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and later, international ceos on emerging markets. british foreign secretary

phillip hammond discussed a range of foreign policy issues at a parliamentary hearing tuesday in london. he talked about the role the uk would play in the ukraine/russia conflict, the impact of israeli prime minister netanyahu's visit to the u.s., and the progress of iran nuclear negotiations. this is an hour and 20 minutes. order. welcome the public to this foreign affairs committee and what i strongly suspect will be the last opportunity to question the former secretary and his team on world events. foreign secretary welcome. good to see you here today. >> thank you. >> foreign secretary, this committee published a report a

couple weeks ago on the finance performance and administration of the foreign office. we rather felt the foreign office was at a bit of a crossroads. in our judgment, it had done a good job over the last five years but it is spread rather thinly. the choice now is whether or not we maintain that spread or deepen it which requires extra resources, or we narrow the band width of the foreign office and tailor our aspirations accordingly. which direction do you think we ought to be going? >> it is certainly the key decision, threat versus debt and this is not a new discussion in the foreign office. i asked the league nonexecutive to conduct a review of the network shift policy that was introduced and changing the allocation of resources and

opening some new posts. and i, in the course of doing that piece of work, i discovered that actually this debate has been going on in the foreign office not just during the course of this parliament but for many years about the tension between breadth coverage and depth intensity of resources. clearly -- and by the way, that review suggested that the network shift decisions that have been taken had been broadly the right decisions and it had broadly satisfactory outcomes. i think when we know what our resource envelope for the next parliament is after the next spending review i think this is a discussion that the foreign office needs to hold once again. between breadth of coverage

footprint and depth of coverage and also around the balance between the resource that's devoted to the core bilateral and multilateral relationships and what i call the thematic resource that is focused around the, if you like, diplomatic themes within the foreign office in london. when i came to this debate, it started with a slight prejudice that perhaps we were thinning ourselves too thinly and we needed to put a little more depth in some places. i think the evidence suggests that actually we've been quite successful in most places managing to maintain a high proportion of output even where we have taken out resources in the interest of broadening the footprint.

i think the jury is out. i think it's the right question to ask. i don't think from my perspective i've got a definitive answer yet. i don't know whether either of my colleagues has any more to add to that. >> as you say, a lot will depend on the resources that we have to deploy in the next par element. i don't know if you can say more than that. >> clearly if there were a substantial reduction in resources i think the option of just thinning out the current footprint of overseas posts would be challenging. i think if we were talking about a substantial reduction in resources we would have to look to footprint. >> given the foreign offices had quite a pounding here in the last five years, i hope we won't come to a reduction in resources. have any preliminary conversations taken place with

the treasury on any of these aspects? >> no. the discussion on the next spending review clearly will be a discussion for the next parliament and there's been no discussion about that as yet. >> if you had to pick a reform that you'd like to -- if you -- you know, commence in the foreign office, what's the area you'd most like to pick on? >> well, as i said and you'll appreciate that i've been there a relatively short time and we have had quite a lot of other things going on but if i were looking to start a big new piece of sort of inward facing work it would be around the balance between the resource that's invested in bilateral relationships and the resource that's invested in subject matter expertise. that sort of crosscutting versus vertical agendas. and i slightly have the perception that the department in the past has had too much of

its resource in the crosscutting thematic areas. that balance has been redressed somewhat over the course of the last five years. but i'm not sure that we've got that exactly right yet. we may need to put more of our resource into what i regard as the jewel in the crown which is the bilateral and multilateral relationships which the foreign office manages. >> as far as the present membership is concerned we'd probably agree with you. can i bring the subject to defense spending. you said on the andrew marl program on the weekend that you remain committed to the 2% figure. is that the government's position? >> well, as you know, what i said i think on the andrew marl show, to get him in the record, the prime minister led the charge at the nato summit in newport along with president obama urging our nato partners

to sign up to the commitment, the target of 2% of gdp. we are one of the very few nato countries, certainly one of only two large nato countries that are currently spending 2% of our gdp on defense. now, i can't second guess the outcome of either the strategic defense and security review or of the next spending review. but clearly we have -- we have signed up to that target at newport and not only passively signed up to it, we actively sought the adherence to the target of all our other nato partners. >> so it would be pretty inconsistent if a future government had a figure below 2%. >> well we're clearly committed

