed. at which point the two kernels colonels who were in charge of operation, the junior colonel said, did you hear what the president said? we cannot use force at all. he said do not listen to him. when we get out there we will do , what we have to do. they went with a presidential order to use no force, but determined if they had to they would use force. the other argument was -- what could the military to? supposing the military got up, get into tehran and they were the edge of liberating these people and the bad guys came in and began to shoot them up, are

you not going to shoot back? are you guaranteed to get the people out? the answer was no. jimmy carter went into that he was gettingng us into another vietnam war. he did not want to do it, but he did it for political reasons. and humanitarian reasons. he wanted to get those people out. >> are you concerned that so few of our political leaders have military experience? does that make them more or less manipulated by the pentagon? >> senator john mccain was on "news hour" earlier this week, and he was asked a question similar to that, making the point that many of the new people going into the senate and house have no military experience. and many of them have not traveled out of the united states.

in other words as senator mccain , said, they had limited international exposure. a very diplomatic way of putting it. but the senator added very quickly he did not believe that a president had to have -- you military service. he believed that you could learn quickly enough what the issues were in any military encounter, and then you have to have something within you that has to do with what -- with what you were composed of. god knows. the inner strength of character to know that you were doing the right thing. mccain did not think you really needed it. i always had a feeling -- i will

go with mccain's feeling, by the way. i had a feeling how much better it would be if a new president had that kind of experience. for example, i am not making a political point. when senator obama became president obama, he never served in the military. he had very little international experience except what he picked up as an intelligent person. he did not have much of that. did it make any difference? my answer is yes. i think it did. at the very beginning of the obama administration, the military and the cia came to the new president and said, we are losing in iraq and afghanistan, both big-time. and in afghanistan, if you do not send another 50,000 troops, we are going to lose it. now, you are a young, inexperienced democratic president.

the military comes to you and says, hey, buddy, we need 50,000 bodies now or we are going to lose. what are you going to do? you are going to yield. 33,000, but heto yielded. why did he do that? he didn't want another vietnam. he felt it would be absolutely horrific for the united states to have to suffer another one of those losses. part of his motivation unquestionably was to avoid another vietnam, absolutely. >> let's look at how vietnam has played into american politics this century. it is interesting how american politics reaches back to vietnam over and over again. john kerry and his legacy of vietnam, and george w. bush and

what he did, a national guard with the service. dick cheney got derided for -- where were you? he said it was not my priority to be in vietnam. all of these were issues. how does vietnam still play? >> it still plays, gil, because it was the only were, major war that the united states has been engaged in where we lost. and for a great country like the united states to lose and were, a war, that is a big deal. if we were a european country, if we were france, if we were germany, we would've lost many more. it is the natural flow of events. but we were exceptional, partly

geography, and we didn't until this loss. it is natural that presidents would not want to be the ones on guard duty with the united states losing another war. for example, ronald reagan, will had a masterful feel for the american pulse. one ronald reagan took over, one of the things he said to all the people around him, "you can send me anything you like. you can ask me any question you like. but i want to give you the answer now to a question that concerns vietnam. we are not going to have another loss like vietnam. it cannot happen on my watch. we are a great country." all of the words that he used so well politically -- he meant it.

and when the united states lost, i forgot -- 246 marines in their barracks at beirut, lebanon you would've thought, , the united states would never allow that to happen. we would somehow or another have hit the bad guys hard. and the cia came to ronald reagan and said we know exactly who these people are and we know their hotel rooms. give us the order, mr. president, we can go in with pinpoint bombing and take out that room if we have to. he would not allow it to happen. he was concerned, maybe excessively so, with the possibility of a war that would

suck us in like vietnam did. and he used phrases like that all of the time. suck us in. he would not have it. >> marvin, exactly a year ago today i was in hanoi and was stunned by the transformation that has taken place. in vietnam. the regime is still the regime, one-party system, repressive in many ways. the country has opened up economically and in many ways, you would think we had one of the war. there are starbucks, kentucky fried chickens, you see no animosity to american visitors. in fact you see american flags , in many places. i wonder -- have you been back to vietnam? >> no, i have not. my brother has gone back very often.

