screeria -- nigeria. -

and the senate armed services committee questions the commander of u.s. forces in afghanistan. at a house armed services committee hearing today retired general michael flynn, the former head of military intelligence, testified about the threat posed by isis. he calls for a more aggressive strategy against the militant group in iraq and syria. president obama has asked congress to pass a new authorization of military force against isis. congressman matt thornberry chairs this two hour hearing.

>> on wednesday, the president submitted to congress proposal for authorization to use military force against isis. although the president ordered combat operations against isis take place in iraq, since last august and in syria since last september, only now has he sought congressional authorization required by the constitution. despite air strikes, press accounts say isis expanded control in syria, the world has been horrified at its barbarrism. the u.s. has a setback in yemen abandoned our place there a plays the president held out as model for counterterrorism approach. now we are in a much weaker position to prevented attacks by the organization that posed the most serious threat to our home land in recent years. elsewhere, boko haram is killing thousands and steadily advancing in nigeria.

libya is a breeding ground for terrorist groups. aqim in several north african countries, and concern that al qaeda in afghan, pakistan region is becoming reinvigorated as u.s. troop levels are reduced. congress will consider the president's aumf proposal in the context of this wider fight against islamic terrorists. the purpose of today's hearing is to evaluate how that broader struggle is going, among questions i have what are the trends we see with islamist terrorists. is the threat to the united states more or less serious. many in congress want reassurance that the president has a strategy to succeed against this threat and that he is personally committed to persevere until we are successful. it is clear that before we are successful we have to understand the threat, where we are, and where we are headed. that's the purpose of today's hearing.

mr. smith. >> thank you. i thank the chairman for the hearing on this very important topic. i think it is the largest national security threat that we face as a country. i know all three of our panelists have a lot of knowledge on the issue, i think it will be helpful for the committee to hear from them engage in questions and answers as we figure out how to confront this threat. part of the problem with the threat is it is not easy to define, not easy to put strategy around. it really is a broad ideology that has many different components. you know, post 9/11 we saw al qaeda as a terrorist group with a centralized leadership that was plotting and planning attacks against us and i think we responded accordingly to try to defeat that organization, to try and defeat that network and did a reasonably effective job of it in afghanistan and pakistan as we prevented that group being able to mount further attacks against us. that's the positive. the negative is that the ideology itself has

metastasized. it has grown into a number of groups the chairman mentioned and even more than that, in a lot of different places, and the root cause is a lack of solid governance lack of solid economic opportunity in the middle east and north africa and much of the arab muslim world. they have an exploding youth population that has nothing to do. no jobs and no prospects. so the ideology that comes along and says i have the answer for you has plenty of willing recruits. meanwhile, they don't have much in the way of example of a good government anywhere that they could look to and work with. so it is going to be very difficult to contain this. i think the chairman laid out the challenges with isis in iraq and syria the collapse in yemen, the difficulties in libya, but overall i think we need a long term strategy. one of the things i think has

hampered us is a notion that we have to be able to confidently say a, that we are winning, or that we are going to win and here is how. i honestly think this is a long term ideological struggle not something that we can say we are determined to defeat it, so let's just suck it up and three or four years from now it will be done. it took 75 years to defeat communism. we have to figure out how to have a long term strategy for dealing with this ideology. that doesn't mean that in the short term the ideology runs rampant. huge piece of that strategy is containing the threat, figuring out how to protect our interests from violence and figuring out how to begin to roll back these groups and roll back the advance of their ideology. it is an issue that defies an easy answer. so what we hope to hear today is some ideas on how we can proceed and move forward, mindful of the fact that it is a very, very

large problem that's going to take a long time to deal with. the final point that i will make, one of the things that hamstrings us, it is not something that the u.s. or western world can take care of. the muslim world does not want the united states to show up and tell it what it ought to do. and this is true even of the moderate muslims that we look to work with. we have to figure out how we can be helpful to support the moderate voices so that they can triumph, so they can defeat the extremist ideologies. it cannot be western driven by the very definition of the way those folks look at the world. so we can help but if we help too much in an odd sort of way, we wind up hurting the overall effort. i think that's the lesson we learned in iraq and afghanistan. with that, i look forward to the testimony, questions and appreciate the chairman holding the hearing. >> i thank the gentleman. i mention to members i think we are supposed to have votes on the floor roughly around 10:40,