to maintaining strong defense maintaining britain's armed forces, and as again i said on the andrew marl show on sunday during my nearly three years as defense secretary, the prime minister was absolutely consistent in making clear to me that he had no appetite for any further cuts in the size of our regular armed forces. the cuts that we had to decide upon in 2010 because of the black hole in the defense budget that we inherited were extremely painful, and we've been very clear and consistently clear that he wasn't prepared to see any further cuts. >> thank you very much. >> thank you, mr. chairman, foreign secretary. i want to move you on to the ukraine crisis. general sir richard scherr reef command of europe on the record

saying we're going to be absent in the -- why has not the uk been more directly in negotiation with resoling that crisis? >> first of all, i don't accept the arguments that are being made. general sir richard scherr reef said several things starting the day he retired from office. i never heard him say anything in office. he's been quite vocal since he left office. i'm not sure he's approved to comment on this. this is a diplomatic discussion that's been going on. we agreed amongst ourselves last summer the best way of trying to explore the opportunities for a

peaceful solution to the ukraine crisis was an approach thread by chancellor merkel simply because she is of all the european leaders the one who has the closest thing to a working relationship with vladimir putin. the discussion took place at the normandy celebrations and for no other reason became known as the normandy event. we were not included. the americans were not included. our view always was that the russians wouldn't have agreed to have the conversation if we and all the americans had been included. and we think our german and french colleagues have done a good job in very difficult circumstances in trying to take forward a negotiated diplomatic

solution. meanwhile, we have played a very significant role in, if you like playing the bad cop role. we've focused on stiffening the resolve of the european union on sanctions, using the resources of our own intelligence agencies to identify targets for sanctions, and we've played a very large role in that process within the european union, using our diplomacy to encourage our partners in europe to maintain robust on sanctions and to make the argument for sanctions, and using our relationship with the united states to make sure that the european union and the u.s. sanctions regime remain well alone nape ear not exactly synchronized but they are wail lined and the u.s. is looking now, i believe at making some adjustments to their regime so that we are more clearly in lock step. and that requirement will

continue making sure that while the minsk forces is taken forward and we all wish it well, the resolve of the eu to maintain the pressure on russia is strong and unbroken over the coming months. and that's the role we've assigned to ourselves. >> and just on the good cop bad cop, did you as bad cop have any relevant conversations with both france and germany about the second minsk agreement before a deal was reached, or did you find out about the deal after it was agreed? >> well, we had continuous conversations with french and german colleagues including meetings, but i have regular telephone conversations with both my french and my german colleagues at official level, particularly political director level, in close and regular contacts, on this and a range of other issues. talking to them about the iran negotiations the minsk process,

and many other -- you know, the isil challenges, many other things besides. so we have very close working relationships. i met all european union colleagues in riga on friday and saturday then we had a quad meeting in paris on saturday afternoon, which we discussed again all of these issues. by the way, i was in kiev on thursday discussing with president poroshenko, and the prime minister, where we are at in the minsk process and how we can be helpful to ukraine in discharging its obligations over the next weeks and months. >> channels of communications were open all the way through. >> channels of communication were open at my level, at the prime minister's level and at the senior official levels. >> you mentioned the sanctions regime and our role in that. do you think you have enough support within the eu to secure

an early extension of the existing tier three sanctions, and, b, commitment to immediate expansion if sanctions -- if violence reignites? >> on the latter point, i think there is a very clear acceptance across the european union ranging from enthusiastic in the case of the hawks to reluctant but understanding in the case of the dots if there is a significant breach of cease-fire or major assault, for example the european union would have to respond and respond immediately with a significantly increased regime of sanctions. beyond that if we look at the scenario where the mincing process rumbles on more or less, albeit there have already been significant breaches of it from the russian separatist side, but if it more or less rambles on

