could conceive of how inadequate hood's logistics situation was, worrying about him going into kentucky and on up the ohio river, he couldn't have begun to do that. he just didn't have the logistics situation to do it. and i think grant probably found it difficult to believe that he would have come all this way into central tennessee with such poor logistics. >> we all know that general forrest had a lot of problems with his commanding officers. what i would like to ask is, what was his relationship with general hood? how did he get along with him? and also in regards do we have any comments or thoughts from him regarding springhill, regarding franklin, regarding the battle of nashville?

>> okay. the question was, how forrest and hood related to each other at the springhill situation, is that what i understand? >> and nashville. >> and nashville. well, in regard to franklin, certainly, forrest did not agree

with hood's decision to attack there. back at springhill, it seems to me that forrest was never fully clear about hood allegedly wanting to block the pike, and instead was coming in and attacking the union troops that were marshaled there, maybe some 6500, rather than trying to concentrate on blocking the pike. i think there's misunderstanding certainly between hood and forrest at springhill. i don't know that that particularly affected what happened the next day at franklin. i think that probably forrest just disagreed totally with the idea of a frontal attack, a

frontal assault at franklin and, of course, wanted to try and blank the federals out of their position. >> i think another interesting point is that what happened in the nashville circumstances, forrest was detached and sent down to murfreesboro with the idea that it was presumed that, per se, the pressure brought to bear on the union garrison at fort rose crans, and the murfreesboro area would forces union army to come out of their entrenchments, and attack the confederate army, and their fortified redoubts and so forth at nashville. well, it didn't work out that way. in fact, forrest took a pretty good beating at -- down around murfreesboro. but the point of the matter is that -- and i've never seen

anything that per se discounts the relationship in terms of forrest after the campaign, the tennessee campaign. he was so upset with the command staff and the command of the army of tennessee that he wanted to go to richmond. in fact, he asked permission to go to richmond. he wanted to go and set the record straight, according to his concept versus that of john bell hood in terms of why there had been so much failure and frustration. he, forrest, seemed to be, from what i've read, very, very, very upset with the campaign as conducted from the very beginning of the tennessee campaign. >> the only thing i would add is that in sam hood's book, he criticizes forrest for springhill, particularly. forrest allegedly had a meeting with him. and hood asked him if he could send troops, and the road north of springhill. and forrest said, my men have been fighting all day and we're short of ammunition and apparently a.p. stewart's men

gave him some ammunition and then the pike wasn't blocked. so somehow along there, what hood really desired forrest to do and part of that controversy, apparently, you know, hood says to somebody, don't worry about it. general forrest is going to cut off the road. and apparently it didn't happen. we know it didn't happen. as to their personal relationships, i don't know. it always struck me that forrest had been a superb independent commander of raids and things like that. some historians have said that he should have been put in charge of the army of tennessee. and i think he would have been a miserable failure.

he didn't like criticism, was used to doing things his own way. i just think that that would have been -- that's not his forte. but, you know, he doesn't get criticized very often. but you know, you can argue that at springhill particularly, so sometimes i think that if we ever perfect time travel, i would like to go back and go to frank cheatham and some of you go to nathan bedford forrest and say get across the damn road and let's see what happens. you know, because if they had done that at least we would have a little different topic to talk about. >> yes, sir? >> yes. this is less a question and more a plea for help, i guess. my wife purchased this for me about 25 years ago. it's a swagger stick. and i got it from the veterans home in california, in napa valley. it's got the name of wheeler on it and the name of palmer on it and a date of '65. so if anyone wants to take a look at it, maybe some shed light on it, i'd be most appreciative. thank you. >> make sure you're standing in a good corner so we can find you when this is over. >> how about the museum? >> yes, sir. >> general hood seems to get short shrift in everything i ever read. seems to me that, number one, he

was ordered by president davis to take the army of tennessee on the offensive. number two, the only thing that made any sense was what he tried to do, namely to retake nashville for the confederacy and go join lee in virginia. certainly he deserves criticism for, i guess, the rashness of the attack on franklin. on the other hand, it's a little different than what general lee did at gettysburg and yet he gets virtually no criticism for that. so i guess it just surprised me that the history doesn't seem to find anything favorable about the general. >> okay. well, and i have a little different perspective, to say the least, because i think there are tremendous differences between gettysburg and franklin. lee had a lot of artillery, for one thing, in terms of he bombarded the daylights out of the line on cemetery hill.

and hood didn't. but those are technical points. the aspect i think is that you've got to put things in context the way i see it. you've got to put it in context in the sense that hood had a tremendous responsibility. he had the hopes of the confederacy really riding on his troops in terms of what he was trying to do, the desperation circumstances that he was in as a result of atlanta. the south was losing the war. they weren't going to do anything about bringing in black soldiers, so on and so forth. so the whole scenario was unfavorable. so hood was in a desperate strait. but still, in terms of the decisions that you make as a commander, you cannot, on the

basis of desperation and the basis of a circumstance that doesn't look favorable, you can't just commit men in terms of a frontal assault like at franklin without paying the responsibility in terms of the consequences, not only then but now. and i think it's a disservice, to be honest with you, to bring up the fact that john bell hood should not be regarded as anything other than a tremendous failure in his responsibility for making that attack. will stay with him, in my opinion, forever. >> i'm more sympathetic to john bell hood than wiley. here's why. when he takes over the command

of the army of tennessee in 1864 he's in a no-win situation. he's taken over for a commander who has surrendered about 100 miles of north georgia. as an aside, if you want somebody who has taken a beating historically, there's not a soul who has anything nice to say about joseph e. johnson anymore. he just gets battered by historians, left and right. so hood takes over, and he knows that richmond thinks that this fabian strategy of falling back has to stop. and it has to stop now. so he fights three battles, around atlanta in about eight days or so, and none of them go the way he wants. tactically, none of them go the way he wants, partly because there's new commanders in unfamiliar positions and trying to take on this responsibility in ways that they have not grown into. so i think he loses those battles in part because he just can't get the army to do quite what he wants, and part of it is

because the army is in command shuffles. if you want to give the best case construction for hood, at franklin, and here's what sam hood says, schofield was there. and if you let him go, what happens? he goes all the way to nashville and he augments george thomas' numbers at nashville. so this is your only opportunity to get him before he withdraws, and gets all the way to the capital. so he makes this decision. now, was it an impulsive decision? i don't know. i know that frank cheatham advised him against it. i know nathan bedford forrest advised him against it and other officers had great doubt about it. but i just don't know that he felt he had much choice, in the sense that if you let schofield go, he'll be criticized by people later for that, too. i mean, this is sort of a damned if you do, and damned if you don't situation for hood. and then, you know, after franklin -- let me tell you this. when the battle starts, to be honest with you i think what happens and i see it primarily

through cheatham who was closer to the batfield. he sent his staff officers in and not a one of them ever came back. once the smoke and the darkness came, those generals had no idea what was transpiring. all they knew was that there was still musketry going for a long period of time. there was obviously a lot of fighting taking place. but they had no idea how ghastly the casualties would be, particularly on the confederate side. so the best case for john bell hood, i think, at franklin, is they're there. if i let them go, i've made things worse for myself. at nashville. i've got to inflict as much damage as i can. and i'm going to roll the dice. and, you know, it's easy for us to sit here in 2014 and say, man, what a terrible decision. i think whatever decision he makes is bad, you know. i do think that. >> yes, sir? >> and we've got two more questions, so greg and then. >> dr. west, panel, thank you all for being here.

i've followed your work for a long time. i've always enjoyed and appreciated what you've done. i do have a question along the lines of the prior gentleman about general hood. about four years ago, several boxes of documents, previously unknown, i think, were discovered as hood's personal papers. i wonder if you guys have had the chance to review those? and if so, has it changed your thoughts in any way about hood's performance? thank you. >> i never have had any opportunity to see those papers. >> sam hood found those papers -- like some relatives said hey, we've got these old things, they knew he was working on general hood. as it turned out it was this treasure trove of papers.

