it leads on capitol hill and have your say as events unfold on tv, radio and the web. the new congress will start off the year with 247 house republicans. that's the largest gop majority since the 1928 elections. they'll leave 188 democrats. the senate will have 54 republicans, 44 democrats and two independents. bernie sanders and aung us king of maine are expected to caucus with the democrats. cspan sat down with ray smock so discuss the history of the house speaker position. >> the constitution requires the house of representatives to choose a speaker. what is the speaker's job in. >> it's a big job. it's evolved over a long period of time, over 200 years. it started outcid as a constitutional office because constitution says the house shall choose its speaker.

chuse. they even spelled it 18th century style. choose its speaker and other offices. there were no other duties mentioned. it was assumed since the founders knew all about speakers from colonial ledge islators that what the speaker was. a presiding officer, but in our congress the speaker was not only a presiding officer, he quickly became the powerful person because he appointed committees. and that evolved as party systems evolved, first congress' didn't have organized parties the two-party system developed the speaker became the leader of the majority party. and took on political ramifications. the constitution is very silent on this of the powers.

the power of the speaker are what the speaker can make of them and that's the unique part of it and some have exercised great power where they even rivalled the presidency in terms of setting the national agenda. most of those in recent times, but also 100 years ago, two powerful republican speakers, thomas bracket reed and joe cannon of illinois they were powerful figures that set the alleged of the country. the first speaker knewen burg of pennsylvania in the first congress, he simply was a preside presiding officer who was paid $2 more than members. $6 a day. got $8 a day and for that $8 he said oh i spent most of it on oyster suppers for the members. he didn't feel like it was much of a bonus.

he felt like he was losing money on the deal but even he quickly as he got power found that he was elevated among the other members. >> the house chambers behind you and the speaker is second in line to succeed the president after vice president what does this say about(l the speaker's authority? >> the speaker has great ! authority in the constitution and every respect. that was changed in 1847. with the succession act, which brought the; higher position as the highest elected officer. and then it goes to -- the speaker is up to the vice president, the president and the speaker is in line to succeed and that was, the act was an

effort to look at having someone in line that was an elected official and secretary of state. >> how does the job evolve with the founders? >> as i mentioned before, the, it has e involveded into something where the speakers today, modern.a"8 speakers, their role is the chief administrative officers of the house, even though they have other officers that are elected, the buck stops in terms of administration of the house. the speaker is also the head of his party. and if that party is opposite that of the president of the united states, it means that he is the highest ranking officer of the opposite party and therefore, the spokesman for the other party. the speakers are also at various

times, have various power to bring the legislature to the floor, with the speaker's say so. so, they control the agenda. the majority controls the agenda. what qualities make a successful speaker? >> the best through history have been those who have tried to find ways to be compromisers. to work with presidents of their own party. those who understand the relationship with the chairman of the committees of the house. and that's a tough job to balanceh=u all those courses, speakers that don't always have complete control of their own

caucus. there are divisions within the system. the house runs by the numbers for the most part. if you have the majority you can push the legislature of the majority party. and control everything that goes on in the house. that's one of the differences in the senate, no matter who party is in charge has considerably more powers, but the house goes by numbers. if you're the speaker, you can make the agenda, but that comes with a price. if you look against the best interests of the most of the members of the caucus or sometimes, where your party is in opposition to a national agenda this is different from your own. >> in a few minutes, we'll see tip o'neill's remarks from 1985 on the opening day of the 99th

congress. what is the purpose of the day it marks? how old is this tradition? >> i don't know how long they've been doing the opening remarks. i guess it's a fairly pod earn device. started since radio and television. the house and the senate even though their chambers were open, they didn't really do a lot of ceremonial rights. even the state of the union address was not resurrected to be something that was held in congress until woodrow wilson did it in 1913 and lbj made it an evening event on television in 1965. so, these other things like opening days, it's an important event. there's no question about it. it's been televised for many years, but it is it is a wonderful day, despite the

differences. this is where the members try to put their best foot forward. they try to put the hand the olive branch to the other party. majority and minority. they bring their families. you'll see lots of children. some of them sleeping. some of them paying attention. and they so, it's a family day to a large extent. also former members come out on the floor. it's sort of like meeting your old friends, patting them on the back. it's a very friendly thing, but it has a serious tone in the sense that it it sometimes speakers have used it to just to say hi i'm glad to be here. i'm humbled to have the office. other times, they want to speak of what their agenda is going to be like and this is the first opportunity. it's usually a light handed approach. and a friendly exchange.

and minority party, the person who has lost the speakership has to hand the gavel over to the winner. and that should be done with great style and dignity. >> tell us about tip o'neil. >> tip o'neill was from massachusetts. classic politician of the old school. he was born in 1912 and his first campaign, he worked as a campaign -- in 1928 when he ran for president. so tip o'neill's whole life was politics. he was on the cambridge, massachusetts, he served the district. he was a district in north cambridge that was mostly irish. it was even called old dublin. so he that was his power base.

he never forgot where he came from. he always said that was important. he said all politics was local. and that was that was pretty good shrewd observation about the nature of politics. whether you're fixing a pothole in a local street or whether you're dealing with a national budget. somebody has to have money to fix the problem and someone has to set the priority of what problem to fix, so, in that sense, all politics is mobile. whether it's a pothole or a tril dollar budget. >> what kind of a speaker was he? >> he was a affable. ] he could be partisan. he could be tough on the floor but he was the kind of guy that liked to put his arm around you and call you pal. and if it was a lady, he would sadary darling. he would sometimes go out on the floor just to sit on the floor so if new members wanted to talk

to him they to his office. he would have times he would just make an appearance on the floor. he was a classic liberal in the sense that he believed that government could do things for people and their lives. he grew up during the depression watch watching president roosevelt change america and put people back to work. whether those programs were always successful, didn't matter. it was the government that was leading the struggle to restore the economy of the country. and he always thought that was important. that was sort of the hallmark of his politics. >> when ronald reagan was in the white house in 1985, what was happening in the house of representatives? >> the, his relationship with president reagan was really a lot of quite interesting. both irishmen after hours they would still be buddies after 6:00 and have a drink together.

but they were tooth and nail against one another. by 1985, tip o'neill had survive ed the reagan revolution. reagan came into office and of course, the senate went to republican in '81. so, it was very hard for the speaker to stop reagan policies even when many democrats wanted him to. he just simply said, i don't have the votes. so in the early years, the reagan agenda, cutting taxes and other programs, went through without much trouble. even though tip o'neill had a majority of democrats in the house, there were all these 40 or 50 or sometimes 60 members of the democratic party that were conservatives who frequently side with the minority. so, tip o'neill didn't always control his own delegation. >> the 114th congress gavels in

tomorrow at noon eastern. we'll see the swearing in of members and election for house speaker. you can see the house live on cspan and senate live on cspan 2. with the new congress, you'll have the best access most extensive coverage and have your say as events unfold on tvr@ radio and the web.÷cfñ >> the defense department's technology and security director beth mccormick, now outlines the task of securing critical u.s. information. she spoke at the hudson institute for about 45 minutes. >> good morning. i'm ken weinstein, president and["the ceo of hudson institute. i'd like to welcome our audience here, our distinguished guests,

of course, beth mccormick the director of the defense technology security administration and i'd also like to welcome our audience at home on cspan. hudson institute is an international policy research organization dedicated to strong american national security and national leadership in partnership with our allies and one of the most important parts of the work we do here is assessing present and future threats to security and securing our nation's most important military assets and advanced technologies, so we are ' delighted and i can say honored to have with us beth mccormick director of one of the most crucial agencies in our national defense. beth worked at the intersection the crucial point of the intersection of technology, industrial cooperation with our

