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college professors delving into america's past. and reel america, our new series featuring educational and archival films from the 30s through the 70s. c-span3, watch us in hd. like us on facebook and follow us on twitter. and knew senate foreign relations committee meeting on the iran nuclear negotiations. members of the status of the talks, the role congress should play and whether new sanctions should be imposed. and a group of protesters stood up to voice their opinions about additional sanctions against that country just before the meetings.

the committee is chaired by senator bob corker of tennessee. >> let the international community have a chance. let the international community -- californians are here today to ask you to please not continue with new sanctions on iran, postpone the vote until after negotiations have taken place. ranking member menendez, it's incumbent on to you keep the peace, keep the peace in the area. [ inaudible ] she's my senator.

state of california. i ask that you please listen. cannot continue sanctions on iran, we need less diplomacy not more. [inaudible] no the hearing hasn't started sir. that's why i'm doing it right now. i don't want to take any of the senator's time after the hearing starts but the public needs to be heard on this issue. we want no new sanctions. even debating sanctions in iran is a mistake. people from california want diplomacy not new wars, not new sanctions. >> new sanctions will undermine diplomatic efforts. >> i'm going to call the meeting to order. i would say to people in the

audience that we would appreciate you refraining. we understand people have strong emotions about much of what happens in this committee and others and we hope you'll respect the work of the committee. i have never operated a gavel. i learned as a young man how to operate a hammer. i understand my staff told me to be a little more gentle with this, but i want to welcome everybody to the committee. we've switched sides. that was not symbolic. i understand just because of the number of seats it works better this way. i do want to welcome the new members of the committee and say that under senator menendez's leadership, i really believe that this committee has caused it's profile to rise.

we've passed a number of very important pieces of legislation out of this committee, and i think it's because of leadership it can happen. i wan to thank him for that. i want to say to all the committee members we plan to certainly build upon that. we have a number of very important issues to deal with. a nation has put its truth in us to deal with issues in a sober way. i think the issue today that we'll be talking about really causes us to remind ourselves of the indispensable nature of u.s. leadership. i think the committee has, like any committee, we have important things to deal with and we have urgent things to deal with and we need to do both. the important for us to continue a committee to show the importance of u.s. strategic engagement and how that improves

our economy and makes us safer at home. at the same time we need to make sure our taxpayer dollars are spent wisely. while it will take some time to build, i like for us to work towards a state department authorization. i think all of us know we haven't passed one since 2002. what that means is the state department is basically operating off of policies we passed 13 years ago. if we really want to leverage our efforts, what would make sense, i look forward to working with ranking member menendez in a certain way would be to make sure what the state department is doing is leveraging those kinds of things we would like to see happen. i don't want to shy away from difficult issues. this first hearing is evidence of that. i wan to make sure the views of all committee members are heard. i want to make sure we

strengthen our nation in the process. today we're here to talk about iran. i want to say to our witnesses thank you for being here i think there are legitimate concerns by almost everybody on this committee and it's not in any way disloyal, it's not an infringement on anybody else to say we have legitimate concerns. when you think about where we are in iran negotiations, we have six security resolutions, u.n. security resolutions that call for full suspension of enrichment, we then move to the e1 standard called practical needs. in other words, if you're in iran and you have -- if you want violkóçm5ijáq(u)ity council resoluql3ip:iyg]"á ]s%>v practical need for the country. by all estimation that's maybe ].qkdi 500 centrifuges, 3 tur)jju$e.be÷/n]ñ) zqb+c%;xñv(ys negotiations have moved way jvp

beyond that. we know that. we talked about dismantlement, we have concerns about what that means. some people say it's disconnecting the plumbing to use very coarse terms. we spend time talking about hour one and two, talking six, way beyond that. it doesn't speak to ballistic missile development, significant concerns for all of us. we believe, although i'm not sure this is the case. i had a meeting last night and maybe this is not true. i know some of you can enlighten us here today but we're

concerned about what we're really going to cause iran to do relative to their past military intentions. most of us think they are way down the road since 2003 and we'd like to understand the type of technology they have developed. and i know this, and y'all have shared this with us in all kinds of meetings, they still are stiff-arming iaea relative to access to many of their facilities which obviously continues to cause us to have great concerns about their trustworthiness. i think all of us know they are destabilizing the region. we watch what happened in yemen, hezbollah and iran. we watch what's happening with hamas. we know they are even with the minor amounts of money that has been lessened from the sanctions regime that senator menendez and senator kirk and all of us work together to put in place even with that minor amount of money, we know that that has enhanced

their ability to destabilize the region. we know that. you can imagine if we end up with a really bad deal that ends up creating a nuclear arms race in the region and makes the world less safe and yet much more money is released, they can even destabilize the region more. so obviously there's significant concerns. i'm proposing some legislation, and i look forward to hearing from y'all today.> we're vetting it with people on this committee that builds off the one, two, three agreements that we have in place right now. senator markey is familiar with this. 27 times this nags has approved a one, two, three agreement with another nation under civil nuclear arrangements. y'all reach an agreement with a country and we approve it. secretary kerry came in and said he wants to make sure any agreement that happens passes muster with congress. i'd like to understand today how you'd like to see us pass muster. one way to do it is an up or

down vote. i know there's been a lot of discussions. i know senator menendez will speak to this. a lot of discussions about what we might do and might not do. i've talked to prime minister cameron. i talked to the uk -- excuse me, european union negotiator last night in my office. some of us were in israel this weekend over this very same issue. we have heard no one, no one say that if congress were to weigh in on the final agreement it would have anything -- it would in any way destabilize negotiations. as a matter of fact, we understand iran's parliament may have to approve their agreement. so i hope today you'll share with us the appropriate role for us to play. we obviously have our own

thoughts. we thank you for being here. with that i'm sorry to give such a long opening comment to ranking member menendez. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me also welcome colleagues on the committee. it's an extraordinary committee to serve on, confluence of national economics of united states, in a global context as well as major issues for which america is exceptional on democracy, human rights, among other issues. i welcome you. i think you'll find an extraordinary experience of since this is the first hearing that we've had of the new committee, i want to congratulate the chairman on his ascendancy to the chairmanship. during the two years i was chairman, we worked extraordinarily well in a collaborative fashion and in the midst of partisanship in the senate as a whole this committee was an island of bipartisanship on so many major issues that overwhelmingly passed the committee in almost every instance with strong bipartisan support. we look forward to working with you in the same context, same comity and same goals at the end

of the day. we look forward to you having a very successful chairmanship of the committee. i want to in the context of the hearing say that i shared your concerns that the iranians are playing for time. over the past 18 months, we have been moving closer to their positions on all key elements. on the iraq reactor, on enrichment and iran's disclosure of the military dimensions of its nuclear program. i think we need to review how we got to this point. iran over the course of 20 years deceived the international community and violated not u.s. but u.n. security council resolution toss arrive within weeks of achieving nuclear breakout capacity. iran came to the table only after the cumulative impact of years of sanctions began to affect the region's economic and

political stability. for us to give up the leverage of sanctions, which would take years to reimpose, we need a deal that truly reverses their nuclear program rather than just buying a little time. this is why i'm concerned about more than breakout time. i'm concerned the agreement won't provide a clear picture of the military dimensions of iran's program, which are critical to understand to know how far down the road they were as it relates to weaponization so we understand the time frames of any breakout capacity vis-a-vis weaponization, so we

know just how close iran is being to make a nick weapon. i'm concerned instead of dismantling and closing iraq and fordow as we were told by the beginning of the administration, the iran iraq reactor will be converted and the facility built under a mountain, which i don't think you do for civilian purposes, will be repurpose. after 18 months of stalling, iran needs to know there will be consequences for failure. some of us think that should be -- iran playing an asymmetrical game violating, in my view, the spirit and intent of sanctions. in november iran violated interim agreement by feeding iranian gas into it's irr centrifuge at the research

facility. the issue whether it's a violation of the interim agreement is only an issue because at the time of the interim agreement ir 5 had not been used for enrichment and, hence, the agreement only prohibited iran from making advances on the ir 6. that is spin if i've ever heard it. but in any case, the action clearly violated the intent of the agreement to halt enrichment advances at and violated security resolutions. it's interesting to know talking about verification agreements, should we be able to get an agreement, it was a group of sign advertises outside of the administration that noticed this and were the ones to inform the administration about it.

