allegations of misconduct on march 4, 2015. and the agency's progress in fulfilling the recommendations of the independent u.s. secret service protective mission panel. as director, i'm honored to lead the men and women of this important agency through this challenging time. with respect to the recent allegations, i personally became aware of the incident on march 9th. when i received a phone call from a former agent informing me of an anonymous e-mail that was circulating. on that same date, i determined that the allegations should be referred to department of homeland security's office of the inspector general. i made this decision because allegations of misconduct involving employees at the gs-15 and higher level must be referred to the oig in accordance with departmental policy. i trust the oig's investigation will be thorough. i have committed the secret service's full cooperation to the oig and eagerly await the findings of their investigation.

the fact that i did not learn of this allegation until five days after it is said to have occurred infuriates me. this is unacceptable. i called my senior staff together the week before last. i made clear my expectation for prompt notification of allegations of misconduct that could impact our mission or violate the agency's standards of conduct. if it is determined that any of our employees failed to report information about this alleged incident, they will be held accountable. our mission is too important for this to happen. it undermines my leadership and i won't stand for it. i am resolved to holding people accountable for their actions, but i want to make clear that i do not have the ability to simply terminate employees based solely on allegations of misconduct. this is not because i'm being lenient but because the agency's ability to take action is

controlled by title 5 of the united states code, which provides federal government employees with certain statutory due process rights. i must respect these rights and the procedures congress has put in place to preserve them. as it stands, the next step in this process is to wait for the issuance of the oig report, at which point we'll determine the appropriate disciplinary actions consistent with our established table of penalties. once again, if the oig investigation reveals misconduct, those involved will be held accountable. i've personally reviewed video footage from the evening of march 4th with this committee. the initial reports of a vehicle crash were inaccurate. there was no crash. the video shows a vehicle entering the white house complex at a very slow side and pushing aside a plastic barrel. there is no damage to the vehicle. however, many people have expressed serious concerns that the available footage from the

night does not provide a full picture relative to the alleged misconduct. while the primary function of the camera systems at the white house complex is for operational security, specific video footage is routinely maintained for investigative and intelligence purposes. i share the concerns of this committee that more video footage from the night of march 4th was not preserved. after receiving consent from the oig, the secret service contacted the manufacturer of the digital storage unit and is leveraging our capabilities in cyber forensics to make every attempt to recover additional video footage from that night. although it predates my appointment as director, secret service has been to retain camera footage for a period of 72 hours. this practice concerns me. therefore, i have directed that the video storage period be

increased to seven days immediately. i also directed my staff to explore the feasibility of further expanding this time frame while being mindful to concerns of privacy. i will touch briefly on each of these three areas identified in the report. first, training and personnel. second, technology, perimeter security and operations. and third, leadership. regarding training and personnel, i have consistently held that a primary focus of mine has been to increase the critical staffing in the secret service to meet the demands of the mission. and to incorporate regular and consistent training to sharpen skills, ensure preparedness at all times. the secret service is expected to exceed its hiring goals for this fiscal year and maintain this pace for fiscal year 2016. we have also fully completed integrated training for officers and specialty teams within the white house branch. and made improvements with respect to the amount of training received during fourth

shifts by agents on protective details. with respect to technology and perimeter security recommendations, the secret service is in the midst of a multi-phase project to replace the current fence around the white house. the goal of this project is to mitigate security concerns identified by the panel, including delaying potential intruders to get secret service personnel more time to react. the selection of a final fence option will be followed by a design, procurement and construction phases. as discussed in the classified briefings provided to this committee, the secret service acknowledges the need for interim measures during this process. process and has conducted initial testing, research and development to that end. finally, with respect to leadership, i am moving to rebuild, restructure and re-invigorate the secret service, including elevating and empowering those with specialized professional skills within our civilian force. by ensuring our people have the

necessary resources, by developing budgets from the ground up and utilizing a mission-based approach. in closing, i would like to make clear i am proud of our workforce and would be remiss if i did not recognize that the vast majority of these men and women perform their duties with honor and distinction. they deserve strong leadership, clear and consistent policies, and appropriate resources to support the important work they do every day. it is my life's work to ensure they get it. i thank the committee for this opportunity and welcome any questions you have at this time. >> thank you. now recognize the gentleman from south carolina, mr. gowdy, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director clancy, do you believe congress has a constitutional right to provide oversight over the secret service? >> yes, sir. >> do you believe this committee is motivated solely by a desire to see what is best for the

president and the agency itself? >> yes, sir. with those two thoughts in mind does this committee have every single bit of video footage available from that evening? >> sorry, sir. >> does this committee have all available video footage from that evening? >> it does not, sir. >> why not? >> sir, we had provided that footage, video, that we have to this committee. >> all of it. >> we have shown two clips. we have not shown all of it. >> that's not my question, director. you just said congress has a constitutional responsibility to provide oversight. you just agreed with me that ranking member cummings and chairman chaffetz have the best interests of the president and the agency in mind. so why is it you will not turn over all video footage to this committee? >> congressman. we will show all video at any time, day or night, that this committee would like to review the footage that we have.

