e does not do. and then as to the timing issue it would if congress is doing its job and there's a three-year aumf, after two years we passed something else rather than wait waiting for two days while we have soldiers in the field wondering whether congress will pass the bill. but i want to focus with my time economics. this is the richest terrorist organization in history. they got a huge quantity of iraqi currency. i don't know if our witnesses -- you know, you're blue money is has got to be void because you've got to change it for purple money. this inconveneiences the corrupt.

which may very well describe baghdad. do any of you, are any of you qualified to talk about whether iraq should do a currency exchange designed to invalidate the many billions of dollars worth of iraqi currency isis seeded in the mosul bank? >> well we'll move on to another question. >> for what it's worth, ranking member, i think it's a good idea. and i would suggest maybe after a you reflect on it if you could have a written response to the congressman's question. that would be helpful. >> and let me establish just a policy for this committee. i will yield automatically to any member who wants to say i have a good idea. >> won't happen all the time. >> it's unlikely to interrupt me very often. in world war ii the french

lived under any occupation and we regarded those areas as areas to be bombed and constricted. obviously, you couldn't, the government wasn't allowed to buy argentine wheat and just bring it in by ship across the ocean. we regarded france as an asset of the nazis. yet, i'm told in news reports that indicate ha the iraqi government is paying the civil servants in mosul and of course, isis then takes as much of that money as they want. do any of you have a comment about that and whether it should continue? >> certainly, mr. sherman that's a tough question. i know that the embassy is focused on that. they saw the news reports as well. it gets also to the question of

can you just change the currency. we did that from time to time in vietnam. when i was there it had a lot of second and tertiary level impact on a lot of people. i think that the reason that the iraqi government is continuing these payments is first of all, you know, it's hard to explain this but it's, there are legal obligations of the government to their civil servants. >> somehow, the government and exile of france did not feel it necessary to pay the teachers of vi shia. go on. >> right but the government in exile of france was not considered the legal government of france. that's a whole other complicated question. iraqi government is and i think that's important but the most important thing is it gets to the questions you've asked about who is going to do the liberating. the answer is much of it by the sunni population, the tripes, the members of those communities. they need to feel a certain loyalty to baghdad.

i'm not so sure if cutting off their money is going to give them that loyalty. >> every penny that goes to isis controlled areas scooped up by isis, but just take 30 seconds to say anything, there are news reports that we are providing free electricity, the iraqi government provides free electricity to the isis areas, so in world war the 2, we took it seriously here, we the mosul dam i believe provides electricity to mosul, the mosul dam was retaken by iraqi forces, so it's not free electricity because the consumer has to pay. they pay isis. i yield back. >> think we go now to mr. smith of new jersey. chairman of the subcommittee on africa and. >> thank you very much for leading this important hearing. i want to thank our three panelists for their extraordinary service to our country and providing this committee and by extension, the

american people the benefit of your insights and recommendations. if i could ask you say you do not think a campaign of strategic patience is appropriate. how do you think president obama defines that? you also point out that in your testimony, that the stress when the coalition begins a major ground offensive operations would occur, talked about day after scenarios and that a containment michelle that would eventually crater the coalition or lead to new isis threats and then you say time is not on our side. and that the administration has to move faster. has the administration moved fast enough years to date and does the president's aumf meet the criteria to move faster? >> thank you very much. first of all the administration moved not at all after my colleague came up here and

talked to you over a year ago and that has led to a strategy ji. first, falluja, then mosul in june. i will say having worked with his administration, that i'm surprised at how rapidly the administration responded in august when i shallr bill was threatened. since then, i think that the administration and central command has done a fantastic job of putting together this administration and stopping and in some cases pushing back isis. my problem is what's going to happen next. this gets to the question of strategic patience. president obama laid this out last week in his national security strategy and with fareed zakari and in his state of the union speech. the president is clearly very nervous and the use of military

force, particularly ground forces without a lot of allies, without a lot of legal backing, without the support of you and everybody else. sometimes, that's necessary. sometimes, that's smart. we could have useded a little bit more of that a decade ago but there are times when action is necessary. i'm concerned we may not be moving fast enough. >> how do you think isis, the isis leadership and other interests who are completely anesthetic to our interests in the region look at what is happening at the white house and what is happening up here? >> that's a very good point and i was about to use it saying any restrictions on the authorization is going to encourage the enemy but fair is fair. these guys are so busy dodging right now that i don't think they're going to spend a lot of time. what i worry about is iran, russia, china. all of our conversations members of this committee that we talk about with isis we have

to take this in the context of the whole extraordinary variety of challenges we've seen over the last year. china, russia, al-qaeda elements on the march, particular lyly in north africa. isis itself. syria. and iran. they're all watching us. isis probably won't respond the most to any signs of weakness but others might and i'm concerned across the board with all of these challenges. >> i have repeatedly ask they designate boka ha ram a terrorist organization. after we were having another hearing to both -- we were getting ready to mark up the bill. the administration announced it a day late and a dollar short, but never the less, the parallels, we don't train in my opinion and secure the cooperation of the nigerian military, i was in jose. i saw how they had fire bombed so many churches. they're going after christians

with a vengeance, but also muslims who stand in their way. your thoughts on the parallels. again, isis -- human rights measures soldiers. >> i would go back to -- basically you have to find allies if they're willing to fight, i wouldn't worry that much about vetting them. i would give them weapons. in the case of iraq, it's complicated about sending the peshmerga into different areas. but they deserve more support from us. people the same kind of support we're giving the folkses in iraq. with many enemy and i think that

if you are a day short and a dollar behind and only at the last minute, you take action. obviously a terrorist organization, you've just defined strategic patience. >> thank you for your testimony and your leadership. >> mr. meeks of new york ranking member of the subcommittee on europe. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank the witnesses for their testimony today. i look at these hearings as i did back in 2001 when you were in endeavoring to try to decide what was the best thing to do there. understanding what took place in 2001 so that we could learn from it. sometimes, what i think the president is talking about when you say patience et cetera we didn't have any patience. we thought that and sometimes, we think it's a quick hit. i remember when shock and awe happened and then a few days later, we heard the president of the united states say, mission

accomplished. we thought that was going to be it. many members of this committee said once we got in there, that individuals would be waving a flag and saying thank you, america, and we're bringing our values to them and they would just embrace it. ten, 11 years later we still have troops on the ground. we've committed more in the region than anyone else. no one has lost over 6,000 lives in military combat. it's us. and then i still hear, i've heard some before, our allies, you need to get back out there and get more folks and yet in their region, they are the ones that are the threat. we want to help our allies because they are in our strategic interest, but the ones in immediate danger are the ones around there, so we need to back out and say, look, y'all got to do something, too. we're losing our lives. we put our lives on the line. we're ready to give you all the

strategic help we can. the president was clear. if we find there's somebody out there from isil their organization and some of our allies cannot get to them, that's when we're going to use that limited number that's in the aumf so that they can go oof those guys and absolutely destroy them and i think that you know, clearly, and i think that became more evident than that one, that this is not a religious group because if you see what they did to the jordanian pilot, that's so anti-islam. these are thugs and terrorists so we've got to make sure that is out there with reference to delegitimize their ideology. i think someone else said what they're doing with their pr folk, maybe they're just asking for us to come in. because i think they do. because they would love for us to have people on the ground on a continuous basis.

why? that's their best recruitment. if it was us on the ground, they could recruit more folks to fight because it's them against us and that's why we've got to resist that temptation because otherwise, when people when we start to delegitimize their ideology, their recruitment will begin to resend. now, i happen to agree i think dr. rand with your testimony, i think we've got to do a whole lot of things on a multilateral basis. diplomacy, it's not all about. we've got to do some other things. i did agree with dr. rand and her opening statement. ambassador jeffrey, what was wrong with dr. rand's testimony this morning? >> nothing at all. it was really good testimony. and i agree with it. what i would say again, getting back to a strategic patience means not making the mistakes of the last decade. i'll sign up for strategic patience, however, means and

it's not only this administration who's looked at it this way, it means no casualties norris k of. >> casey: nullities. it means assuming that the people in the region not only have more at stake than us but assuming they can carry a big part of the burden, i don't see anything in our history. at the beginning of this meeting, hearing, chairman royce talked about us doing 85% of the stripes, i believe. i would say if you look at libya four years ago barack obama niosnia, if you look at kosovo, where we had nato, you will find, you look at the korean war, other than the koreans themselves you will find similar statistics for the last 70 years. we can complain about that, but that's how we've maintained international security. where we've run into trouble and three times going into vietnam and iraq, have been when as you pointed out, we thought we could do regime change and change

populations. we're not going to do that, but i don't think anybody up here today is suggesting that. what we are suggesting is that we at least consider if our military commanders and if our diplomats need it a more aggressive policy militarily, but as i said, a more aggressive set of diplomatic actions. >> dr. rand, what do you have to say? >> just to clarify, i'm not advocating for more aggressive use of more than that has suggested. i also look at the lessons learned from the past ten years and the fact, this is the 25th year that the u.s. is involved in some operation in iraq. if you count all the operations in the 1990s, so it's quite remarkable we're still talking about iraq and the proper use of american force. the two lessons learned and i would agree with you, congressman, don't make americans part of the story.

