i think we are picking up continuously a stream of important information that needs to be absorbed and somehow or another woven into our common psyche. i think you guys have been absolutely wonderful tonight. but you will have been even more wonderful for coming. thank you very much. [applause] >> you're watching american history tv all weekend, every weekend, on c-span3. to join the conversation, like us on face book. >> coming up next on the presidency, former national

security council and state department officials from the nixon administration discussed the president's efforts to stabilize relations with china. they detail henry kissinger's 1971 secret trip to china and richard nixon's official trip a year later. national archives and the richard nixon foundation hosted this event. >> good morning. i am the archivist of the united states. it is a pleasure to welcome you here today. a special welcome to our c-span audience joining us from around the country and around the world. today, we have the latest in an ongoing series of nixon legacy forums. when asked about his library president nixon said i have

insisted that the nixon library and birthplace be not a monument to the career of one man but a place where visitors and scholars will be able to recall the events of the time i served as president and to measure in way the policies my administration pursued. i hope the library and birthplace will be different, a vital place of discovery and rediscovery, of investigation, of study, debate and analysis. those words will be our touchstone as we begin a major reservation at the next in library this year. except for the recently opened watergate exhibit, the every has been relatively unchanged since it opened in the summer of 1990. over the past four years to -- over the past 24 years, there have been many changes in many is in the techniques and technologies. and in the volume of material now available. it will be an invigorating exercise in bringing in the 37th president into the 21st century. today, that you legacy for him

-- you see forum is 29th in the series. the documentation at the nixon library, regarding the opening of china, the papers and tape recordings are particularly rich. these forums are not intended to be the definitive of any subject. they are meant to be the building block of in history. they are a unique opportunity to provide first-person for current and future scholars and citizens who want to understand how the nixon policies were really made and how history really works. dean acheson named his papers "the creation." we are at the creation of the

most momentous events in the last century. the opening of china today, few events are a transformation of what he has called china's angry isolation and to restore america's relations with the world's most populous nation. america and the world were transfixed with vivid images of the week that changed the world when president nixon went to china in february 1972 and secretary of state clinton recently remembered renting a small tv set so she could watch the coverage in her room at the yell law school. she said that calling the week that went to china the week that changed the world is -- that nixon went to china the week that change the world is an understatement.

the world was different in february 1972 that it was on february 21 when he arrived. today's distinguished panelists all worked at the nixon national security council and helped prepare that momentous and transformational trip. please welcome ron walker. [applause] >> good morning, everyone. the panel is going to come out. it's my pleasure to welcome everyone along with david. it is nice to see all these lovely faces out there. those of us on the white house staff in the 1970's remembered a

young lady named catherine toya. she was on the nse council at 18 years of age. she worked at night during the residence briefing into the next morning. she would ride your bicycle from george washington university to the white house and worked in the situation room. she went on to serve in the national security post or -- for president ford and president reagan. in 1984, she wrote secretary of defense can't wonder's memorandum, "the uses of military war." she received the department's highest civilian award for the work she did in the reagan administration. today, she is a fox news security analyst and she hosts the foxnews.com.com three. she is -- death com 3.

she will introduce the panel. >> thank you, ron. [applause] >> ron walker is much too modest to mention it but he played an essential role in nixon's opening to china. he did advance work and was ground breaking in every way. it was the first time a rhyme time presidential trip -- the first time american people saw china in a generation and the first time a handful of americans had been into china. run isn't a part of this shout today, but if you want a real behind-the-scenes look to nixon's trip to china, you can read the book ron's wife wrote. "china calls" by ann walker. it was five years that nixon was

in office and this was considered one of the most fruitful times in american foreign-policy. the less fast the last for -- the last forum focused on how it was organized. we will have future forms and they will focus on arms control with the city at union and the it not more and the u.s. peace accord and a final forum on the lasting legacy of the nixon-kissinger era. i want to introduce you to the gentleman who held it happen. winston lord joined the nsc staff at the beginning of the

nixon administration during he was one of henry's closest advisers and he works on every aspect of american foreign-policy. he was in and out of kissinger's office several times a day. he helped plan kissinger secret trip to china in 71. he went on to become president of the foreign relations secretary of state and u.s. ambassador to china to richard solomon was a university of michigan professor. kissinger tapped him to join the staff in september 1971. he had a phd from m.i.t. he was a senior scholar at the prestigious rant corporation and spoke fluent mandarin and he accompanied kissinger and general hag on numerous china trips and he was in nixon's 1972