so that makes me worried about how the verification process is moving forward. in december the u.n. panel of experts that monitors sanctions compliance said in a report that iran has been illicitly trying to by technology for the research reactor, which as originally designed would produce plutonium for a bomb and has been referred to by experts as a bomb making factory because of the quantity of plutonium output. under the interim agreement, iran agreed to make no further advances in the construction at arak. iran's position any purchases alone would not contravene the agreement only new construction. well, if you believe that, i have a reactor to sell to you. just last week iranian president rouhani announced construction

had begun on two new nuclear reactors at bashir. while not a technical violation of the joint plan of action, the announcement is clearly intended to leverage further games in the negotiation. the very next day the iranian regime announced "washington post" correspondent, who has been in prison for 178 days had been referred to the revolutionary court that handles sensitive national security cases. as "the washington post" said in a recent editorial, it's difficult to avoid the conclusion that he's been used as a human pawn in the regime's attempt to gain leverage in the negotiations. we have this whole alternate track the iranians can cheat on. because it's technically not in the joint plan of action, well, we don't call them on it. that's a great opportunity if you can get it. you can advance your interest out of the jpoa and quote, unquote, not violate jpoa. let me close by saying iran is clearly taking steps that can

only be interpreted as provocative, yet the administration appears willing these developments and signs of iran's bad faith negotiations. it seems we are allowing iran to shuffle the deck and deal the cards in this negotiation that we're playing dealers choice. frankly, that's not good enough. we need to get into the game. now, up until now, iran has not been motivated sufficiently to make tough decisions. and i hope there will be an agreement in march. but i also believe we need to make clear there are consequences to no deal or to a bad deal as senator corker is ukxr referring to, and i'm intrigued by his most recent concept of legislation. so mr. chairman, thank you for holding the hearing and i'll look forward to hearing from our witnesses. >> thank you mr. ranking member. i'm not used to calling you that. to the other members, i'm going

to say we don't normally give those comments on the front end. they are usually shorter. this is obviously one that evokes a lot of concern. we're going to be having -- the committee will operate by early bird rule. if you're here when the gavel goes down, you'll know what order you're in. we've watched people coin and sit and wait as other people come in and out. but in order to show we're not going to be totally rigid going that senator boxer has a meeting. we don't normally have other opening comments. she's not going to ask questions later but since she has to go to another meeting she wanted to say a couple of words on the front end. i'm going to allow her to do that. >> mr. chairman, thank you for your generosity of spirit. senator inhofe called our organizational meeting for dpw down the hall and i have to be there. i so appreciate this. i want to thank both my chairman and ranking member now for this hearing. we're all here today with the same goal. and that is to prevent iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. but we have different thoughts about the best way to do that. and that's why this hearing is so critical.

and we welcome the witnesses, as well. what we have a historic opportunity to peacefully achieve this goal. and to me it seems like you've got to give this diplomacy a chance to work. i think it's only common sense as president obama said war should be a last resort not a first resort and a peaceful end to iran's nuclear program, i believe, is in the best interests of america, and in the best interests of our great ally israel. and that is why i'm concerned, and it's not partisan. i have a concern that reaches across party lines that some colleagues are pushing to enact new sanctions while our negotiators are still at the table. i don't believe that strengthens us. doesn't strengthen our position at all, and these negotiations are going on right now. in fact i think if we enacted that legislation we would jeopardize a chance, a once in a lifetime perhaps chance of having a far reaching final

comprehensive agreement, which we know is going to be hard. our own president has said it's a 50/50 chance. he's not you know, wearing rose colored glasses on the point. our own intelligence community said, and i quote, new sanctions would undermine the prospects for a successful comprehensive nuclear agreement with iran. unquote. and passing new sanctions legislation would threaten the unity we have achieved with the world, and that is critical. i want to quote british prime minister david come ran who said last week, quote, as a country that stands alongside america in these vital negotiations it's the opinion of the united kingdom that further sanctions or further threat of sanctions at this point won't actually help to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. they could fracture the international community that has been so valuable in presenting a united front to iran. and i think a new sanctions bill would give iran an excuse to

walk away. i think it says to iran, to the hard-liners, you see you can't really deal with america. now, in the end, they may not be able to, and we may not be able to, either. it's all -- life is about timing. we all foe that. we ran, we got our seats because of timing. everything is about timing. and this is not the time. so, in closing, let me say, i oppose the legislation i've seen so far. i haven't seen the new proposal. i look forward to seeing it. but i am working on legislation with senator paul to send a clear, unequivocal signal that iran will be held accountable for its actions, and any failure to fulfill its commitments will be met by swift action by congress. so our bill in essence would allow expedited consideration by congress of legislation to reinstate waived or suspended sanctions against iran if the

president in consultation with the intelligence community, determines that iran has violated any existing nuclear agreement. senator paul and i are putting the final touches on this bill. we think it's a moderate proposal. we think we're going to see perhaps three options. one option which would essentially do nothing but have a series of findings which i don't think goes far enough and one that perhaps moves too quickly towards sanctions. so senator paul will be working on that with me. we're very excited to share it with our chairman and ranking -- mr. chairman i thank you so much for this opportunity. >> just to be clear before we move to the witnesses there's been a lot of confusion about what this committee does. and what the banking committee does. any sanctions legislation it's been determined will be dealt with in the banking committee

because of the treasury functions. so this committee i think will be looking at ways for congress to weigh in and one of those is just for us to approve up or down the final deal, which is what we do every civil nuclear deal that comes our way. certainly this is of greater importance. but with that, i want to thank everyone for their comments. i want to move to the witnesses, thank you for your patience. our first witness is tony blanken the deputy secretary of state. mr. blinken confirmed his post after being confirmed by the senate in december. he is a former deputy national security adviser to the president and has previously served as the democratic staff director of this committee. from 2002 to 2008. welcome back. our second witness today is david cohen, the undersecretary of treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence. mr. cohen has been in his position since 2011. and has recently been appointed deputy director of the cia.

he has previously served as assistant secretary of the treasury for terrorist financing, where i think he's done an outstanding job. i want to thank you both for being here and sharing your thoughts and viewpoints with us today. we would remind you that your full statements without objection will be included in the record. if you could keep your remarks to around five minutes, we would appreciate it.at i know there will be numbers of questions. so thank you again for being here, we look forward to your testimony. >> mr. chairman, ranking member, thank you very much for having us here today. mr. chairman congratulations to you on assuming the chairmanship. i'm very glad you're wielding the gavel, not the hammer, but very much look forward to working with you, the ranking member and all the members of this committee going forward. and i think it's very appropriate that you are starting the hearings here today in this congress on the subject of iran, the nuclear negotiations. it's an issue of paramount importance to our national security and an issue that we've labored on with congress for years. secretary kerry, undersecretary sherman as you know, and our entire negotiating team were in geneva last week as part of the

effort to get to an agreement where iran's nuclear program we can be sure is used for exclusively peaceful purposes. and i want to talk to you about where we are with that today. i'll give you as much detail as i can. it may be appropriate at a later stage to do some of this in a closed setting, given that the negotiations are ongoing. and it's hard to get into some of the detail in public without undermining our negotiating position. we remain committed to continue and indeed when necessary to expand the regular consultations we've had with congress and particularly with this committee on these negotiations. we share the same goal, to make the world a safer place by resolving international community's concerns about iran's nuclear program. our core goals for the negotiations are clear, and consistent. any agreement we reach must effectively cut off the four pathways iran has to obtain enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. the two uranium pathways, a plutonium pathway through the

iraq heavy water reactor and a potential covert pathway. any agreement must require stringent access, monitoring, transparency measures to mox mize the international community's capabilities to detect quickly any attempt by iran to break out overtly or covertly. any agreement must give us confidence that should iran choose to break its commitments, it would take at least one year to produce enough fissile material for a bomb. and any agreement must deal with some of the issues that you and ranking member menendez alluded to, including the missile question, r&d, possible military dimensions of the program, et cetera. and we can talk about that in questioning. in exchange, the international community would provide iran with phased sanctions relief. tied to verifiable actions on its part. such relief would be structured so that the sanctions could be quickly reimposed if iran were to violate its commitments. the discussions last week with secretary kerry in our judgment were substantive, they were

serious, we've made real progress on closing some of the gaps that separate us. but at the same time, real gaps remain. i'd be happy again to provide further information on exactly where we are along with ambassador sherman and others in a closed setting so we can go into more detail. overall our assessment remains that we have a credible chance to reach a deal that's in the best interests of america's security, as well as that of our allies and partners. our goal is to conclude the major elements of the deal by the end of march. and then to complete the technical details by june. in our judgment we're negotiating from a position of strength. in the past, iran has used the cover of talks to buy time and advance its program in significant ways. thanks to the interim agreement we've reached, the joint plant of action, iran's program was fundamentally frozen in many key respects, rolled back in some others and international inspectors have giv)d extraordinary access. before the japoa japan had about 200 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium in a form that could be quickly converted into weapons grade material. it produced much of that

material at the facility which is buried deep underground. dhahran has no 20% enriched uranium. zero, none. it has diluted or converted every ounce, suspended all uranium enrichment above 5%, removed the connections at fordow that allowed him to produce the 20% in the first place. before the japoa iran was making real progress on the iraq reactor which, had it become operational, and together with the reprocessing facility would have provided iran with a plutonium path to the bomb. once fuelled the iraq facility would have been very challenging to deal with militarily. today, iraq is frozen in place. no new components, no testing, no fuel. before the japoa iran had installed roughly 19,000 centrifuges the vast bulk 6 them at the natanz facility. today 9,000 of these are not operational. iran has installed no new centrifuges. and its stockpile of 4% low enriched uranium is capped at its pro-japoa level.