i mean, it's a thing that we all would die for, you know. and it happens very rarely. frank cheatham's papers are burned, i'm afraid. what they -- if you want to know, sam hood has written a book about them, taken the documents and, you know, edited them and things like that. if you want to know what's in there -- i don't have that book. i have his study of his ancestor.want it, it's available, i think. and it is widely available, i think. so you can buy it. and see what -- and make up your own mind. >> well, again, as i say, i don't want to beat a dead horse to death, but in terms of my view, my view is, again, you look at john bell hood, what did

he have access to when he wrote his memoirs. did he have these papers that sam hood found? i presume he did. certainly, why didn't he -- if there's any really tremendously exculpating evidence or something that hasn't been brought out, why didn't hood utilize them in his own defense? which that certainly his book, his memoir, advance and retreat, was based on his perspective in terms of the events and whatnot. why wouldn't he use these papers if they were so important? and critical in terms of the memoir he wrote? i'm not saying -- i certainly haven't examined the papers. maybe there are some great material there. i presume that there's a lot of post-war material in the collection.

and i'm sure that there probably is some material of very much value. but, again, in terms of hood's defense, in terms of himself, if he had access to these papers to begin with, it seems to me that he certainly would have utilized these papers in his defense in writing that book. "advance and retreat" his memoirs. >> the only thing i want to say in addition is i think that hood died really before that book was fully fashioned. he died of yellow fever. he may have had access to the documents. the advance and retreat has this feeling of -- it's not really polished, not that it necessarily would have been. but it's almost like an incomplete work that he would have gone through and revised. so i don't know that he wouldn't have made better use of those documents, but yellow fever came

along and took him away, so. >> yes, sir? >> in the aftermath of the battle of franklin, the federal troops leave in the middle of the night, leaving behind all the severely wounded men, thousands and thousands of confederates and union wounded are there. what happens to them when the confederates move on to nashville? are they just told to go home? i mean, there's very little transport. what happens to these people? >> the really severely wounded stayed here in franklin. franklin, like a lot of towns, sharpsburg, you know, gettysburg, wherever you want to talk, fredricksburg, became a vast hospital for wounded men. and robert hicks' novel describes -- that's really the basis of his novel. i would think that some of the more slightly wounded, if they're confederates, would have gone on to nashville to reunite with their commands. but there were an awful lot of

people here. the other problem is what to do with the dead. i think what they did with the union dead, there were two lines. they simply threw a lot of them into one of those lines and took the dirt that they had piled up and put it on the bodies. those bodies sometime after the war were disinterred and taken to nashville and put in the national cemetery. the confederate bodies were removed after the war. and one of the things that eric jacobson has said it looks like the space between graves is so small, and that's because even though it had only been a few years after the battle, that there really wasn't that much left. you could put them in little, i mean these human remains you could put in boxes about this size. so that's what happened to them. when the yankees came back

through, they basically reclaimed franklin, and took care of theirs, as well as confederates who were here. and some of the union probably felt that they had not been cared as well as the confederates had. but i'm not sure that that's accurate to say. confederate medical doctors and medical personnel probably did, my guess, is as good as they could with what they had to work with. >> i'm going to squeeze in that last one. but to be like george plaster, you've got 30 seconds. >> shouldn't take that long. basically this is a two-part question. first, in reality, is it possible that the south could have taken nashville? and what would have been the strategy implications had they taken nashville? thank you. >> well, i'll give a simple

answer. i don't think they had a chance of taking nashville. now, to speculate then on what might have been the strategic implications of something that i don't think could have happened, i find rather difficult to deal with. >> i completely agree with james. because the -- you look -- from any aspect, the technical aspect, the ordnance aspect, whatever, there was really very little chance that, unless there was some major, major mistakes made by thomas and the union command, that there was very little chance of nashville falling to the confederate forces. especially after they had been so greatly devastated at franklin. but indeed, the question -- the old saying "if" is the biggest word in the english language. if nashville had fallen, what difference would it have made? i think, indeed, that's probably an imponderable question.

but in my opinion, the concentration that would have been brought -- if hood and his army somehow had managed to take nashville, the concentration that would have been brought against that army through the influence of grant and others would have been such that, i think, they would have had no chance, even after the, shall we say, the conquest or victory at nashville. >> real briefly i'll just agree with my two other panelists. i really think that nashville by late 1864 was one of the most heavily fortified cities in america. and let's take franklin out of the equation. let's say it never happens and hood had some with his army intact and everything. i really just don't think he had the men to covers rotedous of nashville. i don't think you could storm nashville. vicksburg told us that. grant tried on may 15th and may 22nd to storm the works at vicksburg and was unsuccess. ful. i don't think that would could have happened. the best hood could have done is wait for thomas to come out and if lucky destroyed a part of thomas' army. that might have been a gateway into the city. i think it's highly, highly unlikely and i really don't think it would have happened. >> well, let's give our historians a big round of applause. [ applause ] you've been watching c-span's american history tv. we want to hear from you. follow us on twitter@c-span history. connect with us on facebook at facebook.com/cspan history. or you can leave comments, too. and check out our upcoming programs at our website c-span.org/history. >> we'd like to tell you about some of our other american history tv programs.

be with us every saturday at 8:00 p.m. and midnight eastern for lectures in history. join students in the classroom to hear lectures on campuses across the country on topics ranging from the american revolution to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. lectures in history every saturday at 8:00 p.m. and midnight eastern here on american history tv on c-span three. new year's day on the c-span networks, here are some of our featured programs. 10:00 a.m. eastern, the washington ideas forum. energy conservation with david crane. business magnate t. boone pickens. cake love owner warren brown. and inventor dean cayman. at 4:00 p.m. eastern the brooklyn historical society holds a conversation on race.

then at 8:00 p.m. eastern from the explorer's club, apollo seven astronaut walt cunningham on the first manned space flight. new year's day on c-span2, just before noon eastern, author hector tobar on the 33 men that were buried in a chilean mine. and at 3:00 p.m. eastern richard norton smith on the life of nelson rockefeller. then at 8:00 p.m. eastern. former investigative correspondent for cbs news sharyl attkisson on her experiences reporting on the obama administration. new year's day on american history tv on c-span3, at 10:00 a.m. eastern juanita abernathy on her experiences and the role of women in the civil rights movement. at 4:00 p.m., brooklyn college professor benjamin cart on the link between alcohol and politics in pre-revolutionary new york city. and then at 8:00 p.m. cartoonist patrick oliphant draws ten presidential caricatures as historian david mccullough discusses the presidents and some of their most memorable qualities. new year's day on the c-span networks. for our complete schedule go to c-span.org. on december 21st, 1864, union forces under general william tecumseh sherman captured savannah, completing

the march to the sea campaign that started in atlanta more than five weeks earlier. todd gross, president of the georgia historical society, talks about the significance of the campaign, and how it has been remembered. this ceremony in savannah is about 20 minutes, and includes the unveiling of a new historical marker about the march to the sea. good afternoon. i'm bob jepsen, chairman of the georgia historical society and i'd like to welcome you all to madison square on this warm and balmy day. i'm taking a big risk, we believe that the bells are finished for awhile, so i hope

you can hear me. part of our mission at the georgia historical society is the education of the history of the great state of georgia, and we're here today to dedicate a marker that represents an event, people, and a time in our history, and to get on with the program, i'd like to introduce the president of the historical society, dr. todd gross. todd? >> thank you, bob. thank you, sir. thank you. well, thank you, bob. and good afternoon, everyone. let me add my welcome to this historical marker dedication commemorating the 150th anniversary of the end of the march to the sea. one of the best-known, but most controversial, and i would hasten to add, misunderstood, aspects of the american civil war. the marker we dedicate today is one of 25 markers installed by the georgia historical society, and our partners, over the last five years as a part of the civil war 150 historical marker project. a public education and heritage