you're not leading from behind, taking a backseat role but you don't want to insert our presence to create an insurgency against american power. that was clear in the 2003, 2004 situation. the second situation is the importance of the isf being sustainable. most of the isf, govrt and security forces need to be multisectarian professional and less susceptible to the penetration by the shiite militia militias. that is the only way to sustain and protect iraq as a sovereign country over the long-term. we've had the sons of iraq, the awakening, problems with the sunni region and its connectivity. this is the second time, third time this has happened, so we need to create a force to really think of representing the force and that is part of the strategic and that's what the trainers are doing and it's better and more effective to

train them with our arab and european allies. we're training 12 brigades as you know. thank you. >> we go now to mr. war backer of california, chairman of the subcommittee on europe, eurasian and emerging threats. >> thank you very much mr. chairman and i want to thank the witnesses for coming here. we have, this is a discussion between us and the witnesses about what direction we should go and we appreciate your advice. dr. vernon let me note that i agree with your basic assessment that we are not just talking about isil orris isis, whichever we want to call it that this is an enemy that's been ten years or 15 years around us and it's radical islamic terrorism groups

that are willing to use terrorists to terrorize the western world and this goes back all the way to even before 9/11 when we lost 3,000 americans, murdered to try to terrorize our country. so, these groups, whether we call them isil, whether they're burning somebody to death out there to try to say, show us how mean and nasty they are or whether they're trying to bring down buildings in new york, it's, it is that the same enemy. whatever they want to call their organization, whatever particular moment. so with this i would suggest that this is the primary threat that we face in the western world faces today. that is our primary threat to our security and our safety and united states needs to recognize that and figure out how we defeat these type of o enemies. let me just note that i

personally will not and i can't speak for my colleagues, but i don't believe that i will be giving the president of the united states, i don't think the congress would give the president of the united states a blank check on the use of american military force in the arab world or in the gulf, whether it is and by the way, it's maybe not specific enough in the territory, much less the timing of this. we're not going to give them a blank check for a given period of time, we need to know exactly if that means that he would be willing to commit major forces on the ground or not. that needs to be part of any agreement that we have. so i don't see this just being oh, the president's asking, he's

going to get whatever he wants. we need to work it out and work out the details. i personally don't belief this is going to be settled by the military. when we eliminated the soviet union, which was then the ultimate threat to peace and stability in the world it was done by not by deployment of large numbers of troops and we need to create a dynamic that will end with, with the defeat of this threat to western civilization. we need to create that dynamic and that means what we did to defeat communism, we made that our number one goal. and we worked with anybody who would work with us to defeat that goal. and that made it by the way, possible for us to defeat them without conflict, direct military conflict with the united states. let me just note that i think

this president has not reached out, we've heard about the kurds and to other people and other groups in the world and especially in that region who should be our best friends and mobilize them in this effort. whether it's general cici or the people we're fighting against who marched against radical islam in tehran where the president couldn't get himself to say anything about that and support of those kids earlier on. so, we need to have that dynamic created rather than just having the president come to us and asking for military for a military blank check. and the question i have, i know we're just about out of time here, but let me just note this. i'd like to ask about shouldn't we be working with assad?

we worked with stahlen to defeat hitler, shouldn't we work with assad? shouldn't we be working with putin in order to defeat this threat that you have capsulized for us of radical fanatic islam? and that's my question to you. >> thank you, the gentleman's time has expired. >> once it's out there, it's there for everybody to answer. >> no objections. gl i think we need to be able to talk to all the regions of the country. assad is actually part of this broader islamist movement that is supported by tehran. so, we have in the middle east today, what is the equivalent of a sunni shia civil war that's taking place and at one level, we need to determine which side of this we're on and how are we

going to pull together these various countries in order to address the issue. you're right. it's radical. it's a radical islamist ideology writ large, sunni and shia but we need a grand strategy for it. military is just one component of that. that's where we need to be going. if there's one thing that comes out of this committee, could be a process of thinking about how do you move forward to confront this global threat, not justice is or one of the other groups. >> thank you very much for your service to the country and for being here. every time i sit here and i hear witnesses talk to me about training the iraqi army because of the experiences that we have

had with this idea, i don't know where we get the confidence that if we train this army, it's going to solve our problem. we've spent billions we took a shot at them, they ran. so, to go back and start training people again and spending all their money you know, i'm just concerned at the end of all this people are going to say that the only people who can solve the problem are us putting troops on the ground and i would never vote for that. you lost 6,000 lives. countless people coming back. we have soldiers coming back committed suicide and for what? we saw one group another one pops up. i don't know the answer. obviously. i just take your word for it.

you know, what you're saying. i do agree that we should fund the kurds and we should give them the weapons they need and i'm wondering where a few years ago, president biden said -- i wonder how viable that is. all these groups i'm concerned about jordan. more and more people keep coming and are we doing enough to make sure that jordan is well enough prepared to deal with what they're dealing with now. they have stepped forward.

the things i may be wrong about -- i got to tell you it's hard for me to accept that. trz trz. >> the iraqi troops in mosul, the iraqi army did not really run in anbar province. maliki pulled the troops out of falluja in january because of a political dispute and they rushed in and took over the police, who were in many cases, much weaker than the military. the military, they have some bad days in anbar province, but they haven't up and i have a good bit of experience on laws including out there trying to train them is that you can train forces to do well. it helps a hell of a lot if you

have american troop, advisory teams with them. the vietnamese ran in 1972 when the vietnamese came in until we put in massive air strikes and had our advisory teams out there fighting with them and the result was they turned the tide and pushed the vietnamese back. i've seen this also in iraq in 2010, 2011. iraqi troops did well against al-qaeda, but particularly when they had american advisory teams with them, so that's the first question. in terms of puffing up, having been spending much of my license, the 1974 yom kippur it was almost deployed to the region with a lot of other american troops, i have a feeling of popping up, too, because history of my life of the last 40 years is constantly being redeployed to the middle east and wondering on the capacity. my take away is this is something we're not going to fix. we can provide multipliers to the people fixing it and the

most important is assuring that really radical violent elements do not get a hold of large territories. that's the ukrainianrain irans al-qaeda, assad and to beat back those forces so that the people of the region have the chance to move on away people in the balkans, in central america and the way people in other places where we've been successful have moved on, but you're right. this is a long struggle and it's frustrating and we shouldn't tie a lot of troops down in a high casualty effort to fix this because we won't. >> biden's idea. >> i'm sorry. he's recanted, first of all. and secondly, the problem with that is i know of no border in the middle east and frankly no

board border i've ever been stationed in the balkans elsewhere, that you can just break up into three parts because there are overlapping groups. what these people will do, they won't agree to a piece of paper. they'll fight. you change one border in the middle east, they're all going to start being shaky and we'll have yet another bigger problem. >> thank you. >> condolences of all the residents of arizona for kayla. >> thank you very much. appreciate that. i guess my question is to anyone on the panel that would like to take a stab, ambassador, i'd appreciate your, let me say that i very much support a very robust aumf given to the president which gives maximum

flexible the i the to our general so they can prosecute this effort until we win and we do it qukly as possible. that they believe they have full legal authority under the 2001 aumf to prosecute isil. my question is submitting to congress or asking congress to give us an aumf that ties his hand. i've never heard of a president sending that kind of a request to congress, please tie my hand and give me a time limit and also, you know, limit my ability to use ground forces. i get really frustrated. i marvel in fact i can't

imagine franklin roosevelt standing up saying here's the five things i'm not going to do to the japanese. it just doesn't make a whole lot of sense to telegraph what we're willing to do and what we're not. if the president believes he has authority and i believe he's said that many times so have his advisers, why would he want to further limit aumf? >> he does have the authority, but it's an awkward fit and he's absolutely right to come back here and ask for more specific from all of you. in terms of why would he limit it, that's his flosphilosophy and i have to be fair to him. i've worked for him. he doesn't think that military force can often be a solution and he thinks that we have gotten very committed almost like a drug to using military force. rather than other means of national power.