before the japoa inspectors had less frequent access to iran's nuclear facilities. today it's enabled iaea inspectors to have daily access to iran's enrichment facilities and a far deeper understanding of its nuclear program. its centrifuge production, its uranium mines and mills and other facilities important to monitoring the program and detecting any attempts to break out. the iaea has consistently reported that iran has lived up to its commitments under the japoa. just as we've asked iran to live up to commitments we've lived up to our commitment to provide iran with limited relief about $14 billion to $15 billion from the start of the agreement to this june when it ends. and david cohen can talk more about that. but that relief is dwarfed by the vast amounts denied to iran under existing sanctions regime we're vigorously implementing. the entire sanctions architecture remains in place and david can talk about that. congress as has been mentioned is now considering legislation to impose additional sanctions on iran should negotiations

fail. let me say at the outset i know the intent of this legislation is to further increase pressure on iran and in so doing strengthen the hand of our negotiators and strengthen our leverage. we very much appreciate that intent but it is our considered judgment and strongly held view that new sanctions at this time are both unnecessary, and far from enhancing the prospect of negotiations, risk fatally undermining our diplomacy, making a deal less likely and unraveling the sanctions regime that so many have worked so hard to put in place. they're unnecessary, because as i noted a moment ago and david will go into more detail on this, iran already is under intense pressure from the application of the existing sanctions, in recent months that pressure has actually grown stronger with the dramatic drop in oil prices. should iran refuse a reasonable agreement or cheat on its current commitments under the japoa the senate could impose additional measures in a matter of hours matching or going beyond what the house has already passed. the administration would strongly support such action. iran is well aware that a sword

of damocles hangs over its head. it needs no further motivation. so the sanctions new sanctions at this point are not necessarily but we also believe their passage now would put at risk getting to a final deal over the next several months. let me very briefly explain why. as part of the japoa we committed within the wounds of our system not to impose new nuclear related sanctions while the japoa is in effect. absent a breach by iran any new sanctions enacted by congress would be viewed by iran and the international community as the united states breaking out of the understandings of the japoa. this in our judgment includes so-called trigger legislation that would tie the actual implementation of new sanctions to the failure to reach a final agreement. even if it is not arguably a violation we believe it would be perceived as such by iran, many of our partners around the world. the intelligence community believes the same thing. so do our key partners including theic, france and germany. this could produce one of several unintended consequences that far from enhancing our security in our judgment would undermine it. first the passage of new sanctions could provoke iran to leave the talks violate the japoa and pursue its nuclear

program full tilt. reversing all of the benefits we've achieved under the japoa. and i can go through those later. even if iran does not walk away or returns promptly to the table negotiators are luckily to adopt much more expeople positions in response making a final agreement much harder to achieve. third and finally if our international partners believe that the united states has acted prematurely through initial nuclear related sanctions legislation in the absence of a provocation or violation by iran, their willingness to enforce existing sanctions, never mind add additional sanctions later in our judgment will wane. their support is crucial. without it the sanctions regime would be dramatically diluted. we've kept countries on board through a lot of hard work despite being against the economic interest of many of them. we're serious about diplomacy and trying to reach an agreement that advances our security.

if they lose that conviction the united states and not iran would be isolated. the sanctions regime could collapse and iran could turn on everything it turned off under the japoa with no consequence. we can debate whether any of these things would happen, whether all of these things would happen. what i can tell you is this, those that we believe are best placed to know, that is the folks who have been engaged with the iranians, engaged with our international partners, in these negotiates, for several years now, that is their best judgment. judge run these risks and jeopardize the prospects for a deal that will either come together or not in our judgment there is nothing to be gain and potentially lots to be lost by acting precipitously. as senator boxer noted this is a judgment shared by many of our key partners. she cited prime minister cameron and his remarks. i think you'll hear the french, the germans and others make similar statements in the coming days. one final point. even if we resome the challenge posed by iran's nuclear program, i want to assure you that we

will continue to confront iranian actions that threaten our security, and that of our partners, including its support for terrorist groups, its efforts to proliferate, its destabilizing activities in the region. we will continue to spotlight and oppose its violations of human rights, freedom of expression, freedom of religion and we will continue to defend and build the capacity of our partners from israel to the gulf countries, to counter iranian aggression and provocations. thank you very much, mr. chairman. >>mr. cohen mr. blinken was very fulsom in his comments about double over. if you could sort of keep it to five, it would be good. thank you. >> certainly. good morning chairman corker, ranking member menendez, distinguished members of the committee. thank you for the invitation to q#b+ (q#ore you today, and as this is likely my last appearance before this committee before i assume my new duties i

want to thank former chairman menendez, current chairman corker and members of the committee for the courtesy that has been shown to me over the past several years. i appreciate it. there is no higher national security priority than ensuring iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. and president obama has made clear that we will do everything in our power to prevent that from happening. for us at treasury that has meant working within the administration with congress and with international partners to impose the most powerful sanctions in history. and in many respects the sanctions have worked exactly as designed. they have driven iran to the negotiating table. because iran's leaders know that relief from sanctions can come only innics change for taking steps that will guarantee that iran cannot produce a nuclear weapon. as we sit here today no one knows whether the negotiations ultimately will yield a comprehensive deal. but we, like you, are dedicated to testing fully the diplomatic path. as we do so iran's economy remains subject to intense

pressure from sanctions. under the point plan of action which has been in effect for a little over a year now iran halted progress on its nuclear program, rolled it back in key respects, and allowed unprecedented inspections of its enrichment facilities. in exchange iran received limited and reversible relief from some nuclear related sanctions. importantly, the japoa left in place the full architecture of our financial, banking, oil, and trade sanctions. our terrorism and human rights sanctions. and our domestic embargo. this means that iran is still cut off from the international financial system. it is unable to export even half the oil it was exporting in 2012 and it is barred by sanctions from freely accessing most of its oil revenues in foreign reserves. these sanctions are not just words on the books, we vigorously enforce them. since the signing of the japoa

in november 2013 we have designated nearly 100 iran related targets and imposed over $350 million in penalties for sanctions of asia. put simply, iran still is not open for business, and its economy remains in a deep hole. let me cite just a few metrics. in 2014 alone our sanctions deprived iran of over $40 billion in oil revenues. that is well over twice the total estimated value to iran of the japoa sanctions relief. altogether since 2012 our oil sanctions have cost iran more than $200 billion in lost exports and oil proceeds it cannot access. iran's currency the rial is depreciated by almost 16% just since the signing of the japos and 56% since january 2012. and iran's economy today is 15% to 20% smaller than it would have been had it remained on its pre2012 growth trajectory. because of the scope and intensity of the sanctions iran currently is subject to and because of the economic pressure those sanctions continue to apply iran is negotiating with its back against the wall. accordingly we see no compelling

reason to impose new sanctions now, even on a delayed trigger. we think new sanctions legislation is more likely to be counterproductive than helpful in the negotiations. dhahran's nuclear program is frozen in its economy and thus its negotiating team remains under enormous pressure because we've been able to hold together the international sanctions coalition. enacting new sanctions now threatens to unravel this. if congress enacts new sanctions now and the negotiations ultimately prove unsuccessful our international partners may blame us not iran for the breakdown in the talks. overall support for the sanctions regime would then

decline making it more difficult to maintain, or to intensify sanctions pressure. and if a break down in talks led to the demise of the japoa we would lose the additional insight into iran's nuclear program and the restrictions on development that the japos has given us. make no mistake this administrationion stands and embraces the power of sanctions. sanctions are a key component of many of our most important national security initiatives. we are not sanctions doubters. but neither do we believe layering on additional sanctions is always the right move. sanctions are one tool in our tool kit alongside diplomacy, military action, and the myriad other ways that we project power. if diplomacy does not succeed the president said he, quote, will be the first one to come to congress and say we need to tighten the screws. but in our view now is the time to give diplomacy every chance to succeed not to create a new sanctions tool. thank you and i look forward to

addressing your questions. >> thank you both. and, again i just want to make sure everybody understands this committee is not the committee that deals with sanctions. and i know the witnesses certainly have the opportunity to say anything they wish in. . that is not the issue that is before us. i'm sure you may get some questions about things other qñgñ than iran today, and people will use this venue for that. but i would just like to to ask this question of mr. blinken. do you believe congress has any role at all to play in these negotiations. short answer, if you would. >> yes, i do, mr. chairman. in several ways. first, we wouldn't be where we are without the role that congress has already played. i think the sanctions that have been imposed to date are what brought iran to the table. and our ability to bring the international community along has been critical to that endeavor. second i think it's absolutely vital that we remain in close

consultation with you as the negotiations proceed. we've had the opportunity in various closed sessions and briefings to do that. we want to continue that. finally, if we get to the end game and if we do get a resolution, in our judgment, the best way to ensure that iran complies with its obligations, would be to suspend the existing sanctions, not end them, to test iran's compliance, and only then, and obviously congress would have to play a lead role in this, to actually end the sanctions. so, all along, from the beginning to where we are now, to an agreement if we reach one, congress' role is central. >> thank you. i think one of the things that we all know is when the sanctions were put in place, we gave the administration some national security waivers, and you've utilized those. i think all of us also know that once you suspend these in more depth and you agree to do that with the p-5, in essence what's going to happen is the entire regime is going to fall apart. and so i sent you some legislation, i'm very disappointed you didn't address that today in your opening

comments that would just allow us, we do not want to do something that infringes upon getting to a good deal. and so we've sought to figure out some way for congress to be able to weigh in before you dismantle, before you dismantle over a longer period of time with this national security waiver the entire regime. we've asked, is it appropriate for us to at least be able to weigh in. since we did, in fact, put those sanctions in place. so i would just ask you this. do you believe that congress should have the ability to vote up or down on any agreement in the same framework that we do with one, two, three agreements which we've done 27 times on our civil deals, do you not think this rises to that level of importance to our nation, and would you oppose this body

taking up legislation to deal with that in an up or down vote on the senate floor? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i've had an opportunity to look at what you're proposing and let me say at the outset, first of all, how much we really appreciate your leadership on this, and the intent of what you're proposing. as someone who as you alluded to before worked on this committee for six years i also fully understand the desire for a congress to have some kind of up or down vote on whatever is agreed to. from where i sit now. i think you'll also understand the position of the administration for that matter any administration, republican or democrat, on the importance of maintaining the executive prerogative to conclude agreements that advance our national security interests and do not require formal congressional approval. there's a concern that this could set a precedent for future executive branch action. this, to us, would be i think a unique arrangement. it will not be a treaty. or other type of international agreement where all parties are required to take similar actions themselves.

