introduced during the last congress, and i am hopeful that it will be introduced and you will support its passage in this congress. let me just mention before i close a little bit about the future. the change that's going to occur. change is a lot like heaven. kind of everyone wants to get there but no one wants to die. so we're working hard. you know who said that? i got that statement from carly fiorina. so pretty interesting statement. well, what's clear to me in preparing for the future is that we need to reflect the realities of your business and the world that you exist in. the constant evolution of the global supply chain. i recognize that while we have some major efforts already under way, there are some areas that need additional focus and they need more work and they need more work from us. trade enforcement. over and over again, i've never heard anyone say that, well, you shouldn't be enforcing and spending as much time on

enforcement. but you should do it in a consistent, predictable way, and those that are violating our trade laws, those that are being required of enforcement, that it only helps the businesses that are in fact playing by the rules and that have that level playing field. so we need to do a better job in that. i heard from congressional leaders about the importance of enforcement also. and the critical role that we play in protecting our markets. we have made some strides. for example, cbp and immigration and customs enforcement, we have a new director, as many of you know, sara saldana. she was the united states attorney in dallas so she clearly understands enforcement and prosecution issues. so working closely with ice and homeland investigations, we're trying to do more training for each of our components, we're trying to understand and work through the processes and the operations that we can attack smuggling and the growth in

shipments in counterfeit goods. many of these pose serious health and there et cetera to public safety and also harm our national and economic security. in addition, trade penalty assessments have increased by 140% from $385 million in fiscal year '11 to over $900 million in fiscal year 2014. but we clearly know that work can be done in that area. i know there are other aspects of the trade enforcement area that could really improve from our transparency. we've gone way out of our way after hearing a number of complaints because you are our eyes and ears. you give us the information and when you make these complaints or you provide us information about things that you believe are wrong and things that we should be following up on, we haven't been particularly good in making sure that we're getting back to you about what did we do and how are we handling it. sometimes the cases are complex, they take on a lengthy period of

time. but still we need to make sure that we're doing a better job in that area. the enforcement and collection of antidumping and countervailing duties, we're working to increase those enforcement efforts. in reviewing regulations we have tons and tons and tons of regulations. we need to do a better job of reviewing those regulations and we need to do a better job of making sure that you have input into some of those regulations. i believe that as many of my leadership team really talk about that we can improve and streamline the process, it is a complex discussion, it's time consuming. many of you devote a lot of time to it. i couldn't be more pleased with the incredible amounts of time that the members provide on this. but it is invaluable. we welcome your ideas in this type of discussion because it can make a difference in years to come. those are some of efforts i plan on pursuing in the coming year. everything i do as the

commissioner over these next several years -- as long as the president keeps -- over the next several years is going to be done to increase our trade and security mission. cbp plays that critical role in protecting our national security, safeguarding the supply chain from terrorism, transnational crime and fraud. we carry out and i've had a chance to meet literally thousands and thousands of cbp employees. we carry out that mission in a very dedicated way with a professional staff and we continue to make sure that we're hiring the very best people. we have to be an agile and flexibility organization. sometimes that bumps up against bureaucracy but i believe we can work through these things. and we already have. when the world economic forum said that if you remove supply chain barriers, you can increase the global economy six times more than removing all tariffs

everyone should pay attention and listen to that. and we have been listening to that. i want you to know that i recognize my responsibility to serve all of you and appreciate the input, cooperation, help, advice and assistance that you do. we really appreciate this robust dialogue with the chamber and its members. we want to continue to fulfill our commitment to operating as a strong law enforcement organization while helping america's businesses remain competitive in the global marketplace. thank you all very much. [ applause ] >> thank you, commissioner. we have a few minutes for questions. if i could just ask you to state your name and who you're with to ask your question. who would like to start it off? you did cover a lot of ground there, thank you, sir.

>> i thought we had one back here but i will just lead off with questions while -- there is a vocal group up here so i know you guys will have one soon. so spencer, get up there. commissioner, thank you again for addressing the chamber and members and broader membership from other organizations as well. we appreciate your partnership, as always. my question is in regards to your international comments. we obviously see the trade facilitation being a big component of the agreement moving forward to remove customs barriers at borders. you mention that u.s. customs can play a big role in the international environment. how do you see u.s. customs taking its best practices and exporting those programs, but also improving your processes as well and seeing what you could do to modernize to rise to the standards of the tfa.

>> i think we're fortunate to have two things going on right now. one is that with the assistant secretary at the helm of cbp and now being the assistant for dhs, we have a lot of support. we clearly recognize the value that cbp can bring to other countries. we're working hard as you look at things and changes in the world, we're working hard to expand our international footprint and to put more people there. in my relations with the department of state and many of the ambassadors that i've had an opportunity to work with, every ambassador in a foreign country that has a member of cbp within that embassy, almost universally tells me how valuable and helpful they are. they bring a perspective and information to that.

so i am intent on moving forward with expanding our international footprint in cbp. right now of course many of you know that we're in negotiation. we receive letters of interest from 25 airports around the world to expand pre-clearance, the same type of pre-clearance we have and have it in canada for a number of years. so i think that's particularly important. the other is that -- and we haven't done this for a while but over the course of the next day and a half -- or thursday and friday -- we'll be taking all of the senior leadership within cbp out to our advanced training facility at harper's ferry for a day and a half, perhaps away a little bit from blackberries and telephones and spend some time saying how can we better align. we're all busy, we all have these silos we end up operating in. how can we harmonize within cbp to meet some of the goals that i mentioned here.

>> other questions. >> yes. microphone is coming to you. >> my name's clark nelson. we're a provider of metrics to your old position, actually, seattle, king county, fingerprint system. you alluded in the beginning to the interface and challenges of balancing commerce and security, of course whether it is people or goods moving across the border. can you comment briefly on the variable priorities from cbp on the new entry/exit buy metric border control versus goods and management of goods crossing. i'm sure everything's a priority, but -- >> so i think it's particularly critical right now when it comes to the identification of people and things like fraudulent documents.

there isn't a day that you don't pick up some news article about syrian foreign fighters, whether it's people leaving the united states and i think the number is certainly less than 200 -- but it is people that have either shown an intent or have gone over to syria. then of course because they are u.s. citizens, could return back to the united states. what danger, what threat do they pose and how are we recognizing that. it is certainly a much more significant concern in europe, the uk and other locations. but the fraudulent document information and stolen passports, not every country will query passports against interpol stolen passport database. we do. other countries do. but that's important that we show that this is critical. when you apply for and ask for the information to apply to come

in to the united states, there are now additional sets of questions. and some of you have read that we're working with facial recognition systems in an experiment at dulles airport. these are going to continue on. so the fraudulent document information is going to be critical. biometric exit information. of course, as everyone in the room also knows, our airports really aren't designed for exit and they're designed to get people on to the airplanes but not through certain portals, et cetera. so we have to think through that pretty clearly, how can we work with technology given infrastructure constraints to work in those areas. so i think that the verification of people is critical. the agriculture inspections are still going to be critical, and then the screening and risk-based analysis of cargo.