i disagree with him, but it's an honest position. he can point to areas from marching into north korea from vietnam to iraq that others have cited where we have gone astray and it's something to really worry about, but while i wouldn't support that position myself, i mean, i understand why he has it and a lot of americans agree with him. >> let me just modify that before you speak. i also believe that one of the reasons for the conflicts you cited that we were not very successful is that politicians micro manage the whole damn thing. dr. brennan. >> we need to put something on the ground that's wide enough, gives the president the ability to make the decision. he may choose he doesn't want to do that, and that's a legitimate choice. but i think that the issue is, i've been portrayed in my testimony and the others have,

this is a great thet to u.s. national security. if it is a grave threat as the president put in his aumf, we need to be giving the president everything he needs and you don't know what's going to happen six months from now and how going back and forth on this idea just ties his hands and i agree with you that it makes most sense to look back and perhaps the 2001 aumf could be cleaned up or amended to the types of capability. it's not a perfect fit, but whether or not we need to restrict the hands, i'd be concerned about that. as a commander as well as going to look about the country on this. >> i'm going to run out of time and i have one other question. because i'm deeply concerned that the administration isn't very serious about this fight with only 250 coalitions a month versus the roughly thousand air stiks a day we flew in previous

conflicts in the region, could we do more with the air power that we have to at least degrade isis and couldn't additional air power further attack isis and funding strength they're using to support their -- >> i believe that we ought to be having a much more robust air campaign, but to do that, you need to have more targetable intelligence and you get that by having troops with our allies and without having that i think you run the risk of having collateral damage, which will run counter to our policy strategy and the interests we have in iraq. >> so, it gets back to the ground forces and support again. >> i believe so. >> thank you. mr. higgins, new york. >> it amazes me in all of these

hearings how quickly we just kind of bypass the fact that the united states paid about $25 billion to build up an iraqi army and the first test of that army was against the islamic state of iraq and syria. and they essentially ran. and we are told that reason they were not committed to the fight was because the previous prime minister al maliki was not inclusive, the shia sunni population and therefore didn't feel as though it was a fight worth committing to. and now, we're told that there's a new prime minister who's also a shia but more inclusive of the sunni community and therefore, we should have confidence again in the iraq national army. $25 billion.

who had the most effective fighters in iraq today? peshmerga and shia militia. the new prime minister had said there are about a million shia militias that are trying to fill the void the ineffectual iraqi army. mr. brennan, you said earlier, you talked about the shia militias who recently experienced success against isis. you also made reference to solomoni is iranian forces leader who really negotiated the second term of al maliki with one condition. that the americans leave. that the americans leave. and now, we have a president with a resolution before congress asking for authorization to engage nen militarily.

the shia militias are are not there to prop up the iraqi government. they're there to do what solomoni and others in asymmetrical warfare try to do. that is create a prop city in places they want to control. via in southern lebanon, in syria or be it in iraq. my concern is is if we commit american forces and there's no passive wing of the american military. everybody has weapons and fights and die courageously when they do. we are continuing a situation in this country that has been going on for way too long. tom friedman, the author and "new york times" columnist once said iraq, the way it is because saddam was the way he is or is saddam the way he is because iraq is the way it is? i think it just speaks again to the sectarian tribal nature of

a place that we are trying to impose a political solution to. we are told that the american military, extraordinary courage, extraordinary commitment. extraordinary effectiveness. could only do one thing. create a breathing space. within within the shia, sunni and kurdish community could achieve political reconciliation including the sharing of oil revenues. it's all a hopeful sign. that that was occurring between the central government in baghdad and kurdistan with a 17% sharing of the national refr knew knews and also, a billion dollars to equip and train the peshmerga, but where our investment has been made financially, where our investment has been made morally has been an abject failure and

what we're proposing to do with this resolution by the president is continue that failed policy without any clarity about what it is we're going to achieve because when there's no political center here's what we know. when there's no political center, there are only sides to choose and right now, there's no political center and doebtn't argue the changing of a shia prime minister in iraq is going to mund mentally change the will and commitment of the iraqi national army. now let eets just acknowledge that our investment of $25 billion in the iraqi national army failed. failed miserably because when you say they all ran, 250,000 of them in the face of 30,000 isis fighters, well, certainly because iraq is a majority shia country. many of those fighters would be

shia, so at least they wouldn't run, so i don't know really what's going on here, but i know where this is leading and i think most americans know where this is leading. it's not noin a good place because again, mesh is essentially going it alone. for the third time in two different countries. and unless there's the recognition of minority rights, unless there's a recognition of the pluralistic nature of iraq, there will never be peace there. >> gentleman's time has expired. thank you. >> thank you, madam chair. being this far down the dayous is of some help because a lot of good questions have been asked. one that i don't think has been covered because we are considering the authorization for use of military force is

sort of what we have and what we need. let me just run through it quukly. 2001, the aumf basically said global war on terror al-qaeda. go anywhere, get them. 2002, it was lib rat iraq. i think it's fair to say whether we like the way iraq is is or not, it's been liberated. any new problem in iraq very clearly is a new iraq. that's where i have some real challenges with the president's belief that he has any real authority. but leaving that aside, they're both obsolete. al-qaeda as we knew it is no longer al-qaeda as we knew it. as we defined it in 2001 it's really a different organization. is that fair the to say? and anything we do in iraq and syria and other areas in which derivative organizations including isil or dosch is in

fact at least fundamentally different or expanded and fits a slightly different definition so we all agree on that part i think. so, let me ask the broader question. aren't we dealing with two idea logical group both of whom are a threat to regional security, to democracy, and to the west to a certain extent? one of them, dosch, is a radicalized derivative of what we once knew as al qaeda. the other the shia activists whether it's hezbollah, tehran directly or various groups at any level, are ultimately a group that looks at the 12th imam and his proclamation of what you have to do, which is more or less take the holy lands and bring back all the glory and peace and i listen to the former

president of iran at the u.n. in 2012 and he may be crazy, but that's what he was saying is the 12th imam is going to bring this all back and it was a call for jihad for the shia. question. and i'll start with dr. brennan but all of you can answer it. aren't we really dealing with the need to be targeted against both as appropriate and at the same time and i'll use syria, an area i've worked a little bit in, as the poster child. we have if you will the 12 imam crowd on one side backing assad. and then we have isil. aren't we in a position in which we have to make sure that we give a nimble authority to the president, but one in which we weighs the comparative balances? one in which he clearly does no harm to one group, however

reprehensible, that simply advances the other and isn't that really the shia and doctor to you first the shia sunni conflict that we're now in the middle of. it's not just isil assad, hezbollah. we have me tas sized into a conflict in which many many cases, we're fighting on one side and empowering our enemy on the other side. doctor? >> congressman, i agree with your assessment on that. i think that as we're looking at the conflict between sunni and shia we have to be understand that this islamist movement is is a cancer that has evolved from various elements of islam and we need to go back and take a look and reenforce those people who are really helping out. king abdullah has made some courageous stands. the president in egypt.

this has got to be done through them and we have to be politically to encourage them and all of our neighbors, all those neighbors have been our allies over the last ten years, 30 years. so the gulf state saudi arabia arabia, they need to change internally to stop what's going on. >> let me narrow the question. i think you said it well. isn't the president's obligation with whatever authority we give him to work with those who will be forces for moderation or at least tolerance in the region and you mentioned president -- who had been disrespected by this administration in an amazing way. they were quick to recognize the muslim brotherhood and slow to even call the president after he was legally elected and obviously, king abdullah as an example of a sunni leader who is simply trying to bring back a moderate sunni border to his

near jordan. but quickly, i know my time is expired. this, for me is the important part. i don't want to topple a syria that iran has power in to get at isil, but i don't want to defeat sunni extremists only to empower a shia aspiration paid for out of a -- iran that since 1975, '79, has consistently managed to ruin country after country and continues doing so. >> thank you, mr. issa. >> thank you to the witnesses for your testimony. and for your excellent written testimony as well. it was very helpful. i want to build for a moment on gentleman from new york's last questions. one of the thipgs i'm concerned about is that i don't think we have a clear understanding of what the end game is is or what success even looks like and i think it builds on what you were saying that it's more than just defeating and killing

individuals who are members of a terror terrorist organization, but it's do we have the ability to kill an ideology or radical ideology. i have deep skepticism that continued our deepening military engagement is the solution. real questions about whether it will make it worse because of what you raised in your testimony. but if you think about the role of iraqi security forces and you think about the money we spend and now, we've embarked on a training of the syrian opposition so-called moderate syrian opposition, who can we have confidence that there will be any different result and over what period of time? we're talking about beginning this training process now presumably isis and isis fighters will not standstill while we sort of get up to speed. so, how should we tell the american people that we should have any confidence after $25

billion of training after training sols that somehow, this time, it's going to be different. that's my first question. my second question is that we talk about the role of our international partners and then learn that 85% of the air strikes are by the u.s. is it just impossible to imagine that the uae and saudi arabia and jordan and egypt who are in the region will take on the chief responsibility for this ground operation and for the air strikes? do they just not have the capacity, the interest because of the political context? but everyone seems to suggest it's going to require air strikes and ground operations to be successful. whatever that means. but nobody seems to have identified who the ground troops are and we talk about peshmerga, which is great and they're doing a terrific job, but there are these allies who have real armies. i'm interested in why they're not playing a role.