it will not be like an arms control agreement that imposes obligations on the united states and our nuclear weapons policy. and it's not exactly akin to a one two three agreement because in this case we have multiple partners at the table on an issue obviously of tremendous complexity. rather this would be the international community putting strong limits on iran's nuclear program, and iran agreeing to adhere to those limits. but as i said earlier, just as congress played a key role in getting us here -- >> sir, if i could i think the answer is no. so, let me -- let me -- you know we could easily deal with this by just passing legislation that does away with national security waivers. then you'd have to come to us. >> yeah. >> so, i don't understand. you know, you've talked about the sanctions piece. i've talked to our french negotiators directly. i talked to our uk negotiators directly.

i talked to prime minister cameron directly. i talked last night at length in my office to the negotiator on behalf of the european union. i was in israel this weekend, talked to the intelligence agencies there. i talked to the prime minister. i have met no one who believes that us weighing in would do anything to destabilize these negotiations. as a matter of fact, many have said, knowing that congress has to approve the deal would be a great backstop for the administration to strengthen their hand, just as the negotiators in iran continue to refer to the hard-liners, and to khamenei, the supreme leader. again we could just do away -- we were generous in the passage of these sanctions giving you a security waiver. we could actually just do away with that and you'd have to come to us. so why would you oppose congress weighing in on an issue of this importance, and isn't power for you to say you want this to pass muster or secretary kerry to say this should pass muster and yet

continue to stiff arm every effort be pushed away, congress who represents more fully this nation than the negotiators, not having the ability to weigh in on this deal? >> mr. chairman, let me suggest a few concerns that could materialize. first, in terms of the negotiations themselves, the knowledge that there would be very early on this kind of vote in our judgment could actually undermine the credibility of the commitments we would make in the context of negotiations to suspend, not end -- >> does the iranian parliament not need to weigh in on some of the agreements that iran is putting in place? >> under their laws they may be required to. that's correct. >> okay. so, so on one hand we would negotiate in such a way as we know that the supreme leader could try to influence the iranian parliament to go against what they may agree to. and yet you would say here it's not important for the greatest deliberative body in the world, quote, quote, quote, to be able

to weigh in on this issue, matter of fact, the body that actually put to the this regime that the entire international two things. first there's a concern that if a judgment is reached immediately, yea or nay on this it may be too soon to see if iran has complied with its agreements. if iran had been asked to vote on the agreement, i suspect many who believe the agreement has produced very strong results for our security initially were skeptical might well have voted it down. i think giving the iranians time to demonstrate clearly to you, and to us, that they're making good on their commitments would make sense. second, i actually think our leverage is enhanced and

congress' leverage seine hansed if we suspend sanctions initially if we get an agreement and then once iran has >> my time is up, but i would support a series of votes if that's what you're saying. i would support an initial vote. on the deal, as a whole. and i think congress would be more than glad to work with you on a series of votes as you move along. i will say, mr. blinken, after having served on this committee, and after y'all spending incredible amounts of time dissing the sanctions regime which we are not focused on we're trying to find a constructive way for congress to play its rightful role in these negotiations. i'm very disappointed that in essence what the administration is saying is we really don't want, even though congress put us in this place, we really don't want congress to play a role in one of the most important geopolitical

agreements that may take place during this administration. with that, ranking member menendez. >> thank you, mr. chairman. you know, i have to be honest with you, the more i hear from the administration and its quotes, the more it sounds like talking points that come straight out of tehran. and it feeds to the iranian narrative of victimization when they are the ones with original sin. an illicit nuclear weapons program, going back over the course of 20 years, they are unwilling to come clean on. so i don't know why we feel compelled to make their case when, in fact -- do you dispute any of the things i said in my opening state about actions that they have taken as it relates to the u.n. monitors? as it relates to fuelling that

rod? as it relates to those other elements? do you dispute any of those? just yes or no? >> ranking member, no i think you're largely correct. >> so then the bottom line is, they get to cheat in a series of ways -- i'll call it cheat, you won't. but they get to cheat in a series of ways and we get to worry about their perceptions. to quote from your testimony, and i'll quote directly, even if such sanctions are not, arguably, a technical violation of the joint plan of action, we believe they would be perceived as such by iran. now, so we're worried about

you say it could resume its efforts to increase and significantly improve its nuclear capabilities in a relatively short time frame. so let's be honest about what the joint plan of action. before this committee have said looks like they need about three months. now what, mr. chairman, i don't know that members of the audience get to participate here or not, but they need about three months. now, i'm not a scientist but i'll accept their testimony as pretty much substantive as to where they need to go. any sanctions that we have imposed have taken minimum six months to give lead time to the world, and to companies that this is now a sanctionable item. so that puts us beyond the time frame, if they make a decision to move in a different direction. and let's be honest, that at one

time, maybe, but now, the iranians do not believe that there is a credible use of military force on the table should they not make a deal, and should they move to break through on nuclear capabilities for weaponization. so, you know, it's -- you're telling the committee then, and you can look us straight in the eye and say that prospective sanctions that don't take place until july, well after the period of time of not just a framework because i've never been able to get my hands around your march framework, what that really means, i've been told there's not even going to be a written document to that effect, a march framework, takes place in july, after a deal has either been consummated or not, and would only take place if a deal has not been consummated, and

even with presidential waivers, at that period of time, is somehow going to make the ayatollah walk away from a deal that he thinks is in his country's or his best interest to have anyhow. that's tough to believe in. it's just -- it defies common sense. that if i want to make a deal that something you're going to do that doesn't affect my ability to make that deal is going to make me walk away from a deal that i find is in my interest anyhow. that's just not common sense. so i get -- i get that you all are hung up on the sanctions thing, and i get that there's, you know, you talk about perception, that it's not necessarily a violation, but it will be perceived as such. so we're to worry about all the iranians perceptions, but we can just swallow all of what they're doing independently. so let me ask you this, isn't it true that even the deal that you are striving towards is not to

eliminate any iranian breakout capability, but to constrain the time in which you'll get the notice of such breakout capability. is that a fair statement, yes or no? >> yes, it is. >> okay, so we're not eliminating iran's ability to break out. we're just getting alarm bells, and the question is how long are we going to get those alarm bells for? now, isn't it also true that the administration cannot lift sanctions, that it can only waive them under the present law, yes or no? >> that is correct. >> so now the iranians are going to make a deal in which this president may waive sanctions but the next president of the united states, whoever that may be, may decide you know what, this is not in our interests because it's only going to give us a limited period of time and they're going to go ahead and say sorry we're not waiving the sanctions anymore. in that the iranians are willing to make the hard decisions that they agreed to make that they have been unwilling to make for 18 months because i heard this movie's been played before. right?

20 years. last june we heard from the president just give me time. that was seven months ago. right? now we're reliving it again. and so the bottom line is, that we are going to do all of this and ultimately be in a position in which if they don't make a deal, we're exactly where we are at. but with no immediate consequences to them. their breakout time is shorter than the time it will take to create new sanctions. and now you're telling me the chairman, based upon your responses, that you don't want us to even -- the iranians have made it very clear that their parliament has to vote on this issue. why is it possible that tehran will treat its parliament better than the administration in the greatest democracy is willing to its congress? it's -- it just boggles my imagination. so, mr. chairman, i'll look forward to looking at your legislation, and i have suggested to you in our previous conversations some ways in which

i think it might be made even stronger. and i appreciate the -- this is one -- >> chairman can i quickly address some of the ranking member's points? ranking member, i think we're most worried about not iranian perceptions, but the perceptions of our partners who are critical to enforcing the sanctions and what we've heard from them, including from prime minister cameron as recently as last week, including from our french and british colleagues, is that further sanctions now, or the threat of sanctions, or even trigger legislation, risks unraveling the international coalition that we've built to impose the sanctions. at the end of the day, it will be much easier if we wind up suspending sanctions in the event of an agreement of some kind to reimpose them quickly if we've kept the international coalition together. so what we're most concerned about, and focused on, is that. it's not iranian perceptions. although it does matter, because, look, iran is not immune to politics, either.

they have their own. they have people who are negotiating, who are not friends of ours, who are not good guys but who may be more pragmatic because they're looking at the future of their country and trying to get out from the burdens that they're under. so we do want to do what we can to make sure that they're not penalized. but what's critical sour partners and our ability both to sustain the sanctions, and if we have to, to increase them. second, i think under the japoa, this is different than the past. in the past, it's true, we've engaged with iran and talked to them without having something like the japoa that froze the program, in some respects rolled it back and created much better access to learn more about it. you're exactly right that under those circumstances the iranians would be able to talk and advance their program at the same time. that is not what is happening now. this has been a good interim deal for us in our security, as we've pursued whether we can get to a final deal.

i think the framework you asked about, what we hope to get to in march, is the agreement on all of the core elements. what commitments the iranians would make. then, it will take some time to translate that in to tremendous technical detail. that's why we would need the time until june to do that. that's what we hope to be able to present to you if we get to yes at the end of march. i do believe that iran believes that there is the very credible threat of force. but what is motivating it primarily now and what brought it to the table is the tremendous economic burden it's under. thank you. >> senator menendez, i appreciate your willingness to look at some legislation that would give us an up or down vote on this issue. i would say in response to mr. blinken's comments, i've talked with our international partners. not a single one of them has any concerns whatsoever with congress having the ability to vote up or down on a final deal. many of them believes it strengthens our hands. with that mr. gardner, senator gardner.