>> mike mullen. >> i'm mike mullen from the express association of america. thank you for those remarks, commissioner. i was happy to hear you emphasize the relationship you have with the other government agencies with the context of the effort to implement the single itds window. i think i can speak for a lot of people in this room in saying that we feel of all the government agencies, cbp has the best grasp, the sort of deepest understanding of risk management and that that's an area where a lot of the other agencies, for a host of cultural and historical reasons, have a much different perspective. so my question is, i know this is being discussed in the auspices of the beck. how far do you think you can go or how do you see the government implementing a single approach to risk management that from our

point of view hopefully will look a lot more like cbps than what some of the other agencies use. >> i think that the fact that we have such a leadership role with the deputy secretary in the border inner agency and having been the united states attorney in los angeles, he clearly kind of has that understanding and that balance. and i think all of us, especially inside the beltway, know that the usual parochial way is to close our arms, make no comment, say that we don't make mistakes and things can't happen but i kind of go back and take my experience as a police chief for a long time. no mayor, no city council held me to a crime-free city of seattle or a crime-free city of buffalo. and yet there are times some elected officials like to hold folks like me accountable for no one should cross the border.

a secure border is that no one will ever get in. and if only we do more, things will be better. we need to not do more whether it comes to huge expenditures. we need to do more when it comes to being smart, to being good partners, to using intelligence, to using technology when it comes to border security trade security, or the people coming in to the country and doing that. i think the more we can talk about that in a very direct way, the more cover or protection it gives to my colleagues and other federal agencies. >> yes. go ahead. >> commissioner, good to see you. mary ann with u.p.s. can you give us a few thoughts about your work on beyond the border around how you're going to move forward just working with cbsa on opening the

preclearance. >> so cbsa will still require through the government of canada legislation to allow that. i think we will be able to move a little bit more quickly when it comes to that. i think given the strong working relationship that the two agencies have, that hosting and sharing with cbsa, their ability to do some of the work after legislation here in the united states where they can be -- to work within the united states is absolutely fine. there are so many now -- there are so many systems now that are available to verify the work that's being done, whether it is video systems, trafficking systems, et cetera, that an overarching concern that, well, a representative from canada is doing this, or it is a representative from the united

states. we should be able to trust each other. of course, we also have those systems in place. so i think that -- i think that that agreement that received so much support will continue to receive support from industries on both sides of the border as they work with both our united states congress and canada's legislature and government to move forward. >> over here. >> good morning. thank you so much for taking the time to meet with us. i apologize if i bring up a subject that you already discussed but i was a little late. the question has to do with -- many in the industry are very concerned that who now enjoy the benefits of -- may lose that benefit. i was just

wondering if you see in any way possible that the solution could be reached that would satisfy national security concerns and at the same time preserve this great benefit for some of the companies that need it and deserve it. >> thanks. you really hit me with a question that i couldn't even begin to answer. just so you know. >> i was worried it might not come to your level but i decide to ask it anyway. >> somehow i think it will now. >> i'm sorry, what did you say? >> i think it will get to my level now. >> okay. >> national association of beverage importers. the trade and labor went through just a horrible slowdown on the west coast that is just being alleviated right now. customs was somewhat of a bystander in that. but i'm asking, you must have gone through that, too, getting briefings all the time. are there any lessons learned

from customs having gone through that kind of experience on the west coast and the huge impacts it had on trade? >> yeah, i think there are, bill. i know you just stepped off coac and we thank you very much for your service on that. that was tremendously careful helpful, but we watched that very carefully. it kind of hit home because i hear from people in washington state about the apple crop that actually was not able to reach an export market. so the costs were tremendous and you'd like to see some type of labor piece because when i was the police chief in seattle, we had six years -- we had the slowdown also. so it creates difficulties. todd owen, both in his position now but also in his position at long beach in l.a.x., todd worked very hard to have in place a whole series of

additional support mechanisms, whether when it was actually going to be settled, and now things were going to be moving more quickly would we be bringing in people, tdy, would we be bringing people in on overtime, would we have extra shifts, what are the different things that we could do. those port directors have been pretty amazing, whether it is oakland, seattle, et cetera, of being able to shift some of their resources away from other locations when it came time that the out cranes were operating fully and the cargo was coming off to make sure there wasn't a new holdup and it would have been us. so we learned lessons from six years ago and we learned a few more lessons this time. thanks, bill. >> time for one more question back here. >> hi, david richardson with southwest airlines. thanks for coming out today. just a -- congratulations on the preclearance agreement with canada. could you please address the possibility of possibly some sort of preclearance agreement with mexico in the future?

>> i think mexico is a little further off when it comes to the preclearance. by the way, government of mexico and several of the airports, mostly in the high tourist destination, have shown an interest in doing that. i think we've made a good first step with the mutual recognition arrangement on trade and cargo security where we're both recognizing our mutual programs for vetting traders, trusted trader programs. i think that we can expand upon that when it comes to passengers, also. i think it is a little further -- i think it is a little further down the road for the preclearance in mexico. but it was -- good, thanks. >> commissioner, clearly a lot of progress has been made under your leadership. terrific job. thank you. i guess i just want to give you the opportunity, anything that

you haven't been asked this morning that you'd like to hit on or anything that the chamber and our members and the private sector can be doing more of in the next couple of years with you and your team? >> yeah. i think the burden falls on us quite a bit. people like todd and brenda and maria luisa are very busy. but i have never seen them not take the opportunity to attend one of your meetings, one of your conferences, to have some other very smart people like steve and others to be able to brief. and we do that a lot. we spend a lot of time and effort in that and i think it is time and effort that is well spent. so you should not be -- and i don't think you have been. you should not be the least bit hesitant in asking and demanding of us that we continue and do more. thank you. >> thank you. thank you, commissioner. appreciate it.

this sunday on q&a, eric larsson on his new book dead wake, last crossing of the lusitania. >> the story gets complicated when the question -- the question arises as to you know, what ultimately happened to the lusitania, why was the lusitania allowed to enter the iris sea without escort, without the kind of detailed warning that could have been provided to captain william thomas turner but was not. and this has led to some very

interesting speculation about was the ship essentially set up for attack by churchill or someone in the admirality. and it is interesting. i found no smoking memo and i would have found a smoking memo if it existed that is to say there was nothing from churchill to jackie fisher or to somebody else in the admiral saying let's -- let's let the lusitania go into the iris sea because we wanted to get something. nothing like that exists. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern and pacific on c-span's q&a. retired general john allen is the presidential envoy for the global coalition to counter isis. he says the u.s. and its partners are clearly degrading isis' capabilities. his comments came during testimony before the house foreign affairs committee thursday on the hill. also testifying, two dense department officials this is two

and a half hours. this hearing will come to order. this morning the committee continues its examination of the threat that is posed to the middle east and the united states by isis. and one of the things we're trying to do here is to look at the administration's strategy to destroy this brutal terrorist organization, and assess the proposed authorization of military force to be -- to be used. they have sent an authorization to us. the goal of isis, i think, is pretty clear.