tourism initiative, launched by the georgia historical society to help georgia's and visitors to our state gain a better understanding of the cataclysmic struggle 150 years ago that shaped and changed forever the destiny of our nation, and the continued relevance and meaning of the civil war to the world we live in today. the georgia historical society is the independent statewide institution responsible for collecting and teaching georgia history. founded in 1839, the society is the oldest continuously operated historical institution in the south, and one of the oldest in the nation. for the past 175 years the georgia historical society has helped georgians through education and research to study the past, in order to make sense of the present, and create a better future for us all. as a public history institution, the georgia historical society

serves as the bridge between the academic community, and the people of our state, taking the cutting edge historical research being produced in universities around the nation, and connecting it with the general public, thereby creating and expanding access to history. one of the most significant ways in which we make scholarly history available to a wide audience is through the georgia historical marker program. since the program was privatized in 1998, the georgia historical society has placed over 200 markers across the state. these markers provide an executive summary based on sound scholarly research by trained credentialed historians of the events and people that created modern-day georgia. building on this successful private/public partnership on the eve of the civil war sesquicentennial the georgia historical society developed with the georgia department of economic development, the georgia department of labor, and

the georgia department of natural resources, a project to promote heritage tourism by telling stories about the civil war that had been heretofore missing from the public narrative as defined and interpreted in the public spaces of our state. a year-long survey conducted at the beginning of the project revealed that of the nearly 1,000 civil war historical markers in georgia, over 90% were about battles and leaders. there was virtually nothing about the role of african-americans, and women, about unionists and their resistance to secession, and confederate authority, and about the story of the home front, and the war's impact on society. in short the existing markers presented a lopsided picture of the war that ignored large segments of our state's people, rendering the war a purely

military event. so beginning in 2010, the georgia historical society launched a storytelling campaign, aimed at making the public narrative more inclusive by relaying the experiences of all georgians, black and white, civilians, as well as soldiers, unionists as well as confederates, we did this by bringing to the public the findings of historians from over the last 50 years, making accessible scholarship that takes an unblinking intellectually honest look at the war, and that challenges all of us to stand on new ground, and to see a familiar event in a new light. the marker we dedicate today is a prime example of what this project is all about. it is one of two markers, one in atlanta, where the march began, and one in savannah where it ended, that anchor both ends of the savannah campaign, and provide an interpretive overview for the 50 existing markers put up since the 1950s that trace

sherman's route to the sea. the georgia historical society developed technology that allows the public to find these markers, and the stories they tell in communities all over georgia. there is a free smartphone app for iphone and android, and a new website that allows users to create custom designed driving tours using google maps and historical markers. one of the most important and consistent partners in the effort has been the georgia battlefields association, and i am pleased to introduce the president of that organization mr. charlie crawford. charlie? >> the goal at georgia battlefield's association, and we're just about to celebrate our 20th anniversary, is to save battlefield land. so that would naturally lead to the question, perhaps, what brings you to participate in this particular effort. well, we find an important part

of getting people to support preservation of battlefields is to educate them about where historic sites are. and so when todd, who i've known for quite a few years now, approached me about gba participating in this effort, we thought it was a good fight. and so we're happy to help with both the financing, and the preparation of these particular markers, and have done, oh, about ten or so now in conjunction with georgia historical society. so, we're happy to participate. i'm glad to see so many people here. we want you to be aware of the history that surrounds so many of us throughout the state, especially here in a city such as savannah, and i think you'll be pleased with the result. thank you. >> charlie, thank you. the georgia battlefields association has been an important partner we would not have been able to do all that we

did without them. well, on december 22nd, 1864, three days prior to the third christmas of the civil war, united states army general william t. sherman sent a telegram to president abraham lincoln announcing the capture of savannah, georgia. one of the confederacy's largest cities, and last remaining ports. with typical wit sherman presented the city to the president as a christmas present along with 150 heavy guns, plenty of ammunition, and 25,000 bales of cotton. the fall of savannah ask an event that has come down to us as an act of savage brutality, perpetrated by one of the great

villains of american history. sherman decided that the time to widen the burden and pain of the war beyond just rebel soldiers to include the civilian supporters of the confederacy, especially the common folk. sherman believed that forcing noncombatants to field what he called the hard hand of war was a military necessity. making the war as harsh as possible but bringing victory more quickly and with a minimum loss of life on both sides. it would undermine confederate morale on the home front. trigger a wave of desertions from the armies, destroy the confederacy's ability to wage war and prove to the rebels that their cause was hopeless and their government impotent to

protect them and their property. this new hard war doctrine was fully sanctioned by the united states government. the previous year president abraham lincoln had approved the creation of the libor code, a set of rules based on accepted practices that authorized the army to destroy civilian property, starve noncombatants, shell towns, keep enemy civilians in besieged cities, free slaves, and summarily execute guerrillas if such measures were deemed necessary to winning the war, and defending the country. to save the country the code's author the columbia professor francis libor stated is

paramount to all other considerations. like other wartime chief executives right down to the present day, lincoln was willing to take drastic measures to ensure the survival of the united states. so on november the 15th, 1864, sherman's army set out from atlanta on its infamous march to the sea, cutting a swath of destruction towards savannah on the coast. sherman swore to make georgia howl and in his special field order number 120 he laid out the rules of destruction and conduct for the march. the army was to, quote, forage liberally on the country, with details of men sent and officers sent out each day to gather food. soldiers were instructed not to enter private homes, and to discriminate between the rich, who were usually hostile, sherman observed, and the poor and industrious, who are usually neutral or friendly. now, to be sure, there was more destruction than allowed by

these orders. sherman's soldiers, as the historian joseph gladhar has written, saw this as a golden opportunity to teach the people of georgia the hardships and terrors of a war which they blamed confederates for starting, and continuing despite repeated defeats on the battlefield. some homes, especially of those wealthy slave holders, considered guilty of bringing on the war, were burned. private dwellings were entered, and personal property was taken, or ruined. and civilians were stripped of more food than the army needed or could possibly consume. beyond food and livestock, high value targets included anything that could be used by the confederates to continue the struggle. factories, mills, cotton gins, warehouses, train depots, bridges, and railroads. still, in georgia, relatively few private homes like that of howell cobb a former federal

official deemed a traitor by sherman, or those adjacent to cotton mills and factories, were burned. one study, conducted in the 1930s, comparing wartime maps with existing antebellum structures found that most along the route of the march were still standing, and those that were gone had been lost largely due to post-war accidents. and despite the commonly held belief reinforced by the movie "gone with the wind" that sherman reduced the entire city of atlanta to a smoldering ruin, approximately half of it was completely destroyed, roughly the same proportion of chambersburg, pennsylvania, that had been burned by confederates the previous july. as this author intended, the march to the sea was harsh on civilians. losing crops, food stores and livestock left noncombatants with little to eat as winter approached.