allies and national security. for those of you who don't know, the d its a is the pentagon's watch tower gets access to the best defense technologies we develop here at home and also for assuring those were not exactly our friends. this is obviously a very critical issue in today's globalized defense marketplace. we at hudson do numerous con conferences overseas every year in the last couple of months, we've had conferences in bangalore, workshops in bangalore, tokyo and brussels inz;b1q the issue of defense cooperation, defense partnership, sharing defense technologies and preventing into the hands of our enemies has come up and it's been a real focus. obviously, when you read the news headlines today, we read about the stealing of data and sensitive technology by the internet and by a range of

persistent nation state cyber threats and non nation state siper threats and in a world where run away proliferation of technologies is of concern, beth will be giving us her assessment of those technologies from the point of view of someone who has been overseeing the th fight on the front lines. to talk with beth about these issues -- is our+)@#÷ own arthur herman. arthur is a pulitzer prize finalist, "new york times" best-selling author and he's written numerous books. the exact number's not coming to my mind, but i guess probably somewhere -- eight. okay. that was the number i was going to guess, actually. he's written eight books. his book how american business won world war ii was not only a best seller, but really tells an

incredible story about the role capitalism played in the auto industry. so i can think of no one better prepared to handle the q and a especially because arthur is quite concerned about technologies today. spends a lot of time analyzing as well, geo strategy. can imagine no one better equipped to handle this q and a. let me turn it over to arthur. >> i want to introduce our distinguished guests, but start with a question. who protects us? who protects our homes? our na who is it makes sure our allies have the kinds of weapons and technology they need to defend themselves in a global, in a

global world of global tensions? and who is it who works to disarm those who mean to do"> i think for most americans, the first answer would be people wearing the uniform in our armed services and rightly so. but i think it's also wortd< pointing out there's also a group of people dedicated people in three agencies of our government who are working from a desk in order to ensure that those outcomes take place. these -- and with other countries. for those of you who don't know the way in whichz5h)÷ the system works, there are basically three agencies who do this. the defense department through its defense technology security administration.

the state departmentnx1q through theéa> beth is able unique for being someone who is actually held to of those three offices. currently as director of the events technology at ditsa, from 2010 to 2012. >> 2010 to '13. >> also deputy assistant secretary of state for defense, trade and regional security overseeing the main agency there. the directors of defense control for the state department. two out of three. that's what we have here today. to talk about the issues of defense trade.

that will serve as deputy director of cooperation agency. which is the agency that works around the clock to make sure the technologies get to our allies needed often see efforts of some of the regulatory bodies being frustrated into the efforts they want to achief here, just as many in the state, the defense department and state department overseeing these defense technologies often see things from different even conflicting perspectives. so what we have ismer i think a participant in understanding defense, trade and export control in. and so i'm going to turn the

podium to beth. >> so first off, let me start by apologizing about being a fu minutes late. we were a little confused. we appreciate the hudsons inviting us down to speak today so ken thanks for your initial comments. i think you just fell short of calling me to sharing of technology. i think i'll -- i do apologize i think a later panel i was there on time, but unfortunately not here on time. i'm very pleased to be hen(2ñ this morning. i was listening closely when ken mentioned a little bit about some of the orientation and the

objectives of the institute and i heard some terminology that sounded very much like my own vision statement for my own organization. i think we have a lot of commonality. i want to highlight a couple of things about my career then share a little of my perspectives and what i'm going to call actually the key pillars of defense technology partnership, specifically focusing on the asia region today, but i must tell you that my job as the director of the security administration is actually a functional responsibility with a global footprint, but i'll be interested as we talk later. i can share with you a little bit about how i spend my time. i'm spending more time working issues with countries in the asia pacific region and countries in the middle east so that's where i pend a predominant amount of time. it's just where2úijá t to decide to spend my own personal band

wid. i have 31 yearse8!-ç of service serving our government. predominant lit working in the department of defense, but took a segway over to national arnottics and space administration. since 2001 i have been involved in issues associated with the sharing of technology with other countries, but at the same time, balancing that in terms of determining what technology ensures the cutting edge for the u.s. war fighter and striking that balance sometimes is a challenge, but i try to do it as best i can. the last couple of years have been a unique experience for me. i was detailed over to the state bureau military affairs and actually not to correct you, arthur, but i oversaw about 50% of the bureau of affairs so i was responsible for the trade im(t&háhp &hc% controls, which controls the

export of defense technology from u.s. industry directly to foreign partners and then i also oversaw the bureau the director of regional security and arms transfers, which is responsible for items that go under our foreign military sales process and i would just as a note to just make sure as arthur did, to sort of cite us about roles and responsibilities. one of the things that's most interesting about defense trade in the united states is that trade is under the authorities of the department of state so under the title 22 authorities of the department of state because in our laws and regulations, defense trades providing defense technologies to other countries is an instrument of u.s. foreign policy. while we are very much involved and making decisions about what type of technology should go to our partners, the state department has the ultimate authority. so i had a unique experience for

four years and had the opportunity to see it as a state department perspective. i think it's made me better doing the job that i do today. i also chaired what's called the national disclosure policy committee, a committee involved in the release of classified information to foreign governments and i also co-chair along a colleague of mine from osd and lodgistics, the arms technology and release group. we just held our meeting yesterday and this forum is the central forum we've established under direction from the deputy secretary, to make sure we are looking at priority transfers of technology to foreign partners. now, the motto of my organization is kind of an interesting one and just having been back there now for a year, having been there before. i just want to mention our motto is called ensuring the edge.

but today what i want to do is speak with you as i indicated with a specific emphasis on -- technology and partnerships in asia. and that effort simply put is strengthening existing alliances and forging new partnerships in relation to our ability to share more information chlts we do this while protecting our war fighters advanced advantage and enabling capacity for0= deterrence and maintaining peace, stability and security in the asia pacific region. earlier this year, i spoke at two significant defense trade events in asia. first, the singapore air show and then a defense technology security conference in seoul, korea. these two events represented the two ends of the spectrum of our relationships with key partners sh southeast and northeast asia. while singapore is by no means

an emergency technology securing partner in asia it represents a focal point in the emerging key area of southeast asia in our asia rebalance efforts. southeast asia is a critical gateway between the indian and pacific oceans through the remains of air, sea, space and cyber, where intelligence and recog nance. the republic of korea represents a critical pillar in our commitment. while in korea, i spoke on the 64th anniversary of the attack -- with the republic of korea. that has blossomed into a significant partnership that ensures a strong defense alliance that is enabled with the most advanced technology, military systems and equipment and support of our combined

military commands and future transfer. a key factor in the asia regional strategy is our collective defense and national security calculus that ensures transfers and associated edd exports are consistent with nonproliferation and are done so with the confidence ouyrf technology sharing imports with strong security and export control regimes. these are the foundational strengths of our enduring alliances and partnerships. with that in mind what i'd like to do is share with you today the what i call the technology security pillars to illustrate our efforts in our own robust security policies and i hope these comments will illicit further discussion xf today. so, the first key number one is the capability and intent to protect advanced technologies. so, it's our expectation that the recipient partner of united

states advanced defense technology partner must have the capability and intent to protect articles to the equivalent standards of the united states. let me break down those two terms. the first is capability. so capability refers to laws regulatory authorities and systemic and bureaucratic structures that include but are not limited to aspects of physical security, personalnel security and compliance practices and procedures to protect defense technologies. the intent refers to partner governments political will and attitude regarding overall technology security posture to treat the shared u.s. technology, u.s. defense technology and information as if it were their own. especially in terms of the