i have one more, but want to make sure you have time to respond to those two. >> the reason the united states provides so much air support is because we have the capacity to do that. the other allies in the region jordan being a stronger one, has capacity, but it's limited and i think what they're doing now is probably as much they can. in terms of ground forces as the ambassador commented earlier, each one of these countries has an islamist problem in their own country and those armies that are there that they have are being used to maintain security of those countries, so they came to some but still need to maintain security with its own borders, so that's a challenge for them. >> first of all, i have a lot of sympathy with that you've said because i've been out there and lived this. again, it's not just in the middle east. since world war ii, we have had

conflict after conflict, where the number of saudis, the number of infantry companies on the ground have been somewhere between 50 and 90% american. allies often flee or leave behind their american equipment. they were doing that as i said, in june of 1950 in south korea. we've seen it ever since. we've also seen, though including in korea including in vietnam, i've seen it with my own eyes including in iraq where they turn around and go back. often we including small numbers of we can make and do make a difference. but there i will agree with mr. higgins. particularly in the middle east in my 18 years countinger it turkey, that i served there, i never felt one day that i was in a good place. >> i want to give dr. rand a moment to also respond, please. sorry to interrupt you. >> these are two excellent, excellent questions. i think the answers are actually linked. what is different about this enterprise right now is actually

the partners that are involved. if you consider november and december the reformation of the iraqi government, these arab neighbors were not at all interested in the formation of the iraqi government post-saddam. they were not there. the ambassador can attest to this. they were distancing themselves from iraq. they sent no ambassadors, had no themembassyies embassies. it was really unprecedented that all the neighbors were involved in the prime minister getting started. to me, none of this is particularly promising but that is a source of promise suggesting there could be a chance for this new iraqi government that will be different than the mistakes of its predecessors. thank you. >> thank you. i yield back. >> mr. brooks of alabama. >> thank you, madam chairman. i want to follow up on some of the comments of my colleagues of rhode island and california and some of the responses. plus, some of the written testimony we've had the benefit of. dr. brennan stated in response to a question that the islamic

state has, quote metastasized from various elements of islam, end quote. further, in dr. brennan's written testimony, i'm going to read some quotes. quote, while the threat is often portrayed as terrorism, the true danger is the ideology that provides the logic of extremism, violence, and acts of inhumanity, end quote. next, another dr. brennan quote. whilekilled, the ideology of jihadism is great rer than ever, end quote. again from dr. brennan. quote, while the tactic of terrorism is frequently the immediate threat, i think it is critical to know that the ideology underlying these actions seeks revolutionary change of the existing political and social order. thus, the strategic challenge of

our generation isn't one particular group of insurgents of terrorists it is the ideology that gives them cause, defeating this ideology will require development of a grand strategy that employs all elements of national power and influence. finally, dr. rand, i'm going to quote from her written remarks. quote, isil's savage tactics are at the very core of its ideology. while al qaeda justifies individual suicide bombing attacks against civilians and civilian areas, isil has adopted a new ideology manipulating select stories from islamic history and modern jihadi text to redefine jihad and to generate a blanket justification for violence including against women and children, end quote. if we take these remarks of dr. rand and dr. brennan on face value, dr. brennan, can america

permanently defeat the islamic state and other islamic terrorist organizations without also defeating the underlying ideology that attracts so many fighters to their cause? >> short answer to that is no. what we find is that the -- this is an ideology of revolution. and if during the late 20th century we had marxism today this is it. we have to confront the ideology. >> dr. rand, do you concur the answer is no that we have to defeat the ideology that breeds so many reinforcements to the islamic state and other islamic terrorist organizations? >> certainly, congressman. and we are. this is one of the nine pillars where the coalition is working on the counterradicalization, countering violent extremism. what's promising in this regard is some of our arab partners are beginning and starting programs in their own countries to counter this ideology.

recently in egypt for example, they issued against that. >> with respect, how can america best conduct itself to defeat the underlying islamic ideology of the islamic state and its breatheren islamic terrorist organizations? whoever wants to answer. >> i'll start. i agree with the problem. i would be very skeptical of the idea of we the united states, or the western world defeating a philosophical concept or distortion of a religion. that's a very tricky thing. the vast majority of muslims around the world are not our enemies. they look at their religion differently than the isis people and the people around. >> okay. i'm not asking for an overall picture of what's going on. i'm asking for what has to be done to defeat it.

i have limited time. >> fair enough. stop the military manifestations of it, which is what we're doing with isis, which is what we're trying to do with iran on nuclear weapons. and give the people of the region the space and support those who are strong in fending off this threat among themselves. >> dr. brennan? a few seconds left. how do we defeat the ideology? >> continue to work with people like king abdullah and president sissi so we have the cure from this, of this cancer coming from within islam. >> dr. rand? just a few seconds left. any additional words? >> i would add the people in the sunni heartland across iraq and syria, they're mostly tribes. they don't necessarily inherently subscribe to this' diology. what we're trying to do is give them a chance. they have been exploited, too, by the isis groups that are in there midst. so we're trying to help them. >> thank you, madam chairman for the additional 15 seconds. >> thank you, mr. brooks. dr. berra. >> thank you, madam chairman.

thank you, witnesses. dr. brennan, was i correct in hearing you say we've been involved in 25 years of continuous engagement in iraq? >> to clarify on and off for 25 years. i was counting the time at beginning of the gulf war. >> on and off. as we look at this current engagement, it's accurate to say we're not talking about years we're talking about prolonged periods of time, perhaps decades. no one disagrees with that. dr. brennan, in answer to my colleague from rhode island when asked about who can provide the numbers of ground troops in order to maintain stability to create that open space i think you characterized it as our allies in the region have limited capabilities, limited ground troops, and those ground troops largely are tied up within their own countries.

is that accurate? >> they are tied up, but that doesn't mean they can't provide some. what i think we have to have is reasonable expectations about what they can do based upon their own internal security interests. >> so in this larger debate much of the debate is, you know what the united states involvement is what our troops' involvement is. no one is discounting that, you know, isil is -- these are monsters. these are despicable individuals. these are folks that are distorting a religion, and we do have national security threats and we do have an interest in, you know, ridding the region of this ideology. but it's not going to be easy. and it is going to be prolonged. and it is going to take decades. you know i disagree with my colleague, mr. salmons. i think it's our responsibility

as members of congress to be engaged in defining the context of what this engagement looks like. not in prosecuting this. that's up to our military commanders, our diplomats and so forth. but engaging. i think the public wants us to be engaged in this definition. so i think that is a good thing. this is not going to be easy. there clearly is a scenario.jeffrey, you talked about some of the bad guys here. assad, iran, others. you can clearly see a scenario where you defeat isil you drive them out where you see this chain from iran to a shia-dominated iraq to assad to hezbollah to hamas. we have to be conscious that, you know, that is one outcome here, which is not an outcome i desire. i think it's an outcome that, you know, puts some of our closest allies in a very precarious position. and maybe even creates a worse seecenario in this.

as we members of congress engage in this debate, we have to be very conscious of all possible scenarios. ambassador jeffrey you touched on, you know, the lessons from vietnam that -- i can imagine a ground campaign in iraq with shia my shia militia, with iraqi forces, a prolonged ground come pain that drives out iraq. but what happens in that bordering country in syria? there isn't a moderate syrian force that can cut off that line of retreat. that then draws us into another rabbit hole. and another prolonged scenario. so, you know, i guess in the minute i have i think starting with dr. rand, these scenarios that i'm laying out, are they inaccurate? and the questions we should be thinking about asking. >> sure. obviously none of this is clear and the outcomes are not

predetermined. this is a very difficult region. it's undergoing generational change in the form of the popular uprisings that have weakened state authority across the region. we don't need to get in to all the factors that are making this an unprecedented moment in the region. of course, there's dangerous potential. but, you know, the strategy is trying to figure out the political end game as i said in the written testimony, in each of these particularsyria the idea of inserting a trained moderate opposition faction, 5,000 fighters, is smart because this is the type of fighters that we could ally with. these are the type of fighters that have a chance. >> but it will take time. it will take time to train, to equip, to create this capable fighting force. ambassador jeffrey? again, as i'm thinking about this, am i thinking about this in the correct context? >> thank you doctor, but your

time is limited. mr. perry of pennsylvania. >> thank you madam chair. i'd like to thank the panel for your service. dr. brennan additional thanks to you for your time in uniform. i'd like to associate myself with my colleagues brooks and higgins in their remarks. and just before i get started, regarding the contention that none of what we've tried in this arena has worked in the past, and we tried to provide the breathing space, i think you must acknowledge that america was providing the support for the breathing space. of course it's not going to work when you walk away and no longer provide the support. that having been said to dr. brennan, i think we've already agreed that isis is a symptom of a portion of a larger challenge. would you agree with that? i mean i think we've said that before, but i want to clarify. and you said it should be the first priority. you particularly said that. would it be fair for me to characterize -- i think

everybody is looking for a way to characterize it as a global violent jihad movement. could that be a way of characterizing it? >> i think it is, but i think when you do that, you also need to ensure that it addresses both sides of the equation. >> sure. absolutely. we also have acknowledged that we're in the middle of a shia/sunni civil war, sharia dogma. but let me ask you this. they fight each other, they hate each other on occasion, what have you, but they see us the west, the united states as a common enemy. they will getting to and fight us. is that true or not true? >> i think if we're there in a large capacity then we will attract those forces to attack us. we had that situation in iraq where we were both being attacked by the shia -- >> but even if we're not there in large forces, i mean, they travel the globe looking for us and the west. >> we don't need to do anything for them to attack us. >> right. we've already proven that right. and people say we've incited this and caused it. i think that's a little is a

peeshs. for dr. brennan, we've already kind of broached the question the aumf, why now, article ii powers, the first aumf. i look at administration's track record. look at it from a member of congress' standpoint. libya, syria yemen the side they chose in egypt, what's happened in iraq. we declare he prosecutes. in my mind, he hasn't prosecuted very well. no disrespect intended, but i just went down through the list. is there some rationale of thinking that the president might be looking for a compliciter? an ineffective policy, strategy. i don't want to call it a strategy. a plan, an execution a something. i don't see a strategy but we're going to get to that quickly. is that a fair rationale? i mean i'm not saying it's not the end result but is it reasonable to think that people could feel that way?

