into like, native sponsors? >> no, i didn't. i think, you know, buzz feed came to us with a proposal that included a substantive interview and a funny video. they came together. we had a numberover confers over time. the idea from the video came from them. this has been suggested by some that said we'll give you an interview if we do this course. that's note how it works. it's hit almost 51 million views. >> it's time to catch up. >> you know like, as we get into platforms, there are new ways of going ant it. and, so, you know buzz feed is a very successful platform.

they got a very you know tough, but fair view of the president. and they had a contented rid owe that their audience would enjoy mplt and, so it's worked for them. and other people have, you know, other out lets on different sorts of proposalings. but these are media companies. and they have different -- they're going to engauge their audience. >> were those really vice president's biden's chains? >> i don't think they were actually the vice president. but if it turns out they were the vice president, i will stweet off the answer when i get to the white house. >> any regrets? >> no, it was fun. people see the president. if you're watching the news,he's standing biepd the president taurking about ebola or in some big fight about funding security. and it's like, you know during the campaign people got to see

the other side of him. i think it's important that people have some fun with it. we don't have to take ourselves so seriously all of the time. and so i thought it was great. >> and the president also recently did fox. did you think that fox's questions would be tougher? >> i thought that box's questions were plenty tough. but i always do. there's never an interview where i thought it wasn't tough enough. there was an interview where i thought it was very clever. i think this is the challenge for a lot of media companies now to be able to develop content that is different. kbu speaks to their audience. box did a good job of that. buzz feed did a good job of that. many others are trying to figure that out. >> i think adam learner has a question. we'll get a microphone to him. but when you and i saturday down, we talked about

modernizing the white house broefing. how it might chak. you said it was something that you had given a lot of thought to that you could imagine ways that it could change. but you said "there are some things that only a new president could do." what would the advice be to your success southerlies? how you could achieve both the equities of the whiets house. we get as many complaints in the white house kor responsible dense asoeszuation about having to do the briefing. it's at a time that makes sense in the 24/7 media cycle where they are you know, this isn't like the old days where they would just wake up in the morning, call some sourss go to the wreefing, you know, hear something, but that in a story

and turn it in at 6:00 that night. now, they're constantly writing and producing content. if i think if you saturday down with them, you're able to find ways is that made it more suitable to the current media environment in the current work patternsf white house correspondence. while x at the same time preserving want i think is a very important tradition. of having the white house have to answer questions on a regular basis. >> now, jowl eve given this a ton of thought. what would be an example of how you might do that? >> i think, you know, josh would shoot med for saying this, but you could do it early in the morning. you could do a more -- you could do an earlier morning off kamt ra gaggle that would serve some purposes for people who are writing.

this's a whole host of ways to do i lt people more smart than me with more skin in the bout will do it. squl what media out lets would you like to see in the room that right-hand turn now? >> i 24i it is -- you know, it's really sdi verse filled and expanding. but i think if we can find ways for people to have -- whether there's a capacity for questions from the public in some way, shape or form for smaller out lets.

i don't think it is great that they don't get the local spin on as much as they should on how these poll sids affect their state. they sort of just get the national story. and if you can find a way to incorporate this, it would be excellent. mr. pfeiffer thank you so much for joining us chlts one of the key messaging decisions he's made recently is to use the term violent emt extremism. we've had the violent extremism summit pretty rescently. i saw a poll earlier today from hue that said the majority of iraqi muslims believe in honor killings for adulterers or people who have premarital sex. and a large polarity for the religion. does the white house does the administration believe that there's some sort of link tweep that sort of culture and the

violent extremists that are able to redirect examination kalize segmenteds of the population. >> i didn't see that poll. i can just explain the logic that i think it is very important and i think it is very important that, you know, the bush administration is very good at making this point. to paint the idea that we are at war with islam and snot with them hampers our efforts in that part of the world. we try to be very spechblgs about this.

nchtsd no offense but, you know, in the news, you know, i think very few people ever get to give the experience of the same things that we experience every day. sort of the pace in the white house and the fact that you wake up and the entire world, as you know it has changed because of something that you have no control over. and i did feel real sympathy for the bush, you know, just with what to do with sthar policies. but i felt for the bush staffers

who were going through a lot of the same things we were going through. and, i mean, these are really our jobs. and the choices, like the policy choices are sell sequential. but the strategic choices you make are always 51-49 decisions. there's no easy call that you make. >> and what did you learn from days of fire? >> well, i read it in the course at the epdover 2013 over the holidays. this is right after the health care web siet had broke in. things seemed really bad. you know they're sort of the dth of the presidency. i read that book and i read john harrison harrison's book right after that. as bad as our 2013 was, man, those guys had it worse than we

did. i felt, like a little better about our standing. >> are you reading at this moment? believer. >> how true is it? >> it's very true: >> have you read anything so far that you're,like, come on. >> not yet. you know, it's like, you know now, at this point, i don't know whether i believe these things because -- i think these things are true because they happened orb just because they've been talked about for the last since years now. it's a very poin yant read for me now. so it's very poignant and it's a great read. and i've known dan for a long time but i've learned a ton about ax. it's a great book. you know even if you are not a

huge obama fan, and i can't imagine anyone that's not a huge ax fan. it gives you a good view of what time in the white hois was like. >> what's something that you're going o to read officer sfun now that you're lib rated? >> that's a good question. the next book that i'm going to read is by richard price. he's one of my faif rilt authors. that will be hopefully, a good beach read at some point in the future. >> if you're a young person coming to washington, you want to be darn pfeiffer, what do you do? >> well, aim higher than that. nchtsds look in washington or in campaigns where you went to school, who you know who your parents are may get you in the door. but once you're in the door, none of that matters anymore. the person who works hardest and smartest succeeds.

is there's no better example of that than david kluff who got into politics without graduating sfr college and ended up managing a successful president shl election in 2008. if you work on a campaign and get to work before your boss and leave work after your boss you're going to have a real shot at making a firm. >> as and wez say good-bye jowl ear a georgetown basketball fan. the ambassador from united arab emertz, he has a question for you. he says we have aal emted but young team again. heavy with good guards, but no centers. given the young nature and disadvantage with size, how do you think we'll fair? >> well, look. i think -- >> that's a little bit baked into that question. >> yeah, exactly. i think this is the athletic directional team in a very long

brought up against teams that were more with us. and we got a real if a freshman can stay poised, got chance of a real one. >> who's is in your final four? >> kentucky virginia gonzaga. >> thank all of you live stream land. thank all of you on c-span. we appreciate his partnership and these events. thank all of you for coming out tonight despite having your motorcades having to park elsewhere. congratulations on an maizing run. >> thank you. on the next washington

journal, former undersecretary nicholas burns in foreign policy challenges facing the united states including the u.s. relationship with israel negotiations over iran's nuclear program and the threat posed by isis. washington journal live each morning at 7:00 a.m. eastern. friday we'll bring you the audio of the world argument starting at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. the c-span cities tour take american history tv on the road

traveling to u.s. cities to learn about their history and literary life. we partnered with comcast for a visit to galveston, texas. >> they watched in amazement as both of these factors battered the structures. at that time we had wooden path houses out over the gulf of mex. we we had piers. as the storm increased in intensity these beach structures literally were turned into match sticks. the 1900 storm struck galveston saturday september 8th 1900. the storm began and increased in

dramatic intensity and tapered off toward midnight that evening. this hurricane was, and still is, the deadliest reported natural event in the history of the united states. >> wamptch all of events on saturday at noon eastern. we talk about our student cam documentary competition. the goal is to challenge middle school and high school students about the issues that affect them and their community. the 2015 theme for student cam was the three branches and you. we asked students to tell us a story that demonstrated how a policy law or action that affected them or their community. in addition to telling it through video, we asked them to

use c-span programming in their video and explore alternative points of view. before we meet one of the grand prize winners and watch a portion of the video, here is a bit more background on the competition. there were five top meansthemes. they were education, health, economy, equality and immigration. we received more than 2200 entries from 45 states and the district of columbia. students could enter as team of up to three or individually. 150 student prizes were awarded. now it's time to announce the grand prize winner. team of 8th graders from

lexington, kentucky were named the grand prize winners for their video on minimum wage. here is a small piece from the clip. >> sydnejones is a single mother with a 4-year-old child. she has to make tough choices every week since she has to make ends meet on a minimum wage job 7.25 an hour. she says $15,000 a year isn't enough to get by. >> it is hard because sometimes i have to decide like if my son needs underwear i'm going to have to be late on a bill or ask people to borrow money. it is hard sometimes. >> sydney is not alone. according to the bureau of labor statistics 3.3 americans make minimum wage or below. that's 2.6% of all u.s. workers.