there is i think a broad acceptance that the logic of minsk is that the sanctions regime would need to be extended to the end of the year because it is only at the end of the year that we'll reach the point where russia has to comply with the most onerous requirements on it, handing back to ukraine of control of the border between ukraine and russia. the timing of extension of the existing sanctions for that period is going to be a subject of discussion within the european union, and there is certainly some appetite for waiting to see what the level of compliance with the obligations the minsk agreement is. i'm sure it will be discussed a at the european conference march 19th and 20th opportunities

then and at subsequent european councils. a decision doesn't need to be made on extension of sanctions until the end of june, early july. >> and you mentioned a moment ago the alignment between the united states and europe on the existing sanctions. what discussions have you had with the government the united states, about coordinating a potential expansion of sanctions? you say if things ramble on. >> we have had such discussions. if we decide to extend -- to expand the range of sanctions, we would be -- the eu would expect to agree broad shape of the package with the united states. there might still for various specific reasons be differences at the margin between the two packages, but we would expect them to be broadly aligned. we would certainly expect to act in tandem to make maximum impact. >> my final question, on the

supply of equipment the prime minister has said that the uk is not at the stage of supplying lethal equipment to the ukraine but did not rule it out completely. at what point would the uk consider supplying lethal equipment to the ukrainian government, do you think? >> well, to answer your question precisely, i think we would consider it again but not necessarily do it if the circumstances on the ground materially changed, if we found the ukrainian army was crumbling crumbling, for example, or if we saw clear evidence that the ukrainian army was being -- was under sustained attack and was not holding the line because of inadequacy of equipment and weapons, then we would certainly want to consider again -- the prime minister has made clear we want to keep our options open here, but we don't believe there is a military solution to this conflict and we're very wary of giving the misimpression that we perhaps do think that if we were

to focus on supplying lethal equipment to the ukrainians. but equally we can't afford to see the ukrainian armed forces crumble. >> mr. john stanley. >> foreign secretary committee on arms export control, which, of course, the foreign affairs committee is part, in the latest information which you per sfrooef thereceived from the business secretary a couple months ago on the arms export high senses to russia in other words, the existing export licenses that were in place so, that there were actually a total of 248 export licenses to russia and the value of those, not only the standard individual licenses, doesn't include the open individual licenses, was 169 million pounds, why is the british government still in this

situation with the russians engaging in sequential territorial annexation quite apart from the human rights dimension in russia, still carrying out a still very expansive arms export trade to russia? >> i'm not sure that i'm going to be able to answer technically the question why those licenses still extend. they are of course to the extent that they relate to export of military or dual-use goods to military end users, they will be superseded by the sanctions, the arms embargo. so the answer to your question, but i don't have it written down here i'll have to write to the committee. the answer to your question may well be a technical one, that it isn't necessary to cancel the licenses because they've actually been superseded by the embargo. but if i may i'll -- unless miraculously the answer to that question should come to me

during the course of this hearing, in which case i'll inform the committee. if not, i will write. >> all i can hold out to you is you say superseded by the embargo. this is information provided by the business secretary on 15th of december last year, the 21st of january. so either you're saying that the business secretary's information is wildly out of date or possibly you're not fully informed as to the scale of extent licenses to russia. >> i'm simply making the point that it may be that the extant licenses simply sit there effectively extant, but ineffective because no goods can be exported due to the embargo, which, as it were a superior instrument to the licenses. but i believe that we may be able to find the answer to this question during the course of this hearing and i'll -- >> i'll wait for the answer.

>> -- break in if i may. >> the extensive correspondence we've had on extant licenses they are lie senses which are still up and running and they do not include licenses which are either suspended or have been revoked. and that is -- >> i understand that. and i don't think it would be necessary -- i think it would be -- in fact i sam certain it would be the case that if you were an exporter of an item for which you held a relevant license, that that item was now subject to an embargo notwithstanding your license, you would not be able to export that item. >> i'll await your letter, foreign secretary. is it still the government's policy to stop exports of equipment to russia only that which might be used in ukraine? >> can you be more specific about equipment? do you mean military -- >> i mean the totality of arms

