and women. i understand -- tell me something about -- are these people being trained or are these people kind of letting it all out? and it looks like some of that is happening. and nobody's spoken up. and if somebody doesn't speak up, i'm not sure that this misconduct is not going to continue. this -- this was also a drunken incident. then i learned that in terms of training, there's barely any training going on at the secret service. there were eight special agent basic classes in three years, '08, '09, and '10. by 2012 there were zero. by 2013 there was one. the panel said that you needed staff urgently for starters. what is the problem? is the problem with the

leadership? is the problem with the men and women you're not getting good people? why don't you speak up for these men and women? if in fact they're letting off steam because you're overworking them, are they being overworked? will this budget that tough's just gotten begin to relieve some of those serial days in which people don't get any days off? so would you describe that and would you tell us more about training and what training sessions are expected so that some of this misbehavior will be understood to be absolutely foreboden. >> congresswoman, thank you. i have the same concerns you have. in fact, i want to hear more and more from these agents and these officers, what their issues are. just in a nutshell, i'll tell you that i walked by and around the perimeter of the white house frequently. this past sunday i went to the roll call midnight shift. the following morning went to

the roll call and wanted to hear what are their concerns. and in terms of the -- >> you can see what their concerns are. the days off. are people going to -- according to the panel, the agents were consistently working 12-hour shifts under high stress, often with no days off. is that going to change now that your budget is finally been released by the congress which has to take some of the responsibility for what's been happening as well. >> again, you are exactly right. when i first came back here my number one initiative was to increase staffing. we've got to increase staffing. to do that we've separated one of our directorates which is hr and training. we separated them apart to give each more specific training. we've been working overtime to -- >> you have a new class for 2013. there was only one class. if you need more agents, they'll need more training. >> yes. >> with this new appropriation is there going to be another

class of agents trained, and will the agents who are there who used to get training, i understand every four weeks or so, will they have that recgimen of training again? >> yes. we'll exceed our goals this year. six classes and six special agent classes that were scheduled. we'll now go nine and eight classes. so we expect to hire a lot more people in fiscal year '15 and continue that into '16. that is a critical need for the service and that will also help with getting more people out to training. in fact, since september 19th, the uniform division training has increased 110%. that's just a snapshot. we've got to keep the momentum going. with the agent side of the house on the president's detail that training has increased 78%. again not where we want to be but as we increase the staff we'll get more training for our people. >> i thank the geptntle woman. >> good morning mr. director.

i've got some questions. i guess this is sort of another "gotcha" hearing. we just have incident after incident. we have carta hana the fence jumper. and we have this most recent one. you testified that you cannot take action because -- on personnel as far as discipline because of title 5. but also chapter 102 of title 5 sets some requirements. have you seen a draft that was prepared last year? can you give the director a copy of this draft? it is deliberative draft 7/22/14. it's amendments to the hiring, managing and discipline of its workforce. this is amenities for secret service. so rather than just talk about more incidents, let's get down

to the brass tacks of the issues you face. first is hiring. right? you got to hire good people. you came and you said you need more people. i submit that you need better people and you need better qualifications. when i left the white house about a week ago, i followed a secret service car just by accident. i said what's that on the bumper? it's actually -- it's actually soliciting for folks to work on the bumper of a police vehicle. this is the way we hire folks for the secret service. i didn't know -- i didn't know your predecessor, miss pearson, that well. she came from my local town. she called me after she was there for a while and she says, it's very difficult to get this place under control. i've got to have some ability to hire better qualified people. i didn't know that you didn't need a college education for some of those positions. is that correct? >> that's correct. >> yeah.

she said that by law we've dumbed down the qualifications. first, you got to hire people. you don't hire them with an advertisement on a bumper of a vehicle. you want qualified personnel with the highest qualifications. right? secondly, you've got to be able to manage those personnel. and she asked for these things way back -- in fact, on july 27nd there was a meeting with government reform staff. do you know where these recommendations are? i was told they went back to dhs. >> we have -- >> where these suggestions for improvement are. does anyone know where they are? i with aant to know where they are. she knew what was wrong before she was railroaded out. you'll be railroaded out, too, if we don't make changes. but the fault is in the guidelines that you have to follow. she told me managing personnel administering them, you have a 20-year i guess retirement, then you have to retirement on the

law enforcement side. >> that's the older plan was a 20-year retirement but the fers is not 20-years. >> in any event, when you get to the retirement it took two years to get people trained for s scs positions. >> yes. >> the time you're able to administer, you hire the people getting the best qualified, then you want the best administration. right? zpl yes. >> so we have an impediment in that. she asked for that clang. nothing's been done. then finally she said to hold people accountable. secret service holding protectors accountable. that's what this hearing is about. she asked for the ability to hire and fire an exempt agency under title 5. do you agree with that? >> yes. >> you do. that's one of her recommendations. but we have to do that.

because -- we heard, oh there a he no command. well, hell, you don't have the ability to command! because your hands are tied by title 5. you can't hire and fire. you have to go through this layer. i chaired civil service and i know how difficult it is to get rid of folks. even discipline folks. most people are just mordved horizontally to some other position. >> yes. >> again, you have to have the ability to hire and fire. this proposal i submitted, which was last july -- and i read the recommendations of the little group that came up with stuff. until you address this fundamental problem, that director, or whoever succeeds him, will not succeed in managing his personnel because when he can't hire people that are qualified two he can't manage or administer those folks, and three can't discipline and hire and fire people that need to be held accountable. is that right? >> that's --

>> basically? >> basically, yes, sir. >> okay. and finally, if a bullet hits the white house, a window or the building, is something done to address that? you talked about the fence. >> yes. we have procedures now if there is any -- anything hits the white house, we have instituted procedures since 2011. >> i'd like to know for for the record or behind the scenes about drones and how they can penetrate the perimeter. thank you. yield back. >> now recognize mr. cummings for five minutes. >> director clancy, i want to get down to something you said, you said was unacceptable, and that is when you found out about this incident. you learned of these allegations on may 9th which was five days after the incident occurred. and that is a big concern for me and i know it is for this committee and you. first and foremost, there's no

doubt that you should have been informed about this incident immediately. is that right? >> that's correct, yes, sir. >> you should have been informed about it the day of. >> yes, that's correct. >> at our briefing last week you told us that no one in your immediate office had been aware of this incident. is that correct? >> that's correct. >> last week you testified that the secret service personnel should have reported this incident up the chain. if i have this right, they should have reported as follows. from personnel on the ground to the deputy chief of the uniform division. to the special agent in charge of presidential protective division, to the assistant director of protective operations, and then to you. is that correct? >> that's correct. >> now yesterday the secret service produced documents to the committee indicating that the deputy chief of the uniform division alfonso dyson, became

aware of these incidents on the night of the incident. i guess the briefing sheet is what you sent to start the investigation in the instructor general's office. is that right? >> that's correct. and if i can correct the record. because i know i met with you and other members in a closed-door briefing and you had asked, how is that process started. and i said i think it is a phone call. and it was started with a phone call. but i found out subsequently that there is a follow-up letter which is what we provided to you. that follow-up letter with our preliminary findings the very first day on the 9th. >> so in the briefing sheet it says and i quote deputy chief dyson advised that he was familiar with the incident involving the agents and was briefed about the incident on the evening of march 4th, 2015.

end of quote. >> yes. >> so director if the deputy chief of the uniform division knew about the allegations, did he alert the special agent in charge of the presidential protective division? did he? ? >> i don't know, sir. i'm going to tell you that i am infuriated that i have not been advised on march 4th, why i didn't hear any of that information. i don't know. but i will tell you that the deputy chief needed to raise that up through the chain of command and this is something that i've been battling since i first came back in a very brief time here. i've been back about 30 days. we are working furiously to try to brake down these barriers where people feel they can't talk up the chain. i can tell you personally i'm going out, reaching out to people, going to these roll calls and individually. our assistant director of investigation is going out into the field talking to people. our assistant director of protective operations going out talking to people. we've made all these avenues

through hotlines and web pages to even anonymously get information up the chain. why it didn't happen in this case, i don't know. if you are a he not comfortable going up through your chain of command, you have all these other avenues. anonymously you can go and report incidents of misconduct or whatever you want to report. but you've got to make use of these outlets. >> let me ask you this. how about the assistant director for protective operations. when did he learn about these allegations? do you know? >> i don't know -- well, march 9th. march 9th. because when i found out, i found out the morning of march 9th. i reached out to the assistant director of protective operations. he did not know at that point. i asked him to go find what he knew about it what he could find out about it. >> i understand there is an ongoing ig investigation but according to your own testimony you didn't learn about these allegations from anyone at the secret service. >> that's correct. >> i'm concerned about whether

there's still a problem with the chain of command right now. sounds like there is. based on what you know today what is the highest ranked person who knew about this incident and failed to report it? to your knowledge. >> to my knowledge? again, on march 9th is when i was given all the details that we had. we turned it over to the iog. then i stepped out of it. in all candor right or wrong, i compartmentalized things and i didn't want to see it. the deputy chief is the last one that was -- that's how -- >> well on more than one time here this morning you said you had a meeting with your higher-ups and you told them this is -- you're not going to tolerate this. did you ask him -- any of them, did you all know about this? >> no, i didn't. i was very blunt with what was my expectation -- >> whoa, whoa whoa. rewind. these are your top people.

