cbo to do is that. >> wait a minute, if i say i want to raise the gas tax. i propose i a bill i want to raise the tax 50 cents a gallon and use all that money for infrastructure. couldn't that be dynamically scored? >> umm, that could be dynamically scored. and depending on the extent to which cbo believed that that would persist in future years, that might work. but there is another bias here, which is a low productivity bias. cbo writes in a recent paper for analyses of the changes and federal investment kr, bo that additional federal investment yields half the return with an average delay of five years. so cbo assumes for this kind of investment crowning out of private investment. and so that too would be a bias against the spending impacts of

appropriations. and in fact just speaking a touch more broadly. i tried to think about the positives and the negatives of dynamic scoring on the spending side and all i could come one were negatives. the idea that there are biases against spending scores being positive throughout the process. the most important one -- just let me get it out on the table -- is -- and this is from work that richard koegen did. i didn't know about this. it is a bias that would lead any dynamic spending scores to simply provide more room for tax cuts not for more spending. so the budget act enforces allocations on the revenue side. on the revenue target and on the allocation target. and house and senate rules disallow taxes to go below the revenue floor or appropriations to go above committee's

allocations. under the rule that we're talking about the house dynamic scoring rule, if we were to move towards scoring discretionary spending any positive growth effects would be scored almost entirely as extra revenues just by dint of the rule itself. not by something to give you room on the spending side. you would only have ability to cut taxes more, not to increase spending based on what would pop out of the model. >> we know that when congress does things, whether it's the affordable care act or immigration or other things that they have some effect on the economy. tell us what you think about dynamically scoring those. is it a, a good idea? and b, is it possible? >> in order, yes absolutely a good idea. possible? in degrees. what we've found i think from

listening to the jct folks on the tax side is if the new house rule had been implemented ten years ago the quality of what you would get would be at one level. but they have been working diligently all these years to improve that quality. there's been some level of analysis to make that happen on some types of spending programs. and when that type of analysis becomes more relevant to the policy making process i think you will see investment and improvements in that. now it may be that that in some areas -- as we heard on the tax side -- we just can't figure it out. the answer for purposes of this exercise is zero. and i think that is going to happen quite a bit. to the extent this becomes more common on spending by inging bills. i want to comment on one thing jared said. it is important to distinguish between the analysis itself and then what it's used for.

so a good analysis on a large increase in infrastructure spending will inform the debate and tell policy makers how they ought to vote or what the results of their vote would be. but that doesn't always flow into the rules for consideration of legislation. now it is true that the feedback, if one assumes there is a growth effect from infrastructure, would be primarily on the revenue side. but if you pass a budget resolution in the congress that assumes an increase in infrastructure investment and you dynamically score that, that flows through all of the aggregates and you will find that the revenue aggregate takes into account those higher revenues from your investment and infrastructure. so it only creates the bias in the policy to the extent that a budget resolution leads to that result. >> so i think that that may well be right. but i think you are assuming

that somehow dynamic scoring, this rule, is going to lead congress to increase spending tax or throw away jest radiation or -- sequestration or something like that. and i certainly don't make that assumption. >> again what the do so i'm set of facts lead policy makers to pursue. in this particular case i think when look at the republican congressman or senate it is not likely that is going to cause them to increase the spending caps. every six years or however often we do highway bills these day, out comes a rather simple model that department of transportation put back a while ago saying every billion dollars on highways is 17,000 jobs 42,000 jobs or 27000 depending on what year you did the estimate or the last time the model was updated and people use that on both sides to advocate

more infrastructure spending. >> those are fair points and i think we should definitely do more infrastructure spending and cbo and everybody else should do dynamic analysis around it. the concerns i'm troo expressing is that is a corner of a set of changes to this whole dynamic scoring debate that looked to me like it would really lead to a bias in approving more tax cuts than i believe we can afford. >> donald, a lot of the bills that would clearly trigger the rule involve health. if we -- if it had been in place for the affordable care act if it had been in place for the medicare drug precipitation bill, if we ever do some big wholesale change to medicare. put yourself in their position. how challenging is it going to be to them to come one some judgment about what effect big

changes to health holspolicy on the economy? >> obviously a challenge. i think it's useful when you think about dynamically scoring any bill. there are three bins. short run stimulus effect, either positive or negative depending on the changes you're making you want to think about. in the locker run there are the supply side effects. doing something to increase labor force, increase capital, something on the health side. improve the quality. and then the crowning effect. to the extent this is something that changes the budget balance over the ten year window into the future. is it crowding out or in private investment. in principle you want to go down all the channels. any short run effect if it's reform that would increase the deficit, what are the effects of that that is going to be on investment. and then to try to track through how any changes effect labor supply. we know from analysis of the aba

that there are interesting questions about how the implementation of the aca may have affected the number of people who choose dmob in the labor force over time. so if there is a proposal that comes on to make changes to healthcare they are going to want to take those into account. >> i agree with don's comments and i think the aca labor supply example is a good one of the kinds of biases that i worry about. in this case one i've labelled a marginal utility bias or social welfare function bias, which i think is non trivial. and one that was spoke of. so the cbo comes out with the aca score and it does have this labor supply effect. part of which is by dint of allowing people to move from full-time to part-time work if that is what they want to do because they can now afford to get healthcare, sometimes subsidized in the exchanges, you are releasing job lock. and i'm not making this up.

this is something cbo said was part of the mix. . in the hurl burl of the date where gdp is elevated above everything and labor supply, that's a big negative. this is not don's fault. or cbo's fault. this is what happens when metrics like labor supply and gdp are elevated above all others. the social welfare of the nation was enhanced by unlocking job lock. and so a diminished labor supply is not obviously bad thing unless you are fetishic about the labor supply and gdp. but i think it is outside the scope of scoring that is problematic. >> that is just saying that congress should not make all its decisions based on the scores. that they could decide this will

cost something but it is worth it because it has goals. that is true of any of the scores. >> has has been said in public that this should not be your o only criteria. >> yeah. if a group of wise men and women were assessing precisely those kind of considerations -- >> in this suggests that congress doesn't mean that kind of description. >> correct. >> okay. >> this is a pressure you feel a lot at cbo. the b in cbo is budget. and the primary goal is to provide scores that guide the budget process and the dine scoring discussion should be about making the scores as good as possible. cbo provides important supplementary information for example in health reform what happens to the coverage which is nunl influential and not official part of the process.