export, previous statements made by ministers is that the arms block export to russia is in relation to dual-use goods which might be used in youk ukraine. >> no. >> in order a very specific geographical limitation applying to that policy. >> the ban -- the eu embargo is a ban on the export of dual-use goods for military end users and for military end use in russia. >> thank you. >> can i turn now to the issue of exports to ukraine? >> mm-hmm. >> you said in answer to mr. harvey's previous question that the government policy is to export only nonlethal equipment. that being the case, when the government gave export license

approval in december last year, recently to the 75 saxon armored personnel carriers was not the government fully aware that they were going to be armed once they got to ukraine? >> no. we had no knowledge of the intention, which has been announced, but i understand not carried out, to fit light machine guns on these vehicles. but since we have become aware of that, we've reviewed the license in respect to these vehicles against the consolidated criteria and have concluded that there are no grounds to revoke the license on the basis of that information. >> foreign secretary you'll be aware that mr. alexander chech november nov, has quoted these saxons

arrived without any armament. we will mount arms. we should provide cover for the national guard or other units to which they would be supplied. surely the british government was aware that that was the intention of the ukrainian defense ministry. >> no. the government was not aware when the original license was granted. we're clearly aware now because the ukrainians have said publicly that they intend to mount weapons on these vehicles. but this would be no different from supplying land rovers and then discovering that they intended to mount machine guns on the roofs of the land rovers. the assessment was made that supplying the vehicles would not increase the offensive capacity of the ukrainian army nor would it alter the balance of military force in the conflict in eastern ukraine. that is the relevant criteria against which we have to judge this export. so the position is that the export of these vehicles without any weaponry on them is licensed

and will be permitted to go ahead. >> but the crucial point, former secretary, in terms of the government's policy, mounting weapons on them turns them from being nonlethal to being lethal. >> no. i think -- >> sorry. if i might just continue. is it not a matter of genuine concern to you and should it not be that the foreign office and the british government are clearly so ill informed about the intentions of the ukrainian government that they were apparently in december of last year apparently wholly oblivious as to what was the clear intention of the ukrainian government in respect to the saxons to turn them into lethal -- >> with respect, we only know it was the clear intention of the ukrainian government because they've now told us that it's their clear intention, and we are now apprised of all the facts. they didn't make this clear at the time when they originally contracted to make this purchase

of vehicles. and the -- i don't need to tell you as chairman of the committee on arms exports that the point at which the assessment is made of the capability of the equipment is the point of export. and we judge that the -- applying the consolidated criteria to this second basm of 55 vehicles does not change the decision, that they are still eligible for export licensing, none of the consolidated criteria is engaged on the basis that the vehicles carry no armaments. >> mr. gates. >> foreign secretary, just before your foreign affairs council meeting i was in riga as well at the parliamentary meeting. and we had a lot of discussion there about the concept of hybrid warfare.

can i take you to your remarks yesterday where you said, "there is a hard red line protecting the baltic states"? and you also said, "any russian incursion would entitle the baltic countries to seek to invoke article 5 of the washington treaty. and you were asked which is what are. and you said "and mr. putin knows that very well." can i put it to you that article 5 of the nato treaty is not necessarily clear in the sense that it refers to an armed attack against one or more of the allies? if you are damaging the electricity grid, if you are undermining the infrastructure of a country if you are using special forces in covert

activities but not openly attacking, is it not hard to determine at which point there is an armed attack on a nato power? >> yes, it is. and that's a subject of as you well know of a lot of discussion on both side of the atlantic about how hybrid attacks are to be treated and, indeed attributed because it isn't always that straightforward to be clear about the attribution of such attacks. and i think our position is that we are not clear that being completely unambiguous about this is necessarily helpful. a degree of ambiguity can be strategically advantageous. we're also clear as the committee will know, that the response in any case to any

attack to be lawful in international law has to be proportionate and therefore this might go as much to the nature of the response that would be made to a hybrid attack if it were attributed to a particular state as to whether or not there should be a response. and i think, you know there's a really very interesting intellectual debate about when and whether it would be appropriate to respond i can net kinetically to a nonkinetic attack. that's not just a question of international law but a question of reality public opinion. i think this is a very interesting and real debate that we need to have. >> is there a consensus amongst the nato ministers as to when article 5 would be triggered? or is there an ongoing intellectual debate as you put

