in other words, should there be limitations on funding that congress needs to be mindful of? >> both dollars are useful to us if they are provided for the purposes for which they are intended and needed. we don't need $36 billion or $38 billion in extra oko, we need that in the base budget. they are both useful and both have restrictions in law and in regulation. >> so if you had your choice, you'd rather have the dollars in the regular budget as opposed to oko funding? mr. secretary, do you want to speak to that? >> absolutely. that's where we asked for it, that's where we need it that's where we've identified needs,

and that also -- and this is very important and this gets back to the earlier discussion of sequester -- if it's in the base budget, it is the base upon which we build our future budgets, and we need stability. we need a horizon so that we know what our budget is going to be not only this year but in years to come. otherwise, we can't spend it efficiently, and we can't spend it strategically. we need that kind of horizon and sequester is what robs us of that, and that's why it's bad in a manage yearal sense for anybody who has their budget sequestered. >> general dempsey, do you want to speak to that and perhaps its affect on readiness? >> as you know, we've been trying to dig out of a readiness hole. we said three or four years ago if the wars in iraq and afghanistan ended then it would take us three or four years to recover our readiness because we were ready for ten years for a particular kind ever conflict, which you know better than most. and so we had to kind of recapture our credentials for

other kinds of military missions to include high-end and sequestration, when it hit us last time, readiness tends to suffer a deeper impact because you have to go get the money where you can get it, and some cases you can't get it in man power, you can't shed it quickly enough. you can't shed excess infrastructure quickly enough. you sometimes can't terminate contracts because of the penalties involved. you end up taking more than you should out of readiness. so, yeah i do think readiness always suffers more than we think. >> thank you. mr. secretary, you know, i share the concerns of my colleagues and other defense officials in terms of the detriments of sequestration, but i also am interested in implications for money that is also spent in wasteful and inefficient ways. specifically, i'm thinking about the fact that we really don't know the kind of money that we

are spending when it comes to service contractors, and there is still yet to be enterprisewide contract man power reporting application under your own documentation. i believe the goal was to have 95 compliance by 2018. i don't think you're probably going to make that goal. so despite the numerous commitments from senior level dod officials, can you tell me when you were restart work on the ecmra when you're going to use accepted army methodology, and when will you be insisting on compliance from the components and agencies to ensure inventory is used to inform and review decision makings on taxpayer dollar spent in the department? >> well, thank you for that, and some of the detail i'll have to supply to you separately. >> that's fine. >> but the general point that you're raising is our trade

craft and excellence in the acquisition of services and i'll just say something for everyone's benefit that you know, which is half of the money that dod contracts is not for goods, it's for services. and so as we talk about acquisition reform and improving our game, we need to improve our -- how we acquire services as well, and the initiatives you cite are some of the ways in which we're trying to improve our performance and our trade craft and the acquisition of services because that's half of our spend. >> right. and i'll give you that -- the question for answering on the record. >> will do. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. mr. turner. >> thank you, mr. chairman. secretary, mr. chairman, thank you for being here. thank you for all your hard and diligent work. mr. secretary, welcome. we're all very pleased and very happy that you're in your position. you do have very difficult times and issues as the chairman was

indicating, in the world view we see in front of us. we need some plain answers and talk on the issue of this budget. chairman dempsey we had a brief conversation about this. so let me tell you where we are and then tell you why we need your help. right now the president had submitted a budget that had a base amount of 561 and our budget committee is currently marking up a budget with the base of 523. they're indicating they want to make up the difference to that jagged edge of the lowered number, as you said mr. chairman by koko so the aggregate number would be somewhere around 613. you sort of said however, you cobble it together, but how you cobble it together does make a difference. i would like you to help us with this. i have told the budget committee that making up with oko does not work. 70 members of the house signed a letter and sent it to the budget committee asking to honor the

base budget number of 561 that the president asked for. what i have said to the budget committee is they should ask you guys, so this is my asking you guys, help us. mr. secretary, you said that one, it affects because based upon -- this is the basis upon which you build your next budget. that's certainly important. but we don't need to hear that it's an issue of rather. i think there are structural issues as miss duckworth was going to that could impede your ability to access the funds. one the national defense authorization didn't marked up until december. your fiscal year begins in the fall. tell us why a base of 523 with an oko of 90-plus billion doesn't work or you're going to be facing that. >> i'll start first and then chairman. it doesn't work because to have the defense we need and the

strategy that we have laid out, we need the budget that we have laid out, not just in one year but in the years to come, and so budgeting one year at a time, and this proposal is a one year at a time thing, doesn't work for national defense. it's not going to permit us to carry out the strategy as we've planned. >> mr. secretary, one more thing to jump in because you said that point before. you said that the president would veto a bill that legislates sequestration. if we pass a budget that has 523 as the base and we send you a national defense authorization act that is a base of 523 with oko of 90-plus billion is that within that veto threat? >> i think what the president meant was that a budget that did

not relieve sequestration, that is give a multi-year perspective for the budget he would veto not just for defense but as had been mentioned earlier for others as well. >> okay. now, getting to -- but mr. chairman, oko, mr. secretary, there are restrictions. if we don't lift those restrictions in our bill, the nda doesn't get passed until december and your fiscal year begins before that. won't you have a period of time almost a quarter of a year, where you can't use the money? >> yes. if this is done without an appropriation that is in line with it, you're right, we would have that problem, and i think your earlier point too, the question about whether this approach being proposed by the house committee would be acceptable to the senate or to the president, the uncertainty about whether this would even work for this year is another one of the problems with that

approach. >> so you guys have 40 more seconds if you want to tell the congress why they shouldn't do this, you should do it now because otherwise you will be facing this. >> i'm not going to tell the congress why they shouldn't do it. the congress makes its own decisions with my advice. my advice is we need to fix our base budget because you build the institution through the base budget, and you respond to contingencies with the fund called other contingency operations. in the context of a five-year future defense plan and we won't have the kind of certainty we need over that period if the current strategy is followed. but, look, as you heard the service chief say, you know, we're at the point where this is better than nothing, but, frankly, it doesn't do what we should be doing for defense in a predictable fashion. >> thank you. >> and i'd mention to the gentleman, it's going to be before december before we have a defense authorization bill this

year. senator mccain and i are determined to move -- i know it's different than we've had in the past, but it's going to move a whole lot quicker. mr. o'rourke. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. secretary, you said in your opening comments that you would never send our men and women into harm's way without the necessary readiness the necessary equipment, and the necessary docdoctrine. i think you would agree we not send nem in harm's way without the necessary strategy. i'm having a very difficult time in light of the six months during which we've been at war in iraq and syria against isis and in light of the president's authorization for the use of military force or aumf that is now before this congress for consideration, i'm having a very hard time understanding what the strategy is and i want to make sure that as my colleagues have said, that we fund our military well beyond the budget caps and

the sequester levels. i agree with them there, but i think perhaps more importantly that we have the necessary strategy in place so that their efforts, those men and women serving this country and our interests overseas are not in vain. could you answer the strategy question for me? >> certainly. first of all strategy is -- does take in addition to geographic perspective a multi-year perspective and a multi-year commitment, which is why annual budgetary turmoil isn't consistent with our strategy and taking a strategic view. with respect to the strategy against isil and defeating isil, in iraq the -- i think the first thing i'd say is that we not only need to defeat isil we need to defeat them in a lasting

manner, and that's always the difficult part. we can defeat isil, but defeating them in a lasting manner means having somebody on the ground who keeps them defeated after we assist them in the defeat. on the iraq iraq side of the border, that's oon iraqi force -- >> if i can interrupt there, we'll just take the iraqi portion of this. >> okay. >> from my understanding based on the testimony from the excellent series of hearings that the chairman has brought before us our strategy there largely relies on training, equipping, and advising the iraqi national army. we have spent tens of billions of dollars doing just that from 2003 to 2010 to awful effect. the army melted in the face of a farley farley -- far inferior enemy. what is different about our strategy today that's going to ensure our success?

