screeria -- nigeria. - about the financial

influence that outside groups have on today's elections.

>> obviously we have the individuals here who choose to disrupt the hearing and so i will ask our -- all spectators who are here to observe the hearing today to observe the courtesy of allowing us to hear from the witnesses and for the hearing to proceed and, of course, if you decide to disrupt the hearing as you usually do we will have to pause until you are removed.

i don't see what the point is, but i would ask your courtesy to the witnesses and to the committee and to your fellow citizens who are very interested in hearing what our distinguished panelists have to say who have served our country with honor and distinction. i hope you would respect that. so we will move forward the senate armed services committee meets to receive testimony on impacts of budget control act and sequestration on u.s. national security. i am grateful to our witnesses not only for appearing before us today but for their many decades of distinguished service to our country in uniform. i appreciate their attempts to warn the congress and the american people of what is happening for their services. the brave young and women they represent and our national security if we do not roll back

sequestration and return to a strategy-based budget. we look forward to their candid testimony on this subject today. such warnings from our senior leaders have become familiar to many of us despite an accumulating array of complex threats to our national interests, a number of which arose after our current 2012 strategy was developed and then adjusted in the 2014 qdr. we are on track now to cut $1 trillion from america's defense budget by the year 2021. while the budget agreement of 2013 provided some welcome relief from the mindlessness of sequestration that relief was partial temporary and did little for certainty that our military needs to plan for the future and make longer term investments for our national defense. and yet here we go again.

if we in congress don't act sequestration will return in full in fiscal year 2016 setting our military on a far more dangerous course. why should we do this to ourselves now? just consider what has happened in the world in just this past year. russia launched the first cross border invasion of another country on the european continent. a terrorist army with tens of thousands of fighters took over a swath of territory the size of indiana in the middle east. we are on track to having 3,000 u.s. troops back in iraq and flying hundreds of air strikes a month against isis. yemen is on the verge of collapsed as an iranian backed insurgency swept in and al qaeda continues to use ungoverned spaces to plan attacks against the west. china has increased aggressive

challenge to america and allies in the asia pacific region where geo political tensions and potential for miscalculations are high. and, of course, just last month north korea carried off the most brazen cyber attack ever on u.s. territory. let's be clear. if we continue with these arbitrary defense cuts we will harm our military's ability to keep us safe. our army and marine corps will be too small. our air force will have too few aircraft and many will be too old. our navy will have too few ships. our soldiers sailors air men and marines will not get training or equipment they need and it will become increasingly difficult for them to respond to a number of contingencies that can threaten our national interests around 24the world. we have heard all of this from our top commanders before yet

there are still those who say never fear the sky didn't fall under sequestration. what a low standard for evaluating the wisdom of government policy. the impacts of sequestration will not always be immediate or obvious. the sky doesn't need to fall for military readiness to be eroded, for military capabilities to atrophy or for critical investments to be delayed, cut or cancelled. these will be the results of sequestration's quiet cumulative disruptions that are every bit as dangerous for our national security. i will say candidly that it is deeply frustrating that a hearing of this kind is still necessary. it is frustrating because of what dr. ash carter president obama's nominee for secretary of defense said before this committee two years ago. i quote dr. carter. what is particularly tragic is that sequestration is not a result of an economic emergency or recession.

it is not because discretionary spending cuts are the answer to our nation's final challenge. do the math. it's not in reaction to a change to a more peaceful world. it's not due to a break through in military technology or a new strategic insight. it's not because passive revenue growth and entitlement spending has been explored and kpautsed. it is clearly collateral damage of political grid lock. i would like to echo what was told this committee yesterday no fall in the field can wreak such havoc on our security that mindless sequestration is achieving. america's national defense can no longer be held hostage to political disputes separated from the reality of the threats we face. more than three years after the passage of the budget control act it is time to put an end to the senseless policy and return

to a strategy driven budget. our troops in the nation they defend deserve no less. thank you for calling this very important hearing and for your very timely and insightful remarks. i would like to welcome our witnesses and thank them for their extraordinary -- thank you. this hearing takes place as the administration and congress continue to wrestle with two intersecting policy problems in our debate on how to solve them. because of sequester we have a strategic problem which senator mccain has illustrated well. every senior civilian and military leader has told us if defense budgets continue to be capped at sequestration levels we are likely not able to meet the national defense strategy. as senator mccain indicated we faced a variety of new and