most time he goes back he spends most of his time in hanoi, and he thinks it is a fantastic city. the question a good friend of mine, who used to the president of ford's press officer and nbc correspondent, he was going to a documentary called "how we won the war." he said what is obvious is america is all over the place, not in a negative way. i think it's fascinating. what we have been doing, the united states has been doing in the last three years, is building up an interesting relationship with vietnam. the nation that beat us is one of our great allies. in asia. why? because we both worry about china. now, anyone with half a brain during the vietnam war would have known any intelligence

officer would have known, that for more than 1000 years, the chinese and vietnamese do not like each other. yet we went to war against vietname because we were concerned that the chinese would send in to help the people they couldn't stand. and right now for the last three years, when the building up this close relationship to the point where several months ago the united states agreed to sell a military hardware to the vietnamese. and we say we sell the hardware to them and has absolutely nothing to do with china. do you think the chinese believe that? no. a funny kind of way, vietnam is like an omnipresent irritant. in our policy. it is over, it is done with, let's move on. but we can't quite manage it.

i always have the feeling that we have been since world war ii, with the exception of vietnam, we have been prepared to settle for half victories, many victories were stalemates. korea ended in a stalemate. if you call afghanistan and iraq victories, god bless you. but you have had these mini 1989. like panama in when you didn't need much to conquer panama, but president george h.w. bush and in the american people did, too. his ratings skyrocketed. entering the gulf war. his ratings went way up. american people love victories even if the enemy is a pipsqueak

enemy. [laughter] >> it comes to a good question here. george h.w. bush and colin powell responded to saddam hussein's invasion by saying you vietnam, as you said, we lost and we are taking 500,000 people, and they didn't go into iraq because george h.w. bush knew that if you toppled saddam hussein, you own iraq. his son did not get the word. he toppled saddam hussein and the place went to hell and here we are.

where is the lesson of vietnam? >> the first thing you do is ask your father for advice. [laughter] and in a new book that george w. wrote about his father, he describes his feelings that maybe i should ask dad and maybe i shouldn't, but he didn't want to put dad in a difficult position. i suspect it was a little more than that. i suspect it was the belief that dad would tell him not to commit american force at that level. one of the reasons i say that is, a man who work for his father as a national advisor, he wrote a fascinating piece in the "wall street journal," arguing against the commitment of american forces in iraq. i think he wrote that after having cleared it with the

president, george h.w. and george w. bush was saying to himself, i think it's a very close relationship, honest, loving relationship. but i think when you are president, you don't want to be told what to do. that's the funny thing about the way we govern ourselves. presidents do not take advantage of the amount of experience and knowledge that exists in this city. or in this country. can you imagine if president obama on a regular basis, not a big deal, but had all of the living presidents to dinner every couple of months and say,

hey, what should we do? or the secretary of state to bring in former secretarys of state. or create a national security team. it does not have the constitutional authority to act but inform and advise. i think that would be wonderful. we do not have it. i do not know why. something that has to do with the ego of president, i am not sure. it's sort of makes sense. >> we are going to let our audience ask -- >> i was about to say, you have one more question, i have one more question before we turn it over to you. >> what you said segues into what i am going to ask. as someone who is head a little bit longer view of history than most of us, and you are to be proud of that -- >> i am. [laughter] >> do you think we have learned the histories of lesson? if so, how long do they last?

