announcement was decided i knew about it. >> you found out simultaneously to the announcement being made? >> no, no, no, no no. no. as that was being decided, i knew about that. in other words i knew about the decision to announce the new policy about six weeks as it was being decided before, and so the date of the announcement i was -- i knew about as that was being decided at the white house.

>> okay. can you tell me what resources, what u.s. resources were used to ensure that girardo hernandez, accused of killing four u.s. citizens, could artificially in sem seminate his wife? what resources were used on that. >> we from the state department from my perspective have always given the visit of life when he was incarcerated. >> but transferring, i understand he was able to artificially inseminate his wife, and that was by the u.s. government? >> beyond her ability to have

these visits, that was decided by the department of justice. >> i would like to know that. i would think it would be a u.s. priority to make sure hernandez fathered a child while he was in incarceration. i'll wait for the answer on that. last question. these secret negotiations went on for over a year and reportedly consisted of seven meetings. so when you went to havana last month for talks, cuba made it very, very clear they would not allow their diplomats to speak to dissidents and normalcy was not possible until the return of prisoners to guantanamo bay and other things we talked about today. so what did we really accomplish, other than maybe getting a t-shirt that i had meetings for over a year and all i got was this lousy t-shirt? >> i guess i would start out by saying we got an intelligence asset out of cuba and we got

alan gross home, and you know that. but beyond that the beginning of this process of normalization starts with diplomatic relations, which is only the first start. normalization is going to take years, and we made it very clear that it includes things like property claims, which has to be part of this discussion judgments against the cuban government, which has been adjudicated in u.s. courts which has to be part of this, so that's a much longer process and we haven't acceded to any of the things -- >> i don't expect that we will ak acquiesce to any of those. >> it's the start of the process. >> i understand, but what was your response when they said we won't do any normalization? >> what they meant by normalization was the end of that years-long process, not the

restore restoration of diplomatic relations. >> thank you very much sir. mr. connelly of virginia is recognized. >> i thank the chair. miss jacobson, i believe in politics and in diplomacy and a very simple adage don't give it away for nothing. i am very troubled by the abrupt change in u.s. policy to cuba at precisely a moment where we actually have leverage. for 50 years one could argue the castro brothers have loved u.s. policy because it's helped keep them in power. fair enough. but that was then, this is now. things have changed. they're hurting. the economy is hurting.

there is their oil supply is hurting. as they look out to the future, it's very difficult to see a viable cuban economy without major change including a change in the relationship with us. now, i take your point about diplomatic exchange, and i put that aside. but the liberalization in trade and tourism and investment and, indeed, the president's call to begin the process of dismantling the embargo that's been in place for half a century, i need to understand what we got in return with the reciprocity. why wouldn't the united states use its good offices and its leverage with respect to human rights, with respect to press freedoms with respect to religious freedoms with respect to political dissidents. in our briefing when we asked that question, the answer we got was, we're not doing this. to me i must admit, that's

shocking. and i think a disappointment to many that we wouldn't use the leverage we finally have to some good point. i worpdnder if you would address that because i think we squandered leverage. >> first i want to start out by saying that what liberalization there has been in regulations, and my colleagues would certainly specify on all of this, is very specific and i think mr. smith repeatedly noted that most transactions still remain prohibited. >> if i may, fair enough. but the promise of the president, he said explicitly, we're going to start the process of dismantling the embargo. cubans see promise not just here and now, but a pathway toward the dismantlement of a policy that's been in place for half a century. >> and the president said he would like to see a debate over that, there's no doubt.

but the cubans still keep demanding this in part because it's still there, so they know it's not a big liberalization yet. in addition, i think the most important thing that we have made clear to them is we're not letting up on human rights. if you were to try and be transactional about this with the cuban government, the problem with that is that they won't trade for anything. and we will end up still not helping the cuban people. the goal of these policies is not to do something that relies on the cuban government agreeing to give us something for a human rights concession. we want to try to go directly to the cuban people. now, it's true they may not let the telecommunications companies

work or more internet access. but what has the news all over cuba and every cuban knows is we're restarting our relations, and the boogey man of the u.s. being their problem is no longer credible. >> again, my time is limited. i appreciate that and i wouldn't deny that there are lots of people who see lots of hope in what has now been started. but my question is really more specific. what is the reciprocity? what did we get out of this other than the aspirations that things will get better with this change because they weren't getting better under the old regime? i can't think of a single thing but in terms of a policyship a confession i couldn'tan't think of a single one. >> i believe we also will get some things that matter in

opening our embassy and hopefully the ability to travel throughout the country and see more people and support more people. we can't really move outside havana right now. >> that's what you hope. >> but that is necessary for opening an embassy. that's part of this. i also think that, you know, we will have all of these dialogues that they want to have for cooperation. that will be part of those discussions as well. it is to come i agree. >> madam chairman, i know my time is up, but i want to under underline, i always think it's a mistake in foreign policy to give it up for nothing. >> thank you, mr. connelly. now we turn to mr. duncan the subcommittee chairman. >> there are oppressive regimes like cuba. more sanctions on venezuela the

same week as the policies shift on cuba. may we see similar normalized relations with venezuela or other opressed regimes? >> the sanctions that were imposed on venezuela were deceased sanctions -- >> when the president started normalizing things with cuba he imposed some things on venezuela. >> if you're talking about the signing of the regulations signed by congress it's not a trade sanction bill. >> are we going to see any more normalizations? are there going to be more surprises? we didn't see cuba coming. what are we going to see with venezuela or others? >> i can't speak outside my region, but i don't expect to see any surprises with venezuela, nor any surprises on could you be cuba. we'll continue to consult on

that. >> i think you were surprised over the cuba talks and you weren't brought into it until late in the discussions, but let's move on because many of the people i speak with about this policy shift on cuba some even here in congress, talk about and point to the freedom now afforded americans to travel to cuba. so i ask is the same freedom of travel a two-way street? is the same freedom of travel afforded the cuban people to travel to the united states? and in this policy shift american travelers unless it's family travel, stay in hotels owned by the cuba military they can accept credit cards, and they require all foreign commerce to be in the state, so how does this help the cuban people? >> let me start out by saying on travel by cubans, we're looking at that really carefully since the 2013 decision by the cuban government to allow our people to travel, it's gotten better. you've been able to have some

dissidents to speak in front of this house that's never been able to before but it's by far not good enough. there are still people who can't travel, and they should be able to. they should all be able to travel freely. let me say that on the trade portion, i will go back to what i said. we understand that there will be some benefits to the human government. we really do believe, again, because of people that we've talked to who are entrepreneurs because of activists because of artists, because of some of the small agricultural folk working that they will benefit more than the government will if we are able to implement these regulations and get them the equipment they need that the government won't provide them. >> they'll benefit from maybe some economic transaction, i'll give you that. we'll see. how about other freedoms for the cuban people? what was negotiated in this? freedom of speech freedom of religion, economic freedom, freedom of assembly and protest?

i point to miss burkhardt's testimony yesterday. she said the truth is the government opresses our right. the government is constantly repressing activists who are trying to gather together to discuss issues important to them. so the assembling of a peaceful government is still there so what did the u.s. barter in exchange for this partnership that benefits the cuban people and ultimately gives them more freedom? i want this to be about the cuban people. if we're truly going to pursue a policy to normalize relations, it ought to be about the cuban people and not the castro regime, and the castro regime is the only one i see that benefits from this economically, through the businesses they own and operate. i don't see where property rights are really going to -- maybe. you mentioned that earlier i think someone asked that question, but property rights and the claims by

cuban-americans and cuban people in general that own property that was nationalized by the federal government. how are we going to address that? i think the private property rights is so important, and it's sort of left out of this discussion, and you and i talked about this in my office the other day. i think that's critical. we talk about the freedoms for the cuban people in the remaining 20 seconds that i have. >> thank you, mr. chairman and i agree with you that all of those things are what we're seeking, and i think we all agree that's the goal here. >> so tell me how this policy gets us to that goal. >> the policy gets us to that goal, number one by having a lot more people able to work with us on it from outside cuba than ever before. we were alone. we were not joined by anyone else. we are more effective with allies. number two, we believe that there were no concessions here. some of these things are things we're doing that deeply worry

the cuban government because they may not be able to control them, and we don't believe that anything we did on december 17 as the president and secretary have said were concessions to the government. >> my time is up. the concessions to the cuban people are important. i yield back. >> now we go to mr. lowenthal of california. >> thank you, chairperson. i have been touched by listening to the people most affected by the oppressive regime and that's been joined by congressman siciline and congressman bass by saying i've been touched by both the testimony of congressman cyrus who talk about their families and some of the impacts. having said that, i am very supportive of our re-engagement and the restoration of