continuing threats from around the world from ukraine to syria and yemen and beyond. if we don't address the problem of sequestration we will limit the range of options to address the threats and protect our national interests. for the last three years and numerous rounds of congressional hearings and testimony our witnesses have described increased strategic risks and damaging impact of budget control act top line caps and sequestration restrictions on military readiness, modernization and welfare of our service members and their families. and i am sure that we will hear a similar message today. compromise and difficult choices are required to provide sequestration relief in the department of defense and for other critical national priorities including public safety, infrastructure health and education. mr. chairman i know you are committed to working with our budget committee to find a way to work through these challenges and i am eager to help in this effort. i look forward to the testimony

of our witnesses. thank you. >> thank you senator reid. for a moment i ask committee to consider a list of 41 pending military nominations all of these nominations have been before the committee the required length of time. is there a motion to report? >> so moved. >> second. all in favor say aye. the ayes have it. welcome to all of our witnesses and we will begin with you. >> thank you ranking member reid, other distinguished members of the senate armed services committee, thank you for allowing us the opportunity to talk about this important topic today. as i sit here before you today a sequestration looms in 2016 i'm truly concerned about our future and how we are investing in our nation's defense. i believe this is the most uncertain i have seen the national security environment in my nearly 40 years of service. the amount and velocity of

instability continues to increase around the world. islamic state in iraq rapid disintegration of order in iraq and syria have dramatically escalated conflict in the region. order within yemen is splintering. the expansion continues there and the country is quickly approaching a civil war. in north and west africa anarchy extremism and terrorism continues to threaten the interest of the united states as well as allies and partners. in europe russians intervention in the ukraine challenges resolve of europe yn union and effectiveness of the north atlantic treaty organization. while the cycle of north korean provocation continues to increase. the rate of humanitarian and disaster relief missions

heightens level of uncertainty we face around the world along with constant evolving threats to the homeland. despite all of this we continue to reduce our military capabilities. i would like to remind everyone that over the last three years we have already reduced the capabilities of the united states army. this is before sequestration will begin again in 2016. in the last three years the army's active component strength reduced by 80,000. reserve component by 18,000. we have 13 less active component brigade combat teams, eliminated three active aviation brigades, removing over 800 rotary wing aircraft from inventory. we slashed investments in modernization by 25%. we have eliminated our vehicle modernization program and eliminated our scout helicopter development program.

we have significantly delayed other upgrades from systems and aging platforms. readiness degraded to lowest level in 20 years. only 10% of the teams were ready. our combat training center rotations were cancelled and almost over half a billion dollars of maintenance has been deferred. both effecting training and readiness of our units. even after additional support from the bba today we only have 33% of our brigades ready to the extent we would expect them to be if asked to fight. our soldiers have under gone separation boards forcing us to separate quality soldiers some while serving in combat zones. this is just a sample of what we have already done before sequestration kicks in again in 2016. when it returns we will be forced to reduce another 70,000

out of act of component and 10,000 out of the army reserves. we will cut an additional 10 to 12. we will be forced to further reduce over the next five years because we simply can't draw down quicker to generate required savings. the impacts would be much more severe across our acquisition programs requiring us to end, restructure or delay every program with decrease of 40%. home training will be defunded. we will be forced to drop over 5,000 seats of additional military training 85,000 seats from specialized training and over 1,000 seats in our pilot training programs. soldier fam readiness programs will be weakened and facility upgrades will be affected impacting our long term

readiness strategies. sustainable readiness will be out of reach deteriorating between 2016 and 2020. additionally overall the mechanism of sequestration has and will continue to reduce our ability to efficiently manage the dollars we do have. the system itself has proved to be very inefficient and increases cost across the board whether it be acquisition or training. so how does all of this translate strategically? it will challenge us to meet our current level of commitments to our allies and partners around the world. it will eliminate our capability to conduct simultaneous operations specifically deterring in one region while defeating in another. essentially for ground forces sequestration puts into question our abilities to put into one prolonged multi phased combined

arms campaign against a determined enemy. we would significantly degrade our capability to shape the security environment in multiple regions simultaneously. ultimately sequestration limits strategic flexibility and requires us to hope we are able to predict a future with great accuracy, something we have never been able to do. our soldiers have done everything that we have asked of them and more over the past 14 years and they continue to do it today. today our soldiers supporting five operations on six continents with nearly 140,000 soldiers committed in over 140 countries. they remain dedicated to the mission, to the army and to the nation. with the very foundation of our soldiers in our profession being built on trust but at what point do we the institution and our nation lose our soldier's