but the fear sherman created was more powerful than his acts of destruction. the site of federal troops marching across the state, destroying property, and pillaging virtually unopposed, had a demoralizing effect on white georgians who supported the confederacy. by waging war against the minds of his opponents, sherman's march achieved its creator's goal of hastening an end to the conflict. the wives of confederate soldiers along the route of the march who feared that they lay in the path of sherman's advancing legions begged their husbands to come home, and desertions increased significantly during the fall and winter of 1864-65. this hemorrhaging from robert e. lee's army in virginia further he depleted his already thin ranks, and allowed general ulysses s. grant to deliver the knockout blow in the spring of 1865. from the vantage point of the 21st century, sherman's way of war seems a dramatic departure from earlier methods, and has prompted some historians to characterize his george to the sea as the birth of modern total war. but hard war was not total war. while the march destroyed

property and infrastructure and visited suffering and fear on the civilian population, it lacked the wholesale destruction of human life that characterized world war ii. sherman's primary targets, food stuffs, and industrial government and military property, were carefully chosen to create the desired effect, and never included mass killing of civilians, especially those law-abiding noncombatants who did not resist what sherman described as the national authority. indeed, sherman always claimed that his war on property was more humane than traditional methods of conflict between armies. he even told one south carolina woman that he was ransacking her plantation so that her soldier husband would come home and general grant would not have to kill him in the trenches at petersburg. he was fighting to bring rebels back in to the union, not to annihilate them. at the end of the march, when the people of savannah surrendered virtually without a

fight, they were completely subjugated, sherman wrote. he saw no need to wreck the city's military and industrial facilities or to destroy private homes. an end to resistance mitigated any further need for destruction. five months earlier sherman had told the mayor of atlanta, if you and your citizens will give up, i and this army will become your greatest protectors. and it was a lesson not lost on savannahians. the fate of the march of the city where the march to the city ended was different than the fate of the one where it began. sherman demonstrated for the first time in the modern era the power of terror and psychological warfare in breaking an enemy's will to resist. this concept would come into

full bloom during world war ii when both axis and allied powers deliberately and indiscriminately bombed civilians in order to create terror, and win the war by any means at their disposal, including dropping two atomic bombs. it would be seen again during the vietnam war when america bombed hanoi, dropping on a single city more ordnance than the united states dropped in all of world war ii. indeed, in america in the 20th century, waged total war to such a frightening extent that one wonders if sherman had commanded in world war ii or vietnam, would his detractors be so repelled by him, especially those white southerners, taught to hate him as a war criminal? if he had served in the same army a century later, and had worn khaki or green, rather than blue, and if his targets had been germans, japanese, vietnamese, or islamic terrorists, rather than confederates, would we still loathe him to the same degree? francis libor's words, written

in 1862, to save the country is paramount to all other considerations, could have been spoken by generals 0 mar bradley or george patton as they smashed their way through another german town. or curtis lemay as he ordered the fire bombing of japanese cities. history has deemed them heroes, because their actions were against their country's foreign foes, while sherman has been vilified as a terrorist because his actions, although less severe, were against his country's domestic enemies. rightly or wrongly, sherman did what he deemed militarily necessary to win the war within the rules laid down by his government, and to save his country. rather than an aberration, his hard hand of war fits well within the american military tradition. it is no wonder that such distinguished generals as john

pershing, george patton, and norman schwarzkopf would revere and emulate swarmen. schwarzkopf even kept on his desk during the first iraq war a quote from sherman. war is the remedy our enemies have chosen, and i say let us give them all they want. like the war tactics of his 21st century successors, and the enhanced interrogation techniques employed more recently, sherman's march to the sea reveals the moral ambiguity of war and the extent to which americans are willing to go when our national existence is at stake. i would like now to invite the members of the board of the georgia historical society to join me me at the marker and charlie crawford from the georgia battlefield association will read the marker text as we unveil it. you stay on this side. that's it? >> the march to the sea.

on december 21st, 1864, during the civil war, u.s. forces under general william t. sherman captured savannah, completing the march to the sea. a military campaign devised to destroy the confederacy's ability to wage war, and break the will of its people to resist. after destroying atlanta's industrial and business, but not residential districts, sherman's 62,500 men left that city in mid november, and marched over 250 miles, reaching savannah by mid december. contrary to popular myth, sherman's troops primarily destroyed only property used for waging war. food, railroads, train depots, factories, cotton gins and warehouses. abandoning their supply base, they lived off the land, destroying food they could not consume. they also liberated thousands of enslaved african-americans. sherman's hard hand of war

demoralized confederates, hastening the end of slavery, and the reunification of the nation. erected for the civil war 150 commemoration by the georgia historical society, and georgia battlefields association. [ applause ] >> thank you. >> good job, as always. >> thank you. >> well, that concludes the ceremony. thank you all for coming. remember, that there is a free phone app for android and iphone for finding all these markers. there is a website, if you go to the georgia his core cal society site to find all of the new markers plus the 1,000 existing markers about the civil war. you can use those to create driving tours around the state, and learn about this fascinating conflict that created this world that we live in today. thank you so much for being here. we'd like to tell you about some of our other american history tv programs. join us every saturday at 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. eastern for a special look at the civil war. we'll bring you to the battlefields. we'll let you hear from scholars and re-enactors and bring you the latest historical forums on

the subject. every saturday at 6:00 and 10:00 p.m. eastern here on american history tv on c-span3. you've been watching c-span's american his try tv. follow us on twitter @c-span history. connect with us on facebook at facebook.com/cspan history. where you can leave comments, too. and check out our upcoming programs at our website, c-span.org/history. >> new year's day on the c-span networks. here are some of our featured programs. 10:00 a.m. eastern, the washington ideas forum. energy conservation with david crane. business magnate t. boone pickens. cake love owner warren brown. and inventor dean cayman. at 4:00 p.m. eastern the

brooklyn historical society holds a conversation on race. then at 8:00 p.m. eastern from the explorer's club, apollo seven astronaut walt cunningham on the first manned space flight. new year's day on c-span2, just before noon eastern, author hector tobar on the 33 men that were buried in a chilean mine. and at 3:00 p.m. eastern richard norton smith on the life of nelson rockefeller. then at 8:00 p.m. eastern. former investigative correspondent for cbs news sharyl attkisson on her experiences reporting on the obama administration. new year's day on american history tv on c-span3, at 10:00 a.m. eastern juanita abernathy on her experiences and the role of women in the civil rights movement. at 4:00 p.m., brooklyn college professor benjamin cart on the link between alcohol and politics in pre-revolutionary new york city.

and then at 8:00 p.m. cartoonist patrick oliphant draws ten presidential caricatures as historian david mccullough discusses the presidents and some of their most memorable qualities. new year's day on the c-span networks. for our complete schedule go to c-span.org. the siege of petersburg was a series of maneuvers and battles around petersburg, virginia, lasting more than nine months from june 1864 into the spring of 1865. beatersburg was crucial to the supply lines of confederate general robert e. lee's army and the confederate capital of richmond. union forces under ulysses s. grant repeatedly probed, attacked and attempted to outflank the entrenched recks, finally gaining a decisive advantage that led to a confederate retreat and just days later, lee's surrender. author and historian richard sommers takes us into the minds of each commanding general through their personal letters, and strategies. he argues that this siege was unique in military history, and discusses how the conflict brought about the end of the war. this talk is about an hour. >> ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the director of the u.s. army heritage and education center, colonel rick harney and

the entire staff of the u.s. heritage and education center and the u.s. army war college, welcome to the third lecture of the 47th annual perspectives in military history lecture series. the u.s. army war college sponsors the series to provide an historical dimension to the exercise of generalship, strategic leadership, and war fighting institutions of power. we would like to extend a warm thank you to the army heritage center foundation for their support and everything we do. please be aware that the book for tonight is on sale in the gift shop, and we will have a book signing directly after the lecture. all proceeds go to the foundation to support the growth of the army -- the army heritage and education center. our speaker is dr. richard somers. he is a native of indiana and obtained his bachelor's degree

in history from the carleton college in northfield, minnesota. he earned his doctorate in history at rice university in here at carlisle barracks, making him the last chartered member of the organization to be hired. he held the position until 1997 and served in various capacities until his retirement in 2014. dr. sommers was the professor of military history in 2007 and 2008, and continues to teach american history courses at the u.s. army war college. he has made numerous television appearances, addressed audiences across the nation, and has presented in the military history series three times prior to tonight. dr. sommers has written over 100 books, articles, entries, and reviews primarily on the civil war and is a distinguished

member of many historical organizations, including the southern historical association, the society of civil war historians, and the civil war trusts. ladies and gentlemen i present dr. richard sommers. [ applause ] >> thank you, carl. it's a pleasure to be back home devoting 43 years of my professional career here. i, of course can never leave. it's always a part of me. and i feel a part of it. and i'm so happy to be able to share in our perspectives in military history presentation tonight. and in this 150th anniversary season of the siege of petersburg i'd like to talk about richmond redeemed