>> well, it will hinge as it did then, upon a multi-sectarian approach by the government of iraq. without that it cannot succeed, and what happened to the iraqi security forces a year ago was that they collapsed because sectarianism had taken root in the government of iraq and the people who lived in the regions that were swept over by isil were not willing to accept or support the iraqi security forces as they were then configured. they need to be configured in a nonsectarian manner or multi-sectarian manner or it won't be possible to have that lasting defeat of isil on the iraqi side of the border. it's as critical now as it was last year. >> mr. secretary with all due respect, the strategy in so far as we understand it today i think is insufficient to achieving the president's aims of degrading and destroying

isis, to your aims of ensuring a lasting defeat of isis. i think if we're honest with ourselves and the american public and the service members who will act out the policies of this country, if we are going to achieve those aims we are going to need u.s. ground forces in iraq and syria. we cannot depend on a syrian moderate opposition force. we cannot depend on the political whims of the different sectarian factions in iraq. we should not depend on iranian-backed shia militias in this country. let's be honest about what it's going to take to do it, and with today's topic of the budget in mind, do we have the resources necessary in the president's request to support ground forces to achieve our tactical and strategic goals in syria and iraq vis-a-vis isis? >> i'll answer that first and then the chairman may want to

add something to it. we do have the resources to support our strategy. the one ingredient, very important ingredient you left out was air power, and we are applying air power in a very effective way in support of ground forces that are not u.s. ground forces but that are local ground forces because we want a lasting defeat of isil and only local forces on the ground can impose a lasting defeat, and that's our strategy. chairman? >> and if i could just in the interests of time, chairman, i will take this for the record because i do think that the strategic advantage we have is the coalition and i think that will eventually be the path to an enduring defeat, but i'll take it for the record. >> thank you both. >> mr. rogers. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you all for being here. secretary carter, i want to start off with a shamelessly parochially issue. the amp v program which i know you're familiar with is replacing the ml 13 combat

vehicle which is maintained at the army depot. do you know who is going to make that decision and when about where the source of repair is going to be made? >> i do not know when that source selection will be made but i'll find out and make sure we get back to you. >> thank you very much. general dempsey, based on open source reporting russia is planning to put tactical nuclear weapons in the illegally seized territory of crimea. what is your best military advice as to how we as a nation should respond to that? >> well, there's several things. i saw the same open source report. i haven't seen it reflected in intelligence, and if i had i would have suggested we have this conversation in closed session. there's other things that russia is doing that seem to be provocative in nature, and i think we have to make it very

clear that things like their compliance with the inf treaty that there will be political diplomatic, and potentially military costs in terms of the way we posture ourselves and the way we plan and work with our allies to address those provocations provocations. i have seen it, it concerns me greatly. i certainly would counsel them not to roll back the clock to previous experiences, and i have had those conversations with my counterpart. >> great. and this would be for secretary carter. i was very pleased a couple days after you were approved by the senate for your new position to see you publicly announce that this inf treaty violation by russia can no longer be tolerated without some kind of response. i'm curious, how much longer do you think it will be before we provide some kind of response to

that continued violation of the inf treaty? >> our response is twofold. one is to a diplomatic one which is to try to get the russians to come back into compliance with the inf treaty, not my responsibility but an important part of it. but on the military side, we have begun to consider, and i think -- what our options are because the inf treaty is a treaty, meaning that it's a two-way street. we accepted constraints in return for constraints of the then-soviet union. it is a two-way street and we need to remind them it's a two-way street meaning that we without an inf treaty, can take action also that we both decided years ago it was best for neither of us to take. so we are looking at our alternatives in the areas of defense against the systems that

they might field in violation of the inf treaty, counterforce options, and countervailing options. all of those are available to us. we're looking at all of those because the russians need to remember this is a two-way street. >> well, i appreciate that. i would hope that one thing that you would consider is to modify the aegis we're currently constructing in romania with the capacity to defend itself against those intermediate range missiles that they are illegally testing. >> defenses are one of those -- the categories of response that we can consider. >> thank you very much. that's all i have, mr. chairman. >> thank you gentleman. mr. takai. >> thank you mr. chairman and welcome mr. secretary and nice to see you again general. i wanted to ask a little bit about what's happening in hawaii. there's been a lot of walk regarding the drastic reductions

in army troop levels, which i believe actually is contrary to the defense strategic guidance that called for the rebalance or the shift to the pacific. so mr. secretary, does the president's fisal year '16 budget request provide you with the capabilities and the resources to conduct a rebalance to the pacific and how would drastic reductions in this theater affect this capability? >> well, it does provide for the rebalance, but i want to second what the chairman said, which is we are on the ragged edge of being able to satisfy all the ingredients of our strategy of which the asia-pacific rebalance is a central ingredient. so if we don't get some budget stability and we keep doing things one year at a time and one piece at a time we are going to have to reconsider our strategy. the way i put it earlier is not just the size but the shape.

now, i would hope that our rebalance to the asia-pacific is something that we are able to sustain, and in our budget and our multi-year budget plan, we are able to sustain it. but under sequester and in one year at a time fashion, as the chairman said, we're on the ragged edge in our strategy, and something will have to give. >> okay. thank you. and mr. secretary, the other purpose of this hearing is to talk about the president's request, the aumf request. so i wanted to shift gears a little bit and talk about that and ask you to clarify some aspects of the request. in subsection c called limitations, it says the authority granted in subsection a does not authorize the use of the united states armed forces in, quote, enduring offensive ground combat operations. so what is enduring offensive

ground combat operations? does this refer to the length of time which the operation is ongoing, the scope of the operations, some undefined relationship between time and scope? >> well, thanks. the aumf for me as secretary of defense, two things are important in the aumf. one is that it gives us the flexibility to carry out our campaign, and that speaks to the provision you quote and i'll come back to that in a minute but the other is that it is a past up here on capitol hill in a way that says very clearly to our men and women who are conducting the campaign against isil that the country is behind them. that's very important to me. both the content of the aumf and that it's supported widely in the congress. to get to the provisions of it, the aumf doesn't try to say

everything that is permitted. instead, which is i think wise because for the chairman and me we need the flexibility to conduct the campaign against isil in the way that the enemy -- defeating that enemy requires, it does rule out using the language that you described what the president has said an iraq or afghanistan-type long period of offensive combat operations. and that is -- that language by taking that possibility only out leaves to me our department the flexibility we need to conduct the campaign against isil both practically and geographically because we don't foresee having to conduct another campaign like iraq or afghanistan and that's the one thing that is ruled out

in the formulation you describe. elsewhere we have substantial flexibility under the president's formulation, and i welcome that because i said as flexibility and widespread support are the two things that we need most. chairman, do you want to add anything to that? >> there is no doctrinal term in our military that is enduring offensive but it's clearly a statement of intent by the commander in chief. it does allow us to execute the campaign as it is currently designed. >> okay. thank you. i appreciate that. but maybe if you can for the record provide it to us. i think it's important to define this provision of the request, so if you can provide it in writing, some clarity as to what the president means by enduring combat ground offensive operations. thank you. >> i thank the gentleman. mr. wittman. >> thank you so much for joining

us today and thank you for your service to our nation. we've heard a lot about how we are going to address future challenges in our military. obviously a lot on the funding side, but i want to follow up secretary carter, with some of the things you have spoken about, how we can do a better job in the dollars we get in spending, especially making decisions on things like acquisition, big programs making sure we have efficiency and timeliless in those decisions, that agility as admiral howard spoke about yesterday is critical. give me your perspective on where you believe we are right now with the acquisition process. should there be greater authorities given throughout the different levels of decision making in acquisition, and what do we really need to do as far as acquisition and -- well acquisition reform throughout the process? >> well thank you, and thank you for your interest in that subject because it is central and i appreciate the fact that

this committee is committed to it, and i'm sorry i can't give a simple answer to that because there's so many ways that we can improve our performance in acquisition and that we need to improve our performance in acquisition. there is acquisition of services that has been mentioned previously. there is the requirements process and the role of the service chiefs and i personally welcome a greater role on the part of the service chiefs in the acquisition system. i think maybe gold water nichols went too far in the other direction in that regard, and we can get some of that back. there's an enormous amount of simple process that encumbers good sense. there is some training that is required to better equip our people to interact with industry and understand how to give appropriate incentives and

partnership with the industry that we serve. there is the technology point that the chairman was pointing to earlier where we have to work very hard to stay up with today's eight generations of iphones. we can't take for granted anymore that we're at the cutting edge. we have to fight our way to the cutting edge again. so there are many many dimensions to this. and this is something that i believe we will be continuing to struggle with for a long time because technology changes, the world changes, and we have to keep up if we're going to continue to have the best military in the world. >> general dempsey? your perspective on what we can do to help the procurement and acquisition process. yesterday some of the chiefs said they'd like to be able to have the thresholds heightened so they can be more involved in the decision-making process. give me your perspective too, on how do we get as secretary carter said, technology ideas

innovation more quickly to the war fighter? >> well, i align myself both with what the chief said yesterday about increasing their role in this process because it's very -- it's a very bright red line right now that probably needs to be dotted as we say so there can be much more collaboration across it. and in terms of the technology, i think it's a combination of shortening our programatic time horizons. you know, i recall the days of the future combat system which was conceived in 2003. it was going to deliver in 2017, which to my way of looking at it doomed it to a graceless death from the moment because that's seven cycles of the congress of the united states. so i just think we have to take a look at the pace at which we try to develop. i think as the secretary said, commercial is outpacing government at this point and we can either fight that or find

ways to conform to it. >> very good. secretary carter, just your perspective, it seems like what you're advocating is putting more authority but also accountability in the hands of decisionmakers to taking it more away from process, which right now is more of a process-driven effort, to more of a person or individual-driven effort. give me your perspective of where you think the balance is because it seems we're too much of a process-driven effort today. >> i think that's right. we've gotten to a point where there is as many checkers as there are doers, and we need the doers to be enabled and then held accountable. so today you have the worst of all worlds. there aren't enough doers and when something goes wrong you can't tell how it happened or what its causes were or who's responsible for it. >> very good. thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you. miss graham. >> thank you mr. chairman.