trip to china. derek held senior positions and in the state department, service and asked her to the philippines, written numerous books, and remains one of america's leading sign all adjusts. he is now the senior fellow of the ran operation. next is ambassador nicholas platt. unlike our other analysts, ambassador plat was not on the national security council staff. nick was a career foreign service officer. he was also on the nixon trip. he was the staff assistant to then secretary of state william rogers. he went on to hold senior

positions at the department of defense and after leaving government he dealt extensively with the chinese through the last 40 years. finally is admiral jonathan how who was a young commander on kissinger's staff. he was the only military officer on the staff and the only naval officer. then a lieutenant commander, he spent most of his time at sea as a submariner. he went on to a very distinguished career in the navy. became a four-star admiral. he was also present george h w bush's national security advisor. i'd like to get right to it. i want to ask each of you how you happened to be associated with henry specifically. how did henry find you?

>> i was a foreign service officer working in the pentagon in 1968. the first person that kissinger asked to join him was the head of the policy planning staff in the pentagon where i was working, a man named would help and to he asked me to go with him. i had a quick interview with kissinger so i guess i passed. the first year, i was on a mini policy planning staff. many were criticizing what he was doing and that is why i got his attention. then i became a special assistant and february 1970. >> how did henry find you, deck? >> i was recommended by the council of foreign relations. david rockefeller had arranged a fellowship program. in 1971, i was recommended to kissinger because he was taking

scholars or recommend these from the council on -- as a matter of fact, it was the second year of that program. i got a letter in the spring of 1971, before the secret trip saying that i would be welcome to join the staff for a year as an academic in that context. i was teaching the summer of 1971 at michigan in preparation for taking the years leave. i was shocked as the world was when president and send on television and announced a that kissinger had already been to china secretly. immediately, i started getting phone calls from my colleagues in the state department.

boy, are you lucky. you will be in the middle of a lot of interesting things. i showed up at the end of the summer. from that point on, i became a member of that team. it worked out well enough so that i was asked to stay beyond the first year and ended up working for kissinger and thence -- then scowcroft for five years. >> i was thrown together with henry. when we were coordinating the papers for the next entry of rogers asked me to pull the papers together. i had been working with the secretary and i had some idea how to do this and i had in working on china. i brought over the papers to discuss them with henry himself. henry was very anxious that we all the -- all be singing from the same sheet of music. we showed him our same -- our sheet of music to make sure it was the same as his and it was. >> what about you?

i had just finished two years of graduate school. i took kissinger's last course that he taught at harbor on -- on harvard -- at harvard on national security. i had orders to be on a submarine. i got a phone call from the navy's saying come to washington. we can't tell you why. just come. and don't go back to new london right now. so i came, obviously, and that turned up to be an interview with hague and kissinger, etc. i was worried about wanting to go back to submarine and started bargaining. when they finally brought me over, they said this could be two years. so for and-a-half a half years

later, i got back to the navy. i had an enjoyable experience. some professors, unbeknownst to me, were advisers on my thesis etc. and had written to kissinger and said this is somebody you ought to have. i never saw the letter. they never said anything to me at all. it was totally out of the blue. that was the reason they learn who i was. >> i would like to start off now setting the stage for the historical record. where was the united states in the 1960's? do you think now about china, it is hard to think about a time when china wasn't a central player in the world of politics and with the united states. but that was not the case in 1968. set the stage for the historic perspective of the situation. >> here we are 2014, a world

that has been totally transform since the era of the nixon initiative. we are almost half a century away of nexen making first move soon establish contact with the chinese. today, the soviet union's history. in china is approaching certainly number one in the world economy. it has emerged, risen as an international force in no small measure because of the opening that president nixon and chairman mao initiated. let's go back to what the world look like when the soviet union had -- the soviet union and china had allied themselves. eurasia, from eastern europe to the pacific ocean was controlled, dominated by a hostile alliance.

it was a fundamental threat to american security. and that threat persisted. it was certainly one of the motivations for the vietnam war involvement. as the 1960's progressed, there were signs of real tension between moscow and beijing. and mr. nixon who was at that point out of office and would have been unaware of these tensions, he was very much aware of the degree to which the vietnam war had undermined political support for the lyndon johnson administration. it got so bad that president johnson decided not to run for a second term. in the second half of the 60's, president nixon anticipated that he would run for office.