trust? the trust that will provide the right resources, training and equipment to prepare them and lead them into harm's way, trust that we will take care of our soldiers and their families and our civilians who so selflessly sacrifice so much. in the end it is up to us not to lose that trust. today they have faith in us, trust in us to give them the tools necessary to do their job. but we must never forget our soldiers will bear the burden of our decisions with their lives. i love this army and i have been a part of it for over 38 years. i want to ensure it remains the greatest land force the world has ever known. to do that it is our shared responsibility to provide our soldiers and our army with the necessary resources for success. it is our decisions, those that we make today and in the near future that will impact our

soldiers, army and the joint force and our nation's security posture for the next ten years. we do not want to return to the days of hollow army. thank you so much for allowing me to testify today and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you general. admiral greener. >> ranking member reid and distinguished members of the committee thank you for the opportunity to testify about the impact of sequestration on our navy thus far and the impact of a potential return to that in 2016. mr. chairman, presence remains the mandate of our navy. we must operate forward where it matters and we need to be ready when it matters. i have provided a chartlet to show you where it matters around the world to us and where it matters to our combattant commanders. recent events testify to the value of forward presence. for example, when tasked in august the george h.w. bush

strike group reloced from the arabian sea to the north arabian golf and was on station within 30 hours ready for combat operations in iraq and syria. navy and marine strike fighters generated 20 to 30 per day and for 54 days represented the only coalition option to project power against islam. the united states arrived to establish a u.s. presence and reassure our allies within a week after russia invaded the crimea. over a dozen u.s. ships provided disaster relief to the philippines in the wake of a supertyphoon about a year ago. and the uss fort worth and sampson were among first to support search effort for the air asia aircraft recovery. we have been where it matters when it matters with deployed

forces. however, due to sequestration in 2013 our contingency response force what is on call from the united states is one-third of what it should be and what it needs to be. sequestration resulted in a short fall in 2013 below our budget submission. this short fall degraded fleet readiness and created consequences from which we are still recovering. the first round forced reductions and generated ship and aircraft maintenance back logs and compelled us to extend unit deployments. since 2013 our carrier strike groups, ambibbious ready groups and most destroyers have been on deployments lasting eight to ten months or longer. this comes at a cost of sailors and families' resiliency. navy's fleet readiness will

likely not recover from back logs until about 2018 five years after the first round of sequestration. this is just a small glimpse of the price caused by sequestration. although the funding levels provided to us under the bipartisan budget act of 2013 were $13 billion above sequestration. those were below resources we described in our submission as necessary to sustain the navy. we pushed out nodernization to be scheduled. we reduced procurement of advanced weapons and aircraft. the epd result has been higher risk particularly in two of the missions that are articulated in our defense strategic guides. that is our defense strategy. i provided a copy of that.

the missions at the highest risk are those deterring us to defeat aggression. now a return to sequestration in 2016 would necessitate a revisit and a revision of our defense strategy. we have been saying this for years. that would be a budget-based strategy for sure. we would furger delay critical war fighting capabilities and contingency response forces and perhaps forego procurement of ships and submarines and down size. in terms of war fighting the sequestered navy of 2020 would be left in a position where it could not execute the missions that are referred to. we go to high risk to we could not execute those and we would

face higher risk. that's seven out of ten. more detail on the impact as i described is on a handout in front of you and outlined in a written statement. although we can model and we can analyze and we can quantify war fighting impacts as was said what is less easy to quantify is sequestration's impact on people. people under write our security. we call them ouray symmetric advantage. they are the difference between us and the most tech nologically advanced navy close to us. we have enjoyed meeting our recruiting gelz and until recently our retention has been remarkable. however, the chaotic and indiscriminate discursion of sequestration really left a bitter taste with sailors civilians and with our families. and the threat of looming sequestration along with a recovering economy is a troubling combination to me.

we are already seeing disconcerting trends in our retention particularly our strike fighter pilots, nuclear trained officers our s.e.a.l.s., cyber warriors and some highly skilled sailors in information technology and nuclear fields. these retention symptoms that i described remind me of the challenges that i had as a junior officer after the vietnam war period on a down size. it reminds me of when i was in command of a submarine in the mid '90s a down size. the world was more stable then, mr. chairman than it is today. i would say we can't create that same circumstance. sequestration will set us right on that same course that i just described. frankly, i have been before and as was said i don't think we need to go there again. ship building and related industrial base stand to suffer from a sequestered environment.