and thank you, secretary carter and general dempsey. first, secretary carter, congratulations on your recent confirmation, and, general dempsey, i want to say thank you not only for your generosity of time before this committee but also with new members in general. you have been very very kind. so thank you. first, i'd like to start secretary carter, in 1915, 100 years ago this year the mark 5 dive helmet, the trademark of diving, was created. military divers are located a number of military installations around the country including at the naval support activity center in panama city, which is in my district. i had the opportunity to visit recently and it's just phenomenal. with the 100th year upon us, mr. secretary, i would much appreciate if you would support the designation of 2015 as the year of the military diver. to honor those who are serving and have served and will serve

as military divers for our country. >> well first of all thank you for hosting our folks and for supporting service members in your district. we don't take it for granted. we're very appreciative of it and that sounds like an excellent way of commemorating the significance of the diver community, so thank you for that suggestion. >> thank you. i really appreciate that support, and i know that the men and women who serve as military divers do as well. so thank you. >> thank you. >> a separate question, yesterday, to both general dempsey and secretary carter, i asked the service secretaries about their wounded warrior care programs. as the congress debates a new authorization for use of military force one of my prioritities is knowing that should we engage in military -- in current or future -- military in current or future conflicts, that our military service members go into this fight with confidence that this country

will take care of them, especially the most severely injured when they return home. so i would like to learn what is the department of defense's -- what is the department of defense doing to ensure the transition from active service to the va for our most injured and ill service members and what can we do to make sure that we identify every discharged service member who qualifies for the va's federal recovery care? and i appreciate your answers. >> okay. well, i'll start and then, chairman, if you want to join in. first of all, thank you for your interest in that too. we are fortunately at a period right now where the chairman and i on a weekend in -- at bethesda won't find ten new wounded warriors as was the case for many years when i was serving in the department and the chairman was serving in the department, and we're very grateful for

that, but we can't forget that those who have been wounded will in many cases are 20 years old. they have a long life ahead of them, and that means we have a long obligation to them, and i am concerned that our country remembers the sacrifice of these service members in all the years that they'll live and i think we owe them that and of course, we hand them off to the va, and your question goes to how good is the transition program for their care to the va and in general to civilian life. that's something that we've done a lot of work on in the course of these years but i think there's more that we can do and should do to smooth that transition and prepare them for the life ahead. but, you know, to me it's really

something from the heart that we need -- remember these are young people. they've got a long life ahead of them. it can be a productive, happy, and wonderful life for them, notwithstanding the sacrifice they made at a young age, but we owe them the help to make sure they can do that. chairman, do you want to add anything? >> thanks, mr. secretary. yeah, we've actually -- the service chiefs and i and with the help of the department have included in our budget two aspects of this. one is the care of those who have already been wounded through the life cycle of their care and secondly, importantly we're taking a look at -- there's three areas we have developed incredible expertise and we can't let it erode. one is amp ewe at thises, second is burn victims, and third is brain injury. we're looking to the future now that we don't have a population thankfully that is suffering those injuries, we have to ensure we can sustain our expertise that we've developed

and that's baked into the budget as well. >> thank you very much, and our hearts are in the same place and i yield back the time i don't have left. thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. hunter. >> thank you mr. chairman. gentlemen, thank you for being here. mr. secretary, it's great to see you in your new position. three things. first, when it comes to acquisition reform one of the best ways to do it i think is instead of doing a process or policy change, which we do every year, part of the -- if you can use technology and actually change the system itself. for instance you have testing. it takes months to test our systems when you're talking f-35 or an aegis test, it takes forever. there's now a programatic line in your budget request that we're going to match and hopefully put some more money in. it's a new way to test. and where you can test your aegis cruisers on the spot literally on the spot as they're out there in the water and see

if they're going to work or not. that has met with fierce resistance, even in san diego where they say we have entire departments that are testing departments. that's what they do. you have entire departments that spend years and years simply testing. they aren't happy about things like this that really disrupt the system and cause reform just because of the nature of the technology that makes sense. so i would encourage us this committee and you to instead of just doing policy reforms, working within the system and technology to put in systems that reform no matter what because people can't stop it, right? if it's faster and it takes fewer people, there's going to be major pushback because you have literally tens of thousands of people within dod and osd that test. that's their job. they don't like it. that's the first thing. number two we talked about isis in syria and iraq and our coalition partners. you have jordan, for instance. jordan, i have talked to them,

written the president letters. we have mq 1s and mq 9s in warehouses. even if -- and we have the exportable predator too, the xp. even if you change the itar rules and state approve this is stuff, it will take a year or two to get these in the hands of the jordanians. you have to deal then with the qualitative military edge issue with israel because the jordanians would then own those aircraft. a fix to this i think, is taking some of the aircraft that we have now that are in warehouses, letting the jordanians fly them, and basically having the contractor that makes the predator, have them recover and launch and have them do it. so then the jordanians don't own them. there's no qme problem, and they're able to use that now. and they are requesting this now. the king has requested this. his ambassador has requested this. and their military liaisons in the u.s. have requested this,

too. just want to run that by you. what do you think? >> thank you. that is one of the actually many forms of assistance to the jordanians and other coalition partners that we're looking at, and no decision has been made about that but the logic that you describe and the possibility that you describe is a real one, and to get back to your testing thing, i think that's a very good point also. technology can transform the way we do tests and, therefore the ponderousness and the cost of the test systems. both good points. chairman, do you want to add anything? >> just after king abdullah visited, the secretary chartered his deputy to run a senior initiatives group to take a look at all the coalition members, because there are many requests coming in and there's a thing called the war fighting sig that the secretary directed that is

getting at things like that. and you're right, your letter is being addressed at the department of state right now. >> thank you. the last thing is i'm going to have a piece of legislation due to all the hostages we have had taken in iraq and syria and afghanistan. it's on an unprecedented level to have so many hostages taken in places where we don't have a big fbi contingency where the fbi can't do it. the fbi has purview over hostages anywhere in the world. so even if they only have three agents at the embassy in iraq or 12 agents, whatever they don't have the ability that jsoc has, that any of our special operators, or just big army, big marine corps whoever. i think there needs to be a buck stops here person. your predecessor, mr. secretary put in mike lumpkin. he became the hostage guy during the bergdahl case at our recommendation, and we also recommended this that there be

a buck stops here person that answers to the president. so that person, whether they choose the fbi or the cia or the dia or dod, whoever has the most resources to bring to bear for that particular hostage case i think that's the way we should go and we can maybe recover a few of these hostages which we haven't done yet. wonder if you can comment on that. thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> only comment would be you're absolutely right that this hostage rescue is an example of something that can only be done with a whole of government approach. we need obviously things to be done in a way that is law enforcement sensitive but in many cases we have the assets or the intelligence community has the assets or it involves homeland security, and this gets to the point i was making earlier. i have to take a view of security and the future strength of our nation that is -- that

looks beyond the department of defense itself to all of the instruments of national power and everything that's going to dear us into carry us into the future, and these kinds of operations are a perfect k356r78example of that. you're right, we need a choreographer when that time comes to bring all these pieces together. but the times in which we live require for most problems there be the defense instrument and then other pieces of the government as well whether it be technology, whether it be our personnel, or whether it be operations. >> mr. moulton. >> thank you, mr. chairman and, gentlemen, thank you very much for your service to the country. there is tremendous bipartisan agreement on the committee that we need to move past the sequester. i just came from a budget committee hearing where this is being debated. there's a lot of frustration with the way the budget is being handled at present, but the question, therefore, is just how

do we get there? how do we figure that out? one question that's been debated much this morning on this committee is, is there a role for nondefense spending cut under the budget control act in ensuring our national defense? and i think secretary carter, you have made your view quite clear. general dempsey i was wondering if you could offer your own comments. >> look, everything we do around the world in terms of security these days are done with other government partners, whether it's dea, homeland security, fbi, cia, and so, yes there, is a role on the nondefense side for security. >> great. thank you. if you could both comment on this, and i want to be just very specific here to try to cut through the rhetoric. what are the top five programs or weapon systems that you want to cut to take that money and better invest it in ensuring the safety of our troops, the safety

and success of our troops on the ground or more broadly in our future national defense but are prevented from cutting by congressional politics? secretary carter, perhaps we can start with you. >> there are more than five i'm sorry to say and some of them are programs. some of them are older platforms. there's been a lot of discussion and debate around the a-10 for example, in the air force which the air force wishes to retire not because it's not an excellent airplane, but because their budget doesn't provide room for it anymore compared to other things that are a higher priority. so that's one. and there are a number of those that we have enumerated in past years, and we're willing to work with people here. we understand -- i want to find common ground with people, but we can't just continue to be

frustrating year after year in these program areas or in a whole number of compensation areas, efficiency areas, and so forth, and i'd be happy to provide to the committee a list and it will be more than five items of initiatives that we have proposed in past years this is before i was here but that we thought on balance and sometimes with great regret as in the retirement of older systems, we needed to do, and we have not been permitted by congress to take those steps. >> thank you, secretary. if you could provide that list, i would greatly appreciate it. general dempsey, if you could as specific as possible outline -- as specifically as possible outline what things would be on your list. >> well i actually can't, congressman, because recall my role. the services build their program

to deliver service capabilities which then we integrate into a joint force. so what we submitted was actually what we believed we needed to accomplish a joint force to execute the strategy. i'm not in a position now to tell you that there were ways we could have done it otherwise. we've given you our best advice and i can't help you decide how to find the money to do it. we need the capabilities we've describeded in our bunt.dget. >> fair enough. thank you. i yield my time. >> mr. lamborn. >> thank you all for being here. we appreciate it. secretary carter as you know qatar is an important partner of ours. we have troops stationed there and they have played a role in the counter isis fight. however, they are playing both sides. there are a number of u.s. designated financiers operating