he made a trip through asia in 1967 and he wrote a really fascinating article in the journal foreign affairs that hinted not only the desire to get out of vietnam -- the title of the article was "asia after vietnam" -- but he hinted that it was important to draw china into the international community so this was very much in his head. he was saying, how do i construct a policy to deal with this situation? the brilliance of what he put together was he could see the tensions between the two communist states. he thought that might be the basis for splitting the alliance. and he was looking for a way to excel or eight or gain some -- accelerate or gain some

leverage on getting out of the vietnam situation. as he prepared to run for office, he was talking publicly about he had a secret plan to end the vietnam war. his game plan is a strategic maneuver in international politics of the 20th century. what finally transpired, the breakthrough to improve relations with china and all that followed fundamentally transformed the political dynamic of the cold war, certainly to america's advantage. it but the soviet union on the defensive and made the position for the engagement that played out for decades, not only after mao.

>> when you are on the national security council, you are already kissinger's assistant. did they talk to you about this? did you know that that was in nixon's mind from the beginning? >> yeah. in the first week of nixon's term, he sent a memo to kissinger saying the skin touch with the chinese. -- let's get in touch with the chinese. let me follow up on what dick has said. there is also the domestic scene that nixon inherited. troops in vietnam, no contact with 1/5 of the world's people and a home, you had riots and people being disillusioned with executive power and particularly the vietnam war. so the first impulse, the most

brought impulse of nixon going to china was to show the world and the america people that we will not bogged down in vietnam, that our diplomacy could force despite incredible contests that he had inherited and break out of the mall -- the mold. as a corollary of that, to live the spirits of the american people over many years. he knew that any exit from vietnam would be messy and ambiguous. he thought if he opened with china, this huge country, the drama and the importance of dealing with that giant who put in perspective the rather messy exit from vietnam. the more specifically, number one, he wanted to improve relations with the soviet union. the best way to do that was to get their attention by going to china. number two, he wanted help in

ending the vietnam war. he figured hanoi would see that it was being isolated by two patrons. he also over time -- those are his objectives. on the chinese side, they are concerned that the polar bear, their northern neighbor, they saw bresnan declare the bresnan is thought -- the bresnan doctrine. they were concerned about the soviets. they were totally isolated because of the colorful association. here is a classic case where both sides achieved their goals essentially.

within weeks of the secret trip and nixon's announcement, moscow had reached a summit meeting with nixon as well. they had been dragging their feet for years. we made major breakthroughs with the russians. it did help us put pressure on vietnam but that was a much longer operation. certainly and terms of american diplomacy, it showed that we were a major act on the world stage again. it enhanced nixon's popularity. the chinese concern got some security against the soviet union and they broke out of their isolation. then japan, which had been holding back, and europe to go with normal relations, it would get into the united nations in october 71. it is a win-win situation.

>> who were the losers? were we selling china out? >> we were sticking straightly to the policy of supporting taiwan. i was in the china desk when the transition between johnson and nixon took place. one of my tasks was to write a history and -- a history of johnson's achievements in china policy. this was a slim volume at best. [laughter] but he gave me a chance to look in the files and see all of the different initiatives we had worked on, sent forward to dean ross that were then sent back. the change that nixon came in

with. we were asked by the secretary's office to brush off various initiatives we made on cultural exchange, sports and education and so on. so we sent them forward. and they disappeared. and they must have gone to the white house. we didn't have a clue what was going on. >> the state department was kept out of what was broiling out the state, at the pentagon. >> we were not privy to what nixon and kissinger and grant lord were cooking up. [laughter] >> we relied a lot on some of the background and papers that were sent to us even though they didn't know why they were sending them. >> those of us who had read the nixon article and those of us who are sensitive to these different vibrations realized that something was up. we didn't know what it was but

something was up. of course, there was a lot of intelligence and analysis going on. i spent some time doing that. particularly in the context between -- context of the clashes between china and russia. >> this was in 1969. >> we wrote our reports and the policy implications were that they were going to improve the atmosphere for china and the united states to get together. this began the period of winking that went on. there was some very public

aspects to nixon's policies. there was relaxation's of trade and travel and things like that that laid the groundwork for what was going on behind the scenes. >> let me just add that the university of michigan campus was in turmoil through the late 1960's. tremendous fear of getting drawn into another war with china is we had in the korean war period because of the vietnam conflict. so there was tremendous tension building over whether we would get involved with another conflict with china. there was an organization set up where i began my teaching career in 1966 call the u.s. committee on u.s.-china relations. the academic community was trying to find ways to avoid another class with china.