it is to wreck everything and every person in its path to establish a caliphate and then fight to expand that caliphate. isis affiliates are growing in power and presence throughout the region. in the last few weeks, we have seen attacks in yemen. we have seen attacks in tunisia and libya. what is less clear is the administration's approach and its determination to tackle this threat. many of you know that for some time some of us on this committee have been pushing the idea of hitting isis from the air. we went through many months of isis going town by town in syria and then in iraq, without the use of u.s. air power against isis. as a consequence, isis ended up taking many major cities across the region ended up taking the central bank of mosul. if we count the number of sorties against isis to date there is 2,959 that have been

flown. if you compare that to the 116,000 air strikes during the first gulf war, when iraq moved 40 some divisions into -- into kuwait, you get an idea of the difference in magnitude between the way this has been conducted versus the very real deterrence that we utilized in the past. we also have the fact that at least among the canadian forces their spotters are forward deployed so they can hit their targets when they call the targets in. and when -- in the u.s., with u.s. forces, our forces are not forward deployed, so when you're calling in an air strike, and you're not forward deployed to do it, there is some question about how effective that is going to be. most americans would be puzzled to learn about a lot of this. and i think that the piecemeal attacks that the obama administration has been systematically using here has

been squandering our air power advantage, at least one observer tells us that's the case. and adding to the problem, the regional forces on the ground, these air strikes are supposed to be supporting are badly undersupplied. after seven months of fighting this committee is still receiving troubling reports from the kurdish peshmerga and visits from the kurdish representatives about how outgund their men and women are on the front line. 37% of their battalions are female. and those women are fighting against isis and fighting with small arms and they have yet to receive the artillery and the long range mortars and the anti-tank weaponry that they have repeatedly asked for. this morning, ranking member engel and i are reintroducing legislation to allow u.s. arms to be sent directly to the kurds, they're strung out on a 500 plus mile front, against

isis. these brave fighters these women and men and battalions need better equipment to defeat isis and we can't allow iran through its influence over baghdad to continue to prevent that type of weaponry from coming from the center. so we should provide it. we should sell it to them directly. and the sunni tribal fighters who will be central to this fight are yet to trust baghdad as you know. strong local police and provisional national guard forces are desperately needed to protect sunnis in anbar province and elsewhere. into the void on the ground in iraq, have stepped iranian-backed shiite fighters. the leading force behind the recent tikrit offensive. senior u.s. officials have put this development in positive terms. the reports indicate that u.s. intelligence and air power will now support this iranian-backed

mission. in an editorial, it was cautioned this week, quote the growing power of the militias with their brutal tactics sectarian ideology and allegiance to iran's most militant faction has become as large an impediment to the goal of stabilizing iraq as isis. shiite militias taking on isis may serve the immediate interest of killing jihadis, but it is hard to see how empowering iran's proxies is in the short medium or long-term interest of an inclusive iraq or a stable middle east. the fear that many of us have is that sunni iraqis who have been tortured by isis will get the same brutal treatment by their shiite militia liberators and that would fuel endless conflict. to see how this is viewed in the region with respect to iran being on the march the other day, the iranians boasted that they had taken four arab

capitals. well, in taking yemen, you've set off a situation now where the saudi -- the saudis and others are reacting a ten-nation coalition is reacting. and saudis are making preparations to hit that iranian proxy on the ground. we know that other iranian agents helped organize and topple that government and now that the iranian regime is crowing about it other countries in the region are taking action. and this is complicating the circumstances here. in other words iran is very much complicating the ability in the region to get some stability. political reconciliation in baghdad must be central to u.s. policy. the committee will be interested to learn what the administration is doing to press prime minister abadi to ensure he doesn't become former prime minister

maliki a disastrous sectarian. and we'll hear today our u.s. strategy is focused on iraq first. that's what we'll be told. but until the meltdown of syria, with general petraeus termed a geopolitical chernobyl is capped, until that meltdown is capped, it is going to continue to spew radioactive instability and extremist ideology over the entire region. last fall congress voted to authorize training in equipping the syrian opposition forces. but to our great frustration that is still not up and running. and when pressed on the path forward in syria, most administration officials seem to suggest we can figure it out later. our slow action is creating a crisis of confidence among our allies. our witnesses are here to explain the president's strategy and when the committee returns in april we plan to hear more from the secretary of state and defense about the president's aumf request.

i'll turn to the ranking member for his opening statement. >> mr. chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing. general allen, general fantini, general olson, welcome. we are delighted that we have such a distinguished array of generals to really speak with us this morning. thank you for appearing here today and thank you for your tireless service to our country. the main purpose of this hearing is to get an update on the progress of the anti-isis coalition. and the significant challenges that remain. but we must also address the elephant in the room in my opinion, the need for a new authorization for the use of military force or aumf. as i said again and again, this committee, and this congress have an important role to play in our foreign policy. i believe that's the case with our negotiations over iran's nuclear program.

and the same must hold true when it comes to our effort against isis. congress needs to play its part. i will resist any attempt to marginalize congress fulfilling its constitutional role. by passing the new aumf, our service members, the brave men and women in uniform risking their lives against this enemy would feel the full support of congress. our coalition partners would see if the american government is united in our commitment to degrade and destroy this enemy. congress would reassert the important role we are empowered to play by the constitution. and we as lawmakers would show that congress doesn't shrink away from the tough decisions because if we do, we're setting the message that congress my put itself on the sideline the next time the crisis erupts and the time after that, and the time after that. that's simply unacceptable. the language sent to us by the

president with the aumf isn't perfect, but i believe it is a good start. so let's work together to craft a bipartisan aumf. let's tailor it to the needs of our troops and this mission, because everything we're dealing with today is taking place under the shadow of the vital unfinished business. i know that we're talking a lot about iran these past days, as an impending agreement, the deadline for one is rapidly approaching. and talk about an aumf seems to have faded in the background. but i believe that's something that cannot fade in the background. it is something we have to tackle and this is the committee to do so. and we will do so. generals, we look to you for leadership. and clearly explaining our strategy to degrade and defeat isis to this committee. and to the american people. in my view, the international coalition has made real progress conducting military operations and advising our partners on the ground, working to alleviate the humanitarian

crisis, cutting off funding sources for isis taking steps to stem the flow of foreign fighters, and pushing back against the toxic message of isis propaganda. this strategy is making a real difference isis is losing ground, much of its top leadership has been taken out. obviously we still have much more to do. thanks to our training iraqi security forces are improving, so they can better deal with the isis threat. regional partners are playing a bigger and bigger role in the coalition is holding steady. but we're still facing a lot of challenges and i would like to touch on some of those today. first of all, i'm concerned about iran's growing foot hold in iraq. the iran guided operation in tikrit has faltered, but shia militants including some fighters trained by iran's qods force are playing a more influential role in iraq. what are their intentions and had how do our own plans take