most minimum wage workers are employed in feelields like retail service, food service or day care care. >> we would be able to take care of ourselves and pay our bills and pay for our housing and stuff like that. we can't do that on minimum wage. just can't. they got all these programs like food stamps. people are like why do where you need food stamps? you got to eat. you don't make enough to feed yourself and pay all your bills. you just don't. >> the push is onto raise the federal minimum wage to 7.25 an hour to maybe 10.10 an hour which would provide a little over $21,000 a year if the individual works 40 hours per week. it's been six years since the minimum wage was raised. some in congress say now is the

time to raise it again. >> things a getting better. the problem is they're only getting better for some. we know that corporate propertyfits have continued break records. >> some like kentucky congressman say raising the minimum wage will cost jobs sietsing a nonpartisan study. >> if we mandate a higher minimum wage in those entry level jobs we would lose 500,000 to a million jobs immediately. that's the last thing we want. >> not an artificial wage. >> now it's time for us to meet one of the students that's on

the grand prize winning team. her name is anna gilligan. hi. congratulations to your team. >> hi thank you so much. >> where were you when you herd the news that you won the grand prize this year? >> i was in my principal's office with my team and a few teachers and i got the call. for the first time in my life i didn't have anything to say. >> isn't that terrific? were you surprised that you won the grand prize. did you feel this was really a top winner? >> well my team and i when we were first making it we would joke around, let's show so and so. we wanted to get the word out and let some people know. we had no idea. there's always somebody better out there. we didn't know that this was a possibility. >> how did you choose the topic the artificial wage which deals with the minimum wage? >> well we were looking through the clips that you had

available. we're all very passionate about human rights and i was like oh let's look at this. minimum wage. hey, for the people. give them more money. help them out. right there we're like that's what we're going to do. we want to help people. >> it's interesting when people watch your video and i hope they will take time to find it on our website, you have a decided point of view, the three of you, that you speak through. was it your opinion when you started out the piece? >> our opinion changed. when we first started researching we saw the top layer. if you give people more money, they'll be happier and can buy more things. we started to dig a little deeper. found out the cost of inflation. people can put people out of a job. we decided it's not best for the workers and our community. >> how did you find the people that you interviewed

particularly those working on minimum wage to interview for your piece? >> my father had a job connection. he found them through a job fair. we were able to coordinate those interviews through a program called jubilee jobs. they were like, all right. we have three people. if you would like to interview them and they are happy to tell you their story. >> were you surprised that they were so willing to share their lives with you? >> absolutely. absolutely. we had one interesting view. one of the gentlemen said no i don't think this is a good idea. that just shocked us. just everything about it. it was very interesting. absolutely. >> have you worked with video before or is there your first documentary project? >> this is my first time. michael is very experienced. he definitely helped out with the technical aspect of that. >> how did you put your three member team together? >> well it was originally katie

and i. we have been friends since fourth grade. then i was like, hold on, how are we going to put this together? who will help us figure out how to make this into a news story and not just facts? i was like michael how about you come help us out. we worked well together. we're friends. we're all on speech team. we get along very well. >> how will you celebrate your win both in your school and what will the three of you do with your prize winning money? >> oh gosh. starting out we didn't even think this would happen. i haven't made any plans. in invest in the stock market do something worth while. >> do you know how your school will celebrate? >> we'll all watch this on tv. we're going to have an assembly and all sorts of fun stuff. >> i'm sure the student will be

really happy to cheer you on. congratulations from c-span to all you have and your school for your big win. we're very proud of you. >> thank you so much. >> in addition the grand prize winners there were first prize winners in each of our categories categories. here they are. they produced a video on school lunches. their cable provider is comcast. first prize in high school central went to a senior from oklahoma. her topic, public access to natural resources. they chose medical research funding.

one more prize. mckinley lair won our first ever fan favorite prize. this was the first time allowing the public to preview and cast votes for their favorite documentary. all 150 name prizes were decided independently of the public vote. during a week of voting with 325,000 votes cast the documentary received 119,000 of those votes. she'll be recognized as this year's fan fraft andavorite and win $500 $500 prize. congratulations. congratulations to all the student cam winners a and the students who entered this year. you can watch the winning entries on our website a student cam.org.

i know he had a hard stop at 3:30. he had a meeting later that he's traveling to. i want to thank him for being

here and i'll properly introduce him in a moment. the president has sent forward a request for the authorization of the use of military force. i think one of the things that most people here are concerned about is that there's a level of confidence in what we're doing and it's going to achieve the stated goal that is the president has laid out. and i don't know of anybody more equipped to come before us today than general allen, who served our country with great distinction. i think many people feel decently well about what is happening in iraq. i think there are a lot of questions relative to syria. my sense is today you'll have a number of questions regarding that. and we hope that what you'll do general allen is give us an honest assessment as to the end state we would like to see happen in iraq and syria when we

complete the activities that we're involved in. and understand the political and military strategy that we have under way. and to give us a little sense of time frame relative to the various activities that are necessary. i was just in iraq last week, in both baghdad and erbil with our kurdish friends and ankara with our turkish friends. the shia militias are everywhere in iraq as people know. general sulayman who was head of the force for iran has now become a celebrity in iraq. and i have to say it feels very strange to be there knowing much of the activity we have under way while it is necessary is really to iran's benefit. and i know there is a lot of concerns that after this activity is completed, if we're successful with isis, which i

know we will be, and in essence the next issue is going to be dealing with security of our forces there with the shia militias. i was happy to see that turkey has gone ahead and signed an agreement, to train and equip agreement, that's something you made happen and thank you for that. at the same time, i know there is a lot of concerns now about how we deal with assad's vero bombs as we train and equip these individuals, how do we protect them from the barrel bonds which cause them to diminish in greater numbers than they can be trained. i'm sure you'll talk about that. there is a lost discussion as you know on the ground there about the exclusion zone. i know you have questions about that. and no fly discussions. it may be taking place to draw turkey more into what is happening in syria itself, which i think most of it -- most of us believe is very important. so as we -- as i close, i want to say we owe it to our nation as we consider this to know that

the full range of america's elements of national power, diplomatic, economic, and military means are aligned, aligned in such a way to get to the administration's stated goals. because of the nature of this decision, one, again this being made after a fact, all of us need to have confidence that the administration is truly committed to achieving the stated goals that they laid out and i think your testimony here is going to be very valuable to us. with that, i would like to turn to our distinguished ranking member, senator menendez who has been a great partner on all of these issues. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for calling the hearing and for our work forward on this. and general allen, welcome back to the committee and thank you for your distinguished service to our country in so many different ways including your present position as a special envoy. although this hearing is not focused on the administration's

proposed authorization for the use of military force against isil, it is by nature an opportunity to probe the dynamics of our current anti-isil strategy that will inform our discussion of an aumf. and specifically with a strategy that relies on u.s. air power and logistics, intelligence and training support, but not on u.s. troops on the ground would be successful in achieving our ultimate goal to end the barbaric rampage of isil. there are those who believe that it is up to our local partners on the ground to ultimately take this war across the finish line. i've heard from others who believe isil can be defeated -- cannot be defeated without a significant u.s. ground commitment. so i would like to hear from you, general allen, where you come down on what will be required to eradicate isil, given that we hear reports from secretary carter's meetings in kuwait that while the anti-isil

strategy does not require fundamental recalibration, our coalition partners can be doing more. my view personally is that the united states must help combat isil and restore stability to the region. and we must follow through on our commitments to our arab partners, but large scale u.s. ground forces at this time and this complex political and military atmosphere, would at end of the day decisively increase the prospect of losing a long war. i appreciate and want to salute all the men and women who are waging a campaign against isil, particularly from the air, all of the air strikes that have according to your own testimony inflicted significant damage and those are promising and we salute the men and women who do that.