openly in qatar. the leadership of hamas openly operates there and they have been financing some very bad islamist extremists. my question is how can the u.s. hold them accountable and how can we make it clear that playing both sides is simply unacceptable? >> thank you for the question. qatar, as with other of our coalition partners in the fight against isil are being very helpful and in the case of the qataris in terms of the air base we use indispensable. at the same time not everything that our coalition partners do in the region are things that we support or that we think are constructive with respect to either the isil fight or other things, and so all of our partners are -- we are trying to work with so that we get their

support for the fight against isil but we can continue to work with them on areas where we disagree, and there are disagreements we have with almost all of our coalition partners that are helping us with isil, and we just try to work through them. >> but, secretary, i understand we may disagree on this or that issue, but when their policy is cutting against what we're trying to accomplish in that very fight i have got a real problem with that. >> well, we have problems with that, too, in some cases, and we explain that in our view their policies are contradictory in that way, but we have these disagreements with them. we try to work through. while at the same time benefiting from their help where we can agree but we don't agree 100% of the time. >> okay. thank you. also secretary carter or general dempsey, on the aumf, i have a real problem with the two major limitations that the president has put into his proposed

language, a limitation on time and a limitation on scope. is it right to be tying the hands of this president or a future president in that way? >> i'll start first and then chairman -- >> and if you have already addressed this, apologize. >> on the scope, the proposed aumf gives us wide scope to conduct the campaign we're anticipating against isil. the time limitation has nothing to do with the length of the campaign. i cannot tell you that the campaign will be over in three years. i don't think anybody can tell you that. that feature of the aumf is included for reasons that are not military related. they are related to the fact -- they'rerived from the fact

that we will have a new president in three years and the aumf provides for a new president, and for that matter a new congress to revisit this issue. now, that's not something that comes from the secretary of defense or i would say from our thinking, but we understand and respect it. it derives from the way the constitution regards use of military force as a very grave matter in which both the congress and the executive branch play a role. so i understand that. i respect that. but the number three doesn't come from the campaign. it comes from our political system, and again i understand and respect that and i hope the result of all this is an aumf that tells our troops that we're behind them in this fight. that's the key thing to me in addition to having the flexibility to carry out the campaign that will win. >> congressman, i was consulted on the aumf before it was

submitted to you and i believe it does allow us to execute the campaign that we anticipate against isil. i think what you're sensing is the difference in using military force against state nation states, and these groups of non-state actors which have a different character to them. and the last time we were handed a completely unconstrained authorization to use force was probably eisenhower's orders on the eu vote the invasion of europe, where he was told to take the armed forces of the united states, deploy them to the continent of europe, and defeat nazi germany. that's probably the last time we've had a completely unconstrained aumf. >> thank you. >> mr. aguilar. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you mr. secretary and general dempsey, good to see you again. i want to talk about the aumf discussed in this wide scope that you just mentioned. one of the -- one of the questions i had was the

hostility. if the hostility -- it doesn't say anything about the termination of the hostilities at the three-year period. is it your feeling that hostilities could continue and that we could have actions against isil beyond the three years as currently written and implemented? >> again, the three years is not a prediction about the duration of the campaign to defeat isis. it is a recognition of the way our political system works. and the recognition that a new president and a new congress in three years may wish to revisit this issue. as i said, i understand and respect that. but it isn't a prediction about the duration of the campaign against isil.

>> general? >> my military experience and judgment suggests that the answer of your question is it will likely extend beyond three years. >> could it extend -- could hostilities extend without a new aumf by a new commander? >> if i understood the question, the enemy gets a vote on how long hostilities extend. i actually don't understand the question. >> sure, i guess what i'm trying to understand is, if proposed, if congress gives the authority to use military force, we have this three-year window which you both said offers the flexibility but is more of a political discussion than anything and allows the new president to make that determination absent a new discussion about aumf, could hostilities continue in perpetuity beyond the three-year

window? >> i think the aumf that the president proposed would require action by a new administration and a new congress in three years, in light of the circumstances at the time. which we can't foresee. >> sure. one of the other pieces that isn't discussed is detention policies within the aumf and this was discussed in another hearing that this committee had as well. could you provide us with examples of what u.s. forces could and could not do with respect to detention policies under the aumf, under the proposed aumf? >> under the aumf, the law of armed conflict and all of the applicable u.s. and international law would apply to detention operations, as they would apply to all aspects of waging this campaign.

>> general? >> i have nothing to add to that. >> thank you. i yield back. >> dr. fleming? >> thank you, mr. chairman. and secretary carter chairman dempsey, thank you for your service and thank you for coming for us today. you know the president has said that he -- his goal is to destroy isis. he has submitted a proposed aumf. in the aumf it says a limitation is no enduring offensive ground combat operations. that suggests no significant boots on the ground, sort of a colloquial expression that we use about that. so my question to both of you gentlemen is, can you give examples of wars america has won with sustained success and peace, without substantial ground forces in relations to the foe?

>> excuse me. i'm sorry. i'm not a historian so i'm not sure i can answer your question from a historical point of view. i can give a logical answer and a commonsense answer to the boots on the ground question as it applies to a campaign like the one against isil. and it has to do with the -- who sustains the victory after isil is defeated. because we seek not only the defeat of isil but we seek the lasting -- >> well if i can interrupt -- >> if i can just finish the thought. that means that there are local forces involved who control the territory after it is won back. that's our strategy. and otherwise, we have boots on the ground for a very long time. >> many experts believe the main reason why we have the isis problem we have today is we didn't have a status of forces agreement and we didn't have a stay-behind force.

so again, i will ask you, chairman dempsey, can you name the wars that america has won without sustained boots on the ground against a significant foe? and i do believe -- i remember that boko haram has now given its allegiance. the forces are growing with isis and we know how barbaric they are. can you name some examples of warses we've bon without boots on the ground? >> we've -- historically we've had several campaigns against insurgencies. in the philippines, for example, back at the turn of the last century. and generally, actually our campaign strategy has been the same as it is today. which is to find a coalition and to find indigenous forces, as we used to call them. now we call them regional partners. to do the lion's share of the lifting, because unless they own it, they will often allow us to own it. >> then can you tell us who this -- these forces are going

to be? i get we're trying to stand up again an iraqi army that fell apart because we left. but can you explain in other regions outside of iraq where we're getting these forces, where they're coming from, and when they're going to take action? >> i will. but i don't want to align myself with that we are the cause of the current crisis. i think the secretary mentioned earlier that iraq had an opportunity to demonstration to its population that it would actually work on its behalf of all groups and failed to do that. which provided the environment in which this challenge arose. we've got a 20-nation coalition two members of which are the kurdish forces and the iraqi forces. we're working to develop a moderate syrian opposition. we're calling it the new syrian forces. we're hardening regional allies. you heard some of that discussed moments ago. it is actually -- the reason that the campaign has a defeat

mechanism is the coalition. it's not because of our activities. >> again who are the core forces? who are going to be the core forces in syria, for example? again, we hear about the free syrian army which nobody seems to know who they are. they were referred to, of course, as doctors and pharmacists before and we're going to, i guess, offline train them some place maybe in kuwait. but again isis is growing every day and they are killing a number of people in very brutal ways, specifically going after christians and jews, so my question is who is this core force that's going to go up against isis in the near future? i'm still vague on who this force is. >> well, there are forces. it depends on which side of the border you are talking about. on the iraqi side there are the forces that -- >> well i get iraq. i'm talking in the limited time

i have. i'm talking about syria. where are these -- >> on the syrian side, as the chairman indicated, we are trying to build -- >> trying to build. so we don't know who they are. >> trying to build a force -- >> we don't know the size -- >> the reality of the situation is you have the forces of the assad regime and you have the forces of isil. neither of which we want to align ourselves with. and they are the largest forces on the ground in syria. that is the circumstance in which we find ourselves and we are trying to create a moderate syrian force that will be able to defeat them and own the future of syria. that is our objective. >> mr. chairman as i yield back, i have to say we're not finding out who these people are. there is no answer here in this question. >> i appreciate that. mr. ashford? >> thank you, mr. chairman and general and secretary.