these elements into account? secondly, i'm struggling to see the path forward in syria. i think you know that i view our efforts to aid the opposition as too little too late and far too slow. two and three years ago i was yelling we should be aiding and abetting and providing weapons to the free syria army. what happened now through years later is the forces are barely hanging on. they have been focused on fighting the assad regime and that would be hard enough especially with an adequate weapons and training. but they also have to face off against isis and other battle hardened groups like the nusra front. they need more training and equipment as quickly as we can get it to them. and lastly what more can we do what more can we do to support the syrian people? more than 200,000 syrians have already perished in this war. nearly 10 million have been driven from their homes. this crisis has spilled over borders into turkey iraq

jordan and lebanon. this is a humanitarian catastrophe assad has blood on his hands and the syrian people desperately need relief. so, gentlemen, i look forward to covering these issues with you. i thank you, again, for your courageous service. and i say again, that it is past time for congress to give you the support you need for this vital mission. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. engel. this morning we're pleased to be joined by senior representatives from the department of state and defense. general john allen is the special presidential envoy for the global coalition to counter isil. appointed on september 16th, 2014, by president obama. general allen is a retired u.s. marine four star general, former commander of coalition and u.s. forces in afghanistan from 2011 to 2013, during had his combat tour in iraq he played a critical role in the awakening movement in el anbar province. brigadier general michael fantini is the middle east principle director for the

office of the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. previously he served as commander of kandahar air field. brigadier general olson is with us. the deputy director from middle east joint staff strategic plans and policy at the department of defense and previously he served as the deputy commander for marine forces central command. brigadier general olson, as i understand, you'll not be giving oral testimony but will be available to answer any members' questions. we thank you for that, sir. without objection, the witnesses' full prepared statements will be made part of the record and members will have five calendar takes to submit statements or questions of you or extraneous materials. we would ask that you would summarize your remarks and we'll begin with general allen. >> esteemed members of the committee, thank you for providing me this opportunity to

update you on the progress of the global coalition to counter isil. more broadly let me thank you sincerely, the members of this committee, for the tremendous support that you have been giving our men and women in uniform, and also our diplomats within the foreign service at far flung posts and stations around the world who served our country so well and we're deeply grateful for the support of this committee in that regard. a return to washington this past week after ten day visit to coalition capitals where i met with partners in rome and ankara berlin and finally in brussels where i briefed the members of the european union in the north atlantic council. my engagements in each of these stops reinforced my confidence in the coalition strategy to council -- to counter isil across the informational, the physical and the financial spheres in which it operates. the territory isil has lost in the increasing financial strain on the organization and the

diminished morale and increasing desertions of its fighters were clearly degrading its capabilities. the so-called caliphate is under direct assault. to date, the coalition has conducted nearly 3,000 air strikes, i believe in fact one over that number last night. against isil territories. more than 1600 of them in iraq and nearly 1300 in syria. we have taken out isil's fighters, many of its commanders, as well as infrastructure support to its terror infrastructure and facilities and including 20 training camps, and over 200 oil and gas facilities. so as the coalition campaign began, isil lost more than a quarter of the populated territories it held in iraq. because we lack the same kind of partners on the ground in syria the situation there is more challenging and complex. still, we're working closely with regional partners to establish sites for training and equipping vetted moderate syrian

opposition elements in order to train approximately 5,000 troops per year over the next three years. syrian opposition groups to counter isil continue to make strategic gains expanding west and east from kobani and retaking territory from isil. coalition air strikes against isil in syrian territory continue to degrade isil's sanctuary and limit its freedom of movement and military capabilities as well as its capacity to resupply its efforts in iraq. in iraq, coalition air power supported many iraqi security force led operations and we're actively supporting the training of iraqi forces at four training camps where nine iraqi army and three peshmerga before he gads are being or will be trained and equipped. coalition is planning to build on this initial success as well as to prepare to meet a set of critical challenges in the months ahead. as isil is defeated in the population center and military forces must move on to their

objectives, there will be an immediate need for policing and public security efforts to set the conditions for essential services and delivery. populations that have fled the flighting will need shelter and assistance and security until they can return home. in many cases facilities have been destroyed or made insecure by improvised explosive devices and providers will need to rapidly assess and respond with basic medical care with water and electricity and other municipal services. as a successful stabilization effort begins with fair treatment during military operations, we applaud iraqi leaders including the grand ayatollah saeed ali sistani who called for the protection of civilians and warned against acts of revenge and recrimination or abuse. and i might digress by saying it is worth reading his 20-point code of conduct that he issued last month with regard to the fighters in the field to liberate iraq. it also means protecting the schools and hospitals and water treatment facilities and

securing antiquities and libraries. these measures begin the process of reunifying iraq and building trust between the liberated communities and the government of iraq. these critical stabilization efforts were at the center of my consultations last week in baghdad, and on the first day of the meetings we heard from the rackies about their need to plan for idp return support ied removal and provide services and expertise to assist with stabilization efforts. on the second day, a team of experts and coalition members met with their iraqi counterparts and discussed iraqi plans in greater detail. throughout my meetings, i emphasized that iraq's stabilization efforts will be the most important signal of the intentions of the government to fulfill its goal of rebuilding iraq for all iraqis. we know from experience that these kinds of essential services are delivered nor effectively and efficiently when sequenced and planned early on with military operations and civilian cooperation.

we also know this stabilization operations require significant resources. we as a coalition will work together to assist and support iraq as we are able to. but we do not have the resources to support all of iraq's needs nor can money alone, whether from the iraqi budget or the trust fund or from any number of partners achieve the full effectiveness of that appropriate prioritization planning and sequencing. from baghdad, we travel to berlin, for first meeting of the coalition stabilization working group. there under the leadership of german and other governments we convene a dozen coalition partners to identify specific areas where the coalition can support the iraqis and establish a shared understanding of what we hope to achieve. the working group on stabilization is just one of five coalition working groups coordinating coalition activities on specific lines of effort including military support, counterfinance countermessaging and efforts to

stem the flow of foreign fighters. among coalition members disrupting the flow of foreign fighters it is an urgent concern and rightly so. partners are working together to make it more difficult for their citizens to fight in syria and iraq through criminal justice reform and enhanced border control and better intelligence sharing. 18 coalition partners have passed new foreign terrorist fighter legislation over the last six months in order to stem the flow of fighters traveling to the region. more action is being contemplated. in fact just this week the italian government broke up a ring of smugglers, of foreign fighters operating between italy and albania the ct operation flowed from the use of information as a result of our coalition actions and prosecution of those individuals will flow from legislation as a result of our coalition actions. we must continue to improve how we harmonize border and customs processes, track potential and actual fighters en route to the battle and share intelligence with partners. this kind of information sharing and creative thinking between partners is also vital in

meeting a related and similar urgent challenge containing isil's access to financial support. here the coalition made gains in synchronizing practices to block isil's access to banks both region and globally. this includes stemming the flow of private donations and limiting isil's financial options by restricting the ability to generate oil revenue. we're now expanding the efforts to count the access to local and informal financial networks. there is also broad consensus among partners in the coalition counterfinance working group which met for the first time in rome last week, that we must closely examine any financial ties between core isil and terrorists linked to isil throughout the region. we're also beginning to better prepare ourselves for isil's violent messaging. last month the president announced the creation of a new joint operations online center with the uae where we will collaborate with regional partners who take on isil in the online information space. efforts like these to counterviolent messaging were to