conditions of appropriate end use and respect for anproperty. another vital element is a the assess o. the -- balanced national security with a strategic trade advantage with regard to exported defense articles and services, so without the infrastructure capability to protect and the government intent to protect defense articles from internal and external defense, the key pillars are less likely to succeed. the second pillar is technology security is a shared whole of government endeavor. due to the strategic nature of activities, strong, interact -- and defense export initiatives. these processes should be a healthy, robust system of checks and balances with ab partner government to assess the stake interest. adequate checks and balances

will insure proper oversight of issues and this is only possible through a strong interagency process. i've had unique experiences wherev)s5v4&rbñ i've seen quite a number of the dimensions of the processgbhç and when i work with other countries, when we meet with them, we encourage them even if we're meeting with the defense of national defense, we encourage them to bring representation from their min city industry of foreign affairs or whatever organization within their country has responsibility for foreign control. it's very important. the third pillar is existing technology security and export control legislature. and legislation provides stat choir authorities that allow institutions to create policies, practices and proceed years

necessary to enable a system to ensure all import and exportentties are following the law as prescribed. tong transfer come with the law enforcement component to address punitive measures when necessary. and the key pillar number four, enduring national technology security regime requires active clb ration. while oversight should be a national government responsibility all entities associated with the defense articles have certain technology security related responsibilities and shared goals in pursuit of national level objectives. such key stakeholders include industry think tanks defense related trade organizations research and development organizations, academic institutions military services

branches. i believe these four pillars will give a nation a solid foundation from which to develop a world class regime. and while we do our best to have the world's leading control system, we ourselves continue to)$ñ refine it through our ongoing reform efforts. as many of you know, the u.s. export agency has been engage edd in a multiyear effort to reform our system to better reflect current realities and the advancement of technology. this is a constantly evolving work in progress that requires great deal of investment and government time and resources. also just want to focus a little bit about some of the specific relationships that we have in working on the collaboration we have the our partners in the asia region since i know that was a bit of a focus for today. our collaboration in asia

partners reviolases around the most -- export controls. among these are australia. all to the key nonproliferation regimes including the -- arrangement, missile control regime, the nuclear suppliers group and the australia group. these nations represent the measure by which emerging partners in asia should aspire in -- goes commensurate with their practices. regarding japan in particular, our relationship represents a true measure of information technology security cooperation that continues to grow with each engagement. since the government of japan expanded the japan defense agency to a ministry in 2007, japan has taken some very robust and expanded roles regarding roles to issues. this is especially true regarding the defense trade impacts of its advanced

technologies. to name a few milestones, the government of japan has devised a national security strategy implemented a national security counsel, revised its prohibition on defense technology exports the so-called three ps and passed a milestone legislation called the secrets protection act. as japan moves forward to become a significant player in the defense industry arena, we have pledged to work aloing lonk side them, to share some of our own lessons learned and best practices regarding the export of defense articles, as well as concerns over the export of dual use technologies to entities and destination countries of concern. as japan moves forward with its protection act implementation this month it will ensure continued, high prioritization on the protection of critical shared intelligence and technology between our two nations. so in conclusion,dxnyñ recognizing

that we need to get to that wonderful q and a session, i want to leave you with a couple of take aways. i want to characterize the work i do as share what we can protect what we must and what i mean by this is that strive to retain the tech logic and military advantage for our commanders along with the same military advantage for our friends and partners who will fight alongside us. this means that we will collaborate and share those technologies commensurate with the partners, the partnerships that address our strategies through robust support of our military operations through seamless interoperaablety. we are prepared to share more with our international partners while expecting an e live lensy of those technologies. i'll just conclude by mentioning a little bit about a new initiative when i came back bahlast october

having been away about six years having run the agency previously, what i found was i found my colleagues were very much involved in having a will the of bilateral discussions with various partners and with many of those partners we had sort soft long standing bilateral dialogues and those were very productive, but with many, i found we didn't have a lot to discuss other than to sort of compare notes because we were doing things so similarly so there weren't a lot of issues between us. so, what we have done here over the last couple of months is that we're doing what we call a cooperative technology security program initiative. and this is where we're going out and working with with other countries around the world who perhaps are still in that emphasis stage about developing their own system or refining that. so we're work k collaboratively

with partners. in this era, we've got to decide where we travel, so we've fut that emphasis on countries we need to work closer with. many have increased aspirations and we think it's very important that of course those exports from their industry grow it's important for them to be what i call choosy sellers. and i can tell you my experience in working with some of these countries, we're finding a lot of common ground. because the situation here in the united states, where our defense industry has been able to sell quite a lot of equipment to our defense department, as that declines i can tell you our own industry here in the united states is looking for increased international sales

so i feel that i'm in a very important juncture because we have to work in partnership because we want to maintain the viability of the defense industrial base through the united states obviously to ensure we are still providing to our military departments and to our the best equipment possible and that to maintain that we have to sell more things internationally. in talking to them about countries because there would be nothing worse than sharing those technologies and those technologies findingma r their hands into the the wrong hands and used back against our forces and allies on the battlefield. so, let me stop with those prepared remarks and i'll be more than glad to entertain what i expect to be a lively q and a session, so thank you.;wjo

>> particularly with regard to countries you mentioned and -- we are interested in working towards increased trade defense and japan. but i'm going to start with a broader question. when most people now think about protecting defense, technologies and transfers they tend to think and protecting that can be through cyber theft and through a rang]-a obviously, the very important part of it. among the four pillars here, a robust cybersecurity regime would be paramount, but it's not

the only real area where the threat comes is it. in terms of stealing technologies and in terms of dissemination of technologies you don't want to get in the hands of the bad guys. >> i think what's important and maybe i didn't say this as clearly as i should have. the threats that we face in terms of the exploitation of technology come from a variety of sources. and so some of it is obviously through cyber and cyber obviously is something that i think not only is the u.s. government very concerneded about, but i think we are as average citizens, concerned about the protection of our personal information. but obviously, when we talk about security, it's really got to be the full range of security. so, i have in fact on my staff, i have a very solid kad ray of individuals who are security specialists, they're coded by job series on the dept of defense is security specialists and so when we work with countries, we work with them in

thinking about the full range of security issues that they need to consider. everything from the kind of individuals that they provide access to, classified information, so in some cases, we're actuallyíj(jñ helping countries to think about how do they go about sort of doingsp ofr we also talk to them about issues associated with physical security because just there are items that can be where people are stealing items and physical security and really the full range of information security and it's also just making sure that we have proper access to domination and the whole range. while cyber is a very significant growing tleft and something the u.s. government is putting a lot of attention on. in fact, i must say that my colleagues on the defense department that are responsible for this they're very much the pioneers in this because you can imagine that the kind of information that the the

president of defense has particularly with our technology as well as our operational plans and those things would be something people would want to get their hands on so we have a lot of seeb r attacks that as a defense department, we have to deal with every day, we're making sure we talk to them about the range of threats and understand where those are and then finally, just to mention, when we're working with some of these new countries that some of the countries that are now themselves becoming exporters! of technology one of the things we're reallyéúsñ sharing with them is making sure we do the analysis where we are vetting, first off, we are looking to make sure does this make sense that this technology is the kind of technology that is appropriate for this requirement so there's first a match of that level and then we're making sure that the quantity seems to be right and then we make sure that the recipients of that technology, they don't have