diplomatic relations. i sauy that not because i support any of the oppressive issues, but i say that as someone of one of the largest vietnamese communities in the united states, people who escaped also an intolerable situation, who i believe while certainly very, very against the existing regime in vietnam have benefited by having, i think greater ability to communicate some of their concerns. and they've had it by having the u.s. ambassador to vietnam come to a community which is not at all supportive of that government and really have a dialogue and be able to express some of their concerns. i see that as a very, very positive step. so my questions are as we go forward, will there be a strategy also to reach out to the cuban-american community in

the united states who have been suffering a great deal? that's my first question. >> absolutely sir. we have begun doing that knowing the views in that community are diverse as well and seeing activists within cuba among the four points they could agree on was that the cuban dia srkssper has to be taken into consideration. >> i think that's really important. i also would like to know what we see as we move forward. there is more trade and more tourism. how are we going to deal when many of those tourists go back to cuba and speak out against their government that's in cuba? have we talked about some of those issues? >> we certainly considered that in terms of cubans coming to the united states, and when that travel policy was liberalized there was enormous concern among

activists that if they left and spoke freely they either wouldn't be able to go home perhaps, or if they went home, they would they would never be able to travel again. the fact that some have traveled repeatedly, i think, is a good sign but some are still fearful. and we raised that issue. >> anyone else have any issues or want to respond to any of the issues as the policies begin to change, what you see in the future as some of the consequences. not so much the reasons -- i'm wanting to move forward. where do we go from here? what do you see that we need to look at as this policy has changed? >> the points i would make are one, we certainly are doing a lot of outreach to all segments of the american public. we understand what the new changes are. and secondly, we'll be watching very carefully to see how they actually play out in practice. because coming back to the 15% of the cuban population and the

cuban communist private sector, we're looking to grow that with these opportunities. that's certainly something we'll look at very carefully. >> i would echo those comments. i think the implementation is what we'll be looking at over the next few months to see what the effects are and what we need to do to make -- >> as a member also because of my own concerns and also because of the concerns of the communities i represent, i've been a very active member of the tom lantos human rights commission, i have adopted prisoners of conscience in vietnam, actually put pressure on the vietnamese government to begin to release some of these prisoners. i would like to see some of the same efforts increase as we go forward with change policy in cuba. thank you and i yield back. >> thank you, mr. lowenthal. we go to mr. brooks of alabama. >> thank you madam chairman.

i believe that america's policies should be consistent throughout the globe as best that we can do so. and by way of example i would like to just make a quick comparison between cuba and saudi arabia looking at some of the similarities between the countries, some of the differences and also the desperate ways in which each is treated by the united states government. on trade american-cuban trade is very limited as we all know, less than $5 million per year in exports to america by cuba but american-saudi trade is very robust. roughly $80 billion a year, perhaps higher. on travel to cuba, very limited by the united states government. saudi arabia, quite the opposite. on embassies and diplomatic

interaction, in saudi arabia we have an embassy and very significant diplomatic interaction. in cuba, we have no embassy and little to no diplomatic interaction. i could go on and on, but i think it's fair to say that the united states treats cuba substantially differently than saudi arabia. as i listened to the witnesses and other comments concerning cuba and why cuba must be treated differently, i can't help but emphasize some of the similarities and differences that have been pointed out. on the issue of freedom of religion, as bad as cuba may be and we've heard some comments as to how bad it is, the question is, is saudi arabia worse? one member commented that some religious observance requires cuban government consent. yes, in saudi arabia, open worship by christians is a criminal offense, as is missionary work. if a muslim dares question whether islam is a true

religion he is severely punished. dawai being a recent example facing 1,000 lashes and six to ten years in prison assuming, of course, that the lashing does not kill him. on the issue of dictatorial government, one would be hard pressed to know whether the cubans or the saudis were more dictatorial. on the terrorists most of them were saudi, and in fairness much of it opposed by the iyaud regime, but nevertheless, still a lot of money for terrorism comes from the country of saudi arabia. one could have a lively debate again concerning which country poses a greater threat to world peace. given so many similarities and

also some differences, with saudi arabia being treated so much better by the united states of america what factors in your mind justify treating cuba so much worse than saudi arabia that supports the 50-year policy the united states has had with respect to cuba? >> thank you. congressman, i think that our own view has been pretty clearly laid out by the president on the 17th and the secretary certainly made a number of comments that we believe that cuba not on its merits, necessarily, in terms of its behavior, but on the effectiveness of policy arguments, the efficiency and what is in our national interest merits a change in that policy, so it was announced in december. i can't necessarily make that comparison between saudi arabia and cuba, but i will say that we

believe very strongly that the values and the ideals of the united states need to be pursued aggressively all over the world and that they are best pursued and you could expect this from a diplomat at the state department via diplomatic relations and having embassies. those are concessions or gifts. we do them effectively when we have a presidentence. that's why we want to have a presence in cuba. >> i'm running out of time. america is always faced with a difficult choice. on one hand we can be open hoping our relations with this country will certainly cause them to accept freedom that we cherish in america. or we can be very restrictive as we have been with cuba, north korea and other nations in hopes that the punishment will be sufficient. what do you think, long term, is best for cuba? >> i think we're most effective

when we have allies with us, and we were alone vis-a-vis cuba. so i believe the openness with allies to the cuban people not the cuban government, will be effective. >> gentlemen, your time is expired. mr. deutsch is recognized. >> thank you madam chairman, for making sure we were able to be heard on these policy shifts. i work with north china, and let me say that i'm extremely concerned about the human rights abuses as my colleagues have today, and i hope that we expect and demand more of them. coinciding with the administration, one of the major south side newspapers published an in-depth feature which exposed the way criminal networks have exploited policy toward cuba. madam chairman and the united states opened the doors to cuba

so they could have a better life, and those who have come here have made incredible contributions to our country and become a deep part of the fabric of our society. a great example is those on this panel. policies were put in place to ensure that those who sought refuge in the u.s. would still be able to see their families, and remittances are being taken advantage of for criminal gain. individuals engaged in normalized criminal activity have turned our terror policy into an underground criminal enterprise to use their ability to return to and from cuba to engage in an elicit product and are transporting large sums of cash back to the island and evading arrest will not extradite the fugitive. they have turned our open door policy into a revolving door enabling, and i quote, crooks from the island to rob american businesses and taxpayers of more

than $2 billion in two decades end quote. as the administration rebalances its relationship with cuba, i hope we're not ignoring many years of cuban activity that the americans have turned a blind eye to at best. we need to know to what extent the regime or people connected to the regime have been or will continue to be involved in these illegal crime rates. assistant secretary jacobson, i'd like to know if your initial round of talks with the cubans included any discussion of extradition of immigrants from cuba, and if not, how and when will this issue be raised? >> it certainly did include the discussion of fugitives. it did not specifically include the question of extradition. as you know, we have a very old extradition treaty that has not been used in many years. i have no idea whether we will get back eventually to actually using it but it certainly included the question of fugitives and the desire to have

much more in-depth conversation about law enforcement and fugitive issues in the future. >> can you just elaborate a bit on the extradition you referred to, the situation that we have now, but in the talk -- >> wait. let me -- i just want to be clear that the morning of the talks i had were on the diplomatic restor orksrestoration. in the afternoon we're going to have experts who are not me have much more substantive conversation about what we want, all right? that's one of the subjects. >> what will be the context of those discussions and when will they take place? >> right. we're going to try to set those up as quickly as possible. part of that conversation already began in the migration talks because we take with us our lawyers and the department of justice and we talk about fugitives in the context of the migration talks, so we've actually begun that one. but we'll have a separate conversation on law enforcement

and fugitives basically as we can set these up in the time schedule. the cubans are a little bit overwhelmed by our new wanting to have dialogue on lots of different subjects. they have accepted the idea of having that and we'll get them set up as soon as we can with our justice department colleagues. >> thank you. mr. smith, understanding much of this falls under law enforcement's purview, has your office looked at where the money coming from these critical cuban networks, where all that money, which usually comes back to cuban cash goes, or the role of human government in sponsoring or even training these individuals, or what's being done to impede their activities? >> they do work with our law enforcement colleagues on a variety of issues that relate to sanctions. with respect to any issues with regard to money flows or anything that might impact the u.s. law or u.s. sanctions, i

couldn't talk about anything we would actually be looking at. >> can you speak to the specific situation that was described in great length in these newspaper reports? >> i think most of what you described at great length from the newspaper reports and the details from the newspaper reports, i would refer to the department of justice. i think it would have the primary equities there and primary statutes that would be involved. what we would do in opec is we enforce the sanctions laws and very little, from what i've seen, impact our regulations that we would enforce. >> thank you. >> thank you gentlemen. time has expired. mr. francis? >> you said we did not make concessions to the cuban government, but later in your answer you said the cuban economy will have benefit to the u.s. government. that is a concession is it not?