10:45, so i am going to try to be fairly strict, be strict with the time limits so we can move along smartly. i ask unanimous consent the full written statement of all our witnesses be made part of the record. without objection, so ordered. let me again thank our witness force being here. very pleased to see retired lieutenant general michael flynn, former director of defense intelligence agency, mr. william bran ig executive director, national consortium for study of terrorism and responses to terrorism with university of maryland and dr. mark lynch with the george washington university. all of these gentlemen have done very serious helpful work for the committee and for the country on this topic of terrorism and we are very grateful to have you with us today. as i said your full written statement will be made part of the record. if you would like to summarize at this point and we will get to questions, we would appreciate

it. general flynn. >> great, thank you. chairman thornberry ranking member smith members of the committee, it is an honor to be here today. i really appreciate the invitation. you have asked me to comment on the state of islamic extremism. today i have the unhappy task of informing you that according to every metric of significance islamic extremism has grown in the last year whether it be the scale and scope of isis and it's associated movements, the number of value payment islamic groups, the territory these groups control, the number of terrorist attacks they perpetrate, mass numbers and suffering of refugees and displaced persons due to islamic groups, that's approximately 15 million people. the amount of kidnapping and rape of women and children by these groups. the numbers of casualties they inflict. their broad expansion and use of the internet, which is very serious, or just their sheer barbarrism that we witnessed, i

can draw no other conclusion but to say the threat has reached unacceptable level and is growing. we are at war with violent and extreme islam, and we must accept and face this reality. this enemy has an engrained unshakeable vision how the world and society should be ordered and believe violence is a legitimate means of bringing about this ideal state. the violent islamist is serious, devout, committed and dangerous. his ideology justifies the most heinous inhumane actions imaginable, and he will not be reasoned with, nor will he relength. this enemy must be opposed they must be killed they must be destroyed and associated extremist form of islamic ideology must be defeated wherever it reers its ugly head. there are some that counsel patience arguing violent islamist are not existential threat and can simply be managed as criminals. i respectfully and strongly disagree. i have been in the theaters of

war of iraq and afghanistan for many years faced this enemy up close and personal, and i have seen first hand the unrestrained cruelty of this enemy. they may be animated by medieval ideology, but they are thoroughly modern in capacity to kill and maim as well as precisely and smartly message their ideas intentions, and actions via the internet. in fact, they're increasingly capable of threatening our nation's interests and those of our allies. furthermore, it would be foolish for us to wait until our enemies pose an existential threat before taking decisive action. doing so would only increase the cost in blood and treasure, later for what we know must be done now. our violent and extremely radical islamist enemies must be stopped. to that end, i offer the following three strategic objectives. first, we have to energize every element of national power, similar to the effort during world war ii, or during the cold

war, to effectively resource what will likely be a multi generational struggle. there is no cheap way to win this fight. second, we must engage the violent islamists wherever they are, drive them from their safe havens and kill them. there can be no quarter and no accommodation for this vicious group of terrorists. any nation state that offers safe haven to our enemies must be given one choice, to eliminate them or be prepared for those contributing partners involved in this endeavor to do so. we do need to recognize there are nations who lack the capability to defeat this threat and will likely require help to do so inside of their own internationally recognized boundaries. we must be prepared to assist those nations. third. we must decisively confront the state and nonstate supporters and enablers of the violent islamic ideology and compel them

to lend support to their enemies or be prepared to move capacity to do so. many are currently considered partners of the united states. this must change. if our so-called partners do not act in accordance with internationally accepted norms and behaviors or international law, the united states must be prepared to cut off or severely curtail economic military, and diplomatic ties. we cannot be seen as being hypocritical to those we partner with to defeat radical islam. finally in pursuit of these objectives, i fully support congress' constitutional role providing authorization for use of military force. this authorization should be broad and agile, but unconstrained by unnecessary restrictions, restrictions that today cause not only frustration in our military our intelligence, and diplomatic communities, but also significantly slow down the decision-making process for numerous fleeting opportunities. it is important however, to

realize that such an authorization is neither a comprehensive strategy nor war winning one. if there is not a clear coherent, comprehensive strategy forthcoming from the administration there should be no organization. with that chairman i am happy to take your questions. >> thank you general. mr. brennan. >> chairman thornberry ranking member smith, esteemed members of the committee i would like to thank you on behalf of the star consortium for inviting us to speak with you today. in 2013 over 22,000 people were killed and nearly 8500 terrorist attacks. when star releases the full database, set for 2014, we anticipate it will include over 15,000 terrorist attacks. our preliminary data from the first nine months of 2014 suggest that 7 of 10 mosley that will groups were violent jihadist groups and isil conducted more terror attacks