companies not necessarily the big primes but the companies that make key valves key circuit cards and things that put us together might be forced to close businesses. it takes a long time to build a ship and longer to recover from the losses of skilled workers or materials that some of the companies provide. the critical infrastructure in this vital section of our nation's economy is key to sea power. i understand the pressing need for our nation to get the fiscal house in order, i do. it is imperative we do so, i say, in a thoughtful and deliberate manner to ensure we retain the trust of our people and sustain appropriate war fighting capability. unless naval forces are properly sized, modernized at the right pace with regard to the adversaries, ready to deploy with adequate training and

equipment and capable to respond in numbers and at speed required by commanders. i look forward to working with this committee and with congress to find solutions that will ensure that our navy retains ability to organize train and equip great sailors and marines and soldiers and coast guard in defense of this nation. thank you. >> thank you. it's always an honor to be here, a special honor to sit before you today with three people i consider to be friends, mentors and literally heroes. my pride in our air force hasn't changed since the last time i appeared before you. what has changed is we are the smallest air force we have ever been. we deployed operation -- >> repeat that again -- >> we are now the smallest air force we have ever been. when we deployed the operation desert storm in 1990 the air

force had 188 fighter. today we have 54 and heading to 49. in 1990 there were 511,000 active duty air men alone. today we have 200,000 fewer than that. as the numbers came down the operational tempo went up. your air force is fully engaged. all the excess capacity is gone and now more than ever we need a capable fully ready force. we simply don't have a bench to go to. we can't continue to cut force structure as we have been doing to pay the cost of readiness and modernization or we will risk being too small to succeed in the task we have been given. bca level funding will force us to do exactly that. we will have to consider vestiture of things like the u 2 fleet, global hawk black 40 fleet. we would have to consider reducing mq 1 and 9 fleet by up to ten orbits. the real world impact of those

choices would be significant. in the isr missionary alone 50% of high altitude missions being flown today would no longer be available. commanders would lose 30% of their ability to collect intelligence and targeting data against moving vehicles on the battlefield. and we would lose a medium altitude isr force the size of one doing great work in iraq and syria today. the air force would be even smaller and less able to do the things routinely expected to do. i would like to say that smaller air force would be more ready than it has ever been, but that's not the case. 24 years of combat operations have taken a toll. in fy 14 and 15, we used the short-term funding relief for the balanced budget act to target individual and unit readiness. and the readiness of our combat squadrons improved over the past year. today, just under 50% of those units are fully combat ready. under 50%. sequestration would reverse that trend instantly. just like an fy 13, squadrons

would be grounded, readiness rates would plummet, red and green flag training exercises would have to be canceled, weapons schools classes limited and air crew members frustration in their family's frustration will rise again, just as the major airlines begin a hiring push, expected to target 20,000 pilots over the next ten years. we have a broader readiness issue and the infrastructure that produces combat capability over time, things like training rages, test ranges, simulation infrastructure, nuclear infrastructure, have all been intentionally underfunded over the last few years to focus spending on individual and unit readiness. that bill is now due. bca caps will make it impossible to pay. the casualty will be air force readiness and capability well into the future. i would also like to tell you your smaller air force is younger and fresher than it has ever been, but that wouldn't be true either. our smaller aircraft fleet is also older than it has ever been. if world war ii's venerable b 17 bomber had flown in first gulf war, it would have been younger

than the b 52, the kc 135 and u 2 are today. we currently have 12 fleets of airplanes that qualify for antique license plates in the state of virginia. we must modernize our air force. we want to work with you to do it within our top line. it certainly won't be easy and it will require accepting prudent operational risk and some missionaries for a time. but the option of not modernizing isn't an option at all. air forces that fall behind technology fail. and joint forces that don't have the breadth of the air space and cybercapabilities that compromise modern air power will lose. speaking of winning and losing, at the bca funding levels, the air force will not longer be able to meet the operational requirements of the defense strategic guidance. we cannot defeat an adversary, deny a second adversary and defend the homeland.