>> it is a been theynefit they may receive. >> and russia is reeling from a change in world oil prices, and i think the castro government wants any kind of patronage they can get. and i think as mr. cirrus poind srkss pointed out, money going into that country is going to be regulated by the government. you have open relations switzerland, australia, whoever. how come with all those ties the cuban people have not benefited? because you said in your testimony in response to a question by mr. poe that the human people are not better off after 50 years of our policy. my question is if the other policies of all the other countries in the world are so good, why haven't the cuban people benefited from those policies? >> i think part of the problem in terms of actual sort of economic policy in cuba is that

they have not modernized their system, opened their system, made a foreign investment law that adequately attracts investments to have those other countries be a part of it. >> and they said they are not going to change. castro said they're not changing. he said this is a victory for the cuban revolution and we're not going to change. so i don't see where you get the people of cuba are going to somehow benefit more than the regime. i think the regime will benefit from this but until there's a change, i think the benefits are going to be bottled up at the top. >> but remittances go directly to cuban people. we raised the remittance amounts in addition. one of the reasons they haven't rushed to us to implement the telecommunications provisions or the internet provisions they've been very, very wary of all this is because they know full well that they probably won't be able to control it and that the benefits may well reach the cuban people. >> so they're probably not likely to do it. let me ask you this.

when you took your trim, were you given access to any of the political places the prisoners were being held? >> i was not. >> has there been any discussion, is the united states trying to get property return that was taken by castro when he took power including cubans in exile? >> we said the omission of private property has to be part of the conversation. >> what was their response? >> they agreed it had to be part of the conversation and responded they had issues they wanted to raise with us about losses under the embargo. >> i know they wanted gitmo. can you categorically say that on january 20 2017 at 12:00 p.m., a date a lot of my constituents are looking forward to, that gitmo will still be under u.s. control, the naval base? >> i'm certain that guantanamo will still be a u.s. stay, but i

can't tell you what would be a part of these normalization talks. but it's not on the table for us right now, and i don't envision that, but i'm not a high enough ranking person to know, and i'm not from the department of defense, et cetera, to know whether it could be in the future. but -- >> i'm just talking about over the next few years that this administration is in power. >> i can't envision that. >> cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism, the federal statutes. in order to be removed from that list, there is certain criteria. one of them is the government has to provide assurances that they will not support international terrorism. the cuban government provided those assurances, and if so are they credible? >> cuba has repeatedly rejected international terrorism, and we're in the process right now as we review this of also looking at their statements and

evaluating whether they have or whether they will give such a concern. >> if they won't change to me that's a declaration to the contrary. my final question is, does the administration believe that the president has the authority to unilaterally lift the embargo? >> clearly not or he would not have welcomed or encouraged the debate in congress. >> we've been down this road because he said he couldn't do this a number of times and then turns around and does them so i think it's important to get this on the record. the statute is very clear as to what would have to happen in order to have any kind of waiver of these restrictions. there is no evidence that any of those criteria have been met up to this point. is that accurate? >> i'm sorry, a waiver to have lifting of what kind of restrictions? >> any type of provisions that can be waived there are certain provisions that are listed that must occur in order for the president to act? >> to act and lift the embargo,

the president was clear at the state of the union that he wants that to be debated in congress. >> gentlemen your time has expired. thank you, mr. santos. mr. caster of texas. >> thank you madam chair. i've been moved by the testimony, and many cuban americans lost family members, lost property, lost their livelihood in their country, and for many years, i think much of our foreign policy toward cuba was in great deference to that fact. when you hear the stories, that's very understandable. i do think with the president's change in normalization in diplomatic relations towards cuba that the power of american culture and the power of our technology and our democracy will ultimately win out. and i think that in many ways it's the start of the new revolution in cuba, and as the

brothers are in the winter of their range, with that they are gone. i ask you how is it our country vis-a-vis cuba wants these folks no longer in power? >> thank you congressman. i think this really is the question question. one of the things that's critical is the next generation of activists, the leaders, we want to keep face with them. i thought one of the most important things in this policy is how we work with the current human rights activists and democracy leaders, the new entrepreneurs and artists and expand civil society. how do we encourage them? when tanya bulgara wanted to have performance art and asked people to speak openly, 300 artists rose in support of her

effort. many of them had never made a political statement before. it's the idea of expanding people's engagement in civil society. which is novel and is important in preparing for what comes next in cuba. >> true. and i know in places like china, for example, they don't have an active social media site and many people don't have access to the internet. >> absolutely. >> i got here a little bit late, because like many of my colleagues here, i have two committee meetings at the same time. but let me ask you, what becomes of the wet foot-dry foot policy? >> at this point congressman, we have no plans to change that law, and the law obviously is on the books chlts that would have to be changed by congress. we have no plan to request such a change. >> okay. thank you. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. castro. mr. ever of minnesota.

>> thank you madam chair and thank you, panel. it's interesting. i hear often in the past few weeks that if something hasn't been working for 50 years, you should look at changing it. but nobody seems to go directly to the issue except some of the comments i've heard today about how nothing has changed within the country. and i'm interested in a couple of things, because much of it has been covered already. but the president's growth with policy by conducting a couple white house aides for this policy. ms. jacobson, you seem to at some point have been brought in and made aware of what's going on. what happened in that moment of time where the president decided to appoint these two to negotiate secretly with the cubans and why? why did he break from policy?

>> i can't answer that question on behalf of the president. what i can tell you is that one of the two people engaged in those discussions is a foreign service officer on loan to the white house, a foreign service officer who is one of our foremost experts on cuba, having served there and on the cuba issue at the state department. >> but you don't know what suddenly sparked, now is the time this has to happen? >> i think there has long been a concern within the administration that the policy was not effective in empowering the cuban people. >> let me ask you this, then, ms. jacobson. i heard from representative connelly and others, what did we get? if i understand your testimony today, these secret negotiations included, for instance discussions about the

brutalization of families. in other words, how you're going to compensate these families for their personal loss during the castro takeover and since. and there's been a promise that that will be part of the negotiations before actual -- there will be a proposal to quote, unquote, dismantle the embargo. >> what has to be part of full normalization of relations, that is making the relationship with cuba look like every other normal one, and that's the full range of things, not just diplomatic relations is a process and a resolution of this longstanding issue of. >> i just want it on the record so i understand because you separated between diplomacy and complete normalization, which would be lifting the embargo and things that the president says he cannot do as the executive,

only congress. when we talk about the, and the ability to travel across the island, which right now has not been assured, that's diplomacy. and these there are few things the administration can do without congressional approval. my next step, as i understand in your testimony today there has been a promise that there will tbl, as part of anything moovlg forward, an understanding how these families will be compensated not only for their personal loss but also their property loss. is that correct? >> there will be a process with the cuban government to come to resolution of those issues. >> so you may not require that they be reimbursed or compensated for loss of -- >> i think in all of these kinds of cases, and i'll ask my colleagues if they have any comments, but it may be the department of justice that would be better placed to answer this. in all of these kinds of things

it has to be agreed mutually between two countries to resolve this. >> i understand, but you led me to believe that when these discussions were taking place, these are issues that were, in fact, raised and have been discussed. and it would lead me to believe listing the question here today that there are things that are going to be required if congress is hoping we're going to approve a full normalization. >> right. and that means a satisfactory resolution, which means we have to be satisfied, but the cuban government will have to be satisfied, too for an agreement. >> and that would include this harboring of murderers and thieves and criminals by the castro regime? >> if you mean the question of fugitives -- >> you put these together, and i see my time is running out. you made it sound as though these are all going to be necessary requirements to a final agreement if it's actually going to be fully normalized. and i believe my time is expired, madam chair.