we have done that. in fact the chairman was the first i believe to see this video. >> with all due respect, that's not true. go ahead, mr. gowdy. >> no i would -- >> i would like to correct the record. >> i would like to yield to the gentleman from utah because i was under the misapprehension apparently that this committee was not in possession of all available video from that night. >> that's correct. they are not in possession of the video. but we did allow the chairman to view the video. >> you've shown us less than one minute of video. >> yes, sir. yes, sir. >> well, back to my question. will you make all available video? and i say "available," because we're going to get to it in a second all of it was not preserved. will you make all available video available to this committee? >> we will make all video available to this committee for your review at any time, day or night. >> will you make a copy of it

available so we can retain custody as opposed to simply showing it to us? >> i will not release a copy of this video at this point. >> why not? >> the oig has an ongoing investigation. >> you think the oig's responsibilities supersede those off congress? >> sir, i know that they have an ongoing investigation. >> well, can't you have simultaneous ongoing investigations? why can't congress provide oversight while the oig is investigating? why do you have to pick and choose? >> sir, again, i think we have one initial investigation from the oig. we've given them film to look at. >> you understand the responsibility of the ig is very different from the responsibility of congress. congress determines funding, among other things. the ig does not. >> yes, sir. >> so those are not exclusive. why can't congress investigate what's in its jurisdiction while the ig does what's in its jurisdiction? >> congressman, i'm sure after

the oig's investigation -- >> i don't want to wait until after, because that makes me think that you believe that congress' constitutional responsibility to provide oversight is subservient to the ig. surely to the world you can't believe that. >> the ongoing investigation the secret service has as well regarding the protective intelligence case, we have an individual who committed a crime, made a threat and that investigation is also going on at this time within the secret service. >> how will providing that video footage to congress jeopardize that ongoing investigation? >> that -- >> with precision, how will it? >> that video shows the actions of the individual who would be accused of a criminal act. >> i get that. my question is how will providing that to mr. cummings and mr. chaffetz jeopardize an ongoing

investigation? with specificity. >> i am happy to show that video all day and be available at all hours of the day and night to show that video. but at this point we cannot release that video. >> that's the video that is available. the video that is not available, will you agree with me there are at least two potential crime scenes at play on the evening of march 4th? at least two. an there is an assault on an officer and a suspicious package. >> that is correct. >> why would the video not be preserved as part of that ongoing investigation that you just cited as the reason you can't give the video to congress? why wouldn't you preserve it? >> the process -- my understanding of the process is that the watch commander on site relays back the incident that he is the incident commander for. he calls back to our joint operation center and says we do have an incident here, we have a suspicious package. preserve the video from this incident.

>> director, i'm out of time but i want you to consider for just a moment the dueling narratives that you have just portrayed. number one, we're not going to give the video that does exist to congress because it's investigation is subservient to the ig investigation. that's narrative number one. narrative number two is you're not even going to preserve video that could be used in an investigation of two potential crimes. did i hear that right? >> we did preserve the video, the footage from the incident as those in the joint operation center viewed it. >> are you familiar with -- >> the gentleman's time is expired. >> some of my time was taken by the chairman but that is the chairman's prerogative and i would of course not ask for any more. >> the chairman obviously made the right ruling. >> i yield back.

>> good decision. i'll recognize the gentlewoman from the district of columbia for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think, mr. clancy, that you understand that the anger, the outrage that you hear really comes from this notion that you are a zero failure agency. we don't expect that, frankly, of most federal officials. i was really surprised to see that you were just now -- i'm reading from your testimony, page 3, sent an agency-wide memorandum saying that they have to report allegations, apparently right away. when, for example, before you came to the agency you knew of the white house incident where they actually shot into the white house and they learned about that -- the secret service learned about it perhaps months later when an attendant found these bullets.

it seems to me that the very first order you should have been given is please let me know. don't put me on the hot seat of not knowing. i say that because i think the committee did the right thing. it began at the right place with leadership. so we say we wanted new leadership. you're the new leadership. it said we want an expert panel. we had that expert panel. now i think we ought to go -- i realize you've not been in place for a very long time, but i'd like to focus on the men and women under you, because i don't think there's been any focus, except for that panel. and that panel really did focus on what i was amazed to hear, that people were working sometimes 14 days and with a day off, if they got it but it could be denied. and that -- and i tried to link this to what i knew about the secret service, a kind of serial misconduct.

you know, in colombia, for example. in the netherlands. all of it drunken agents. well see, i don't think that the secret service is a bunch of bums. so i've got to look at what is happening to these men and women. i asked the staff to tell me something about, are these people being trained or are these people kind of letting it all out? and it looks like some of that is happening. and nobody's spoken up. and if somebody doesn't speak up, i'm not sure that this misconduct is not going to continue. this -- this was also a drunken incident. then i learned that in terms of training, there's barely any training going on at the secret service. there were eight special agent basic classes in three years, '08, '09, and '10.