it? >> well i'm sorry to answer the question. i suspect rather technically. but i think any member state can seek to invoke article 5, and article 5 is only considered invoked if all member states by consensus agree that the member states seeking to invoke is under armed attack. i think that's the correct -- that is the position under the washington treaty. so consensus is required for there to be deemed to be an armed attack on a member state. >> can i put it to you for a country like latvia or estonia with a substantial russian-speaking minority amongst its population, right on the front line with russia, facing a president who has shown that he is actually prepared to admit that he planned the annexation of the territory of ukraine and who has said that

the collapse the ending of the soviet union was the greatest disaster of the 20th century, that there is understandably deep concern about not having clarity from united states united kingdom, france, and the other big nato partners about under what circumstances article 5 would be invoked? >> no i'm not sure that's right. i was with you until the last ten seconds. of course we understand the concern that there is in the baltic states and nato members and the uk has been leading among them, have sought to reassure our baltic partners, for example, by offering strike aircraft for the baltic air policing commission by taking part in military exercises in baltic countries and poland. and we will continue to do so. but i think the interest of the

baltic countries are best served by a degree of strategic ambiguity around the asymmetric warfare question and by a very clear and unambiguous distinction between nato countries and nonnato countries. and one of the challenges i think we face around the management of the ukraine crisis is-nato countries. and one of the challenges i think we face around the management of the ukraine crisis is that ukraine is not a nato country and while we want to show clear support for the ukrainians in their struggle to defend their sovereignty, we must be always cheer that there is an air gap between the kind of support that we can offer to ukraine as a non-nato country and the kind of support that we would and should offer to a nato member if it faced the similar kind of challenge. >> we're coming up to general election, and after march the 30th the house of commons is

dissolved. and there is a convention about parliamentary approval for military action, sh which has seemed to develop over recent years with regard to syria with regard to iraq. with if a crisis develops in the period after march the 30th and before a new government is formed whenever that is, it could be several months, how are we going to hand that will situation if there is a case of clear interception of united kingdom alongside nato partners or even unilaterally in terms of defense interests? >> well the convention that's grown up and established de facto by the last government and we've confirmed thatwy acknowledge it is that where it is possible in terms of time and

in time of the need for secrecy to consult parliament, parliament will be consulted. where parliament is not sitting it clearly will not be possible to consult parliament and in no circumstances would bit right to postpone military intervention that was required for the safety and security of britain or the alliance because we were unable to consult parliament because it was dissolved at the time. so in compliance with that convention, my understanding is that it would require the government to bring that issue to parliament as soon as the new parliament was formed for what would be retrospective endorsement. >> would there be any plan to consult with the opposition? >> i mean that depend on the circumstances. but when matters of great importance and certainly a

matter of intervention but of great importance, where the circumstances allow even while parliament was sitting, to engage with the opposition on council terms. >> well, hopefully it won't be necessary. given the way russia is behaving

with regard to breaching the helsinki agreements and other international agreements they signed up to? >> it is more difficult but we've made a clear decision that our approach would be to engage with russia where our vital national interest requires us to engage on a case-by-case basis, and many of the examples you've given are such cases where our national interest requires us to engage. and the russians have given clear signals that they want to compartmentalize and treat the dispute that we have over their behavior in ukraine as separate from the not necessarily terribly deep relations we have over things like syria on the one hand and the actual quite sensible working relationship we have, for example, in the iran nuclear negotiations. and i think it suits both side to maintain practical working

relationships where it suits both sides. >> do you think it's a fair summary to say the militants or iranian aligned shia militias are one of the main forces in the country -- territory? >> particularly -- >> trying to recapture -- >> okay. i think iranian aligned or prod broadly iranian sympathetic militias have been for a long time probably one of the most if not the most significant forces in iraq. and that's part of the problem that the government of iraq has.