>> thank you so much. mr. claussen of florida. >> thank you for coming today. i would like to ask a question or two about this deal's impact on religious freedom in cuba. i represent south florida, southwest florida. and of the 94% of the jewish folks left after the revolution, someone came to my district, so this is a question i'm sure that's on a lot of their minds. of those that remain of the families. but there are also religious folks that have been persecuted in cuba. christians. we don't talk a lot about mormons much, but there are two mormon branches, i understand in cuba and other religious minorities as well. so i'm wondering about the impact of this deal on religion

in general and will missionaries and other folks from different sects be able to go and help their brothers and sisters on the island? >> i think it's really important, congressman, the regulations -- and i can let my colleagues -- this really expands the ability of religious groups to go, because what we've done is made the religious missions a part of this, the religious opportunities of general likeness. so we're hoping that there are a lot more religious groups that are able to go and see counterparts in cuba and have that interaction. in terms of the tolerance for religious freedom in cuba, i certainly hope that there will be an impact certainly by having their brethren come and work and support them. i visit the jewish community

every time i go to cuba, and i did it this time with the church, and obviously the announcement of a new church to be built, a new catholic church to be built in cuba. but it's a very important part of what we're hoping to stimulate as part of civil society. >> if i could just add to that, in the past, many americans had to come to opac to get a specific license to be able to go to cuba and participate in different religions. now people may go to cuba for religious activity, for religious purposes without coming to this government agency to seek approval first. >> and there's two pieces on our side. one is that for those trips that are now generally authorized for religious purposes the thing the travelers want to bring with them also can be done under general authorization instead of

waiting for specifically from us. it allows it without individualized licenses with this authorization. >> i hopewell have measurables here. i'm always worried about bait and switch and using some other aspect of the law to really get around things that are uncomfortable, and i personally just think it's hard to have a meaningful life for a lot of folks if they don't have a meaningful religious experience. so i'm hoping that the administration will follow up here to where we actually see leaning towards meaningful religious awakening on the island for so many that want it. >> thank you sir. >> i have no more to say. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. claussen. mr. weber of texas. >> thank you, madam chair, and gentlemen, i apologize y'all seem to have gotten some of these questions, so let me ask

y'all a couple questions. are you all going to be okay while i question her? >> yes, sir. >> thank you very much. let me start out by saying i have really appreciated your professionalism and your demeanor and your attitude. you've done a good job and i appreciate that. are there state and treasury regulations now fully in compliance with congress ms. jacobson, when it passed the parade export and enforcement act of 2000? >> yes, sir. i believe they are. >> you believe that they are. going forward, and i understand you said the president wants the dialogue that he is's happening in congress. i appreciate the comments earlier made about moving past the current regime. that was an interesting take. but going forward i have rice

farmers in texas in my district and other producers and they're very interested in the trade part of this. will the trade of ag products be able to be conducted without a lot of input and some would say, interference from the administration? >> i think that's a great question, and we know that there is an enormous amount of interest in that. i actually may defer to my colleagues on some of this. >> i think they would appreciate that. >> they will. >> yes mr. smith? >> we may change the current regulartions that change what ag requested, so it should be easier to send -- >> without a lot of red tape? >> -- without coming into opac with any requirements. any input? >> one of the things we were not able to address in our changes was the specific requirement that there will be a license

that's no more restrictive than the licensing section. so that piece stays in place, but that's currently a 12-day process. export if they have an application, ye or no on the 12th day. >> we will break away from this hearing in the house yesterday and take you live now to the senate, the armed services committee holding a hearing on the future of guantanamo bay prison here. >> i ask my opening statement be submitted for the record. at this time, when the testimony is concluded we will beginning a round of questioning. with that mr. rasmussen are you prepared to go first or secretary mccann? >> i believe it's you. >> go right ahead, mr.

secretary. >> thank you very much, senator reid. members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today at the detention certainty at guantanamo bay. our policies on retaining detainees and related issues. in 2009, president obama signed executive order 13492 which ordered the closure of the detention certainty of guantanamo bay, cuba. pursuant to that order a task force was set to discuss the detainees and determine the possibility of their release. through that rigorous effort, a certain number of detainees we are referred for transfer and review and a certain number for detention. since then pursuant to the executive order signed on march 2011 for fiscal 2012 a periodic

review board has begun to review the status of those detainees not currently eligible for transfer except for whom charges are pending or judgment of conviction has been entered. when the president came into office six years ago there were 242 detainees at guantanamo today, because of the task force and subsequent efforts, 122 detainees remain. of these, 54 are eligible for transfer. 10 are being prosecuted or have been sentenced and 58 reviewed by the periodic review process. in his nearly two years as secretary, secretary hagel has reviewed the transfer of detainees, 28 transferred last year and five transferred this year. the great majority of these transfers authorized by the secretary occurred under the authorities of section 1035 of the nda for fiscal 14.

we urge you to maintain these authorities. mr. chairman members of the committee, i want to make a fundamental point regarding the detention facility at guantanamo. the president has determined that closing it is a national security imperative. the president and his national security team believe that the continued operation of the security weakens our national security by draining resources damaging our relationships with key allies and used by violent extremists to incite local populations. it is no coincidence the recent isis videos showing the barbaric burning of a jordan pilot and execution of a japanese hostage each show the victims clothed in an orange jumpsuit believed by many to be the symbol of a guantanamo detention facility. 45 military leaders, all retired flag officers wrote this to the committee last week it is hard to oversay it how the continuing existence of the detention

facility at guantanamo has been and continues to be. it is a critical national security issue. many of us have been told by countries around the world the greatest action the united states can take to fight terrorism is to close gan tan so. this letter is signed by retired general charles kulak, retired of the marine corps and the first commanding general of the task force at guantanamo. cancel joseph of the centcom and many others. many leaders encourage closing of the facility including general dem said in admiral mullen. in 2010 general petraeus stated i've been on the record well over a year stating guantanamo should be closed. i think when ever we have taken expedient measures it has turned around and beaten us on the backside. senior figures across the

political spectrum maintain guantanamo should be closed. former secretary gates an pennetta and current secretary all support closure of guantanamo. finally, president george w. bush concluded the guantanamo closure was a proper tool for enemies and distraction for our allies. i will raise some of the letters. 27 detainees have been transferred since november 2014. these detainees have been transferred to nine different countries. key features of the process that leads to a decision to transfer include a comprehensive inner agency review and rigorous examination of information regarding the detainee and the willingness of the host country and willingness to maintain appropriate compliance of security measures. those reviews were conducted by career professionals across the

government. next, any transfer decision requires assessment of the receiving country and willingness and capability of that country to comply with assurances. we also have the ic look at that issue. finally each has been subject to six principles secretary of state, secretary of homeland security, director of national intelligence, attorney general chairman of the joint chiefs and finally secretary of defense. under section 35 of the nda they decide if it is in the action of the united states and if actions plan to be taken to substantial substantially reduce the risk of the terrorist engaging in terrorist or host file activity that threatens the united states or u.s. primary interests. the primary interest of a potential transfer is whether the dozenetainees will return to the fight.

we take the possible of re-engagement very seriously. the most recent public data on re-engagement of former detainees was released last september and the data is current as of july 2014. i know you may have seen a more recent classified report on this matter. the office of the director of national intelligence categories the figures in three ways. the totals for before 22nd january 2009 when president obama signed the executive order and total after january 22nd, 2009 referring to detainees who departed after that date. this is how the data break down. the total number is 17.3% confirmed of re-engaging, 12.4% suspected of re-engaging for a total of 29.7% confirmed or suspected. before january 2009 that is

those transferred in the last administration the numbers show 19% confirmed. 14.3% suspected re-engageing for a total of 33%. the data after january 2009 shows 6.8% confirmed of re-engaging. 6 out of 88 transfers. 1.1% suspected for a total of 7.9. in other words the rate of re-engagement has been much lower for those transferred since 2009 which attests to the rigor of this new process. of the detainees transferred during this administration, over 90% are confirmed or suspected of not having re-engaged. this leads to the transfer of the review process and security measures the refugee government intends to take pursuant to its domestic laws and determinations to mitigate the threat. of the 107 confirmed of

reengaininging the vast majority transferred before 2009. 48 are either dead or in custody. rein reingaugement is not a free pass. we take it seriously and work with partners to mitigate re-engagement or follow-up action. cannot discuss the specific discussions with foreign governments with specification. among what we seek is act to restrict travel, monitor, reintigration and rehabilitation programs. before transfer we had details specific conversations with receiveing countries about the threat they pose for transfer and what the receiving countries will take to mitigate the risk and we review the ability of that country and security and track record adhering to private agreements. let me talk about the periodic