so the public mood was sort of primed for some breakthrough that would relieve that fear that tension that we would be drawn into another war with china. >> i'd like to talk about the steps leading up to -- make you talk about some of the signals being spent. you talked about the fear that the united states would drift into another war with china after the korean war. in 1969, 1970, china was one of the u.s.'s arch enemies. the world was shocked when nixon went on television in july 1971 saying that henry kissinger had just finished completed a trip to china and that nixon would go

to china several months later. how did that get organized we did not have? diplomatic relations -- how did that get organized? we did not have diplomatic relations. >> first, there was the public signals that had to be sent, both so china would pick up the signals and other countries would get used to the idea that we were moving in a different direction. as has been pointed out, we relaxed trade and travel restrictions. but we did other things. the president, with a toast with the romanian out-of-state, had said "the republic of china." no president had ever used that phrase before. the beauty of these gestures were, they were unilateral. they did not require a response

from the chinese. we were not negotiating in public. but they could get noted by chinese leaders as well as other organizations. the other was to get touch of them. we had no direct contact besides charles de gaulle of france briefly. we tried romania which got fairly interesting for a while. we tried various channels to see which one they picked up. they settled on pakistan which was a close friend of theirs and close to us in the cold war. we had begun to condition the public and then we set up a secret channel. >> talk to me what the secret channel is. >> the president of pakistan came in and said he wanted to be the end of [indiscernible] joe would write a message and

get it to the pakistanis. an ambassador in washington would come in and see kissinger. and we would go back the same way. what was important was not only to converge on an agreement for a trip and a side was going to go on that trip -- it ended up being kissinger with great reluctance. [laughter] >> several staff members are here.

we tried to get our ambassador to run down our chinese ambassador in warsaw and i did not happen. we wanted to make sure, if anyone went to china, the agenda would be much broader than the sticky issue of taiwan. the key issue to work at a private was the agenda. once the chinese agree to a broader agenda, that is when we settled on a trip. there was one public event that was important and that was the ping-pong diplomacy. in the beginning of 1971, we had not heard from them in two or three months so we were getting antsy. then you had the american world championship and they were invited to the mainland. it did two things. one, it told the world not to mention its own cadres and his own audience that they were going to reach out to the u.s.. secondly, it was a public answer to our private channel. thirdly, there was a veiled

fist. if we don't engage with him, he can put pressure on us using methods, for example, this ping-pong diplomacy. >> the chinese had put out their own signal. in october of 19 seven, chairman mao invited edgar snow, who has become famous for his book "red star over china." he invited edward snow to meet with him for the national parade. this is the fall of 1970. my understanding is the message didn't really get through.

the mind on all sides was so negative. and probably because of the internal turmoil in china, the cultural revolution, there may have been a period of pullback. >> there were so many signals going on. we had suggested that the warsaw talks actually be moved to the embassies. they had previously taken place for uighurs -- >> what were the warsaw talks? >> talks we had had with the chinese for decades about prisoner exchanges mainly. it was our only direct contact with the chinese during those years. they had been in advance for some reason. you had the mitzvah levitsky palace which was eminently buggable. a taxi going by could turn into the warsaw talks.

the suggestion was that we move the warsaw talks. that process actually began. but it was interrupted. i think the interruption came about as a reaction to the invasion of cambodia, which in fact put things on hold. >> we called it encouraging. >> call it as you wish. [laughter] the chinese saw it as a reason to slow down. why ask you were in the military at that time. >> i had -- i just want to underline one thing. i think there was a serious chinese concern about the

russians and what was happening on their border and the buildup of almost a million troops and so forth and some clashes that were occurring. so to mao's mind and the chinese leadership's mind, they were really concerned that this was a serious threat to them. as far as getting along with the americans, they did not feel we were territorial, ambitious, etc., etc., and the russians would be. this was a motivating factor. >> we think about the triangular diplomacy. we think we were running again. but what you are implying is the chinese were looking at this triangle to see if they could find in your lines. -- a new alliance. >> and the u.s. was someone they could depend on more than the russian part of the triangle.