i don't think that's good for america. no matter what angle you look at it from. we do need your help to be ready for today's fight, and still able to win in 2025 and beyond. i believe our airmen deserve it. i think our joint team needs it. and i certainly believe that our nation still expects that of us. i would like to offer my personal thanks to the members of this committee for your dedicated support of airmen and their families and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you, general dunford. >> chairman mccain, ranking member reed and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. i'm here to represent the marines and testify on the impact of sequestration. i would like to begin by thanking the committee for your steadfast support over the past 13 years, duty or leadership we fielded best trained and equipped marine corps we have ever sent to war. i know we have high expectations for marines as our nation's naval expeditionary force and readiness. you expect the marines to operate forward, engage with partners, deter potential adversaries and respond to crises. when we fight, you expect us to win. you expect a lot of your marines

and you should. this morning as you hold this hearing, the marines are doing what you expect them to be doing. over 31,000 forward deployed and engaged. i've captured what the 31,000 are doing in my statement. i ask that be accepted in the record for the interest of time. our role as a nation's expeditionary force and readiness helps us equip the marine corps. it prioritizes the allocation of resource that we receive from congress. before i address what would happen at a budget control act level of funding with sequestration, let me quickly outline where we are today. we have experienced budget cuts and fiscal uncertainty over past few years, we prioritize the readiness of our forward deployed forces. but in order to maintain a readiness of our forward deployed forces we have assumed risk in modernization, infrastructure sustainment and quality of life programs. as a result, approximately half of our nondeployed units, those who provide the bench to respond

to the unexpected, are suffering personnel, equipment and training short falls. in a major conflict, those short falls will result in a delayed response, and/or additional casualties. we're investing in modernization at a low level. we know that we must maintain at least 10 to 12% of our resources on modernization to field a ready force for tomorrow. to pay today's bills we're investing 7% to 8%. over time, that will result in maintaining older or obsolete equipment at higher cost and more operational risk. and we are funding our infrastructure sustainment below the dod standard across the future years defense program at the projected levels we won't be properly maintaining or enlisted barracks, training ranges and other key facilities. when we can meet the requirements of the defense strategic guidance today, there is no margin. even without sequestration, we will need several years to recover from over a decade of war in the last three years of flat budgets and fiscal uncertainty.

in that context, bca funding levels with sequester rules will preclude the marine corps from meeting the requirements of the defense strategic guidance. sequester will exacerbate the challenges we have today. it will also result in a marine corps with fewer active duty battalions and squadrons than would be required for a single major contingency. perhaps as concerning, it will result in fewer marines and sailors being forward deployed in an position to immediately respond to crises involving our diplomatic posts, american citizens or interests overseas. while many of the challenges associated with the sequestration could be quantified, there is also a human dimension. our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines and their family should not have to face doubts about whether they would be deployed without proper training and equipment. the foundation of our all volunteer force is trust. sequestration will erode the trust that our young men and women in uniform, civil servants

and families have in their leadership. and the cost of losing that trust is incalculable. given the numerous and complex security challenges we face today, i believe the dod funding at the budget control act level with sequestration will result in the need to develop a new strategy. we simply will not be able to execute the strategy with the implications of that cut. thank you, once again, for the opportunity to appear before you this morning. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. i thank you all for a very compelling statements and i hope that all of our colleagues and in fact all of the american people could hear the statement and see the statements that you made today. our most respected members of our society. i would also have an additional request, that is that if you could provide for the record all

of you a list of some of the decisions you would have to make if sequestration continues to be enacted and there is no amelioration of the situation that you're in. i guess the only other comment i would like for you to answer, because i'd like all my colleagues to be able to have time to answer questions is the old line about those of us that ignore the lessons of history. general odierno, you made reference to it. when general shymire came before this community and said we had a hollow army, i know my friend senator reed remembers that also, and we were able to recover hardwarewise and ships

and airplanes and guns and -- but it took a lot longer than that to restore the readiness and the morale of members of our military and all four of you made reference to it. i would like you to elaborate a little bit on the personnel side of this because it seems there is always the best and the brightest that leave first when you're a pilot that can't fly and on a ship that doesn't leave port and on so maybe each of you can give a brief comment about the intangible that makes us the greatest military on earth. i'll begin with you, general odierno. >> thank you, senator. the center of everything we do is our soldiers. the army is our soldiers. and without them, and their capabilities, our ability to do our job becomes very, very