enduring lessons in leadership from the siege of petersburg. the siege proved one of the longest operations of the civil war, some nine and a half months, from june of 1864 to april of 1865. it pitted two of the greatest generals in american history directly against each other. robert e lee and ulysses s. grant. it was waged by two of the finest armies of americans that have ever been raised, the resilient federal army of the potomac and the hard-hitting confederate army of northern virginia. those were the antagonists, which had grappled for the entire war, were reinforced with with the siege by several newer armies that had been created only in 1864. serving in those armies were

senior subordinates who had figured prominently in earlier battle also in the eastern theater, such as gettysburg and antietam, which are so familiar to all of us here tonight. these officers include such prominent northern commanders as george g. meade, winfield scott hancock, and david and greg, and such senior southern soldiers as richard suwell and ap hill. with that prelude let us briefly summarize the siege before we, as we say, assess it. petersburg, virginia, situated on the right bank of the appomattox river 20 miles due south of richmond, was militarily important in its own right, as the tenth largest city

of the confederacy, as the head of navigation on the appomattox, as the site of the confederate states lead works, which manufactured bullets for lee's legion. however, the strategic significance of petersburg lay in logistics. how fitting it is that the u.s. army logistic center is now situated at ft. lee, and our new director colonel harney came to us from the logistics center at ft. lee. throughout the civil war, petersburg functioned as the rail center for richmond. from northeast, southeast, south and west, railroads ran to the city. from there, a single railroad continued north to the confederate capital.

food stuffs from fertile south side va, armaments from the ports along the lower atlantic coast, salt and lead from southwestern virginia, and most vitally, reinforcements all funneled through petersburg to richmond. only one other railroad running southwest through danville and the carolina piedmont connected the capital with the rest of the confederacy. defending petersburg and its supply lines was crucial to defending richmond itself capturing the city would comparably cripple the capital. in the first three years of the civil war, danger remained distant as lee's masterful generalship kept the unionists far from the rail center.

ulysses s. grant changed all of that. by the spring of 1864, grant served as general in chief of the entire united states army. as eastern theater commander and as commander of what i like to call army group grant, an admittedly anachronistic term which i will nonetheless use because it so accurately conveys the reality that he commanded a group of armies. in all of these capacities, grant carried the war from central virginia to the vicinity of richmond. in 30 days of almost incessant fighting, from the battle of the wilderness on may 5th and 6th, to the battle of cold harbor on june 1st and 3rd, he compelled the confederates to concede the

forward position, and confronted them with the conviction of the close and confined coverage of their capital. in a daring southward strike in mid-june grant crossed the mighty james river itself and attacked the capital's crucial communication center, petersburg. his leading core overran the outer defenses but did not capture the cockade city itself. failure to recognize opportunity, saved the city. a grand assault by the unionists on june 18 was bloodily repulsed. even worse disaster befell the yankees less than a week later in their efforts to cut confederate communication south of the cockade city.

those dual defeats on june 18th and june 22nd and 23rd and the mobile warfare of spring that had carried the armies from of the rapid river to the appomattox. thereafter, operations stagnated into the slowness of summer, and the siege of petersburg began. this siege was not tactical. it lacked the parallels and other facets that type of five european siege warfare. the infamous battle of the crater on july 30 was an aberration, totally uncharacteristic of the siege, yet petersburg unquestionably was a siege.

on the higher plains of operations, strategy and grand strategy. in essence, grant used the siege to fix the gray coats in place at petersburg and richmond, thus to deny lee the operational and strategic initiative, which the virginian had used to such advantage in 1862 and 1863. grant's great entrenched camp close up against petersburg in the east where fort lee now is with its incessant shelling and sharp shooting at the secessionist lines, created an ongoing threat which the southerners could not ignore. more dangerous with the attacks, some of them two-pronged, some of them first strike which

grant launched from the security of that camp against undermanned positions north of james river and against vulnerable supply lines south of petersburg. nine such attacks which i have termed offensives punctuated the nine and a half months of the siege. most were marked by mobile field battles in the open rather than by assaults on well-defended positions. the most significant strikes were the fourth offensive in mid august which cut the vital weldon railroad linking petersburg to the blockade runners ports on the lower atlantic coasts. the fifth offensive in late september, the subject of my book, "richmond redeemed," which nearly compelled lee to abandon petersburg and which threw richmond into the greatest danger of capture by a field

army that the city ever faced until she was occupied without resistance in april of 1865. another major one was the eighth offensive in early february, which extended the federal left flank to hatcher's run and the ninth offensive in late march which finally netted both petersburg and richmond. overnight, april 2nd-3rd, 1865 lee abandoned petersburg, abandoned his james river defenses abandoned his capital itself for a last desperate flight toward north carolina. but north carolina proved too far away. the federal forces were too advantageously positioned. the butternut brigades had been too badly battered in the course

of the siege. one week to the day after the final fighting at petersburg came appomattox. by the spring of 1865, indeed, ever since late 1864, the siege had assumed strategic dimensions. grant made this clear in hits letter of december 18th, to his trusted subordinate and friend william t. sherman who had just completed his devastating march to the sea, my own opinion, wrote the general in chief, now we're quoting general grant my own opinion is that lee is averse to going out of virginia, and if the cause of the south is lost, he wants richmond to be the last place surrendered. if lee has such views, it may be

well to indulge him until we get everything else in our hands. the siege thus became a strategic tool for fixing the southerners in place in the old dominion while sherman philip h. sheridan and george h. thomas devoured the rest of the confederacy. by march of 1865, sherman had shoved the western theater all the way from tennessee deep into north carolina, while in the eastern theater, lee remained pinned at petersburg. that is the essence of a strategic siege. there now, the nine and a half months of the siege have been summarized in just nine and a half minutes. but i'm not done.

the various mobile field battles that marched each offensive are fascinating. many in our audience and viewing on c-span have heard me speak on one or another of those battles. here tonight, however, in the army war college community, the focus should not be tactical, but operational and strategic. so let me suggest then some enduring lessons in strategic leadership derived from the siege of petersburg. an operation lasting nine and a half months proclaims perseverance, both its prizes and its pitfalls. grant's bulldog tenacity in grabbing hold of the army of northern virginia in the wilderness of spotsylvania and never letting go all the way through petersburg to appomattox

is one of the greatest hallmarks of his generalship. yet just what did this tenacity, this per se convenience entail at petersburg? part of it as we've seend involved fixing the southerners in place, tactically, ongs operationally and strategically. however, this fixing in place did not come easily. time and again in the mobile field battles south of petersburg and north of james river, grant was defeated tactically. even so, he managed to weave such setbacks into operational and strategic success. he achieved such success. despite those battlefield setbacks, because he remained undaunted.