concerns about that and we use a variety of information to do that. we have the benefit of all sorts of intelligence information to make those decisions and we're trying to encourage the partners we have in other countries to make sure they are also involving their intelligence community and helping them to make these decisions. >> this would be in the issue of reexport. where does it go from there? >> i'm concerned about it, yes.s-- i've given it to them for particular purpose. we would be concerned about turning it around and willingly exporting it to another recipient or we're helping them be sensitive to the fact where another countries knows they have received that technology from the united states, they're going to put efforts to target that technology and so, we want them to protect the technology and to make sure that they're

not allowing it to go to some place we wouldn't authorize it to go. but really, it's in their interest as well. >> should we open up the floor? >> please. go ahead. >> i'm pat hose with defense daily. i believe japan wants to buy fighter jets. is dod helping them with that and can you talk about technologies you're not comfortable sharing with japan? >> are you talking any specific technology? >> i believe they want to build they want to have their own fighter jets. >> they're actually going to potentially, they have actually done a selection process where they're going to be a recipient of the giants right fighter program, the f-35 program. i'm not going to speak specifically about tonls that i wouldn't share with japan to be honest with you. i have a lot of confidence in japan. one of the reasons i focus on

some of the efforts that the japan is undertaking is the fact that i'm very confident in fact the united states shares a variety of advanced technology with japan. they're the recipient of many technologies and the fact we would approve for them something like the fighter it shows we have a level of confidence. what i have been focusing on with the japanese is not really improving per se their systems for receipt of u.s. technology, but as japan thinks more about becoming an exporter themselves in the future although to be honest, they have put in place some good criteria based upon those original principles, they're going the to do a lot of thinking about who they sell to. i'm interested in working with them that they should think about who it is they're working with, but in terms of sharing technology with japan we have very solid bilateral relationship with japan and i can tell you, i don't have any

qualm about sharing advanced technology with japan. >> next. >> and when you do, we do our caller please give your name and whatever affiliation you care to disclose. >> right. >> name's mike pillsbury. affiliation would be former osd official. i don't think this microphone's working. >> it is. >> i don't mean this as a hostile question. you may take it that way. >> do i have to answer it if i think it's hostile. >> it's up to you. >> okay. >> i've been both a friend and enemy of ditsa. >> i do think this is a hostile question. >> my colleagues and i have thought if there's an agency in the u.s. government that's most out to sabotage the president's foreign policy's initiatives

it's ditsa because they have a way of going in and behaving holier than thou to brand-new friends of the united states. countries veryú-h concerned about their sovereignty sensitive about telling them what to do and they even see ditsa as an intelligence agency. i'm hoping you do this. can't there be a school or a piece of paper that you can give to sensitive officials who are new friends of the united states that to help your own country, these are 27 things we wish you would do. not because ditsa demands it, but because it's in your own interest? some of the countries recently that have had problems with india, ukraine, a long list. some african countries.

so who, know the old ronald reagan comment that there's i think 17 words in the english language that are the most frightening in the world. i'm from the u.s. government and i'm here to help you. >> is that 17? >> maybejmd/x it's nine. i'm from ditsa and i'm here to help you. can you clarify that things have improved and now ditsa has a way of being friendly and overcoming these sensitive countries that don't like being;1!w told what to do and they're willing to cancel cooperation that the president offered because of treatment by ditsa.nklz >> i'm going to take it not as a hostile question and i'm here today because i don't think that is ditsa's reputation any longer so i'm not sure where you have your information from. i believe that ditsa right now is seeing and i won't say it's all because of me, i'm not going to take that much credit.

i'm not that egotistical. i believe it's because of the issues that ditsa's working and in terms of the protection of u.s. technology and also egotisticals. also to maintain their technology is really starting to resonate. i mentioned those cooperate -- what we're finding with countries is that we are basically giving them, as you said, almost sort of some suggestions, it's not telling them you must do the following things, but we are making some suggestions to them, relating to the things that we believe they should put in place to ensure that their technology that they have in their possession can be actually protected. we were just talking a few minutes ago, about the various attacks and things that are going on. so there are people outx that are trying to acquire technology, these cooperative programs we're doing them with a variety of countries, we started them with turkey and

korea. i'm very much involved in the defense trade and technology initiative with india and we are making very significant proposals about sharing advanced technology with india and i can tell you, i am right involved in that obviously the under secretary kendall, has been directed by deputy secretary werk to be the -- we have proposed to the indians a variety of co-product is -- i can tell you that myself and my team are intimately involved in the actual decisions about what technology is being shared and we're saying no we're coming up with answers where we can say yes. >> could youp four pillars as you have described almost becomes a kind

of road map for a wide spectrum of countries by which one could become a trust worthy u.s. defense partner. >> absolutely. >> and this would be ways in which you could say this is the checklist under each pillar. in order to be set up for the -- >> we didn't attend when we laid fuejut pillars to be absolutely directive and prescriptive. we're trying to make some suggestions in terms of the protection of technology based on our experience and the first time i actually utilized those pillars in a public speech was actually earlier? year this year when i spoke in korea when i organized a technology forum and what was great about that forum is that korea extended an invitation to a variety of other countries in

the region. from japan, indonesia malaysia singapore, the full range, and so i laid out those pillars, and what was interesting to me, again, these are just suggestions, these are things that we have found in our system that work well and so khl we're using those pillars to make suggestions to countries about things they should consider, but how they decide to implement it within their own country is really their own decision, we work very collaboratively with korea and made some suggestions about the creation of1[! an organization within the defense acquisition procurement agency focusing on the protection of technology. the koreans have decided to take some of the suggestions we have made and they're implementing it. they have a piece of legislation that will be peshdnding this year, so i feelñ/dj good about that from the stand point that again, that

big, bad, ditsa has been -- suggesting that these might be things they should consider. particularly since it's a very largeá> because of our abbreviated schedule we're going to have time for one more question on the floor. >> i'm with the defense industry you had mentioned a couple thoughtsíy@c÷ about the industry's greater export market. over the 40 years i've been doing this, i have been noticing a contrary trend newer and

higher levels of protection information, and it's even seeming to be -- how does this all co-exist if we're particularly in the post snowden era. to be more restrictive and tighter, and i'm -- how do we both keep our arms more closely around various types -- even unclassified information and at the same time share more and support american business around the world. >> if i could just clarify your question, if i listen j%rwintently i guess i'm getting a little

deafer as i get older, you're suggesting that what you see is additional restrictions on 93 unclassified information? but it's controlled but unclassified? i just want to clarify the comment. >> yes, there are more and more restrictions coming to us from unclassified information. >> we're wait inging -- what has to be done there to upgrade security. is so i'm just u thinking that that potentially -- a newnb÷ level of review. >> i'll give it a shot, but i got to tell you it's a little bit outside, because it sounds like the protection of controlled unclassified information in the department of defense, that's the responsibility of the under secretary of defense for intelligence. it's not directly in my job jar, that's kind of the first thing.

just a couple of observations. so the first thing is i think some of the things that i@ spoken about today, working with other countries in terms of thinking about how to put in place the right kind of policies processes and procedures that protect technology can be and applicable to technology itself. so the first thing is while we are -- we want to share technology -- when we do things with those countries those countries would be protecting it in a similar information. i have not briefly eluded in my remarks about what we're doing in export control reform. so one of the things that is%yq potentially going to help but you're from the defense industry, so i don't know what technology area you're in, one of the things we're doing in terms of that review, is making some clear decisions about what type of technology as we go

through the review of the u.s. ignitions list we're making decision -- with those very stringental controls. as we move that over to the congress list, we're kind of making distinctions when we go through this process, is it's incredible technology that -- and things that can go over to the commerce department. so that would help a little bit. but some of the broader issues which i think you're getting at more which i think are essentially controls or limitations that are being placed on information technology systems, that's realally coming out from the department of defense chief information officer, as well as the under secretary of defense for technology. from the white house, because of the significant cyber abacks on the united states industry and government. that's the best i can do. i probably should have said i don't know.