by 2012 there were zero. by 2013 there was one. the panel said that you needed staff urgently, for starters. what is the problem? is the problem with the leadership? is the problem with the men and women you're not getting good people? why don't you speak up for these men and women? if in fact they're letting off steam because you're overworking them, are they being overworked? will this budget that you've just gotten begin to relieve some of those serial days in which people don't get any days off? so would you describe that and would you tell us more about training and what training sessions are expected so that some of this misbehavior will be understood to be absolutely ver boden. >> congresswoman, thank you.

i have the same concerns you have. in fact, i want to hear more and more from these agents and these officers, what their issues are. just in a nutshell, i'll tell you that i walked by and around the perimeter of the white house frequently. this past sunday i went to the roll call midnight shift. the following morning went to the roll call and wanted to hear what are their concerns. and in terms of the -- >> you can see what their concerns are. the days off. are people going to -- according to the panel, the agents were consistently working 12-hour shifts under high stress, often with no days off. is that going to change now that your budget has finally been released by the congress which has to take some of the responsibility for what's been happening as well. >> again, you are exactly right. when i first came back here my number one initiative was to increase staffing. we've got to increase staffing. to do that we've separated one of our directorates which is hr and training. we separated them apart to give

each more specific training. we've been working overtime to -- >> you have a new class for -- 2013 there was only one class. if you need more agents, they'll need more training. >> yes. >> with this new appropriation is there going to be another class of agents trained, and will the agents who are there who used to get training, i understand every four weeks or so, will they have that regimen of training again? >> yes. we'll exceed our goals this year. six classes and six special agent classes that were scheduled. we'll now go nine and eight classes. so we expect to hire a lot more people in fiscal year '15 and continue that into '16. that is a critical need for the service and that will also help with getting more people out to training. in fact, since september 19th, the uniform division training has increased 110%. that's just a snapshot. we've got to keep the momentum going. with the agent side of the house on the president's detail that

training has increased 78%. again not where we want to be but as we increase the staff we'll get more training for our people. >> i thank the gentle woman. now recognize the gentleman from florida for five minutes. >> good morning, mr. director. i've got some questions. i guess this is sort of another "gotcha" hearing. we just have incident after incident. we have cartagena, the fence-jumper, and we have this most recent one. you testified that you cannot take action because -- on personnel as far as discipline because of title 5. but also chapter 102 of title 5 sets some requirements. have you seen a draft that was prepared last year? can you give the director a copy of this draft? it is deliberative draft

7/22/14. it's amendments to the hiring, managing and discipline of its workforce. this is amendments for secret service. so rather than just talk about more incidents, let's get down to the brass tacks of the issues you face. first is hiring. right? you got to hire good people. you came and you said you need more people. i submit that you need better people and you need better qualifications. when i left the white house about a week ago, i followed a secret service car just by accident. i said what's that on the bumper? it's actually -- it's actually soliciting for folks to work on the bumper of a police vehicle. this is the way we hire folks for the secret service. i didn't know -- i didn't know your predecessor, miss pearson, that well. she came from my local town.

she called me after she was there for a while and she says, it's very difficult to get this place under control. i've got to have some ability to hire better qualified people. i didn't know that you didn't need a college education for some of those positions. is that correct? >> that's correct. >> yeah. she said that by law we've dumbed down the qualifications. first, you got to hire people. you don't hire them with an advertisement on a bumper of a vehicle. you want qualified personnel with the highest qualifications. right? secondly, you've got to be able to manage those personnel. and she asked for these things way back -- in fact, on july 2nd, there was a meeting with government reform staff. do you know where these recommendations are? i was told they went back to dhs. >> we have -- >> where these suggestions for improvement are. do you know where they are? does anyone know where they are? i want to know where they are.

because they've been sitting around. she knew what was wrong before she was railroaded out. you'll be railroaded out, too, if we don't make changes. but the fault is in the guidelines that you have to follow. she told me managing personnel administering them, you have a 20-year i guess retirement, then you have to retirement on the law enforcement side. >> that's the older plan was a 20-year retirement but the fers is not 20-years. >> in any event, when you get to the retirement, it took two years to get people trained for scs positions. that still exists, right? >> yes. >> she said that needed to be changed. because the time you're able to administer, you hire the people getting the best qualified, then you want the best administration. right? >> yes. >> so we have an impediment in that. she asked for that change. nothing's been done. it's probably sitting somewhere over at the agency. then finally she said to hold people accountable. secret service holding protectors accountable. that's what this hearing is about.