than any other terror organization. the trend lines are largely driven by two factors. proliferation of groups associated with al qaeda in hot spots around the world, second, the rise of isil and strategy of escalation through sectarian violence. what we have, therefore, is the makings of a global competition involving the most violent terrorist organizations in the world. this is even more troubling when one considers that both the theoretical and empirical work in terrorism studies field suggests that competition among terror groups is one of the most important predictors of increasing lethality over time. to better understand this, i would like to contrast operations and strategies of al qaeda and associated movement or aqam with those of isil. al qaeda is waging protracted war of attrition against the west, aiming to bleed the united states. if they're able to get the military, economic or will to remain in the muslim world, they

can overpower regimes and establish what they consider proper thee objecting kri see. al qaeda sent operatives into conflict zones across the world to reor yenlt violence of militant organizations and individuals, refocussing wrath on enemy targets like western embassies or tourist destinations. al qaeda uses mass casualty attacks for heavy handed military response from western and other governments -- thereby polarizing muslim and nonmuslim worlds enabling jihadist to motivate for conflict. isil is not waging war of attrition but one of escalation. instead of inviting muslim versus western violence it is benefitting from resources already being mobilized by sek taern polarization taking place in iraq and syria and beyond which it actively seeks to interstate. instead of the far enemy, isil's

military operations focus on attacking competitors who do not submit to their organizational prime see, seizing resources necessary to build the caliphate. given this competition, several implications for u.s. policy and regional security. the first, was al qaeda or enemy strategy relies on provocation to pulverize the masses isil is ratcheting up elevated levels of sectarian tension in the post arab spring world. continued presence of assad is more a problem for isil. it helps to dampen government responses to isil and groups. and al qaeda affiliate. sek taern tensions remain high isil and aligned groups foster and exploit those tensions. isil veterans travel to new fronts outside iraq and syria bringing escalation strategy and

sectarianism with them. worst case scenario, this contagion effect runs risk of sectarian civil war in the muslim world, regaiting west to observer unable to take meaningful action for itself or others. in addition, every new isil front opens a new set of grievance narratives and mobilization pathways seek to go radicalize and recruit foreign fighters. three, they have incentives foray tax against the west. for isil attacks against the west can be used as form of deterrents, making foreign countries think twice or pay the price for large scale military interventions in iraq and syria. we cannot be fooled into thinking al qaeda's focus on the caliphate presents them from actively seeking capability to conduct attacks against the home land. for al qaeda and associated movement, the antagonistic rise to prominence incentivizes them to use enemy attacks to regain

the spotlight. if isil continues to murder muslims, overstep bounds as we have seen with respect to murder of jordanian pilot, al qaeda and associated movement may wind up looking more legitimate and mainstream by comparison as long as they remain focused on the true enemy of islam the west. we cannot take pressure off aqam. we are seeing escalating competition among violent sunni groups when sectarian tensions are high and many government holds on government are weak. it is essential that any u.s. strategy works with sunni nations and communities to marginalize violent sunni extremists. the u.s. must find a way to ease sectarian tensions and allow them to focus on marginalizing groups like isil and aqam. >> thank the chairman and

ranking member smith, it is an honor to have the chance to speak with you. as you heard from my colleagues, isil poses a serious threat to american interests, to the people of the region, to our partners in the region and it is he extremely important to not underestimate the nature of the threat or misunderstand the nature of the threat. it is important to not exaggerate its novelty or perhaps magnitude of the threat. it is not -- these are not super humans with unprecedented ability to form states or to seize territory or to inspire. the world history is full of insur general sees that captured territory and sought to govern by extracting resources from the local population, the world's history is full of insurgencies that used graphic violent terrorism to intimidate their enemies and to ensure control over their local populations. we have seen both islamist and other ideological movements

other world history. this is a dangerous, violent organization which must be confronted, but it is important to place it in proper perspective. to understand the dilemma extremist groups faced from the beginning, islamic jihad in egypt or armed islamic group in algeria or al qaeda in the 2000s, or isil today. that fundamental problem is while they have the vision that general flynn described, characteristics that general flynn described and that extreme dogma tichl, the vast majority of muslims in the world do not agree with them and they failed every time they have attempted to reach out and mobilize the world's muslims on their side. the ideology and strategy of al qaeda and isil is to create a clash of civilizations create