but people get mad that the budget process tends to elevate the budget numbers over other things you might worry about from a social welfare point of you. but cbo is not the congressional cost benefit office or the congressional social welfare office. would sometimes be fun if it were. >> tax. joint tax. >> this is a very important challenge to think through e a particularly if we expand what gets scored, which is that the budget number has to be treated appropriately in the overall policy discussion weighed against other things. >> let's say that it's 2009. we are in a deep recession. the president proposes a major fiscal stimulus. the arra. the chairman of the budget committees tell cbo we want to know the dynamic score of this. would that have been a good thing to do? >> absolutely. and certainly we saw numbers from the cea projecting what they thought the outcome of the

implementation of the president's policies would be. and there is no awe record to compare that to. but in terms of the relevance of what that dynamic score would have been on the legislative process, on the enactment of those policies the question of whether you were deliberately increasing the deficit by 750 billion or 850 billion or 600 billion or a trillion was not something that was really going to effect the outcome of that particular debate. there was a deliberate policy choice that we need to expand the deficit here over the next couple years to try to get some beneficial effect in the economy. so if the feedback effect of that was baked into the official score, thenl people would have to go into their talking points and, you know, scratch out one number and put a different number. >> but it would have been -- it would have looked like a smaller price tag and might have paved

the way to a bigger fiscal stimulus. >> perhaps. but unless you are up against, you know, some arbitrary threshold like the t word as opposed to 999 billion, the political forces -- the political balance i don't see is fundamentally changed. i think back to tarp. >> that was my next question. >> and, you know, some internal conversations about a how much money do we need? b, how much do you think we can get away asking for? >> 500 billion? maybe, maybe not. but if you're asking for 500 may as well ask for 700. just don't is ask for a trillion. and the people who thought tarp was terrible policy or shocked by the price tag i think would

have been every bit as shocked at 500 billion as they were with the bill that went up. >> i think -- i'm not sure that you would really get the help that you need. i'm a huge ad -- as you know if you know my work. i'm a huge advocate of the spirit in the keynesian spirit. and i think the global result os austerity which is fiscal contraction in the face of that are exhibit a, in which good fiscal policy looks like and what bad fiscal policy looks like including implications of that. but the thing is again because of some of the biases built into -- kwlon if they are biases. to me they are. the rules in which these are scored, i'm not even sure how much help you would get through a more dynamic score of these keynesian stimulus. because cpo correctly i would say views this as pulling demand

forward. so you get some demand in the quarters where the policies are in place. but then you pay for it later typically within the ten year window. here is where i would say and this is not calling out cbo because they are just following basic rules of the economics. i think many of the crowd out and crowd in estimate os about interest rates and their impact on growth are wrong and becoming more incorrect over time. and the reason i think that is because of changes in the dynamics of global capital, of loanable funds throughout the world, of capital markets. and so i think that the extent to which cbo diminishes growth in later years relative to stimulus impacts in earlier years are too large. for example, i don't think that cbo does a very good job of estimating the amplified impact of fiscal stimulus when the

federal reserve is at the zero lower bound. it is a very big deal. the multipliers go up by a factor of go or three based on some of the research on this. so those dynamics make it look like a fiscal policy isn't as it is stimulative fiscal policy. >> what i'm hearing is cbo should improve the quality of its best judgment. not that we should ignore their best judgment. >> that is definitely a fair interpretation of what i'm saying and they definitely should. my problem with the earlier panel and the fundamental question, do we have enough knowledge do that in a method that improve ours score. so yes we should in terms of analysis. we are not there yet in terms of choosing a score. >> i want to turn to the audience. we'll have time for a few questions at the end at tax. i want to start with people who have a question about the non tax bills. yes right here. mic's coming to you. tell us who you are please.

>> vick miller. independent fiscal economists. one of the things we knew was we wanted to get the assumptions out of the way so we could argue policy with the house. so here we have a rule that is a house rule. that rich kogan has pointed out will have impacts not just the spending side but the revenue side. and steve has said this with taken care of the budget resolution. are you assuming the senate will assume this rule in terms of the putting together the budget resolution? >> i don't have knowledge o that. to the extent the official process incorporates macroeconomic feedback, then any bias introduced in terms of spending versus revenue, that, you know if in fact beneficial spending produces a revenue surge in later years, the strict rules of the budget right now do not allow you to mix and match

spending and revenues. but a budget resolution if that is a preferred policy does allow that. that was the only point i was making. >> anybody else on spending? or do we want to -- nobody? anybody? >> it's really important. really. >> do you guys want to wait. >> can i -- >> gentlemen there in the back. by the dorors. by the fire alarm. please don't touch it. >> i'm basal scarless. i just have a question. what was the rationale behind the house ignoring spending in its rule. >> i don't think it's quite rite to say they ignored spending. what it said was it would apply to mandatory spending or entitlements but not to

appropriations. >> and i had no hand in creating that rule. but my own guess as to why they went that. first of all as a practical matter, annual increases of at least $40 billion in any appropriated program are extremely rare. so it's unlikely that would be triggered a any point. secondarily as jared pointed out, appropriations are one year at a time things. so the budget rules don't take into account future effects of appropriations as it stands now. so you might produce an analysis that is interesting about appropriations. but the way the budget rules are structured, it would have have no impact on the enforcement of budget limitations for that bill. >> exactly right. and think about the bias that creates. i think which was mr. huang talking about how boosts

productivity in later years. it's arguable year by year cbo couldn't score and it that would create a negative bias in which spending has a positive growth effect. >> and this is a distinction between what is inadequate about the current system to. have information about what happens to our economy when you spend more on education -- to the extent we can get that education -- is very interesting. the fact we have budget rules that count a dollar in the tenth year, the same as the dollar in the first year and completely ignore a dollar in the eleventh year, that is yeah a process that is in need of improvement. but, you know, having analysis that does show us what happens in these years still helps people figure how to vote. >> questions on anything. relevant to dynamic scoring. eric. >> small technical question.

in looking at the affordable care act. and i'm sure labor supply issues are taken into the count. and you mentioned job lock. since the purpose of the act was to improve the health insurance and health of the population is there any way that gets processed into the process of the productivity or can be factored? >> i think the answer is aspirationally but i don't know what the evidentiary base for that is. >> thanks. this is a question i didn't get to ask my panel so i'll ask this panel. there is great discussion how private sector agents will respond, individuals businesses, etc. there is a little discussion -- although it is not framed this way -- about how the federal government will respond. the finance issue about if you have a non revenue neutral proposal then what does the budget do to make up the short

fall. suppose we did something like limit the ability of the state and local taxes. they would have to respond somehow if we cut the federal corporate tax rate you would expect other countries to respond and to off set some of that impact. the question is how comfortable are you with how far we go in estimating policy maker responses other than the federal government? >> do you want to respond to that? >> well i think -- no i guess not. [ laughter ] >> tom do you want to respond? >> i'll take a crack at the beginning o that have. when i was at cbo i sat in meetings where we tried to predict the behavior of other parts of government. so we had meetings where we

tried to predict whether the supreme court would judge a particular provision to be constitutional or not. we had lots of meetings where many laws are written where they delegate to the administrator of a program the opportunity to make a choice about how to run the program several years in the future. and so it is not -- you can't go to the economic literature and find an estimate of how you are going to respond. you have to collect evidence, sometimes see what they have said in public, assuming they are already in the office and you do a best judgment of how is this person going behave. if you go the macro route you have to put in your thinking a model of how the federal reserve will respond because it isn't appropriate to assume the fed is going to maintain constant course. i think think you have to do the same with governments. big issue in health things is how will state government respond to changes in health policy? and there are lots of estimates cbo does where somewhere behind