she asked for the ability to hire and fire an exempt agency under title 5. do you agree with that? >> yes. >> you do. that's one of her recommendations. but we have to do that. because -- we heard, oh, there a -- there's no command. well, hell, you don't have the ability to command! because your hands are tied by title 5. you can't hire and fire. you have to go through this layer. i chaired civil service and i know how difficult it is to get rid of folks. even discipline folks. most people are just moved horizontally to some other position. isn't that just the case? >> that's correct, yes, sir. >> again, you have to have the ability to hire and fire. this proposal i submitted, which was last july -- and i read the recommendations of the little group that came up with stuff. until you address this fundamental problem, that director, or whoever succeeds

him, will not succeed in managing his personnel because when he can't hire people that are qualified, two, he can't manage or administer those folks, and three can't discipline and hire and fire people that need to be held accountable. is that right? >> that's -- >> basically? >> basically, yes, sir. >> okay. and finally, if a bullet hits the white house, a window or the building, is something done to address that? you talked about the fence. >> yes. we have procedures now if there is any -- anything hits the white house, we have instituted procedures since 2011. >> i'd like to know for the record or behind the scenes about drones and how they can penetrate the perimeter. thank you. yield back. >> now recognize mr. cummings for five minutes. >> director clancy, i want to get down to something you said, you said was unacceptable, and that is when you found out about

this incident. you learned of these allegations on may 9th which was five days after the incident occurred. and that is a big concern for me and i know it is for this committee and you. first and foremost, there's no doubt that you should have been informed about this incident immediately. is that right? >> that's correct, yes, sir. >> you should have been informed about it the day of. >> yes, that's correct. >> at our briefing last week you told us that no one in your immediate office had been aware of this incident. is that correct? >> that's correct. >> last week you testified that the secret service personnel should have reported this incident up the chain. if i have this right, they should have reported as follows. from personnel on the ground to the deputy chief of the uniform division. to the special agent in charge of presidential protective division, to the assistant director of protective operations, and then to you. is that correct?

>> that's correct. >> now yesterday the secret service produced documents to the committee indicating that the deputy chief of the uniform division, alfonso dyson, became aware of these incidents on the night of the incident. >> that's correct. >> >> i guess the briefing sheet is what you sent to start the investigation in the instructor general's office. is that right? >> that's correct. and if i can correct the record. because i know i met with you and other members in a closed-door briefing and you had asked, how is that process started. and i said i think it is a phone call. and it was started with a phone call. but i found out subsequently that there is a follow-up letter which is what we provided to you. that follow-up letter with our preliminary findings the very first day on the 9th. >> so in the briefing sheet it says, and i quote, deputy chief

dyson advised that he was familiar with the incident involving the agents and was briefed about the incident on the evening of march 4th, 2015. end of quote. >> yes. >> so director, if the deputy chief of the uniform division knew about the allegations, did he alert the special agent in charge of the presidential protective division? did he? >> i don't know, sir. i'm going to tell you that i am infuriated that i have not been advised on march 4th, why i didn't hear any of that information. i don't know. but i will tell you that the deputy chief needed to raise that up through the chain of command and this is something that i've been battling since i first came back in a very brief time here. i've been back about 30 days. we are working furiously to try to break down these barriers where people feel they can't talk up the chain. i can tell you personally i'm

going out, reaching out to people, going to these roll calls and individually. our assistant director of investigation is going out into the field talking to people. our assistant director of protective operations going out talking to people. we've made all these avenues through om budsmen through hotlines and web pages to -- even anonymously, get information up the chain. why it didn't happen in this case, i don't know. if you're not comfortable going up through your chain of command, you have all these other avenues. anonymously you can go and report incidents of misconduct or whatever you want to report. but you've got to make use of these outlets. >> let me ask you this. how about the assistant director for protective operations. when did he learn about these allegations? do you know? >> i don't know -- well, march 9th. march 9th. because when i found out, i found out the morning of march 9th. i reached out to the assistant director of protective operations. he did not know at that point.

i asked him to go find what he knew about it, what he could find out about it. >> i understand there is an ongoing ig investigation but according to your own testimony you didn't learn about these allegations from anyone at the secret service. >> that's correct. >> i'm concerned about whether there's still a problem with the chain of command right now. sounds like there is. based on what you know today, who is the highest ranked person who knew about this incident and failed to report it? to your knowledge. >> to my knowledge? again, on march 9th is when i was given all the details that we had. we turned it over to the oig. then i stepped out of it. in all candor, right or wrong, i compartmentalized things and i didn't want to see it. the deputy chief is the last one that was -- that's how -- >> well, on more than one time here this morning you said you had a meeting with your higher-ups and you told them

this is -- you're not going to tolerate this. did you ask him -- any of them, did you all know about this? >> no, i didn't. i was very blunt with what was my expectation -- >> whoa, whoa, whoa. rewind. these are your top people. right? >> yes. >> would that be the top -- the eight assistants? >> it would be more than that in this room. >> you never asked them? you didn't say, ladies and gentlemen, who knew about this? >> i did not. >> why not? >> at that point i honestly did not want to interfere with this oig investigation. i wanted no indication where i might be pressuring someone. no indication that we've reached out to people. or people to leave that room and say the director's asking for more information. i wanted to give this oig complete ownership of this investigation. >> just one last question, mr. chairman. director, at any time did you