>> pardon my parochialism, i'm just going to ask a broad question related back to the people in our district omaha, when we went to see -- i absolutely agree with you about president ghani and there's a lot of hope there and his ability to start reforms in the armed services, open up discussions with pakistan, which are meaningful, apparently. it was interesting, when we went in to visit with the president, one of his first comments to me is how is my friend tom guttier and tom, many of you probably know tom but he started the afghan studies program at u.n.o. 35 years ago and is a friend of the president's and they communicate. so that was nice to see. also you know the peter keywood institute at the university of nebraska is at omaha is doing research into isis and had been doing some of that research prior to -- prior to june of last year.

and the ebola work done at the university of nebraska medical center. and it is pretty significant and we're very proud of all of that. having said that, i guess my question is, when i visit those institutions and talk to the principals, it is clear that not just the university of nebraska, clearly, but all over the country, there are partners at that level who are sophisticated significant partners in our efforts in the mideast. and would you comment on how you foresee the partnerships continuing to develop and evolve and move forward? >> well it is critical, because we depend for our technology, all of the research and development that underlies our system, we depend on private institutions to do that. our universities, excellent universities, university affiliated r&d centers.

in industry. i always have to remind people, we don't build anything in the pentagon. this isn't the soviet union. our way of doing things is not to do it in the government, it is to contract with private entities because we think that is the best way to stay up with technology and to get excellence and that is how we -- so we depend upon those institutions. our great university systems, our great laboratories and our great defense industry to make us the best military in the world. >> i just think that is absolutely right. and i think it does differentiate us from everywhere else in the world, really. and we're proud of what we've contributed in nebraska, obviously. but every state has similar experiences. one other -- and thank you for that answer. one other -- this goes back really to congresswoman graham's question and this is something i'm trying to figure out. your comment about transitioning the military back into civilian life and the role of veterans

administration, i don't necessarily want to comment on that. but i know in nebraska, we've had, as a lot of states have had, this infusion of new veterans, obviously with distinct problems that are somewhat unique are unique to a great degree to the middle east, and the higher degree of disability claims all of that. and i know what we're trying to think about doing in nebraska in omaha and sarby county is to think about developing out of outpatient clinics because we're seeing a real need of the veterans coming back now, the military coming back now and needing that sort of outpatient in the mental health area women's health issues that are not being addressed in traditional mode. i don't necessarily need a comment on that because that's a different department. but if you have any thoughts on that, kind of the new way of delivering health care. >> i would only echo something that the chairman said, which is that by sad necessity over the

last dozen years, we have learned a lot. and in a sense pioneered techniques in treating amputees, burn victims, very importantly, tbi, pts and we need to make sure, as the chairman said earlier, we remember those lessons. and that we transfer that knowledge to society more widely, which i think is happening in our medical system and including the medical system of the veterans administration. >> and i agree. and my only thought would be that clearly in our area of the country where we have a robust medical system at the university and other facilities is being able to develop those new options as we move forward is part of our strategy in the mideast generally and every. so thank you, mr. secretary. >> thank you. >> mr. gibson?

>> thanks, mr. chairman and greatly appreciate the panelists. thank you for your leadership and commitment to our nation. general dempsey i noted in your opening remarks you laid out a case for continued forward presence, put some passion behind that. some of us, myself included, have been arguing for thinking and acting differently, certainly recognizing the need for some forward presence, particularly with naval forces for open sea lanes and access to markets. and then in places like korea, of course, there is a need for land forces there for the near term, at least. but that when we rely on this, as we have really since the end of the cold war, we end up with free rider problems, and friends and allies who don't fully ante up for even khat they committed

on paper that they would do and we end up with some other second order effects. i have been arguing for a peace through strength approach that really puts more reliance on agility, strategic maneuver. and particularly the restoration of the global response force capability. with the idea that -- and of course we deal with nation states, and we deal with transnational actors. here i'm talking about the former, not the latter. this whole idea of deterrence and deterrence really being defined by capability and will and here's where i get to the point on the global response force. we had the service secretaries and chiefs here yesterday, and they gave a response to this. and so i'm interested in from the department standpoint, from the secretary and from the chief leadership, as it relates to restoring the global response force, and how you see that factoring in to our posture going forward? >> i'll start. we do have something called the grf, the global response force.

which is -- we provide very carefully for just the reason you described, namely, it is the most ready force, it is the most deterrent value because it has global reach and it is highly ready. and one of the things that is concerning about this whole budget drama of sequester so forth and year after year and its effect on readiness is that it -- if it continues in the way that it is it's going to affect our readiness, even at the grf level. and that is not good for deterrence. it's not good for the picture of american strength that is so necessary to avoiding conflict in the first place. >> congressman, you've touched on two things that are near and dear to my heart.

one is the grf. we do have to restore its readiness. there are times of late because of increasing demand and reducing supply we've had to actually reach into it and send it forward, which is not the intention, but we're forced into that position on occasion. the other is the issue of presence. i think we have our forward stationing about right. and what we are doing is looking at how we can be less predictable to our adversaries and more reassuring to our allies, and maintain readiness through a thing we're calling dynamic presence. and so we are very much interested in pursuing that idea. but i'll tell you, the sequestration actually makes this -- both of those, almost impossible. >> i appreciate those responses. and to be clear, even the vision that i'm laying out here requires the world's strongest military as a deterrent to those that would do us harm. and also this vision includes

american leadership. it is just a different conception of power and how we would array it that would look for contributions from our friends and allies at the level we would expect and also recognize the moral strength of our country as evidence through diplomacy, commerce and trade, and in the way that we're able to strategically maneuver our forces with the real capability, i believe, strengthening the hands of our diplomats that will allow us to i think, reach a level of security that we're striving for. so thank you very much, once again, for everything that you do for our servicemen and women and their families. and i yield back. >> thank you. mr. courtney. >> thank you mr. chairman and i want to thank the secretary and general for your service and all of the witnesses here today. i think when the historians write the book on this administration, one of the overlooked achievements was the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty which was ratified on a bipartisan basis.

and in the wake of it, we've heard a lot of testimony at the c-power committee about the fact that the triad is going to change as a result of the you know, realignment that the treaty created in terms of the leg of the triad that's going to carry the heaviest burden is the sea-based deterrence. about 70% according to some of the navy witnesses that we've had here. in the wake of that and the aging out of the existing ohio fleet, admiral greenert, secretary stackly, yesterday secretary mabus made it crystal clear that the ohio replacement program is at the absolute top of the list because the timing, even with the president's robust funding for design work, which again is another reason why we should support that top line there is really just no margin for delay in terms of making sure that we're going to be able to implement new s.t.a.r.t. so mr. secretary, i was reading your testimony over at the

appropriations committee and others about, again, we have been hearing about this for years at the -- you know, what the impact is going to be on the ship building account. so last year's defense bill when we created the sea base deterrence fund we thought we really used well established precedent from the national sea lift defense fund, which, again was an effort to take pressure off the ship building account for a once in a multigeneration investment, missile defense, et cetera. i just wondered if you could kind of talk with us a little bit about what your sort of thinking is. because there's just no question that something's going to give when the resources are needed to build those boats in terms of the ship building account, if it has to all come out of there. >> well, thank you for that. and you're right, the triad is part of our future. it is part of our future planning. nuclear weapons aren't in the news very much, thank god.

so they are not the answer to the isil crisis. but they are a bedrock of our security. and we have to -- we're going to need a safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent as far into the future as i can see and we need to provide for that and the sea based leg is an essential leg because it's survival on a day-to-day basis and it's long been a tenet of stab ability and it remains true now. it's also true that the ohio class replacement is a very expensive proposition. now we're trying to get the cost of that down like all other other programs, as much as we can. but it's -- it -- we have to pay that bill. and i think it's more complicated, as i'm sure you would say also, than late -- how we label the money. the money has to come from somewhere and we're going to have to make difficult trade-offs, particularly in the decade between 2020 and 2030. and that is just a fact of life

if we're going to have an ohio class replacement and if secretary mabus and admiral greenert said it was the highest priority, they're absolutely right. it's just something we have to do. and we have to find room in the budget to do it. and there are going to be tradeoffs there that are not going to get alleviated by calling the money this or not. >> the only other thing i'd add congressman is we, the joint chiefs and i, firmly believe that the triad all three legs, which as you know is intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range bomber and the ohio-class replacement submarine are necessary to make our deterrence credible and survivable. and just because it's an unfortunate happenstance of time that the three legs of the triad are all requiring modernization at some level over the next decade, but you know we've been kept safe -- this is our strategic deterrent responsibility, and we're going to have to find a way to do it.

>> no quarrel with your comment, just when you look at the size of the legs it's not quite -- it's a kind of funny looking stool because one of them is a lot longer than the other, i guess. as long as i got a few seconds left, general, first of all thank you for your service. first time i met you was in iraq when you were in charge of retraining the iraqi forces and i know you're probably more passionate than anyone about trying to, you know, rebolster that force that's over there. we had a national guard unit leave for afghanistan a few nights ago out of hartford, and the i just -- the expectation was that the reserve force was kind of going to stand down as the troop drawdown took place, and frankly, for some people it was a little jarring to still see national guard forces going over there. and i hope you're keeping an eye on those guys, because you know, it caused a lot of dislocation for the families to have a 60-day call-up, when i think again people's world expectations thought was going to change with the drawon. with that i yield back.