but our effectiveness in combatting this threat, i think, cannot be measured only in the number of sorties flown or bombs dropped. so today's hearing is a welcome opportunity to step back and assess the big picture. the state of the coalition, but will it ultimately take to defeat isil and what we know, i think, will be a multiyear effort that will take billions of dollars, significant military assets, and the painstaking patience of diplomacy matched to all of those efforts. we look forward to your insights and we welcome you back to the committee. >> our distinguished witness today is general john allen, the special presidential envoy for global coalition to counter isis. general allen is a retired u.s. marine four star general, former commander of isaf and u.s. forces in afghanistan. upon his retirement from the marine corps, he was appointed as the senior adviser to the secretary of defense on middle east security. he's currently on a leave of absence from the brookings institution where he's co-director of the 21st century

security and intelligence center. we thank you for your frankness. we thank you for your service to our country. we thank you for being here today. i know you're going to have an unusually long opening comment, which we appreciate, and then we'll turn to questions. >> chairman corker, thank you, and ranking member menendez, it is good to be back today. esteemed members of the committee, i want to thank you for providing me the opportunity to update you on the progress of the global coalition to counter isil and let me add my deep and sincere thanks for all this committee has done for our diplomats and those who are serving with courage and capability at the far flung locations of american influence. this committee has done marvelous work to support them and i want to thank you very much for that. i just returned to washington yesterday afternoon from kuwait at the request of secretary of defense ashton carter. i joined a group of more than 30 senior u.s. diplomats and military commanders for a wide ranging discussion on our counter isil strategy. while my role as senior special

presidential envoy is concerned with the consolidation and integration of the coalition contributions, not the coordination of the military activities, i remain nonetheless closely synced with my colleagues in the military and we meet regularly with other departments and agencies involved to review the progress of the counter isil activities. we're discussion the next steps. now that we largely achieved the objectives of the campaign's first phase, to blunt isil's strategic operational and tactical momentum in iraq. through over 2500 coordinated coalition air strikes in support of our partners on the ground, we degraded isil's leadership, logistical and operational capabilities and we're denying it essential sanctuary in iraq from which it can plan and execute attacks. with new zealand's very welcome announcement yesterday that it will provide military trainers to build the capacity of the iraqi security forces, a dozen

coalition nations now participating in these efforts are operating from multiple sites across iraq. still, the situation in iraq remains complex. and the road ahead will be challenging and nonlinear. considering where we were only eight months ago, one can begin to see how the first phase of the strategy is delivering results. as i appear before this esteemed committee today, it is important to recall that in june of last year, isil burst into the international scene as a seemingly irresistible force. it conquered a city, mosul, of 1.5 million, then poured south down the tigris river valley toward baghdad, taking cities and towns and villages along the way. outside tikrit, it rounded up and massacred over a thousand to the west it broke through the border town and poured east toward baghdad

isil's spokesman vowed, quote, the battle will soon rage in baghdad. and the holy city of karbala, unquote. shortly there after isil launched a multiple prong attack further into northern iraq, massacring minority populations, and enslaving hundreds of women and girls, surrounding tens of thousands of yazidis and opening a clear route to erbil, the region's capital. then the united states acted. since our first air strikes in august, isil's advance has been blunted. and they have been driven back from the approaches to baghdad and erbil. isil lost half of its iraq based leadership. thousands of hardened fighters and is no longer able to mass and maneuver effectively and to communicate as an effective force. iraqis standing on their feet. the peshmerga has taken control of the mosul dam, the crossing

with syria, the sinjar mountain, zumar and the kissic road junction which eliminated a supply route for isil from syria to mosul. these forces also broke the siege of the oil refinery and have begun to push north into the tigris valley. to the west, sunni tribes are working with iraqi security forces to retake the land in the heart of al anbar, a land i know well. last weekend under the cover of bad weather, isil launched an attack on the town of al baghdadi, near the air base in al anbar where our forces are located with the danes and australians to help to train iraqi soldiers and tribal volunteers. isil as it has done over and over again rampaged through the town, killing civilians and driving hundreds of families into the safe haven of the air base. but the iraqis did not sit idle. they organized and fought back.

the prime minister went to the joint operations center in baghdad and ordered an immediate counterattack. the minister of defense flew to al assad to organize available forces and iraqi army commander sent an armored column from baghdad to road march to al baghdadi to join the attack. and sunni tribal volunteers organized to support and in some cases led the attack. today, much of al baghdadi is back in the hands of the local and tribal forces and as i was at al assad last month and my deputy was there just three days ago, i would tell you that all americans would be proud to see what our troops are doing there, helping the iraqis and the tribes. this is only the start and isil will remain a substantial foe. but any aura of the invincibility of isil has been

shattered. isil is not invincible. it is defeatable. and it is being defeated by iraqi forces, defending and taking back their towns and their cities and ultimately their country with the support of the united states and the coalition. and importantly, very importantly, the aura of the so-called caliphate is destroyed. and the future of the so-called caliph is very much in doubt. because we lack the same kind of partners on the ground in syria, the situation there is more challenging and more complex. still, we're working closely with regional partners to establish sites for training, and equipping vetted and moderate syrian opposition elements to train approximately 5,000 troops per year for the next three years. these and other military aspects of the campaign will inevitably receive the most attention. but as i've seen in the four previous coalition efforts in which i've been involved, it will ultimately be the aggregate pressure of the campaign activity over multiple, mutually supporting lines of effort that will determine the campaign's success. this is why when i visit a coalition capital, when i meet with the prime minister or a king or a president, i describe the coalition's counterisil

strategy as being organized around multiple lines of effort. the military line to deny safe haven and provide security assistance, disrupting the flow of foreign fighters, disrupting isil's financial resources, providing humanitarian relief and support to its victims, and countermessaging or defeating the idea of isil. since mid-september i've travelled to 21 partner capitals, several of them multiple times to meet with national leadership there. and in that short span we have assembled a global coalition of 62 nations and international organizations. of the many recent visits leaders expressed heightened concern for the immediate and generational challenge presented by foreign fighters and rightly so. through capacity building in the balkans, criminal justice efforts in north africa, and changes to laws in more than a

dozen countries, partners are working together to make it more difficult for citizens to fight in syria and iraq. even with the expanded measures, foreign fighters continue to make their way to the battlefield. we must continue to harmonize our processes and promote intelligence sharing among our partners. this kind of information sharing has also allowed the coalition to make significant gains in synchronizing practices to block isil's access to banks within the region and globally. this includes stemming the flow of private donations and restricting isil's ability to generate oil revenues. we're now expanding these efforts to counterer isil's efforts to informal networks. the coalition is also supporting the united states efforts to provide food and aid and supply critical and supply critical assistance to protect vulnerable children and women and men from harsh winter conditions in the region. the ravaged communities isil leaves in its wake bare witness to the true identity, one where actively we're working with coalition partners to expose with arab partners taking a leading role.

isil was attractive to many recruit because of its proclamation of the so-called caliphate and the sense of inevitability it promoted. the last six months have amply demonstrated that isil is really operating as a criminal gang and a death cult, under increasing pressure as it sends naive and gullible recruits to die by the hundreds. coalition partners are working together as never before to share messages, engage traditional and social media and underscore the vision of religious leaders who reject isil's millennialist vision. as the president announced reedly, we're partnering with the united arab emirates to create a joint messaging center that will contest isil's offensive and extremist messages for the long-term and seeking to create a network of these centers, a global network, where regional consortium of nations can dispute and dominate the information space filled with

isil's messaging. the president has outlined a framework for the authorities he believes will be necessary to pursue this long-term campaign with this formal request to the congress for the authorization for the use military force against isil. the aumf requests using our unique capabilities instead of large scale deployments of ground forces. taking the fight to isil requires that we be flexible and patient in our efforts. it also requires close coordination with this committee and with the congress so that we're constantly evaluating our tactics and strategy and that we resource them appropriately. chairman and ranking member menendez, i thank you for the opportunity to be before this committee today and to continue that process of coordination and consultation with you and i look forward to taking your questions. >> we thank you for the testimony. and for your great service to

our country. yesterday senator kerry testified that he felt like that today the administration already has, because of the '01 aumf and the '02 aumf the authority to conduct the operations that are being conducted against in iraq and syria. do you agree with that assessment? >> i do, chairman. >> okay. so it is an interesting place that we find ourselves, where six months after conflicts have begun, a new aumf is being offered and i know that in order to pursue one properly through congress, that's the standard process which i appreciate. but it is an interesting place that those authorities already exist. the trainer equip program that you've been able to negotiate, many concerns have been raised about the fact that most of the free syrian initially was targeting assad.