right? zpl yes. zpl >> yes. >> would that be the eight assistants? assistants. >> there would be more of that in this room. >> you never asked them? you didn't say ladies and gentlemen, who knew about this? >> i did not. >> why not? >> at that point i honestly did not want to interfere with this oig investigation. i wanted no indication where i might be pressuring someone. no indication that we've reached out to people. or people to leave that room and say the director's asking for more information. i wanted to give this oig complete ownership of this investigation. >> just one last question mr. chairman. director at any time did you have a staff meeting where you would have expected -- i mean, you know, you and i have talked about this sacred trust in the

secret service, these jobs of honor. would you have expected ssh-- did you have any meeting where you would have expected someone who knew about this to say something to you? >> absolutely. absolutely. when i heard this on march 9th i was in disbelief. i didn't believe it. i called and said, look run this out. especially over that time frame. >> thank you, mr. chairman. zpl now recognize the gentleman from tennessee, mr. duncan. >> thank you mr. chairman. director clancy, all over this country there's been a growing belief for many years now that the federal government and many top-level federal employees have become -- have been becoming more and more bureaucratics elitist, arrogant and there along with this, been a growing belief that we've ended up with a government that's of, by and

for the bureaucrats instead of one that's of by and for the people. when you refuse to allow these four witnesses to come and of it t to us who are supposed to represent the people as best we can, when you refuse to allow these four witnesses to come and you refuse to release most of the video that's been requested. you should realize that this looks very bureaucratic elitest and arrogant. and it looks as though you feel you're working -- you're not really working for the people of this country. that you're working to protect the people of the secret service. and last week in the house appropriations committee, chairman rogers said in a very strong, very emphatic way that he felt there should be terminations and firings for all these incidents that have

happened. and i hope that you agree with that. i assume that you are close friends with mr. connelly and mr. ogilvie. but i hope that you feel that you have more of a duty to the people of this country than you have a duty to protect mr. ogilvie and mr. connelly and others who have been involved in these other incidents. what do you have to say about that? >> sir you're absolutely correct and i've already made changes in our agency of people that i know and who served honorably but i wanted a fresh perspective. friends of mine. i have moved them -- or offered them positions in other components in dhs. i'm not opposed to moving people people that i know. it is all about the agency. in terms of -- >> well, that's one of the problems though. too often federal employees who really mess up they aren't really disciplined. they're not cut in pay.

they're not fired, they're not terminated. they're just moved to a nice desk job someplace else and i've already been told that ogilvie and connelly have been moved to some other desk job someplace and not much at all's been done to them. i'm going to yield the balance of my time though to mr. gowdy. i think he has another question or two that he wishes to ask. >> thank you. director, who has custody of the video that was retained and preserved? >> technical security division. >> who has the power to make a copy of that video and turn it over to mr. cullmmings and mr. chaffetz? >> sir, i would in consultation with my legal counsel. i got to be honest with you. i don't know that for certain. i'm relatively new to the position. >> well, to the extent you do have the power or have influence over those who do have power, will you recommend that a copy of all video footage be made available to mr. cummings and

mr. chaffetz? >> congressman, i'll certainly talk to our department and with our legal counsel -- >> you don't need lawyers for everything. i mean you got a bunch of them on this panel. i'm telling you, if the only excuse they have for not turning it over is there's some theoretical potential investigation or prosecution? i promise mr. cummings and mr. chaffetz are not going to interfere with either one. i promise you that. so we can eliminate that concern now. now, will you turn over all available video to mr. cullmmings and mr. chaffetz? >> again, the video will be available at all times. i will go back to our department and agency and revisit this. >> do you know if there was emphasis on -- emphasis on "was" video of the alleged officer misconduct? >> no, i'm not aware. >> you don't know whether any of the cameras were trained on the car that these two agents were in? >> the only video i'm aware of, congressman, is what we have

provided as they entered the gate at south park. >> well, do you have a policy of retention and preservation of any video that could be potentially part of a criminal investigation or officer misconduct? is that part of your policy? >> yes, sir. we retain video that is related to any incident on -- >> so if there were video of that, no one would have taped over it or destroyed it? >> the video would not have been destroyed. in someone saw an incident somewhere else in the complex, yes. >> how about taped over? would it have been taped over? >> by practice, it is automatic. you have to -- my understanding is you have to selectively decide what you want to preserve. otherwise -- >> wouldn't potential officer misconduct be one of those things that you wanted to preserve? zpl . >> without knowing the facts, i don't know what took place beyond that entry point. >> i yield to the chairman. >> thank the gentleman.

gentleman's time has expired. now recognize the gentleman from massachusetts, the ranking member of the subcommittee on national security. >> thank you mr. chairman. you know i'm a little bit -- more than a little bit put out by the willful ignorance here. you know when you -- let's just back up a second. secret service is an intelligence gathering organization. and then you don't ask questions. and you destroy evidence. i guess i'm trying to have faith. i really am. i offer no disrespect whatsoever. py think you're an honorable man. but i tell you, this whole system -- you said at the tail end of your testimony that you had implemented a change to go to seven days retention of

video. is that correct? >> that's correct. >> so we went from 72 hours now to seven days. >> that's correct. with the intent to look at our storage capabilities to go beyond that. >> all right. i'm actually going to -- if we have to do it legislatively, the fa kt the fact that the department of homeland security requires logan airport to retain their tsa tapes for 30 days if i have to do it legislatively i'm going to make a recommendation that we adopt legislation that requires that secret service keep video for 30 days. if that's what we got to do. director clancy who is responsible -- who's the individual responsible for technical security division? because i want to send them a subpoena as well. they're not on this list of folks that we had. but who is that person? >> he is relatively new in the position. just -- >> that's okay. >> joseph depetro is the chief

of the technical division now. >> so would it be correct in me assuming that he's responsible for that whole surveillance around the white house and the technology, the tapes, the purging or scrubbing of the tapes and all that is that the person i want? >> yes. he would be able to talk to those questions that you have. yes. >> okay. all right. and we would give him a subpoena duces tecum as well to have him bring whatever information he has. that will be good. i mean the local pigly-wiggly has 30 days retaining tapes. to just scrub those tapes without asking questions, and coming from an intelligence gathering organization, it is just -- it leaves me almost -- almost speechless. i just can't imagine a more

deliberate attempt not to understand the nature of the problem. what's the penalty -- now it's clear from the tape that the two officers drove in to an active bomb investigation. i don't think there is any question about that. right? mr. ogilvie and the other gentleman -- i'm blanking on his name -- but the two agents. >> connelly. >> mr. connelly. okay. so you got an active bomb investigation going on and they drive right into the -- they drove right through it. i guess they were going back -- they left their car at the white house so they were going to get their car. i understand that. but in the meantime they drive right through an active bomb investigation. any disagreement on that? >> i don't know the facts in

terms of going to get a vehicle but i know they absolutely drove through an active investigation. >> there's no question about that. and yet we re-assigned them. so we know that. we don't even ask them questions about that. and yet we just re-assign them to desk jobs, there's no discipline at all. what's the thinking behind that? >> to put them on administrative leave, they would have administrative leave with pay and i felt that we could still get some work out of them. and also i didn't want to do the discipline in a piecemeal fashion. >> well, i need to interrupt you right there. the signal that you're sending to every other secret service agent, uniformed and ppd, is that those folks were not penalized at all for doing what they did. and so you didn't remove them. you didn't remove them. i think it would have been a clear signal to send to every

other member of the secret service that those two guys screwed up and they're gone. for now. and we're going to hold them responsible. instead, instead -- and i know you're thinking about, okay, they'll be sitting at home instead of working -- but i think on balance, i think it was a more important -- especially with the history we've got here of folks shooting at the white house and jumping over the fence and it's like the keystone cops here. so i think it would be a more important message to send to the employees that these guys screwed up and they are being held accountable rather than just putting them on a desk job. >> congressman rest assured, once we get the final report, which again i'm told will be weeks -- people will be held accountable. >> yeah. >> and i can understand frustration for many here on the committee, as well as within our

workforce, but they're looking to see how are these things handled and how do you handle agents as opposed to uniform division. so i respect your view, sir. >> i just want to -- in closing, i just want to say, there needs to be a rapid response to these incidents. we can't put this into a bureaucratic process where i get an answer in eight weeks or ten weeks. that cannot happen. you need to have the and the to act right now on an incident like that rather than file some forms and bring in somebody else and engage in willful ignorance and let somebody else handle this stuff. you're in that spot because you're very capable and in the future we need you to have the ability to act. i'll yield. >> now recognize the gentleman from north carolina, mr. meadows for five minutes. >> thank you mr. chairman. mr. clancy thank you for your testimony. i want to return to what you said earlier about meeting with

your senior staff and not asking what they knew. when did that happen? >> sir, it happened -- forgive me sir -- my memory with everything else is converging. wednesday. wednesday. >> wednesday, what day? >> that would have been the 11th. >> so you met with your senior staff but you waited until wednesday to meet with your senior staff when you were informed of this on the 9th? why would you wait two days to meet with your senior staff? >> i had a hearing on the day in between and -- >> i have hearings every single day. it doesn't preclude me from asking detailed questions like that. >> forgive me, sir, i don't know what my schedule was. >> so why did you wait two days? was it not important to you, mr. clancy? >> as i expressed are earlier, this is lugely important to me and to the agency.