and i think there is in evidence some of military action that's been going around tikrit a little bit more than the iranian-aligned militias. we are seeing iranian forces engaged in the conflict around tikrit playing a direct role. iranian regular forces. that's another step. and of course while one can understand that the government of iraq facing the challenges that it does with the iraqi security forces is anxious to make some progress in recovering control of territory is tempted to welcome any assistance, we have always been clear that iraq will only be a successful state if it manages to two-point a form of governance that embraces all three of the main communities -- kurds shia, and sunni in iraq ap to the extent that the iraqi government

appears to be allowing itself and its authority to become dependent on interventions by iranian regular forces that is likely to make that much more challenging, much more difficult. >> there's nothing new, is there. >> nothing new on the shia militias. >> iraq secs have been fairly close over a long period of time. >> yes there is nothing new about the presence of the shia militias and the role of the shia militias has been established for many years. >> do you foresee it as a problem in the longer term? >> it is potentially a problem, and in an ideal world the government would be raising sunni forces to balance the shia militias and integrating them together in a new iraqi security forces. but we don't live in an ideal

world and the reality is probably going to be less perfect than that. but the government will have to show that it is not beholden to direction from tehran enforced by the power of the shia militia, because if it can't show that it will not gain the trust of the sunni population who are present in large part in the areas which are occupied currently by isil and will have to be part of the process of evicting isil from that territory. >> relationships between the krg and baghdad seem to be a fit bit fragile again. what do you think is the reason for that? >> the oil crisis prince pli. and i think last autumn major

progress was made but a deal was done that was predicated on $100 oil, and when oil is the currency of deals, suddenly the value of the currency is virtually halved you get a problem, and there isn't enough to go around to do what everybody thought. if the kurds deliver the oil that they said they were going to deliver to the baghdad government, their own budget will take a massive hit because the residual oil that they're able to sell is worth half what it was. equally, if the baghdad government doesn't get the oil it was promised from kurdistan the hit to its budget from the falling oil price will be amplified by the reduction in supplies from kurdistan. so i'm afraid that is at the root of the problem. i'm visiting both iraq and kurdistan in the next couple of weeks and i will have discussions with both side as to where they are on their private discussion about how to try and

solve this problem. >> is the fco on the ground in iraq trying to mend fences? beefed up the representation in irbil? >> we have a good representation in irbil, and i monitor that regularly and i hear good things about the role that our people on the ground in irbil are playing, and i have been able to cross-check that with members of the krg administration, that they are getting the access to and input from our mission in irbil that they seek and they tell me they're very satisfied. >> there was a lot of publicity over the -- continuing subject for documentaries on television. i was very unclear when i was asking questions about the plight of these people. what we did to try and protect them what we are doing now to try and protect them and, in

fact all the religious minorities of iraq who are under threat. >> i think in the case of the uzidis, going back to when they were trapped on mt. sinjar, we were involved with the united states and others in airdrops of food and emergency supplies to them and supporting kr g-forces in trying to secure an escape route from the mountain for them, and it became clear over time that the overwhelming majority of those that wanted to get off the mountain had been able to do so. and i think in the north certainly our engagement with krg forces, the leverage that that engagement gives us the anyway quite generous instinct of the krg forces towards

minority communities in the north, is the best -- the best support to offer to those minority communities. but of course it remains the case that those who belong to religious minorities in areas controlled by isil can expect a horrendous fate to await them. and as the iraqi government eventually rolls back isil control, i have no doubt we will uncover atrocities that we are not currently aware of and i'm afraid that's a horror that awaits us in the future. >> we also know that the position of uzidi women and the fact that many of them have been sold into slavery. we've had accounts from some who have managed to escape talking about the horrors of their existence under isil.

are we actually doing anything on the ground to try and rescue some of those women? >> i don't think there are any -- we don't have people on the ground in any numbers. we have trainers supporting and technical advisers supporting krg forces, but we do not have significant boots on the ground. neither do any of our western allies. not least because neither the kurds or the iraqis want outside forces on the ground. so we are independent on what in this case is peshmerga kurdish forces can do. and of course they are seeking as a matter of urgent priority to eliminate isil-controlled territory, but i'm not aware of any sort of specific rescue missions or raids being planned. it is a systemic program to roll back isil control and retake territory that has been lost to isil.