the scenes someone is deciding these 25 states do, and and these 25 do y. and you have varying levels of evidentiary base for doing that. but it is essential to have a plausible estimate. the aspirational goal is to do that in all the cases where it matters. and if there is some response out there you want to incorporate it with the sole exception of the future legislation. if your goal is to score the legislation in front of you you do not want to be in the position of predicting what future legislation will follow that. >> a, that suggests which i think has been a team theme of this is there is a limit to what you can do with models. this is going to be judgment in that he has estimate as there is in static estimates but do you think that asking them to dynamically score adds an excessive layer that makes them

less useful? >> general -- in some cases yes. and in some cases no. i will note that cbo has been strong historically with some effects it will basically give a zero or others where there is ant the strong evidentiary base one way or the other. preventive measures in health, tort reform. and a whole bunch of issues where people on either side feel very strongly about it. but if there is about a strong basis of evidence to cob conclude one way or the other the institutional goal -- not goal but the institutional prior isn't to go one way or the other. >> i think john's answer to the point was good and comprehensive and i dupreeagree wit. but at the end of your first comment, you gave a compelling reason why we shouldn't accept models that close the fiscal

model. because they de facto assume legislation. legislation that either races s raises cuts trafr, raises taxes. when you are in the situation where you have to close the fiscal model to make it converge you are in a assumption about debt does explode relative to the gdp. that's assuming what a ten year congress will do. >> does that apply in the ten year window? >> it can apply in the ten year window. but more importantly since the decision makers in the model have perfect foresight they can observe what you are doing outside the ten year window and they will have a behavioral response that. so it -- that is the model works. so it is hard to find something that will have no effect. >> pam and nick do you want to add anything?

respond to anything? okay. i think we're out of time. i want to a, remind you all that tax policy center as an event on january 30th in l.a. on international tax but will be web cast and we're here have a an event that will touch on a lot of these issues to marking the anniversary of the congressional budget office. secondarily, if you look at your feed and there is a piece of paper or coffee cup, pick it up and put it in the recycling can in the back. and join me in thanking all the participants. particularly those that came from jct. i tried to get cbo. but i really want to thank the people from jct. it is not easy to stand up and

answer that's questions and not know what tom's going to stay when you get back to the office. [ laughter ] so i think they did an excellent jock. job. thank you all. [ applause ] >> what you are about to see as you connect all these devices. and think about it. the number of devices squared where this will go.

the challenge is how do you get the right information at the right point in time for the right device for the right person to make the right dwegs decision? that is about architectures and the process. changing healthcare and education the same thing. how countries are run is about to change. but when you see the industry leaders and it's one thing as the ceo or government leader you have to have the instincts of when does one thing really fundamentally change. south korea, mexico. how do they achieve the goals of the social equality and the role of the next generation of the internetich. the internet of everything. how does this transform business. you do the same this germany, france and the u.k. and suddenly they get it. these are very smart people. see all of that event tonight at 7:00 eastern on c-span.

the senate armed services committee recently heard from two former national security advisers. and they provided their assess om the u.n. national security and raised international areas of concern and u.s. involvement. senator john mccain, republican

of arizona chairs and the senator reid of rhode island is the ranking member.

good morning, the committee hearing will come to order. and to start with, i would like to obviously welcome our new members. senator tom cotton, senator joni ernst, thom tillis, mike sullivan, mike rounds and senator martin heinrich. for the benefit of our new members and all, this committee has a long fashion of which we're proud. i've had the opportunity of working with senator reed for

many years, despite his lack of quality education, he has done an outstanding job here as a ranking member of the committee and for those who are political trivia experts, my staff tells me it is the first time that we've had chairman ranking members from the two service -- oldest service academies and so i welcome the opportunity of working closely as i have for many years with the senator from rhode island. today the armed services committee considers global challenges to the national securities committee and today i'm here with general brent snowcroft and zbigniew brzezinski, each serving as advisors to the president of the united states, laying foundations for the u.s.-china relationship, confronting the

ayatollahs in iran and moscow and the middle east have clear assailants today and we're thankful for you to allow us to draw on your wisdom. four seconds ago dean atchison titled his post world war ii order quote, present at the creation. looking out at the state of that order today it is fair to ask if we are now present at the unraveling? for seven decades, republican and democratic leaders alike have committed america's indispensable leadership and strength to defending liberal world order, with free trade and settlement of disputes and rell relegates wars of aggression to

their rightful place in the bloody past. america has defended this order because it is essential to our identity and purpose as it is to our prosperity. but the liberal world order is imperilled like never before. in a speech with unrealistic wishful thinking the president told the nation that the shadow of crisis has passed. that news came as quite a surprise to anyone who has been paying attention who has been happening around the world. a revisionist russia has invaded a sovereign european state, the first since that occurred since hitler and stalin. a rising china is forcefully inserting itself in historical and territorial disputes and alarming its neighbors. all the while investing millions of into military capabilities to

diserode u.s. power in the asia pacific. iran is seeking a nuclear weapon which would unleash a nuclear arms release. a an islam ideology continue s across africa and now the islamic state, this evil has the man power and resources to dissolve international borders, occupy wide swaths of sovereign territory, destabilize one of our most strategic parts of the world and possibly threaten our homeland and in yemen the country the president hailed for a successful model for his brand of counterterrorism, al qaeda continues to facilitate global terrorism as we saw in the attacks in paris and iranian rebels have pushed the country to the brink of collapse, all the wy american allies are

questioning whether we will live up to our commitments and our adversaries think we won't. it doesn't have to be this way. the congress and the president can restore american credibility by strengthening our common defense. american military power has been vital to the sustainment of the liberal world order. it enhances our economic power, its leverage to our diplomacy, reassures our allies and deters our adversaries. yet despite the growing array of threats to our security, we are on track to cut $1 trillion out of our defense budget by 2021. army and marine corp is falling low and the air forces inventory is the oldest in its history,

the navy fleet is shrinking to preworld war i levels and top pentagon officials are warning that advances by china, russia, iran and other adversaries mean u.s. military technology superiority can no longer be taken for granted. this is unacceptable and represents our failure to meet our basic constitutional responsibility to provide for the common defense. we must have a strategy-driven budget and not a budget-driven strategy. we must have a budget that provides the resources necessary to con front them. by crafting a reality-based national security strategy is impossible under the mindless mechanism of sequestration.

and there would be no clearer signal that america in tends to commit to the defense of our national interest that protects them than the immediate repeal and i would hasten to add, while a larger defense budget is essential, it is meaningless without the continued pursuit of defense reform. rethinking how we build, posture and operate our forces in order to maintain our technology edge and prevail in long-term competition would determine adversaries who seek to under mind the economic and security architecture we have long championed. this hearing is the first in a series of how we build a national security strategy that can sustain the american power and influence required to defend the international order that has produces prosperity and liberty across the globe. i'm pleased to have such a distinguished panel of american

statesman to begin that conversation. senator reed. >> thank you mr. chairman. let me join you in welcoming our new members and colleagues that return. also let me congratulate, mr. chairman, on your leadership role. i think the committee is in very strong and capable hands and i look forward to working with you. and also to underscore your comment about the nature of this committee. its bipartisan approach to problems to which i'm sure we'll continue under your leadership. thank you mr. children, general zbigniew brzezinski and mr. snowcroft, thank you for your service to your country and for your agreeing to be here today. let me commend general mccain for calling this hearing as a series of hearings for looking

at the challenges which he outlines the challenges that he articulates here today and this hear la guardia provide us an opportunity to hear from leading experts and military commanders and key leaders in our country about the national securities issues that we face and i welcome a chance to take this broad perspective and broad view. the number and breath of the challenges seems unprecedented from russia's destabilizing and breakdown in the middle east and in europe. threaten the integrity throughout the region to iran and the nuclear program and the risks with that, to the growing assertiveness of china regionally and globally and to cyber threat prs the north korea and other malign actors.