now we're organizing these against isis. we're going against an entirely different recruitment group to do that. are we finding that to be on easy recruitment process? >> we -- as we began this, chairman, we weren't sure, frankly, how that recruitment process would unfold. just two days ago i had the opportunity to have a conversation with the great soldier that the united states has put against this challenge. the numbers were much higher than we thought and it's been very encouraging. we've had an encouraging sense that there is an interest in this outcome. >> my sense is there are, based on my experiences last week,

there are larger groups of people willing to go against isis initially in this train and equip program than some initially thought is that correct?? >> that is correct. >> one of the big moral dilemmas is that as we train and equip these folks, we know that assad is barrel bombing other members of the members of the army today. but my understanding is there's been significant discussions with turkey over an air exclusion zone in the northwestern aleppo area and a new fly zone along the border. and that's been the issue that's hinder them getting more involved in the content, even though they're working with us more fully than they have. that has been the issue that has kept them from actually getting more involved. it's also my understanding that that decision, the decision to do that is at the president's desk. it's at the white house and he's

nod made a decision yet as to whether to engage. can you update us on that or tell us the effect of that decision not being made on turkey getting more involved in the conflict open helping us with the ground operations you were talking about earlier? >> well, i'll start by reciting what i've said before with respect to turkey. we have an old friendship with turkey and they are an ally. and where we began this conversation just some months ago and where we are today, i think there's been significant progress from the conversation about turkey's role in the coalition and all that we want to accomplish together, and in particular what we would like to accomplish in syria. that conversation isn't over. but there has been much progress. i just met with a turkish delegation yesterday and i intend to head back in the very near future to continue that conversation. and part of that conversation obviously is those measures or are those measures that can be taken either collectively or by

a larger coalition to provide protection for the modern syrian elements that we support and ultimately will produce over time. i won't get into the specific details of the conversation but that's an important conversation and we're going to continue the conversation in the future. >> it is fair to say that there are significant decisions that our government needs to make and if they're made, could break a logjam relative to greater involvement by turkey. that would be a fair assessment, am i right? >> it is a fair assessment. the details of what that conversation can be can lead us in several directions. there was the initial conversation about a formal no-fly zone which was very specifically and purposefully laid out on a map. the real issue isn't necessarily a no-fly zone.

it's how do we protect our allies. putting all measures together necessary to provide for that protection is the heart of the conversation that we're going to continue to have with the turks. >> one final question and i'll stop and turn it over to senator menendez. in the event that we needed to protect those that we're training and equipping and other members of the free syrian army, in the event we needed to protect them against assad barrel bombing them, do you believe that that is something that needs an additional authority other than what is now being requested? >> i would have to study that, chairman. my hope is that we'd be able to provide the kind of protection that they need and they deserve within the authorization that we're currently proposing. >> you would want to make sure

that we knew that that type of authorization was a part of anything we may do? >> i think so, yes, sir. that's going to be clearly a part of the outcome. >> okay. senator menendez. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general allen, you're a retired u.s. marine four star general, you were the former commander of nato's international security assistance force and the u.s. forces in afghanistan for about a year and a half and then you became the senior adviser to the secretary of defense on middle east security. you commanded during that a period of time 150,000 u.s. and nato forces in afghanistan during a critical period of the war. i put that out there, one in recognition of the service, and, two, in also the framework of my question. what does enduring -- no enduring combat forces mean?

>> well, i think obviously the nature of the contingency or the emergency or the potential conflict will give us the indications of what kinds of measures would need to be taken in the aggregate to deal with that emergency, to give the president the kinds of options that he needs in order to protect the lives of american citizens and americans interests in the homeland. each one of these emergencies will be different. each one will require a different aggregation of american hard and soft power ultimately to solve them. i think it would be difficult to put necessarily a level of precision against the word enduring. i think what we'll seek to do -- and i believe this administration and future administrations would be obviously very interested in consulting with the congress about each particular emergency -- >> i appreciate a consultation. the problem is you reference your answer in the context of emergencies. but no enduring offensive combat troops doesn't necessarily only apply to emergencies. if you send 20,000 troops in

there four months, is that enduring? >> again, senator, i think that trying to put a specific amount of time on the word enduring -- >> so it's neither time nor size? >> i think we take a full appreciation of what we're facing. and i believe that we give the president the options necessary in order to deal with the emergency. and enduring might only be two weeks. but enduring might be two years. we need to make sure we put the right resources against the contingency and give us the amount of time necessary, us being all of the american people, the time necessary to solve the problem. >> and i think you've obviously stated the challenge that we have. two weeks is one thing, two years is another. and this is the problem with the

language as it exists. there is no clear defining element of the authorization given to the president in which hundreds but maybe tens of thousands of troops could be sent. they could be sent for long periods of time. that's a challenge. so how we get our arms around that, you know, i think i can fairly speak for democrats. we want to fight isil. but we can't provide a blank check to this or any future president, because everything that's envisioned goes beyond this president. i wanted to use your expertise to put my arms around it. following up on the chairman's questions, isn't it basically true that unless we buy into something that is about getting rid of assad turkey is not really going to engage here with

us in the way that we want them to? >> the turks have not indicated that to me in our conversation. i think we share the same goal with respect to syria, that is that the solution to syria is not going to be determined by military force. that ultimately we desire a military outcome in syria that is one of the syrian people and that outcome does not include bashar al assad. but i have not had the requirement that we take concerted effort against bashar al assad as a precondition for the turks to have any greater role in the coalition to deal with isil. >> isn't it true that turkey at this point is still allowing foreign fighters to cross its borders into syria? >> if foreign fighters get across the border, it's not because the turks allow it. i had a conversation with them yesterday. i've watched them grip the problem.

it is a greater problem that me of us had imagined at the beginning. they've attempted to strengthen their border crossing protocols. we're seeking greater intelligence sharing with them in that regard. we're restructuring some elements of the coalition, specifically to focus the capabilities of nations on the issue of the movement and the dealing of foreign fighters through transit states of which the turks are going to play an important role in that process within the coalition. to foreign fighters cross turkey and get into syria? yes, they do. do the turks permit that? i don't think so. >> one final question. iran is in the midst of iraq. it's in the midst of syria.

do we share mutual goals with iran? >> well, i'll say that our goals with respect to iraq is that we return iraq to the sovereign control of the people and the government. >> do you think the iranians share that view? >> i believe so. i believe the iranians would believe that their interests -- would consider their interests are best served -- >> because they have significant influence in iraq? >> they have regional interest and those interests are in iraq. that's not something that should surprise us or necessarily alarm us. >> i'm looking beyond. so if we think an accommodation with iran to fight isil is good, the aftermath of that in iraq, in syria, in yemen and elsewhere in my view is not so good. so times we look at the short game versus the long one and i'm concerned about what the long one is. >> i would not propose that we're accommodating iran and iraq at this moment. we're undertaking the measures

that we're undertaking in iraq with the iraqis. but as you have pointed out and your question presupposed, the iranians have an interest in the stable iraq, just as we in the region have an interest in the stable iraq. that doesn't mean we're accommodating the iranians by the measures we're taking in iraq. >> general allen, thank you for your service. i do not envy your task. in your testimony you say that isis has lost half of its iraq based leadership. how do we know that? >> i'm sorry, say again your question, sir. >> you say that isis has lost half of its iraq-based leadership? how do we know that? do we have pretty good intelligence on this? >> we actually do have pretty good intelligence on this matter. the process of tracking the elements within the senior echelons of isil's leadership we've been tracking them and dealing with them.