review process briefly. the interagency process established to review whether continued detention of detainees in guantanamo is a continuing threat to security and we will maintain the step of dozenetainees risk assessment. to date, 10 full hearings of detainees made public and six eligible for security assurances pursuant to this process. two eligible by this process already been transferred, one to kuwait and the other to saudi arabia. the other three detainees remain subject to law of detention. efforts are being made to expedite this process and prioritize hearings. you asked us to address legislation introduced pie senator ayotte and several other members i understand may be marked up by the committee next week. in our view this legislation

would effectively ban most transfers from guantanamo for two years and relates to fiscal 12 and 13 which resulted in only court ordered transfers transfers pursuant to plea agreements and use of only a few national security waivers. in addition, it adds a proposal to limit transfers based on jtf gitmo threat assessments that may be outdated or not include all available information. we believe any decisions on transfers should be based on current information and individual assessments of current detainees. because this legislation if enacted would effectively block progress towards the goal of closing the guantanamo bay detention center the administration will oppose it. it bars transfers for any detainees for two years. 76 yemeni nationals remain. 47 eligible for transfer. 26 for prb review and two have charges referred and one is

serving presentence confinement. a ban on transfers is unnecessary because we are not at the present time seeking to transfer any of them to yemen, especially in light of the recent further deterioration in the security situation there. since the president's moratorium on detainees transfers to yemen was lifted two years ago in favor of a case by case analysis not a single detainee have been transferred to yemen. the 12 who have been transferred have been transferred to five other countries. we are currently seeking other countries to take additional yemenis. briefly our plan to close guantanamo has three main elements. first, we continue the process of responsibly transferring 54 detainees eligible for transfer. second, we will continue the prosecution of the detainees in the military commission's process and if possible in federal court. third we will continue and

expedite the prb process. when we have concluded, it is likely several detainees cannot be changed because they are too dangerous and will remain in our custody. ultimately closing the detention certainty at guantanamo bay will warrant us to consider other options including secure facility in the united states. the department of justice has concluded in the event the detainees are located to the united states existing statutory safeguards and executive and congressional authorities provide robust protection of national security. we understand such transfers are currently barred by statute. as a result, the government is prohibited from prosecuting any detainees in the united states even if it represents the best or only option tore bringing the detainee to justice. the president opposes these restrictions for the detainee population. you asked us to address what

happens if someone is captured on the battlefield. the disposition of an individual captured in the future will be handled on a case by case basis and by a process principle and credible and sustainable. when a nation is engaged in hostilities as we are, detaining the enemy to keep them off the battlefield is permissible and humanitarian alternative to lethal action. in some cases those detained will be transferred to third countries and others transferred to the united states for federal prosecution after appropriate interrogation in the case of ahmed ahmed. the president has made clear we will not add to the population of guantanamo bay. in closing i will note president bush worked towards closing guantanamo and many officials in his administration worked hard to achieve that objective. we are closer to this goal many

people may think. of the 800 detainees held since it opened in 2002, the vast majority have been transferred including more than 500 detainees transferred by the previous administration. the president and national security experts of this administration believe it should be closed as do the senior military leaders and civilian leadership of the department of defense. we believe the issue is not whether to close guantanamo the issue is how to do it. thank you very much for listening. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much, mr. secretary. let me do something i neglected to do prior to your testimony. introduce the witnesses. i'm a little rusty at this. secretary mckeian has presented testimony principle underdeputy department of defense and mr. rasmussen is director of the national intelligence center office of national intelligence and admiral frost myers is head of nuclear defense and joint

staff. do you have a statement? >> i believe -- >> please. mr. ranking member. >> thank you for the opportunity to appear today. specifically the analysis the intelligence community provides. the community provides a range of tailored assessments. >> could you adjust your mike? ? sorry. >> the intelligence community produces a range of assessments helping policymakers make decisions about the potential transfer of detainees from the guantanamo detention facility. these assessments include profiles of relevant factors whether individual detainees pose threats to the united states or our allies. to echo brian's remarks, we take the risk of reingaugement very seriously. the community is continuously evaluating global threat

environment and make ss those makes decisions including congress of threats to the united states. as you know we continue to face threats from a wide range of actor, al qaeda and its affiliates as well as isil and those inspired by violent extremist messaging. the full force and brutality of these groups isil and isis i felt majorly in iraq and north africa. today's threat in western countries is largely characterized by chalsmaller scale attacks and worthy noting the attacks recently are by individual terrorists. and guantanamo detainees focuses most intently on potential for these detainees to threaten the u.s. and its interests overseas after they leave guantanamo. these assessments add to provide a comprehensive understanding of the ee's background and mindset

and any groups that pose a terrorist threat to our interests. those assessments take into account the evolving threat to the united states as well as security developments overseas including the detainees' home country and conflict zones and potential transfer destinations. intelligence community products do not state whether a detainee poses a high or low risk of re-engagement. we assess the likelihood for a detainee to reingauge is shaped by a sinthy this isynthesis of environmental factors. we also provide assessments about pro-tensional destination countries, their capabilities and willingness to mitigate a potential detainees' threat. brian mentioned re-engagement. i want to talk about monitoring an individual for possible re-engagement. once a detainee is transferred from guantanamo.

the icc monitor fors engagement and work closely with liaison partners for a full understanding of a former detainee's activities. through a formal detainee's process that draws on assessment of eight different intelligence agencies we determine whether to mark a former detainee as re-engaged. we confirm a detainee as re-engaged in terrorism when a preponderance of evidence shows them involved in terrorist or negligent activities. we determine a former detainee is suspected of re-engaging in terrorism when suspected of plausible and unverified and single source reporting indicates an individual is directly involved in such activities. it's important to note engagement in u.s. statements or engagement in prop qanta activities does not by itself qualify as terrorist or

negligent activity. also the case that some former detainees have been added to this list of suspected re-engagement candidates and later removed after information came to light suggesting the individual had not after all re-engaged. to quickly run through the numbers brian cited again. 107 or 17.3% of the 620 detainees transferred from guantanamo had been confirmed of re-engagement in terrorist activities as of september 20, 2014. at the same time the ic assessed presidential 12% were suspected of re-engagement. of the 88 transfers that have occurred since the inner agency bro process that the director of national intelligence participates in in 2009 68% of those transferred during that time have been confirmed of re-engagement with another 1% suspected of re-engagement. the next unclassified report the

intelligence community will put out on these re-engagement numbers is expected in early march and we will refloekt those numbers of the recent activity. i can't point them out but say they will largely be in line of information reported from the allies. i'll stop then and look forward to your questions. >> thank you. admiral, any general comments? >> chairman reed and members of the committee thank you for having me today. as the joint staff representative of current operations i appreciate your effort and focus on this matter. may i always expend my personal thanks for your unwavering dedication and support to the members of the armed forces. i look forward to your questions. thank you very much. >> thank you for your statement admiral.

succinct and to the point. there was a letter 42 general officers addressed to senator mccain and myself. i ask it be made part of the record. hearing no objection so ordered. with the presumption that the chairman, when he arrives, will be immediately recognized let me ask a few questions and begin to recognize my colleagues. you've all testified the trimline is going down significantly. and you see this continuing in terms of recidivism which is a critical issue. is that your conclusion? >> senator reed, that's certainly what we're seeing in the data and too soon to say whether they've re-engaged or not because they're still getting settled but feel good about where we are with those that's correct. >> let me also ask both you and

mr. rasmussen as you annual thiz these individual cases of recidivism, are you using it to inform your judgments going forward, ie the circumstances of the individual, the country which he or presumably he, in some cases, perhaps she goes back to anything like that, so this is a continuing learning experience and you feel getting more capable of making judgments about the usefulness of returning the individual? >> the answer to that is yes, sir. we take a very close look at not just the individual who may be transferred but assurances the country agrees to sign up to and capability of its own security services to uphold the agreement. the ic and embassy help us with that kind of assessment. >> there is a check on the

assurances given by these various countries so we are confident they have both the capacity and the will and are actually keeping up their end of the bargain. is that accurate? >> we continue to monitor compliance with agreements through various means, including the u.s. embassy and where appropriate, liaison services and our own capabilities. >> let me go to one of the major points you made. that is specifically mr. rasmussen, that the continued operation of guantanamo gives some of our adversaries a propaganda points we respect to recruitment, tension, magnifying their operations. is that the assessment of the intelligence community? >> ye s, senator, from the

perspective of weighing these decision from the national center of intelligence, what underpins his decisions in this regard an analytical judgment of the benefits from closing guantanamo in many cases outweigh the risks occurred by releasing individual detainees. precisely because of that continued featuring of guantanamo in the terrorist narrative he's made that calculation. the fact guantanamo features in terrorist recruitment and propaganda signifies it has significant use terrorist are tries to recruit on. isil has used guantanamo in english language propagation in the english magazine and the magazine in yemen has used