>> not going into the motivation of the president, it is fair to say that he is looking to have congress as a participant in this process. >> agreed. can i stop you there? ambassador, i agree with you that military force is not the only answer. tediously, i'm a student of clause. it's an extension of diplomacy. that having been said, what about -- and where is the appropriate place for the associated actors here in this country and abroad that enable, that fund, that support through fighters and material? how should they be dealt with in an aumf? and if not, where? >> you mean the people who are supporting the isis movement? >> the people that support the global jihadist movement. >> i think that -- >> and the organizations that have vowed publicly that we let walk around among us, that we have in this building and down the street. what about them? where do we deal with them if we're in this fight committed to winning? and where is that in the

strategy? >> it is in the strategy, as my colleague pointed out. it is actually a nine-track strategy, which internationally is a five-track strategy. but it's actually -- it includes of all that. the problem is some of this is political, some of it is legal. pursuing some of these people requires american laws and judicial action. >> we have a couple hundred maybe or more unindicted co-conspirators in the holy land foundation trial. they're walking around among us here. if you say this is a strategy that includes going after these people and that american laws are stopping us there's one person that's stopping us. it's the attorney general. because he refuses to prosecute them. how do you explain to me that this is an authorization without a strategy? the strategy is an aspirational goal of defeating the enemy. that's it because in reality we aren't going to do the hard things that need to be done.

>> i think the congressional record of declarations of war and things like declarations of war including this one have not tried to expand into these very complicated ideological, legal, and other things but rather authorize the use of military force as part of that strategy. you need an explanation of that strategy. you knead anneed an explanation of why those people have not been arrested and what we're doing about them as part of your analysis of our whole process here, but i wouldn't stick it in the legislation. >> appreciate your thoughts. >> lois frankel of florida. >> thank you, mr. chair. thank you to the panel. let me just start, there have been many folks on this panel who served our country. i want to thank them. i come from a little different perspective because i have a son who i saw go to two wars. sorry if i babble or get emotional. but i wanted to say that i'm lucky he came home safely.

i cannot tell you how horrific it was for his family. i don't even -- so when i went to -- and i think of the families who have lost their children, their loved ones, the morbidity of the thousands of soldiers who return and we have to say what for? so for me so make a decision of whether to send someone else's child into harm's way is i think, the biggest decision or most important one that i will make in congress. and i feel like we have been given this huge jigsaw puzzle where the pieces do not fit. my colleagues today have made a lot of -- asked a lot of good questions, a lot of good comments. i can't repeat all of them, but i have a number. you could just pick which ones you want to answer. i feel like we're in conflict all over the world.

and we have to have some strategy. what is the most important enemy to be focused on? we're trying to prevent iran from getting a nuclear weapon. obviously they're a player against isil. we're trying to weaken russia. obviously they're a player with assad. that's just two examples. you've identified that we have to go after al qaeda as well. how does the past aumf affect that and repealing that? what about -- is military action the only way? how does humanitarian aid fit into this or educating women? i mean, is this the only way out? and where does it leave us? who fills the void if we get isil? i mean, i could ask a lot more questions. so start with those and go at

it. >> while i cite sized earlier, the president's national security strategy does talk about that. it does a pretty good job. you know, while i'm a doom and glad guy because that's where i've been deployed for many years, i'll have to say this is a much safer better world now than it was when i started in this business as an army lieutenant in 1969. and that's largely because of the united states the executive branch, the congressional support, and the american people and what we've done. so even though it's a jigsaw, we don't like working in this jigsaw any more than you do observing it. we wish we could give you a clean, sensible way forward. we're painfully aware we're not. but that's how we've lived with it. and what we have seen in our lives, in my case almost 50 years now, we've seen a lot of progress and we've seen that smart use of military force with all of the other things you said combined working with allies actually does work. we usually don't have the end

game spelled out because we never know. we didn't have it spelled out with come youmunism. we thought we would contain it, bush it back, go against it and hope for the best and it worked out. that's about all i can tell you. but i'm pretty optimistic in the long run. i share your frustration at the jug jigsaw. >> i agree with the complexity, congresswoman. i think you raise a lot of good -- i like the image of a jigsaw puzzle. i think that's apt. in this particular aumf with the isisayeisis threat, in some ways there are three different theaters. it helps for me to think of them separately. the third, which is the global con testation of ideas, where there's a marketplace of ideas and change and social movements and twitter and all kinds of youth bulge all over the world not just the arab world that, are leading to some of the radicalization causes. the tools need to be refined and

specific to each of these three domains where our partners will be different, where our foes will be different, where the patrons of the foes will be different, et cetera. >> and i'd just add that it is a jigsaw puzzle. it's a very complex issue but i think that leads back to a piece i put in the paper. we need to be thinking about how do you develop a grand strategy that moves us for the next 30 years as we address this issue. we had the strategy of containment that came out in nfc-68. we need to be doing that same type of thinking about this current world that we're in. how do we carry this forward using all elements not just military? military is just one piece. >> okay. we go now to mr. reid ruble of wisconsin. >> thank you, mr. chairman. this has been really an

insightful hearing. i thank all three of you for being here. i would like to start with dr. brennan. we've heard from some of our colleagues here today that almost an implicit idea that we should just leave this to the region. if we leave this fight to take care of isis to our regional partners and just step back out of it, one what do you think would happen as a result of that strategy, and would the u.s. homeland be put at risk implementing that strategy? >> thanks for the question, congressman. i think that if we -- since president carter, the united states has taken on the responsibility of being the guarantor of regional security in that part of the world. we have vital interests both with our partners as well as europe and our own economy that are at stake here. if we pull out, it'll create a huge power vacuum that will be filled by these very organizations that we wish to stop. so i think that would be the exact worst thing to do.

and the perception unfortunately from the withdrawal of u.s. forces in 2011 by many of our partners in it the region is that we are disengaging from the region. we have to convince them that's not true. part of the ways of doing that is by being more active in what we're doing in iraq showing that we're committed. the argument i made on putting troops on the ground unless you put troops on the ground you aren't showing commitment. i think if nothing else that's one of the big benefits we'll get out of this. >> thank you. ambassador jeffrey in your written testimony, in the second paragraph, you talked about the campaign with our coalition partners and its strategy. i'm going to quote out of here. building up political capacity with our partners in iraq and syria is one thing you wrote. then you wrote, combatting the violent extremist ideology that fuels isis. could you give us some specific

ways that our partners along with the united states are combatting the violent extremist ideology? also could you tell us how successful our political capacity efforts in syria are. >> to start with the latter, they're not very successful. we don't have a good argument for the sunni arabs who are fighting against the assad regime and simultaneously against the isis people. our long-term program to train a few thousand people is not an answer. what is our long-term vision of syria? we have a long-term vision for iraq. i mean, i can spell it out. it's not too different than it's been since 2003. and it's sometimes one-half one-third, 60% there. that's a unified iraq with the three groups living in something

approaching harmony. the people we're supporting in iraq, the kurds, many of these sunni tribes, many of the other sunni politicians i know are working together to some degree, better than in the recent past certainly, and they are all opposed to this kind of violent extreme perversion of religion that we see in isis and that we see in iran. and they are our allies. but they need a lot of support because if we did just walk away the bad guys win, as dr. brennan said. >> is there a specific strategy though that you can use to combat the extremist ideology? or is this just flowery language that ended up in a strategy statement because it sounds good? >> it's kind of like only more complicated, how did we respond to communism? there that was different because it was an alternative vision of how we should live. this is how these people should live and what they should draw from their religion. the basic -- the first thing is

fight those people who are coming out after us and coming out after the moderates. secondly, make it clear that this is not a war against islam. we're not trying to take anybody's territory. we want to live in peace with the 1.4 billion muslims around the world. and support people who understand and get that. support them politically, support it through our propaganda by other words, support it through our economic assistance and our diplomacy. and i think that this will work. >> thank you. dr. rand, a question specifically for you. you seem fairly supportive of the president's language in the aumf. why would it necessarily be bad for congress to give broader authority than the president is even asking? because he then would still have the ability to choose to restrain himself or not. why is that a bad idea? >> the aumf is filling a lot of roles. we've talked about a lot of them today. >> could you please move that closer to you so we can hear you? >> the aumf is serving a lot of roles. we've talked about a lot of them

today, policy and legal. we haven't really hit on one of them which is the legitimizing role it's playing and the message it's sending to our partners in this coalition and to the people in the region. so -- and to the american public which by the way public opinion polls show majority are opposed to more extensive use of ground forces in this fight. so i think it hits the right target. it balances between the need to send the message that we're not going to re-enter, re-engage the same kind of engagement, boots on the ground we've had for the past ten years. that was deeply unpopular here at home in the united states and in the region. >> mr. chairman i yield back. >> thank you. we go now to mr. jerry connolly of virginia. >> thank you, mr. chairman. welcome to the panel. by the way, ambassador jeffrey where are you from originally? >> just north of boston. >> where? >> saugua. >> i'm from boston. thought i heard something

similar. all right. dr. brennan i want to make sure i understood what you were saying about boots on the ground. where and how many? >> what i've suggested that we be able to do -- >> and again, if you could pull the microphone closer. thank you. >> what i've suggested is that the commanders in the field be allowed to have the types of capabilities that they need. >> which field are we talking about? >> i'm talking about iraq today. and i believe what we need is to put -- have a greater advise, train, and assist role. we need to be able to put special operations forces down at the tactical level using a teams and b teams. we may need to put supporting elements that are out there. in my view we're probably looking at a package of somewhere between 5,000 and 8,000 troops.