>> a ghastly spectacle, we're doing what we can to provide other countries with counseling services for women who have been brutalized in the form that you describe, and it is happening on a horrendous scale, as you say. and there will be a lot more to be done but the issue is access. >> i know the pyd were act itchi along with the peshmerga in taking part in some of those rescues. also helped the peshmerga in various situations. but still prescribed organization in this country. is that still our view and if so, why? >> would you like to answer that? >> at the risk of sountding bureaucratic, we don't go into

cities -- can't get into sort of who is being considered and who isn't being considered for prescription. they nonetheless continue to have a difficult relationship no higher with turkey. and so it's -- it's not an entirely sort of straightforward thing. >> it's also a matter for the home secretary, of course. >> yes. i've heard the answer from the home secretary. i was hoping your answer might be different. the iraqi didn't attend january's anti-isil conference in london. this caused considerable hurt to them apparently and also annoyance. were you aware that they would not be part of the iraqi allegation and if so did the fx

co have any responsibility to persuade the iraqis to take a more inclusive approach? >> well, we did -- clearly we couldn't invite them in their own right. it was a conference of nations and we did encourage the iraqis to include kurdish elements in their delegation, and we will continue to encourage them to take an inclusive approach. >> thank you. >> foreign secretary, on that inclusive approach point and around your operation that's currently ongoing tikrit, would you say that that's for the coalition, certainly a test to see the intentions of both the actors like iran of course the militias themselves as to how they win the peace in tikrit when they eventually drive isil out and it would actually signal

to the coalition as to the intent from baghdad a to how they are going to behave towards both -- in the first place the sunni population but then of course with kurdistan as well? >> i think that's right. it will be a test case and it's very important that it's handled correctly. and one of the messages i would be wanting to reinforce with prime minister al abadi when i go to baghdad shortly is precisely that that >> but is there is always the danger of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. and the engagement of iranian regular forces in the battle for decree is a further complexity in this question. >> foreign secretary, because you will you you've had to cut your stay here for perfectly understandable reasons and tipped off the vote coming as well, it would be

great if colleagues could truncate their questions and perhaps their answers could be to focused? >> could i turn to syria? prime minister said at the liaison committee last month that it was the policy of the government to hold up the moderate opposition in practical terms. are we actually dealing with the same people? i think for most of us it's confusing as to where we are today. >> it's a large number of often very small groups.

>> many of them had areas to make sure that there are proper services and policing and rescue services on. we expect to make our main impact through a commitment to engage in the u.s.-led training and equipping program for the moderate opposition. you'll remember that the u.s. congress last autumn allocated $500 million as an initial trench of funding. it has been quite slow not least because of the difficulty of

setting out mechanisms to vet candidates for training. >> in the short term rngs is it policy to work so closely with opposition when you consider the main opposition to the west is now isil. and actually not the sad. >> well, it's inconvenient. but we've got to fight both enemies.

there's a moral reason why we should do that. he's bombing them on a regular basis. his conduct is completely inexcusable and it would be wrong of us to align ourselves. it's a practical reason, as well. asaad and his brutality is what gave birth to isil. it was anyceps that we were aligning ourselves with the regime which kills the attempts, particularly in iraq, to win over moderate sunni opinion to the government of iraq and the coalition effort to roll isil back. we're dealing with bad and worse, but i'm not quite sure

which one was which, but we have to tackle both. >> what would it be worth with the violence that's going on. >> how the kurds meant to perceive if we don't give them some recognition from what they're trying to achieve. >> the kurds have the potential to be an important part in the moderate opposition in fiekting against the machine and against isil. historically, they have occupied, i think it's probably fair to say a somewhat ambiguous relationship with regime, where the regime left them alone and they left the regime alone. and i hope that we're moving

into a phase to play a more engaged part and help deliberate syria as well as defending it against isil. >> on a completely sprat subject, if i may, you would be aware that yesterday was commonwealth day, indeed. >> indeed. >> isn't there a reason why the commonwealth office was not able to fly the flag of the commonwealth for that important occasion. >> we are often asked to fly flags by various organizations and to support various causes. and while it's a little bit like wearing the emblems while any request may be sensible and worthy of support looked at in the roubd across the entire range of requests to provide

some support. we do not fly flags of other organizations or to commemorate other events. >> but that of course, is a new rule that the government brought in to fly the flags of the overseas territories and, indeed, the formations of the united kingdom. so why not the commonwealth in e? it is, afterall, the foreign common welt office. and, if i may say, isn't it also the case that we fly the flag of the european union? if we've got to be consistent, shouldn't we instruct to not fly the flag of the eu if they can't

fly the commonwealth flag? >> on that last question the position is that outside of british european missions to fly the emblem alongside the union flag where there is a case in doing so. they have to make a business case for flying that eu emblem. >> last question, briefly. that it's showing not consistent with your previous secretary. but on the day her majesty is here for the commonwealth surface at westminister abbey, we should surely make it a position. would you make that change before the general election?