we would be interested in hearing of your perspectives on each of the challenges and the principals you believe should guide us in addressing them. they include, and this is not an exhaustive list but it is a lengthy list, with regard to the middle east, how would you define the near and long-term united states interest in the region? and second what do you believe will be required to defeat the threat and violent extremist groups like isil, involving the u.s. policy and international collaboration? what role if any do you believe nations outside of the u.s. do you believe should address centuries old, including the sunni and shiite. with regard to iran there are variety of ongoing developments. another round of negotiations just wrapped up over the weekend. a july deadline looms while it is a few months away it is

approaching quickly. and the senate banking committee is working on legislation it hopes to mark up as early as next week that impose additional sanctions. the committee would be trz in the assessment of the like liehood that these negotiations will succeed or fail and the giving of this process the opportunity to play out and your assessment of iran's regional ambitions, with or without a nuclear weapon, change the dynamics in that region and also the broader sunni shia conflict. and in europe, contending a russia and the allies of eastern europe to draw nearer to our community of nations in europe. with regard to china, how should the u.s. keep the relationships from spiraling into conflict while still demonstrating to partners in the region that will help to counterbalance china's

assertiveness? and regarding the cyber problem our society seems to be vulnerable of cyber attacks like countries like north korea and a what are the implications of this vulnerability from there and other sources? let me again commend the chairman and join with him in under scoring, echoing and reinforcing his very, very timely and critical comments about sequestration and the effect of our military and the need to couple sequestration with reform of purchasing. and with that, i can think of no more thoughtful gentlemen to ask to come forward that general snowcroft and zbigniew brzezinski. thank you. >> in other words, if you both would take seats and proceed however you choose to speak first, it is fine.

>> flip a coin. >> well, who is oldest? >> who went to a real college? go ahead, brent. >> mr. chairman, ranking member reed, members of the committee, i appreciate the opportunity to present some of my views on issues that the chairman and ranking member have laid out in the world which is difficult for all of us. my opening comment i hope can contribute to your deliberation

over vexing issues and choices that we have. the world we live in is full of problems and some of them seem to result from new or novel forces and influences and i intend to focus on them. let me begin my comments with just a few words about the cold war. the cold war was a dangerous period in our history where problems abounded. a mistake could have resulted in a nuclear war. but the cold war had one advantage. we knew what the strategy was. we argued mightily over tactics but we were always able to come back to what is it we're trying to do and it was contain the

soviet union until such time as it changed. and that helped enormously in getting us through the cold war. with the end of the cold war, that cohesion largely disappeared. but shortly thereafter, we were subjected to globalization. the blending of many worldwide trends of technology, trade, other kinds of things, and with it an undermining of the westphalia of the western state systems. the system was created really in the 17th century after the 30 years war and the devastation it had caused. it made the nation state the element of political sovereignty

in the world. totally independent. totally on its own each one. it was a tough system. and for many, many have claimed it was responsible for world war i and world war ii. but it is basically the structure of our nation state system today as modified in the westphalian system, because the united states has spent much of its focus softening the harsh influences of the westphalian system, like united nations, like laws that are applied to everybody. like bringing us together rather than having these unique

cubicles who are in themselves but don't relate outside. now we have something new to confuse the system and it is called globalization and two aspects of it are particularly difficult to manage in this westphalian world because globalization says that modern technology, modern science and so on is pushing the world together in this westphalian world is not real. we are separate and sovereign. two are particularly intrusive,

if that is the right word. one is communications and other in a different way climate change. this is connecting people like never before in history. for most of history, most of the people of the world didn't participate in politics of their system, didn't participate in anything except their daily lives. and they were just like their parents, they expected their children to be just like them, on and on and on. well now they are surrounded by information and they are

responding and reacting to it. it is not that kind of a world at all. i'm not just chattel for the -- chattel for the boss down the street to use any way he wants. i'm a human being and i have dignity. and this is sweeping throughout the world. and altering our system in ways that is difficult for us to cope with. and one of the ways, of course, is the impact of cyber on our societies. which could be enormous. as deadly as nuclear war, not deadly to the person, but deadly to the society. and those are the kinds of things that we face now and it

is focused most importantly on the middle east. and i think one of the things we've seen, that if you want to object, like in egypt for example, you go out and you parade in the square. well that is a difficult thing to do ordinarily. you have to find people that will go out with you, you have to avoid the police and so on and so forth but now globalization has made it really easy. all you have to do is pick up your cell phone and say there will be a rally tomorrow in tahrir square at 10:00 and you can get 10 million people. this is a very, very different world where the westphalian information is keeping people out it didn't want people to see and that is what we are facing and we've barely begun to deal

with it. and i add -- i add climate change to it because it demonstrates what we cannot do, the nation state alone. no nation state can deal with climate change. we have to cooperate to make it work. it is just that way. so these are new impacts on our system. and they make governance more difficult. and more so for the united states because we have been at the forefront in liberalizing

the westphalia system in making a more just world for all. to help us in this difficult task, we should look to our alliances, especially nato. i think nato in many ways is as valuable as it was during the cold war, in a world war the relationship of the individual to the state is frequently under attack, an alliance of states to whom that personal relationship to the state is sacred is valuable and nato has many areas where it can deal with these new forces on us in a cooperative

way which negates the independent sovereignty and atomizing the world. the impact of globalization on communications seems most dramatic in the middle east where the impact of the arab spring was very heavy and still very much being felt. it's brought sunni-shia differences to acrimony and even combat. and the isil issue in syria and iraq is an excellent example of the devastation that communication can create in a nation state system. it is attempting to transform a political state system into a

caliphate or religious order, and i don't think the nation state system is under gross attack but this is a new and very different development which would be dangerous or painful for all of us. also in the middle east, however, besides chaos, are some situations where it is conceivable that real progress towards peace and stability might be made. one of the areas is iran. the iranian nuclear issue is excruciatingly complicated but resolution, i don't think, is out of the question. and a resolution of this difficult issue could open the way to discussions of other

issues in the middle east region which we used to have with iran when it was a very different state. and it might serve to change some of the sunni-shia issues in the region to benefit all of us. another enduring issue in the middle east region has been the palestinian peace process. many would say that expecting progress is grasping at straws but a determined effort, a determined effort from the top, including the united states, might bring surprising results. just a word about the nuclear arsenal. as more and more nuclear

delivery vehicles reach, the number and types required, becomes more voluable and more difficult. one way to calculate nuclear needs could be to create a balance, and i'm talking particularly between the u.s. and russia, that means that nuclear weapons would never be used and that is that our numbers and character of the force is such that no one can

reasonably calculate that in a first strike he would destroy his opponent's systems and escape unscathed. if we look at that, it gives us -- guidance and numbers in a system in which we need. one other nuclear comment. in order to avoid a world's demand for nuclear reactor fuel creating other iran-like states, i think the u.s. should consider establishing a nuclear fuel bank where states can check out fuel for reactors, return it after it has been used, and thus avoid

what could be almost endless moves toward nuclear power. mr. chairman i focused remarks on aspects of world development. i thought most vexing and unique. but i would be happy to answer any questions. thank you very much. >> thank you, general. doctor? >> mr. chairman and members of this distinguished committee. thank you for the invitation to address you. i will be very brief and i generally agree with what general scowcroft has just said.