his calm, quiet confidence in himself gave him the determination to keep up the struggle. then, too, his assurance in his own mind of ultimate federal victory in the siege and in the war gave him the ability to press ahead despite temporary setbacks. together, such self-confidence and such certainty of success produced military peace of mind, which freed him from doubt, fear, anxiety, and torment that had vexed so many other army commanders and which thus enabled him to focus on succeeding in the siege and on winning the war. yet within such military peace

of mind, grant was neither arrogant nor bullheaded. an even greater hallmark of his strategic leadership than tenacity was his ability to learn and apply the lessons of experience. such a faculty had won him victory at vicksburg. it also produced the prize of petersburg. when he perceived that frontal attacks, which had worked so well in the western theater brought only heavy casualties in the east culminated in the disastrous repulse of june 18th in the first battle of petersburg, grant explicitly forbade such assaults against

well-defined, fortified positions. he launched no further such attacks through the siege until the final onslaught of april 2nd. again, when experience demonstrated that sequential two-pronged strikes on both sides of james river were not working, he progressively altered the timing of those strikes until, by late october, they became simultaneous. when simultaneous strikes too failed, he again adjusted his grand tactics to massive first strikes by his left south of the cocade city. such first strikes carried him to hatcher's run in february and carried him into petersburg and richmond in april. yet grant was not the only senior leader to display perseverance at petersburg. his confederate counterpart also showed tenacity in holding that

city and richmond. lee understood their practical and symbolic importance to the southern war effort, and to the southern cause and he fought to save those cities fought is the key concept here. lee did not sit supinely in his trenches awaiting bluecoat attack. when they left their defenses of the entrenched camp to attack him, he left his defenses to attack them. although he never again controlled the strategic initiative, which remained in grant's hands throughout the siege, the great confederate commander repeatedly challenged the yankees for control of the operational and tactical initiatives. the ensuing battles were not static, set piece struggles of

attack and defense but fluid, mobile field battles that raged up and down the ground in which the secessionists' superior knowledge of terrain often enabled them to offset their numerical weakness with surprise flank attacks that halted the union advance. counterattacking attackers offers obvious advantages. even more significantly, those counterattacks reflects lee's approach to warfare. he did not equate probable disadvantage with certain loss, but rather strove to redirect the military situation to his advantage advantage. by way of contrast joe johnston in georgia when threatened would fall back and when threatened again he would fall back. and when threatened yet again,

he would still fall back. lee, when threatened, would not fall back, lee fought back. and in the fifth offensive covered in "richmond redeemed," lee was prepared to abandon petersburg on september 30th, if necessary, to save richmond. yet he did not yield to such likely danger, but battled back and saved both cities. through such fighting tenacity, lee prolonged the security of his supply linzes, his capital and his country for another nine months. yet at the end, he eventually came and all was lost. the graycoats held on to petersburg too long. i do not blame lee for this decision or this outcome.

he did not become general in chief of all confederate armies until february of 1865 too late to effect the course of the war. the decision to remain is the confederate policy. there is an aspect of perseverance, however, where lee at petersburg may be criticized. unlike grant, who learned from experience the virginian continued fighting in ways that had worked well earlier in the war, but were no longer applicable in may 1864. unlike at chancellorsville, his counterattacks at petersburg almost never drove the union strike force from the field.

at best, they simply stopped the force short of its objective. follow-up counterattacks, understandable though they were, invariably failed to overcome the federals. instead, they simply produced mounting confederate casualties with no corresponding conquests. for lee at petersburg, the old ways no longer worked. such hallmarks of generalship characterized the exercise of command by lee and grant at petersburg. yet with armies ranging from approximately 50,000 to 60,000 secessionists, and from 100,000 to 127,000 blewcoats, those two commanders obviously could not control everything themselves, but had to rely on senior subordinates. here too, lay lessons in leadership.

to begin with both command inging generals worked with and through their senior subordinates, not around or despite them. they accorded those responsible subordinates latitude to exercise the responsibilities of their offices. as theater commander and army group commander, the illinois then focused on strategy and left operations and tactics to army and core commanders. army of the potomac commander meade retained and retained grant's respect, although the two generals never became close personally. the other yankee army commander benjamin f. butler was the quintessential political general of the union army. despite butler's many shortcomings as a field

commander, grant recognized both the massachusetts man's talents and also understood the necessity of working with such an influential politician. not until butler finally discredited himself with the powder boat fiasco in december of 1864 did the general in chief at last have grounds for removing the insubordinate subordinate. butler's successor was the able professional soldier ord who had earned grant's respect and friendship in the western theater. because the illinoisan liked ord, he tolerated the junior officer's quaint conceits. such antics by other senior subordinates usually cost them grant's respect and therefore their commands.

william f. smith, william brooks, and quincy adams gilmore were all relieved of their core commands when they demanded actions or promotions that grant was unwilling to grant them. john given almost suffered the same fate and much more tragically by the final hours of the siege war had so drained the reservoir of good will that he had earned on little roundtop, that neither meade nor grant would save him from the imblackable wrath of phil sheridan. sheridan's practice of summarily relieving generals on the field of battle was atypical of the siege of petersburg and of command style in the civil war. more characteristic was grant's practice of avoiding wholesale house cleanings of subordinates

and instead working with and through them until they either succeeded or else discredited themselves with their ineptitude and ambition. lee's command style was similar. earlier in the war to be sure, he had cleanseed the army of northern virginia of the senior subordinates who had not measured up. the terrible attrition of general officers reduced him to working with and through those who remained. by then, the great stonewall jackson and jeb stewart were dead. and james longstreet had been severely wounded at the wilderness. the best of lee's subordinates at petersburg was beauregard was in command.

a month later the able longstreet returned to duty. among the newcomers to core command, wade hampton and john b. gordon proved promising, but richard h. anderson was disappointing. then too, richard s. yule and a.p. hill had never lived up to expectations. indeed, just before the army's besieged petersburg yule was put in charge of the department of richmond. by then, however the capital was no back water. the richmond sector formed a prominent portion of the petersburg siege lines. there you will render his most contribution to the confederate cause by saving the capital from federal attack on september 29th, in the operations covered in "richmond redeemed."

whether subordinates are able or not, they are the tools with which senior leaders must work. the chain of command, moreover, runs upward as well as downward. one of the greatest strengths of both grant and lee, is that they understood the proper relationship between the uniformed general in chief and the constitutional commander in chief in a republic at war. they not only worked for, but also with president linking and president davis and certainly not against them. those great generals earned and retained the respect of the chief executives and thus were accorded the latitude to apply their professional abilities in service to their embattled nations.

contrast their success to what became a beauregard, joe johnson, george mcclellan, and many other army commanders constantly quarreled with their respective governments, and who, thus were kept on close rein, marginalized or shoved to the side altogether. this ability to work with the president comes through clearly in the following correspondence again grant -- between grant and lincoln in mid-july of 1864. in my opinion, wrote the lieutenant general, there ought to be an immediate call for say 300,000 men to be put in the field in the shortest possible time. grant then specified many benefits from increasing the fighting force. finally he summarized the

greater number of men we have, the shorter and less sanguinary will be the war. yet he did not stop but went on to make clear that -- i give this entirely as my views and not in any spirit of dictation. always holding myself in readiness to use material given to me to the best advantage i know how. the following day, the president replied. yours of yesterday about a call for 300,000 is received. i suppose you have not seen the call for 500,000 made the day before in which, i suppose, covers the case. [ laughter ] always glad to have your suggestions. [ laughter ] so close and so effective for

the bonds -- were the bonds that lincoln not only welcomed grant's suggestions but actually engaged in a little harmless humor about it. not that the war was a laughing matter, but that two men were close enough to share a smile as together they strove for success. that exchange not only underscores their effective working relations, it also provides other lessons in strategic leadership. grant recognized the benefit of applying overwhelming force, and he realized that the north possessed such power potentially. his great talent lay in understanding how to convert advantages into achievements.

yet all the while, he did not demand perfection. unlike some senior leaders who insisted on waiting until everything was perfectly arranged, and who thus often waited forever, grant was willing to give it a try, with whatever resources were at hand. those resources often sufficed to produce positive results. the president liked those results, and he liked the attitude of the general who was always willing to act. lee, too was willing to act, but under much different circumstances. he knew that the south had fewer soldiers and fewer resources, and he realized that time was not on his side. he could not wait for perfection of positions, powers, and plans,

for they remained unattainable. he instead tried to make his own perfection in outcomes by seizing the strategic and operational initiatives or by wresting it from the yankees. in 1862 and 1863, he often managed to achieve such results. by the time that petersburg was besieged, however, grant controlled the strategic and operational initiative and lee was reduced to fending off federal offenses. yet as we consider grant and lee and their senior subordinates, it is important that we not mistake them for the magnificent monuments that grace our national battlefields and our public places today. the statues of meade and

hancock, and longstreet lay in gettysburg, down the national mall in washington, or in south carolina. those giant sculptures of bronze and marble honor the generals but they are not the generals. the generals themselves we must always keep in mind were real live human beings with varying degrees of quality noble and ignoble. which mark the human condition. courage and heroism and honor and perseverance and vision, to be sure, but also rivalry and jealousy, and resentment, and bitterness, and vindictiveness. by the time that the armies reached petersburg in mid-june of 1864, the soldiers were

exhausted, physically and psychologically, from over six weeks of incessant fighting and marching, and fighting yet again. so were their commanders during the hot, dry, seemingly ceaseless siege. anger flared among meade and his core and different commanders, and among federal division commanders as well. such strife certainly affected command relations and also somewhat affected operations. such personal animosity is not confined to petersburg, to the civil war, or to olden times. it can flare up today and tomorrow. senior strategic leaders need to recognize that reality and to be prepared to deal with it.