>> in the last six months you we've aptly demonstrated that isil now finds itself under pressure. how many people are coming into the battle, actually being drawn and recruited by what they see in isis versus the people that really are dying? >> well i think that's a difficult number to -- >> is it positive or negative? are more people joining the fight versus what we're able to -- >> i would say two things. the numbers are up and they're up because we ooh now tracking the numbers in ways that we haven't before. i think the numbers are also up because of the caliphate. and that has created a magnetism for those elements that want to be part of this, that want to

support this, this emergence within their own sense of their faith. and so that has created a recruiting opportunity for isil that they had not had before. so we're going to continue to track those numbers. it's not just a matter of dealing with those numbers in the battle space. we're dealing with those numbers by virtue of taking other measures. as my testimony indicated, we operate along five lines of effort. the military line is one of them. another line where we'll be seeing more traction be realized as time goes on will be the consortium of nations that have taking the necessary steps to make it difficult to be recruited in a country, to transit out of that country and ultimately get to the battle space. plus, as isil, the so-called caliphate as it continues and receive blow after blow, using that to message what this

organization is to decrease its attractiveness to other those that might otherwise be attracted. it would take all of those measures in concert. >> that leads to me next question. defeat sounds good. but can you describe what defeat looks like? >> it is that this organization has been rendered ineffective in its capability of being an external threat to iraq. we're not going to eradicate or annihilate isil. most of the organizations that we've dealt with before, there will be some residue of that organization for a long period of time to come. but with we don't want it to be abilities to threaten iraq ore other states in the region. we want to deminish its capacity to generate funding which limits dramatically its operational

decision-making and capabilities to affect discretion with respect to its recruiting and battlefield capabilities. we want to compete with it and ultimately overcome or defeat its message in the information sphere where it's achieved significant capability. we know how we want to deal with them in the financial sphere and the information sphere and all of those together constitute -- will constitute the defeat of isil. >> you mentioned the establishment of the caliphate, the article in the atlantic really laid out that that is a draw, that is a pull, that establishes a certain benchmark, a certain motivation for people being recruited. it relies on territorial gains or holding on territory. is that part of defeat, deny them territory. >> absolutely. >> so that that caliphate no longer exists? we're talking about decimation.

that's what secretary kerry -- that was the word he used, decimate. kind of like after nazi germany, people scattered around the world. that's not what i'm hearing from you. >> decimation is clearly one of the terms that we might apply to it. we want them to have in operational capability in the end. break them up into small organizations that don't have the capacity as it begins to attempt to mass to be a threat. >> define a small organization. again, i'm just trying to get some sense of what we mean by defeat. it sounds great, deny them operational capabilities. are we talking about taking 30,000 down to 500? >> it will take time.

it will take time that will ultimately be realized in a number of ways, breaking up the organization through kinetic and military service means, it will take time to reduce the message and the attractiveness that gives it the capacity to regenerate its forces, it will take time to deny it to the international financial system that gives it the capability of restoring itself or generating capabilities. all of those things together, if we deny the access, defeat their information, break them up into small groups, then that's defeat. >> i'm out of time. thank you, general. >> senator carden. >> thank you very much for your continued service to our country. these are extremely challenges times and we're very proud of your leadership. >> thank you, sir. >> you're urging us to be patient, that this is going to take some time in order to achieve our mission of not only degrading but destroying and defeating isil. you believe, as i understand, that the authorizations previously passed by congress

give the administration the authorization necessary for use of force. but i also understand you support the president's request to congress? >> i do. i do, sir. >> and of course the president's request for congress is pretty specific on isil and expires in three years. it's clear that there may well be a need for a continued military presence beyond that three years. >> i would say probably a need for military activity, u.s. activity in some form or another, yes, sir. >> and i think that's an honest assessment. >> sure. >> and if i understand the reasoning behind the request is that the current administration recognizes it will be up to the next administration to come back to get the next congress and administration together on the continued commitment to fight terrorists and what use of force will be necessary.

>> i can't answer that precisely but it would seem that's a logical reason for that. >> so my point is, why doesn't that also apply to 2001 authorization of force? here we're talking about a threat that was identified last year that we are currently combatting, recognizing that the campaign or use of force may well go beyond three years. but it's the prerogative of the next congress and administration to define the authorizations that are needed. the 2001 authorization, which was passed against a known threat against the united states and afghanistan now still being used to a threat such as isil, wouldn't the same logic apply that congress should define the 2001 authorization contemporary with the current needs to go after al qaeda? >> i've traveled to many of the

capitals of this coalition and one of the things that has been clear to me as i have traveled to these capitals has been the really substantial gratitude of the coalition for american leadership. and the willingness for america to act. and in so many ways, these nations, the coalition, see isil in a very different way than they ever saw al qaeda. they're grateful for our leadership and our willingness to act. and i believe that that amuf, which is specifically tailored to isil, with a strong support of the congress, gives not just the president the options that are necessary ultimately to deal with this new and unique threat, but it also reinforces the image

of the american leadership that i think is so deeply wanted by our partners and so deeply needed by this country and ultimately by the coalition to deal with isil the way we want to. >> and i understand that and it's limited to three years. >> that's right. >> would you agree that our success in iraq in dealing with isil very much depends upon the sunni tribes taking a leadership role in stopping the advancement of isil, that it's difficult for the shiites and the western force to be able to get the type of confidence in the community to with stand the recruitments of isil? >> i put it slightly differently. i would absolutely agree with you. but i think it takes decisive sunni leadership as well within iraq. but the tribes will be essential to the outcome.

your question is correct, sir. >> what is your confidence level in the government of iraq and baghdad and its ability to work with the sunni tribal leaders to give them the confidence that their centralized government represents their interest and protects their interest? >> it's a hard sale, senator. because previously we asked the sunni tribes to trust the central government in baghdad under maliki. it didn't work out too well for them. but i've met with them and been pleased frankly, very pleased at their willingness to accept the leadership of prime minister abadi and the minister of the interior and helping them to be a principle mechanism. that has been an encouraging sign for me, frankly, to see them not just as a group of tribes but also as leaders of

the tribes be public and forthcoming in their willingness to support the central government in iraq and in particular prime minister abadi. >> i really do appreciate your service. >> yes, sir. >> senator paul. >> general allen, thanks for your testimony. what percentage would you say is an estimate of how many of the official iraqi army are sunni versus shiite? >> i'll have to take the question. the standing army, the preponderance is the majority is shia. i'll take the question. >> it's on the hills of what senator carden is asking. global security reports 80% to 90% of the iraqi army being shia. i think to have an enduring victory there's some question whether you can have an enduring victory and occupy mosul. so i think that still is a significant political problem

and a significant military problem as well. of the chieftains that fought in the surnl, what percentage are engaged on our side now fight against isis, what percentage on the shrines and what percentage indifferent? >> those are numbers that are difficult to give you with any precision. the ones i fought alongside in '07 and '08, the ones i've spoken to without exception have indicated their desire to fight, to recover their lands, to ultimately return to the tribes and ultimately to iraq. they've been forthcoming in their desire to do that. >> and the chieftains are no longer in the area? >> many of them are. some at great risk traveled out of the area ultimately to speak with us. but they are. and many of them are in eman and they're in other places. >> with regard to arming the kurds, there were reports a month or two ago that germany

and many of them are in aman /*and they're in other places. >> with regard to arming the kurds, there were reports a month or two ago that germany wanted to send arms directly to them but there were objections by our government saying everything had to go to baghdad. are the arms forced to go through baghdad to get the kurds? >> i'll take the question but let me offer this. baghdad has not disapproved any request that the kurds have made for weapons. we have attempted to work with baghdad to streamline to the maximum extent possible to reduce any delays that may inhibit or impair the expeditious delivery of arms and equipment to the kurds. >> do you think this includes sufficient technology and long range weaponry to meet their needs and their requests? >> all that is coming. as you know, sir, through the support of the congress we're training and equipping 12 iraqi

brigades and three of which are peshmerga brigades which will be armed and e equipped with the same sophisticated e weapons that the ther brigades will receive. >> is there any possibility that any of that could be transported to the kurds? >> that's a question we should pose to the department of defense but i'll take the question. >> thank you. with regard to ultimate victory, with regard to trying to get turkey involved, do you think there's any possibility of an agreement between the turks and the kurds, particularly between the turkish kurds to accept the agreement are where there would be a kurdish homeland not in turqish territory that would

encourage turkey then to participate more heavily and is anybody in the state department trying to come to an accommodation between the turks and the kurds? >> not to my knowledge. >> take that message to them too, please. thank you. >> senator if i may, on the one comment that you made to the shia and iraqi security forces, the actions that are going to be taken in these towns are going to be more than simply those of the clearing force. what's going to be important to recognize is there will be follow alongs after the clearing force. we're working closely with the iraqis for the hold force which will be hopefully the sunni police which will actually secure and provide support to the iraqi population that will just have been liberated. the governance element, the most important aspect of the clearance, the immediate humanitarian assistant necessary to provide for relief of the populations.