but i never do that so that's my best attempt to give you an answer. >> there's not a lot that beth mccormick dint know about export control and defense technologies and what beth mccormick doesn't know isn't knowledge. thank you very much, please give a thank you to our distinguished guest. and thank you for your patience and for joining us and being part of an absolutely fascinating discussion. for the hudson institute. thank you very much. the 114th congress gavels in

at noon this tuesday. and track the gop-led congress and have your say as events unfold on the cspan networks cspan radio and cspan.org. new congress, best access, on cspan. >> tonight on cspan 3, a look at u.s. policy toward the asia pacific region. then portions from the national transportation safety board summit on drowsy driving. and later, a discussion on the use of diplomacy in regions of conflict. >> the center for strategic and international studies today looked at the priorities for congress and the white house when it comes to u.s. policy in the asia pacific region. topics included u.s. relations with japan and china, upcoming elections in burma and taiwan. this is an hour.

>> good morning, happy new year. happy year of the sheep. i'm mike green, senior vice president for asia. thank you all for coming on what is probably the first day of work for a lot of people, including, i think, most of us. tomorrow congress comes into session, and we face a new world in washington. a republican congress, democratic president and so far, on issues from immigration to cuba policy there are signs that the new congress and the white house are going to be colliding with each other, politically and over policy.

what we wanted to do today and in the short report we have produced is spotlight one area where bipartisan cooperation forming an agenda to move forward is not only possible but necessary. and that's in the area of policy toward the asia pacific region. which in washington, a very partisan town these days is probably one of the most bipartisan areas of foreign policy, unless it becomes corrupted bywzf÷#t disagreements over other areas, so we wanted in this report to try to spotlight issues and actions the administration and congress can take together to keep moving forward what president obama has called the pivot and others call the rebalance. a majority of americans in polls now consider asia to be the most important region in the world to u.s. interests. we have done surveys of elites in the u.s. and in asia here in csis and support for the

rebalance tobssñ asia hasd:"ñl over 90% favorable ratings among american experts which means a lot of republicans are behind the idea of focusing more on the asia pacific as well. our surveys also shoxl@ however that within the region, while there's pretty robust support for china. there are real questions about weather it can be sustained. that showed up in our survey last sprirk and you hear it increasingly because the president is constrained by budget see questkwes sequestration and pulled into the conflicts in iraq and iran. so we think it's critical and bracket kl that the congress -- we have done a series of nonpartisan, bipartisan dinners and round tables as we thought about this agenda and it seems clear to us that there is a lot of room to move forward

together. the report outlines specific actions on china, defense policy in asia the korean prince, india and southeast asia, this was internally funded and generated, we did it on our own research budgets. and drew on the asia expertise we have at csis that runs the gamut in terms of regional functional expertise and policy back grouchbd. on my far left, on your far right, chris johnson, scott miller leads our work on business diplomacy here, victor shaw is the korea chair matt goodman is the chair of the intern5xhq1 political economy and the and ernie bauer, the

southeast asia chair. now we also want to introduce and welcome one new member of the team, who just arrived and starting this week, scott kennedy, who will be joining us starting this week the chinese economy, which is a terrific edition for us and we're delighted to have him here. i'm going to summarize the points from the report for you. and then and the questions i'll let my colleagues elaborate on the different portions that they wrote. let me begin with trade, because i think most of us would agree over the coming two years, perhaps the most important thing the united states can do to cement our long-term engagement in the asia pacific region is to trance pacific partnership and pass trade promotion authority which is constitutionally critical and then tpp itself. our report recommends that]nfqs the

president follow up on statements he made in december to thez=2 business round table stating that he was ready to move forward but that's got to continue and it's got to broaden all the history of trade agreements in washington suggest that unless you have a high level sustained case being made to the american public andqjj to the congress, you can't get these things done. the window is narrow most people think that an agreement has to be reached, primarily with japan, i think with japan right now, we're talking economically insignificant areas of liberalization the tariff on auto parts in the u.s., pork and things like that in japan. but politically charged. and with japan, we can break through and move forward with the other participants in the negotiations.

in fact, with japan 95% of the tpp chapters, we have the common view that we're trying to establish 21st century views between tokyo and washington. this is critical and to do that some movement on trade>kco promotion authority is critical. and then get these through, most people think by the summer recess. matt and scott in particular can elaborate on that. it's the most important part of the pivot. tpp started in the bush administration expanded to more countries and really will be the defining element of the obama administration's asia policy, if we can get it done and as you have probably seen, senator mcconnell has said, this is one of the areas where potentially the white house and congress with work together well because republicans are strong promoters of free trade. on china chris and bonnie took the lead the prospects for a major break through in u.s.-china relations a major

redefinition of u.s. china relations in the region are small, i would argue are almost dangerous. but there's some stabilizing elements in the relationship that we think the administration needs to followthrough on with congressional support. in burglar the confidence building measures, the militarh-" to$ú+ military cbms agreed upon in beijing. we are disagreeing with china it appears on new institutions in asia, proposed to beijing at the end of the day, the recommendation in our report is we need to find a way to aline ourselves to ensure that this new institution is moving as closely as possible as the standards set by the existing banks, the world bank, and the abb. the other aspect highlighted is the importance of maintaining clear red lines with beijing, because we do have problems and they need to be managed

skillfully, one highlighted in the report is the growing problem within the domestic chinese political economy, an area that scott will help us unbundle in the coming months. but china in the last few years has seen the investors in the,y(l chinese economy as the demanders and china is holding the cards. that's clearly not the case if you look at changing investments patterns by the u.s. and japan. but there needs to be some disciplining and the report recommends really putting energy into the bilateral investment committees between the u.s. and beijing. on defense policy, which i took the lead on with zack cooper, my colleague here, we had three basic recommendations which draw from reports we havea6ñ done recently about the pentagon and for the pentagon. we have argued forodd some time,

it's important for the administration to produce an east asia strategic report. is -- we have done a piece which is in the war war quarrelly. the priority is listed for the rebalance change they're in consistent. and congress is a bit confused. and so it's going to be important, we think and members of congress, leading members have asked for this that there

be a strategic report clarifying the priorities. in exchange, congress has usits work to do. a critical part of the military rebalance is reducing the pressure on okinawa, reducing the forces not just in northeast asia and in southeast asia and the ingd yang ocean ute liszing access to darwin, arrangements with the philippines, new facile is in guam, much of the cost of this reapliant is being born by our allies. congress hasn't fully funded those and we think it's time to move forward to can demonstrate our intent. and finally this is the hardest one on defense. we're coming down to crunch time over the next few years. we will at the current rate defense cuts and operational demands on u.s. military start facing choices, do we invest in new capabilities what the

pentagon calls acdp, advanced capabilities and deterrence programs, to invest in new capabilities to counter missile threats and cyber threats especially in the western pacific. or do we assumption tan our traditional platforms like aircraft carrier and other groups that demonstrate american commitment and presence. the right answer is we do0ui=k both. but we're getting to the point where we have to choose. that's not a point that will be missed by our allies. sequestration is a large part of the problem. one way out of sequestration would be for the congress to pass a nonbinding budget resolution sometime in the spring, that]úfc sets defense spending above sequestration caps. the president might veto this, but it would lay the ground work for increasing defense spending in the reconciliation process which would be justified based on áffjincreased revenue, and by the