difficult and it is something that happens over time. my concern is when you're funding readiness, you're funding the development of our young soldiers and you can't do that episodically. you have to do in a sustained manner. it allows them to execute the most difficult and complex missions we face. in today's world, those missions are becoming more complex and more difficult. my concern is as they see maybe we're not going to invest in that, they start to lose faith and trust that we will give them the resources necessary for them to be successful in this incredibly complex world that we face. i think sometimes we take for granted the level of capability our soldiers bring and the investment we have made into the education and training, which is central to everything that we do. and we can't lose sight of that. and unfortunately with sequestration, we are going to

have to reduce that over the next four to five years for sure because we cannot take in and strength out fast enough to get the right balance because of our commitments we have. therefore you have to look at readiness, training and modernization. we're losing cycles of this training that develops these young men and women to be the best at what they are, the best of what they do. so for us, we can't forget that. >> as chairman, i bring something to everybody's attention. when we had sequestration, we say, we exempted personnel as if, hey, that's good. that means they got paid. but that doesn't mean that they got -- that's their quality of life and we gave them their housing allotment, that's good. but the quality of their work, which is what you're alluding to, when they go to work and what general was -- the general was alluding to, they're not proficient at what they do. and they're not -- therefore they're not confident.

as a sailor, you're out to sea, you're on your own, you need to be confident and know you can be proficient. you alluded to pilots. you have a have and have not. if you're deployed, you're flying 60 hours a week sometimes. if you're not deployed, you may be flying ten hours a week and some may be in a simulator. you're sitting around the classroom looking out the window at your strike fire hornet, it looks great but it is on the tarmac. that's not why you joined. the same at sea. if you're a destroyman and in a submarine, you're not operating. that becomes behavioral problems eventually because the idle mind is the devil's workshop. we're out and about, our alcohol problems go up. i alluded to it, i saw it in command, saw it as a jo. this is what happens. then this gets to family problems, it starts cascading. you bring all that together. we have an all volunteer force that wants to contribute and they want to do things, they

want to be professionally supported in that regard. thank you. >> general welsh? >> chairman, our civilian airmen felt we committed a breach of faith with them. they still have not recovered completely from that. if it happened again, it would be absolutely horrible. and i believe we would see the effect immediately in retention. i can't emphasize enough my agreement with what john just said about people not joining this business to sit around. pilots looking out at their airplanes parked on the ramp feel like a hollow force whether we define it that way or no same thing with the people who want to fix the airplanes, load weapons on them, support them from the storage area, all they want is to be the best in the world at whatever it is they do. all of our people are that way. if they don't think we will educate them, and train them and equip them to do that, and to fill that role, then they will walk. they're proud of who they are, proud of who they stand beside

and proud of what they represent. and when they lose that pride, we lose them. when we lose them, we lose everything. >> also, we're going to have, as you made reference to, a significant draw from the airlines as the vietnam era pilots retire from the airlines. i think that's an additional issue that we are going to have to face up to anyway without sequestration. >> we see it today, sir. >> chairman, thank you. you alluded to the hollow force of the 1970s. i was on active duty during that time. i was a lieutenant commander -- platoon commander where we had organization of about 190,000 marines, we didn't have proper landing, didn't have proper training, didn't have proper equipment. where we saw the impact was in poor enlistments, discipline rates. we were unable to maintain the quality people that we wanted to

have and quite frankly i know myself and many of my counterparts at the time had a difficult decision to stay in the marine corps. and many of us only made the decision to stay once the marine corps started to turn around in the 1980s. as you alluded to, it took five to seven years after we started to make an investment for the morale to catch up. the thing i would add to what the other chiefs said is that i think most of us would be -- would not have been able to predict the quality of the all volunteer force and its ability to sustain now over 13 years at war. there is nothing that has allowed that force to sustain except for intangible factors. it has not been how much we paid them. it is the sense of job satisfaction, sense of purpose, sense of mission. as i alluded to, their sense of trust. none of us want to be a part of our last tour and active duty want to be part of returning back when we had a hollow force. i think we're fortunate we're not tested at that time.