so it's more complex than just the clearing force, and while we may have to accept that there is a large presence of the shia elements within the iraqi military, i know that there's a very strong effort under way to ensure that the sunnis are deeply engaged elsewhere many in all of the other aspects of the recovery of the population. >> one quick follow-up to that. i think you might get more support from the sunni people if you were leafletting the place saying it's led by sunni generals. i think our problem was mosul was being occupied by a shiite force and they didn't say long once push came to shove they were pretty much gone. thank you. >> senator markey. >> thank you, mr. chairman, very much. thank you, general, so much for your service. in the authorization for the use of military force text that the administration provided to this committee, it said it would

prohibit enduring ground forces. and this was meant to convey that large numbers of troops wouldn't be on the ground for a long time. whatever that means. i voted for the 2001 resolution and i'm reminded that the u.s. combat operations in afghanistan were dubbed operation enduring freedom. we are now past 13 years in that enduring fight and that resolution, of course, was also the basis for the justification of our actions in somalia, in yemen and the administration is saying quite clearly that they oppose the repeal of that. and that the operations that are going on right now in fact are consistent with that 2001

resolution. now that causes great problems to me and i think many members of the committee. because even in the absence of the passage of a new amuf, the administration is maintaining that they have the authority to continue as they have for 13 years under operation enduring freedom. and so that obviously is a problem for us, because that sits there as an underlying authority for the next president, democrat or republican, who is sworn in on january 20th, 2017. and most of us will be sitting here at that time as your successor is sitting here. and perhaps not with the same interpretation of the word enduring. so my questions then go to, is this going to open up a potential for an open-ended war

in the middle east? will it allow for unfettered deployment of ground troops? and ultimately whether or not we are opening up pandora's box especially in syria. so my first question to you goes to president assad and what the goal will be underneath this authorization in terms of the removal of president assad, which has been historically an objective that the united states has said is important. so could you tell us what president assad and his removal represents as one of the goals that exists in training 5,000 troops in syria for the next three years in a row, as the long term objective after the defeat of isis?

>> well our political goal, the policy goal ultimately is that the process of change of assad's departure should occur through a political process and that ultimately he should depart and not be part of the future of the political landscape in syria. the role of the tne program is to first and foremost, give those elements of the moderate syrian opposition we're supporting the capacity to defend themselves, to build battlefield credibility and to ultimately use those elements and force ss to deal with da' ash

and the kon tex thet of the vat ji to deal with daesh. at the same time we're building that capacity, our hope would be to build within the political echelon, a sophistication that the two together, the political and the military echelon are the critical force that will have a place at the table during the political process that will see the replacement of assad. >> it seems to me that's a ten-year proposition. and if that's the case, we should be talking in a ten-year period. we can finish iraq over the next three years, but then that's a much longer process and we should just understand what the long term goal requires of us inside syria. and just saying assad's name over and over again will help us focus on the ultimate objective that the free syrian army is going to have in that country and then what we're signing up for in terms of the long term military effort inside of that country. and if i -- and i thank you, mr. chairman, for the opportunity to ask this one final question,

which is, the basic tension that king abdullah was talking about, which is that of the americans providing help to fight the war but not claiming credit, so it does not look like a crusade inside that region, can you talk about that so that the people in the region do not view this as an u.s.-led coalition against isil because ultimately that then comes back to haunt us. that was the message that we were receiving from all across the middle east. >> well i think, senator, king abdullah of jordan has been very clear throughout the period of this coalition that in the end the solution to the problems of the region must not only look like but must be the function of those states within the region to take concerted action supported by the united states

and supported by a broader global coalition for those concerted actions to be successful. it's very important obviously that the solution have an arab face and a muslim voice with respect to dealing with the so-called caliphate and all that it has brought to the region. and the king and other muslim and arab leaders in the region have been very clear on the desire that they -- not just appear but really are exercising leadership frontally in this process. >> i don't think the people in that region view it that way. but it has to be our goal. we have to switch it so that it's not us. senator paul was referring to that, that it has to be an indigenous muslim-led effort and i don't think right now that's the internal view. thank you. >> senator isaacson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general allen, thank you for your service to the country. i followed you closely on tv the last couple of months and i think you've done a great job.

>> thank you, sir. >> we are operating under the 2001 amuf, is that correct? >> that's correct. >> would it be fair to say that the one the president sent to us to consider is actually eliminating amuf compared to the 2001 authorization? >> it is specifically intended to deal with the threat of isil, that is correct. >> but it is limiting in the authority of the president would have primarily of the interpretation of the enduring phrase is that correct? >> enduring and the expectation as he's described it in the proposed legislation on the size and kinds of forces that might be applied, measures that might be applied, is that correct? >> like senator markey, i voted for the 2001 authorization when

i was here it came on the heels of 9/11/2001. . it was passed at a time when americans had flags raised and the patriotism in our country was at an all-time high, at least in my lifetime and my memory. are we going to have to wait for that type of event to happen before we use whatever it take to destroy this evil? meaning isil and those like them? >> i think we're taking those measures now to get after the evil that is isil. it's an evil we haven't seen before in a very long time. just today the fbi rolled up three individuals in this country that were intent of joining isil in the battle space or doing ill to the american people. and as long as we're at the front edge of this taking those kinds of measures, we have the possibility of keeping it from becoming something like a 9/11. >> in your printed statement and i presume it's part of your remarks you said verbally, you said it will be the aggregate pressure of the coalition's activity over mutually supported

lines of effort that will will determine a campaign's success. >> that's right. >> what are the mutually supported lines that you're speaking about? >> working more aligned in the community of nations, to limit the flow of foreign fighters, to deal with the measures to take the measures necessary to deal with the ability to limit isil's capacity to generate revenue ultimately to support its operations and to give it discretion to take action against us or potentially or allies. to provide support to those elements of the population in the region that have been displaced by virtue of the activities of isil or have been directly suppressed by the boot of isil's conquests and sub tro gags. and then very importantly to work together to, in the information space, ultimately to

defeat the idea of daesh. and the coalition is working very hard. i've just come back from southeast asia where i met with the leadership of several countries there. they're watching with great interest and concern those things that are occurring in the middle east, which could spread into their region, and they're interested in joining us in ways that can limit the ability of those organizations there to travel to the battle space or to limit their ability to directly challenge the authorities of those countries. so it's not just the countries of the middle east, it's not just the countries of europe, it's the countries of southeast asia. and very importantly within the confines of effort. working closely to outreach the indigenous populations of the country in ways that the can dispel the image of the caliphate. in ways to work with the religious leaders and tribal leaders in those countries with populations that may be at risk, to work with teachers and clerics and family to reduce the attraction to this extremist

message. and the combination of all of those activities together we think will pressure and ultimately put the kinds of pressure on daesh first to defend ourselves and ultimately to defeat the organization. >> on that point and very briefly because my time will be up in 45 seconds. >> yes, sir. >> are we doing enough to counter act the use of social media and technology to communicate exactly what you're talking about? what you heard about in southeast asia and what i've heard from on trips i've taken is the fear they'll use social media and the modern mechanisms that we have today to spread their ideology and fear around the world? >> they are doing it now. it is in fact an explicit

objective within our evers among the many nations involved to do just that. obviously in nations where free speech is an issue, that we have to accommodate that aspect of our relationship with industry that owns these platforms to ensure that we're either able to intradikt that message or work with industry to remove the message many in its own koncontent. we're working closely with industry and with our partners to counter that message across all of the social media. >> thank you for your time and your service. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you. senator boxer. >> thank you so much, mr. chairman, ranking member menendez. general, thank you so much for your dedication to this nation. i want to thank the president for the wisdom he showed in appointing you as the special envoy. i find your presentation to be very direct, no frills, just straightforward and i appreciate it. under article one, section eight, congress has the power to declare war. i know you agree with that, yes? >> yes, ma'am.