>> all right. so why did you -- you said earlier you didn't ask the question what they knew. you're not interfering with an investigation for you to be informed of what they knew. that wouldn't interfere with an investigation. why wouldn't you have asked the question? is it so that you could pull a sergeant schultz here today that you know nothing? i don't understand. >> no, in fact when i pulled that group together this hearing was not scheduled. i did that because, again it's probably hard to understand for this committee -- >> it is very hard for mr. lynch and i to understand how there would be a lack of inquisitive nature on why the director would not want to know. >> to be candid, i compartmentalized this incident. i gave it to the oig so that i could concentrate on -- i have protectees all around the world, classified documents i have tro keep up with president of

afghanistan and all these other issues that i need to focus on today and future threats. this in my mind -- >> well the president of afghanistan may be very important. and indeed he probably is. but the president of the united states is a lot more important and i wouldn't compartmentalize and put that somewhere else, would you? >> you will a of our protectees are important but certainly this in my mind i gave it to the oig. i was content to wait until we get all the facts and not do things piecemeal because i thought that was a dangerous path to take, to do things in a piecemeal fashion. information starts to leak out and information would have started to leak out people would start -- >> so keeping these guys there working on administrative duties, do you not think that they have the ability to talk to some of their fellow workers and spin a different narrative instead of sending them home as mr. lynch had suggested? do you think it is not dangerous that they might interfere with the investigation? >> they could still converse in my view at their residences with

anyone they wanted to. keeping them -- >> so you haven't told them not to converse and tell a different story. >> i haven't spoken to those individuals. >> so these are gs-15 and you haven't spoken to them -- why? >> the two individual -- >> why have you not spoken to them? >> i didn't want to -- again, interfere with the investigation. one is an scs and one is a -- >> mr. clancy, you were hired to clean up the mess. >> yes. >> and you and i have met personally. >> yes. >> before you were actually the official director. i told you about a number of things where i was actually getting e-mails. >> yes. >> and i stem cell get e-mails. anonymous e-mails on all kinds of different things that are happening happening. details in honolulu where we've had some of the same accusations made that have been made in other parts of the country. details where people have actually had major offenses and

then were left within the secret service and allowed to retire or something a year later. what are you going to do? because i asked you specifically about forced transfers and how the threatening of taking away their security clearance for some of the rank and file and yet nothing has been done with that, mr. clancy. are you going to act on that eventually? >> yes. in terms of threatening to take away their clearances, i understand that was in a letter that went out to people when they were routinely -- we move people around the country. zpl . >> it is used as a force of manipulation for most of the rank and file. at least that's the wait they see it. so are you going to make sure that they know that their security clearance will not be taken away? >> right. >> clear and simple. yes or no. >> security clearance is not taken away. >> if they denied to thecide not to transfer, you can't affect their security clearance. zpl we can't do that. now the president's personnel

needs additional detail. if they say no, i don't want to have to go to the president's detail, now we're short on the president's detail. that's the nature of the business and they're informed of that when they are hired. >> this sounds like just the same old problem that we had under the previous director, mr. clancy, and i'm very troubled. zpl >> thank you. >> mr. clancy, welcome to the committee and thank you for your service to your country. i want to white -- first of all, i think there's bipartisan -- a lot of bipartisan agreement on this committee about a problem obviously at secret service and i think that you're going to find those bipartisan in agreement to how we resolve this. my friend and mr. gowdy and his questioning raised a very

interesting point. i'm pretty sympathetic with this point of view, but i'm opening to hearing a counterargument. you've got an oig investigation going on so they've got the tapes. well, congress has a constitutional role irrespective of what an oig is doing. now the fact that we have the power to compel doesn't always mean we should use it especially with an ongoing investigation. there are plenty of precedents for not doing that for not dropping that hammer because we don't want to unduly interfere with a prosecution or whatever it may be. but i would say that im -- to underscore mr. gowdy's point -- i think the burden is on you and your lawyers to make a case before this committee representing the institution of congress for why at this time it would otherwise corrupt an ongoing investigation. absent such compelling testimony or rationale, it seems to me this committee is entitled to

those tapes for its own investigative purposes. we are an independent branch of government. we have every right to exercise our oversight. hopefully we do it responsibly. but i just -- i'm telling you in my view we're going to move forward on a bipartisan basis on this issue. not always the tradition of this committee but in this case kay, i think that's where we're headed. i don't speak for the ranking member but i join him in his observations. just a word to the wise mr. clancy. that's where we're headed. >> congressman, i sense all of you, your outrage. all of you. and i will go back and revisit this with our folks and with the department and see if we can accommodate the request. i've heard all of you loud and clear today with what we need to do. >> i thank you. . i'm going to try to get through five questions quickly and hopefully you will cooperate. do you believe given your new responsibilities -- and i know

you've got a lifetime invested in this very noble service with a storied history. is there however, do you think parallel with that or sort of super imposed on that noble tradition, perhaps a creeping cultural problem that has to be addressed in your ranks? i think both the chairman and the ranking member cataloged a history going back of unfortunate headlines. >> congressman i think we do. i think to be candid -- >> "we do" what? >> we do have a small element that has a culture of in this case -- most of our recent cases, alcohol has been involved in the most recent cases. however, i will say that the oig did a report and i think 8% of our incidents involved alcohol. but irregardless, in our looking

back at our recent history some alcohol has been used. so that is clearly something i'm concerned about. we're looking at how to address that. in terms of the culture of not bringing information up through the ranks there obviously is a concern with that as all of you are getting these anonymous calls and -- or maybe not anonymous. either way. that's something we've got to fix. i know it is not a proper answer but some of these things take some time. and it has to come with building trust and there's communication and we're trying to hammer this home, give us a chance through communication. >> okay. the five-day delay. to what do you ascribe it? was it bureaucratic inertia or do you believe somebody was deliberately trying to withhold that from you so that -- to preclude your taking action? >> this is speculation on my part. i don't think anyone was intentionally hiding it from me. but at a lower level, if they felt that -- i don't know how they viewed the incident.

and the oig again, i'm sorry to keep leaning on them but we'll find out those facts. i don't want to speculate for those at that level, that rank. >> obviously it would be very troubling if it were the latter. right? >> absolutely. >> bureaucratic inertia we can manage through that and try to clean it up. but if somebody is deliberately trying to scrutinize your ability with an unfortunate incident that doesn't put us in a favorable light, you have a problem. zpl it would be a direct reflekdzre reflection of my leadership. zpl well, it would be a direct challenge. don't know if it would be a reflection. i think that's an element of concern both for us and the public. we had a review panel that recommended strongly that the president should seek and outside director for your position. he didn't take that advice. he chose you because he had confidence in you apparently.

and there is an argument to be made that only an insider, a careerist, like yourself, can actually make the tough decisions, knows where the bodies are buried and doesn't put up with sort of nonsensical arguments. on the other hand, the counter argument can be, yeah, we put somebody in there who's co-opted who couldn't possible bey be a change agent and isn't what we need. i would like to give you the opportunity as my final moment of questioning to respond to that. >> well, thank you, congressman. let me just say, one of the things we've done since i've come in, it is not the same old upper tier of management. we have made some changes and primarily because we wanted to take better advantage of our subject matter civilian experts so what we've done in the past, we've had a director and a deputy director. now we have a deputy and just recently made it a deputy director who was named. but additionally at the same level, a chief operating

officer. we're reaching out for a chief operating officer who will not be from within the agency. he or she will be from the private sector. and then underneath that chief operating officer who again is on equal level with the agent deputy director we have a tier of several -- a chief financial officer, chief information officer, several other civilian experts in that side of the house. we're integrating both of them. so this is not the same old secret service from one month ago. in the short time 30 days i've been leer, we've made significant changes to the traditional culture and structure, the structure of the upper management. and we are new, including myself. and i'd like to have some time to try to let that progress. >> thank the gentleman. now recognize the chairman of the subcommittee on national security the gentleman from florida, mr. desanesantis.

>> director with this video policy, last week you said there were three clips with the woman with the suspicion package but only two clips of the agents in the vehicle. why is there one more clip of the woman than of the agents? >> where the female was positioned, it is outside of that gate area, just outside. so that is specific to that incident with the suspicious package and the confrontation between the officer and the lady. so there are three very short, very short clips of that and her actions. the other two clips are more -- all throw it captures the package -- suspicion package but it also captures the agents nudging that barrel and coming through a secure zone. >> but the third angle just would not have captured the vehicle? is that why? >> the first one would not have -- well, there are two

different time frames. yeah. i can't answer that question sir. >> okay. so because mr. gowdy's questions about allowing congress access. you do not want to provide congress with any of its own versions or copies that we could then look, review with the staff and then determine the next steps that we may want to take with the investigation. is that your position? >> as i just recently said, i will revisit. i understand the outrage on this. our initial offer was to be there whenever you needed to view it. we would provide it at any time day or night. but i understand that's not acceptable. >> again, i've been bouncing around so i apologize. i did not hear that. now mr. gowdy also raised the issue of this inspector general. i know you're doing what you think you're required to do, but sitting here in hearings and

across the whole federal government conducting oversight the number of times where witnesses say, well that's the ig we can't do anything we can't goive you information, congress, because the ig. i just don't believe that that was ever the intent of inspector generals to cause the rest of the world to stand still. we have an independent due it i to conduct oversight over all these agencies. we are asked to fund the agencies and i think the american people obviously need to know what's going on so that we can make decisions about that. what is the timeline of the ig investigation? >> i'm told weeks. now again, i haven't been conversing with the ig. i did have one call with the inspector general but i'm told it would be a matter of weeks, not months. >> and he's also doing a kind of look-back investigation for some of the previous incidents. is that correct? >> i saw that somewhere in print but i'm not -- i'm not sure we talked about that. >> that was not something that you asked the ig you went to the ig with the incident at the gate. >> specifically this incident.