demands on u.s. forces in the pacific and the capabilities in the pacific will be drawn down to deal with increasing demands anticipated in the middle east. on korea, you'll all want to know about the interview and hacking against sony, victor cha did not do it. he has written quite a bit about it, though. the korea piece of this is that we have to keep enhancing tiber abilities particularly between the leg and the u.s. and the uk. given the movement on condemning north korean human rights violations finally in the u.n., human rights should be a more central part of u.s. policy towards north korea an area where the congress is likely to be quite supportive. and this one is hard, but it is

strategically imperative for the united states in the next two years to work on improving japan-korea relations, which are strained for reasons that are complex and have more to do with identity and politics than geo strategy that definitely complicate korea's foreign policy, our foreign policy and japan's foreign policy. the administration has signaled there will be a try lateral information sharing agreement between japan and korea. so this is an area that congress can play a role in the administration needs to keep moving forward. on india, india isb( part of the overall fabric of the strategic -- under prime minister moody there's potentially there's always going to be an issue.j[6z

the new coach agreement moves frafrd. carter knows all these issues very well. congress can do it's part. the india caucus ask more active.fyw typically the 2015 elections coming up in myanmar or burma.

more needs to be done with the new leader in jakarta, to institutionalize the new geneva partnership. it's time for president obama to go to vietnam. not easy, because of human rights concerns. tpp negotiations, but absolutely critical. it is possible to walk and chew gum at the same time, it is possible to engage strategically and address concerns in congress in particular will have with respect to human rights. and we need to support countries like the philippines, that are pursuing legal means through the tribunal to address china's claim that the 9-line defines chinese territorial rights in the south china sea. these are some of the areas there are certainly more and my colleagues can elaborate. where we think it's practical, it's consistent with what

republican leaders and the white house has said they want to do. and where the american public wants, clearly, bipartisan efforts to advance our interests in the region. let me open it up now for questions. my colleagues will want to weigh in and answer specifics. we started the new year hopeful we think this agenda is realistic, and we hope that you will help ushah4÷. >> so please raise your hand, we have microphones and itm(jp÷ can get to you quickly if you have a question or a recommendation. please.í

>> all rightwhen you suggest stretching sequestration to add more money for defense, i hope you also support keeping the 50/50 relation in the bca, budget control act between domestic and defense. do you have a positionps oníz that? >> i'll speak only for myself, and to say how ultimately that 50/50 split is are resolved is beyond my pay grade. if we can keep the 50/50 sblit i wouldn't oppose that. but i think one of the big challenges ash carter is going to face is this tough tradeoff between investing in capabilities to sustained h@mááq'ce in the future and engagement as well. and that's critical. and it's critical enough that

the congress ought the to table it. the president and the congress ought to debate it, the answer is a 50/50 split. i don't think anybody @) panel would object to that.myñk >> thank you for doing this. i have two questions, first is about korea. i wonder, how does this feel like china is changing its view on korea. there are more you know preparation on china's side if there's a collapse of -- you know, north korea and they will be more willing to accommodate a possible unification future for the korean people. and the second question with the election just concluded last november in taiwan. there's some uncertainty developing in taiwan. do you feel like issues will be

a new concern for the u.s.? and what do you think about the medical parole of a president, a formal president, do you think there will be imp indication for the domestic politics? thanks. >> thank you nadya for the question. i do think that there is a potential that -- both of the parties in taiwan. in particular with the dpp.

but there's still a lot that can be done in this period,-io to -- so more arms sales, which of course congress would be involved in as well. they -- taiwan as you know is extremely interested and has recently announced it will be building it's own submarines. and the united states could have a role to play in that and i think the united states should be bolstering taiwan's participation in the international community. but in the runup to this election in taiwan, i think it's important for the united states as i said to maintain consultations, so that china does not overreact to the potential election of the dpp president and at the same time i would say that the united states should remain neutral.

>> on the korea-china question, let me just say something i'm sure chris will want to say something as well.$ so my sense is that, the chinese have a lot of indigestion when it comes to north korea. it's not an ulcer yet, but it's certainly a very sour stomach and i don't think that has changed over the past quarter and i don't think it's going to change over the next quarter. the south koreans have been quite aggressive in trying to develop a strategic understanding with beijing, with the government on north korea. it's one of the reasons that he's been so enthusiastic about holding as many meetings, nfc ties, defense exchanges, to try to deepen that understanding.

apeckr>px we saw that they announced a tree trade agreement, which again i think is another sign that korea is trying to step into a space that they see opening up between china and dprk. contrary to some perceptions, i don't think that the ---that doesn't mean the chinesen doesn't see it that way, i'm sure the chinese opportunity to pull south koreans out of the three-way alines and so in that sense i feel like they're winning at the game they're playing. whereas the reality is probably neither of them are winning but either of them are inching a little closer to their desired objective. >> yay, i would agree with that as we have talk -- my own view

is a lot of ink has been spilled about the issue of have they changed their policy, i think we would all agree at the fundamental level, they're still trying to keep the north koreans going, and i think it's edging more toward an ulcer at this stage, and i think we're going to see the same chinese approach, which is denying kim jong-un a visit to beijing which is very significant. i don't see any former chinese leader going to korea. so the issue for me really isn't about change, it's about the normalization of the relationship.

i agree with everything bonney said but it's one that -- my sense is that this issue will be back on the agenda, i think we should be doing everything we can to accrue a possible ddp victory. but i don't think the chinese are going to be able to help themselves in that regard. what will be interesting is to look -- the chinese made a deliberate decision to kind of forego their interests in the south china sea or at least put it on the back burner what they focused on exclusively we look

and see what they have been doing down there. it will be interesting to see. >> he is a man whose family suffered a lot in the process of democratizization. he's afbs during his time in the presidency. and in the interests of democracy, in taiwan, i think it's important for a new era where changes of government are not followed by vichb÷ dickive act act -- paying the get back to

society, for taiwan's long-term democracy, that's my own >ívsview. on the election, i think it's going to be important for the administration to be very disciplined.ó0)t which appear to be an administration:éa? hit against -- it may not have been. but i think it would be very important going forward to put as a first and foremost priority for u.s. policy respect for the democratic process. and there are ways to signal expectations with respect to cross state relations and the relations between washington and taipei. i think the administration has to be more careful and more disciplined than it was last time. that's not easy. taiwan's democratic politics are not for the feint of heart.

there's lots of -- well i was going to say there's lots of stuff flying in the air and literally there's lots of stuff flying in the air. i think the administration's got to be very, very disciplined this time. it's important for our overall stance in the region. >> thank you very much for the use of trying to maintain a bipart season approach to asia. my question is there's no real detailed treatment on the taiwan taiwan-japan relationships. we have issues in okinawa and be more complicated in oak now wankxa$u politics. raises history issues as a problematic thing. i wonder what your thoughts are in managing u.s.-japan relations

over the next few years. >> matt has graciously asked me to do the history question. and he'll address things that vo numbers, although history does involve numbers, as you say it's the 70th anniversary and it's the anniversary of several other things the 21 demands. prime minister abe will keep the previous apologies by then chief cabinet secretary and that is his own statement of remorse the model that i hear about, you probably too as well rusty, is the canberra speech, which everyone should read if you're interested in japan. because it was really a very emotional and forthcoming disposition by prime minister abe before the australian parliament on what japan did to

australia. very emotional, very important for u.s. -- australia-excuse me for japan australia diplomatic and strategic ties. i think a lesson that the people around the prime minister and the prime minister himself will be taking away as they look at the 70th anniversary. okinawa is going to be harder after the gubernatorial election. i'm personally not convinced the new governor wants this to be the defining issue for a preeffect sure that has some economic challenges but it's going to be harder. that is one of the reasons why i think it's important for the u.s. congress to begin -- we're serious about lightening the burtd on the oak now wan people and aligning our forces more geographically and politically in a sustainable way. >> obviously this is a report with recommendations for the u.s. side of this story.