have a staff meeting where you would have expected -- i mean, you know, you and i have talked about this sacred trust in the secret service, these jobs of honor. would you have expected -- did you have any meeting where you would have expected someone who knew about this to say something to you? >> absolutely. absolutely. when i heard this on march 9th i was in disbelief. i didn't believe it. i called and said, look, run this out. but i honestly could not believe -- especially over that time frame. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> now recognize the gentleman from tennessee, mr. duncan. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director clancy, all over this country there's been a growing belief for many years now that the federal government and many top-level federal employees have

become -- have been becoming more and more bureaucratics, elitist, arrogant and there, along with this, there's been a growing belief that we're ended up with a government that's of, by, and for the bureaucrats, instead of one that's of by and for the people. when you refuse to allow these four witnesses to come and of it -- to come and testify to us who are supposed to represent the people, as best we can, when you refuse to allow these four witnesses to come, and you refuse to release most of the video that's been requested, you should realize that this looks very bureaucratic, elitist and arrogant. and it looks as though you feel you're working -- you're not really working for the people of this country. that you're working to protect the people of the secret service.

and last week in the house appropriations committee, chairman rogers said in a very strong, very emphatic way that he felt there should be terminations and firings for all these incidents that have happened. and i hope that you agree with that. i assume that you are close friends with mr. connelly and mr. ogilvie. but i hope that you feel that you have more of a duty to the people of this country than you have a duty to protect mr. ogilvie and mr. connelly and others who have been involved in these other incidents. what do you have to say about that? >> sir, you're absolutely correct and i've already made changes in our agency of people that i know and who served honorably but i wanted a fresh perspective. friends of mine. i have moved them -- or offered them positions in other components in dhs. i'm not opposed to moving people

that i know. it is all about the agency. in terms of -- >> well, that's one of the problems though. too often federal employees who really mess up, they aren't really disciplined. they're not cut in pay. they're not fired, they're not terminated. they're just moved to a nice desk job someplace else and i've already been told that ogilvie and connelly have been moved to some other desk job someplace and not much at all's been done to them. i'm going to yield the balance of my time though to mr. gowdy. i think he has another question or two that he wishes to ask. >> thank you. director, who has custody of the video that was retained and preserved? >> technical security division. >> who has the power to make a copy of that video and turn it over to mr. cummings and mr. chaffetz? >> sir, i would in consultation with my legal counsel.

i got to be honest with you. i don't know that for certain. i'm relatively new to the position. i'll have to get back to you. >> well, to the extent you do have the power or have influence over those who do have power, will you recommend that a copy of all video footage be made available to mr. cummings and mr. chaffetz? >> congressman, i'll certainly talk to our department and with our legal counsel -- >> you don't need lawyers for everything. i mean you got a bunch of them on this panel. i'm telling you, if the only excuse they have for not turning it over is there's some theoretical potential investigation or prosecution? i promise, mr. cummings and mr. chaffetz are not going to interfere with either one. i promise you that. so we can eliminate that concern now. now, will you turn over all available video to mr. cummings and mr. chaffetz? >> again, the video will be available at all times. i will go back to our department and agency and revisit this. >> do you know if there was emphasis on -- emphasis on "was" video of the alleged officer misconduct?

>> no, i'm not aware. >> you don't know whether any of the cameras were trained on the car that these two agents were in? >> the only video i'm aware of, congressman, is what we have provided as they entered the gate at south park. >> well, do you have a policy of retention and preservation of any video that could be potentially part of a criminal investigation or officer misconduct? is that part of your policy? >> yes, sir. we retain video that is related to any incident on -- >> so if there were video of that, no one would have taped over it or destroyed it? >> the video would not have been destroyed. if someone saw an incident somewhere else in the complex, yes. >> how about taped over? would it have been taped over? >> by practice, it is automatic. you have to -- my understanding is you have to selectively decide what you want to preserve.

otherwise -- >> wouldn't potential officer misconduct be one of those things that you wanted to preserve? >> without knowing the facts, i don't know what took place beyond that entry point. >> i yield to the chairman. >> thank the gentleman. gentleman's time has expired. now recognize the gentleman from massachusetts, the ranking member of the subcommittee on national security. >> thank you, mr. chairman. you know, i'm a little bit -- more than a little bit put out by the willful ignorance here. you know, when you -- let's just back up a second. secret service is an intelligence gathering organization. and then you don't ask questions. and you destroy evidence. i guess i'm trying to have faith. i really am. i offer no disrespect whatsoever.