yes. >> then at that point -- well let me ask you this. with the witnesses that were invited, we had four witnesses that we asked to attend. they are not obviously here. so what is the reason for not bringing those witnesses here today? >> there's a couple of reasons for that. right or wrong. they're rank and file. they didn't sign up for coming in front of an open hearing with this -- with the cameras and lights and i think it is my responsibility. it's my responsibility -- >> but did you -- i mean correct me if i'm wrong but you have not allowed them to be interviewed behind the scenes, have you? >> we have not. now i understand the staffs may still be discussing that. correct me if i'm wrong on this. but my understanding is that we're not doing that. again, it goes back to interviewing people twice. you get different stories. every time you interview someone you get a little slight difference. not intentionally, but it can be

perceived different. we went through some examples of this in the closed-door hearing. but i think you just have one investigation initially to do their investigation, and then if there are gaps or whatever then certainly others can follow up. >> i think that's problematic. i mean we have our own duty to conduct oversight and the questions that we may ask from a congressional perspective may be different than what an ig would be looking at. and i think we're all interested in accountant but how that accountability would be done within the executive branch would be different than how we as a group that has received recommendations, that knows that there's going to be funding issues with this, of some of the issues that we would want to examine. so i'm not satisfied that that is the way to do it. i join the chairman. i wish at a palestinian mum that

these witnesses would have been provided at least behind the scenes so that we could have received some answers. i yield back. >> we'll revisit that, sir. >> thank the gentleman. i'll recognize the gentlewoman from michigan, miss lawrence, for five minutes. >> thank you chairman. director clancy i looked for the core values of the secret service. and on their website it says that the five -- the agency has five core values. justice, duty, courage, honesty, and loyalty. these values in the secret service adage is worthy of trust and confidence and that to reinforce these values, secret service leaders and employees promote and measure personal

accountability in program performance across the agency by holding each person to the highest standards of personal and professional integrity. the secret service ensures that they preserve the core values and the fulfillment of the vision and the success of that mission. and then i'm always interested in leadership. and so i understand that you have 27 years as a veteran of the secret service, and during your career you were a special agent in charge of the presidential protection division. you yourself was in charge of that division. and that during your tenure of 27 years you also served in the secret service office of investigation, the agency's

internal affairs division. is that correct? >> that's correct. for a brief time. >> so my concern after listening to all the testimony and my question to you today is that i'm -- i recognize that you were brought in to this office -- or given this opportunity and you've been in the office a little more than 30 days but you were brought in this february of this year. correct? and i would -- in looking at your resume, i would -- i would think that experience like this would put you at a position where investigative skills, the knowledge of how a department should operate, having -- because you went up through the ranks. so you have actually performed the duties of the people you are now the director of. but i hear things like, "i don't know," "i'm outraged," "that

shouldn't have happened," "yes there is a culture." when you're put into the job, you're expected to bring all those skills and to provide leadership and to be able to address issues and concerns. i'm really challenged right now. already had those those issues that we have outlined today. how are you going to make a difference. i know that you need time. but when i hear you didn't talk to those who were your executive level to investigate this, when you yourself were in charge of the agencies internal affairs. i would think that you would be

prepared to be able to dig right into that and to sit here today and have a clear vision and clear mission on your leadership how you are going to address that's. and i'm not hearing that. my question to you today as the member of congress and of this committee is where is the vision, the leadership and just the fears commitment to these core values that you took yourself personally, that you now personally are in charge of making sure that that is the mission of this agency? i need you to give that to me because i'm not hearing it. >> congresswoman, in my opening statement statement i said this is my life's work. i've spent most of my life 27, 28 years protecting four presidents.

i've given everything i've had at great expense, personal expense, to ensure that our protectees our presidents are safe. i didn't come back from private industry just tone joy enjoy the ride. i'm immersed in it. i spend hours talking to people at all levels. and we're pushing it out to this new leadership team that we've just built. we've built this new leadership team. we're bringing up the professional people to marry the areas of responsibilities of the law enforcement and get them together. that is new look. we're trying to rinneeinvigorate the look. once this report is done our people are held accountability and we'll have the table of penalties we'll work with and it's based on what other

agencies use and we've only had it about a year. but we will definitely will holding people accountability. and that is what people want to sea. when you ask why is there morale down? there are several reasons. quality of life is one of them but the other reason is we're not holding people accountable in a consistent matter. and that is our first test then. are where he being consistent with the way we hold people accountable and follow up with that accountability. >> i yield back my time. but results is what will measure your leadership. >> yes. >> thank you. >> thank you the gentle woman. we now recognize the gentlemen from south carolina mr. mulvaney. >> i'm going to ask you a couple of specific questions about the incident that we'll be discussing here today and then talk more generally about the agency. as best i can tell, a layman summary of this is a woman

dropped off what she said is a bomb at 10:24 on a wednesday night. yet it looks like a be on the lookout order didn't go out until thursday afternoon at 4:15. does that surprise you? that ordinary course of business. >> i can't confirm. i'm going to ask my staff if that is the actual time flame. >> let's assume it is for the sake. would bitit be tong. >> it would be. >> have you investigated why that happened yet. >> our investigative office certainly will investigate why. they are going to look at the whole process. >> be but you have talked to your folks about this. of you've talked to your senior folks about it. you have done perhaps not a formal investigation but you have asked them why, right? >> on the incident involving the lady throwing the suspicious package, i have talked to our people about that. i've been briefed on the

incident. >> but you still don't have have any idea for it took to be on the lookout order. >> i don't know why no. >> and i'm coming to this issue for the first time. you found her the friday morning. the woman who threw a package at the white house and then ran over a secret service agent with an open car door as she was speeding away you found her at the hotel in virginia on friday morning. you agents talk to her in the lobby of the hotel while she's having breakfast and they didn't detain her. are you aware of that. >> i am after being briefed yes. >> why didn't they detain her. >> i'm going make a assumption other than the fact there was no arrest warrant out. the arrest warrant came out the following day i believe. >> how long should it take you if get a warrant for someone throwing a the bomb at the white

house. >> we know there are books we know she has a history with the secret service and she's been interviewed in the past. >> she has a history. the arrest warning didn't go out until the following tuesday. it took you seven days to get the warrant to arrest this lady. which takes me to the next step in the time line. saturday she was arrested by local police in virginia. and the local police called your pioc, and the pioc told the local police that the suspect is no longer a secret -- on the secret service lookout. were you aware of that? >> i was not. >> does that strike you as something unusual and strange and perhaps wrong? >> it does. i'm not sure why she would not be a lookout. >> and i guess -- i don't want to pile on mr. clancy because i know it's ban rough day for you. but i hope -- this has been a month now since this happened.

you nowknew it was a high profile event. a woman threw a bomb at the white house or what she said was a bomb. and the details are less interesting. let me ask my general question. you have been here 27 years and seem like a dedicated public serviceman. thank you for your service. i think people undervalue you and folks like you who what you do for this nation. >> has it always been this bad? >> no, sir. >> what changed? >> sir i've -- i don't know that answer. i wish i did. i know there was great dedication when i was younger and i think there is -- i know there is great dedication now. i honestly believe it is a smaller element of people that are not satisfied. and again it goes back to how we're treating our people. you know and they're getting crushed, some of them with the hours. because the staffing is so

limited. and we're up for some real challenges as we go into the fall here with the pope's visit and the u.n. that is going to be a tremendous challenge which again is going to create a tremendous burden on our workforce. and i think that is pampt of it too. the demands on the workforces our mission has somewhat expanded but primarily our staffing levels haven't kept up. and that is effecting our morale. but i don't want to dismiss the leadership. leadership is a key part of this too and that is something that ive got to correct and got to work on. but the staffing levels which we're making some headway to, i think that is going to help overtime. >> let's look at that together. one last question mr. clancy. was it better when y'all were under treasury? is that part of the problem that you are under homeland now and not treasury. >> i was a young agent a young manager under treasury. i don't know the relationships and how that worked during that time frame. i wouldn't be able to give a

good answer on that. >> thank you sir. >> thank you is gentlemen. now recognize the gentle woman from the virgin islands ms. plaskett for five minutes. >> good morning and thank you very much chairman and ranking member. mr. clancy thank you so much for your time here. my questions really go along the same line but a much more condensed time frame as my colleague mr. mulvaney. and i wanted to really talk with you about allegations that are out there as opposed to facts. i have a real problem with people putting information out that is not substantiated by direct facts. so i wanted to talk about this anonymous e-mail and some of the allegations that are in it. we understand that you received this anonymous e-mail five days after the fact correct? >> that's correct. >> and you are not very familiar with this. and it was given to this committee yesterday. and i wanted to walk you through some of the allegations that were in there to see what you

have been able to ascertain as being factual, as opposed to those which are not credible or you still do not have information about. >> in the e-mail it says at some point an atsaic from wfo george ogilvie and a ppddsaic mark mcconnelly drove through a crime scene tape. i'm going to get back to that allegation of a crime scene tape specifically. but later on it says that the officers at the scene said they were both extremely intoxicated. they were coming home from ed donovan's retirement dinner. were they in fact returning from a retirement dinner? do you know that? >> i know there was a retirement dinner that night. i don't know if they were coming from the retirement dinner. >> you haven't been able to ascertain the list of guests or individuals that were there. >> i've stepped away from it for the oig.