>> so i hope you can then understand what we would want to be very precise when we do that. because we're sent here by a lot of people who have a lot of kids who serve in the military. and they're the fabric of our community. so we want to be careful. and i just want to say i'm not even going to ask you to expand on this enduring word because you've said it very clearly. your definition is no enduring presence could mean a two week presence of american combat boots on the ground or a two-year presence of american combat boots on the ground. and that answers a question the democrats on this committee have been searching for this deaf -- definition. and i think what you have proven with your honesty here is that there is none. because it's the eye of the beholder.

when you say to me if i vote for this no enduring combat presence and i'm sending my kids there in any state for two years, i would argue with you, you've misinterpreted it. yet, the congressional research service says there's really no definition and if i wanted to take an administration to court because i would say as a member of congress i said no enduring presence, crs says i wouldn't have a legal leg to stand on because this's no definition. so i just think it's very important the administration hear this once again. i know poor secretary kerry had to hear it over and over again from our side yesterday. but we're very uncomfortable with this language. and when senator menendez was chairman, he cobbled together a good amuf that united all of us on our side because he essentially said no combat troops with these exceptions and he put in the kind of exceptions i think you would agree with, special forces operations,

search and rescue, protecting personnel. and we would urge you, please, to go back and take a look at it. i just feel very strong. and i want to ask you questions that have nothing to do with that because i think you and i would probably disagree on that subject. there's no point in going over it again. but i am very concerned about u.s. military support for the kurds. and you answered the question in a very sure way, which is wonderful. you said, oh, no problem. however the kurds aren't saying that. so i want to call to your attention a recent interview with bloomberg view just three weeks ago. the head of the expressed concern about our commitment to the kurds. these are our boots on the ground. these are our boots on the ground. he said quote we're starting to have doubts that there might be a political decision on what kind of equipment will be given the kurds. we're fighting with the rest of

the world against this terrorist organization. we're putting our lives on the line. all we ask for is the sufficient equipment to protect these lives. so i need you to respond to that. is that off base? what do you think about that? do you take that comment seriously? does it concern you? >> i listen very carefully to what the kurds have to say. and they have in so many ways demonstrated battlefield excellence and courage that should elicit all, all of our respect. but we have worked very carefully and very closely with the kurds. and your question presupposes and is correct that american support to the kurds have given them the capacity and more broadly and more recently coalition support to the kurds has given them the ability to do much of what they have been able to accomplish, recovery of mosul dam, the seizure of kisook junction.

the many things they've done is because the coalition has been in close support with them. at the same time, in several different rounds, we've worked very hard with coalition member to respond to kurdish requests for equipment and that equipment has been flowing in. also in the context of the $1.6 billion that was appropriated for the train and equip program for the 12 iraqi army brigades, three of which are peshmerga, they're getting exactly the same sophisticated equipment that the kurds -- >> my question was not about how good they are. we agree. they are saying they do not feel they have enough equipment. and i'm just saying, you're saying everything is rosy. they're complaining about it. as one senator, i can't speak for anyone else. they are our boots on the ground. we need to get them what they need. i know there's pressure from

certain factions but if they're going to be our boots on the ground, we've got to give them what they need. thank you. >> thank you. senator rubio. >> thank you for your service to our country and your willingness to come back in and help with this new endeavor of great difficulty. i know we're not debating the authorization for use of force but i want to ask you, it's my understanding from our review of the process that only two times in our history has congress authorized the use of force with limitations and both were u.n. peacekeeping missions. and so the question that i would have now is if our objective here is the defeat of isis, would it not be prudent to authorize the commander in chief to move forward in that regard and allow him as commander in chief and any future commander in chief, whoever they may be, to decide what the appropriate strategy is moving forward. what would be wrong with simply authorizing the president to

defeat them? >> well the strategy that the president has approved in fact does envision the defeat of daesh. >> i understand the strategy does. for purposes of an authorization from congress -- i know you've endorsed today what the president wants to do. and i understand that that's what the president thinks he can get passed. but from a military point of view, wouldn't it be appropriate to authorize the president to do whatever it takes to defeat them? >> the president needs the options that he -- that should be available to him ultimately to defeat dash. >> my second question is, is it possible to defeat isis without ultimately defeating them by putting someone on the ground? someone is going to have to confront them on the ground an defeat them there. >> yes.

>> can you update us on efforts -- i've seen some conversation amongst the regional countries about the potential for a coalition of armed forces brought together, the egyptians, the turks, the saudis, perhaps some of the kingdoms, jordan, et cetera, who could provide a coalition of local forces who could play that role with significant u.s. assistance from the air. logistics logistics and intelligence, and et cetera, and has there been any progress paed inmade in that? is that being activity discussed with the nations? >> i would really prefer to have this sort of a conversation in a closed session. >> let me move to a separate topic. the nature of the conflict, isis has already proven they're going to move in -- for a group of this to take hold and be able to grow, they need ungoverned vacuum spaces. that's what's attracted them to libya, the ability to operate uncontested in terms of another government, et cetera. it is important to understand that as this conflict continues,

the possibility continues to grow that isis, in addition to being based in syria and iraq will look to other places where they can set up nodes of operation, libya is an example, but potentially training camps in afghanistan, any place where a vacuum opens up is attractive and appealing for them. as we put forth our strategy and the congress deliberates the authority it gives the president, that reality needs to be taken into account, correct? >> i agree, yes, sir. >> the last question is about the nature of the conflict. it's been talked about in the past that isis is some sort of a group of monsters that take on these acts of extreme violence. but these are not just random acts of extreme violence. this is a group -- their barbarism has a purpose at the end of the day, to purify that region to their form of islam at the exclusion of non-sunni islam but especially of nonislamic populations.

and in that realm it is clear that christians and yazidis, but recently christians in particular are in increased dang danger in this area. they target the christians as a way to shock the world and as an effort to carry out the ultimate goal of purifying the region for islam. is there not a deep religious component to isis's strategy here. they're trying to again using a term they would use, not one that i necessarily enjoy using, but cleanse the region of infidels and nonbelieves and in that realm they've specifically targeted christians for these sorts of atrocities they're committing on an ongoing basis that we saw yesterday again. >> i would say yes to that. the interpretation that they apply to all of those segments of the population that live within the area that they

control has permitted them to do the things that they have done to certain elements of the population. to i absolutely agree with you. their interpretation of their responsibility under the so-call caliphate is to take action against certain elements of the population and treat them one way and certain elements of the population and treat them another way. it's based on their historic interpretation. >> thank you, senator cain. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you general allen for the service. i want to thank you. you did very significant and important work with respect to trying to provide a security road map for the west bank in the event of a peace deal between israeli and palestinian leaders. whether the leaders will do what their citizens want them to do and find such a deal is up to them. but it shouldn't go unnoticed that you have worked hard on that and your work then and in this context in the best traditions of american diplomacy. i want to thank you for that.

thank you, sir. >> i want to ask you a question and then ask two questions about means. senator johnson was quizzing you about what is defeat of isil. they're not a state. they say they're a state, they're not. they're not islamic. they say they are. they're not. they're a mutation of islam. you talk about defeating the idea of isil. they're an ideological death cult. we have to grapple with the question of what does defeat look like. i'm very practical about this. i want to protect americans from isil. that's what i want to do. i want to protect americans from isil and i want to protect the allies who ask for our help. the defeat of the ideology, we could be chasing a phantom but i want to protect the americans

and defend the allies who ask for that. on the means side, a question about the ground troops issues. in the last three weeks we've had meetings with king abdullah and the mayor of cutter. king abdullah said this is our fight, not yours and basically suggested that u.s. ground troops would not be a good idea. the emir of cutter was actually even more straightforward about that today. he said, i don't want american ground troops in. he actually -- he didn't suggest this to hum. he brought up that it may be a recruiting bonanza for isil. it's against the west, now we can really recruit people. >> i think that's accurate. >> the ground troop thing is a wordsmithing issue, but that's subsidiary to the bigger issue. do we become an occupier, a recruiting tool for isil. king abdullah's notion, this

terrorism is born and bred in the region. the region has got to stand up against it. if the region is not willing to stand up against it there's nothing that the u.s. can do that will ultimately lead to a success. we can't police a region that won't police itself. when the leaders from the region say american ground troops are a bad idea, that's a powerful thought to those of us who are going to be voting on authorizations. how would you respond to that notion that the presence in any significant way of american ground troops changes the character of this making it the west against isil rather than a region needing to police its own extremism? >> i do agree with the amir and the king. the presence, infusion of a large i think this is where they would be a little more precise if even the opportunity.