and we did not concert our statements. my hope is that your deliberations will shape a bipartisan national security strategy. such bipartisanship is badly needed and i think we all know that. given the complexity and severity of the challenges that america faces in europe, in the middle east and potentially in the far east. together they pose an ominous threat to global security. in europe, putin is playing with fire. financing and arming a local rebellion and occasionally even intervening directly by force in order to destabilize ukraine economically and politically, and thereby destroying its european aspirations.

given that, the current sanctions should certainly be maintained until russia's verbal commitments to respect ukraine's sovereignty are actually implemented. in the meantime nato and especially the u.s. should make some defensive weaponry available to ukraine. something that i have been urging since the onset of the crisis. not to provide them simply increases russia's temptation to escalate the intervention. at the same time, i have also advocated and do so again today that we indicate to the kremlin

that the u.s. realizes that a non-nato status for a europe-oriented ukraine could be part of a constructive east-west accommodation. finland offers a very good example. the preservation of peace in europe also requires enhanced security for the very vulnerable baltic states. in recent years, and we should really take note of this, russia has conducted menacing military maneuvers near the borders of these states and also in its isolating ingrad regions. one of these involved a simulated nuclear attack on a neighboring european capital. that surely speaks for itself.

accordingly, the only credible, yet peaceful way, to reinforce regional stability is to deploy now in the baltic states some trip tripwire nato concontinue gents including also from the u.s. such deployments would not be threatening to russia because of their limited scale. but they would reduce its temptation to recklessly replay the scenario that transpired recently in crimea. prompt prepositioning of u.s. nato military equipment in nearby poland would also significantly contribute to enhancing regional deterrence. turning to the middle east, again very briefly, we should

try to avoid universalizing the current conflict in europe into a worldwide collision with russia. that is an important point. it is both in america's and in russia's interest that the escalating violence in the middle east does not get out of hand. containing it is also in china's long-range interest. otherwise regional violence is likely to spread northward into russia. don't forget that some 20 million muslims live in russia. and northeastward into central asia eventually into to singjong, to the direct detriment both to russia and china. america, russia and china should therefore jointly consult about how they can best support the

more moderate middle east states in pursuing either a political or military solution. in different ways america, russia and china should encourage turkish engagement, iranian cooperation, which is much needed and could be quite valuable, saudi restraint, somewhat overdue, egyptian participation, if seeking, if possible, some form of compromise in syria and the elimination of the regional extremists. and the three major powers should bear in mind that there will be no peace in the middle east if, quote, unquote, boots on the ground come mainly from

the outside and especially from the u.s. the era of colonial supremacy in the region is over. finally, with the president soon embarking on a trip to india, let me simply express the hope that the u.s. will not and intentionally intensify concerns in beijing that the u.s. is inclined to help arm india as part of a de facto anti-chinese/asian coalition. that will simply discourage the chinese from becoming more helpful in coping with the volatile dangers that confront us in europe and in the middle east.

to sum up in my preliminary statement, global stability means discriminating and determined but not the minering american engagement. thank you. >> thank you, both. and those were strong words and gives us a lot of food for thought. i guess to begin with, would you both agree that sequestration is badly given the events as we see them in the world today as something that we need to repeal? would you agree general scowcroft? >> absolutely, i would. it is a terrible way to determine force structure, strategy, anything like it. it is undermining our ability to do what we need to do to retain,

as sbig says, contingencies of the world. so yes, i'm very much opposed to sequestration. >> doctor? >> agree -- i agree with brent. >> it seems if we are going to develop a national security strategy, given the myriad and complexities of the challenges we face as both of you pointed out, it seems to me that we have to have -- it seems. >> cyber attack. [ laughter ] >> -- we need to set some priorities. would you give us your view, both of you, of what our priorities should be? general.

>> in foreign policy, i presume? >> in order to develop a national security strategy? >> i believe we need, first of all, to pay attention to our nuclear structure and nuclear relations with russia because we do not want, above all, a nuclear war to erupt. i think we also need to look carefully at how the world is changing and what we can do to assist that change to produce a better, not a worse world.

one of the big challenges in this world is cyber. and i'm not intellectually capable of dealing with the cyber issue, but it is a worldwide issue and, as i say, could be as dangerous as nuclear weapons and there is no control anywhere about it. i think i agree with zbig that the united states has areas where it can work with both the chinese and the russians. and sometimes both of them. i think we should not neglect those.

the chinese especially didn't participate in the westphalian world i'm talking about. their system is very different. there's china, and there's everybody else. and we need to learn the chinese -- how to communicate to them so that we have the desired effect. i think russia is a very difficult case right now. but i think the cold war is not returning and we should not aid and abet its return. >> dr. brzezinski, on the issue of russia, some believe because of the price of oil and the effect on the russian economy will lead putin to be more

conducive to lessening some of his aggressive and confrontational behavior such as you described not only in ukraine but with the baltics and maldova, et cetera, but there are others who say that because of this, it will make him more confrontational in order to maintain his standing not only with the russian people, but in the world. i wonder what your assessment is on -- and i know it is a very difficult question. >> yes, but could i comment very briefly on the previous one. >> anything, doctor. >> first of all, about the nuclear confrontation. obviously, we confront each other. and we have had some crises in the past. i think we have learned a great deal with them and i hope the russians have as well. but what is somewhat alarming is the fact that in recent times,

during this current crisis, which is a limited ground-based crisis, putin has invoked the threat of nuclear weapons. people haven't paid much attention to it, but he has publicly commented on the fact that we have the nuclear weapons, we have the capability and so forth. and he has then matched that with highly provocative air overflights over scandinavia, over parts of western europe, and even all the way to portugal. so i'm a little concerned -- when i say little, i'm underestimating my concern. in that there may be a dangerous streak in his character that could push us to some possibly very dangerous confrontations. and in that respect, he reminds me a little bit of khruschchev.