>> but the oig is looking into that. >> yes they are. >> and they apparently flip on the lights of their govs to go around the roadblocks. what is that? >> it's government owned vehicle. >> so they were in government vehicles coming back to the white house. >> that's correct. >> and they went -- >> did they in fact go around the roadblock? what does that mean? >> i don't know that. it would be an assumption on my part. i know when they arrived at the gate on e street and 15th street there was a barrel there that was placed there by our officers to secure the zone. and they did go through. they moved that barrel over. >> well it says -- the e-mail says apparently flipped on the lights. does that mean -- you know, i've been an investigator and prosecutor. it apparently means the person doesn't know them self. what do you think? do you think this individual who sent this e-mail was in fact

there at the scene. >> i don't know that. because i don't know if the lights were flicked on or not. reading that it sounds like it is secondhand information but that would be an assumption on my part. >> that's what i get out of it. and that the agents nudged the barrel as opposed to we've heard nudged and we've heard crashes. cha one was. >> tchs more of a nudge. >> why would you call it a the nudge? >> because the barrel didn't cross over. it was more of a purple move. it wasn't losing control of the vehicle. it was a very delicate movement of the barrel with the vehicle. >> how was with are they going? >> 1 to 2 miles an hour. >> so crash something would probably require a much greater speed. >> yes the barrel would have been tipped over. >> okay. now i want to talk about a specific time period. we have -- and tell me if i'm correct with these times -- at

10:24 the suspect drives up. correct? >> that's correct. >> and at 10:30 the joint operation center notifies the metropolitan police department. >> that's correct. >> 10:32 they report the uniform division reports the incident to that joint operating center. right? >> i don't have the time line in front of me but yes i -- >> and then at 10:47 a notification message goes out. right? >> according to your time line, yes. >> no at 10:4 the poc reynolds notification regarding the specific package. >> yes. >> and then at 11:12 the pic issues the first of two notification alerts regarding the suspicious package. >> yes. >> okay. what is the difference between the one at 10:47 a notification

message, and the 11:12 the notification alert? >> the alerts should be the same. they are both protective alerts to alert the director staff that there is a suspicious package or an there is incident at the white house or whatever the incident is. so they are updates to the original alert. >> okay. and when did the officers arrive on the scene? >> metropolitan arrived at -- >> no the two officers in question. >> the two officers in question arrived at -- >> 10:58. >> 10:58. so they didn't know that there was a scene there did they? at 11:12 when the notifications went out? >> they should have. they would have received the notification. typically senior staff would receive these notifications.

so they should know and the assumption is they saw the barrels there. and they should know. >> but based on the e-mails was there crime scene tape or any notification that would let them know this is a crime scene. >> from the video i looked at i don't remember seeing any crime tape or any tape. there may have been some out there but i didn't see it in the video they saw. >> thank you mr. chairman for your indulgence at the time. it just appears that this anonymous e-mail does not necessarily comport with the information that we have in fact. >> that's why we need to see the tapes. will now recognize the gentlemen from georgia mr. hice for five minutes. >> thank you mr. chairman. mr. clancy, who are required under the policies of the secret service to report misconduct. >> anyone can report misconduct. >> we have a slide. in that regard.

my question is not can anyone report misconduct. but whose required to do so? >> every -- every supervisor is required is required, to report misconduct. >> and if a supervisor fails to report misconduct there are penalties. >> yes. >> so these slides are accurate. in terms of what is required and the punishment the penalty if policy is not followed. on the night of march 4th. captain michael brawn was the watch commander overseeing the white house. >> correct. >> and in a nutshell what does the watch commander mean? >> the watch commander is the on duty supervisor for the white house complex. >> so the on duty supervisor in charge that night. who does the supervisor the watch commander, report to? >> he reports to an inspector in uniform division.

>> what does the inspector report to. >> the inspector reports to the deputy chief in uniform division. >> which would be who? >> alfonse dyson. >> who does deputy chief dyson report to? >> he reports to special agent in charge of the president's detail. >> which is who? >> robert buster. >> okay. now you have confirmed that the incident was reported is that correct? >> the -- >> the incident on march 4th. it was all reported. did it go through the proper chain of command. >> it was reported up to the deputy chief of the white house complex mr. dyson and from that point on i don't know what notifications were made. >> were the reports made done so in a timely manner? when were they reported? >> and again there is two separate incidents though. if you are talking about the misconduct, i know that it stopped at -- >> well really both. the question i'm trying to

determine if we're following the proper chain of command and doing so properly. >> for the incident involving the throwing of the books, that followed the proper chain of command. the incident involving the misconduct, i it did not follow. >> it did not follow. okay. so could it be that it did not follow the proper chain of command for the misconduct because he was a superior officer? a superior agent? could they have been intimidated fearful or even instructed not to report mr. mcconnelly. >> i can't answer that. i don't know. >> don't you think you should know. >> well i w will know once the investigation is completed. >> what would happen to this crime scene had it been disturbed by someone other than secret service agents? would anything have been handled

differently? someone driving a car ran into the area. >> i would say they would be interviewed. they would be detained and they would be interviewed and see if there was intent. did they know what they were doing. was there intent to disrupt the zone? >> but that did not happen with an agent. so it's one set of policies for an agent, which is basically nothing, versus had it been a civilian, the entire scenario would have been treated differently. >> again, not knowing all the facts -- it may have been longer. >> but that is what you seem to be indicating. >> yes. >> had it been someone else it would have been treated differently. >> yes. >> do you have policies for agents who intoxicated. >> yes if you are driving under the influence and operating a motor vehicle there are penalties for that. >> do you believe the agent who is responded to this incident should be reprimanded for any failure not to report according to policy?

>> now i'm pre judging here the investigation. but if we find that people did not report up through the chain of command absolutely. >> you have already admitted that that did not happen. >> yeah i can't say that i know it went to the deputy chief but i don't know why where it went after that. >> so there was a breakdown. >> yes sir. because i didn't hear about it. >> and what reprimands have taken place to this point for those agent who is did not properly report? >> none to this point sir. right or wrong i don't want to piecemeal the disciplinary actions and i want to hear the facts too. there is a lot of hearsay right now and i'd like the definitive report. >> you stated a number of facts and still no reprimand. i find that inexcusable.

>> now the gentle woman from mexico. >> there mr. chairman. mr. clancy, i recognize that this is a difficult environment. and i have to say that i think there is general agreement by both side of the aisle on this committee and in other committees of jurisdiction that this is a significant series of issues that effect the secret service. and then ultimately effect the security and safety of the commander in chief and largely everybody else in that -- in the white house and the credibility of the country as a whole about our ability to provide that level of protection and security here and currently abroad. and i also know that no amount of money will fix an environment that is like the environment that you are describing where there are questions of accountability transparence

whether there are reprimands, whether those are fair, whether -- it's clear that you have got low morale and folks aren't reporting incidents. you said while you are having an independent review you did say the command on the face was not followed and i would a have to agree that ancillary information, in and of itself warrants some action and there may be other actions as you garner more information about what is coming. so i believe that without a sustained and concerted effort to change the culture of the secret service that nothing will change. now i say this because i've headed a difficult culture change in my career. when i was the department of health secretary. and it requires rigorous constant work. and a clear time frame where you are evaluating whether or not

those culture shifts are making a difference. and while it is -- i understand that you are making administrative changes. and that there will be some new folks. if you are not careful and that is all administrative, you still aren't going to attract the right kinds of shifts in a culture change in that -- in the secret service. and i also recognize that you have got a very difficult job and that we expect you because that is part of your job. you have to restore not only the operations but our trust and the public's trust that you can do that. i also know it is an honor and privilege to work for the secret service. here is the question. tough environment. you don't feel like you're getting the right answers. we oh don't see the day to day that indicate leadership on culture change. give me substantive clear examples, more than the cao, about what you are doing to instill a culture shift in the

secret service? >> number one is staffing. we know that our people are being overworked. and we're trying to build up their staffing. and once we do that give them more training so that they can -- if they have received this training they are going to feel more pride in their work i think. be more efficient and just operate better. we've also initiated about five weeks ago, six weeks ago now a work life initiative. we're reaching out to see what's troubling them what do they need from us what suggestions do they have? we've brought in an outside contractor do this. we expect to hear some very promising results. but i would say also that some of these changes we are making including the coo and the cio, etc., the chief financial officer, these changes are going to have an impact on the workforce. >> i'm not getting a the sense

about the time line and i'm not saying i disagree that those investments are important. but i'm going to disagree -- you need to give me something. i'd like something about your management style. if there is not accountability for every investment that you make in supporting that workforce, which i agree you have to have a workforce that feels sported. but they also have to feel like it is a fair work environment. and if there is no accountability or transparency, i don't believe that you will have the changes that you desire. what kind of management style? what is the message that you are providing today to the secret service? >> we are reaching out in ways that we haven't done it in the past to hear our workforce. all of our executives are getting out to talk to the workforce and investigations. in fact -- >> so accountability is not part of yor management style. >> it is. >> i'm not hearing that from you mr. clancy. >> once this investigation is completed we'll see what accountability is administered.