unbridgeable divide between muslims of the world and the west, and what we must keep in mind as we formulate any effective strategy is that the way to defeat isil, al qaeda and all forms of violent extremism is to marginalize them form alliances with vast majority of the world to reject their barbarrism and reject their extreme ideology. the face of muslims in the minds of americans and face of muslims in the mind of the world should not be osama bin laden, it should not be the faceless murderers of the journalists of "charlie hebdo" in paris. it should be the student that was murdered in north carolina this week. to defeat isil america must be seen as their champion, not as their enemy, and if we are able to align ourselves with as mir agencies and hopes of muslims

all over the world then isil can be defeated, and only then. so i do not disagree with general flynn's characterization of the threat posed by isil. but i believe it is extremely important we approach this threat from perspective of the need to constantly seek to deflate their pretensions, to marginalize them, to expose their extremism in the eyes of not only us but muslims they seek to recruit to mobilize and ultimately to lead. now, this was i believe one of the great accomplishments, great bipartisan accomplishments of both bush administration after 9/11 and obama administration. the immediate understanding of the strategic divide and need to not allow al qaeda after 9/11 to provoke this kind of clash of civilizations. president bush despite some missteps early on i think did a fantastic job trying to reach out to the muslims of the united states and ensure that this

divide did not open up. and i think that's the bipartisan commitment that we should build on today. in my prepared statement i go through in some detail explanations for why isil has emerged in the form that it has today. i won't repeat those here. let me hit some of the bullet points because i think it is important to place this into specific political context. mentioned failure of government, failure of arab uprising is a key part of emergence of isil in the form it is today. enormous number of young muslims and arabs around the middle east seen their hopes raised and then crushed. military coup is unfortunately proving to people that peaceful political participation is not an option. if we are going to respond to kwlil in the way as again i agree with general flynn that we

must, we need to address the underlying causes of despair, alienation, and building the possible pool of recruits for isil. that includes reversing sectarian misgovernment of iraq, includes trying to find some kind of peaceful deescalation of war in syria. and it means trying to find some way to align the united states with forces of moderate, peaceful change. that's no easy task. i have some ideas about how we may go about doing that. for now, i stop and welcome everyone's questions. >> thank you. i appreciate the testimony from each of you. i would like to ask hopefully a brief question from each of you. general flynn, toward the end of your statement you make a point an aumf should not be overly constrained. you had a lot of experience fighting folks in the middle east and south asia.

do you have an opinion about how difficult it would be for our troops to follow a restriction that said they could not engage in enduring offensive ground combat operations? >> yes. so we need to be very clear in this aumf that may come out of an agreement between legislative and executive branches, when we give military commanders a mission, we should allow them to execute that mission, not overly constrain them with approved authorities but then have to come back to the administration for permission. so if we authorize use of force to do something with the many times fleeting opportunities there that our military forces see, then they have to come back

up through a bureaucratic process to get permission, even though there's authority given to them, then we need to review the authorities and those permissions or we need to change the commanders because we apparently don't trust them to do the job we have given them to do. that's a real problem today. give the commanders the authority to execute the mission they have been given if they are not the right people, remove them, put somebody else in that can do that. otherwise, allow them to do the things they have been assigned tasked, and very capable of doing in what is currently the aumf that we have. we have become so overly bureaucratic in coming up through the system to get permission to basically do things that frankly colonels on the battlefield or captains at sea are very capable of doing. >> thank you. mr. braniff, i was struck in your testimony that as i read it

that just in the last 12 months we've seen a dramatic rise in these terrorist organizations and in their attacks. as i understand it, one of the things your organization does is keep track of these with objective metrics. and am i reading that right that even in the last year we have seen this problem get dramatically worse? >> mr. chairman if you compare the most violent terrorist organizations in 2013 to those in 2014 the level of violence from isil taliban, she bob, boko haram have increased between 2013 to 2014, according to preliminary data. iraq afghanistan yemen somalia, libya have increased terror violence in our preliminary data from 2014. pakistan is the only sort of