understanding human dimensions of high command is just one lesson from the siege. persevering, weaving tactical setbacks into strategic success, adapting flexibility of methods to fix a purpose, not yielding to possible threats but fighting back against the odds displaying strategic vision, converting advantages into achievements achievements. functioning effectively within chains of command, upward, downward and laterally. all these are enduring lessons in leadership from the siege of petersburg, when richmond was redeemed. and i thank you. [ applause ]

>> ladies and gentlemen, we're going to do a few questions and answers now. i'll start over on this side and work our way over. if you do have a question, please raise your hand. we do have quite a few people in the crowd, though so please limit yourself to one question at a time. do we have anybody over here? here we go. >> just a question about lee's strategic division. so you've commented on the fact that he had a strategic vision, but could it also not be the case that by 1864, he knew that the south had lost? there wasn't the opportunity for the offensive in 1862, or 1863, that it was over. so in sv fact, if he had strategic vision, perhaps as a leader he should have encouraged his president to sue for peace

earlier than april of 1865. just any thoughts on that? >> thank you, jeff. that's an excellent question. i think it is pretty clear that well along into the siege lee came to realize that the cause of the south is lost. i don't think he had reached that decision in the spring or summer, or even autumn of 1864. lee was fighting back and fighting very effectively to maintain his position, and to keep up the struggle. there are so many indications that the confederates themselves did not realize their grand strategic peril. talking about the whole civil war now, until it was too late.

even when sherman had cut loose from atlanta for his march through georgia, the confederates really didn't know where he was going, whether he was heading east towards charleston, south towards tallahassee, southwest toward mobile, that turned out he went southeast to savannah. and it's not sbrizurprising that the confederates didn't know, because even the federal plans didn't know. and their logisticians had supplied positions all along the coast that wherever sherman struck at blue water he could be resupplied. once sherman made his march and captured savannah on december 21st, the confederates were still not sure what he was going to do next. and they positioned their forces all around him to include south of savannah to guard against the

danger that he might march against thomasville, the railhead in southern georgia or to liberate andersonville, or to threaten tallahassee. it wasn't really until he moved north through the carolinas that it became clear to the confederate in richmond how dire was their peril. but i don't think that lee or anyone else foresaw that danger as early as any point in 1864, and that he is continuing to do his duty to bravely and honorably uphold the struggle. other questions or comments?

>> thank you, dr. sommers, very much, for a fine presentation. i have a question about leadership, which you just touched upon. late in the civil war, and i don't know exactly when but at some time ulysses grant was given the authority to promote general officers in the field subject to confirmation by the united states senate. i assume that that authority came to him through lincoln and stanton, and probably the senate. i know you probably do know, but it was by that route that chamberlain achieved brigadier general. my question to you is were there any other officers so promoted by grant in the field and do you know throughout the course of american history if any commanding general was given such authority besides grant? >> well, general lee in effect had that authority in the army of northern virginia.

the appointment power rests with the president. the senate's role is to confirm presidential appointments, and that is both the appointment by grade to be a brigadier general or major general. and also core command and army and department command were considered presidential appointments. grant promoted several officers during the course of the siege of petersburg certainly not chamberlain alone. but the -- it's always consistent with the basic government practice of heeding recommendations of officers in the field as to whom they want as their senior subordinates. but not every officer that grant wanted was provided to him.

it's very interesting that at the time that war erupted in the shenandoah valley in july, and remained a continuing threat in the lower shenandoah valley, even burning chambersburg, pennsylvania, on july 30th rjts, the officer who grant wanted to put in charge to deal with the threat posed by general early was none other than william b. franklin. despite franklin's performance at the landing his performance at cranston's gap, his performance at fredericksburg, his performance in the red river campaign, all of which fell far short of the high expectations that had been accorded to

franklin going into the civil war, grant who had never actually served with franklin during the war, nonetheless had high confidence in his ability. but there had been a time when they had been together. and that was at the u.s. military academy when franklin was the number one graduate in grant's class. and i have to think that cadet sam grant is still looking up to the number one man in his class. but however that may be washington denied him that promotion, and said that franklin just will not do for this position. so his next choice was general meade, to give meade a more independent command that he enjoyed as in effect an executive officer within grant's army group. but then something happened. i'm not entirely sure what.

it might have been the battle of the crater which ended the career of general burnside, but did not present meade in a very favorable light. anyway, meade is no longer in the picture after july and the command is finally entrusted to philip shsmt sheridan. sheridan was not the first choice for that command he was the third choice. and that was the case where grant did not get his first choice. and one of the cases where i think probably the north was well served as to franklin was not put in command. >> thank you. the follow-up on your discussion there on the animosities and rivalry that took place just before the battle of the siege of petersburg, as i understand

it, that happened on both sides? >> very much so. >> beauregard had lee listen to beauregard in the beginning rather than doubting him, the outcome would have been entirely different. suppose the same thing is true on the northern advances initially, 15th, 16th of june before the siege took place. it was just a total lack of cooperation and even follow-up. some of that is attributed to the horrendous defeat of the bell of the crater. we admit that everybody was fatigued -- excuse me, at coal harbor, which meant that everybody was fatigued and what have you. and beauregard was still trying to overcome some bad press early on. do you support that? >> to a considerable extent. but not so much bad press, but his bad command relations with richmond, with president davis, with secretary of war seddon and braxton bragg.

and there was -- there had always been a certain healthy rivalry between lee and beauregard as two very bright engineers on winston scott's staff in the mexican war as two superintendents of the military academy, although beauregard was shortstopped in actually assuming that position by the outbreak of the war within the confederacy where lee was the third ranking general and beauregard was the fifth ranking general. but the real problem here was that the bad relations -- and this underscored another point that i made -- no matter how good beauregard was, and i think he was et second best army commander in the confederacy after lee, stonewall jackson might have proved to be a great army commander, but he was never given that chance with a real field army.

his so-called army of the valley was in effect an independent corps. but among the officers actually entrusted with army command i would put beauregard right up close behind lee. but the big difference is that beauregard is constantly feuding with richmond, and feuding with braxton bragg, and thereby he's nullifying his ability to bring his great talents to the service of the confederacy. the same way that mcclellan and rose rosekranz and other union generals, by feuding with washington reduced or nullified their ability to serve the united states in the war. now, as to the exhaustion, certainly cold harbor is the culmination. but i would suggest it's really the almost incessant fighting

that begins may 5th in the wilderness and continues to june 23rd at the first battle of the weldon railroad that just wears out the armies physically and psychologically. and grant recognizes this. and that's one reason that petersburg becomes a siege, and that he doesn't continue always moving by his left flank in the mobile warfare that had carried the army all the way from culpepper county down to prince george and dinwoody counties at petersburg. the term combat fatigue psychological exhaustion were not known to military medicine in the mid-19th century, but that does not say that the conditions did not exist. just they weren't recognized. and this is an important part of fraying the tempers and leading

to the feuding and animosities among commanders. joe, when you get a microphone. >> you did a great job. a question on grant's strategy. after all the hammering on the overland campaign, and yeah i understand something about combat stress. he sat himself down at petersburg for nine and a half months, the army couldn't restore itself within a month or so, and just go back. because lee was just hanging on by his toenails. any comment on grant's change in strategy besides what you had just said earlier? >> good questions, joe. the army of the potomac would restore its tone, but it would take much more than a month to