i think you're an honorable man. but i tell you, this whole system -- you said at the tail end of your testimony that you had implemented a change to go to seven days retention of video. is that correct? >> that's correct. >> so we went from 72 hours now to seven days. >> that's correct. with the intent to look at our storage capabilities to go beyond that. >> all right. i'm actually going to -- if we have to do it legislatively, the the fact that the department of homeland security requires logan airport to retain their tsa tapes for 30 days, if i have to do it legislatively, i'm going to make a recommendation that we adopt legislation that requires that secret service keep video for 30 days. if that's what we got to do. director clancy, who is responsible -- who's the individual responsible for

technical security division? because i want to send them a subpoena as well. they're not on this list of folks that we had. but who is that person? >> he is relatively new in the position. just -- >> that's okay. >> joseph depetro is the chief of the technical division now. >> so would it be correct in me assuming that he's responsible for that whole surveillance around the white house and the technology, the tapes, the purging or scrubbing of the tapes and all that, is that the person i want? >> yes. he would be able to talk to those questions that you have. yes. >> okay. all right. and we would give him a subpoena duces tecum as well to have him bring whatever information he has. that will be good. i mean the local piggly-wiggly

my local supermarket has 30 days of retaining tapes. so by scrubbing those tapes without asking questions, and coming from an intelligence gathering organization, it is just -- it leaves me almost -- almost speechless. i just can't imagine a more deliberate attempt not to understand the nature of the problem. what's the penalty -- now it's clear from the tape that the two officers drove into an active bomb investigation. i don't think there is any question about that. right? mr. ogilvie and the other gentleman -- i'm blanking on his name -- but the two agents. >> connelly. >> mr. connelly. okay. so you got an active bomb investigation going on and they

drive right into the -- they drove right through it. i guess they were going back -- they left their car at the white house so they were going to get their car. i understand that. but in the meantime, they drive right through an active bomb investigation. any disagreement on that? >> i don't know the facts in terms of going to get a vehicle but i know they absolutely drove through an active investigation. >> there's no question about that. and yet we re-assigned them. so we know that. we don't even ask them questions about that. and yet we just re-assign them to desk jobs, there's no discipline at all. what's the thinking behind that? >> to put them on administrative leave, they would have administrative leave with pay and i felt that we could still get some work out of them. and also i didn't want to do the discipline in a piecemeal fashion. >> well, i need to interrupt you right there. the signal that you're sending to every other secret service

agent, uniformed and ppd, is that those folks were not penalized at all for doing what they did. and so you didn't remove them. you didn't remove them. i think it would have been a clear signal to send to every other member of the secret service that those two guys screwed up and they're gone. for now. and we're going to hold them responsible. instead, instead -- and i know, you're thinking about, okay, they'll be sitting at home instead of working -- but i think on balance, i think it was a more important -- especially with the history we've got here of folks shooting at the white house and jumping over the fence and it's like the keystone cops here. so i think it would be a more important message to send to the employees that these guys screwed up and they are being held accountable rather than just putting them on a desk job.

>> congressman, rest assured, once we get the final report, which again i'm told will be weeks -- people will be held accountable. >> yeah. >> and i can understand frustration for many here on the committee, as well as within our workforce, but they're looking to see how are these things handled and how do you handle agents as opposed to uniform division. so i respect your view, sir. >> i just want to -- in closing, i just want to say, there needs to be a rapid response to these incidents. we can't put this into a bureaucratic process where i get an answer in eight weeks or ten weeks. that cannot happen. you need to have the ability to act right now on an incident like that, rather than file some forms and bring m somebody else and engage in willful ignorance and let somebody else handle this stuff. you're in that spot because you're very capable and in the

future we need you to have the ability to act. i'll yield. >> thank the gentleman. now recognize the gentleman from north carolina, mr. meadows for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. clancy, thank you for your testimony. i want to return to what you said earlier about meeting with your senior staff and not asking what they knew. when did that happen? >> sir, it happened -- forgive me sir -- my memory with everything else is converging. wednesday. wednesday. >> wednesday, what day? >> that would have been the 11th. >> so you met with your senior staff but you waited until wednesday to meet with your senior staff when you were informed of this on the 9th? why would you wait two days to meet with your senior staff? >> i had a hearing on the day in between and -- >> i have hearings every single day. it doesn't preclude me from

asking detailed questions like that. >> forgive me sir, let me correct the record. i don't know what my schedule was. i don't know what i was doing on tuesday. >> so why did you wait two days? was it not important to you, mr. clancy? >> as i expressed earlier this is hugely important to me and to the agency. >> all right. so why did you -- you said earlier you didn't ask the question what they knew. you're not interfering with an investigation for you to be informed of what they knew. that wouldn't interfere with an investigation. why wouldn't you have asked the question? is it so that you could pull a sergeant schultz here today that you know nothing? i don't understand. >> no, in fact when i pulled that group together this hearing was not scheduled. i did that because, again, it's probably hard to understand for this committee -- >> it is very hard for mr. lynch and i to understand how there would be a lack of inquisitive nature on why the director would