and we have this table of penalties which is very strict we have to follow and it shows that we are serious about holding people accountable. so there is no making decisions on our own here how do we stone. and it is modelled after other agencies. fairness across the board. >> i'm still concerned i have to say. with that i yield back. thank you mr. chairman. >> we thank the gentle woman. we'll know recognize the gentlemen from georgia mr. palmer for five minutes. >> second straight hearing where i've been misappropriated to the wrong state. my jurisdiction is expanded. thank you mr. clancy for coming in today. there's many reports that suggest the secret service morale is all time low. according to the best places to

work in federal government report the agency ranks 226 out of 300 agencies. there are routine requests for uniformed divisioned officers to work on their days off and the secret services failure to pay proper overtime. this is particularly troubling in the context of what we've been discussing. because when you have low morale at what was once once of the most respected agencies in the world it seems to be indicative and a climate not conducive to excellence. and in some respects not conducive to integrity. how do you respond to that. >> well you are exactly right. when i went to this role call the other night the first question when i asked what are the issues here? what do you need and why? why are we having these issues? and the staffing was the first thing they said. they said we can't get a day off. to get a day off in uniform

division, very often you have to put in a leave slip. sick leave. and you may have a very important function within your family. now we all grow one that. you know you miss your anniversaries and birthdays growing up. but it is more exasperated now especially within uniform division. routinely held over additional four hours. days off are canceled. and that is one of the most important things we got out of this. >> let's talk about the excessive overtime. and this was brought up in a previous hearing and the lack of training. i think they said that uniformed officers were getting 25 minutes training. and that protection detail previously had been spending 25% of their on duty time in training. it's now down to 2%. does that not indicate that you have got a staffing problem? and not only that. in the context of what's happened, the quality of the people that you are recruiting.

i frankly don't understand why you are advertising for secret service agents on bumper stickers instead of going to college campuses and recruiting the best and brightest that you can find first. >> we've corrected that. we've asked for funding to go out to the bases and do a better job of the recruiting. i will stay we get i heard 40,000 people applied for a special agent position. so we're getting a lot of people. but trying to get the right people, it takes us a while to get to them. >> in that regard though, deputy assistant director james senten e-mail to the secret service field office that all background search has to be done in three days. i can promise you they did not do the background check in three days. you familiar with this e-mail?

>> i'm not familiar with that particular e-mail. typically they are given 14 days and i think there was talk to bring it back to 10 days to speed up that background check. but they still go through the polygraph examination. they still go through several other steps. >> 10 days though. even 10 days. you know when you are responsible for safeguarding the president and his family and other members of the executive branch, does it make sense to have -- and in this case a three day background check? >> no. let me just say this. that there are specific requirements in that background check. so they have to be met. we don't lessen the requirements and it it is about the 7 month or 8 month process to ensure that we get right people. good people. they are fully vetted and that is one of the reasons why it takes a while to get our staffing levels up. >> you have had some foreign

nationals. apply. in one case you had a chinese born foreign national who had her -- apparently had her review expedited in the washington field office despite the fact it wasn't sure whether or not she had renounced her chinese citizenship. what is the secret service policy for a foreign national who applies who has dual citizenship. >> i don't have that answer --. [inaudible] you have to renounce your citizenship. renounce your citizenship. mandatory. >> i realize that this country is a melting pot. but does it make sense that we're not -- that we're recruiting foreign nationals to serve in the secret service? >> she has to be a u.s. citizen to be employed by the federal government. >> i believe my time is expired.

thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you the gentlemen from alabama. a great state f alabama. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> now recognize the gentlemen from wisconsin for five minutes. >> thank you. first i want to say i disagree a little bit from some of my colleagues. it doesn't bother me if some of your guys don't have a college degrees. that's over rated. i know so many great people without college degrees. i want to ask more questions and get more about this woman's vehicle. according to the metropolitan police they weren't contacted until 30 minutes after she fled the scene. is that an accurate statement? >> i don't know if that's accurate or not sir. >> okay. i'd look into it. because at least that is what i have here. and to me, if you had two law enforcement divisions say in my neck of the words, the county and the city, and somebody was

fleeing into the county man the sheriff's department would be notified immediately it. kind of scary if it took 30 minutes. >> i know they in a short period of time i think reached out for the bomb explosive unit. so it should have been in that same time frame that the police force was notified. >> maybe my stuff here is wrong. but check into it. did you have a copy of her license plate right away? >> they had a license plate. >> did the officer did you find somebody show up like right away where she lived? assuming there was a -- >> my understanding is the license plate is what helped identify who this individual was. >> right. and i assume that once you know the person is at least they have an address on file that somebody shows up at the house. >> they showed up at the spouse's address in the philadelphia region. and we had agents go out to that residence and to talk to the spouse, who indicated that this

lady was down in the washington area. >> what is her name? >> i can't say that in a public hearing. i'll be happy to give it to you later. >> okay. what else can i say? how long -- for every open spot, how many applications do you get for secret service? >> when i first came back as the acting director i was told that for a special agent vacancy announcement we had 45,000 apply and very few actually made it through the process. >> like very few means how many? >> i'm told there were about 70 that made it through the process. now that is on usa jobs. 45,000. so it was very cumbersome. >> but you had 70 people at least make the fist thing for everybody in there. you said a lot of these problems are alcohol-related which is kind of scary. but you weren't familiar how to

deal with them. i guess it kind of bothers me. because i have a lot of trucking companies in my district. >> yes. >> and you can't deryk at allrink at all. and nevertheless these guys don't have huge problems talk finding guys without alcohol proxy. and i guess you can ask the trucking companies. >> first we've changed the policy. driving within ten hours you cannot enter a government owned vehicle or a leased vehicle that. policy has gone out. we revisited that. and, you know -- >> okay. i'll wrap up with one more thing and a follow-up on congressman palmer. when i was a kid the secret service was the top of the top. when they were coming to town you really felt you had an e lite institution. and you go through the stuff in the file when they get their

name in the paper the last four or five years. it's kind of embarrassing. it's almost like a screen play for some comedy or something like that. so just good luck in your new job and hope you can do something to bring back the pride and just explain to the guys that you are working with and gals that you are working with that right now it is -- like i said you look at it and it's like comedy movie starring phil silvers or something or other. >> thank you. and i will certainly we are focuses on the negative aspect we have had over several years. i don't to paint the entire 6500 force in a negative light. we have people that are going great work and they are pained by this as much as we are here. but there is certainly an element. and rightfully so, we've got to work to try to get them to where they need to be. >> the gentlemen yield. >> thanks so much for coming over. and i yield the remainder of my time. >> let me ask you.

45,000 applications. why -- what is the reason most of these people don't make it? and a i think a lot of people don't realize that we are hitting a brick wall in this country in many instances with regard to quality of people. and i hate to say it. when i listen to my city police department and others, they tell me they have to go through a whole lot of applications before they can get to a few people. and i'm just wondering. when you talk about 45,000 to fill how many positions? >> it would be a class of 24 is my understanding. that is what i heard when i first came back. >> what is the main reasons why? if you know. >> yeah, again just more anecdotal than having the stats right in front of me. but primarily it's drugs. drug-related past or credit issues in the past. they are two of the things that rule people out. one of the things that that

we're doing now is with this accepted service we can bring people in we may know that have a good background. and they can get into that pipeline a little quicker to go through the polygraph and do the background check and all that. so rather than waste a lot of time on people that we don't know if they are going to make it threw or not. we can highlight those we know that will probably get through that process. >> thank you the gentlemen. pursuant to clause b of committee rule 9 we will use the next 60 minutes for an extended period of questions for the wbs. i'll now recognize myself for 30 minutes. director clancy, whose the most senior official on duty the evening of march 4th? >> most senior official on duty at the white house was the watch commander, captain brawn. >> catptain brawn. did the individual act

appropriately and per united states secret service policy? >> i know he reported it up to the next level. >> which is? >> the lieutenant -- sorry, the inspector. he reported it up to his inspector whose not on the complex. >> is it the joint operation center? >> no theinspector is his inline supervisor. >> and he did report it. >> that's my understanding. >> the inspector then reports to who? >> my understanding again from the initial preliminary review was he reported it to the deputy chief, alfonzo dyson. >> whose he supposed to report it to. >> he should report it to the special agent in charge, robert buster. >> both of which -- again these people were invited too. so they are -- you indicated that you learned of the event from a former secret service agent. >> that's correct.

>> can you describe that call. >> yes. on the morning of march 9th i was getting ready to leave our headquarters to an off site meeting and received this call from this individual who said are you aware of this incident that happened supposedly on march 4th? and i said no. and he went into some of these details based on the e-mail you put up there on the screen. and -- >> whose the first person you called? >> the first person i called, i believe -- now again please forgive me as i go there this. because this is weeks ago and i don't have notes in front of me. so i don't intentionally mean to misspeak. but i believe it was the assistant director of protective operations. >> whose? >> william callahan. >> who counseled you not to ask questions on your own following the incident? >> i'm looking at the dock -- the management director from homeland security regarding the oig investigations.