why don't we call people, as you said, who have been there to help mold our current policy? >> i am not sure if this answer is in any way valid, but over the last 20 years or so, we have had an increasingly dysfunctional government. with the upshot is that anything that makes sense is therefore something we shouldn't do. [laughter] and therefore the people and authority probably feel that if they asked someone from a former administration to clue me and help them or advise them it would be a sign of weakness on their part. absurd, but sort of the way it is. i deeply appreciate the way this country has functioned in a

very, very difficult times. but i don't like the idea that we add to the problems that are normal to a great country, self-inflicted political wounds making it more difficult for us to deal with the rest of the world. right now, it is difficult people around the world -- not just obama, going on with bush. people asking about the capacity of the united states. that is why people ask the question about the authority of the president to send troops to war. what president obama did last year on syria, i know the argument, but he built up every reporter in this building knows that he built up for one solid week the white house, the image of the united states about to go

to war in syria and then on saturday morning when there was something going on with the russians that might have led to giving up its chemical weapons. that must be knowledge. he took a walk around the white house grounds with denis mcdonough, his chief of staff. very energetic, very healthy he , came back and told war he is given up the idea of attacking syria. in the middle east, if you were an american banker, you ask what america backer, you asked what the heck is going on there? if you didn't like america, usa, told you these guys cannot be depended on. and people who are in the leadership of the taliban, al

qaeda, the islamic state, they say america cannot be depended on. the vietnam legacy, and the haunting legacy we speak of, that is there not just for us -- it is all over the world. the legacy is there in very .aunting, dispirited way somehow, it is in us to do, we have to manage to think about what is in the better interest of this country. i think i am in a safe environment and i can say i think it is, but it is the best country in the world. but now we have to prove it again. i think we can, but we have to get started. >> a good way to head over to

questions. i got sam, a great student that back there. sam, i have got a question over here, and you want to bring the microphone over here to the gentleman? >> thank you very much. i enjoyed this very much. i want to bring up the american president's response to israel. it is very much in the news right now. you have seen different presidents handled conflict in israel. has it gotten more heated than it has today, how would different presidents from our past have handled that, and how easy the next president handling it if america was called upon to defend israel?

>> thank you for the question. i think this chapter nine of "the road to war." there is a chapter happened to do, it makes an effort to answer your question. but briefly. american relations with israel since the telling and eisenhower in the beginning of kennedy have been for the most part very good, very close relations with the united states providing israel with a massive armament, u.n. support, it has been a very close relationship. what is it based on? it is based on a series of letters, private letters sent by the president of the united states to the prime minister of israel. it doesn't matter who the president or prime minister is. these letters do not have to be cleared by anyone in congress. they are for the most part --

they have never been disclosed except in presidential libraries some have been. our relationship with israel is now so close that if israel had to go to war again against an arab country, israel's line up to this point has always been -- you, mr. president, provide us with the military hardware. we have our men and will fight our wars, and we do not want you here, but we want your stuff and your backing at the u.n. the president has always said, you got it. it has become so close, the relationship and through the letters, president ford once told the israeli prime minister

in 1975 i think, we will never negotiate an agreement with an arab country. that we think will hurt you unless we clear it with you. that is a heck of a statement to make, but it is a private statement. i think there ought to be a couple of -- understanding of what our relationship with israel should be. i think there should be a mutual defense treaty between the united states and israel i say , that in the book and i explained it. i think the situation is so dangerous that the possibility of israel having to fight a war is very real and very close. if it does have to fight, and if it gets into trouble as it was in the 1973 war one richard nixon came to israel itself and

probably saved israel. if we had that situation again, i simply would love it for there to be a defense treaty so that the israeli and the american people know what is expected of their government. that it is not a mystery and it is not a private deal between two individuals. that's not the way to make foreign policy. i appreciate that that is a controversial suggestion. but when you contemplate how dangerous that part of the world is and the depth of the american commitment already to israel that you -- at least i feel that ought to be cleared by congress and understood by the american people. >> lou.