guantanamo in their propaganda and also noteworthy al qaeda's senior leader ayman al zar wa hi continues to use it to those around the world. >> this is a specific issue we have to face. general kelly of the u.s. south command is concerned about the medical facilities there. you have an aging population of individuals. last year in the senate version of the authorization bill we put in language that would allow for temporary transfer because of the medical condition of an individual to more appropriate facility, care in the united states. this was not ultimately adopted. is that something that concerns you going forward, just in terms of a population that obviously is going to be -- as this

closure is delayed more and more in need of specialized care? >> it does. there are members of the population who have acute health care issues and as they get older those will continue to get worse. i was down to visit a couple months ago and had a conversation with the jtf commander about this. his concern is it's quite expensive. they have to bring in specialists to treat these individual matters from the states. i think we would prefer, if we could, on a short term basis, as you indicated in your legislation, bring them to the united states for such specialist care as needed. >> thank you very much. senator till lisis. >> thank you, senator reed. gentlemen, thank you for being here today. i have a question about the five talabanis who were released. i think we got notified through the press, back in may of last

year. my question for any on the panel would be, were the five talabanis who were released subject to the periodic review? >> they were not, sir. >> they were not. >> and if not, why? >> i was not in the department at that time, sir. i would have to go back and ask that question. as you know it was part of an exchange for sergeant bergdahl. >> so the assessment of their risk level didn't go through the processes that were established? >> i didn't want to leave you with that impression. the periodic review board process makes a determineation whether the detention of the person is still permissible. the statute you have given us requires the secretary to make the determination prior to any transfer of the national security interests and the substantial mitigation of the

risks. that, sir, that was undertaken. >> i don't believe you were there at the time, but why do you think the department decided not to notify congress, as per the statutes? >> sir, i believe the secretary- -- >> perhaps, what's the legal basis for that as well? >> sir, i used to be -- i'm still a lawyer technically and counselor on the senate foreign relations committee for several years but they stopped paying me to give legal judgments and it would be malpractice for me to try to opine on it. my understanding the department of justice and mr. preston, the general council of the department interpreted the president's powers because of the security risk and safety of sergeant bergdahl necessitated proceeding without the 30 day notice. i'm happy to get you the more refined legal answer because i'm not the person to do that for the department. >> thank you. another release of four

afghanistan nationals, i believe, back in december, why did the administration not require continued detention of these four detainees? >> sir these individuals had, i believe, approved for transfer in 2009 by -- >> did they go through the -- >> no, they -- they were already cleared cleared -- approved for transfer by the 2009 task force, sir. >> another question i had is with respect to the process. i noted that the detainee is entitled to having counsel which presumably means the information that the periodic review board uses to determine or to make a determination is available to that counsel. is that same information available to the public or congress on the periodic review cases that have gone through? >> sir with the periodic review

board, the detainee has a right to a personal representative, who's a military officer. he can employee private counsel. if that person is give an clearance, we can share certain classified information. we have tried to have some measure of transparency with the prb process in releasing information about the hearings on the department website. we are not able to share everything that's available to the prb because some of the information is classified. >> thank you. thank you, senator reed. >> thank you very much. senator king, please. >> thank you. mr. rasmussen, it seems to me the key question here is weighing the risk of individual recidivism versus what i would call a reputational risk or recruiting risk of the facility itself. could you elaborate on what the director of national

intelligence -- that's what -- that's what this is all about, it seems to me, is it more dangerous for national interests to keep guantanamo open because of its use as a recruiting tool or greater risk of the people being released re-engaging. give me your thinking on that. is that the question? >> sure. happy to answer that senator king. because the director of national intelligence does have a voice in the process to approve a transfer, he does look at as i said earlier all the relevant information related to the detainee's specific background. background while going to gan guantanamo and background in the course of detention at guantanamo and any information in which he might be transferred. at the same time he has that underlying analytic judgment the director of national intelligence has been very clear about, is there a cost in terms of our national security we're bearing because of the continued

operation of guantanamo in the context of recruitment and potential radicalization of future terrorist adversaries. the weighing process he goes through looks at both factors. that does not mean in all cases he will look at detainees and saying continuing to operate at guantanamo creates too big an obstacle to pose a transfer. there are some detainees he would consider too dangerous to return in a transfer almost -- unless there were extraordinary arrangements made for their monitoring and disposition overseas. that calculus made is not a single cookie cutter calculus in every case but is overlying assessment. >> if this is one of the key questions, it sounds like it is, i would appreciate if you or some of the witnesses could

supply to this committee data supporting evidence of this recruiting factor, just rather than a reference to what al baghdadi said or something -- a real set of materials, written materials, the way it's being used. it seems to me that's one of the most important questions we have. if we're going to decide to close the facility collectively the united states government will decide to close the facility, based upon that we better know it's real and not just a perceived threat. mr. mckeon is the administration contemplating a further executive order to close the facility beyond what the current process -- how the current process operates? >> i'm unaware of any contemplation of an additional executive order. as i said in my statement

senator, we're working on the three lines of effort transfers, the prb process i'm blanking out on the third one. >> you don't know of contemplation of additional exercise of executive authority to simply close the facility? >> i'm not, sir. we are operating under the president's executive order from 2009. >> any question that bothers me, okay, if we decide it's in the national interests to close it, there still are some people there very dangerous. can we hold these people in the united states under the law of war, and the second question is how does the law of war analysis work if the war which was the war in afghanistan, is officially over? does that undermine the legal analysis? in other words, we could bring very bad guys here and put them in maximum security prisons under the assumption they're law

of war detainees only to find we get a where it of habeas and don't have enough to keep them in a federal court. you understand where i'm going with the legal question? >> i do, sir. on the second question the detainees are already subject to habeas or can file habeas petitions in then d.c. circuit pursuant to supreme court rulings. >> there's no difference between guantanamo and some place in the united states in that legal regard regard? >> that's correct. as to the question of the legal authority to continue to hold them we are relying on the 2001 aumf that's the law of war and if we reach a point it is either repealed by the congress or decided it was no longer sustainable based on the situation in afghanistan then we would have an authority issue to wrestle with no question about that.

>> thank you gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. thank you. mr. chair welcome back. >> thank you. other members in attendance at the national prayer daybreak fast will be coming in and that obviously is the reason for me being late. i want to thank the witnesses and thank you, senator reed for proceeding. i will hold my question until senator sullivan. >> thank you, mr. chair and thank you, gentlemen. mr. rasmussen, congratulations on your recent appointment. i want to follow-up on senator king aes king's questions. there's a lot of discussion here abtout how guantanamo potentially weakens national security that you made in your testimony. at the same time, i think we would all agree that allowing known terrorists back on the

battlefield to engage our troops, our citizens, also weakens our national security. i think that that is one of the big concerns certainly of the -- this committee and members of congress. and, i'm certain, also members of the administration. so from a broad perspective, of the remaining gitmo detainees how many are currently assessed to be high or movement risk? >> senator, i don't have those numbers at my fingertips. if you're referring to the assessments that were done by j.t.f. gitmo back in the last decade, my impression is knowing the population of that which we already transferred using those categories, i think we have transferred most of

those who are low risk. i don't know then precise data. we have to get that to you, sir. >> but i mean of the current remaining detainees we don't have handle on who's high or movement risk right now? >> i don't have that at my fingertips fingertips. as we -- both i and nick rasmussen explained when we bring forward a case for possible transfer we look at the totality of the evidence what the detainee had done on the battlefield, how they behaved at guantanamo, what their current -- what our assessment is of their intentions. it's not just to look at the assessments done. >> mr. secretary, you're not answering the question, if you don't have the answer then submit it. it's important to this committee to know who's low risk medium risk and high risk. i would have expected you to come to this hearing with that information. >> yes, mr. chairman. i should add these risk levels

in terms of who's in what category is classified and we'd be happy to have that conversation with you in a classified session as well. i don't have those numbers at my fingertips it's safe to say many are in the medium or high risk category. >> it would be very important for us to know that as we move forward. senator till lis touched on this issue of the notification of congress. i think a lot of people were very disturbed by that, just by reading int the paper. can you again -- if you don't have it here perhaps with the attorney general's help provide a detailed -- detailed legal reasoning of why a very simple statutory requirement for notification of congress on the release of the taliban five was not undertaken? because i think one of the things that is troubling is