>> whose that? >> no i'm sorry the management director at -- it is a memorandum with the department of homeland security. >> who did you consult with to make this decision that you couldn't ask any questions? >> i don't know if i spoke to our -- well res security, the profession of the professional responsibility and they described the process. >> did you consult with homeland security. >> not other than advising them of this incident. i didn't consult in terms of what i could investigate. >> who in your chain of command is ultimately responsible for briefing you about security threats around the complex? >> the assistant director of the protective operations. >> when did you know there was an assault on one of your officers? >> the evening of march 4th. i would have received the i alert via e-mail. and i believe they called me as

well. they typically call as well. >> so you knew there was an assault on your officer that night. what did you do? >> i knew there was that suspicious package. and i'd have to go back to the pioc alert. but there was an altercation with an officer. that's routine. they happen i wouldn't say almost every day but that is that routine event. >> should that have triggered the saving of the videos? >> the fact that there was a suspicious package would have triggered saving videos. >> assault on one of your officers does that trigger? >> yes that would have as well. it was one and the same. it was the same incident. >> well there are two different incidents. but what -- what period of time is reasonable before and after that altercation should they have saved the videos? >> i -- i would say within -- once things settle down they would call that evening before the shift. certainly before the shift was

over i would assume that the watch commander would call the joint operation center. >> how much video before and after the incident is a reasonable time to save? >> i think anything that captures the incident. that captures the incident. >> do you deal with the incidents different whan the president is in the residence? >> so i'm sorry? >> does your policy change with a discussion about response and video. >> no. >> it does not change if the president is in the white house? >> no mr. chairman. it duds not. >> was the president or anybody in the white house briefed top march 4th incident? >> the white house was briefed on the march 4th incident not on march 4th. when i found out about it on march 9th. that's my assumption. march 9th -- >> who was briefed? >> the deputy chief of staff? >> and who briefed them? >> the special agent -- no i'm

sorry. initially i did via an e-mail. and i think the special agent in charge may have followed up on that. >> so you sent e-mail to the deputy chief of staff. who is that? >> anita breckenridge. >> have you ever spoken with metropolitan police chief lanier regarding this incident. >> i have not. >> you are the director of the secret service. she is chief of police. >> can i just say we did have a meeting scheduled and there was a conflict -- >> you have been in this position for six months as the acting and current director and you have never had a personal conversation with the chief of police for the metropolitan police determinate. >> since i've been back -- >> in the last six months. >> that's correct. >> and not about this incident. >> and not about this incident. again there is interaction all the time with metro around the white house complex. there are issues every day.

there are arrests every day. >> i just don't understand when the principals don't talk to each. >> and -- >> but i think there would be open lines of communication, communication that you all even know each other and that you have each other's telephone number. what time did the protective intelligence operation center alert secret service personnel about the bomb -- about the e-mail about the bomb threat? i believe the answer is 11:12 p.m. correct? >> yes. >> this is 47 minutes after the package is dropped and 15 minutes after the crime scene was disrupted. who drafted the alert? >> our protective intelligence division would draft the a alert. >> do you have a specific name or title? >> i don't. >> do you think it was complete? >> i think based on the information they received it was complete. >> you have reviewed this?

>> i'm sorry. >> you have reviewed this. you have gone back and looked at it. >> i've read the pioc alert, yes. >> why didn't this alert contain information about the suspicious package barrier being breached by mr. conley and mr. ogilvy? >> i don't know that they were aware of it. i don't know that the protective intelligence division was aware of it at that -- >> but they are watching this. there is a live feed of this, correct. >> there is, yes. >> and nobody notices that a car kind of just drives right through the scene. >> they may have noticed it. >> that's why we're going drag these people in and have a discussion with them. we've tried invited mr. buster. kimberly telllow tomas rissa and michael brawn. very senior people within the organization. did the witnesses we sent invitations to in this hearing

personally receive those invitations. >> they were aware but i don't know they received the invitation invitations. >> how do you know they were aware of it. >> i know some of our people have talked to them. >> but not you. >> -- >> did they personally decline. >> -- >> to come testify before congress. >> i don't know if they were asked. >> whose decision was it to not allow witnesses invited to testify before this committee. who made that decision. >> ultimately it is my decision. >> why is it your decision. >> they work in the secret service and it is my responsibility to make those decisions. >> so you told them not to come testify before congress. >> i didn't specifically tell them. through our staffs i said working with the department that we would not provide them in this open hearing. >> why? >> again i was focused on this open hearing.

and i didn't think it was proper to have them in an open hearing giving testimony which would -- as we've heard today the morale in the secret service among many people is not where it should be. and as we bring out -- >> are you concerned that it would have been embarrassing? >> i'm concerned that some of the information that would have been released would have generated a lot more conversation within the ranks and they would have said well if those four were brought up why didn't we have others? or why were they representatives? or their story doesn't sound right. it might taint others that have to be investigated or interviewed. so there is a number of things that would have been -- >> so instead of transparency you opted for just keep it close to the vest and don't provide that transparence correct? >> no. i want -- again. >> you wanted one filter point. >> i wanted the office of inspector general to give them -- >> we'll go back to the conversation that we had.

did you or your staff have any conversations with any white house officials regarding their appearance? >> with the white -- no. no. >> you had no conversations with anybody at the white house. >> no. my conversations were -- actually it was through my staff with the department of homeland security. >> who at the department of homeland security is this. >> i can't answer who. >> was it mr. miorcas. >> i did not speak to mr. miorcas regarding. >> will you give us the answer to that. >> i will -- >> when should we expect that answer. >> >> i will speak to my office. this afternoon. >> thank you that would be great. if we invite these individuals and others within the secret service, if we invite them for transcribed interviews will you provide these individuals to the committee? >> i will. >> will you provide all personnel we request to the committee for transcribed

interviews? >> with the department i will certainly work through this. but i answered -- >> you are the director. >> i'm the director under the department of the homeland security. >> can you make decision this by yourself. >> i can take responsibility for it. >> can you make this decision by yourself? >> we'd have to see. >> what does it depend on? >> who makes the decision. is it the president? >> i would seriously doubt it raises to that level. i'm assuming immaterial goese inging it goes to the legal offices and the decisions are made there. i don't know if they're looking at the precedent or what they might look at this. >> why haven't you'll fully responded to the committee's letter. done in a very bipartisan way. the letter of march 19th for our document request. >> i any some of that takes time to acquire all -- >> do you intend to fully comply with it? >> yes we do.

>> by what time frame? >> i can't understand answer that. now te intent was to have it reed completely by today. but some of these things just takes time. >> have you had conversations with homeland security about the fulfillment of these requests? >> our staff i would assume. >> anybody else in the administration clearing or approving your response to the committee? >> no. but homeland security is. >> homeland security is looking at work and decisions we make yes. >> anybody at the white house? >> not that i'm aware of. >> why haven't you provided the committee a detailed description and timeline of when you became aware of the alleged misconduct or other events of march 4th? >> i don't know. i thought i was forthright in the testimony today of what my account of that day was. >> we need a more complete

timeline. you have yet to provide list of all the personnel on duty or otherwise involved in the response on march 4th. is that something you will provide to the committee? we will. >> when. >> i don't have a time frame for that. >> what's reasonable? >> it -- >> it shouldn't be that hard to tell whose duty. >> no it shouldn't be that hard. i would assume then by early tomorrow. >> that would be great. we appreciate it. thank you. let me ask you when you were special agent in charge of the president protection detail. the ppd did you have an incident where a lower officer raised concerns about security at the white house complex. >> i'm assuming yes. because i was pretty open talking to officers. when i was a special agent in charge? >> how did you respond? how did you deal with those?

>> well i would talk frankly with them. what is your concern? what can we do? what vulnerability do you see? have you talked to your chain of command. i'm glad you came to me. but you should be comfortable going through your chain of command. but i don't think it would be unusual for me to say i won't talk to you. >> do you think you encouraged junior officers or agents to raise concerns up the chain of command. >> i think i did. and i think my manner is the same as today i'm very approachable. >> what is a fireable offense? >> well something that would require your security clearance to be removed. if you have something that might affect national security in terms of your relations with foreign nationals. >> did you take any disciplinary action regarding the failure to

report misconduct by your staff? >> in this case i have not at this point. well it is not discipline. but i did move the two individuals involved until we get through this investigation. >> at the time of the march 4th incident, what was the secret service for policy for driving a government vehicle after drinking alcohol? >> at the time of the incident, you cannot drive a government vehicle under the influence of alcohol. >> can you have a drink? what level? what level is acceptable. >> the way the policy reads going off memory here is that if you are impaired. if you have -- you are not able to control your actions. so it is not a legal limit. it is not the legal limit. so in other words it could be less. you may not be intoxicated by a legal limit. but someone could say that you don't have proper abilities. >> will the chairman yield for a question? >> yes. >> has the chairman or ranking member been able to establish who asked agents connolly and

ogilvy to respond to the scene? >> again, i don't know the facts of this case. what i've heard -- and again at this point, some are news reports and so much information. but i'm told that there were returning to retrieve vehicle. they were not responding back to the white house. >> is it -- can you determine somebody's level of intoxication based on the phone call? >> i don't think so. >> do you know how many people attended the retirement party of march 4th. >> i do not. >> will the chairman yield for another question? >> yes. >> director. i'm trying to understand this dichotomy between the inspect general and you. does the inspector general have jurisdiction to issue subpoenas to people outside the secret service? >> i don't know that answer