take on isil's recruitment capabilities and efforts to generate revenues will endure long after the defeat of isil and will support long-term u.s. counterterrorism goals. the united states and coalition partners are also supporting the united nations efforts to provide food aid and supply critical assistance to protect vulnerable women and children and men in an attempt to limit the suffering caused by isil's excesses and advances. best way to protect vulnerable communities from isil's barbaric campaign of death and terror is to degrade and defeat the organization, militarily and ideologically over the course of several years. president has outlined a framework for authorities he believes will be necessary to pursue this campaign with his formal request to the congress with the authorization of use of military force against isil. the aumf request using our unique capabilities and partners on the ground, instead of through long-term, large sc!i

this hearing presents an important opportunity to continue that important dialogue with the congress and coordination and consultation. and i want to thank you, mr. chairman, and ranking member engel for calling this hearing. i look forward to takinging your

questions. thank you very much. >> thank you very much for your testimony. we now go to general fantini. >> mr. chairman, ranking member engel, members of the committee, thank you for havin/?c me here today. i will briefly describe our efforts that we are undertaking to counter isil in iraq and syria and as general allen mentioned, the u.s. strategy to government effort supported by a broadn4m and includes multipl8/y lines of effort across the government to counter this threat. the department of defense has lead responsibility for denying isil safe haven, and building partnership capacity. this means conducting strikes against critical isil assets and supporting our partners on the ground. principally the iraqi security forces and vettedwi9ñ syrian opposition. under the denying safe haven line to deny isil safe haven the coalition has conducted approximately 3,000 air strikes including more than 1600 in iraq

since august 8th, 2014. additionally over 1200 strikes have occurred in syria since december 23rd, 2014. commanders, u than 1,000 vehicles and tanks, over 200 oil and gas facilities, the infrastructure that funds this terror as well as over 20 training camps and more than 2,000 fighting positions, check points buildings barracks in both iraq and syria. as a result of this effort the coalition hasym arrested isil's momentum degraded its ability0)r(t&háhp &hc% to mass andñ maneuver forces and pressured or eliminated its leader cells and disrupted its supply lines. overall we've put isil on the defensive in iraq. under building partnership capacity countering isil will not be possible without our local partners in the league to build partnership capacity in iraq the u.s. and coalition partners are supporting the government of iraq in its

efforts to strengthen and reconstitute the iraqi security forces by assisting with training equipping and advising iraqi security forces. this includes kurdish fighters as well as sunni tribes. last summer we stood up a team to support partners andzv earlier this year we began training iraq security at four sites across iraq. i was able to visit tagi sitet( recently and saw firsthand the?; partnership that we have undertaken with our iraq forces. with the help of v quick train fund8z to train three peshmerga brigades and nine iraqi brigades that was mentioned by general allen as well as tribal and sunni forces. under the syria train and equip in addition to our efforts in iraq we are working with our coalition partners to build the capabilities of the moderate syrian opposition. with training of the first classfá

that began later next month in april, the goal is to train vetted syrian recruits to defend the syrian people, stabilize area under-9 opposition ccontrol empower trainees to go on the offensive against isil and promote the positions for negotiated settlement to end the conflict in sir yeah our partners in the region including saudi arabia, turkey qatar have hosted and supported the program. u.s. forces in the region strengthen our 3wpartner's locally. it will be with the iraqi security forces and syrian fighters who will serve to secure the gains against isil and inflict a lasting defeat. we look forward to working closely with you and we will continue to keep you and your colleagues informed. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much. let me beginu first of all, general allen, from a purely military point of view, is the current military strategy -- is

the current military strategy tobn) defeatjf isil deficientym in any way? >> well, obviously as the strategy unfolds we know it's a long-term strategy. we'll keep a very close eye on the progress. we'll evaluate the resources against our expectations. again, asjeá the strategy unfolds. as i watch the pieces of this come together with respect toa+= the training, with respect to our enabling with respect to our fikup power and fire support provided to the iraqi security forces, it seems to be unfolding in a manner which i think will be successful in iraq. so we'll keep a close eye on this and obviously we'll remain in close consultation with the congress on the issue of resources. >> let me ask you if i could, two days ago i chaired a hearing on the increase of

anti-semitism. robert lauder was a former world junior congress. he said there were thousands of young european muslims that left to fight with radical muslims in iraq andoqa syria. there's a fear they could have returned bringing the bloodshed with them. some have returned and we have seen the consequences. he referred to the increasedko attacks on jews.t( to what extent are we examining the threat of returning muslims, a threat not just to europe but to the united states? i noticed in your testimony, general, you talked about how the coalition members are trying to disrupt the flow of foreign fighters.q kkws?ñ you made a very cursory reference to someté%ju$e efforts. you mentioned 18 coalition partners have passed new foreign5a terrorist fighter legt shup and so on. this is a rear guard the likes of which i think we have never seen it. what can we do to mitigate the

threat? >> you've put your finger on$k one of the greatestr ultimately of the -- of isil as it exists today. it is a threat in iraq it is a thread in syria and the region. the return of fighters is a threat to our homeland and the homeland of our partners as we have seen tragically in places like ottawa, paris, cope pen hagganhag hagen and brussels. you are correct. this is an issue for us. there is a working group with an entire line of effort with the u.s. strategy as wellzv to extend the foreign fighters. it begins by dealing with issues at home where we havee1 encouraged through best practices and consultation and exchange of information where nations will work with at-risk populations at home with e1clerics teachers, with family members, with tribal leaders in thosexd populations in our coalition partners homes. >> is there recognition, if i

could interrupt, among our partners that jew ares at heightened risk? >> absolutely. absolutely. this is, of course an issue, the anti-semitism that has arisen from this. it is the security of these countries. they are fixated on it. >> if i could many of us have noted with a great deal of dismay the president's earlier dismissal of isis as a j.v. team, the equivalent of we've seen this ujz on a number of front. i held a whole series of hearings on boko haram and tried desperately to get the administration to declare boko haram a problem went to nigeria, it was as clear as the nose on my face that boko haram had a global -- not global but more of a regionalvfd terrorist mind set and we seemed not to

have assessed the scope, lethality of the threat. it's part of the coalition of the 60. is nigeria part of that? you know, again, to my dismay and shock and many others, allb? of a sudden we walked away last december from helping the nigerian government combat the very real threat that they're conducting. it all can be done, it's a matter of political will. if you might speak to that and quickly because i'm almost out of time general dempsey had pointed out that the security of the iraqi forces and iranian support is positive. happens when the drums of isil stop beating and: $at aboutym this -- the idea that we need an inclusive government in iraq? that seems to me to be a very far away dream and not likely to happen. if you could speak to boko haram especially.