effected nation which has seen a decrease, out of countries where al qaeda and associated movement are active. so we have seen a year on year increase over the last 12 months, over the 12 months before that, and 12 months before that. the trend line is continuing to rise. partial explanation is that a lot of strategy now focuses on trying to build capabilities of partner nations to deal with the issue, and that's a slow process, things may get worse before they get better that's opportunistic read. pessimistic read is the organizations enjoyed greater safe haven in post arab spring world and seized on less stable governments and are exploiting that safe haven. >> so dr. lynch, i am a little perplexed by a sentence you have in your prepared statement that says the u.s. has thus far crafted an effective strategy in responding to isil which has

halted its momentum. is that the way you see the developments in the last year or so? >> thank you, chairman. yes, actually i think the way the administration has crafted the strategy as initial step has been quite effective. they managed to leverage the increased military commitment in iraq into the most important move, which was a change in government of iraq, and the removal of prime minister maliki who carried out misgovernment and corruption which lost and squandered all of the gains of the previous years by managing to then get new iraqi prime minister willing and able to reach out to iraqi sunnis, then to use air power and limited military support the momentum of isil has been halted. they're no longer able to advance. they suffered a serious defeat in kobani thanks to coalition air power.

and they have now seen significant reversal in the eyes of arab public opinion after the brutal murder of jordanian pilot. and momentum matters for them, their appeal was rooted in the idea they were a winner. now people aren't so sure. i think we may actually see people jumping off the band wagon faster than we think. >> appreciate it. obviously i hope the optimistic scenarios prove right. i worry we see momentum through our eyes, not necessarily through their eyes. at this time i yield to mr. smith. >> thank you just following up on that rather key point, there's problems all over the world. yemen ironically is a shiite uprising that overturned the government there that gets us into the whole issue of decent governance in that region will depend on believe it or not saudi arabia and iran figuring out how to get along in that part of the world, neither one can advantage kwish the other

and meanwhile doing dach to each other, that's perhaps subject to a whole other hearing. but this notion it is all falling apart, these guys are superman, going to take over everything, the analysis of isil is interesting. you watch the news reports, and the chairman's comments about how they're spreading that's what people believe. that's simply not the case. several months ago going to get my time line wrong, when they went rolling through, out of syria, went rolling through iraq everyone was saying they're going to be in baghdad next week. well, they're not and they're never going to be. they were as you mentioned rolled out of kobani. they have not taken any territory since that initial surge and they have given back territory. they were also within miles of irbeal, but with allied support

and support for the kurds, they were pushed back. you have to keep it in realistic perspective perspective. the greatest strength is what you said, these guys can't govern. they cannot deliver for the muslim population. in mosul it is falling apart. electricity is off pretty much every day, nobody is picking up the garbage they can't govern. the people there are only staying with them out of fear. so i do believe isil's momentum has been blunted and it is interesting, blunted in part with the help of u.s. military but blunted more by their own weaknesses, and that's what we have to remember. and that's what i want to ask general flynn about. i get this, it is an existential threat, i agree with you therefore we have to amass all of our forces and figure out how to defeat them, but fundamentally do you disagree with the statement that u.s. military might is simply not in position to defeat this ideology because of this clash of

civilizations, because of the way the muslim world looks at western aggression and that the only way we are going to be successful is if we get moderate muslims to rise up against these folks and support them? do you think it would be good to drop a bunch of troops into syria and iraq and get them? or don't you see how that would perhaps play into the hands of isil, and if so, what does it mean to say we are going to mount all of our military might and go get them? don't we have a little bit of a knot in that regard? >> so the answer quick answer is -- >> sorry that was like six questions. it is early in the morning. >> you typically do that to me. so overall, the answer is yes. >> yes, you believe -- >> yes, that i don't think i don't believe what you said about dropping in, you know hundreds of thousands or u.s.