sir. >> does the inspector general have jurisdiction to interview former agents? >> i'm assuming he can ask. they are private citizens. >> but the answer might very well be different right? >> different in which way sir? >> different from a current agent than a former agent. >> yes. >> you can't discipline a former agent. >> does the inspector general have the power to subpoena, say, surveillance video or credit card receipts from the bar or hypothetically where a retirement party may have taken place. >> yes. >> so the inspector general does have subpoena power. >> my understanding is they do. my understanding is they are 1811s, they are investigators. >> my understanding was they had less power than even you would have to investigate your own folks, which is why i'm kind of wondering. and i'm sure the chairman is headed there. why you would stand down your investigation of agents in lieu

of the inspector general who has no authority over agents at all. >> i may be wrong on that in terms of the subpoena power. but i believe they are investigators. and we can confirm that. and also looking at the management director from -- directive from the department of homeland security. specifically says that you have to stand down with your investigation. >> let me jump into this and we can come back if that's all right with the gentlemen. i understand that the washington field office requested the video the morning after the incident within the 72-hour period, whereby the video should be retained. why were the videos then erased if they were requested within that period? >> i'm not aware of that. >> do you think it's suspicious? >> from what i understand of the process it does not seem suspicious to me first of all. no. you can argue that that loop every 72 hours, you can argue

that is not enough. but we're not in the position where we intentionally delete film. it is a matter of just selecting what you think is pertinent to the incident. >> and by the way, the washington field office request is something that you actually did produce to this committee. but how many different videos or angles have you reviewed? >> i'd say the same -- well i'd say including the lady who -- >> um-hmm. >> i'd say three, four. i don't know. i know there were five clips. there may have been five views. very similar. >> when did you first get to see the videos? >> again the days, i don't know when the days are. >> kind of important. >> before you saw it, i wanted to see what we were going to present to your committee. >> by the way the timeline thursday march 5th wfo request a copy of the surveillance record of the incident is where

this comes from. p would it have been u.s. secret service policy to train cameras on the alleged misconduct by mr. conley and mr. ogilvy on the evening of march 4th. >> i wouldn't say it's policy. but if there is an incident the watch commander decides whether an incident is and he calls back to the joint operation center and says preserve this video. if he saw -- whatever he sees as an incident. >> have you discussed providing custody of the video to our committee with homeland security? >> i have not personally. but i believe our staff had. >> have you communicated with the white house, you or our staff on possession of the video? >> not that i'm aware of. >> you said you sent an e-mail to the white house chief of staff regarding the deputy chief of staff on march 4th incident. did it reference that your staffed a had interrupted a

crime scene? >> the -- it referenced the -- yes i think the way i phrased it was two individuals drove through the >> did you receive a response? >> i'm trying to recall if i spoke to the deputy chief of staff or the special agent in charge. i don't honestly remember. i know i did speak to the deputy special act -- i'm sorry to the chief of -- deputy chief of staff. but i don't know if the sax spoke to her first i don't know that time frame. >> but you did speak to her? >> i spoke to her. >> on -- >> i don't know the time frame, though. >> but you'll get that to us? >> i'll look for it. i didn't keep notes but i'll look for when i may have spoken to her. >> will you give us a copy of the e-mail you sent? >> yes. >> who in the joint operations

center would have been responsible for realtime flagging of video during the march 4th incident? who amount the joint operation center is responsible for that? >> there's an onduty supervisor at the operation center. >> you have a forensic services division correct? >> we do. >> have they been engaged in this? >> i think everyone has been trying to retrieve these videos. >> when you say everyone -- >> i'm sorry, i should be more concise. i know that when we didn't have these videos available that you requested, we brought in some of our people from cyber investigations, as well as some of our people from our technical side, as well as the manufacturer. i directed the staff -- >> didn't you engage the forensic services division? >> i don't know personally who -- i just don't know. >> who gave orders on which tapes to preserve, and which to

not, during the march 4th time frame? >> i don't know that answer. >> who should have been responsible? >> i would -- there's a sergeant lieutenant in the joint operations center as well as a gs-14 supervisor. and the watch commander decides who -- or what is an incident and typically, as i understand it, would call back and make that request. >> recognize the gentleman from south carolina. >> thank you, mr. chairman. very briefly, then i want to go to the gentleman from north carolina who has done so much work on this issue. director i'm a little bit vexed whether or not these agents were on duty or not. i'm sure you have policies on the consumption of alcohol while you're on duty. i don't know whether or not these at consumed alcohol. do you? >> i don't know if they consumed alcohol. that will be a matter of the investigation. it will come out.

>> what we do know is that they either responded to a crime scene, which would be problematic, because they potentially contaminated a crime scene, or secondarily they were unaware, and they just can't drive worth a damn and drove over a barricade, neither of which would be good scenarios, right. >> that's correct. >> i continue, and then i want to go to the gentleman from north carolina, i continue to honestly not understand this desire/willingness of government agencies to stand down for the inspector general and suspend their own internal investigations. i just -- you've been an investigator for how long? >> well, i've been in the business 27 years. >> 27 years. if you saw two gs-15s fighting in the parking lot, would you call the inspector general? >> well, we called the inspector general. and then it's their option to either take it or give it back to our agency.

they could have refused to investigate and given it back to us. again, in an effort to try to be transparent, and again i'm required to do that by the department of homeland security's memorandum -- >> but if there were an ongoing theft, just an ongoing theft of say, a vending machine at your headquarters, you wouldn't call the inspector general. wouldn't you interrupt that theft? >> that would not be required, because it's not a gs-15. >> what if it were a gs-15? >> if it's a gs-15, we could notify the oig and then they could make a decision on -- >> i cannot believe that in the throes of an ongoing crime, you would notify the inspector general. we trust you to protect the life of the president of the united states and you can't investigate a suspected drunk driving? >> well we would investigate the incident that -- of the

protective interests, which is the female with the bomb. that is ours. and we would take that. with regard to misconduct that's something that we would offer to the special agent -- or to the oig. >> i want to say this in conclusion and then i will give time to the gentleman from north carolina. it is great to correct and punish misconduct after the fact. it is even better to prevent it in the first place. and there's not a person here who does not want to see you successful, director. not a single person on either side of the aisle does not want to see you successful. i just don't think this is a training issue. i don't think it's a resource issue. you've got to get to the bottom of whatever is pervading the culture. and i hope you can. because this is a venerable well-respected agency. and i hate to participate in hearings like this. >> thank the gentleman. i reclaim my time. director, it was according to the metropolitan police

department, 11 minutes after a suspect is dropped, what might be a bomb at the gate of the white house with the president in the residence, it takes 11 minutes to call metro police department. why does it take so long? >> yeah, i don't know the answer to that. >> how do you not know? this is what is so infuriating. you're the director of the secret service. it's almost three weeks after the incident and you don't know why it takes 11 minutes to pick up the phone and say, hey, metro police department, we've got a problem down here, we need your help. it takes 27 minutes to secure the scene. 27 minutes. what if it was a real bomb? what if it was a real bomb? >> mr. chairman, i've been at the white house complex when we have cordoned off areas, when we have secured zones, and it happens very rapidly. >> but this didn't. and this is the most recent example. why didn't it happen? >> i don't know. >> who are you holding

accountable? >> we're not going to -- we're going to wait -- >> that's the problem. we're going to wait. that's the problem. that's the problem. it took you 30 minutes -- 30 minutes to be on the lookout for a woman who dropped a package at the white house, insteadand said this is bomb. i want her taken down. i want a net to go over that city. i want her in custody immediately. you take 11 minutes to call metro police department, you take 27 minutes to secure the area, and you take 30 minutes to say, hey, we've got a problem here. you get an officer behind the right car and they get waved off. you said you had the license plate number. we spent millions of dollars building a video capability. somebody can't push rewind and go see what that car make, model and license plate number is? don't we trust that officer who has that person in their sight and say, go ahead and pull them over until we clear this up. no, that's not what happened.

then you go out to virginia, you find the person, and the agents say, well, we can't really arrest this person. this is somebody who had already come in contact with us. and the problem is you're still waiting. we're not playing games. this is the life, safety and security of the president of the united states and the white house. don't let anybody get in that gate. and when they come to the gate and they've got a bomb and say they have a bomb, believe them. take them down. take them down. that's what i want to see. i want to see determination. i want those officers and those agents to know, we've got their backs. you take those people down. you do not let that happen. this is the united states of america. the threat is real. but i don't feel it. i don't see it. and it's unacceptable. time's expired. yield to the gentleman from maryland. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. mr. clancy, i just want to go back for a few minutes.

because the question is when all the dust settles, is the president of the united states and his family and all the other protectees safe? >> the president, the white house, the first family, is safe. absolutely. >> and tell us why you say that. >> i protected four presidents. four presidents who apparently respect the work that i've done. i've directly protected presidents. i know what it takes to protect presidents and their families. and i know that we are not a perfect agency. and this is not a perfect science. when you look at the number of sites that we have per year you look at the 36000 people who come through that white house every month we know what we're doing. but do we make mistakes?

yes, we do. we make mistakes. and we follow up on them. our mistakes, compared to the number of visits that we have throughout a year, 5,700 sites in one year, we've got a pretty good track record. it doesn't mean that we've got a problem here, we definitely have a problem. we're going to fix it. but, it's not that all of our practices, or all our foundation is bad, we've just got to get -- do a better job of training our people and responding quicker to some of these events. i could list several very positive events where we've saved lives, where we've responded very quickly to individuals who wanted to climb the fence. i could cite numerous examples of that. but i know that today we are looking at the negative incident. but i'm confident that because of the good work that's being done by the vast majority of our