by as the economics guy it's hard not to say, from a japanese perspective, i think the most important thing they could do and the thing which abe could do which would have the greatest return on investment would be to get the trance pacific partnership done and that means agreeing to, as mike said we're very close on the substance the u.s. and japan need to reach an agreement on these final details. this morning anything else abe is trying to do, certainly in the5dgp economics sphere would have very powerful impact on japan's economic prospects on it's strategic position and i think on u.s.-japan relations. i think this is the thing that the u.s. should be in the near term most focussed on because it's the iron that is hottest in the fire right now that we could strike a deal very quickly, i think the negotiators are going to reengage later this month and i very much hope and i don't see why they shouldn't be able to

reach an agreement and if abe is serious about economics being at the center of his agenda, and if president obama's serious about it being a part of his legacy, i very much hope and expect that they will reach an agreement at the beginning part of this year. i think the magic the imagine i believe agreement will be until now, every tree trade agreement we have done, as scott has explained has been preceded byéhf.d trade promotional thorkts with one small jordan, right after 9/11 which is really not, you know, a unique case. the administration has decided this time to sort of move tpa and tpp sort of parallel, it's asking a lot of our trade partners to trust us on tpa, and

give their best deals, that's asking an awful lot, there aren't many big issues left. but the ones that are there are stuck over this issue in a way politically over japan. my sense of the magic bullet would be that the president's initial volley in early december with the business round table about his commitment to getting tpa done is followed up with more engagement. inxa tokyo they hear thissdfj not just from the administration, they start hearing from the republicans in congress. when they start hearing from the republican congress, we can get this done, then i think the negotiations bilaterally will be much, much easier. so that's why scott and matt emphasized in this report, how important it is for this sustained high level campaign, not just a one off speech. but a real sustained campaign on tpp and tpa with the midwestern public, with key interest groups, especially with the leadership in congress.

>> i$s have two questions concerning china. al china is having a big diplomacy shift china also gave priority to its neighboring countries, so my question ispt how it's going to affect u.s. relations with asia, the second4dw÷ question is about chinese vice premier's rent comments he's saying that -- i couldn't remember the exact words, but it's like to the effect that u.s. is still the leader of the world. so what's the interpretation here. >> thank you for the question. yeah, the, you know, big diplomatic shift in chinese foreign policy was evidence in the president's recent speech to

the so-called central foreign poll speech. in that speech and i think the subsequent things we have seen, it really is a reaffirmation of this notion that his leadership that china has decided to take a much more multidirectional foreign policy, and it was interesting in the speech that in terms of the batting order of prioritization we did put what that did call diplomacy ahead of major country relations, thus being u.s.-china relations. it's not a shift and so on but these things get -- i think what it means and we mention this in the record, for our own administration and congress --

talks about using their economic leverage in the region. i think the administration has been slow to acknowledge this shift. to see that it is a major change in t(w@9y they approach thing. they are going to respond to some kind of tit for tat manner and that's why we so strongly recommend in the ---trying to deepen our relationships with these people who are advising on these major issues. he has substantially changed the method of advisory inside the system as well now. those the formal organs don't play the role that the day did under the previous administration. i saw it, i didn't see anything

particularly new there, they frequently reaffirm this sort of position, it is interesting that someone at his level chose to do so, but i didn't find it surprising."g >> it's very important because it does signal a number of things, more pro active.#p+÷ really means great power foreign policy with a special characteristics.40 i but the question remains, i think as to whether putting the periphery at the tom, really means a recognition of?"yñ deterioration of chinese relations with the neighborhood, and therefore leading to an

adjustment in chinese foreign policy going forward. what we're seeing so far is china's emphasis on economic integration and trying to give the neighbors economic incentives to connect them through the 21st century maritime silk road and the economic -- the traditional economic silk road to try to bind them more to china's own development and in turn to assist8 q china's development. this is not just about giving, it's about getting. this is what china means by a win, win-win approach. i think the jury's still out on whether you're going to see a reduction in china's more provocative policies particularly in the territorial dispute disputes, that's what the united states, i think, is particularly concerned about."]:÷

we certainly don't want to see continued intimidation of china's neighbors and i would agree with chris that it has been said before that the china doesn't want to push the united states out of the region. but it is important, i think at this particular juncture for a leader at that level to be saying, not only that the u.s. remains the main superpower in the world but that china wants integrate itself into the prevailing international system. the devil is in the details. the asian infrastructure bank is going to be a critical test on whether or not china is going to adopt the rules and norms developed over the course of many year ss.

>> i want to return to ttp both on the japan side and in relation to china. you and matt are very optimistic in terms of what is needed for the united states. there are some talk in tokyo that a prime minister can't go forward until the upper house elections later this spring. is your view that this is realistic, or is that more of a block than is realistic to be thinking about? secondly in terms of china a year ago at this time, there was much consideration in beijing about possibly joining tpp. governor huntsman has resurrected as you have others. what in japan there is as much concern on tpp as we say there needs to be. thanks.

>> well i can start and i'm sure others will have you, scott and chris. so there's always another election in japan. and, you know i don't think that that should be and i don't think it is an obstacle to japan and prime minister abe moving forward. as they say, they're close, they could with a little bit of political capital on his side and i do think in the scheme of things, it's not a huge amount of political capital that prime minister abe has to invest in this, in the scheme of things. he could get this done and there could be another election. he made the decision to join tpp against another house election. and that requiress a with this new mandate and with him having focused on economics as the' f1 o right course, the only course for japan, i think that the iron is hot and it time to strike.

just to confirm>wl i think they understand and probably agree that they need to be part of

this system of rules that's being negotiated in tpp. i would expect eventually they will join something in the+÷foh region that is a ---i think based on a tpp agreement going forward, it may be called something different. >> i would agree with mat, that a 12 party negotiation like tpp, somebody's always holding an election. these things happen. more importantly, i think we have our own work to do here. everyone, since the election, all the leaders, the+ú( president, incoming majority leader mcconnell, speakser boehner, new chairman hatch all the leeders have said the right things. what matters now is what they do. and it is a fairly tricky process, particularly the president will need to manage his own party's politics of trade which are complicated and difficult. it would look -- the model is the trade act of 1988 which took about five months start to finish, and once again, you had

a divided government you had a republican president in the last year of his term and democratic congress, so these5úu things can be done and i don't know if they should join tpp or something else. i know at apex immediatings at the chinese íyinitiative of discussing what is the -- what is the sort of the future of asia pacific trade after the completion of the arsof agreement, constructive discussions thatf0 a commercial standpoint pretty obvious, but i wouldn't note the genuine interest on the part of the chinese.

>> right here in front. >> thank you. i would be interested in the team's reflections or reactions to the question of wild cards, things you haven't thought of that might come from outside the region or the united states. let me just suggest three. the president will need to decide on keystone. if he decides no then that creates energy issues for canada and wheresr they mightzc=kr export to, which might suit the chinese very nicely. but in a year of election canada, that creates an issue for america's closest ally. second issue is a broad area of cyber.

in a situation where there was a little more important from a -- or even creates a physical attack, traceable somewhere. what happened what happens? because clearly there are various people in their discussions about how the internet should be governed, which india and china seem to be defining the stake holders? if there's further turbulence in the middle east. or if russia starts to create problems with the world is trying to figure out russia and china. i'm just suggesting there mayñqgitt others that you thought or going to write about, thank you.