again, that's kind of a general range. but the bigger issue is that's today, based on today's situations and conditions. as we get into the situation of having to take back mosul there might be a different need and different determination that's necessary for that mission. i think the commanders need to be able to have the flexibility to come back and say, this is what we need for success. >> got you. thank you so much. just a real quick question for you and then i want to go to dr. jeffrey. and do you agree that an aumf is in order that the president is correct to seek one and we are correct to authorize one? >> i think it's very useful to go through this discussion and have this debate in terms of whether or not to deploy forces and if so how they should be utilized. >> thank you. ambassador jeffrey i heard you say, you know, we want to send the message to 1.4 billion

muslims around the world that we're on your side, this is not an adversarial relationship. there are some bad apples, and let's all work together, muslim and non-muslim alike, to deal with the barbaric being perpetrated by this group isis and that certainly sounds good to an american audience. but aren't we somewhat unwittingly the hand maidens of the creation of isis in that with so long supported the al maliki government that was perceived as absolutely hostile by the sunni majority? in fact that hostility even today continues to fuel support even with the barbarity and violence of isis in the sunni population. because they're looking at, what are my choices? they're not looking at the nuance of the violence.

they're looking at where do i throw my lot where's my future? and the choice is a hostile shia government that is absolutely seeking to exclude me if not worse, versus at least a sunni group that is fighting on my behalf allegedly, however violent it may be. i'm not justifying that but isn't that really what's going on in terms of what's fueling isis? >> you're right. that's how a lot of sunnis think, both about the al maliki government and about us. it's how the muslim brothers think about us in egypt. it's how, ironically, much of the egyptian military who threw them out think about us. that's the problem, and it's centered in your phrase supporting them. we and we means american foreign service offices specifically, as well as the administration and a lot of the pundits and the media have given the impression that we actually make or break governments. we really have very little control over them in the middle east. the iraqi people overwhelmingly

voted for either a shia party, a shia coalition. maliki was basically the head. or a kurdish coalition that for its own reasons in the end wanted to form a coalition with that shia coalition. that led to maliki being in power. it was a democratic legally done thing although people argue about it. it's about as democratic and legal as anything gets in the middle east. the question is were we going to withdraw our support overthrow it? how were we going to do that? i didn't have an answer and i was there. i tried as long as i could to find alternative candidates. i was to the extent i could getting involved in the internal machinations of that society because we all saw problems with maliki. but we have maliki all over the middle east to do business with. >> well, you make a very good point. there's this assumption in large chunks of the world that we're somehow omnipotent.

and we most certainly are not. thank you. >> we go to mr. lee zeldin of new york. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i believe personally it's good that the president has brought an authorization for the use of force against isis. my litmus test is going to be very simple. are we doing absolutely everything in our power to ensure that we win? i have some questions and concerns. the president in his original strategy back in september when he gave a speech, he was talk abouting dropping bombs and a reliance on iraqi military and law enforcement to finish the job. when i was in iraq in 2006, it was an accomplishment to get them to show up to work. expect nothing threat that day to get them to show up to a precinct that's a quarter mile to their house. we were trying to get them to show up. so relying on elements on the ground who have no morale no

patriotism, they don't have the resources or the training or the will is something we have to take into account. in that speech the president said this was going to be different than past wars in iraq and afghanistan because there will be no boots on the ground. in the same speech, he says, i'm sending 495 additional troops to iraq. someone shows me a picture of their grandson in the air force. he's in baghdad. he's wearing a uniform, carrying a rifle, wearing boots. those boots are on the ground. the use of this term boots on the ground here in washington the reality is that we have boots on the ground right now, and i think that we need to not worry about what polls say what wording sounds the best. we also have to understand that we have some of the greatest special operation forces in the entire world. we have the best special operations forces in the entire world. army rangers, green berets, navy s.e.a.l.s, marines delta force. when we talk about boots on the

ground we're not talking about an enduring occupation. no one is talking about that. i don't support that. i'll tell you what i do want. for a member of isis to sleep with one eye open because they fear an army ranger may be visiting their house or their fellow terrorist's house to put a round of lead wean their eyes. we have to cut off logistics, command and control. we have to find the funding streams to figure out how to cut them out. we need to increase our intelligence gathering abilities. these are all critically important. american exceptionalism isn't about strategic patience right now. american exceptionalism is about instilling fear in an element that does not respect weakness they only respect strength. understanding that if we wait five years, what we're going to be up against is going to be 100 times greater than what it is

right now. i want to support the president's use of force. i also want to do my due diligence. i want to know how many troops, which troops what are their missions, who's in charge? are they going to be given the flexibility and resources necessary to accomplish the task? the president talks about necessary and appropriate in his resolution. what to him is necessary and appropriate? i'm going to read a letter that are i just received with my remaining time. i received this letter from someone who's watching, so there are people at home who watch these hearings. he says, lee as a parent of a lieutenant in the marines, i have to doubt that if deployed, he will do his duty with valor and distinction. however, unless, one, the president can specifically articulate our goals two, the president explains a strategy specifically designed to achieve those goals and those goals include the utter destruction of isis wherever they function, and three, our troops are given

whatever they need for however long they need it without limitation, both as to weapons and tactics i request that you vote against the authorization. the document as drafted appears to me to be an attempt to codify a failed strategy of limited our ability to prevail. it is a political document which allows the president to say he cannot do more because congress will not let him. he knows his strategy is failing and he needs someone else to blame. i will be damned if my son is going to be asked to risk his life for a failed strategy simply to allow the president to his incompetence. either authorize the full force of the united states or do not send our troops into harm's way. we must fight to win or not fight at all. our military has been outstretched. lives have been lost limbs have been lost, missed birthdays, missed anniversaries, missed holidays. we're not looking for conflict

but conflict has found us. and it's time for us to defeat isis. we can't half ass it. we need to go all out and get the job done or not send our troops at all into harm's way. i yield back my time. >> we go now to ms. grace ming of new york. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, ranking member rangel and for all of our honorable witnesses for being here today. i sort of want to piggy back off of what mr. ribble had previously asked about what coalition members should be prepared to do to continue delegitimizing isis' ideology. for example, a recent report indicated that around 4,000 foreign fighters have joined isis since the air strikes began. are there specific strategies that coalition members should be employing to further prevent the flow of foreign fighters into syria and iraq? part two of that question is

often talked about. isis calls themselves an islamic state. what name might you suggest we in america and around the world and in the media use to describe this barbaric group so as not to confer any undue sense of legitimacy? anyone can -- >> those are excellent questions, congresswoman. i would just add that i'll defer the second one to my colleagues. the first one, it's very interesting the types of political capital that's needed to be invested by leaders in the arab and muslim world to fight, to counter radicalization. some of the examples i mentioned earlier were the leaders of saudi arabia and egypt have helped their clerics issue fat whats condemning isis' violence. there's also the importance of social media. the united states government is not the only government that has a technical capacity to tweet against isis. in fact, this is one sort of less reported part of the technical capacity that's being

done. we're helping our coalition governments build these anti-social media websites, et cetera. it's a small thing but it's an important thing given the percentage of the youth who are being radicalized in many of these societies. on the foreign fighters, my understanding is that the foreign fighters flowing into syria and iraq has been slowed in the past three or four months based on a couple of factors. one was turkey. we've increased our diplomacy or the coalition has increased its diplomacy and its technical capacity building efforts with turkey, and turkey has improved its border security. so there's a lot of this that's technical that you need to do with partners. it's better if it's done in a coalition so it's not just the united states telling people how to do better border security how to fight foreign fighters. finally, i'll just mention the u.n. security council resolution that the president introduced in september that was basically condemning and urging all member states to stop the flow of foreign fighters. >> let me just go back to your question on the name.

i think we should join our arab friends in the region and start calling them daesh. they are not the islamic state. they do not represent islam. they are an offchute of that religion, but they do not represent it. and i think that would be a good way for us both in the government and academia and others to try to show solidarity with our arab allies. but defeating the ideology it goes back to working with those leaders in those countries, helping them supporting them giving them the type of support they need. in the case of iraq, iraq has a lot of problems. i'm not certain where it's going to go. half the time i think it's going to survive, and the other half i think it's going to fracture. but the reality is that we've invested a trillion dollars and million man years of labor and there's a possibility that this may be saved.