>> thank you mr. chairman, and secretary blinken i don't want to mischaracterize anything that you've said in your response to chairman corker so i want to clarify perhaps a comment that i heard wrong. you mentioned that in the discussion the possibility of the legislation, the chairman has sent over to you the possibility of that legislation undermining the credibility of our negotiators. could you expound on that comment? and is that what you, indeed, said? >> the -- in the context of these negotiations, if we get to an understanding, part of this, our commitment, should the iranians make the commitments necessary to convince us and our partners that their program would be for peaceful purposes, in return, their expectation is that something would be done about the sanctions. they, of course, would like us to end the sanctions immediately. that is something we will not do.

and undersecretary cohen can address that. we believe that the best way to proceed is based on the not only the commitments they make, but also the steps they take to implement those commitments that initially we suspend, not end, certain sanctions. and that over time, as they demonstrate that they're making good, at that point, we get to actually ending them and congress would have to do that, and play a role there. the concern that we would have is that if we're saying we're going to be suspending certain sanctions early on, and yet that is still subject to an initial vote by the congress in some fashion, they will doubt our ability to actually deliver on our commitment. that's a concern that could make the negotiations more complicated. >> and many of our partners around the world, that they believe this legislation would undermine the credibility of our negotiators? >> i can't say that. i have not talked to any of our partners personally about the proposed legislation that the chairman is proposing. or -- >> it's been -- >> what i was talking about was actually sanctions legislation, including trigger legislation. >> i mean it has been fairly

public in terms of the news reports about the proposed legislation. the idea is that we would put forward, no one -- this is strictly administration's position, and none of our partners. >> we would have to ask them. i don't know what their position would be on that. >> you mentioned talk about the iran not being immune to politics. and so following up on president rouhani, does he have the support within the iranian government within the politics within iran to accept an agreement from the united states international community regardless of ow flexible and the united states is and the international community with sanctions during negotiations? >> i think you asked the $64,000 question. the short answer is, we don't know. that really is the test. can iran do what is necessary to get to yes, and to meet the very stringent requirements that we

have, and that our partners have? that's exactly what we're testing now. i would say to you, senator, that over the course of these negotiations, we have seen the gaps close. and iran, after initially absolutely rejecting certain steps that we believe are necessary, of being open to them. here's what's particularly complicated about this. this is one of those situations where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. so we may have in the course of the negotiations an agreement in principle on one aspect. and we've talked about several of them. iraq, natanz, possible military dimensions of the program, et cetera. but unless and until we're able to conclude all of the elements, then nothing is agreed to. so what we've seen is that on specific chapters, critical chapters, they have moved closer to a point where we would find their commitments acceptable in answering our requirements. on others we're just not there yet. and it goes to your question, do they have enough political space to make the agreement? i think what we'll find that out over the next two months. >> going back to the japoa, do you believe the corker legislation would fie late the

intent of the japoa? >> no. >> so again, the -- it would not violate the intent of the japoa. but would it give us the ability to weigh in, as congress, the ability to perform, advise and consent obligations under our constitution? so it's strictly the administration's concern that this would interfere with their negotiations? >> again i think some of the concerns are that, and the japoa i think may be illustrative of this, if members have been asked to pronounce themselves within a month or so on the japoa, i suspect that many members initially might have given it a thumb's down because there was great skepticism about it. i think the japoa has proved itself through the results it's achieved over the course of the agreement, and i think a lot of minds were changed. for example our israeli partners who were very skeptical of the japoa initially acknowledge to

us that it's been a success. so one concern is that pronouncing ourselves on the agreement before we've demonstrated whether iran's going to live up to it and meet its commitments i think may be premature. second there are some elements that, you know, we can certainly talk about. there is a -- in it a, as i read it at least, mr. chairman, a compliance requirement that is on a fairly tight hair trigger. that is, if there's a violation that is detected, then within five days, sanctions would have to be reimposed. we've had situations under the japoa, where we have identified things, and actually ranking member menendez mentioned a few of them, which we believe were violations of the japoa, the iranians believed they were not. there may be circumstances where it's a good-faith difference. we have a mechanism in place under the japoa to litigate those disputes and in every instance, when iran was doing something that we thought was problematic it was litigated and

they ceased their activities. for example the i.r.-5. so that would be another concern. and then finally, one of the concerns, mr. chairman, just to put this on the table, too while we're talking about it is, as i read it, it does rule out a japoa extension. and again, it is our strong intent to try and reach a basic agreement in march, and then to conclude all of the technical details by june. but i would not want to prematurely rule out in a sense arbitrarily any extensions if we're on the verge of completing the technical details in june but still have is to dot and ts to cross. we might want a little more time. i wouldn't want to rule that out. >> by all accounts iran remains a state sponsored terror, one of the world's foremost violators of human rights. these discussions have been involving the regime on nuclear issues. the record as state sponsored terrorism of human rights continues to be abysmal but if the refusal to impose additional sanctions while we discuss the nuclear issues, would you support additional sanctions on -- target the regg theme areas of terrorism and human rights violations? >> undersecretary cohen can address this. i would just say very simply that we have been vigorously implementing sanctions in other areas against iran, including on

the question of human rights, including on the question of support for terrorism, but maybe undersecretary cohen can address that. >> and just very briefly, senator, just three weeks ago or so, we imposed some additional sanctions with respect to iran's violation of human rights. the use of tech cog firms in iran to stifle dissent. in the period since the japoa has gone into effect among the 100 or so sanctions that we've been -- that we have imposed have been 15 focused specifically on iran's support for terrorism. >> thank you. and we would certainly love input, love engagement like you're doing with iran. we'd like the same respect. so if you have some details you'd like to talk with us about, that would be fine. senator markey? >> thank you, mr. chairman, very much. now, i've heard that the right agreement here includes a one-year breakout period of duration of 15 to 20 years would be the agreement. now, the iraq reactor would be neutralized. and there would be a full scope safe guards under the additional protocol.

those are the highlights the way i understand it. are the iranians willing to give up the heavy water reactor at iraq? >> senator, i think you've covered many of the key details that would be required. there's some others. the short answer is, that unless iraq is neutralized so that it is not able to produce plutonium that can be reprocessed for a weapon we don't have a deal. there are different ways of doing that. one of the things that our negotiators are looking at, and the folks who -- the scientists who know the technical details, are the different ways of doing that. that's part of the negotiations.

but the bottom line is absent satisfaction on iraq we will not have a deal. >> have they agreed to take iraq's heavy water processing capacity off the table? >> as of this moment, no. >> they have not. and on fordow, your testimony pointed out that before the japoa, iran had about 200 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium in a form that could quickly be enriched into a weapons-grade level. and produced much of the material at the fordow facility. you say they no longer have that capacity. what do the iranians then expect to do with their civilian nuclear sites specifically the underground facility at fordow under the agreement that you're negotiating right now? without getting into the details of what we're negotiating, but again we'd be happy to discuss that in a closed setting, again in the case of fordow, any agreement has to eliminate its production of 20% fissile material in a

permanent fashion. so that's something that would be critical to the agreement. >> i wrote a book back in 1982 on the international atomic energy agency and i concluded at the time it was a paper tiger in terms of its ability to put in place the kinds of intrusive inspections that would ensure that there was not a breakout. and so, what i'd like to do here, just to give you a chance just to talk about the inspections regime, that other countries abide by, and what iran is now negotiating, so right now, 122 countries have agreed to allow the iaea to inspect nuclear sites any time they want, with as little as two hours' advance notice. can you tell us a little bit then about what the iaea inspectors can do in terms of visiting fordow and natanz, and other facilities if they want to go in with no notice essentially, which is what the

other 122 countries allow to happen? >> that is exactly the kind of thing, again, without getting into the specifics and the details, exactly the kind of thing we would be striving to achieve. that, in fact, any agreement with iran would require the kind of access, monitoring and transparency that actually would put iran in a place that's exceptional. that no other country has to abide by, precisely because over these many years as has been alluded to, they have forfeited the trust and confidence of the international community. so we would be looking not only at the additional protocol, but other steps which i can talk about in a different setting, that would give us, and give our partners confidence that we had all along in effect the production and supply chain, the minds, the mills, the centrifuge production facilities, and then the uranium and plutonium facilities, if any, themselves, that we had access. and also, this would require access to military facilities, and i should add -- >> so what are they telling you about parchin? their willingness to allow for iaea inspectors to go in to that site? >> what i'd like is for your

permission to leave any of the specific details of where we are in the negotiations including what they've expressed a willingness to do and not do to a classified briefing which we'll be happy to provide. >> i think it's very important for the united states to understand exactly what will be the level of intrusiveness into each one of the sites. and finally, although there are so many things that we can talk about here, it has been reported that saudi arabia and jordan are interested in pursuing nuclear cooperation agreements with the united states.