>> thank you very much, mr. chairman. thank you, general, again, for your testimony, for your great service to the nation. you have already reduced training. you already reduced maintenance. you already stretched out acquisition programs, et cetera. whatever we do, i think you will manage and which presents the interesting problem is that we could be in a period of a steady accelerating, but invisible decline until a crisis. and then the reckoning will be near. -- will be severe. i think we have to take appropriate action now and the chairman's leadership is critical in that. let me just go and ask you individually, with all the cuts you already made, with all the losses, looking forward what are the one or two capabilities that you will see leaving or lost if sequestration goes into effect. i'll ask each of you. general odierno? >> i often get asked the

question what keep me up at night. and the number one thing that keeps me up at night is that if we're asked to respond to an unknown contingency, i'll send soldiers there not properly trained and ready. we simply are not used to do that. the american people and we expect our soldiers to be prepared. and that they had the ability to train, they understand their equipment, they have been able to integrate and synchronize their activities so they're very successful on the ground. that's the one thing that i really worry about as we move to the future. the second thing is our ability to do simultaneous things. what we're coming to the point now, we'll be able to do one thing. we'll be able to do it pretty well. but that's it. this world we have today is requiring us to do many, many things, maybe smaller, but many, many things simultaneous. i worry about our ability to do that. >> admiral greenert, please. >> we're at a time of modernization. our benchmark is the year 2020

and our ability to do the missions i refer to. and for the navy, a lot of those missions require joint access to areas around the world and, against an advanced adversary. i look at the futures, perhaps the inability, we'll fall further behind in what i call electromagnetic maneuver warfare. it is an emerging issue. electronic attack. the ability to jam, the ability to detect seekers, radars of satellites and that business. and we're slipping behind. our advantage is shrinking very fast, senator. also, anti-air warfare. our potential adversaries are advancing. we're losing that. and if we don't have that advantage, we don't get the job done in the 2020 time frame. the undersea domain we dominate in it today, but we have to hold that advantage and that includes

the ohio replacement, the sea based strategic return in addition to anti-submarine warfare. it is about access and the ability to get that access where we need. cyber is also another one. one we talk about a lot. lastly, i can't underestimate the fact that we're good and we will continue as joe dunford said, our forces we put forward, we'll put forward and they'll be the most ready. we're required to have a response force, a contingency force. we owe that to the combatant commanders. if we're not there today and we'll just never get there, if we go to sequestration. we'll remain at about one third of what we need to be. thank you. >> thank you, general. if you could be succinct. >> infrastructure that gives you long-term capability, training ranges, test facilities, we haven't been investing, it will cost us the ability to operate in the future. multiple simultaneous operations.

we simply don't have the capacity anymore to conduct that, particularly in areas like isr, refueling, et cetera. the capability gap is closing as john mentioned between the people trying to catch up with the technologically and they have momentum. if we let the gap get too close, we won't be able to recover before they pass us. space and nuclear business and space business, we cannot forget that that is one of the fastest growing and closing technological gaps in the cyberarena if we don't try to get ahead in that particular race, we'll be behind for the next 50 years as everybody else has been behind us in other areas. those are my biggest concerns. >> thank you. commandant. >> the two capability areas first would be our ability to come from ship to shore, we're in a vehicle now that is over 40 years old and replacing that is both an issue of operational capability and safety. also our air frames, f-18 are both over 20 years old, an issue of operational capability and safety. but i would say, senator, you alluded to it, my greatest concern in addition to those two capability areas is the cumulative effect of the cuts we made to date and the cuts we

make in the future. every day i'm still finding out second and third effects of the cuts made to date in the sequestration that was put in effect in 2013. >> thank you very much. further complicating your lives and our lives is that this is a focus today on the problem of defense, but the ramifications go to government. and the impacts will roll back on you. one more obvious example is if the state department is subject to sequestration, they won't be able to assist you in the field

>> which has 22 000 children including 18 dependents in ft. hood would lose an estimated $2.6 million. we have to take our view not only towards the defense but the cost of the whole government. you all talked about taning troops. that's not your responsibility, that's our responsibility. it will affect you in so many different ways rngs you will, as the general will be waking up getting complaints about how the schools have been and leaving and that's not title ten. so, thaurng for your service and your testimony. >> senator wicker. >> thank you, gentlemen. this is very profound testimony today. and very helpful to us.

we have a debt problem in this country. no nation in history has maintained its military power if it failed to keep its fiscal house in order. we're blanksing a spending problem with really, a lack of funds in the defense department that you talked about today. in your 40 yearings or so of service, this is the fewest number of ships.

and general dunford,in talking about sequestration, you say it's the funding levels and, also it's the rules of sequestration. so i thought i would start with you and then we'd go back up the panel there. if we were able to give you flexibility fwr the funding levels, to what extent would that help you in the long run? >> thanks, senator, for that question. just the fupding caps alone would reduce our overall budget by about 4 to $5 billion a year.