>> boko haram is obviously a great concern. it has put its hand in the airzv to be a what they call distant province of the caliphate. they have ultimately established ae1 relationship so i certainly mmend your having held hearings on this s7issue, because it is a very serious issue. nigeria is not a member of the coalition, but i am traveling to trying to explain the nature of isil and the nature of this threat, which is through franchises, local franchises expanding. >> if you could look to include them as well as other countries in africa which are al all theñr] other threats that are being faced. i yield to mr. edsel. >> thank you, mr. smith.u i want to talk a little bit in the beginning about iran. you know0l we're negotiating at( deal with them. they continue to be a bad actor

all over the middle east and yemen. it appears that the iraqi security forces with?; the help of outside militias, including shia militias, were making gains in tikrit. what has been iran's role in this operation and what is the united states's current role in this operation? >> i don't think we have a fulli] and complete pictureçó onlpñ iran's role. there seems to have been some organizational support to the shia elements in thexd popular mobilization force potentially some direct fire support as ko well. how much command and control they were exerting as opposed to how much the shia militia elements, the pmf were exerting, i think remains ultimately to be determined. the u.s. role with regard to tikrit has to be considered in the larger u.s. role across all

of iraq. but your question is an important one. as we watch the operation unfold inkbfñç#" ju)u we established a very close relationship -- not established, continued our close relationship with the combined joint our conversation with the iraqij@n/ h + political leaders continued. as the operation unfolded prime minister abadi and members of the iraqi security forces requested a u.s. andfá coalition support for the final phase of the operation ultimately to liberate the city of tikrit. that began and i don't want to get into a lot of the operational detail to the benefit of the enemy who's listening to what we're saying, it began by the provision of information and key intelligence, but as i think?uk$ @r(t&háhp &hc% mr. 7ñengel, you saw last night, a large number of well-targeted and precise airstrikes went in and are beginning to support the

iraqi security force operations that are t(ñi it's specifically as a1éueu of the request of the iraqi government and the i2 security forces to assistñijf

in tikrit. >> i recently met with senior leaders and last week across iraq met with senior iraqi leaders. they're very keen on our role. our role across iraq and the role in the restoration of iraq's territorial integrity and sovereignty but are very keen on our role now to support the iraqi security forces in the final assault on tikrit and the liberation of thatñ population center and that aspect of sal hadin province. >> let me turn to the aumf because i think that's very important. the administration sent an aumf. i was one of the few people who thought it was ar

how should ground troops be received in the middle east and by other coalition partners? w%culd a large deployment help8 or hinder our goal of degrading and defeating isis? >> that's an important question. as i try to respond to questions like that i always try to start by saying the operationaly>+éñu .hzvzq-9fá the recommended or decision making with respect to what the

consulted with with the congress on our options but i think we now know over many years now of our experience in the region that the presence of large numbers of ground forcesfá4v(z sometimes have theñis6up6zq$

shiites that i've melt. >> i take it. >> the environment was really dramatically different at the time. it was a contested area where once the tribes were properly supported by us they were able to turn on the enemy. >> general pardon me. my time is limited here to ask questions. >> of course. >> however let me just note for

the record that i -- looking from a distance, it seems that the tribal forces that were so important to your success with an earlier strategy are not at play now is because the administration is insisting on a strategy that is based on keeping iraq together rather than working and deploying the forces within that region into the fight against isil. >> if i may comment. >> yes, sir. >> i've been to al assad airbase just recently where i saw u.s. and coalition special operators training the tribal forces. it is the full intent of the iraqi government to leverage, and they now have about 7500 or so tribal fighters on the payroll, to leverage the tribal fighters ultimately to do much of the same thing that we were successful in doing in '07. it is an intent of the iraqi government. >> i understand it's their

intent, but the fact is that these tribal leaders don't trust the intent of the iraqi government and because of this -- by the way, i wouldn't either if i was in their spot. >> what about the kurds. you mentioned there are kurdish fighters that you are very high on, level on then you've mentioned of course the sunni tribal leaders that we're talking about. where are the shiites? isn't this really the problem is that when we come down to it the shiites are not doing their part in this? >> this is a really important question and it's a bit complex and i'm going to take a stab at it recognizing the time. >> yes, sir. >> last year when daesh entered hh entered iraq and we began to see the route and what ultimately looked

like the loss of baghdad and points south, the grand ayatollah sistani called for the rallying of all iraqis to the flag, not shiias, iraqis. at the time for obvious reasons many of those individuals who were able to get to the flag frankly were the shia and they were organized in something called the popular mobilization committee of which we see in the field today popular mobilization forces. they are not, they are note subiraq, they are not his bola with -- his bowesbollah and they were organizations that were filled last year with young men that came from tribes in the south. they were teachers one day and they were fighters one day. they were bakers one day, they were infantrymen the next day. they came to defend their

country. the fact this they organized in shia organizations, and there's been 80,000 of them or so the fact that they organized in shia organizations has been ultimately to stabilize the situation and then participate conceivably in the counter offensive. it is not an intention sir that these groups remained permanently established. it is the intention ultimately of the iraqi government that elements would be subsumed under the national guard concept or they would be disbanded and go home. they already ceased paying 20,000 of them. so the shia are in fact involved here as an irregular force in+iáa military organization that has played a role. >> has played a role. and, again, under scoring the basis point that we just went through, these are not the -- the ultimate fighters that we have to rely on are really the kurds and the sunni tribal people. i believe in the strategy that

you've set out. i believe it will work but only if we are not hampered by the idea that we're going to keep iraq, which is an artificial entity created by the british a long time ago make that our number one goal rather than defeating isil which supposedly is our goal. thank you, general and thank all of you. >> chair recognizes mr. deutsch. >> thank you mr. chairman. i wanted to continue this line of questions about the shia and iran and sistani's popular mobilization forces. i want to actually start with the news about our strikes in tikrit. the coverage in "the new york times" today included a paragraph that said, if the americans did not engage they feared becoming marginalized by tehran, in a country which they had spilled much blood in the last decade the official said

speaking on condition of anonymity anonymity. is -- if you could speak to the strikes in tikrit, the air support that the united states is providing is it different than the support we have provided in the past? and is it being offered in part because there were concerns about being marginalized by the iranians? and in answering that question it gets to the broader point of the, again, same article the preponderance of the 30,000 fighters on the iraqi side members of the militias fighting alongside the iraqi soldiers and policemen. of those 30,000 how do we, general allen following your last response, how do we view it in a nuanced way to distinguish between the iranian backed militias and sistani's popular mobilization forces? >> congressman, i think the answer to your question is no. we work by, with and through the iraqi government and so

through the iraqi government and the iraqi security forces the iraqis came back and asked for support and we adjudicated that decision to the highest levels and decided to engage there. it's within the iraqi interest and the coalition's interests to be successful in tikrit because we don't want to have another success for daesh or isil. and we anticipate that the support that we're providing the iraqi security forces with the minister of defense -- with the ministry of defense in charge of the command and control of that operation, that we're in a position that we can provide that support to be successful. >> with regard to the command and control, the -- there's a difference between the role of the traditional shia elements