>> thank you. mr. franks. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first of all, secretary carter some of us were a little bit surprised at your appointment. and i just have to say to you it was a pleasant surprise. i, for one, am very gratified, sir, that you're where you are. i think it's a good thing for the country. >> thank you, my wife and i were surprised also. >> well, as you know, producing fissile material is by far the most challenging component of developing nuclear weapons. and i know you also know that once the 4.5% enrichment level has been reached that about 75% of the work, or the enrichment has been done to gain the weapons-grade material. requiring iran to dismantle its mechanism to enrich uranium or produce plutonium was the centerpiece of nearly a dozen u.n. security council resolutions because essentially

we considered that in many ways, the whole ball game. but in direct contradiction to that reality and the u.n. security regs lugss mr. obama's interimagreement with iran astonishingly provides a protected protocol to enrich uranium. if you forgive the political impore tunety of the question do you believe that an agreement long-term with iran going forward that allows them to enrich uranium or produce plutonium is in the best national security interests of the united states? >> it's an excellent question. and i think it's the key question for the -- for such an agreement is does it provide an assurance against breakout, and the development of a bomb by iran? i'm not involved in the negotiations there, and so i can't discuss an agreement that hasn't been concluded yet.

that's got to be its underlying principle, and i think that is the underlying principle with which the negotiations are being conducted, and i associate myself with the phrase that no deal is better than a bad deal. the only other thing i'd say about that is for me, and for our department, we have some other obligations associated with this. one is to continue to deter iran's other detrimental behavior in the region and in the gulf, and protect allies and partners there to include secondly very importantly our critical partnership with israel. very strong ally. and that's important. and then the third is our general presence in the gulf. so those responsibilities which

are also related to iran and iranian behavior, those are responsibilities that fall on the department of defense and that we take very seriously. i know the chairman does also. >> well i certainly wish you the very best in everything else that you do, sir. and general dempsey let me express personal gratitude and collective gratitude for the whole country for the gallant service that you've offered to human family. i mean, this has been an amazing thing that you've done, and we are grateful to you. and so with that i always ask you a tough question. >> let me go on for about 25 seconds thanking you for the kindness that you've just -- >> i think he gauged that i had about 25 seconds left. general dempsey, what is the current cap on troop developments -- deployments, i should say in iraq? i think it's around 3,100. and is there a justification for that troop level or is it a

really an arbitrary policy decision? and do you believe in your best military judgment that that policy represents the surest and best policy to expeditiously defeat isis? >> my military advice on the best and most enduring way to defeat the islamic state in iraq and levant is through our partners with a coalition, and using our unique capabilities, whether they be training or precision strikeses, or working to build institutions, so that the iraqis notably, understand they've -- and other regional stake holders who have more to lose and more to gain by the defeat of isil, actually are in the lead. and therefore that number is not arbitrary at all. it's purpose-built to that effect. >> mr. chairman, i'm going to yield back. thank you, both, again. >> thank the gentleman. mr. nugent. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

and to mr. carter and first of all i want to thank both of you. mr. dempsey, i appreciate your service to the country and particularly the uniform that you wear of the united states army. it means a lot to me. secretary carter, the first time i get to meet you. but the question i have, and i guess where i'm kind of perplexed is what is going on within iraq today, where we have the general of the qods force leading the charge basically, and you know, i get our reluctance to have boots on the ground. because let me tell you, my kids have been there. so i don't necessarily want to see them go back. but on the same token though, i hate to see that iran now has taken the lead in particularly when you go back in history of iraq with us, recently in 2011 when i was there, we had five u.s. service members killed the night i was there by an advanced

ied supplied -- go figure -- from iran. and now we're allowing them to take the lead and -- and you remember back when we had our forced in iraq at the draw-down and american troops being killed and ambushed because of the status of forces agreement particularly as it related to iraq, they kept us from going and hunting or capturing or killing the guys that were killing our troops and we knew where they were laying their heads down at night. but the fact was these are the same now that are taking the lead in iraq and do we think we're going to see a different outcome with the iranian regime today than what it was then and the pressure it will put on the iraqi leaders and ghani i think has brought the fresh air but i don't know how he is going to operate within that when the iranians are standing there saying listen, we're giving you back your country. how do we deal with that?

>> it is a very good question, because what defeated the iraqi forces last summer was sectarianism. and if the fight against isil becomes a purely sectarian fight and not an iraqi fight, then we -- >> just let me interrupt you because time is limited, because isn't it going to turn back into a sectarian fight when you have iran providing the leadership and training to the troops that are going to push isis back out of iraq? >> well, it is actually a complicated situation. in many places the iraqi security forces, including with sunni elements and the support of sunni tribes are participating in the recapture of ground. in other places it is our air power and iraqi security forces entirely.

in tikrit, you're right, there is a heavy presence of popular mobilization forces which are shiite in sectarian orientation and getting some support from the iranians. that is concerning to us. so it is a very mixed picture. but the side that we're on is the side of the iraqi government operating in a multisectarian basis. and that's the only way in which we're going to have success. >> i don't disagree with that. but when we talk to the forces there in place in 2011 and the training we did for the iraqis, it was pretty evident then we had some very, very good brigades within the iraqi military and then we had some that were the sectarian split-off that were incompetent. and i think that is what we saw happen. and i think that is kind of the remarks we've heard, is that having an enduring force would have prevented it, i don't know, but we would have had a much

better chance of preventing it had we been there to train and assist and keep the pressure on the iraqis at the time. i just want to make sure we don't do the same now in afghanistan. >> i'll say something about afghanistan and maybe the chairman wants to say something about iraq. we have fortunately at the moment a very different situation in afghanistan. namely a bilateral security agreement in place welcomed by the government of afghanistan and a partner in the government of afghanistan in the national unity of government of ghani and abdullah that is not sectarian in nature. that is welcoming of the american assistance and the american training. so it is a very different situation from -- from iraq and the reason why, as i said

earlier, we may well be achieving our objectives in afghanistan in a way that a few years ago, when i was working on that campaign i would not have predicted that we'd get as far as we did. it is a very different situation. fortunately in afghanistan today, and from iraq a few years ago. >> and i appreciate your comments. with that, general, i'd love to hear from you but i've been gavelled back. >> and i'd love to chat, sir. but my time is up. >> okay. >> yep y'all are right. dr. win strup. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you gentlemen for being here today. as i'm looking at the aumf it says the use of special operations forces to take military action against isil leadership. again this is the proposed aumf. does that include capture? or is it kill only? >> it includes capture. >> so, my question is, we talk about capture and the use of all of our tenets of war whether

it's diplomatic intelligence military, economic, all those things. i have some visions of how we could form multiple coalitions, our nato-type coalition and middle eastern coalition and we work together with command and control, this is good versus evil, i think that's the message the world should hear. and you know when it comes to holding, though, you know, i have some ideas about holding those we capture, and how we try them, and how we involve maybe the nation of incident. whether it's isil or the global war on terror how we involve the nation of incident and the nation of origin. and are they going to be part of the process with those that we capture? so my question is if we capture, what do we do with them? >> well, thanks for that question. let me go back to the logic of capture. obviously our objective where possible is to capture rather than -- >> have we been capturing anyone in the last couple of years?

>> well -- >> or especially since we re-engaged in iraq? >> exactly as you say, our coalition partners have been capturing. they've been doing that and they've been detaining. now, just to take afghanistan as an example these are afghan -- on afghan territory, they're detained by the afghans, and subject to afghan law. >> so our special forces for example, you say their mission is to capture or kill, and so if we capture, what are we doing with them? >> the answer is it depends on the circumstances and the location. the willingness of a host country to take custody of them, to prosecute them. i'm not an expert on this. you have to talk to the justice department about that and they are involved in these decisions. but since these are captures -- your question concerns captures that take place outside of u.s. territory, there are laws

respecting that, and we obey. >> mr. secretary, are we capturing and then hands off? we just turn them over? are we involved with what may happen? the collection of intelligence is what i'm after here. so what are we doing and if you can't answer, maybe general dempsey can, what are our current posture is. under this aumf. >> well, the answer is it depends on where -- the circumstances of the capture. but to get to the point you are making, which is interrogation and intelligence value, that is an important value to us. it is important that whatever the ultimate disposition of the detainee is that we have the opportunity to interrogate and debrief and that is very important to us. whatever the ultimate disposition of the detainee is. and the chairman can add to that if he wants to. >> dock congressman, what i'd do

is i think this is probably an important enough question that i'll have my legal team work with the secretaries and provide you a longer answer for the record. but i will say that in places where we are in support of the host nation, for example in iraq, we are literally in support of them. so they will do the capture operation, they will give access to the prisoners for us to conduct the kind of interrogation you describe as well as sensitive site exploitation where you get even more. where someone is a direct threat to us either u.s. persons and fasselcilityies or to the homeland we actually have conducted operations with the department of justice representative, and those individuals, there's been a handful, have been brought back to this country for trial. >> thank you, i appreciate that answer. can i ask you if you could mr. secretary, to finish this sentence for me. and the sentence, publicly stating that we will not use ground troops, although i may agree with the policy using troops, but publicly stating

that we will not use ground troops is a good idea because --. if you could finish that sentence for me. >> i'm not sure what you are getting at. >> i'm wondering why we want in our aumf to say that we will not use this entity that we have? >> oh, the aumf -- >> even if i'm not in favor of using them, why would we say that? >> what the aumf says is that in the campaign against isil, we have a very wide range of authorities to wage that campaign, including those that we anticipate are necessary to conduct the campaign and there is one limit to that, which is an afghanistan or iraq-like long ground campaign. that is not foreseen and so the aumf does not request the