what i ask guarantee you whatever amount of money will build the very best marine keerp that he can. we will reduce the capacity to the point where we'll be challenged to meet the kumpbt strategy. general welsh to what extent would flexibility be somewhat of a help. >> i think all of us have to understand that it has to be a solution for the nation. we don't live in a mushroom farm and not believe that that has to be true. if you look back to the 12

budget which is where we came out of, the 12 budget projecting for fy 16 was $21 billion more per year than we will have at bca levels. $21 billion a year requires some tough decisions to be made, some very hard and unpopular decisions to be made. without the ability to make those decisions we'll continue to be stuck and not sure where we're going in the future. the clock is ticking away on that predictability, isn't it, general? gl yes, sir, it is. >> my colleagues have spoken to the flum beryl the value, that is the dollar value. as i would say, the verb, sequestered, that's an algorithm. we spend months reprogramming with your help up here on the hill. and we lose months. four, five six months on a program, like, for us the ohio replacement program, where we don't have time.

it was still only 33% ready. and so, yes, flexibility will give us the ability to manage insufficient funds in our department. but that's all it does. it allows us to better manage. today, we had to extend our -- all our aviation programs so the cost for every apache has gone up. the cost for every ch 47 has gone up because we had to extend the programs longer and longer and longer. we're paying more money per system. we're inefficient, even with the less dollars we have. even exacerbates the readiness problems even more. so flexibility would help, but it is not going to solve the problem we have, which is a problem of insufficient funds to sustain the right level of readiness. >> thank you. let me just ask briefly, there was a decision we would pivot to asia pacific. to what extent do the joint chiefs of staff consulted on that. we have got -- we have got eastern europe, russia, still have the middle east and everything going on there. doesn't seem to have calmed down as some people thought. to what extent was this a pentagon decision that we could even have a repivot to asia pacific? and afford it?

we had a good discussion on the re -- what we call the rebalanced asia pacific. >> i would comment, i agree with that. we had thorough discussions and we thought the rise of china in -- this is 2012, was very important. we had to be able to have the capability to respond potentially to that. and also the problems with north korea and other problems in the asia pacific. and we made some assumptions about where we would be in the rest of the world, those have not quite played out the way we thought with iraq, isis, and specifically russia. and their increased aggression. the strategy is still good, we just have to recognize that there are some additional threats out there that we didn't expect. and that we have to deal with those. that increases the risk as we look at sequestration and other budget cuts. >> thank you, gentlemen. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, all, for your service.

general welsh, i wanted to ask you, in regards to our nuclear mission, it is a very, very critical mission, obviously. what impact is sequestration going to have in your area? >> two specific areas at the top of the list. nuclear infrastructure i mentioned before, we're at a point in time where we have got to start modernizing and capitalizing some of the infrastructure in terms of facilities built 15 years ago now. we have an investment plan designed. it is prepared to be put into

place. we actually have it in the president's budget this year. if we go to sequestration, all of the facility maintenance and new buildings that we have put into that proposal will fall off the table, except for a single weapons storage area at one of the bases. so that's the first point. the second one is that we do have a requirement, as a nation to make decisions on what do we want to recapitalize and modernize in terms of nuclear weapons and nuclear command and control capability over the next 15 to 20 years. it affects the air force and the navy. the decisions on that need to be made in the near future. sequestration and bca caps will limit the amount of things you can do in that arena and make those decisions more important to make earlier so we don't waste money leading into the time when those things have to be done. >> admiral, how will this affect the plans you have for the ohio class? >> if i get back to the verb, if we are sequestered, we lose months as i was saying before hiring engineers and we're on a very tight timetable to start building the first ohio in 2021. that's kind of one piece we have to continue to do that. the sea based strategic deterrent is my number one program.

in fiscal year 17 through 20, we have $5 billion invested as advance procurement for the first ohio, which in 2021 is $9 billion on top of the ship building plan we have now. very difficult to do. we have to do it, though, senator, so we'll have to continue to work in that regard. >> thank you, and i obviously have the same concern you all do on our war fighting capabilities. when you look at the difficulties in syria, and iraq, and that area, what are the kind of things we're not able to do there that you look and you go, if we were doing this, and this, it would really help move the ball forward. where are you being placed in a tighter spot right now? general odierno, if you give us a start. >> i would just say it is -- the first thing is this fight against iraq and syria is a long-term issue. this is not something resolved in weeks and months. something that will have to be resolved in years. and it is going to require a