forces, you also said that they are an extension threat. i wouldn't sit here today and say isis is existential threat to this country. >> broader ideology. >> but the broader ideology is one that will get inside our bloodstream, get inside our dna if you will and will permanent ee ate over time if we don't do something about it now, so it doesn't help us to just wait to do something. now, when i describe you know, and what i recommended about the combination of the elements of national power i mean, you look at the information campaign that's being waged not by just isis but by al qaeda at large and the way they're able to do it, the sophistication they're able to do it that campaign alone, the military has some little bits and pieces of trying to counter that on a tactical battlefield, but there has to be broader imagination that this

country working with partners, working with some of the so-called moderate nations, and i say that in my statement about we have partners out there, and you know, we got to really be honest with ourselves about some of the partners. i mean we can't continue to fund and do all of these kinds of things and have some of these nations sit at the table with the united states of america when in fact we know they're funding some of these organizations. that's a diplomat i can tool that we have to leverage. there are economic tools that we have to lever. when you say we are going after terror financing, going to stop this guy, shut down this money being made by the oil refinery those are tactical things. we have to look at how are we dealing with the moderate frankly the moderate arab world and these nations where we have economic partnerships and relationships and we need to ask them are they doing everything they can from the role of being

moderate. >> to clarify, i think dr. lynch would agree, i am not going to say that there's a moderate muslim nation, we are talking about more individual people and groups than one nation or another. and for instance, i mean, the biggest success that we had in iraq was the on bar awakening and that wasn't a government, that was sunni tribes rising up and saying, you were there -- >> you know, i agree. it took 50,000 more troops too. the anbar awakening was in sent advised by another 50000 troops on the ground. >> the anbar awakening was force multiplier by 2 million. >> i talked to some of the individuals almost on a daily basis involved in this. i guess what i'm telling you, congressman, is that we have to be far more sophisticated and we really do have to use our imagination to defeat this ideology.

tactically need to go after isis and any other safe haven, we have to be more sophisticated in application of all the instruments of national power to achieve what it is i believe we need to achieve over a long period of time as you recognize in opening statement. >> i won't disagree with that. the only thing i say is i worry a great deal about the notion that people are focused on the u.s. military as the solution to this problem and i worry when we talk about oh the aumf has to be open to go anywhere, any time. believe me, i love the military. you work with them you ask them if they can do something is the answer ever no? it is not. you got five guys, can you defeat these that's how they're oriented. that's terrific. but that isn't always the right strategy. because sometimes there are things that military might can't do, and in this case can really sort of turn it back around on us if we aren't careful. >> but there is i'm sorry, i don't want to get into too much

of this but there is a benefit to applying pressure on an enemy. >> absolutely. >> so you have to not let them not have a sound night's sleep anywhere where these vicious individuals exist and groups exist. and in the meantime all the other pieces we have to bring to bear. that's really my argument. and that's one administration to the next because i think the last administration struggled and maybe came to that realization later on. >> not an easy answer to know when to apply force and when not to. and it is there's a lot more tactics than strategy. you have been generous with the time, i yield back. >> thank you very much. general flynn in 2002, the authorization for use of military force basically said the president is authorized to use armed forces of the united states as he determines to be

necessary and appropriate. why do you think we now have an aumf before us that puts restrictions on it on things that the president claims he can do without an aumf. >> my answer would be whatever the decision is between this body and the executive branch of government, we have to make sure in one sense we have to play our cards close to our chest meaning don't discount any option that the united states of america has by telegraphing what the options are or not going to be. we're not going to commit troops, do this or that. i think that we have to play a very smart card game with the aumf. i think on this aumf thing like i said that's not a comprehensive strategy, that's a

component of something we need and like i said to the chairman we have to make sure that we -- when we lay this out to our military forces primarily and to a degree some inside of our intelligence community that they have the full authority to be able to execute the tasks that they're going to be assigned. otherwise you're tying our hands behind our back, so to speak, and we are slowing the system down through unnecessary bureaucracy. >> thank you. dr. lynch, do you really think that a group of barbarrian thugs that would make a human being kneel down before them and cut their heads off really care if they're marginalized? do you care, do you really think a group of barbearian thugs that put a fellow muslim in a cage, douse him with gas, set him on

fire, watch him burn to death really care if they're marginalized? and if you think that, how long do you think it will take for this marginalization to take place. >> thank you congressman. that's a great question and a really important one. i don't think they care. but the nature of their not caring is extremely important. so basically when you're a group like al qaeda or like isil, you have two basic strategies to pursue, same as election here play to your base or try to reach out to median voter, and what you're seeing with isil is very much a base strategy, right? they have decided that they want to mobilize the already radicalized, most dangerous people the disenfranchised, ones that are already radicalized, want to get them to syria and iraq. what we are seeing by press accounts, the mid open source