the presence of a large conventional maneuver force would change the nature of the conversation. but it's really important to understand that during iraq and during afghanistan and in the way we have responded to other similar challenges around the world, the united states brings to bear a variety of really important capabilities. the first is the capacity of our strategic leadership. just our leadership alone has brought to bear 62 nations against this challenge. our leadership brought to bear the first night of our strike operations five, five arab air forces flying along on the wing of the united states air force in strikes against isil targets in syria. that's not anything that any of us could have imagined a year ago. so our strategic leadership counts as an enabler to the

process. other ways and means -- your question is really important. other ways and means that we can bring success to the arab solution to this is providing technical support, intelligence support, focused special operations strike capabilities, the training and equipping that we're doing today, some of>e>$h can be done in country, some of which can be done offshore in partner nations. the aggregation of those activities undertaken with partners in the region ultimately to achieve the ends that we seek. the united states and our coalition partners have many means at our disposal from leadership all the way through to potential for special operations strike to give our arab partners exactly what they want, which is the capacity for them to be the defeat mechanism in the end. >> thank you. mr. chairman. >> senator gardner. >> thank you, mr. chairman and

thank you general allen for your service and your time and testimony today. and again, we have to recognize that isis is a real threat to this country and it requires a comprehensive strategy and the commitment to their total destruction, i think, is the only thing that we can, we can accept. i'm glad the president has made the effort to forward the amuf to congress. obviously i look forward to working with the president on the amuf and this committee. in the letter that the president transmitted along with his language for the amuf, he stated, and i'll quote, i have directed a comprehensive and sustained strategy to degrade and defeat isil. as part of the strategy

>> so besides the air strikes, then does the president's comprehensive and sustained strategy envision? >> several things. the first is to provide the stability of the iraqi government which is essential. we're working with the government in respect to reforms in partnership with the body of government which is inclined to see it that way. we're working closely with the iraqi security forces to prepare them for a long-term counter offensive which will remove them from the population centers and evict them from the country. we're working as an international coalition on behalf of iraq to pressure and generate funds and resources necessary for its long-term survival. we're working as an international coalition to staunch the flow of foreign fighters to daesh has difficulty replacing its combat forces.

we're going to share intelligence so we're working with the iraqis to give them a clear picture of what we understand daesh to be and also so that we can defend ourselves and homeland for the potential of daesh activities within the united states. and then, of course, we're working very closely with our partners to provide humanitarian assistance to those elements of the population that will need to be recovered and relieved as we liberate them from the presence of daesh in their population centers and then finally to work together with iraq and our partners and beyond the defeat of daesh, which is the defeat of its ideas over the long term. >> and the operations that we just discussed, does that change at all. >> commanders take stock of the

operational environment and ultimately and takes advantage of the opportunities available to them in the operational environment. we could well find that, based on our current estimates, that the activities that we'll undertake in the counter offensive will follow along the pace and timeline that we anticipate. but we could easily find, that as a counteroffensive unfolds, that daesh is unwilling to defeat at the hands of the iraq security forces which with what we want to see. so we may see that the operational environment could change and it's the responsibility of our very capable commanders in this case to constantly be monitoring the success of the unfolding operation to ensure we're getting the most out of the resources that we have and if we

need more resources, that we ask for them. >> thank you, mr. chairman. senator murphy? >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. general allen, thank you for your service. thank you for your answers to the questions. they are very helpful. he want to build on some questions from senator menendez and boxer on the language that we have before us. a lot of attention has been on enduring between what our offensive forces and what are defensive forces. just so i understand this, you've talked about the potential limitations under the enduring limitation but so long as the presence of troops is considered defensive, there is no limitation in this authorization of military force as to the number of troops or the duration of their time in

the conflict area, so long as they are considered defensive forces. >> again, i'm not sponsoring the legislation. but the -- i think your point is correct in that regard. >> i thought your answer to senator mccain's question was definitive. i know you worry, as the president does, that a large-scale of deployment of troops could become recruiting fodder. do you think that that changes if our categorization of the forces are offensive or defensive if we have 100,000 defensive troops? i don't think this president is going to authorize this but this is a three-year authorization so the next president will get the chance to decide differently. will it matter in terms of the ability for extremists to recruit as to whether our troops there were categorized as

defensive versus offensive? >> i -- again, these are all individual measures. it depends on how the crisis has unfolded. it depends on the region in which those forces may be involved. it would depend on the activities that would have occurred prior to the introduction of forces that we might call defensive. it's just not possible to give a specific answer to that question. you know, i would have a difficult time understanding how we have 100,000 forces in a defensive environment if we hadn't had substantial offensive operations to begin with and that would, of course, change the regional view and the perspective on our forces and the outcome. so i think there may be occasions where we have

facilities or concentrations of friends and allies need to be defended. the rationale that we would use for the insertion of our allied troops to defend those locations or those populations would be very, very important. so i think each of those circumstances will have to be judged independently. >> and do you have a sense -- i know you're not the sponsor of this legislation but you were there -- as to what the limits of that word defensive are. if our forces were there taking fire from an isil position and you do advance on that position to eliminate it in order to defend our troops, i assume that that action in that time and space would be considered defensive in the sense that it was necessary in order to defend our troops or coalition troops.

>> well, yes. in that particular answer, yes. again, we would probably, prior to the deployment of those forces, have come forward with as clear an explanation as we could as to what defensive would look like in the context of accomplishing that mission and accomplishing those tasks associated with defense. >> you're going to get stuck with a lot of hypothetical questions on these two phrases, enduring and offensive and defensive because we're stuck with trying to figure them out. part of the success of the awakening was not just persuasion but also the transfer of substantial resources to tribes. we effectively paid tribes in various ways in order to compensate them from moving away from insurgency and coalition forces. how do we educate as we move

forward once again a strategy of trying to win over these forces? >> that's a really important question. i was deep in that process and we did, in fact, provide direct support and we gave that direct support to the tribes in so many ways because the central government was incapable of doing it. and when we provided that support, as you well recall, fundamentally the operational environment changed very quickly in '07 and '08. i think what we learned from that was not the fundamental change in the battle space that favored us, it was the long-term outcome of the sons of iraq, which was the hand-over of the responsibility to resource the sons of iraq to the central government in iraq. and that didn't work out, frankly. because it was never clear to us whether maliki intended to support them or not. in this case, we seek in every

possible way, both to encourage and support the central government, to bridge those elements now by supporting them, being present in the training process and ultimately ensuring that the linkage between the shaiks and the sunni leaders is effective with the government not in a handoff later. one of the most important messages or lessons that have come from this. >> and does that include financial resources from the iraqi government to these tribes. >> yes, in the context, for example, of the 2015 budget by the iraqis and there is a way for the recruitment of tribal elements and into the national guard organizations. those organizations will belong

to the governor and support and be nationalized in the event of a national emergency. that entity will belong to the ministry of defense and paid by national funds. so the mechanism is under way right now where we are training tribal elements in anbar right now, they are being trained by the iraqi government. we're providing the training. >> thank you. >> thank you, senator flake. thank you for your testimony. we've got a vote so we need to go quickly. just a couple of questions, quickly. how important do you think -- and i apologize if you answered this before i came. how important do you think it is to have this usmf?

-- this uamuf? >> i think it's very important. the united states has exerted great leadership in bringing together these countries ultimately to support the restoration of the situation in iraq, its sovereignty and ultimately to help the deal -- to deal the defeat daesh. isil is a threat that is unique in our time and certainly unique in the time that i have been in the service and while the elements of the aumf will be treated by this administration and many of the members have brought up important points for clarity or for continued discussion, i think that's extraordinarily important, the message that it sends, that the administration is in a constant conversation and dialogue. but most importantly, in support of the u.s. leadership globally on this issue, a strong bipartisan vote to support the

amuf compliments the leadership that the united states has exerted in this crisis. >> thank you. both our adversaries and our allies need to speak with one voice here. >> exactly. >> is there one that is more important in that regard or equally important for both of them to hear these messages? >> our friends who are in the coalition in the 21 capitals i've traveled to have been extraordinarily grateful for the american leadership on this issue. but what i want is for our adversaries not to be able to sleep at night because we have the unqualified support of the congress in our actions necessary to defeat this enemy. >> at what point is the impact of this aumf diminished if we have language -- if we try to include every point of view and every nuance as opposed to something straightforward that we're in this to win? at what point does it become less important? >> it would be difficult for me to answer, senator, but i would just hope