if that's the case we should continue to work on it. let me just take a little bit off for a second. we missed a great opportunity in 2006 when the maliki government needed us the most and we did not push for reconciliation. i think at this point in time when the iraqi government needs us, that a part of our strategy has got to be and our support for them has got to be honest to goodness reconciliation that is not going to walk away from as soon as the problem is over. >> thank you. i'll try to answer my last question fast. secretary kerry previously testified that the u.s. would be resupplying the iraqi kurdish, peshmerga going through baghdad so as not to undermine the central government. has this prevented them from getting what they need to effective will i fight ayeisis? and how will the central government in baghdad view an

effort to provide military equipment directly to the kurds? >> it did prevent the transfer of equipment when i was ambassador. i don't have the straatistics now but the kurds certainly believe it has. they cite, as we heard earlier, only 25 of hundreds of armored vehicles that have been provided to them. while there's some pretty good reasons why we're careful on what we give them, the point is they're fighting. they are the allies of baghdad. and a lot of these weapons systems are no threat to baghdad, but they are a threat to isis and they should be flowing. >> we'll go now to mr. tom emmer of minnesota. >> i'll try to be brief. i apologize for going back and forth. there seem to be a whole bunch of things going on at the same time. and i don't want to cover old ground, but i'm afraid i might touch a little bit. my understanding, first we're here because the president has requested renewed authorization

for military force. and it seems everything that i've read and everything that i've been listening to including your testimony everybody agrees that isil must be defeated. there seems to be absolutely no disagreement. i heard today, and i think this is for you, dr. brennan, if you would. the others can certainly expand on it. you must first start by stopping the military manifestations. we've had reference to you got to cut off the revenue sources. you've got to -- i just wrote another one down listening to the testimony. we have the ability to interrupt or interfere with internet, social media, the like. i'd love to know to the extent this new authorization of military force. is that something the administration is planning on doing on every level? and how are we going to know what the strategy is? i'll tell you, i agree with my

colleague from new york. i would offer that the executives should have all the authority that he needs to make sure that whatever the situation is, as fluid as it may be you can deploy whatever resources are necessary to take the action that's necessary to win, not just hold something at bay. and i guess i'll add this for the ambassador. i thought i heard you say earlier that we've never ventured into -- that our country has never ventured into combatting such a complex ideology. all that came to mind was fascism and marxism. i would just ask you to help me with that because you've got that background. so dr. brennan, could you fill us in? what needs to be done? >> i think the first thing that we need to do is -- and i think the president is doing this correct.

this is an iraq-first issue. how do you defeat isis in iraq? go after their finances to the extent we can. much more complex than it was when we were there earlier. you use the internet social media. you attack the ideology. >> continue the air strikes? >> enhance air strikes. i think we need to do much more in the way of air than we've been doing. but that will require, again back to my point, you got to put boots on the ground our forces with those four leading elements. not necessarily do the direct fighting, but to be able to reach back and pull the resources of the u.s. government. one of the things on the aumf that said the president was going to use our unique capabilities. i believe that as being air. i've got to tell you u.s. ground forces capabilities whether it be special forces conventional forces or army or marine, are unique.

it's not that one individual you put out this. it's that joint capacity that you bring to the battle tooeld. if we're going to make certain our allies are going to be successful, we got to be out there with them. >> so my question then, dr. brennan, because we are so limited on time, is if congress is going to authorize the additional military force that the executive is asking for, why wouldn't congress authorize the executive to take whatever action with whatever unique resources are available? because this is such an immediate and dangerous threat, not just to this country, but the entire globe. why wouldn't the authorization be that broad? >> i personally think it probably should be that broad. again, the president can restrict what he chooses to do, but i think this aumf is going to continue beyond this presidency. what we shouldn't do is limit the next president based upon what this president may not want to do. >> last question. mr. ambassador i'm sorry if i'm

getting pinched. that's what i would expect as the answer just common sense would tell me, not necessarily the experience because i don't have yours. but the only limitation i'm going to ask you if this is accurate or if you would disagree with this. the only limitation, if there was one, should be in the amount of time so that it has to come back to congress for reauthorization and a discussion of what the strategy has been, where it's been. would that be the only -- >> i think that would be perfectly acceptable to put a period of time. >> how long? >> i would go beyond the three years. maybe four years so the next president has time to look at it, to revise the strategy, and make the changes he needs before it comes back. >> thank you. my time is expired. >> representative from florida. >> section 2c of the president's draft authorization for the use of military force reads as follows. the authority granted in

subsection a does not authorize the use of u.s. armed forces in enduring offensive ground combat operations. ambassador jeffrey what does enduring mean? >> my answer would be a somewhat sarcastic one. whatever the executive at the time defines enduring as. i have a real problem with that. >> dr. brennan? >> i have a real problem with that also. not only because -- i don't know what it means. i can just see the lawyers fighting over the meaning of this. but more importantly f lyimportantly, if you're looking at committing forces for something that's vital or an important interest to the united states and you get in the middle of a battle, and all of the sudden are you on offense or defense? what happens if neighbors cause problems? wars never end the way that they were envisioned. so i think that's really a terrible mistake to put in the aumf. >> dr. rand?

>> enduring in my mind specifies an open endedness. it specifies lack of clarity on a particular objective at hand. >> dr. rand, is two weeks enduring? >> i would leave that to the lawyers to determine exactly. >> so your answer is you don't know. >> yeah. >> how about two months? >> i don't know. again, i think it would depend on the particular objective. enduring in my mind is not having a particular military objective in mind. >> so you don't really know what it means. is that a fair statement? >> enduring in my mind means open ended. >> all right. section five of the draft authorization of the use of military force reads as follows. in this joint resolution, the term associated persons or forces means individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf of or alongside isil or any closely related. ambassador jeffrey, what does alongside isil mean?

>> i didn't draft this thing, but -- >> nor did i. >> but i would have put that in there if i had been drafting it. the reason is i think they went back to 2001. of course, this is the authorization we're still using along with the 2002 one for this campaign. and these things morph. for example, we've had a debate over whether isis is really an element of al qaeda. it certainly was when i knew it, as al qaeda in iraq in 2010 to 2012. and these semantic arguments confuse us and confuse our people on the ground in trying to deal with these folks. you'll know it when you see it if it's an isis or it's an ally of isis. >> how about the free syrian army? are they fighting alongside isil in syria? >> no, they're not fighting alongside isil. in fact, often they're fighting against isil and isil against them in particular. >> what about assad? is he fighting for or against?

it's hard to tell that score card, isn't it? >> it sure is. >> yeah, what about you, dr. brennan? can you tell me what alongside isil means? >> i really couldn't. it might be -- the 9/11 commission uses the phrase radical islamist organizations. i think maybe if we went to wording like that. it includes all of those 52 groups that adhere to this type of ideology that threaten the united states. but we're putting ourselves in boxes. as you said, congressman, i'm trying to understand what that means, what the limits are, who we're dealing with is very confusing. >> dr. rand? >> first of all, i believe that the confusion is probably a function of the fact that this is an unclassified document. it's not going to specify exactly which group or considered associates. that would be for a classified setting. but second as i said in the testimony, the nature of the alliances within isil are changing and are fluid. those who are targeting the military experts know exactly

who is a derivative or an associate or an ally of isis at any given moment. >> why are you so confident about it? seems to me it's a matter of terminology, not a matter of ascertainable fact. >> based on my public service i've seen some of the lawyers and some of the methodologies. >> here's the $64 billion question for you, ambassador jeffrey. then if we have time, for you others. if you can't tell us, you three experts can't tell us what these words mean what does that tell us? ambassador jeffrey. >> that it's very difficult to be using a tool basically designed to declare war or something like war on a nation state, which has a fixed definition against a group that morphs, that changes its name, that has allies and other things. do we not fight it? we have to fight it.