accounts, flow of foreign fighters is increasing. in other words, the brutal videos are actually inspiring that very small number of people and getting them to leave cairo leave tunis and come out to isil. but at the same time, they're alienating the broader mainstream public. so the way i would reframe your question is is this drying up their pool of recruits faster than they can get them and extract them and bring them foo their fight, and i think the answer to that is still unclear. that's why i am advocating a strategy in which we try and accelerate their marginalization and alienation from that broader pool of potential recruits. and so no i don't think they care in the slightest. many of you remember the old battles between about the strategy of al qaeda and iraq. response to criticism he was alienating muslims by butchering

shiites said i don't care, i am closer to god than you are. i don't care about the muslim that abandoned gone. he chose a base strategy which is what isil has done, we need to recognize that and try and make them pay the cost for that base strategy. >> and that cost is? >> that cost is to continue to -- i think we already started this, and i think our arab allies have done this is really strong strategic communication campaigns to highlight the barbarity, deflate detentions to power, and to puncture their mystique in such a way that the alienated disenfranchised youth in tune is or libya doesn't see it as attractive, noble or heroic thing to go and join the group. i think that's the way we need to approach them, to undermine them deflate them, rather than

to exaggerate their capabilities. >> thank the gentleman. mr. o'rourke. >> thank you. general flynn thank you for your testimony and service. i think you made a number of excellent points, including need to have a clear comprehensive strategy from the administration before we move forward with an authorization for use of military force. you also talked about our need to rethink our relationships with regional allies and i think you said something to the effect if they fail to adhere to global standards and norms and values, and international law, we need to rethink our ties. i think you maybe even said cut off those ties. when i think about our allies there, the royal family in saudi arabia, the prior leadership in yemen, alma law key in iraq these are governments that in

many cases are amongst most corrupt or venal or oppressive in the world, yet they are our allies in this fight. how do we pursue a strategy in that region and be consistent to the advice that you gave us which i think is really good advice. i think those repressive regimes and our relationships kbi indicate our ability to be effective in the middle east. >> thanks very much for asking that question. this is the essence of the problem. this is not a military phenomenon that we are facing back to the ranking members. what he was talk about with military, boots on the ground everybody sort of throws that phrase around we need to stop using that need to understand what does that mean. this is a social cultural psychological phenomenon particularly in the arab world

and potential breakdown of arab world order over time, if we do not change this mindset and really move some of these countries to change their internal behavior, what we saw in egypt as an example of essentially three regimes, nowal assist ee in there, now he is trying to bring a sense of security and stability before they can think about returning to any form of prosperity. i think a country like jordan the king and how they treat their population and how they are being you know, really exceptional, moderate example within this very very difficult part of the world that we are in there are others, there are other templates if you will out

there. the underlying conditions that i think everybody recognizes, all of us recognize, if those underlying conditions don't change, then what is going to happen is this problem is going to continue to grow and it is going to undermine the stability of the countries to the point they're going to lose. they're eventually going to lose. it is not just iraq and syria and what we are seeing there. i mean, we were already talking about a lot of other places around the transregion area that are at risk. what happened with the houthi separatist movement in yemen this movement has been going on for a long, long time and then of course you've got al qaeda that took over this military base. i mean libya, those two states now, and we should look at ourselves, those two states right now are failing or failed states or will become that way because who will recognize yemen? will it be us or is it going to

be iran? iran fully backs that houthi separatist movement that just took over yemen. that was a country we were trying to defeat the threat this sunni version of radical islam. that's the essence of the problem. we have to look at how do we want to act. when somebody sits at the table of the united states of america they better be sitting there fully recognized in international law and at least having a recognition of internationally accepted norms and behaviors. if they don't we are being hypocritical. >> i wonder if we have the will to act on that and to really deliver some consequences, withdrawing military aid isolating those countries, rethinking our relationships. in the past we have proven unable to do that or unwilling for probably important tactical

or strategic reasons. i think we will really be tested now. my time is up. thank you. >> real quickly, we are not chained by oil. the united states is no longer chained to the middle east for oil. that's a big deal. so sorry. sorry, chairman. >> appreciate it. mr. lan born. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general flynn, i have a question for you. i am really concerned that just this week president barack obama was interviewed and compared fighting isis to a big city mayor fighting crime. and that really troubles me because there's no comparison. that's a horrible and poor analogy. in a big city, if you have criminals like muggers carjackers, drug dealers they're not trying to kill the mayor and take over the city government, which is what isis is trying to do in the various countries in the middle east.