there's a lack of trust here. there's a lack of trust on the numbers. there's not certainty on what the end game is. and when a simple request -- it's not a request it's the law, one of the things i've been concerned more broadly with the administration is they view certain statutes as advisory, maybe they need to do them maybe they don't. this was a clear directive from the congress in the law that this administration violated. and as far as i can tell there's been no good explanation. i read about them in the press. they seem to change. it would be very important to get a definitive explanation from this administration on why they violated that statute. to me, it seems like a clear violation of that statute. can we get that? >> certainly. you may already have it sir. i believe the jo did a review on the legal issue in the department and probably the department of justice provided a

detailed explanation of our position and i think we provided it to the committee and if we have not we will submit it. >> one other thing, i understand there was an mou between -- regarding the taliban five, that they have a -- my understanding is a one year restriction with regard to their activities and movements. after a year are they free to do whatever they want? return back to afghanistan? that's a concern by this committee and the people. >> you are correct. the agreement between our two governments is classified and we briefed it to your staff and i think some of the members in closed session. i'd want to get into that in a closed session about what happens after one year. >> okay. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator donnelly. >> thank you mr. chairman. a recent department of justice report noted there are a number of statutory provisions that

should render guantanamo detainees relocated to the u.s. inadmissible under immigration laws. but one of the most difficult scenarios hinted at in the report involves what happens if a judge order the release of a detainee because the laws of war no longer permit their detention. in that case if a detainee cannot be repatriated to their home country or third country, the u.s. could face the need to keep that detainee in the u.s. so where does that individual go? >> sir, if we come to that position which i think we're some ways away from that day, it's a very good question and we have to plan for that possibility. we don't expect that would happen if we brought the detainees here. >> but it can.

we don't expect it but we can, so what do we do with that person that has been suggested -- i've heard some say an immigration detention center. you know i think the people of the country want a better answer than that when you're talking about the people we're dealing with. >> if we were to bring them to the united states, we would make sure we had some continuing authority to keep them. i don't think we would roll the dice on losing the authority to detain them. >> then additionally, what's your assessment of the risks involved in this situation? that's, i think as we looking through this whole process, this is one of those conundrums we have to have an answer to. what's your assessment of the risks on that sir? >> i'm not an immigration lawyer, sir i'm probably not qualified to give you an answer on that. i do know and believe the department of justice report speaks in some -- homeland

security department analyses all these issues in some detail. we are, of course currently barred from bringing the detainees to the united states. understand. but if they do come here that's -- i was -- i was on a trip to ganuantanamo recently. this is one of the subjects that we talked about and said, you know, i think before you get all the answers on this, you need an answer on this where if they're in the u.s. and this happens, what do you do with the person at that point? >> i understand. if and when we get to that point, where we propose an option to bring them to the united states, we will have an answer. >> i think we need an answer at that point. thank you. in terms of other than the taliban five piece, how many 30 day congressional notifications meeting the requirements of the

nda has been sent to the committee in the past year? >> i don't know the number. in other cases the 30 day notification was provided. >> and then there's some concern that the detainees that are being transferred, it's on an assessment from more than three years ago by the guantanamo review task force. as we look at this the periodic review process was created in part to regularly update this. do you know what has caused the slowness of this? do you find that to be true and do you know what caused the slowness of this? >> i want to separate two things here, sir. if somebody's already been cleared by the 2009 task force and we find a place to which we can transfer them and a package is brought to the secretary to make the determination we have an updated assessment on the individual. we're not relying solely on the 2009 task force work. the prb is looking at people who

were not previously cleared, taking another look at whether we should continue to hold them under law of detention or if they can be approved for transfer. we had -- it took some time to stand up the prb process. it's gone a little bit slowly but we're trying to pick up the pace. >> okay. just to -- as i wrap up here from that trip that was a little bit ago the question i asked has stuck with me, what are we going to do with this person, we hope for the best but plan for the worst. i think that's something that has to be answered. by the way, mr. secretary i think you showed great wisdom in your choice of colleges when you were younger as well. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator graham. >> thank you thank you all three for dealing with what i

think is a very difficult issue, the issue of great national security importance. i know you've got a tough portfolio to deal with. i want to go into the questioning with that understand understanding. senator donnelly, i had this very conversation with president obama probably three years ago. i was supporting transferring the prisoners from guantanamo bay back to illinois in a maximum security setting controlled by the military. we worked through what would happen. all these people have had habeas hearings entitled to a habeas hearing. no one is at guantanamo today without a federal judge finding the government's evidence is sufficient to hold them as an enemy combatant. if you transfer them back to the united states you create new legal rights. we had a law of war statute to govern that to make sure they wouldn't walk out the door. we went through that process. the problem is you've got to admit we're at war. you have to tell our friends on

the left these are not just common criminals and they will be governed by the law of war not common criminal concepts. it's unfortunate we could not close that discussion because i think it would have been better for all of us. my goal is to keep people in jail that represent a national security threat to the united states. common sense would tell us that if you're still in guantanamo bay after all these years you're probably a high risk -- >> let's have the rule of law back! those people most of them were innocent! all right. arrest me! this country is disgusting! you have betrayed the constitution. what is wrong with you american people! what's wrong with you america! what's wrong with you! i don't care, put me in jail. i don't care. >> i think he may get his wish. i'm a military lawyer, served

with this man behind you. i really want to conduct the war within the values of our country. i want to be tough on the enemy but also follow principles that have guided us as well like the genevieve geneva convention and treating people under the law consistent with the requirements of the law of war. would you agree with me anybody left in guantanamo today is probably a high risk threat? we wouldn't have kept them that long? just common sense tells you if you're still in jail after all these years you've had numerous review boards, that you're probably dangerous in the eyes of the people who say you still should be there? >> i would agree that all of them pose some risk. there are however many -- >> i'm not talking about some risk. i'm talking about obvious common sense here. >> i would say senator several of these people remaining were cleared or approved for transfer

six years ago. we just have not found a place to send them. >> well, is that -- what percentage of the population falls in that category? >> it's around -- around 50. >> okay. so what percentage -- what percentage -- they were cleared six years ago, holding 50 people because we can't find a place to put them. >> 54, sir. >> 54 out of how many? >> 122 remain. >> so of the rest of them would you agree they are high risk? >> several of them are under prosecution, so definitely in those cases. >> take them off the table right? >> the remainder have previously been determined to be held and should be held under law or detention and we didn't have a prosecution option but those are going through the prb process to take another look. >> we have 50 people no place to send them and the rest of them are either going to be prosecutor

prosecuted or represent a high risk to the country. >> like i said we're taking a new look at the prb process. >> the previous prbs concluded they had a high risk, right or they wouldn't still be there. the only thing is are you going to create a new prb process politically motivated to let these guys out or go with past judgments. because i don't think these guys are getting any better. do you agree with the obama administration we're at the end of hostilities and that justified the release of the taliban 5? >> we're not at the end of hostilities in afghanistan. >> they said the reason we transferred the taliban 5 is because you traditionally swap prisoners when hostilities are over, therefore we get our guy back because the war is basically over and we release five of the taliban. i agree the end of hostilities that justice the transfer of these five is ridiculous. so i don't know why the administration would say that.

do you? >> well, i said -- i agree with you, sir hostilities are not over. >> great. >> i couldn't agree with- >> let's go for it as a committee. no one should be transferred because of the concept of end of hostilities. second, if you have any deficiency and legal authority to hold these people, would you please inform the congress of what you need that you don't have and i bet you in a bipartisan fashion we can provide it to you. >> ye. >> do you feel like you have a deficiency today? >> not today. >> do you feel like you will have a deficient sin the near future? >> in afghanistan, not in the near future. in a couple of years we may. >> well the couple of years is in the near future. so i challenge you to send to us legislation that would deal with the problem that's two years away because i finally want to get ahead of the war on terror and not always play catch-up. thank you very much for your

service. service. >> thank you, chairman. >> i actually want to return to this point and return to the point that i think not only senator graham made but senator donnelly made. there are some of these folks who will never be transferred, never be released that are clearly a real risk. at some point if we want to close guantanamo we need to do something with them and if you don't have statutory authority to insure their detention should they be transferred to some sort of high secure facility in the continental united states, i suggest you spell out what kind of authority you need and ask this body for that authority because at some point, we're going to have to deal with that situation. i want to return to the statistics quickly the data and make sure i understand those