said why don't we gang up on kissinger and said why don't we gang up on the chinese? that was summer of 1969. >> when they were having tensions along the border. >> there were study memos being circulated and talked about. they were hotly debated. there was also a big argument within the community in which i was involved which discussed the question whether or not nuclear castration of china was possible by russia. >> this was back in the soviet union. several of the top criminologists told nixon you should not move toward china. it will hurt our relations with russia. so he was being told not to move

to china because it could hurt our relations. nixon knew the best way to make or break with china. >> less take a look at this triangular diplomacy. >> i don't know how explicitly this was conceived at the moment. but what emerged as the diplomacy and fold it is that we were in the favorable so-called swing position, where the russians and the soviets and the chinese started, if you like competing for good relations with us. they had that relations between themselves. we were in a favorable position.

the strategic triangle, as it emerged out of the next and initiative, put the united states in a favorable position. it is interesting to say, well is there a new dynamic to the situation. >> were you looking at that as this would be our opportunity to get the things we wanted and have the lines open to china. >> basically our strategy was to make the russians anxious and nervous about our opening to china and at the same time demonstrate to the chinese that

we had more actual business with moscow then we do with beijing. so the chinese were a little antsy at the same time. china would go there after the moscow summit and brief them both out of courtesy to reassure the chinese, but also to make the nerve -- to make them nervous about the amount of business we had with them. we share our views with sober to it -- soviet military strengths. >> we will talk about that in a subsequent panel, but where were the pressure points? what were we doing with the soviet union, arms control, and vietnam? >> obviously, we were in the

cold war and the russians, the soviet union was the main reason there was a cold war. at the same time, we were trying to open relations with the soviet union arms control agreements, lots of these things, all source of agreements about how we can operate in this semi-hostile world. there are a whole bunch of things that were going on to improve their relationship. i think that what is unusual or amazing when you think of 1972 you have a presidential visit to china and two months later, you have a presidential visit to russia. meetings at the highest level agreements. success in both areas.

this was an amazing buildup in the china trip. certainly the first part of it. the russians are the big providers for vietnam. they were pushing it. via gnome was a huge issue. nexen had run for presidency like all presidents do, in that war. we eventually got to 1972 and the vietnam war was not over. the agreement was at there. it was really a dynamic year. when you look back at all the different things that went on, it is significant. we were providing some information once this relationship started on these trips, to let the chinese know specifically what the russians were doing.

obviously, they have their own intelligence but at least to let them know, through our satellites and other means where the alignment was. we tried to give it very accurately and honestly. >> keep going, guys. >> the guy who provided this material to the chinese, i woods it in. i was a spear carrier. but he was expanding to them -- this is all unclassified now. one other quick point about the dynamics of the summit -- we had asked the soviets throughout 1970, as we took off, haig was holding the fort. i gave them one last chance. once again, to bring them until

now we had left word to haig to call us. the idea was for haig to call us to see how this went out. i think it was hitler -- was either thailand or -- basically, he said the russians had turned us down. the russians agreed within weeks to a summit meeting after that. >> meanwhile -- >> back at the state department -- >> the campaign to get the chinese into the u.n. was gathering momentum. and the state department saluting as always was having a

massive campaign to lobby against this and in favor of taiwan. that is what also was going on. in the meantime, i was asked as head of china washington party. there were all these different currents. >> let's switch to the secret trip to china. winston, you said you are doing these various efforts, initiatives to find if somebody in the chinese government -- what happened? how did kissinger get to china without the world knowing? >> it could never happen again. he was scheduled for a public trip to thailand, taiwan, and vietnam.

we had three different types of briefings. one was for a book of people going into china. there was a briefing book for those who were not going to go to china but had to know what was going on to help cover up where the hell we were. then there was a briefing book who did not know we were going to china. i was just going to sleep and kissinger would wake me up and coming to do them all again. to make a long story short, i have to explain to the audience and history that kissinger was not the first person into china after 22 years. we have all heard it. kissinger admits it in his memoirs. >> that's because kissinger

thought summit might be shooting when you stepped off the plane. >> i will double that for a minute. when we got to pakistan, kissinger was going to get stuck with a stomach ache and go to a pill station. while he was supposedly there, we will shave off 48-hour's to beijing. a couple of problems. cass injured or -- kissinger got a real stomach ache in india. then we get there -- by the way, we interviewed a couple of pakistani doctors to make sure they can go up and take care of kissinger who was being impersonated by secret service men. he asked, you know what kissinger looks like. oh, yes. of course, it was the wrong doctor. [laughter] you been in suspense, but no american had been in there for 22 years.