which is what isis is trying to do. there's just no comparison to a big-city mayor fighting crime. >> what i have said is that you cannot defeat an enemy that you do not admit exists. and i really strongly believe that the american public it ice noet to take away the danger of the thugs and the criminals that exist in our own system.

but that's not what it is that we are facing in this discussion that we're having right now. it's totally different. >> also, let me change subjects and ask about guantanamo bay. there was an interesting exchange over in the senate. my friend and colleague was talking to an administration official and making the point that the fight was brought to our homeland, before guantanamo bay ever existed. and even if the president succeeds in shutting it down, the fight will continue against this. do you agree with me that it's important to have a place where we can detain the worst of the worst until such time they can go before a military tribunal.

>> thank you for asking that question. a couple things. there are three ways to deal with a terrorist. you kill them. you capture them. or you turn them. and you work with these patter in nations around the world. and the saudis actually had a pretty effective program a few years back turning them and things like that. those are the three way to deal with terrorists. we say -- this gets back to the question on the aumf. right now, we're not capturing anybody. we might go out and detain somebody and, you know, in its work between the military and the f.b.i. like we did with this guy in libya. but there's a lot of others out there that we probably would benefit from capturing. i mean, we used to say when i was in the special operations

community, that had we not had the ability to professionally interrogate those that we capture, the high-value targets or the mid value targets, we might as well take that cadillac and bring it on home and park it in the garage. i've run those fa silties and we know how to do them very professionally because we learned a really ugly lesson over teb years ago now. you have to be able to do that. >> thank you. mr. chairman, i yield back. mr. cooper. >> first, thank you very much for being here this morning.

you've touched a bit on other terrorist groups in the region. can you please provide an update on hesbollah? >> so hesbollah is an arraign yan-backed group. i believe we are still designating them as a terrorist organization, our state department. hesbollah is deeply involved in syria. so they are fighting in syria members are fighting and they're ag which youly leading and doing some of the special operations operations-type training. some of the disruption of things in that particular country.

so hesbollah is a very dangerous organization. ther responsible for killing many, many americans. we need to not let them sort of get passed on any of this. >> thank you, congresswoman. let me just say very quickly, hesbollah has been in a very difficult position for the lst e last several years because of its role in syria. it's exposed now in ways it never was before. it enjoyed in the past a very solid, impregnable base. and, from there it was able to play a dom nantd role in not just politics in lebanon but in the overall political system.

now, lebanon is a state that is hanging on by its fingernails. there's increasing signs of dwrumbling. but, also, at the same time radicalization of those communities saying whooi aren't you fighting israel? >> they've seen men out there killing and murdering civilians. so they've lost that card. they're much weaker because the

lebanonese state is much weaker. >> thank you, congresswoman. i mentioned the word sectarianism. i find this to be a very important issue that we have to understand that one of the ways that extremist ideologies can become more mainstream is when soets are polarized and people feel like they have to pick a side.

general flin, how worried are you about american citizens becoming radicalized, training overseas and returning back to the united states? and are there additional steps that the u.s. should take in addressing those citizens that travel to train with isis in sere yad e ya and iraq? and then later return back to the united states and the threats that they would pose here? i'd like to get your perspective? >> yeah, first, i think that our f.b.i. and the leadership of the f.b.i. is doing a phenomenal job dealing with this issue here obama the homeland. just to give you a little perspective. when somebody shows up to syria okay, and this has been going only for a while.

they do a little vetting. in the other parts of the vetting them they look for individuals who have different skill sets and who have savvy with the internet. so they're sophisticated in how they recruit, particularly when they arrive. and those individuals then get put into a different pipeline. they may not get into into the suicide attacker pipeline, but they maybe get put into a different pipeline. and those are the individuals that there will be sort of a different future for them to maybe come back to this country and get involved in additional recruiting additional activities and maeb you know,

larger-scale types of attacks that we're trying to avoid. so i just think that a variety of reasons why they get reyuted. the internet is a big, big part of this. i think the f.b.i. is doing the best job that they can. but what we really need to recognize and track who these persons are. to be honest with you, if somebody is going to conspire to fight against us, which is essentially what they're doing, there also has to be a discussion, at least, about their citizenship. >> so you think the additional steps is to look very carefully at those people who travel. my concern too, is turkey is a con duet for people traveling into syria in those areas. are there additional steps we should make in order to be more aggressive with them spefkly those folks who lefrt the country.