correctly. i have heard repeatedly again and again from not only colleagues but in this press of 30%, 33% residcidivismrecidivism. i want to make sure i understand and you're very clear about the data. if i understand your testimony that since the inner agency review process was put in place since that time the recidivism data suggests you reduced that from 33% in the previous administration and now 6.8%, with another 1.1% potentially suspected. is that an accurate trend? is that what your testimony speaks to? >> sir, i'll let many rasmussen speak to this because the data is owned by the intelligence community. >> senator, i think the 30% number comes from the two numbers both brian and i cited in our prepared remarks. that is the assessment of the

community that of the 620 overall detainees regardless when, who have been transferred from guantanamo, a little over 17% of them have been confirmed by the intelligence committee having reengaged in terrorist activities. 17% confirmed. a little over 12% fall into the suspected of re-engagement category i stated earlier. in aggregate, that would be 30% of the total population of folks- -- >> if you just look at post interagency review. >> if you break out just the number of detainees transferred since the 2009 interagency process in which the dni, director of national intelligence played a role that number is 6.8% confirmed with 1.1% or one detainee suspected. that's an ongoing number and we owe you and the congress an

update on that in the next report snow obviously any level of recidivism is unacceptable but that is immense progress. i want to touch on the cost of this facility fiscal cost. we have spent about $5 billion on this facility since it opened in 2002. on average, about 493$493 million each year for the last five years and in 2014, the american taxpayer spent more than 3 million per guantanamo detainee. and compare that with about $78,000 it costs to house a prisoner at colorado super max prison. i would ask either of you given the austere budget we are in today and i hope we do something on this committee about that and the myriad of very real threats, are we spending those tax dollars in way that gets us the maximum security return for our investment? mr. rasmussen, i would ask your

opinion on that as well. >> i think i'm probably better referring to my defense colleagues on that because that falls squarely in dod's budget lane. >> it goes back to the relative risks we were talking about before senator keen brought up. >> the number i have is $400 million on guantanamo and the number i've always heard about the cost of one person at super max is around $80,000. no, the president has taken the view that this drains our resources and we could secure these prisoners for much less. we're not focused primarily on the costs, we're focused more on the national security view that it's a risk to our security to keep guantanamo open but the cost issue is accurate. >> thank you. >> senator cotton.

>> mr. mccain -- mckeon in early december senator hagel sent a letter about the classified five. it's been almost two months now. we would like to receive a response to that letter before proceeding with mr. carter's confirmation. can you talk to the secretary and see about getting us a prompt response to that letter? >> sir, certainly. i know the answer should be coming shortly, for reasons that are not clear to me although the letter was dated in early december, i think we only received it in the department about 3 1/2 weeks ago. >> mr. rasmussen, you said in your opening statement anti-american incite mentment or statements does not necessarily equal resid virms or re-engagement. does it violate the memorandum of understandings we have with the receiving countries? >> i can't speak in this session about the specific understandings we have with the partners with whom -- the

countries with whom we have worked to transfer detainees but one of the key features of any of those agreements is monitoring ongoing activity by the detainee covering a wide threshold constitute reengagement for the purposes of a threat assessment. >> we consider anti-american by islamic terrorists pretty serious business don't we? >> absolutely. >> and al wa ki would say we consider it serious business wouldn't ithe? >> absolutely. senator graham that the united states, the administration has barred from bringing detainees to the united states mainland. also barred from releasing detainees without 30 days of notification. why should the american people believe that obligation will be any more respected than the prior notification obligation

was last year? >> the lack of notification in the bergdahl case -- >> all laws are created equal. there was a law that created prior notification. a law that prohibits detainees from coming to guantanamo bay. what assurance can we receive that there will not be a detainee on our shores tomorrow morning. >> senator, what i can say as to the 30-day notice issue, our lawyers believe we had a valid legal reason we took, on the issue we're asking, we are focused on transfers in the process. i'm not aware of any conversations not to follow the current steps. >> i now want to explore the so-called risk balance of resit viz m and the propaganda.

>> i'm not sure if i follow the question. >> engaging in terrorism or anti-american excitement. because they're detained. they only engage in that overseas. now, let's look at the propaganda value. how many were at guantanamo bay september 11th 2001. >> zero. >> how many in october 2000 when al-qaeda bombed the u.s.s. cole? >> zero. >> what about in 1998? >> the facility was not opened before 2002. >> first world trade center bombing. >> same. >> 1983 when hezbollah bombed lebanon? the answer is zero. >> correct. >> islamic terrorists don't need an excuse to attack the united states. they attack us for who we are.

it is not a security decision. it is a political decision based on promise the president made on his campaign. to say that is a security decision based on propaganda value is a pretext, a justified political decision and my opinion, the only problem of guantanamo bay is there are too many empty beds and cells there right now. we should be sending more cells there to keep this country safe. as far as i'm concerned, every last one of them can rot in hell, but slons they don't do that, they can rot in guantanamo bay. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and on that happy note, i had really the same feeling senator cotton had for a lot a lot a years, then i went to began tanguantanamo

with some other senators. and i came back changed and i asked my chairman here who gave me some insight he had and i know everybody's trying to form their own direction and thought process on this. if your child was in the military and a guard and that detail, i would not ask anybody's children to be in that position. i'd like to see a few of them in the prison just to see if they changed their attitude. so all i've heard about propaganda, i have to agree with senator cotton on that. i don't think they need a new excuse to attack mesh and that's me that doesn't hold water. what does is $3 million for

detainee and 80,000 to the hardened prisoners we have. we have nobody escaping. we don't have any ones escaping from america. i'm to form my own opinion on this if we hadn't a vote -- are held for crimes and things of this sort. fls got to be a way to do it where they don't scheme and plan and plot. the have you all looked at, should we house them here? could we imprison them here and do it and feel secured and safe? keep them on the island prison, that's fine, but what i saw

there did not, it's not an atmosphere that our guards should be in or our military people should put their talent should be used and wasted on those lines, what i saw. so, someone can comment to that could we do it here? have we spoke in detail? can it be done safely and what do you do with the detainees. right there, over in that part of the world, we're paying someone else to take care of them and a lot of them are going back into the fight. if one goes back into the fight, that's one too many. if we could have kept them off the battlefield, endangering soldiers and anybody else over there. so, any comment on that. >> give them a rights of the prisoner at war. >> your time to speak i've got to get to this first if you can admiral myers. >> senator, i'm happy to respond first -- >> war --

>> on the guard force, i've seen them in action as well -- >> i just want to say that back on this country, they lost their rights as far as attack inging this country, so, with that being said, that's how i feel. >> the men and the women of the guard force, many are national guards and peace specialists. in the first term senator graham made efforts, the possibility, the government purchasing a state prison in illinois that was underutilizing in using one part of it for the bureau of prisons and the other part for detainees that the united states military would hold. we would still have military guards because we're holding them under detention authority. >> that's the detainees. >> yes, sir. >> so, we would still hold them under some kind of military guard whether we were to bring them in the united states, unless we were to prosecute them

in federal court and put them into the bureau system, but there are a number of these detainees that we will not be able to prosecute in federal court. >> how about the ones that are waiting, that we have charges against waiting for prosecution? could they be dispersed in prison systems, maximum security prison prison systems? >> sir, the ones that are currently facing charges and trial are in the office of military commission system, which we have a courtroom set up there. >> probably say when you were there. so it would be the same situation in the sense that they were still on trial. the 9/11 would have gone for quite some time. if they are convicted and sentence ed sentenced, they would still be in the military system. but the short answer is yes, we could do it. here. it would still be a military guard system and they would not be in the bureau of prison. >> my time is expired.

thank you. >> thank you, chairman. my question would be yes or no. has any suspected or confirmed detainee that's been released from guantanamo been involved in an attack that's killed a united states or nato coalition service member? >> senator i don't know all those who have reengaged, there are over 100. >> well, i think that's very important for people to understand. if any of these detainees have been are suspected of confirmed for having been involved in killing us, our nato allies or a coalition service member i'm surprised you don't know the answer to that. one thing that had been reported, it was reported in "the washington post," that ben kumo, who's alleged to have been involved on the attack on our

consulate in benghazi, former guantanamo detainee, but i'd like to get your answer to that. what i'd like to understand is the 6.8% of the administration is touting that they're doipg so well. those are only the cases of confirmed detainees that have reengaged. does that number include the taliban five member that has been now reported to have engaged in additional activity that would be reengagement for terrorism? >> predates the reengagement status of the members you're talking about. the next report due out, updating the numbers on this is due out in early march. we should in a position to assess whether reengagement has taken place. >> of course, on may 31st the administration, of the five they transferred, they transported