authority to conduct that. >> that doesn't really explain to me why it is a good idea. but i thank you for your answer and i yield back. >> thank you mr. chairman. gentlemen, thanks for being here. mr. secretary, in follow-up to representative winthrop's question it just brings back to my mind this issue of gitmo where we're talking about people taking on the battlefield. people taken for question. intelligence gathering. do you support the president's plan? i just came from bath a couple of weeks ago carried a lot of legislation in a very short amount of time on the issue of gitmo. do you support the president's proposal to close gitmo by the end of this year and transfer those terrorists back to this country to u.s. prisons? >> thank you for that question. i don't think the president has a plan to close gitmo and return all the detainees to this country by the end of this year because there's a law that prohibits that. the president does have the stated intention to close gitmo and i'm in favor of the safe

closure of guantanamo bay. i've been there too -- >> would that include the core that can't be released to come back to the united states. >> they have to be incarcerated in some way, there is no question. >> the u.s. prison system. mr. secretary do you support them coming back to the u.s. prison system? >> there has to be some final disposition -- >> is that the only option for a final disposition is a u.s. prison system? >> that is an option that is available. >> what's the other alternative? >> just a moment. but it is now forbidden by law to do that. >> this president has been known to override the law. it is not that this would be breaking news. so do you support -- not that -- what is the other alternative in if the u.s. prison system is not the final destination, what is the alternative, where would they go? i think that there -- we need to work with those of you on capitol hill to find a lawful

disposition for people who cannot be transferred or released safely from guantanamo bay. the reason why i think it is desirable to close gitmo, i realize it is now unlawful to transfer people to the united states, is that i think it still provides a -- a rallying point for jihadi recruiting and i think that is unfortunate. that is the reason to close it. but i say safely close it. we need to find a way to safely close it and lawful and done in cooperation with you. >> i appreciate it. as you know mr. secretary this committee is undertaking an investigation of the transfer of the taliban five from gitmo to qatar in may of 2014. i'm just asking in light of the committee's responsibility to conduct a comprehensive assessment based on a review of this important subject will you commit today where the previous secretary left off to continue the department's engagement in

ensuring all the requested materials provided, and to work with the inner agency to ensure that requested information is provided in those limited instances in which other organizations in the u.s. government have an equity? >> you bet, congresswoman. >> i appreciate it. my final question is, our president, as the commander in chief, said in his state of the union address that the number one threat to the national defense is climate change. admiral mullen just a few years ago said he believes the number one national defense issue in our nation is the debt in our country. do you believe that the debt this nation is carrying, nearly $18 billion as we are sitting here having budget conversations, is more of a threat to this nation's national security than climate change? >> there are a number of serious dangers to the future of our country of which -- >> i would agree with you, sir. i'm just asking, i don't know you well.

i'm just trying to get a perspective from where you're coming from as we're going to be voting on a huge leap in this budget and i think the american people want to know where the national defense leader is coming from, as well. do you believe the nation's debt is a greater issue than climate change? as our commander in chief has stated? >> i think they are both serious problems and there are other serious problems that are not knows two and that we have to deal with all of those strategic challenges at the same time. you're naming two of the problems. >> i'm naming what the commander in chief said as he puts forth a budget that you guys have been defending here for three hours now. i'm just saying he says the greatest threat to our nation is climate change. and we're trying to make an argument that says, you know the greatest threat to this nation and trying to rally people and understanding is that we have an issue of debt that an admiral went on the record to say was a serious consequence and a threat to the survivability of this country. did you agree? >> i think that to the extent

that the deficit drives a budget behavior like the year to year struggle with sequester that we faced, that is a challenge to our national security because the challenge to our national defense and i think we have threats around the world that are very dangerous to us. i think that, to get back to on earlier line of questioning the strength of our nation depends upon other instruments of national power than our military power. i think in the long run, the strength of our nation depends upon our ability to educate people, and to have scientists and engineers, there was some discussion of our scientific base earlier. there are many many ingredients to making a healthy and productive america going forward. we need to tend to them all. and i think we had to have some balance in how we approach these. those things. so i would appeal for balance and a strategic view that looks at all of these issues.

>> thank you. >> mr. zinke. >> thank you mr. chairman. and gentlemen. the country is in your debt. general, i've known you a long time and certainly for your service and mr. secretary, i had not known you as long but thank you for taking the job. having said that, this committee, i'm a freshman. and before this committee, we've heard the testimonies of general abizaid, we've heard certainly conversations with general conway that i know, and fought with in fallujah. and both of them said, i'll quote general conway there's not a snowball's chance in hell that our operations alone are going to degrade and defeat isis. and then given the recent success of iran, and certainly they have embedded commanders in their forces, i even know it's a modern shia force which has great ramifications long-term. and i've always been a fight or go home guy. if you're going to fight, fight

to win. i was never a flag officer, i was a deputy acting commander of special forces in iraq and i was a commander at s.e.a.l. 2-6. at my career i've always looked at protection of our troops and making sure they had the right equipment, right training and right rules of communication to win decisively on the battlefield. having said that, if we are to embed as iran is having success to do and if we are going to go look at general abizaid and general conway's and some of your senior leadership then my concern is is that if we embed we don't embed with just a few. because we've seen what happens should an individual get captured. he's going to die a heinous death in a cage and burned alive. so embedding is going to take a force package of relative weight. and we're going to have to have medevac because if one of our

guys gets hurt we're going to have to bring them out. and it's going to be to a u.s. facility somewhere close. and if our guys get pinned down, we have to have a qrf. that's american forces because we don't want another somalia or benghazi. and we have to have, you know a logistics arm to make sure that our allies we're fighting with the sunnis, and the kurds directly, and the centralized government have the ammunition food, fuel everything it takes to win. because now we're -- we have committed and embedded. and my question is do the current authorization, as proposed, does it allow the flexibility for you, should the decision be made, to embed the force structure i've kind of laid out? does that authorization that you are asking, does it include the flexibility to embed that force package to win?

>> first of all thanks for your own service and thanks for bringing what is evidently a great store of knowledge to this committee. so thanks for that. and the answer is yes. in fact, the president, when he first described the aumf, enumerated a few things that were specifically permitted by it which include many of the items on your list so the answer is yes. >> thank you, mr. secretary and mr. chairman, i yield the remaining part of my time. >> thank you. mr. knight? >> thank you, mr. chair. but not least. i'm going to talk about air power a little bit since it seems like over the last 15 or 20 years we've kind of diverted a little bit away from ex-plane technology, put it into a little bit different phase of different exploration.

and now we're in a phase of flying the wings off an aircraft after 40 or 50 years and not going on to the next generation and it seems to me to be a little quicker phase to stay up with technology. everyone is talking about the iphone here today. and i have a 16-year-old at home that doesn't know anything different than living with the iphone. even though it's only been out for eight years. so in the time of in the '50s when we had five or six fighters working through the program, and we worked through the century series in about an eight-year program, now we're looking at fifth generation fighters that will probably go through 2050 or 2060. is that a concern? is that a concern that we can do something quicker? we always talk about how we acquire things and how we can get through the acquisition phase quicker. well, if we could do that with technology, say we could do a sixth generation fighter today it would be much more advanced than our raptors in the air.

but how could we do that in a quicker phase of 15 to 20-year period? and then fly them for 40 or 50 years? >> well, thanks for that. and that, to me, recalls a word that the chairman used at the beginning of this hearing, which is agility. and if we don't have agility in all of our programs take 10 or 20 years to develop, we're not going to have the best military in the world. on the other hand -- not on the other hand, but in addition it is the case that aircraft remain in our invinner to for a long time. now they're not the same old aircraft. they're continually modified. the software is changed. the armaments are changed. and so forth. but few realize, as i'm sure you do, that 70% of the cost of a military system is in owning it. not buying it in the first

place. so as we talk about acquisition reform and cost control, as we began this morning discussing, we must pay attention to sustainment costs. and in the fifth generation aircraft, the f-35 and so forth, we are trying to be very attentive to sustainment costs because they are going to be the lion's share of the total life cycle cost of the airplane. >> and mr. secretary, i don't argue with you, in the phase of an aircraft before fifth generation we were talking about armament and how we could change the aircraft. some of that was with avionicses, some of that was with guts. but a lot of it is what we hung off the airplane. today it's changing quicker. it's changing yearly. of what the advancement in aircraft can be, how we detect them, how, far they can get into the battlefield without being seen.