not want to know. >> to be candid, i compartmentalized this incident. i gave it to the oig so that i could concentrate on -- i have protectees all around the world, classified documents i have to keep up with, president of afghanistan and all these other issues that i need to focus on today and future threats. this in my mind -- >> well, the president of afghanistan may be very important. and indeed he probably is. but the president of the united states is a lot more important and i wouldn't compartmentalize and put that somewhere else, would you? >> all of our protectees are important, but certainly this in my mind, i gave it to the oig. i was content to wait until we get all the facts and not do things piecemeal because i thought that was a dangerous path to take, to do things in a piecemeal fashion. information starts to leak out and information would have started to leak out, people would start -- >> so keeping these guys there working on administrative duties, do you not think that

they have the ability to talk to some of their fellow workers and spin a different narrative instead of sending them home as mr. lynch had suggested? do you think it is not dangerous that they might interfere with the investigation? >> they could still converse in my view at their residences with anyone they wanted to. so keeping them -- >> so you haven't told them not to converse and tell a different story. >> i haven't spoken to those individuals. >> so these are gs-15 and you haven't spoken to them -- why? >> the two individual -- >> why have you not spoken to them? >> i didn't want to -- again, interfere with the investigation. one is an ses and one is -- >> mr. clancy, you were hired to clean up the mess. >> yes. >> and you and i have met personally. >> yes. >> before you were actually the official director. i told you about a number of things where i was actually getting e-mails. >> yes. >> and i still get e-mails.

anonymous e-mails on all kinds of different things that are happening. details in honolulu where we've had some of the same accusations made that have been made in other parts of the country. details where people have actually had major offenses and then were left within the secret service and allowed to retire or something a year later. what are you going to do? because i asked you specifically about forced transfers and how the threatening of taking away their security clearance for some of the rank and file, and yet nothing has been done with that, mr. clancy. are you going to act on that eventually? >> yes. in terms of threatening to take away their clearances, i understand that was in a letter that went out to people when they were routinely -- we move people around the country. >> it is used as a force of manipulation for most of the rank and file. at least that's the way they see it. so are you going to make sure that they know that their security clearance will not be taken away? >> right.

>> clear and simple. yes or no. >> security clearance is not taken away. >> if they decide not to transfer you're not going to affect their security clearance? >> we can't do that. we need to have people -- for example, the president's personnel needs additional detail. if they say no, i don't want to have to go to the president's detail, now we're short on the president's detail. that's the nature of the business and they're informed of that when they are hired. >> this sounds like just the same old problem that we had under the previous director, mr. clancy, and i'm very troubled. i'll yield back. >> thank you. >> now recognize the gentleman from virginia. >> thank you. mr. clancy, welcome to the committee and thank you for your service to your country. i want to white -- first of all, i think there's bipartisan -- a lot of bipartisan agreement on this committee about a problem obviously at secret service and

i think that you're going to find those bipartisan in agreement in approach to how we resolve this. my friend mr. gowdy and his questioning raised a very interesting point. i'm pretty sympathetic with this point of view, but i'm opening to hearing a counterargument. you've got an oig investigation going on so they've got the tapes. well, congress has a constitutional role irrespective of what an oig is doing. now the fact that we have the power to compel doesn't always mean we should use it especially with an ongoing investigation. there are plenty of precedents for not doing that, for not dropping that hammer because we don't want to unduly interfere with a prosecution or whatever it may be. but i would say to underscore mr. goudy's point, i think the burden is on you and your lawyers to make a case before

this committee representing the institution of congress, for why at this time it would otherwise corrupt an ongoing investigation. absent such compelling testimony or rationale, it seems to me this committee is entitled to those tapes for its own investigative purposes. we are an independent branch of government. we have every right to exercise our oversight. hopefully we do it responsibly. but i just -- i'm telling you in my view, we're going to move forward on a bipartisan basis on this issue. not always the tradition of this committee but in this case, i think that's where we're headed. i don't speak for the ranking member but i join him in his observations. just a word to the wise, mr. clancy. that's where we're headed. >> congressman, i sense all of you, your outrage. all of you. and i will go back and revisit this with our folks and with the department and see if we can accommodate the request.