>> yes, sir. thank you for a very insightful analysis. we look forward to reading your book. what i get out of this is how intensely personal this decision is, and it is not collaborative enough. you can't possibly have a national referendum on whether we go to war, but the advisors that the president has been so is so important to look at the experience and the candor and willingness of a president to sacrifice his ego in this decision-making process. i could go on and on. but what is the solution? it is hard for us mere mortals to understand the magnitude, the intensity of the pressure and the time limits. timeliness. we have got rockets going back

and forth and now in jerusalem. what is the solution? [laughter] >> thanks a lot. [laughter] >> and guys like you -- i was sorry when general james jones left president obama's national advisory. that was an experience intelligent man. ,>> exactly. that is an interesting question. why did somebody like general jones leave? he found it was very difficult to get through to the president and he felt he had to. his position as a general opened him up to the pentagon that he was there. at the white house, which he wasn't. he made that very clear. it was almost an impossible situation for him. and i totally agree with you -- i think he is a wonderful, great soldier and diplomat, by the way. very smart man.

but to get to the heart of your question, so much of it relates to the nature of the american presidency and what it has become and its relationship to the political structure of the country. we've always known that people with money have a larger influence over policy than people without money. you said in your question "mere mortals." but the president is a mere mortal also, and nixon found that out when he had to leave. the president is not larger than the law. so, what then becomes a possible answer and one of it, something mccain said the other day that i thought was wonderful. he said what he was going to do as the new chair of the armed services committee was to call a series of hearings in which he

was going to call in the very top thinkers on national security to have them debate -- to have an open debate about where we should go. that doesn't mean these guys make the law or policy but they will influence it. it will be on television. people can ask questions on the floor of the senate. i think that is wonderful. it brought me back to 1966 when that senator from arkansas had hearings on the vietnam war and recognition of china. in 1966, recognizing china will politicallyable, unacceptable, but he brought in all the scholars. one of the great professors at harvard, john fairbank he , brought him down here and he was brilliant in explaining how the chinese think of themselves and where they are in the world. his explanation was 180 degrees

off what was the common understanding of china. we were massively ignorant of what was going on there. and here was a smart man, taught chinese history for 40 years, and he knew what was going on. and if senator mccain now opened s the doors to that kind of hearing, that is a step in the right direction. a step in a good direction. >> i see a question here. >> can you take me through the mindset and the mentality of the geopolitical -- i'm sure you have reported on what caused president ford to make so many missteps that caused the loss of

life related to the -- what was behind his rush to action? can you talk me through this? i am sure you reporting on it. >> i did. it is the second chapter of the "haunting legacy" book. the reason i mention that is not only that i would like you to buy the book, but it is also the issues raised at the time that are issues that confront us to this day. what happened immediately after the north vietnamese won, i believe it was six weeks later -- a transport ship with american signage -- what is that -- yes.hip american flagship was attacked, it was believed it was attacked

by the north vietnamese. by the communists. it was just south of thailand.i. i forgot the name of the sea there. and there were a number of people who were taken hostages. and gerald ford believed very strongly and instinctively felt it was unacceptable because we just lost in this war. if the message and now those out goes out to the rest of the world that we not only lost the war, but we cannot even get our own people back, that is the worst possible signal to send to the rest of the war. he sent up a very large american counterstrike. u.s. naval -- a very large u.s. naval counterstrike.

and we went and hit the bad guys where it hurt and found and the southern part of the them, there was a base after the hostages were probably there. >> it was in cambodia. >> thank you. they were probably there, so we had to get them. so he sent attack bombers, they and they then found after, they weren't there. he wanted to stop th performancey sloppy all the way around. they finally got to it they were , on an island. lots of people were killed. one american helicopter with a lot of people were shot down. it was bad all the way around. it was not gerald ford's finest hour. and by chance, and after the loss of quite a few marines, we

managed to come upon the hostages and got them out. gerald ford spoke very probably his accomplishment, but it was not much of an accomplishment. the whole thing was designed to avoid the perception in different parts of the world that vietnam has immobilized the united states, has made us incapable of taking any military action. kissinger that henry told president ford, in a way that only kissinger could, "mr. president, you have to do this." he put enormous pressure on him to do something. he was going to do it anyway. it was one of those pathetic examples of a very small -- a