those are the things that are our young airmen should be worried about because the advancements are coming so quickly. for about 50 years those advancements weren't there. it was just -- if we were faster than you and we could shoot first, then we beat you. >> i'm with you, and i'm very concerned that we keep up in the electronic warfare field which i think you are referring to in that, some of our potential opponents have made advances in that area, enabled by the spread of technology around the world and so if we're going to keep the advantage we've historically had, we need to keep up in those areas. so i am completely with you. >> okay. in my last 50 seconds i'm going to say that if there is some way we can do this in d.o.d., that companies do this all of the time, we've talked about one today, that talk about how

quickly they can get it out into the field because the quicker they get it out there, the quicker they make money. the quicker we can do that in d.o.d., the quicker the war fighter is safer or is ahead of the technological curve, and we've seen that with uass, with the young soldiers on the field where they're able to see the enemy, where they probably couldn't see him without them getting around there. so those things i would ask that we could do something like that in dod that might replicate what they do in the private industry. >> we have a number of initiatives in our budget that have exactly that intent and i would be pleased to provide you with more information on them. but i think you are on to something that is terribly important. and it is one of the areas where we are trying to make investments and we need the funding to make -- those investments. >> thank you, mr. secretary. and general thank you, you have helped the freshman class very

much and i'm sure you've helped everyone on this dais but i appreciate your service and your commitment to our country. >> ms. mcsally? you're on. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you secretary carter, general dempsey. i was a masters of public policy graduate so you were one of my instructors back in 1988 and 1990 so it is good to see you again. >> good to see you. >> we've both been able to find a good job to make a difference, right? >> well, thank you, you make me proud. >> well i look forward to working with you in future. i want to talk a little bit about combat search and rescue capabilities in iraq and syria. i was 26 years in the military and i was an a-10 pilot, just truth in advertising and ran our joint search and rescue center during the operation southern watch and then the early days of the afghanistan war. so i know there is tremendous challenges in trying to make sure if someone has to eject or

get shot down, that we're able to rescue them very quickly. also in the environment that we've seen with the fate of the jordanian pilot, to be able to immediately be overhead to locate and protect them while we're moving the forces to pick them up. i mean we've got to get them right away. i'm sure you're aware of that. i've gotten an initial brief and i'll get a more detailed classified brief tomorrow by the joint staff on our combat search and rescue posture but i am concerned, and i know maybe we'll have to talk more classified about our response capability and our posture and whether it's limited by the 3100 person on the ground limitation. because we've got to be able to make sure, especially the guys flying single engine airplanes like the f-16 that if they have to eject we're going to do everything it takes, and sometimes that takes tremendous resources on airborne alert to be able to go in and protect them so that we could get them out. could you speak generally about that? and i'd like to follow up more classified. >> i'll speak generally because we, as you know full well,

thank you for what you did, we need to talk the details about this in a classified session. which we could do. but in general, it is not -- it is not the 3100 limit that in any way paces the search and rescue effort there. it is time and distance. and we're very attentive to that. again, i don't want to say more here. but i'm sure you can well imagine what i mean. very attentive to that indeed for our air operations over both iraq and syria. i'll see if the chairman wants to add anything. >> yes, thanks mr. secretary. by the way congresswoman speaking to you about combat search and rescue is like talking about nuclear issues sitting next to a nuclear physicist. but i will do so nevertheless. it isn't -- we are not limited limited -- the bond does not limit our ability to do combat

search and rescue. and you know generally where we're postured. my staff will articulate that tomorrow. we also we think the mission is high risk, we can, as you know, we can actually put the package airborne as part of the air tasking order. >> right. >> so we're very attentive to that. i think you'll find the staff will ease your concerns tomorrow. >> okay, great, thank you. i wanted to follow up on the a-10 issue. you mentioned it earlier. i commanded the troops of the fourth fighter squadron that's deployed into the european theater working with our allies related to the aggression that we've seen some caught of russia and we also have a-10s deployed to iraq and syria. but the president's budget requests mothballing 160 of them, and while we don't really have a suitable replacement. and i asked yesterday secretary james if that was strictly a budget decision and she said yes. and i just wanted to hear from you if that is the case. whether this is -- because we hear many different arguments over the last few years quite frankly, which are all over the map, that if you had the resources, would you keep the

a-10 flying to its life span which is 2028? >> i agree with secretary james, it is strictly a budgetary issue. we're squeezed on all directions, and a budgetary issue. we are doing our best under to give the country the defense it needs for the amount of money we have. a 10 is a very proud aircraft and i think we've tried to find common ground with those here on the hill. and the, and very important to me which is not a money issue is to make sure that our close air support from the air force to our ground forces is a real enduring capability. i'm satisfied that it is. i'm sure secretary james said the same thing yesterday. >> you know congresswoman, we've got aircraft provideing

from the apache to the pi. the a 10 is in that sweep of capabilities, but we are faced with a budget issue and trying to make sure we keep enough capability. >> thank you. my time is about to expire, but for the record i have a question i'll be following up with. i know we're talking about making sure women can be fully integrated into all jobs in the military, but i want to hear if there are deployment positions that are male only positions. we've seen some of the issues pop up at gitmo. when i served in saudi arabia there were specific positions that were male only. i'd like a follow up on whether you have only male only deployment positions. thank you. >> thank you. as promised, i want to come back on the audit issue. we had two service secretaries

yesterday who said the biggest impediment to meeting a deadline in 2017 for their service to pass a clean audit was the defense finance and accounting service over which they had no control. are you aware of the problem and are you going to fix it? >> thank you, mr. chairman. yeah. i think we have a lot of hard work to do on audit. and we're making good progress. i think you probably heard both sides yesterday. the issue is very much a team sport. it requires the military departments who were here yesterday to work with service provider, which is probably the most important one in the department in that respect. the second way though, it always requires a collaboration of people throughout the department, people who do audit as a primary function like our folk it's a primary responsibility, be it requires the community, people who don't think audit is my primary job to work because it requires information from all those systems. so, in that respect, the it's

very much like if the secretary were to turn to general dempsey and ask him to accomplish a tas it would require the people, but also requires the lodge stations, all the things that support the same with our audit task. it requires managers that i'm in charge of, but also the community, the people that owned information across the department. so with respect to the issue that was raised yesterday as i understand it, defas is an entity of sbitsitself. it's passed clean audit 15 times in a row. they are not an incapable organization in any way. they are doing contracting for all the military departments to do the independent auditing. in a role as service provider they've had four areas where they have a clean audit, their bred and butter areas of military, paint and civilian, contractors and dispersing.

the issue that came up whetherre they did not pass was called financial reporting, which the most involved complex spreads across the whole department issue and that's where the challenge lies. they were given ten areas where they were examining and nine that didn't pass. they were given nine item, 12 will be done by the end of this year and the others will require more time. so, i would say that this is why you do audits and exempts. it's why you have an operational readiness inspection, but i just want to say that the defas is a capable partner. they have a problem here. but financial reporting is strictly an issue only because it's the interaction of issues across the department. >> all this talk about budget up here and this makes a big difference and those of us who

believe we need to spend more on defense, if we can't improve the accountability for how we spend that money it makes our job much, much more difficult. and i appreciate how much how complex this is. but i'm just as an editorial comment, it makes a big difference in getting budget support up here if we can meet those deadlines for an aud audit and if we can't it undermines that effort. particularly in the middle of these discussions, it is very much on my mind. let me ask you one other thing. you've heard some of the substitution about what we can use oco for and what we can't. my understanding is there is omg guidance and perhaps some department guidance that helps direct the uses for oco funds for base funds.

my understanding and my memory is that congress can also designate oco funds for procurement and we've bought f35s in the past with the funds. am i on the right track here? >> yes, mr. chairman. there is an agreement between the office of management and budget. i was involved in negotiating that early on. we felt it needs to be tighter than it had been. when we got here. and we've, that agreement dates to 2010 and it's got geographic aspects to it. things that happened in this country, things that happeneded in countries not in the agreement and we've had some modifications to that. you're also correct in that congress plays a role in general, oco funding has to be december kated by both the congress and president as oco spending at emergency spending and that's the procedure that was followed. both parties have a voice and

the f35s have been an issue of contention in the past. just a few months ago, we requested to buy a few to replace aircraft that were destroyed at kandahar and several committee, including this one approved, but one did not. so, there was division and remains edition sometimes on what's appropriate use of oco. >> would you do me a favor and you or your folks submit to us in writing an overview of how it works now? as y'all all said this is not the best way to run a railroad. and i hope that we can have a different method of funding the department as we move down the many steps ahead in the budget process. if however, we end up with a substantial amount of oco to make up for gaps in the base, then i want to understand what all of those restrictions administrative, or ledge istive

may be because those are things we can address in the authorization bill. i just want to be ready and you can help us in understanding that. i'd appreciate it. >> certainly will provide that information for the record. >> last question i've got is about ukraine. mr. smith has introduced legislation that would require assistance provided to the ukraine to depend themselves so they can do something about these carriers pouring in from russia. what we've been told in our previous hearings from the administration witnesses as well we're studying. well, every day that the white house dithers about that, more equipment is pouring in for what i prum is going to be a renewed offensive at some point so can you help me understand what the timeline is for a decision on from the administration on providing assistance to the ukrainians. >> yes, thank you.

two things. the first is you're right. our support for ukraine as it tries to create a place for itself in europe, situated as it is between europe and russia, is very important. i know you're asking about the military side of it, the part i would preface. though is that is is principally a political and above all, economic challenge because the economy of ukraine is serious trouble and so, i think the assistance of western countries to the economy of ukraine is the most important thing. it's not my responsibility, but i just wanted to say that's the most important thing. we are supplying military assistance to the military. president just made an announcement about a week ago

about a military assistance at a number of categories, vehicles and so forth, that i think will be of assistance of ukrainian military. they are also under consideration, some additional categories of assistance, which are defensive lethal assistance and those are being considered. i think they should be considered. and i've said that before. but it's a complicated decision that involves other kinds of assistance that we're giving and the paramount fact, which is that we need to support the ukrainian's politically and economically. in particular, our partners in our european. to the end that's going to be the key in keeping what we all want, which is an independent way and isn't pushed around to the russians. >> well i don't disagree about