i've heard all of you loud and clear today with what we need to do. >> i thank you. i'm going to try to get through five questions quickly and hopefully you will cooperate. do you believe, given your new responsibilities -- and i know you've got a lifetime invested in this very noble service with a storied history. is there, however, do you think, parallel with that or sort of superimposed on that noble tradition, perhaps a creeping cultural problem that has to be addressed in your ranks? i think both the chairman and the ranking member cataloged a history going back of unfortunate headlines. >> congressman, i think we do. i think to be candid -- >> "we do" what? >> we do have an element -- we do have a small element that has

a culture of, in this case -- most of our recent cases, alcohol has been involved in the most recent cases. however, i will say that the oig did a report and i think 8% of our incidents involved alcohol. but irregardless, in our looking back at our recent history some alcohol has been used. so that is clearly something i'm concerned about. we're looking at how to address that. in terms of the culture of not bringing information up through the ranks, there obviously is a concern with that as all of you are getting these anonymous calls and -- or maybe not anonymous. either way. that's something we've got to fix. i know it is not a proper answer but some of these things take some time. and it has to come with building trust and there's communication and we're trying to hammer this home, give us a chance through communication. >> okay. the five-day delay. to what do you ascribe it? was it bureaucratic inertia or do you believe somebody was deliberately trying to withhold

that from you so that -- to preclude your taking action? >> this is speculation on my part. i don't think anyone was intentionally hiding it from me. but at a lower level, if they felt that -- i don't know how they viewed the incident. and the oig again, i'm sorry to keep leaning on them but we'll find out those facts. i don't want to speculate for those at that level, that rank. >> obviously it would be very troubling if it were the latter. right? >> absolutely. >> bureaucratic inertia we can manage through that and try to clean it up. but if somebody is deliberately stymieing your ability to scrutinize an unfortunate incident, that doesn't put us in a favorable light, you have a problem. >> it would be a direct reflection of my leadership. >> well, it would be a direct

>> that's challenge. don't know if it would be a reflection. i think that's an element of concern both for us and the public. we had a review panel that recommended strongly that the president should seek and outside director for your position. he didn't take that advice. he chose you because he had confidence in you apparently. and there is an argument to be made that only an insider, a careerist, like yourself, can actually make the tough decisions, knows where the bodies are buried and doesn't put up with sort of nonsensical arguments. on the other hand, the counter argument can be, yeah, we put somebody in there who's co-opted who couldn't possibly be a change agent and isn't what we need. i would like to give you the opportunity as my final moment of questioning to respond to that. >> well, thank you, congressman. let me just say, one of the

things we've done since i've come in, it is not the same old upper tier of management. we have made some changes and primarily because we wanted to take better advantage of our subject matter, civilian experts so what we've done in the past, we've had a director and a deputy director. now we have a deputy and just recently made it a deputy director who was named. but additionally at the same level, a chief operating officer. we're reaching out for a chief operating officer who will not be from within the agency. he or she will be from the private sector. and then underneath that chief operating officer who again is on equal level with the agent, deputy director, we have a tier of several -- a chief financial officer, chief information officer, several other civilian experts in that side of the house. we're integrating both of them. so this is not the same old secret service from one month ago. in the short time, 30 days i've been here, we've made significant changes to the traditional culture and structure, the structure of the upper management. and we are new, including myself.

and i'd like to have some time to try to let that progress. >> thank the gentleman. now recognize the chairman of the subcommittee on national security, the gentleman from florida, mr. desantis. >> director, i'm trying to figure out with this video policy. last week you said that there were three clips of the woman with the suspicious package but only two clips of the agents in the vehicle. why is there one more clip of the woman than of the agents? >> where the female was positioned, it is outside of that gate area, just outside. so that is specific to that incident with the suspicious package and the confrontation between the officer and the lady. so there are three very short, very short clips of that and her actions. the other two clips are more --

all throw it captures the package -- suspicion package but it also captures the agents nudging that barrel and coming through a secure zone. >> but the third angle just would not have captured the vehicle? is that why? >> the first one would not have -- well, there are two different time frames. yeah. i can't answer that question, sir. >> okay. so because mr. gowdy's questions about allowing congress access. you do not want to provide congress with any of its own versions or copies that we could then look, review with the staff and then determine the next steps that we may want to take with the investigation. is that your position? >> as i just recently said, i will revisit. i understand the outrage on this. our initial offer was to be there whenever you needed to view it. we would provide it at any time day or night. but i understand that's not acceptable.

>> again, i've been bouncing around so i apologize. i did not hear that. now mr. gowdy also raised the issue of this inspector general. i know you're doing what you think you're required to do, but sitting here in hearings and across the whole federal government conducting oversight, the number of times where witnesses say, well, that's the ig, we can't do anything, we can't give you information, congress, because the ig. i just don't believe that that was ever the intent of inspector generals to cause the rest of the world to stand still. we have an independent duty to conduct oversight over all these agencies. we are asked to fund the agencies and i think the american people obviously need to know what's going on so that we can make decisions about that. what is the timeline of the ig investigation? >> i'm told weeks. now again, i haven't been conversing with the ig. i did have one call with the inspector general but i'm told it would be a matter of weeks, not months. >> and he's also doing a kind of look-back investigation for some

of the previous incidents. is that correct? >> i saw that somewhere in print but i'm not -- i'm not sure we talked about that. >> that was not something that you asked the ig, you went to the ig with the incident at the gate. >> specifically this incident. yes. >> then at that point -- well, let me ask you this.