and we all know where that did lead at some point. and that is why it is terribly important that he has no misunderstandings as to our commitment and determination and that is why doing something on the ground that deters him from trying to leapfrog on the ground with a military solution is needed and i alluded to that in my opening comments. insofar as china is concerned i think probably the chinese have some genuine interest from the standpoint of the enhancement of their international power, in the acquisition of cyber capabilities of a confrontational type. i don't want to over-exaggerate this and am searching for words that do not create the suggestion of an imminent danger

but part of the strategic history is the notion that you don't prepare to fight your opponent at that given stage of weaponry. you leapfrog and then you engage in some offensive activity. and i'm concerned that the chinese may feel that they cannot surpass us in the nuclear area and note, at their very very significant nuclear restraint, in terms of nuclear deployments, that hardly really any nuclear weapons have targeted us. we have many times over had nuclear targets on china. but, the cyber issue may pose at this point or at some point really, of paralyzing an opponent entirely without killing anybody. that could be a very tempting solution for a nation which is, of course, increasing the

significance economically and we must realize there is an enormous military disparity between china and us. suggests we have to be far more inclined to raise those issues with the chinese, which we have done to some extent, but to more important to engage in the deterrence to have the capability to respond effectively or to prevent an attempt from being successful. now on the point you have just raised, which was about putin and how to contain him, right? >> basically, his reaction -- his reaction to this economic crisis that he's confronting? >> well he's confronting a very serious economic crisis which he is trying to deny. i think he's in denial phase. but it is quite interesting how many of his former immediate associates but political allies express growing concern.

here the real question is not how serious the crisis is in russia, but the real question is will the russian economic implode in some political gio significant fashion first, or eo significant fashion first, or will ukraine implode in some significant geopolitical fashion first. a great deal of what tuten is nputin is doing is not part of a comprehensive military invasion of ukraine other than the specific seizure of crimea. but it is to so discourage the organization, economic tensions and costs, and demoralization as a consequence in a regime which is expressing the will of the ukrainian people for a closer association with the west but is a regime that came to power after 20 years of very

significant mismanagement of the ukraine and the economy. and the kind of needle sticking in which putin is engaging against ukraine. not on the blood, in relatively moderate fashion, but gnawing and painful, but could produce a much more serious economic crisis in ukraine and that is why i think in a sense we have to in a sense more credibly impress putin that it is not in his sense to do the needle picking because we can make it unpleasant for him by for example, arm being the ukrainians, but at the same time assuring him we're not equip ingping the others. the others were more important to us, if finland in '45, '46 has worked very well. >> thank you, gentlemen.

for your testimony and for your extraordinary service to the country. about two years ago in 2013, i believe you coauthored an open letter about the iranian negotiations suggesting that it was time now to support these negotiations and specifically saying additional sanctions now against iran will extract neither more concessions in the negotiations or risk undermining or even shutting down the negotiations. let me ask first general scowcroft, then dr. brzezinski. is that still your position? if congress had adopted sanctions, did you feel that would undermine negotiations and perhaps miss an opportunity not only in the nuclear rel. but in other areas of concern? >> yes, senator, it is.ea but in other areas of concern? >> yes, senator, it is.l

but in other areas of concern? >> yes, senator, it is.m but in other areas of concern? >> yes, senator, it is. i think that the -- the system -- the regime in iran is different. we don't know how different and we don't know what the results will be. but this is -- this is -- their behavior is quite different from when ahmadinejad was head of the government. and it seems to me that we ought to try to take advantage of that. the foreign minister served in the u.n. at nato, he's familiar with the west. the president -- they are

talking different and the mullahs are not nearly as vociferous as before. does that mean anything? we don't know. but it seems to me it is worth testing. and i think two things are likely to happen if we increase the sanctions. they will break the talks and a lot of the people who have now joined us in the sanctions would be in danger of leaving because most of the people who joined us in sanctions on iran didn't do it to destroy iran, they did it to help get a nuclear solution. >> dr. brzezinski? >> basically i have the similar perspective. i would only add to what brent said so as not to repeat, that in addition to what he said, i

think the breaking off the negotiations or the collapse of the negotiations would at rest and reverse the painful and difficult process of increasing moderation within iranian political life. we're dealing with an old generation of revolutionaries extremists but there is a iranian society, a significant change, which every visitor to iran notices, a more moderate attitude and lifestyle and temptation to emulate western standards, including how in tehran women are dressed. all of that i think indicates that iran is beginning to evolve into what it traditionally has been a very civilized and important historical country. but we have to be very careful not to have this dramatic and suddenly reversed, not to mention the negative consequences for global stability that this would have.

the reduction and willingness and iranian willingness in some fashion to prevent the extremists and the fanatics that are attempting to cease control over the muslim world from prevailing. >> thank you. dr. brzezinski, my time is falling, last september you were asked to comment about the situation in syria and you indicated that the american role is definitely required but that role essentially has to be very carefully limited. is that your view today or do you have any other comments on the situation? >> that is still my view. it probably goes even further. i never quite understood why we have to help our at least endorse the overthrow of assad. i'm not really sure we knew what we were doing when we made the

statement because there was no real action following on that. what has happened however in the last two years or so since that happened is a demonstration of the fact that whether we like it or not assad does have some significant support in syrian society and probably more than any one of the several groups that are opposing him. so that has to be taken into account. i don't think that those who oppose him, perhaps with the exception of the relatively small and weakest group among the resistors who favor us. and yet he has a bigger and better standing than any one of them combined. maybe there is some division in the country across the board. but he is still there. and i think if we want to in some fashion promote the end of

some fashion promote the end of the horrible bloodletting and the progressive destruction of that country, not the promotion of democracy, i think we have to take that reality into account. >> quickly your account on this topic? >> i pretty much agree with zbig on syria. i wouldn't rule out that at some point we can get some support for resolving a most difficult situation from the russians. they have a big stake in syria and it seems to me that somewhere there is the possibility that we could have a cease-fire and assad maybe step

aside and we would agree that russia would play an important role with us in resolving it. and i think it's -- in among terrible choices, it is one we ought to examine. and the russians have made a few comments in the last few days that they might be interested. >> may i just add one more point? i think the existing borders in the middle east have run out of life. they were never authentically historic, they created largely by west colonial powers. i think part of the complication we face particularly in view of this intense violence, not only just in syria is the problem of stabilizing a region which does different, so to speak different preconditions for different borders or arrangements than the ones that were imposed right after world war i by the west.

>> thank you mr. chairman. thank you for this hearing and i look forward to serving with you on the committee as no one in the senate -- almost no one in america has traveled and had the depth of experience as senator mccain. it is an honor to serve with him and hear his ideas on so many important issues of today's life. while reading dr. kissinger's book "world order," mr. scowcroft, he talks about the westphalian system and your remarks touched me a bit. it does appear -- you mentioned china not being part of that history. at least with the people of the middle east were not also part of any kind of understanding of what went on at the peace of westphal ya. do we have a miscommunication,

and i'll ask both of you, of the misunderstanding of the nation state and the reality of the nation state in that area and a better understanding might make us more effective in response -- in responding to the challenges we face there?in responding to the challenges we face there? >> i think that is possible, but i think the middle east is a unique place. for centuries it belonged to the ottoman empire which loosely governed it and then with the collapse of the ottoman empire after world war i, the middle east was redrawn, the map was redrawn with the agreement quite arbitrarily to pursue the interest that the british and

the french had in it. those i think, zbig said, those borders are in danger. they're tenuous. they don't represent much of anything and it is a very difficult region now and unique in it's not participating basically in the european or western system, the russian system, or the chinese. >> you think as dr. brzezinski's indicated, that we may be moving toward redrawing some of those boundaries or boundaries being altered in the next decade? either one of you like to comment on that? >> i don't think we ought to engage in that. one of the things i think we should do though is to tart