would you consider doing that? >> no. we've made a decision about flag flying this year. i know the number of people are disappointed with the commonwealth flag wasn't flying. but if we were to fly the commonwealth flag on commonwealth day i can promise you we will be inundated with requests to fly other flags and other emblems in support of articles as in other organizations. are there any grounds for optimism about the u.n. media towards the parties in libya?

>> yeah, i think there are some grounds. >> and when i meant the special representative, i have to be candid having listened to him. >> we have at least got people talking. we have people with a focus on a catalytic event. the growing presence of isil in libya, which is i think, no cussing the minds of both people on the sides of the civil war.

>> >>. >> it's a nuisance, to say the least. >> foreign secretary, quizzing you? >> thank you rngs foreign secretary. >> do you agree that peace keepers will be needed in libya? and, if so, has the u.n. government made any commitments? >> we haven't made any commitments. we've discussed on friday and saturday. >> i think we recognized in

discussing this european union that there would be a strong expectation that the european union would take the lead in providing peace keepers. that is not to say a military force to subdue the warring factions. but more of the policing force to maine tan a peace that had been established. libya is very much a step in business with roots through to the gulf of guinea, which is the source of many of these things. it's very much in europe's interest to help to secure libya and ensure that the soit earn coast of the mediterranean is properly policed all the way along.

>> >>. >> so clearly there's some steps in the peace keeping force. >> all i'm saying is that i think there is a recognition across the european union that it would be to europe that the world looked to provide such a force. if flfs a peace to keep in the future. >> so that element was discussed. was there any other developments? that were discussed last friday around some con kreet steps in libya to win the peace? there are outside players involved in supporting both sides and seeking to apply diplomatic pressure on outside players to seek to minimize.

is there are concerns about protecting the assets of the libyan people in the form of the assets of the central bank to ensure that they don't get acquired by either side.

>> i think it's not about how much time he spent in libya. northeast of them are taking place outside libya meetings in rome meetings in malta, meetings in tunisia, meetings in cairo. i think that would understate what he's doing to look only at the time spent in libya. obviously, time spent in libya is restricted by security considerations. to be able to forge meaningful relationship stz.

>> good. president,you touched upon in anxiousing my questions on the issue of being on the doorstep to europe. if so, how do we counter this threat, specifically on the migration issue? >> well, the migration challenge is a threat to the whole of europe, not just to the u.k. but to the extent that travel is facilitated within europe. obviously, irregular migrants arriving in italy or spain are

potentially a threat to the u.k. it does occur through ill leaguely trafficked people. we believe that the only way to stem this is at source. to tackle the traffickers, the smugglers, the extortionists who prey on these people along if way and to seek to work among countries of origin. and to reduce the impulgs to travel as it were among that group of potential mile grat e grants. >> when your minister came in front of the commission last week, he said and i quote we need a policy on dealing with isil in libya.

it is still the case that the government does not have a policy on dealing with isil. >> yeah well the policy, the desire, is to establish a government of national unity behind which the international community can then get in the fight against isil. they're willing to take some risks now in getting early behind the government of national unity to help it to tackle the threat to libya from isil and other established groups in that country. >> i am aware that that sounds sliegtly wishful thinking.

we'd just like there to be a nice government of national unity and then we support it to deal with the isil problem. we have also discussed in eu foreign ministers the obvious fact that we can't wait forever for a government of national unity to be fought. and if the initiative does not succeed, we will have to look at alternative strategies to deal with specific threat from those isil-related groups in libya. >> a real prospect in libya which appears to be in a