how will we be able to convince those countries to agree not to demand the right to enrich uranium as part of those agreements if we allow iran to continue to maintain its enrichment capability as part of a final agreement? and i put that in the context of the 123 agreement and the chairman already referred to this, the 123 agreement with the united arab emirates, which again i thought was a mistake. as i think a mistake would be made if we had an agreement with saudi arabia, for example. just will trigger a pro-live indication cascading effect if there is not a sense that there is equal treatment. could you talk about that a little bit? i think it's very important for us to go to the next step in terms of what is the reaction of saudi arabia, if iran has this capability. >> first of all senator, let me note your own leadership on these issues and the work you've done over the years on this. we have a very clear policy of trying to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing second nothing. we're working to discourage proliferation technology beyond

countries that already possess it. i think any resolution we reach with iran will be exactly the opposite of a model for any other country. i don't think any country would want to follow the path that iran has followed to get to where it is. which is involved a decade or more of increasingly onerous sanctions, isolation, and an economy in tatters. that doesn't make any sense. so i think iran is actually the countermodel, and it sends a very strong signal to the rest of the word, that this is not the path to pursue. if you want to have a peaceful nuclear program, and get the most advanced technology, which we could provide under a 123 agreement for example. so i think it's actually very powerful in the other direction. >> we can pursue this further, but again, i think a no enrichment policy is the correct policy. especially as it sets a precedent for saudi arabia, united arab emirates, and others, and especially since the iranians are clearly intending on building 8 to 10 nuclear power plants, as they are

flaring ten nuclear power plants worth of nuclear electricity generating capacity on a daily basis. okay so we just have to understand fully what the long-term emily indications are. thank you mr. chairman. >> senator grasso. >> thank you mr. chairman. secretary cohen, in a meeting in the white house last week the president said he thought the chances of a deal were about -- were less than 50% and i think you said exactly the same thing xd today. when you look at odds like that i think it's important for us to take in to consideration the pie possibility that this does not succeed, and what we need to do in case of an arrangement -- agreement isn't received isn't able to come out. you had said that the if there is not a deal that the congress and this administration would move quickly to enact new sanctions if iran were to walk away from the talks. so could you talk about some specific additional sanctions that you think the administration would at least support imposing on iran if the

diplomatic talks fall apart, and nothing is achieved? >> senator, we have, as you know, over the course of the last several years, focused in a number of important areas on iran's ability to sell its oil, on its access to international financial system, on its ability to trade, and on investments in iran's various -- i think all of those issues would be ones that we would explore and likely focus on in additional sanctions. i'm not prepared to tell you specifically today what the detailed sanctions would be. but we -- but i think those broad areas, which have been, i think, quite effective, would be areas where we'd be -- >> you make the point where you say those are things we'd be interested in exploring. and so then the question naturally leads to, how long would it actually take until sanctions were imposed that would actually have a meaningful impact on what's happening? >> i think that's an important question. i know that their ranking member menendez commented earlier about the phase-in time for certain sanctions.

and for some legislation in the past we have had relatively delayed phase-ins. particularly as we start to do some brand-new things. in other areas, the phase-in time has been quite short. to cite just one example with the ndaa of 2012 there was a requirement that we block all iranian financial institutions. so impose sanctions on iranian financial institutions. that was implemented in a matter of weeks after that legislation was enacted. so there is -- there are precedents where new sanctions, new legislative sanctions, can go into effect very quickly. executive sanctions, when we act by executive order, they're immediately effective, and so they go into effect, the day that they are announced. and just one final point, even with sanctions that have some delayed phase-in, business and industry adjust before the effective date of the sanctions. so if it's a two-month phase-in

you see financial institutions, you see businesses immediately beginning to scale back their activity so that they're not caught up short when the sanctions go into effect. so we can impose sanctions very, very quickly. if need be. >> and since the combined impact of sanctions, not just by the united states, but by others, has its initial impact on the ground, have there been these discussions with p5 plus 1 about imposing sanctions across the board that would snap back into place? >> we have an ongoing conversations with p5 plus 1 partners and others around the world about sanctions and about what the future may hold. so i don't want to get into any of the details of those conversations, but absolutely. >> a number of us have just come back from saudi arabia, from qatar, from israel, have visited members of the free syrian army and this has to do with what happens when sanction relief occurs and where the money is spent that goes to iran, what we have heard from the commanders

on the ground of the free syrian army is when sanctions were relieved in the past money went into iran which then immediately went to help finance efforts efforts with assad. that assad at this point is buying oil and food staples from isis, so an indirect funding through assad to isis. so i'm wondering how you see what happens on the ground at least what we heard visiting with the free syrian army. sglif heard similar reports. it's terribly concerning. no question about it. i will say that our sense of what iran has been doing with the funds to which it has been given access that were otherwise frozen is primarily to use those to try to prop up its economy, which is as deputy secretary tatters. but we have been very much focused on iran's support for

terrorist organizations for the syrian regime throughout this process. and we'll continue to take action where we see an ability to do so. >> obviously, hamas, hezbollah. mr. blinken if i can visit with you about proliferation. the other thing we heard, and i think senator markey talked about, if iran is able to proliferate, who can do and what interests are going to be. we heard saudi arabia is interested in pursuing a development program or purchasing nuclear weapons from pakistan. there is that concern that this could result in actually instead of eliminating nuclear arms resulting in an arm's race in the middle east. can you comment on that? >> yes, senator, thank you. what's most likely to lead to a nuclear arms race is iran getsing a nuclear weapon. that would open the flood gates and we would go down a path that

no one wants to go down. as i suggested earlier, it's our judgment that what iran has done is hardly going to be a model for any other country. i don't think any other country would want to subject itself to the burdens that have been imposed by the international community over the last decade or more for its efforts to pursue a nuclear weapon. the isolation, the sanctions, the state of this economy, the message that that sends to everyone else is this is not what you want to do. what you want to do is to respect international norms and indeed we're prepared to work with countries that do that. also to provide for them for peaceful purposes the most advanced technology for their nuclear power programs, but not enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. so i think the message it sends is one of following international norms, not violating.

>> as a final thought, i agree if iran has a nuclear weapon that will happen. the question is if they are allowed to enrich at a level that far exceeds what they really need for energy use. there's a mathematical calculation for what they need plus the potential of how much they want to enrich and the concern that even the approval of that could result in this additional proliferation and arms race. >> our entire focus is on ensuring that as a practical matter they are not able to produce enough material nor a bomb in less than one year. that would give us plenty of time to take action with the international community or alone if necessary to counter that effort. i should say we're being very conservative about this at least in my judgment. as you know, it's not just the material. it's having a weapon, it's the assessment of our intelligence community that they were

pursuing a weaponization program, at least until 2003. the evidence suggests they stopped them, but this is something we remain individual lent about. it's also the capacity to being able to make that together. but what is most visible, what is most easiest to see, account for, measure is the material. and that's why in this agreement what we're focused on is making sure that the constraints are so severe and the access so exceptional that we would be able to see if they tried to break out and would have plenty of time to do something about it. >> thank you, mr. chairman, i understand that senator purdue has preferred to senator johnson for time reasons. i would say to the audience we appreciate you being here and listening. we don't appreciate being involved in the dialogue so if you could keep comments to yourself. senator murphy. >> thank you very much, senator corker, congratulations on. i wanted to accept your

invitation and focus some of my questions on the jurisdiction of this committee and maybe sneak in a last question on sanctions. mr. chairman, as you know, i have been one of the strongest proponents of congress exercising its constitutional authority and responsibility when it comes to being coequal with executive branch with respect to the management of foreign affairs. that's why i think it's absolutely essential requirement that this committee continue our work on the constitution spells out very clearly that it's our responsibility to declare war and we need to weigh in on what is happening today in syria and

iraq. the constitution is also equally clear as to when the congress has the responsibility to weigh in on international agreements entered into on behalf of the on united states by the executive. there's a long standing precedent on what constitutes a treaty requiring the u.s. congress to weigh in and what constitutes a nontreaty obligation entered into by the executive. it's important to understand the difference between the two. i accept the caution that secretary blinken made to us about a new precedent that we might be setting about weighing in on this agreement and what it would mean for future agreements. i also work about our ability in the current political context to have a reasonable, productive debate on international agreement of this import. the fact is that we can't even approve treaty recognizing disability rights. we have an agreement on illegal arms trafficking that was opposed only by iran, north

korea and syria at its inception and we can't even begin a discussion about that treaty here. so i worry about our ability to process this. but i do understand the concerns that the chairman is raising. so i want o to maybe direct a few questions to our witnesses about the concerns. the first is that a suspension of sanctions is part of an agreement with the iranians. has the effect of being a permanent sanctions, thus essentially eliminating our ability to weigh in with a statutory removal of the sanctions. so i guess i will ask secretary cohen this question. do you believe if an agreement was reached that led to a suspension of the sanctions that that would be an effective unraveling of the sanctions?