mending our relationship with egypt. egypt is a big player in the region and because of its domestic problems it has fallen off. they played a small role in recent uprising but i think we need help. hopefully we can get more from turkey but i think the chances of our making it worse rather than better are worrisome. >> i thank both of you for your insights. very valuable to us. with regard to strategy dr. brzezinski, i believe it was mentioned earlier that we had a cold war strategy. everybody bought into it in a bipartisan way. the reality is i think it's much harder for us to have a strategy

in this more complex world. maybe not, but it seems to me that it is. i would share your concern as i've been here now 18 years, that we need to be a bit more humble in what we can accomplish. i just -- the world is complex. people are not able to move from one century to the next overnight. and we need to be more responsible and thoughtful about how we exercise american power and care. but in developing a strategy, dr. brzezinski do you see some things that we might all agree on in the next decade or so that we could -- would be positive for the united states? >> well, i can certainly think of a lot of things we should agree on. i'm not sure that we will agree but in order to agree we have to talk to each other. i'm not quite sure in recent

years, particularly in the face of the novelty of the challenges that we face that there has been enough of a bipartisan dialogue about these critical issues at the highest level, including obviously you, members of this very distinguished committee, who, irrespective of who actually controls the executive office, i think we have to ask ourselves how is the world different today. i am a little more skeptical about the westphalian system as so to speak, being in any way relevant because the westphalian system emerged in europe when they were already in being different countries with some territorial definition. this is not the case in many parts of the world. china was unique in having a real advanced state, so to speak, earlier than europe. but the rest of the world is now coming into being and that contributes -- politically into being and that contributes to much of the instability and

certainty what is happening. what are the real borders in the middle east? a lot of the countries in the middle east speak the same language, for example. why should they be here or there or should they all speak the same language? should they have a single state if they all speak the same language? or should religion be the only determinant for a nation state? i'm afraid this process will take a long time before it et is settles itself and i think we should not be directly involved in imposing solution. >> thank you both. i appreciate that. . i would say with regard to members of congress particularly members of the senate i believe we talked together more cleeollegially than with any other subject. there's some pretty big intensity i guess going back to the iraq war and so forth but i

think we're getting past that and hopefully we can be more effective in working as a united country because that's essential. thank you. >> thank you, chairman. mr. scowcroft and dr. brzezinski brzezinski, welcome. i read last year a piece by thomas friedman that i found very interesting where he described the islamic state and the situation in the middle east today by saying that there are really three civil wars raging in the arab world today. one, the civil war between sunni islam -- within sunni islam between radical jihadists and the moderate mainstream. sunni muslims and regimes. two, the civil war across the region between sunnis funded by saudi arabia and shiites funded by iran. and three, the civil war between sunni jihadists and all other minorities in the region.

the yazidis, turkmen, christians, jews. he wrote that when you have a region beset by that many civil wars at once, it means that there's no center. only sides. and when you intervene in the middle of a region where there's no center, you very quickly become a side. i'm curious if either of you would agree with that assessment, and that if you would also return to what you spoke about a little bit earlier regarding how important it is that the fighting on the front lines against the islamic state be conducted by iraqis and other regional arab partners and members of the coalition as opposed to western or u.s. troops. >> >> well, i agree basically with it. i think there are, fortunately several states in the middle east that do show signs of the capacity for conducting a

responsible role. and we have to rely on them. i doubt that they are going to prevail very quickly. these are the countries that were mentioned. but i don't think we have any other choice. i think getting involved inform the internal dynamics religious conflicts, sectarian animosities of the region is a prescription for protracted engagement of the kind that can be very destructive to our national interests. now to be sure, there are some circumstances in which we have to act. when we were attacked after 9/11, we had to respond. but i remember being called in with i think brent and henry kissinger to the session that made the basic decision. we were of course not participants in making the decision but we could say something. and i remember i walked up to

the secretary of defense at the time don rumsfeld and i said to him, look, let's go him, let's knock him off do what we can, destroy the taliban which held government control in the country, and then leave. don't get engaged in development of democracy. now maybe i was wrong. maybe time will demonstrate that i was wrong. but certainly i don't think anybody anticipated it would be ten years. and it might be still another ten years. and certainly in the rest of the middle east if we were to try that, it would be far, far longer. so i think we have to face the fact that the region will probably be in some serious turmoil for long time to come and our bets ought to be on those countries which, like the european countries in the year of formation, have already acquired some cohesion in states. but not try to do the heavy

lifting ourselves. if we could get the russians and chinese to be more cooperative and they had a stake in being more cooperative, we would be better off. and each of them may in fact be tempted to sit on the sidelines and think, well, the americans will get more engaged and this will improve our interest in xoout compete competing with us here or there. i don't think that's the smart solution in the long run but it takes someone like us to kind of indicate to them we would kind of like to collaborate with them in helping med rats in the middle east in different ways because they have different aspirations. >> mr. scowcroft, do you want to add to that? >> well, i largely agree with zbig on that. i think we have to be a participant in the middle east but we should not want to be an owner. and we ought to help those

states which we think are trying to produce, if you will, a modern system. that's why i mentioned egypt. because egypt is a serious power and they are of the region and they do have great capability. we don't have much of a discussion going on with them now, but there is a new government and i think that's one we should look to. turkey is an ally of ours. the turks are in a very difficult position now with syria were. but it seems to me that we ought to be careful and use force where it accomplishes specific

ends ends. but to for example, try to go in and end the syrian war, i don't think we want to own syria. it is a very very complicated country. as are some of the others in the middle east. and i agree with zbig basically. we have to be in the middle east but not of the middle east. >> thank you, both. >> thank you both for being here and everything you've done for the country. i wanted to follow up on your comments, dr. brzezinski. i found them very interesting about putin and that in fact you were concerned about some of the statements that have been overlooked that he has made that have referenced nuclear weapons. and including some of the overflights that russia has

undertaken in scandinavia, west portugal, other areas. so i wanted to follow up in light of the potential and i think actual violation of the inf treaty that we've seen that i know general scowcroft, that you have also written about as well. i think in fact think general you wrote in an op-ed in august of 2014 that this should be a real concern to nato because they haven't embarked on an across the board modernization of their nuclear forces. in russia has launched a nuclear ground launch missile in violation of the inf treaty, that could reach all of nato europe. so how do you view, both of you, the idea of the violation of this treaty in light of where we are right now and some of the statements that you've heard putin made. what should our concern be about that. and thinking about -- i

appreciated your comments dr. brzezinski, that we have to show commitment and determination to putin and that will hopefully cause him to stop being so es esculatory with what he's doing with ukraine and this treaty. i'd like your take on this violation, what it means on nuclear programs and our interactions with them. >> i don't think he will go all the way in violating the nuclear treaty. i'm more concerned about his misinterpreting what has happened recently. let's go back a little more than a year. i wonder how many people in this room or on this very important senatorial committee really anticipated that one day putin would land military personnel in crimea and seize it. i think if anybody said that's what he's going to do he or she would be labeled as a warmonger. he did it. and he got away with it.