producing -- it of a very small incident producing a huge american response because we do think we are weak. most of the world recognizes we are fairly strong, but still. >> a question here. >> since were here at the national press club, i thought i would ask this question. in the decades after vietnam war, there has been discussions about the role of the press. in covering that war. you have probably been involved in those. >> yes. fire away. >> when you think about it, it was the first war covered by television extensively, color television, i might add. there are many bloody scenes reported. how do you see the impact that reporting had on the war and the war coming to an end and the legacy of press reporting and how the military has viewed the press in the many wars we have

engagements since the vietnam war? by the way, that was very courageous of the journalists who put their lives on the line. >> absolutely. much of that reporting was done by very courageous journalists who put their lives on the line. there are many courageous journalists out there now also trying to get the story. the problem today is there -- it is said there is not enough money to provide enough reporters to really cover these wars extensively. i think that is nonsense. to get your question, the media, a word i despise, the media was not responsible for the vietnam war. newspapers are not that adventurous. there are not that courageous, not that bright, not that determined to go win a pulitzer prize everywhere they go. however, they go along with the swings of the public mood.

they ride with the opinion. they don't often produce the opinion -- they heighten the opinion. they give it more oomph. in mydo not believe experience that they produce results. it is very rare that there is a woodward and bernstein, they had who run around for two years after a story that no one else except cbs was trying to get. woodward and bernstein had a huge impact on richard nixon resigning. but i do not think they caused it. and i don't think the reporters in vietnam caused our loss or those moments when we won. they covered the story, and some of them paid for their coverage with their lives. most of them returned. i was at a cbs gathering last

cameramen,orters, soundmen, lightmen, all men and women, not as many then, who covered the vietnam war. i am not going to say there were tears, but there was a deep appreciation of the impact of that war and what it did to their lives. i hasten to add with pride that my brother spoke for about five minutes there and pointed out the impact of vietnam had had on him personally, the way it continues. his judgments of the world and the reason that he , goes back as often as he does. and it is very hard to find any

reporter who covered that war who simply forget it. it really grabbed them and holds on very tight. >> that might be a great way to end since i do not see any questions from my students. >> you are all going to flunk. be careful. [laughter] >> one question. >> i do. the night the senate overrode a presidential veto on an important subject, which we did not spend time on, which was to allow the president to go to war or not go to war -- i was surprised you didn't mention tonight the effort led by senator kaine of virginia to open this whole issue up for debate on the hill, it and i am a soon -- on the hill, and i

assume you are aware of that. >> i am aware of what the senator and not what you said early on. >> replacing the resolution to for bid nixon to go -- >> you are going back. >> i was in the gallery that night. the ignorance of the war and circumstances of southeast asia, and your concept that congress needs to weigh in, then and now, unbelievable level of ignorance of the entire war despite them having been distant observers when they were barring continued aid to the people. it just seems there is a missing argument which is the competence or incompetence of congress to weigh in on these issues and also senior staffers, the iraqi resolution went through and they got no press coverage for opposing it. including three republicans who promptly lost all support from the republican party because

they oppose the iraq war resolution. i will fall into the nostalgia. i came thinking we would spend more time on that. >> you raise an extremely important question at the heart of my attempts to answer earlier on. you will get no argument from me that congress ought to play a larger role. i think that one senator kaine put forth his proposal for a congressional vote on how far the united states should go, you east, you willle notice there was very little quick support of the proposal, . it is sort of died in dead air. one of the reasons it does is that there isn't that much courage in the congress to step up and come up with a decision if there is the possibility that decision will lead to

embarrassment on his part, problems with his reelection, difficulties with fundraising. all of the obvious points. at the to play, but heart of it is the inability of most of the congress to produce the courage to rise above and to -- to rise above the needs of their own political survivor and to look to the larger interests of the country, which makes possible the congress person's ability to get on the floor and talk and support other colleagues who do have good ideas. i think senator kaine's proposal is terrific. i wish he would get a hearing. i think he deserves a hearing. maybe if they are watching this program -- [laughter] time,hink we are out of

even i did see one student up there. you can ask the question later. ken, do you >> i thank you all for coming. i[applause] the books are for sale. christmas is coming. [laughter] >> >> you're watching american st