>> we every january, the last few januarys we have all gathered here to do an exercise we call asia forecasting.bf ñ >> what will happen to japan korea. u.s. india and so forth. and we'll start making predictions for 2015 about the chess board in asia. and then a second panel will start predicting or handicapping

the prospectingss for international reform. you're welcome to join, we put the questions u up we asked the audience for debate. we may have had a wild card session, i'm not sure we'll have to find a technological reason to put the wild cards up. in terms of wild cards, north korea is always a big one. especially since they're probably prepared for another nuclear test. and don't let crisesv a chance to escalate them. i think you're right to mention the middle east which will exacerbate the problems in the asia pafblg. the pacific kmangd stretches to southwest asia. so these could all affect asia and then historically, the last two years of administrations on

asia, are not often very good. george herbert walker bush on an unfortunate business -- prime minister -- bill clinton, bill clinton in his last two years had the famous japan passing where he traveled to china. in all three cases the problem was political band wit at home. you know, when you're in your final years, it's pretty tired, a lot of the strategic heavyweights who started the administration are gone. some talented people come in. you spend a lot more time dealing with the race to succeed

you. so these wild cards could have an even bigger impact filibustered enough so we can hear a few more. >> yeah. i'll touch on a couple that weren't directly called about in the report but southwest asia related. you talked about energy and oil prices spiraling down could play in a couple of ways. for one, import bill drops dramatically, the import bill is part of the reason they put up a lot of trade measures that impaired u.s./india trade in the last couple years. there might be reduce pressure to slow down their import bill. that would be good for u.s./india relations. the impetus behind economic reforms in indy could be reduced somewhat if thatú"yj helps to repair the economy. for south asia of course, you have two others that are closely related. one is the u.s. changing presence in afghanistan.

if not even as a result of that but if you see an increase in terror attacks on india, the perception in del li right now is that it will play a bigger role including crossss border to india. whether it's directly related or not, there will be a perception that it could contribute toú s!g match we talked about we need todúy collaborate more closely with india on afghanistan. we have a trilateral but it hasn't been meeting as often as it should. the last wild card i'll say in south asia is pakistan. the pakistan military -- i just did a lecture tour across india and they continue to press on why does america continue to support the government in pakistan. dating back six months or longer, the pakistan military has had a successful military campaign against insurgence on its own territory. that has only escalated. u.s./india relations it's a strange lens. if they continue and is

successful on its own domestic war on terror, they want to help to support that, which by its nature would push us away from india. afghanistan and pakistan are a couple of -- i mean, afghanistan i don't think anybody would call that a wild card one of the biggest issues in world foreign policies. pakistan is another. >> ernie, since there are never any wild cards in southeast asia -- >> everyday is just boring and we -- you know, we always know exactly what to expect. exactly. i think southeast asia will surprise us this year. i would look to thailand. thailand is a powder zb8ykeg, i think politically. the coup:,) government, the military government said they can't do elections this year as they had hoped to do and probably will do them in 2016. i personally believe they won't do those until other events that

i wish we could talk about probably not on tv happen. but i think the thais are getting fed up. the economy is not performing at the level it should. and when the business community turns against the government or starts to have worries about it i think we should be watching for some political developments in thailand. the other thing that will surprise us in southeast asia is joke wee and the new president of ind donee sha. i think he'll assert himself much more seriously in foreign affairs and security issues than we rkúathought. and i think that will have an impact on southeast asia. and the last one is the arbitrational or arbitration try bu na bual, it could come out this year maybe early 2016. you know i think the way china

reacts to that decision and the way the asian countries respond to it will be something that we should try not to be surprised by and that's why we flagged this in the report. it's something the american foreign policy should be all over. and we should be working the traps in capitals throughout the indo pacific getting prepared for that so we're not surprised. >> historically that has not been partisan but highly divisive. she had good meetings with the president, good meetings with senator mcconnell who has been human rights in berm ma is that bipartisanship and sort of cross governmental consensus that's held around the new approach the myanmar. is that in jeopardy? >> the question is i don't know.

the top as you mentioned the most interested guy on the hill is now thee senator mcconnell. he has been a close follower of developments in myanmarnéand he has a very firm point of view. we also noticed over the last -- i guess the last six months of last year that as?÷ myanmar sort of -- this isn't surprising if we watch southeast asian history when reform movements get announced and start to move forward, they also -- the governing body can start to pull back. this is the one step forward two steps back dance that we've seen in many places. i think we've seen that in myanmar and republicans in particular but i would say it's bipartisan on the hill have expressed real concerns about this particularly aroundxób&÷ the 2015 elections. and i think there's been sort of an accelerating expectation that we're concerned about on íñbr the hill that if these

take place without su chi being able to run, we may have to take action against myanmar. that really puts a lot of risk on the table in terms of obama administration's foreign policy plans because part of what, i think, the obama administration would probably say they felt good about in accomplishing is moving forward÷cq!w with engagement with asian. one of the key ingredients was to sit down with all ten leaders, all ten foreign ministers et cetera and that was predicated on normalizing -- not normalizing but opening relations with myanmar. so mike, i think i'm not sure it's bipartisan. i think the administration actually has played a very responsible role here. ourgáffñ ambassador in rangoon is former csi, derek mitchell.

hey, derek. but i think the administration is really needs to work hard on the hill to make sure that there's not sort of unrealistic expectations but that we do have a very nuanced and effective advocacy for human rights and democracy? myanmar. if we don't lead with those points, we'll lose a lot of ground in asia. i will just make one point that i think is important. if you look at tr/ñbpx that inód+i &háhp &hc% think are really important in asia across asia, southeast asia is a leading trend for the assertion of a growing middle class, a middle class that's going to grow from about 500 million people today to 3.2 billion across the indo-pacific by 2025. that middle class, we can see them sort of putting their issues forward in southeast asia

and they're doing that through elections which is very positive, but they are challenging incumbents and challenging the role ofóu traditional sort of centrally controlled governments. having for morefkh more involvement in governance and i think this will be a trend that will affect all of asia over time. >> thank you all for coming. we're looking at two years where relations across the pacific are hitting some really critical turning points on tpp on the korean peninsula with china. precisely when washington is entering into what will probably be one of the most devicive. we're making an appeal. we hope you all agree. with the idea that we should be working together to try to keep our interest in asia our success other central administrations moving forward. if you look at all the elements we're talking about in these

policies very few began with president obama or president bush, lot go back to clinton. there's an awful lot of continuity here and investment by both parties and we're hoping that people will keep that history in mind and our interests moving forward together. thank you all. have a happy new year and we hope we'll see you on the 29th. thanks. [ applause ].>óúñ the new congress meets for the first time tuesday at 12:00 p.m. eastern and as always, we'll have the house live on c-span and the senate live on c-span2. where you can watch the swearing in of members and the election for house spea3'ñ ahead of that a look now at day-to-day operations in the

house and senate with role call senior editor, david hawkings. joining us to talk to the people and positions that make the day toi day activities of the house and senate run is b&xn hawkings of role call, he is their seniorçhf+> editor. good morning. >> tell us a little bit about these positions that we see all the time. what purpose do they serve in the day-to-day running of things? >> as you can -- on both the house side and the senate side, there are a team of bureaucratic functionaries that keep operations running smoothly and according to parliamentary procedure and making sure records are kept properly, completely, accurately and quickly. there are teams of people you season the rosters of both the house and the senate who make that happen in ways that that if they're doing their jobs properly the public never notices and the members never notice.