i think he is also drawing lessons from that. and i'll tell you what my who are more and night dream is. that one day -- i literally mean one day he just seizes rega and talin, latvia and estonia. it would literally take him one day. there is no way they could resist. then we'll say how horrible, how shouk shocking how outrageous. but of course we can't do anything about it. it's happened. we're not going to assemble a fleet in the baltic then engage in amphibious landings, and then storm ashore like in normandy to take it back. we'll have to respond in some larger fashion perhaps but then there will be voices, well, but there will plunge us into nuclear war. i think deterrence has to have meaning. it has to have teeth in it. it has to create a situation in which someone planning an action

like that has no choice but to anticipate what kind of resistance will i encounter. and this is -- i recommend what i do recommend, prepositioning of some forces limited so it's not provocative. an american company in estonia is not going to invade russia and putin will know that. but he will know that if he invades estonia he will encounter some american forces on the ground and better still, some germans. some french. some brits of course. and i think if we do that kind of stuff, we are consolidating stability, including nuclear one. and the same goes for the ongoing conflict in russia and ukraine. i don't think putin plans to invade ukraine as a whole because that would be too dangerous and you cannot simply predict what will happen. but this continuous pinpricking can involve some escalation.

it has already involved escalation. there are russians, at least in the hundreds according to some nato accounts, in terms of several thousand fighting within ukraine against an he established country. this is something that cannot be ignored. so you can issue sanctions. yes, any had a concern in russian society which will deprive putin of his popular support. and this ecstatic sense we have become a super power again. but in the short run we have to deal also with his motivations and only way to do that is to indicate to him by tangible steps such as defensive arming of the ukrainians, that we will be involved in some fashion in making that military engagement more costly. and at the same time to indicate to him that we are prepared to settle, send him a signal about no nay tore participation for ukraine. that to me is a strategy of

responding to the possibility that you very rightly raise. >> and without -- without taking those steps obviously, as i hear you saying, that you believe the economic sanctions alone will not deter him. >> i am afraid that the economic sanctions alone will damage in the meantime because of what he has a free hand in doing. ukraine, then russia. there is a kind of an implicit race as which economy will collapse first. and the ukrainian government is still not in full control of its entire society. it is putting together rapidly a makeshift army and it is getting very little support. very little support in that regard from the outside. i'm not suggesting that ukrainians be armed to wage an offensive war against the russians. but i do urge that we do something to make putin ask himself, before he escalates, am i going to be in something much bigger than so far and what will

that do to moo he. that's all that's involved. but it's essential. >> thank you. >> thank you mr.t 1200cr

problem with. >> it is hard.jfq i think the outlines are sufficiently clear now, very complicated but )pá i think we're on the homestretch. and to change our strategy now might work but i wouldn't do it at this stage. e1e1t( >> i understand. >> i would wait and see if the administration is successful. koñi >> and dr. brzezinski, your qxds&uiñiñiñr thoughts on syria, the training

if it might be a better investment somewhere else, in a >> i'm not sure whom we would train because, in fact, the xd groups hostile to assad are muchlphtymxdu stronger than those seem to rely on us after what happened over ñr the last couple of years.xdjf i think there are not terribly t( many syrians who want us to wage an intense war because they don't know what the war would é@ be.ok other groups have more advantage being more sectarian, specific, ñr identified as such or identifiedt( a specific sort of regional goals with some historic jfñr

connection to the world as the çórys6 syrians perceive it. so i think some sort of "jvrt( cease-fire and discussions about the future would be for us then in anticipation of the war.ñrjf as far as iran is concerned, don't8ti$u_q ot the only negotiator with iran.ok and all of the parties e1 negotiating, including our closest allies, as long as the xdñrt( russians and chinese favor a qlp:5s continuation of the negotiations for reasons specific to their own interests. if the negotiations broke down, the whole process would collapse and then what would be the alternative?jf should we then attack and bomb them and there :9óake the war in the middle east even more explosive? we have to ask ourselves, why should we do this? a very goodx&n5a1=á t(s( question to ask. i ép'y benefit to the

united states in that transpiring.xddxv2 we have made some progress. whether we have made enough progress, i don't know. whether the negotiations have çó been perfectly co!& z%ij i don't know either because i 5÷ haven't been there. i do have a feeling there has developed a common stake with key countries in the world, lp which we shouldn't unilaterally nm;"÷ abandon just because we're being pressured to do so. jf >> thank you both so much. i appreciate it.w3 >> i'm sure you noted y ñ the signing of an agreement between iran and russia, military cooperation deal iu . interference and t( regional and international affairs.t(r senator tillis. >> thank you, mr. chair. my question is more broad in j5 nature.?; with the changing of the administration, there were clearly some changes and foreign policy strategy.ok

i'm interested in your view over the past five or six years, morefáq or le% yçjuá_q ngaged in the strategy, what things would nb you suggest we stop doing? what things do you suggest we should start doing and what should we continue doing? in other words, anfv ]j )u @r(t&háhp &hc% assessment in u. things that are workymz&9 'r> in the middle east? wow.lp >> one thing, we have to okok continue doing what we have beenñr?;d states in the middle east that has historical identity and capability to ictv5 ! "á xd to wait for us to do the job overall.xd

i think the countries we all i] are tempted t$uáá)r'g done but would prefer us to çóçófáxtó carry the heavy water and are not very clear about their aspirations. that leaves us in a difficult i]w3 position. if we undertake to do what is p,5a necessary, we buy the whole shebang.ñizínllxd we buy the whole conflict and it becomes our baby.r ár if we sit back, obviously it may deteriorate.ñie1 so we have to find some formula in between. i happen to admire secretary

kerry.e1ñi i think he's been trying energetically to find a viable compromise. it's difficult as hell to r achieve it in these conditions. perhaps this very painful process that we're witnessing inxd that region will continue for some time to come. but the better part of wisdom in these circumstances, in my judgment, is the one that present and i have been both advocating, which is a policy of d0 tive engageme.umr(r prevents the other side, particularly the sad))úák killers, fanatics, extreme sectarians from winning. i think we have done that. we don't have to do much more than that to maintain that. >> can you give examples of what selective engagement t1 ujjr @r(t&háhp &hc% like in your view? >> along the lines currently being practiced, which is airstrikes, probably some special forces, intelligence, political assistance, financial assistance and willingness, perhaps, to changí ur position on some issues such as to meet to get rid of assad.rw?ñçós7 we're so eager to get him out ofçó office.e1 is he that much worse than otherok regions in the area?e1 what is it?fáxdt(t( was he our enemy?

was he conspiring against us? there were specific regionalzwbye1 the war started in the region.ok i don't think that was our cup of tea and we sort of got involved in it and now have the lp whole problem. >> thank you mr. brzezinski. mr. scowcroft, you made a comment we need to be middle east.u can you give me an yupá w3v that means in terms of policy ñi execution?çów3 >> yes. i think it means we should e1çó$ guide, help, assist but not be a player in ourselves. that is ground troops. i think what we're doing in syria, it's okay. it was an emergency. i think that we should not carrye1qçóxdokxdkozv the burden on that, much less being in the region or of the ñi