or do you believe that it if the iranians didn't live up to that agreement, we would have the ability to put back in place sanctions that were suspended. it's a legitimate concern that senator corker is raising and would be good to hear your thoughts. >> absolutely, and it is a legitimate concern and one that is foremost in the minds as this agreement is being negotiated, which is that whatever relief there would be from sanctions, from our own sanctions as well as from the sanctions that have been imposed through the u.n. security council would be in relation to steps taken by iran. so as secretary blinken noted earlier, the idea here is for phased sanctions relief, phased and tied to specific milestones that the iranians would have to meet. that is in part designed to

ensure that if the iranians don't meet those milestones, we can reimpose the sanctions quickly because they will have been suspended, not terminated. it's important that our international partners as part of that agreement are buying into that same phased approach so that if iran doesn't meet its milestones, doesn't fulfill its commitments, not only will our sanctions go back into effect, others will as well and they are all committed to reimposing the sanctions. so i think it is a legitimate concern, but one we're trying to address by the way the agreement is being constructed. >> it was a legitimate concern raised about the jpoa that did not end upcoming true. people said this would be unraveling of the sanctions, and even our loudest critics now accept that those sanctions can be reinstituted because they have held together. secretary blinken, just talk about what happens within the p

5 plus 1. if we reach an agreement that our partners are enthusiastic about, they are able to get domestic support for and congress disapproves it, what happens in that situation? our partners have consented to and the administration has consented to but congress rejects? >> you're putting the spotlight on a fundamental point that's important to keep in mind as a general proposition, which is we're nots the only ones who have a vote in this. it's our partners who are critical to a sustaining and if it comes to that actually increasing sanctions. so working to keep them on board has been a critical effort by the president repeatedly over these years. there are several partners, for example, for whom implementing these sanctions is a real economic burden or poses real burdens. keeping them on board is going to be an effort. so if we wind up in a situation

where we reached an agreement that all of our partners believe is in their security interests, our security interests, the security interests of other partners beyond those making the agreement and then that agreement was to be in some fashion unravelled here, i think what would result is the sanctions regime that so many in this chamber have labored so hard to put in place, that would likely unravel. implementing additional sanctions, we would be unable to implement the existing regime. iran would be off in that sense potentially scot-free. that's at least a danger we would have to grapple with. >> one question on sanctions. as a potential tool to the negotiating table, consider a

resolution from the united states congress stating our clear intent upon the failure of negotiations to reach fruition to enact the kind of crippling sanctions that we're all beginning a discussion about today. clearly it would be nonbinding, but would put the majority of the senate on record stating our intention to move very quickly and expeditiously with sanctions. would that resolution be a violation of the jpoa and would it be helpful to your negotiating position over the course of the next few months? >> i don't believe it would be a violation, and i think it would be consistent with the approach that we have taken enabling us both to make clear what would follow if the iranians do not reach an agreement and at the same time not putting us in position where we risk destabilizing the strong coalition that we built to impose sanctions.

so it sounds at least on the surface that that would be consistent with the approach that we're taking. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. >> senator johnson? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'd like to thank the senator for switching positions with me here. mr. blinken, just reviewing the security council resolutions, the goal or the requirement of u.n. 1696 was to ask or call for iran to suspend enrichment of uranium. same requirement, suspend enrichment. 1747 stated that the nuclear program must be verified as only peaceful, and i'll come back to that. 1803, reaffirmed the previous four resolutions. 1929 calls for the halt of enrichment by iran. who or at what point in time did we abandon that requirement? >> senator, thank you. i think what we know is and what we have seen is that iran has mastered the fuel cycle. nothing we do can do that. we can't sanction away that

knowledge, we can't bomb it away, they have mastered it. so in our judgment what is critical to our security and that of our partners is to establish a comprehensive solution that gives us the confidence because of the extraordinary stringent restrictions on that program as well as the exceptional access that inspectors would have that as a practical matter they cannot produce the material to make a bomb. that is the way to get at the concerns that motivated the u.n. security council. >> pretty simple question. when did we abandon the goal of not allowing them to enrich uranium. >> in the course of the negotiations with them, i think it became clear not only to us, but also to all of our partners that iran was not going to give

up as a practical matter some very limited forms of enrichment in the event of an agreement. >> we basically abandoned that, correct? >> in the course of the negotiations and they foresee a final resolution that includes a limited and constrained enrichment capacity. >> mr. cohen, you said there's no higher priority to prevent ooin from obtaining a nuclear weapon. i believe this is your quote, your goal was to guarantee. how can you possibly guarantee they will not obtain a nuclear weapon? >> senator, the intention and i think it's consistent with what sec nar blinken has said, is to ensure if there's a deal to be had here that the time line for breakout is such that we would be in a position to respond so that if iran does not adhere to

its commitments under an agreement will be able to take action to ensure that they do not obtain a nuclear weapon. >> there would be military action then. give ourselves enough time so they cannot obtain a nuclear weapon? is that the administration's policy? >> there are a variety of steps that could be taken upon the detection that iran was not adhering to its commitments. >> we have had testimony how expensive it is to enrich uranium and also if you have a peaceful nuclear program, there's no reason to enrich uranium because you can obtain it readily in the open market, is that correct? >> that's correct. >> with that in mind, mr. blinken, you said earlier, you can't imagine the country would the harm to its economy that iran is subjecting itself to. why is iran subjecting itself to the isolation, the sanctions,

and the harm to the economy if it were not other than to obtain a nuclear weapon? >> i think it's an excellent question. away we believe is they clearly had military aspirations for their program and indeed at least until 2003 were pursuing weaponization activities. one can certainly ask why a country that's so rich in oil resources would need an expansive nuclear program, even a civil nuclear program. those are all extremely good questions. here's what they say, and i'm not saying that i agree with any of thi8ñj

that. >> that's something we have pointed out to them repeatedly. >> how do we ever have a successful negotiation? how do we ever get a good deal with the regime that's behaving this way? >> so i think a few things should happen, and this is the subject of a lot of analysis and assessments and also this is something we can discuss in a different setting. i'm not vouching for any way, shape or form, but i do think what's developed over time is a sense of national pride about the program, a huge investment, ironically, made in the program and a desire to sustain some pieces of it. from our perspective what's critical to our security and

that of our partners is if they are going to have a nuclear power. program it's so constrained, so limited that it cannot as a practical matter be used to produce material for a nuclear weapon and would give us plenty of time to do something about it if they did. >> why does the president of the united states believe he's the sole person that can actually decide whether or not the deal with iran is a good deal or a bad deal for our entire nation? why does the president believe he's the only person that should have that authority and does not believe this is really more like a treaty that would require ratification by congress? >> senator, i don't think that he believes that or that we believe that. as we discussed earlier, one of the most powerful levers we have to make sure that iran makes good on any commitments it makes under an acord if one is reach ed is precisely the ability of congress after iran has made.

good on its commitments to actually end big pieces of the sanctions that congress has put in place. that's a tremendous power. congress has to be fully part and parcel in doing this, just as congress was critical to establishing the sanctions regime, just as we seek these consultations going forward on the details. at the end of this, the role is absolutely critical. so you'll have a strong vote. that's why we want to keep ending the sanctions to the far end of the process to hold iran to whatever commitments it makes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator kain? >> i have been a strong supporter of the administration's diplomatic efforts with iran. we all share the goal of an iran with no nuclear weapons and the determination of such intent diplomatically rather than militarily is preferable to everyone. i think the jpoa has been a

success. there are those who predicted it would lead to unraveling. those predicted it would lead to a surge in the iranian economy, it didn't. i think skeptics at the origin now realize that the jpoa has largely been successful. with respect to a final deal, i have a series of very significant concerns. first a deep skepticism about iran. with u.s. has had to position to potentially engage in an evacuation of the u.s. embassy. a very, very serious contingency that's likely enough we have had to position military assets there it. all understand that the effort to topple the government in yemen has been supported and funded through tehran.