are we having a hard time define it? you bet. >> dr. brennan? >> i agree with the ambassador. i think the issue that we need to be looking at is trying to broaden terminology and understand that it is -- that organizations or groups that adhere to this ideology and make it broad enough that if one pops up in a different country that is doing the same thing, that is a sister of this organization, the president has the authority to act. >> dr. brennan, i think you just described a blank check which i'm not willing to give to the president or anybody else. but thank you for your time. >> we go now to to mr. ron from florida. >> the white house said he had authority to act based on the 2001 and 2002 aumf. so the media is reporting that he's asking congress for authority, but by their own view he's asking congress to

restrict and limit the authority, both by whatever -- and i agree these terms are nebulous, but having some prohibition on the use of ground forces and having a time limit -- and i agree with the witnesses. i don't think that's an effective way to fight an enemy. i think you need to determine the enemy, determine the strategy and then bring all force to bear or be willing to do that. obviously the commander in chief needs to make these decisions. so i'm trying to figure out what is motivating this. i think it's because if you look at the way things are going if you look at the strategy that's in place or lack of strategy, this is not going to succeed. and i think everybody understands that. so i think the president is looking to get congress on his strategy so he can point the finger at us and say these guys limited me. we all thought this was a good idea. right now he's kind of out there. congress is urging him to do different. and he gave an interview this week where he said look,

terrorism, the news makes a big deal about it. it's just something, like a big city mayor. you got to deal with criminals and stuff. i'm thinking like giuliani when he used to get these guys with the squeegees. is that really how you're seeing it? so i'm skeptical of the motivation for doing this now. let me ask you this dr. brennan. i think that it kind of informs where we're going. is the problem a group of violent extremeists who happen to go by the name of isis or whatever you want to call them, or is this a global jihad that presents national security implications and threatens our national security and our allies, not just in this part of syria or that part of iraq, but really in countries across the globe. >> i think it's useful to look at this as not as a terrorist organization. it is a global phenomena we're seeing. and i think you can also look at it as a global insurgency where

you have sister organizations sprouting up all over the world, fighting in support of the same ideology, even though they may not have direct linkage or direct command and control. again, if i may use loosely the analogy of the 20th century when we had marxist revolutions all over the world. many of them didn't like each other, but they supported each other in different ways. >> dr. rand mentioned, i think accurately, that a lot of these sunni tribesmen in iraq certainly when i was serving there, they're really not jihadists. they're sunni arabs, and if they they back then aqi was better than the deal they get with the central government, then they were apt to do that. and if they think it's a shiite government, that's going to push them further. i guess my question is if you look at the administration's policy, there's a clear attempt to have a major reproachment with iran. if to you look at yemen now

potentially an iran client state, the assad -- i know we've been through different machinations there but i think the administration is content to leave assad there. and so if you're just the average sunni arab wanting to figure out should you kind of work with the americans and whatever forces we may be supporting or should you work with some of the sunni jihadist groups, if they see us as as a facilitating shiite domination of the region, isn't that going to push some of these sunni arabs who are not necessarily jihadists into the arms of the more radical sunni groups? ambassador? >> absolutely, which is why we can't pick a side in the sunni/shia struggle any more than we can pick a side in the christian/muslim struggle in the balkans. we have to have a set of values and friends who accept them and go after everybody who's violating them, whether they're

coming out of mosul or they're coming out of tehran or they're coming out of damascus. >> so if you have for example, isis fighters threatening the outer baghdad belts you have shiite militia groups which we have considered to be terrorists when we were in iraq and that are supported by iran's cudds force, some said there is an alliance with the u.s., you know. we were supporting some of the anti-isis forces and other parts of iraq and we're essentially relying on the iranian backed forces to keep isis out of baghdad. is that a sustainable strategy? >> in the long run, no, but there is a saying you slay the wolf closest to the sled. right now when isis is moving forward, we should be working with anybody that can stop them. but they have really not moved forward anymore. now we have to figure out how to go get them. >> mr. ted deutch ranking member of the middle east subcommittee. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks to the witnesses for your willingness to come and stay

through all the questions. i would like to associate myself with many of my colleagues' comments on the tragic death of kayla mueller. i welcome the president's request for an authorization to use military force against isil. we deserve to have a real and robust debate to make sure our mission is clear and to make sure past mistakes are not repeated. i would like to follow up -- the last two members, both of my florida colleagues had said and i want to start by asking ambassador jeffrey, in this discussion about whether ground troops are needed to combat isis we talk about the president has spoken a lot about letting our partners in the region take the lead. question is what would be the impact of having jordanian or emirati troops on the ground, what would the united states

role be in getting back to the -- back and forth that all of you had a little while ago, how would our -- would our role serving aside those troops in a -- in something less than an enduring -- or could our role be described as anything less than an enduring and offensive role? >> i think that, again i didn't draft this thing, but the draft is probably wanted to link enduring and offensive because we have an enduring presence in the middle east. we had combat troops in kuwait for over a decade since i was there in the mid-'90s. it isn't the question of enduring. it gets to could we use jordanian troops absolutely, but there are lots of political problems and frankly we have never seen arab troops on the offensive in any of our earlier wars, not in iraq and not 2003 with a few exceptions not in afghanistan and not in kuwait.

there are huge taboos about that in the arab world. some of them might be broken with some countries. my -- >> excuse me, i'm sorry, do you think they have been. do you think in light of recent events we wouldn't face those same political -- >> if i were advising the president, i would say be very careful about that because the main value of these allies is their political support which plays well here, and the what they're doing in their own societies to deal with this violent islamic manifestation. if they start taking a lot of casualties in ground combat against isis and they will, look at the curedkurds, 500 or 600 killed. they have lots of problems internally. >> do you think given the

concerns ambassador jeffrey just laid out it is realistic to believe that a ground war could be fought by those troops without u.s. troops? usthink u.s. troops have got to be there. as we push into anbar province and some of the ski cities, and most importantly mosul, it will be critically important to have our troops with them. exactly what that composition of troops is depends on the situation at the time and the commanders' analysis. i think if congress looks at this, and believe that this is something worth fighting for, we need to give the commanders on the ground some flexibility. >> let me ask something else i home have a minute left. this amuf only deals with 2002 amuf.

it doesn't touch the 2001 amuf. the real question i think a lot of us have is as congressman desanto said earlier, if the argument is that everything we're doing now we can pursue pursuant to the 2001 amuf then should we assume that whatever the limitations are that ultimately might be included in this amuf however broad those limitations are, that ultimately we could wind up doing anything we want pursuant to the existing 2001 amuf anyway. >> i don't believe that's the intention. i believe the intention is to -- >> i understand. i'm not talking about the intention. i'm asking whether you could still rely upon the amuf to conduct whatever operations regardless of what is contained in here. >> i sense a different threat than al qaeda. the 2001 -- >> i -- so you think no. ambassador jeffrey, you think yes. >> of course. the president has done everything he's done up until

now, air strikes drawing on that and it is a very broad thing. i like it but i'm having to give you an honest answer an, yeah that's a problem. >> thanks. >> we go to mr. ted yeho of florida. >> i appreciate you all being here. dr. brennan, you said since carter's presidency the u.s. have been the guarantors of peace in the region. i look at israel and palestine, syria with 220,000 dead, plus, and we know the situation in afghanistan, iraq, libya yemen lebanon, jordan is a bright spot, and let us not forget iran. how do you assess we have done since the carter administration? >> well, i think our success rate has not been high. >> okay. and i heard our president the other day say that if a failed policy like cuba has not worked after 50 years, it has to

change. i agree with that statement. i'm not going to go into the cuba debacle right now. our whole process in the middle east has to change because where did isis come from? dr. brennan, you go ahead. >> originally came from al qaeda in iraq that morphed into isi and later into -- >> if we go back to what the president is saying here, that we're going to degrade and defeat isis i remember those statements in the iraq war, mission accomplished but we weren't done. i remember this president saying al qaeda is on the run, they're the jv team they're gone. and the question i have for all three of you is what is a definitive definition of defeat of isil. it is an ideology, we're not fighting a nation state it is

like fighting a tumor that metastasizes and we're going after the mehta that sis not going at the root cause. i would like to hear a definition of defeat, definitive one, and then i would like to hear what your root cause is of why there is an isis, why there was an al qaeda, and i've got one other question after that, ambassador, if you would go first. >> it is a good point and it is the major flaw of this draft. the draft doesn't tell -- you give this back to the president and it doesn't authorize the president to do anything more than using armed forces against isil. it doesn't say defeat, though that's one of the things he says is his goal, working to defeat in the -- there is no goal. one reason we have all been debating about how long this thing should be or what kind of troops or what enduring means is there is no goal. my goal is to defeat isis, to destroy its hold on terrain in

iraq and syria. that's what should be in this thing. that is a military mission. we can do it if possible with our allies. potentially we will have to use our own forces. if that's a vital mission, that's what the president should be tasked to do by you. >> i think you are absolutely right. and if we don't define what isil is as a radical islamic jihadist group, you can't defeat it. it is like let's build a house and i give you a bunch of 2 by 4s and the material and you're like, what's the plan? i don't know. just build a house. that's what i see here. that's a simple analogy or bad analogy. but i see us wanting to commit but not really wanting to commit. it is like you're not playing to win. you're playing not to lose. and it is just -- if we're not going to go in there with a very specific strategy, this is a bad idea. dr. brennan, what is your opinion? >> i agree with that. i think what you need to do to

defeat iraq and syria or isis, is to understand we're putting -- at some level an artificial distinction with -- at the border between iraq and syria. we have to look at the entire organization. i agree iraq first, but we need to be thinking about how do we attack this entire organization and make certain that no longer controls territory. and the ambassador's exactly right. that's a military objective. but it means we have to be able to move into syria also. >> which is attacking a sovereign state may be a failed state but we're attacking that. that opens up a whole other can of worms. >> i would disagree with my colleagues in a sense that i think -- >> disagree? >> i disagree in a sense that i think there is a strategy again, preliminary evidence that it is working. this is what the military advisers to the president are recommending as a way to defeat the enemy. so this combination of limited u.s. force with air strikes paired with the coalition partners on the ground has