i was in the back of the plane with kissinger and a couple of others. as we headed into chinese airspace, i went to the front of the plane. henry was in the back. so i was the first person in china. he elbowed me aside when we got off the plane. but still. [laughter] the picture you are seeing is the first night at dinner going on the secret trip. on the american side on the lower left, you have -- henry, himself, and a vietnam expert. and you have joe and i on the right-hand side. we spent 48 hours there in total secrecy. essentially examining what an agenda might look like, whether we can have a meaningful

presidential trip. we were exploring new terrain. and also short enough in announcing the trip on both sides. the chinese wanted to make it look like nixon was dying to go to china. and we wanted it to look like the chinese were dying to have him come to china. we only had a few hours left to work up every front announcement that nixon made in san clemente a little later on. a couple of amusing things on that trip, as we flew into china, you would think kissinger was about the james bond aspect of the secrecy, the geopolitical earthquake that he was about to unveil. no. he was worried that he had no shirts. his staff assistant have forgotten to pack any shirts. john holds is about 6'2".

his shirt had a label that said made in taiwan. [laughter] >> let me make one comment from the chinese point of view. what was not known, during this secret visit, there was an ally of communist china also in beijing and that was kim il-sung. we had the trouble of shuttling back and forth with the meeting with kissinger and his party and dealing with their ally north korea. the chinese leadership was really balancing off what it was trying to do with the united states against this. alliance relationships not only with north korea but with vietnam.

he first flew back to pyongyang to brief kim il-sung on what happened and then they communicated to the vietnamese. they were outraged and they talked about betrayal and the communist movement. but they diplomacy associated with this initiative was very complicated. >> let's explore what was going on in china at the time. the cultural revolution. was it from their perspective -- was it only now who could do this deal? -- was only mao who could do this deal? >> the fact was it was an enormous political risk for both mao and for richard nixon. one could say that rick -- that nixon managed his internal politics more successfully. there was a coed tent by the man we thought had been designated

as mao's successor. we now know that -- we forget the exact day -- but after this coup attempt, he got on a plane fearing arrest and the plane crashed in mongolia. >> it was october 1971. there was a very heavy police presence and we did not know why. >> we later got the intelligence reporting there were people in the chinese leadership who were strongly opposed to this and it -- to this initiative. the cap referring to -- they kept referring to mao as the b-52, the heavy bomber of their politics. mao's wife and others were

opposed to some of the developments that had brought influence to chou en lai. this gets beyond the immediate story, but beginning around 1974, particularly after john lie was ill and was replaced by deng xiaoping, the so-called gang of four had some real influence in the dialogue with the u.s.. the mood turned a bit sour. one aspect to link it to the intelligence sharing, the chinese became antsy that we were taking them for granted because we were trying to make them aware of the soviet threat. they tried to say to us, don't worry about us. we can take care of ourselves. and they developed a public

slogan that the soviet union was preparing to attack in the east but they were really going to attack in the west against american interests as a way to say to their own people and plot be -- and probably to us that we can take care of ourselves. >> may want to talk about the impact on other countries. >> kissinger's secret trip was in july 1971. nixon did not go until 1972. what was the blowback from our allies >> -- our allies. >> after nixon's trip -- the japanese were particularly shops because -- shocked because we had not told them.

we were there closest allies and we had not told them. they got over it. there immediate reaction was to immediately normalize their relations with china and become the major channel to china, the travel channel to china in subsequent years. i think that the reaction of the right in the united states was very negative. >> this was the taiwan lobby. >> yes, very negative. after the trip, war and christopher -- warren christopher was given the task of reporting what we had done. his car was pelted with eggs in the garage and of the things.

the blowback from the secret trip was essentially shock. >> we paid a certain price with secrecy, particularly with japan. but having said that, i think it was felt necessary because, if there have been public signals in advance, if people knew in advance henry was going to china, every lobbyist, not only taiwan but everyone else would be coming in, and our allies and we would be constrained on what we could explore with the chinese once we got there. the signal was made. we had to keep it secret. he would have to tell his cabinet and the japanese press could get hold of it so the chinese would feel betrayed.

it was a tough trade-off. it was worth it.