that are aligned directly with iraq and supported directly with iraq and those elements of the pmf that have provided a larger force posture and a larger force generation capability. they are not -- they don't intend to be or are not intended to be a permanent part of the iraqi security force entity. they are viewed as a temporary organization that have played the role ultimately of blunting and halting the forward progress of daesh and as we continue to build out the capabilities of the iraqi security forces across the board, we can provide you i think significant detail about the forces that are engaged right now in tikrit. it's actually quite encouraging to give you a sense of when the pmf elements are going to be in play and when they won't be in play and as we continue to force generate the regular forces,

they will play an increasing role ultimately in the counter offensive ultimately to liberate the populations. >> carolyn, are you confident that the iraqi people view this action in tikrit as one taking place against isis by the united states through airstrikes and iraqi security forces or is it viewed as one that is a combination of u.s. air strikes and iran any and shia backed militias? >> that's a good question. we -- again, from my time on the ground just last week there, i made an effort to meet with the provincial leadership in the sal hadin province in which tikrit is the largest population center. at the time the leadership in sal hadin and even recently have

talked about focusing on the liberation of tikrit and have applauded the role of american forces in supporting the central government and the iraqi forces in liberating tikrit from daesh. so my sense is on the ground their view is that the united states, as we have done in other places multiple other places in iraq, are providing the enabling to the use of information and support to command and control and ultimately fire power that will facilitate the iraqi government and security forces in liberating this population center. my sense is that at least the sunni leadership, key sunni leadership, the speaker, the vice president and others but also the sunni leadership of sal hadin have been clear that they support the role of the united states in this particular concern. >> i hope that that translates then down to the iraqi people as well. i yield back. >> thank you mr. deutsch.

chair recognizes the gentleman from alabama, mo brooks. >> i pass. >> chair recognizes david sisilini. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you very much for being here, general. you said general allen that you -- in response to a question you said i think we'll be successful and you said in iraq sort of emphatically. that caused me to wonder whether you had a different assessment of the region or outside of iraq? >> the -- the pieces as we have assembled them in iraq, i foresee those pieces achieving the strategy that we have laid out for ourselves, which is ultimately to facilitate the iraqi government's restoration of the territorial integrity of iraq and the sovereignty of the country. with respect to syria, obviously that situation's going to take

longer. the training and equipping program, again with the great support of the congress just beginning to receive trainees and begin the process formally of training elements of the new syrian army. and as those elements are introduced into the battle space as we continue the work of working closely with the syrian moderate opposition, the coalition. i met the president of the syrian opposition coalition there is not the clear partner that there is in syria as there is in iraq. there is not the governmental entity in syria as there is in iraq. it is going to take more time obviously and we're going to have to evaluate that situation as we go on. >> thank you. a shia militia destroyed a sunni village they had retaken from

isis which was methodical and driven by revenge according to the report. it says several other villages were similarly targeted. considering this building on congressman deutsch's question, how can we monitor retaliatory actions and will the shia militia's punitive actions cause iraq's disenfranchised sunnis to view isil as the only protectors? what are we doing to mitigate that and what are the implications for fostering reconciliation between the shia and sunnis because of iraq's involvement? >> it's an extremely important question, both yours and congressman deutsch's. there have been problems. they've been horrible. i think we've seen that the iraqi government condemned those excesses. they have initiated

investigations into those excesses excesses. those excesses have been condemned by the iraqi government. they have been condemned by the grand ayatollah sistani. it was part of -- because of that it was part of the reason for his issuance of the 20 point code of ethics code of conduct which would be recognizable to all of us in uniform as something that would be admirable to be followed by anyone who's involved in combat operations. so that's -- that's what i would say is the first part. the tribes, the sunni tribes that i still remain in close contact with, i just had a conversation with one just this morning, have made it clear that they are willing to give this government in iraq a chance. prime minister abadi has reached out to the shiias he's reached out to the tribes.

he unlike his counterpart who in fact victimized the sunni tribes and victimized the sons of iraq he has also established, i think, an unprecedented way relations with the sunni governments in the region. he's been to visit the king in jordan. he has a close relationship with the turks. he and his government have had close relations. so there's a regional relationship. there is a governmental outreach with his own government through his national security adviser and to his personal actions to the sunni tribes in an effort not just to recruit them into the fight against daesh but also to establish the mechanisms and the environment in which reconciliation can occur. and i -- you know i speak frequently with the sheiks of

these tribes. there isn't one of them who cease that isil isn't one form or other an alternative. that may have been an issue last year. that may have been an issue in and around the invasion by daesh in june of 2014, but the tribes in which i have long relations and the sheiks with whom i maintain contact, there isn't one of them that sees the presence of daesh as preferable to the central government and they've told me that prime minister abadi and this government is something they can give a chance to. >> thank you general. i yield back, mr. chairman. >> the chair recognizes the gentleman from texas randy webber. >> thank you mr. chairman. general allen, how many -- how many of those tribes and sheiks are there? >> i'll take the question sir. there are many.

in anbar i think we tracked in '08 there were as many as 60 tribes and subtribes. there are multiple tribal confederations the shamar confederation confederation, delamy, zobai. there are multiple. >> how many do you stay in contact with? you say you've talked to a number of them. >> i've talked to ten or 12. >> ten or 12. >> and they have significant populations. >> okay. earlier you said grand ayatollah sistani had a code of conduct that had 20 items on them. >> 20 points. >> where do we -- where do you -- >> i'll leave one with the committee. >> perfect. okay. do you view -- what do you think the chances are that when this is all said and done, however long that takes that iran winds up with the spoils of the country of iraq and that actually he'll be in charge? >> i don't think that's going to

be the case. >> you do not? >> i do not think that's going to be the case. in the end these -- iraq is an arab country. while they -- the -- a large element of the iraqi population shares a confession within the faith of islam with a large population in iran, they are a different people. >> what percentage of the fighters would you guesstimate is iranian guard or iranian and then let's go to shia and sunni and even the kurds. can you divide that up for us? >> no, i can't. we'll take the question. the preponderance now, the majority now in the battle space are shia militias that are of the popular mobilization force i described before. some smaller number of them are the direct iranian allied hezbollah, that type of group, but we can provide you, i think, some pretty good fidelity on that. then, of course our focus is

the iraqi security forces, counter terrorism forces and the training of the tribes as well. >> would you guesstimate that that's a total force of 100,000 200,000, what would you guess the fighting numbers? >> i would just ask either of my military colleagues for the number. >> general olsen? >> congressman, there's about 90,000 fighters in the ministry of peshmerga. there have been as many as 80,000 mobilized in grand ayatollah sistani's call to arms for shia militia. some have been enrolled as)[֖ popular mobilization forces, some have not. for iraqis under arms there's a significant shia population in the iraqi armed forces, both the counter terrorism services and the regular armed forces. about 80% of the iraqis in uniform are shia. >> and what number would you put on that? >> i'll have to get back to you with an exact number of the

iraqis under arms. >> would you guess 10,000 to 80,000? >> it's upward of that. >> it's upward. what is our current guesstimate on isil forces in iraq? >> the numbers vary sir. i would defer to my intelligence committee colleagues about their best guest estimate. i've seen a couple,000 numbers. we can get back to you with a detailed classified answer. >> okay. are you guys watching the budget negotiations up here? it's okay to admit that you're watching them. >> my -- my portfolio on the joint staff is not being mindful of budgetary -- >> do you feel like you have enough money to prosecute -- how many -- we don't call them boots on the ground, i think we call them adviseres.