tehran is basically turned the assad regime into a puppet state. they have done that in iraq for years. they are currently involved in activities to destabilize the governments of nations as near as bahrain. so separate and aparts, iran is engaged in activity today that should make us be deeply skeptical about their intentions. second, i'm worried about the negotiation and the potential consequences of it. the united states was engaged in a negotiation with libya over the dismantling of the nuclear program and they gave up their nuclear weapons. libya is no good example for anything now, but imagine the chaos if the weapons had had survived. we were involved in a deal and it dismantled their weapons program. the united states was involved in a nuclear negotiation with north korea where we asked them to freeze their program. they cheated and they have nuclear weapons now. i want this deal to look more like the deal with libya, a dismantlement than trying to make a deal about let's freeze it it with a nation that has proven to be untrust worthy

because if it's only that kind of a deal, the end result is more likely to be the north korean situation. iran has made it plain in the course of this negotiation. this is not an negotiation about iran dismantling a nuclear weapons program. it's a negotiation about trying to buy a year of time to have an alarm bell ring and act. we're already going down a path in this negotiation, in my view, where it's more like the korean scenario than the libyan scenario. the number of sent fujs that centrifuges that are being contemplated. the enrichment capacity does not trouble me and that could be part of the deal, but it would have to be a capacity consistent only with the civilian nuclear program and not civilian plus a whole lot more and the kinds of

things i've been hearing about the number of centrifuges contemplated in this deal. this is not consistent with a purely civilian program. and finally, the point that was made by senator gardner, this is going to trigger an arms race in the region. our allies and others are telling us this. and if all we get with a deal like this is iran agreeing to we'll give you a year before we break out, other nations are going to say, okay, i have to be able to have nuclear capacity within a year. they are going to have to engage in those behaviors. if it's just a year we're buying, they will undertake similar activity. i think congress has to weigh in on a final deal. i support the jpoa, i support the administration's diplomacy, but we have to weigh in and the reason we have to, and i understood senator murphy's point, he's right about many such deals, but he's not right

about this deal. because this it deal is fundamentally about one thing on our side. under what conditions will a congressionally imposed sanctions regime be dismantled. if the administration was negotiating about other things and saying we're not going to touch the sanctions regime at all, then congressional approval wouldn't be warranted. but there's no condition under which you're going to bring a deal back that doesn't want relief from sanctions. and so since this deal is fundamentally the only lever we have is the sanctions regime effectively implemented by the administration that's bought iran to the table. the only lever is the congressional imposed sanctions regime, and i don't think that while limited waivers were certainly contemplated, i don't think a blanket suspension was contemplated by that language. it's very important for congress

to be able to weigh in in this deal. especially given the actor we're dealing with. a couple quick questions. how confident are you for either of you that the united states or can detect nuclear sites? i understand newer and newer it rations of technology are harder to detect. how confident are you and talk about the way you're approaching the inspection? >> thank you, senator, i can also address the other important comments you made. what we know is this. the access that has already been achieved under the agreement is beyond anything we have had and that's already enhanced the ability of the iea and our own people to have a better understanding of what iran is doing and what it's not doing. any agreement that we reach,

this is something we can go into in a classified setting, would have to have more stringent requirements still in terms of monitoring, in terms of access, in terms of transparency. can we significantly increase our ability and the ability of the international community to detect an effort by iran to develop a covert program or to break out from its program? i think we can be in a much stronger place, clearly a much stronger place if we're able to get the agreement we want, and clearly in a much better place we would be if there's no agreement or if we were in the world. by the way, i should have mentioned earlier in response to several questions including senator markey, one of the other reasons i don't think countries are going to rush to do what iran did is precisely because of the limitations in terms of tran parent si, inspections,

monitoring that will be imposed on their nuclear program in the event of some kind of resolution. that's something that, again, most other countries will not want to live with because this would have to go well beyond what's required of other countries. i would just say also very quickly, senator, we share your concerns and the concerns of other members of the committee of iran's actions in other areas. that's precisely why we're vigorously implementing sanctions and taking other actions to push back on efforts to destabilize other countries on their efforts to proliferate and support terrorism. that will not end even if we get an accord with them on the nuclear program. >> senator? >> thank you, mr. chairman. the administration was very clear, mr. cohen, and thank you for being here today, at the start that the sanction relief would be very limited, but the enforcement would be very stringent. yet in the last six months, we have only had one public announcement of a sanction enforcement action. can you speak to that and speak -- has iran stopped its procurement efforts and attempts to bipass our financial

sanctions? >> as i noted since the jpoa went into effect, we have imposed sanctions on close to since the jpon went into effect we have imposed sanctions on close to 100 entities related to iran including some just last -- the end of december. a set of individuals and companies involved in trying to assist iran in getting access to u.s. dollars which remains forbidden. we have had a series of actions taken over the last several months some in august, some previously. we act when we have the information available to us to take the public designation actions and announce them. that's the tip of the iceberg. we have been continuing to work on ensuring that the sanctions

remain in place and remain firmly in place tloud this period as we were previously. and that means things that don't get quite as much attention as thedirectly with partners around the world, reaching out directly to companies that we think might be getting close to the line, and making sure they understand the power that they're courting. there have been innumerable actions well beyond the 100 designations that we've taken that have all together i think result in the sanctions remaining in place, in the course of this jpoa. and as senator -- i forget if it was senator murphy or senator kaine noted, there were a lot of people who questioned if the sanctions architecture would remain in place.

i think we have managed to keep our sanctions regime very firmly in place and have managed to ensure that the pressure on iran from the sanctions that have been developed in congress with the administration with our partners continue to apply that pressure throughout this period and continue to provide the leverage that our negotiators need. >> i'll yield the balance of my time. >> thank you. thank you very much. senator shaheen. >> thank you. thank you very much for being here. deputy secretary blinken i share the view that it's important for us to keep our coalition together if we're going to be successful. and one concern that i have is to what extent we're going to be able to do that given what's happening with russia. so i wonder if you could talk a little bit about what russia is doing today.

there's a notice of an agreement that iran and russia have just signed and you know, clearly the sanctions that we've taken against russia over ukraine seems like it's going to have an impact on what's happening with iran. can you talk about russia's willingness to continue to be part of this effort and to what extent we're seeing their commitment being reduced or not? >> at least as of this moment what we have seen in the context of the negotiations with iran is russia continuing to play a constructive role. and i can see how that would be surprising. and indeed one of the things that i think was a concern was whether russia would because of what we are doing to impose severe penalties on it for its actions in ukraine because of disputes about other courses of action it's taken including in

syria, that this would somehow rebound in the nuclear negotiations. but i have to tell you that at least to date as of now they continue to play a constructive role and they've been actually very helpful in pushing iran in the direction it has to go in if we're going to get any kind of resolution. and david may want to address anything on the sanctions piece. >> yeah. i think we have -- as you know, senator, imposed a whole set of very powerful sanctions on russia. it has i think -- we won't go into great detail on this here in this setting, but it has had a very significant effect on the russian economy and onz[ how they're perceiving what's happening in ukraine. but i think secretary blinken's right, that it has not to our knowledge sort of bled over into the iran negotiations. >> well if you would talk a little bit more about thatjé4

because one of the things i thought was very telling was when russia canceled the missile deal with iran several years ago, and we've got putin -- i was just in an armed services committee hearingya ñ upstairs where dr. brzezinski former national security adviser talked about putin's comments around using nuclear weapons during this ukraine conflict and suggesting that that might be a possibility at some point. so you know can you -- to what extent do we believe that russia continues to be very concerned about iran developing a nuclear weapon, and how is what's happening in the ukraine affecting that? >> senator, i think it does share that concern which i

think explains largely why it has been at least again, until now a constructive partner in the efforts to make sure we put in place something that denies as a practical matter the ability to develop material for a weapon. there have been reports over the course of the negotiations of iran starting to do deals. excuse me russia starting to do deals with iran. none of that to date has materialized. and indeed if russia or any other country seeks to evade the sanctions i know that the treasury department will come down on them as it has on sanctions violators throughout this process. there's pressure on russia to look for new markets, new customers, new countries with whom to engage precisely because in ukraine we have had a significant impact on their economy and on their ability to do business in some areas. but again, at least as of now within the context of the negotiations they remain a good partner. >> if i could just elaborate on one point that senator blinken

alluded to there, the first reports of a potential iran-russia oil for goods deal came up i think in the fall of 2013, and at that point i recall testifying and saying if russia were to do such a thing that we would take action, we would impose sanctions. and it was met i think with skeptical looks on the notion that we would ever impose sanctions on russia. i think we have disabused certainly the russians of any notion they would have that we would not take firm action under our sanctions authority if they were to engage in behavior that's sanctionable including working with the iranians on an oil for goods deal. >> thank you. can you also -- shortly after the jpoa was negotiated there was a lot of noise in some of the european capitals about

trade deals with iran and trade delegations that were being sent to iran. can you talk about what's happening to date, if any of those have successfully negotiated any deals assuming there was an agreement that would be reached and sanctions would be lifted? >> i know senator, this has been a long-standing concern of yours and something that we have been watching very closely, as have our colleagues at the state department department. we're not aware of any deals that have been struck in the event that a negotiation is successful. and i will say that under our sanctions authority executivery contacts that go into effect when it ours are sanctionable. and we've made clear in all of ow outreach that a deal that is contingent upon lifting of sanctions in the future is immediately sanctionable today. >> and do we have any idea how many delegations have actually visited tehran?

>> i don't have that number right at hand. there have certainly been, you know, quite a few that have visited. no question about that. but we have -- we've tracked it. we have reached out on many occasions to some of the sponsors of these trips. some of the entities that are understand what the rules of the road still are. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. senator flake. >> thank you mr. chairman. and thank the witnesses. like many in this room i've been supportive of these negotiations. i applaud the administration for undertaking them. i think it's incumbent upon us to look for every avenue. we often say the purpose of sanctions is to get parties to the table. they are at the table. and so i'm confused by the notion that some would want to impose additional sanctions

while negotiations are going on. recognizing and stating that the purpose of sanctions is to bring people to the negotiating table. having said, that i'm as skeptical as anyone that iran will actually come through and follow through on their agreements for the long term. i certainly hope they do. i am as concerned as you are about breaking up this coalition we have the p-5 plus one. these sanctions have been effective because they're multilateral. and i'm very concerned they will break up. they are at the table because this has been iran versus the west rather than iran versus the u.s. and i think that's what we need to make sure continues. and so i am sensitive to the administration's concern that congress move ahead now with additional sanctions even