do it. it really took the winter of 1864 1865, with the relatively reduced pace of activity. there were two offensives one in early december and one in early february. but really, the armies could rest essentially over that winter. and regain their fighting tone. some of the officers and soldiers who had been wounded earlier in the war, or even earlier in the 1864 campaign and i regard the entirety of operations from may of '64 to april of '65 as a unionary campaign. officers wounded earlier in that campaign returned to duty. also the new regiments being raised under this call for 500,000, about which lincoln and

grant had their little laugh in mid-july, this began to produce vast numbers of troops, not 500,000, but large numbers of troops that started arriving at the petersburg front in mid-september, and would continue on through october, into early november. here in pennsylvania, we think of the series of troops from the 198th to the 211th that would come down to form part of the army of the james and the army of the potomac. most of the regiments in that numerical sequence. we all know about the raw troops at first bull run who fought, but could not stand under the pressure of the day's fighting. we so close to antietam, so many

of us had visited there know about the raw regiments in the army of the potomac, that had only been in uniform for a few weeks when they were thrown into the maelstrom at south mountain and antietam. it was not reserved to july of 1861 or september of 1862 to have this effect on raw troops it is a universal truth throughout the entire civil war, that raw troops need time to train, and sometimes the most healthy and tempering training comes by being blooded in battle. in the sixth offensive a lot of these new regiments that had just reached the front in early october and were thrown into action in late october broke and ran just like the troops at

antietam and first bull run. well, they needed time. it's not to say that they were cowards, or that they were poor material, they just needed time. and by the spring of 1865 they had had the time and the experience, to prove to be effective soldiers. there's also the matter of individual replacements. there is a misunderstanding that is often told about the civil war that shall i use a modern term, army force generation? was fundamentally different between the union and the confederacy that the south would put individual replacements into existing units, whereas the north would raise entirely new units. there's certainly some truth in those two statements, but not entirely. the yankees began putting many

individual replacements into existing units starting after gettysburg in the late summer and early autumn of 1863, and continuing for the rest of the war. and some of these men were called up in response to the national conscription. more were called out in response to the increased bounties that were being offered. and there's nothing wrong with an honest enlistment bonus. there's something terribly wrong with bounty jumping. a much lower caliber of individual were brought forward and put into the regiments. in response to these various recruitment efforts that would change the tone of those regiments. the 35th massachusetts a new

england yankee regiment received a great influx of german recruits fresh off the boat in september of 1864. these were not the 48ers who had a great commitment to liberty in germany, and carried their german liberalism and sense of liberty over to the united states and lived in our country for a dozen years and identified with the northern cause or in a few cases with the confederate cause, these were fresh off the boat. they couldn't speem german -- i mean, they could speak german, but they couldn't speak english, and the officers couldn't speak german. so it was very difficult to communicate. and the commander of that regiment in one of the battles we cover in "richmond redeemed" in effect said we just stood there when the confederates attacked, and really couldn't contribute anything and would

have been justified in leaving the field except for the obvious propriety of sharing the casualties with everybody else. well, that's not the way to win a battle. but that's often the consequence of this type of individual replacement. again, we think of the -- another great new england fighting regiment, the fifth new hampshire, the regiment of edward cross, about which bruce capner writes so elegantly about the bloody lane at antietam, where cross gives his life in crossing across the wheat field at gettysburg. by 1864, the fifth new hampshire had to be stuck inside a readout with a different regiment guarding the gate to make sure that the regiment did not desert en masse. so much has been filled up with

these replacements lacking commitment to the war effort in contrast to the original soldiers who had won some inperishable glory on the field at antietam and gettysburg. to the extent those individual replacements have merit at all, they, too, need time to learn soldiering. it took a good while to create this condition for them. now, for the confederates, they too, continued to put individual replacements into their ranks. very few new confederate units were being raised late in the war. and there weren't a whole lot of them in back water areas to be brought to the front either. there was actually a large

callup of individual replacements to come to the con fed rattle fed -- in response to a -- a billand an order from the war department that would use slaves and reservists, these reservists being men beyond the normal military age use these to take over conscription and enforcement and impressment duties would recollecting in the mining bureau for which you've done such good work, mike lynch to free up able-bodied men who are performing these important duties in the rear, to free them up to join the forces at the front. and so if you look at the roles of lee's army, it is actually

stronger at the end of october despite all of its casualties, stronger than it is at the end of september because these individuals have joined it. some people who are perfectly happy enforcing conscription in charlotte, north carolina weren't at all happy to be where the cannons were exploding and the sharp shooter bullets were flying.

the sale of such time as they made their get away, they spread the cancer of their lack of commitment among the good and faithful soldiers who remained. in is subject of desertion of confederates deserting to the union army and vice versa. inviting these new individuals to come over. all of that comes to bear in 1864. on november 8th president

lincoln is overwhelmingly re-elected. it becomes unmistakably clear that there will be four more years of unrelenting war. and one week to the day after re-election, a general sherman cuts loose for atlanta for his march to the sea which devastates much of the interior of georgia. and with these two fundamental war rk desertion greatly increases. so, joe, thank you for that question.

>> thank you, chuck. this was extremely important, these relagszs. by constitutional prescription, we know it's in the u.s. constitution. it was the same wording verbatim, in the confederate constitution. the president shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the united states and of the militia of the several states when called into the actual service of the united states or confederates. but no president u not even george washington who certainly

had the credibility during the whiskey rebellion, wants to assume field command. of the army. the presidents want to work through the generals and admirals in charge of our armed forces. but it's understand inging the proper relationships striking the right ballots for the great war presidents we've had like franklin d. roosevelt or george her bert walker bush strike a very good balance there. other presidents like james knox polling or johnson don't strike such a good balance, but they have a right to involve themselves. and good generals understand that and work with their presidents. and both grant and lee understood this. and it was one of their greatest strengths and one of the principle reasons why the presidents according those generals the latitude to apply

their great ablt on behalf of their respective nations. whereas you can go all the way back to winfield scot and look at joe johnston and mcclellan and many civil war generals and carry it right on up through general mcarthur to admiral fallon and general mccrystal in our own full-time to see what happens to able hch professional military men who set themselves against their own government. stwl's only going to be one outcome and there should be only one outcome. the future strategic leaders of our armed forces. understand that that relationship and it's one of the greatest insights that military history affords to our professional military education

today, which is one of the reasons why history is one of the enduring themes here at the army war. and so that i might not guilty be an enduring theme here all night, i'll thank you for this opportunity to have spoken to. [ applause ] >> and we'd like to tell you about some of our other american history tv programs. join us every saturday at 6 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. eastern. again, this's programs on the civil war every saturday at 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. eastern here on american history tv on c-span3. >> jowl eve you've been watching c-span's american history tv.

we want to hear from you. connect with us on facebook at facebook.com/cspanhistory. check out our web site cspan.org/history. >> well, thank you for having me. it's a pleasure to be here again. our first speaker this morning is robert wilson. mr. wilson has written written for many of the prominent newspapers and journals and has held editorial journal at many institutions.

he's written two previous books, the explorer king adventure science and the great diamond hoax, clarns king in the old west, as well as a certain somewhere, riders on the places they remember. he'll be talking about matthew brady today. i suspect many of you join me and not having known much about matthew brady the man himself who took so many of these photographs and consequently shaped so much of what we understand about the war. brady not only captured history, but he helped shape it. and mr. wilson will talk a little bit today about the 1860 photograph of abraham lincoln as well as the 1864 photographs of lincoln that not just captured history, but helped shape it as well. mr. wilson will talk a lot about his story of trying to recapture mathd ewe brady. it's a tough thing to do.

>> thank you jared, for that great$ fi= ai9ñ