how many advisers do we have in iraq? >> upwards of 3,000 americans they are divided between building partner capacity advising and assisting the iraqi counterparts and providing the basic security and life support. >> okay. are you comfortable we have enough money in the next two to three years? >> the operations are. if you could come to us with an aumf, would you want it for three years. >> thank you. i yield back. >> the chair recognizes the young lady from florida. frankel. >> i have a couple of questions.

it first relates to the underlying conditions that relates to the rise of isil. would you agree that isil is not the cause of the turmoil in the region but a symptom of a much deeper problems and i'd like to get your opinion. is it unstable governments, poverty, desperation, radical religion? i've got to get your take on that. and secondly, i think the american public somehow thinks that you can simply get rid of isil by bombs or dropping drones. could you just explain the difficulty of their assimilation and population so forth, the terrain? >> one of the i think real

benefits of the counter isil coalition which numbers at 62 entities now countries and entities is the recognition that daesh is, in fact, not the disease, it's a symptom of something bigger, and that broad recognition includes the base societial factors that have given rise to the attractiveness of an organization like this. and they are societal issues they are political issues inclusiveness, participation, social issues associated with economic opportunity, the ability ultimately to have the opportunity to put food on the table for families and often the result of the absence of all of those or some of those in these countries and among these populations have created the conditions of despair and

desperation which has made those populations susceptible to radicalization and then recruitment. >> excuse me general. i assume there are efforts being done to try to respond to those conditions. >> i think so. we just had this week in fact, we ate dinner together the other night with the president ofk"ç)y afghanistan where i personally saw, because we are beginning to see the emergence port potential of isil and we have the presence of the taliban, which is its own entity, where we have seen, i believe, some real progress with regard to the underlying issues that gave rise to some of these organizations. the rights of women and the opportunity of women to have far more prominent role in societies. the dedication to institutions of democracy to build capacity

within those institutions, all of which of course, is stemmed from the security efforts that we have put into the building of that force, which is holding now. and so that -- that country is a good example as are other countries in the region. it's a good example of how they are attempting to address and embrace an absence of capacity whether it's social, economic, human rights, democratic institutions democratic institutions. capacity which has given rise to despair, radicalism extremism and violence. >> which sounds to me why syria is so difficult, because there really is no government there to work with at all. >> syria's very challenging, ma'am. >> could someone just respond to the question about how isil has integrated into the society? they're not standing in a corner

waiting to be bombed so maybe you could just explain the difficulty of rooting them out. >> so, yes, ma'am, isil is a -- an ideological entity that through the use of terror is able to co-op the society, and that is why when we look at the number of strikes that we have done to halt isil and put them on the defensive, it's very precise and we've done it with very -- with forethought with the understanding that this conflict is not a major force on another major force, more traditional, if you will. from a counter terrorism perspective we're in a counter terror fight and when we engage a target we want to ensure we engage the enemy and don't create more enemies by hitting

the wrong target, if you will. and so that is why it will time and the fact that we've conducted over 3,000 strikes in the six months has positioned us to continue to look for success as we move forward. it's a very challenging environment and a distributed enemy that our coalition tactics engender the support of the society and the government and that's how we will continue to pursue it. yes, ma'am. >> we'll go now to mr. salmon. >> thank you. i just asked for any of your thoughts on clapper not designating hamas and iran now

as threats to our naassa security. i was kind of shocksed that they're not included in threats to our national security. i'm curious about your thoughts. also when it comes to dealing with with with. also when it comes to dealing with isil, we're seeing iran and their allies invading other countries. so this muddled mess, one day the shiites are our allies the next the sunnis are our allies. depending on what country if you're dealing in yemen the iran backed forces are our enemy and they're a problem yet when we're fighting against isis they're our allies. it's a very confusing mess. for us in congress to end up,

you know, developing an aumf, it becomes very, very complicated and i'm just curious your thoughts on that. >> confusing mess is actually a good term for the environment that we find today in the region. it's a very difficult environment. it is one that is characterized by long term social difficulties as we explained to congresswoman frankel. it's one where there have been long term insurgencies and disruptions of the social fabric that have been leveraged by political entities within the region. iran has been prominent in that. it is a state sponsor of terror. it has been a disruptive influence for a very long time and i think that we haven't in

any respect changed our view that iran is one of the central destabilizing influences throughout the entire region. not just in the context of its destabilizing of our partners and allies in the region but certainly as a direct threat to our ally israel as well. so iran remains a state sponsor of terror. we still perceive it to be. i don't think that there's been any backpedaling by the administration with that regard. >> why did clapper then leave them off of the list? >> i don't know. i don't know that he did, sir. we'll do some research on his comments to ensure that we provide the clarity that you desire on this issue. i am not going to speculate here. i did not see his comments. you deserve one. but hamas and hezbollah remain ftos, and have been duly

designated by the u.s. government and remain so. nothing has changed in that regard. >> okay. the other question i'd have is why has the administration not designated additional shia militias or their leaders under executive order 13438 blocking property of persons who threaten stabilization efforts in iraq since the onset of operations against isis? >> i can't answer that. we'll get an answer for you, sir. >> okay. that will be really helpful. >> thank you for the question. >> thank you. >> for yielding and we'll go to the gentleman from florida. mr. alan grayson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general olson, trying to piece together information from public sources, it appears to me that we're spending roughly a million dollars for every isis fighter that u.s. forces kill. does that sound right to you? >> it's a figure that we

understand for the operational costs per day is about $8.5 million. >> but am i right that we're spending approximately million dollars for every single isis fighter that u.s. forces kill? >> i haven't done the math sir. >> all right. let's assume for the sake of the argument that that's correct, does it make sense? does it make sense for us to be deploying the most powerful military force that the world has ever seen and spend $1 million to kill some man standing in the desert 6,000 miles from the closest american shore holding a 40-year-old? does that make sense? >> the military strategy as designed provides u.s. support to a coalition that will degrade, dismantle and ultimately defeat isil. >> what about you, general fantini. can you think of ways that we can spend less than $1 million and still keep america safe for

every gentleman standing in the disearth 6,000 miles away whom we kill? >> congressman, i can't address the math that you're presenting. i don't know if that's accurate or not. from the perspective of continuing with the strategy of developing local forces, to enable those local forces with coalition support to degrade and defeat isil, i would submit that that is a worthy expenditure of resources. >> let's talk about that. you are all very familiar with what general powell describes makes a good use of war and what doesn't. general powell said we need a vital national security interest that's pursued by a clear strategy. we need overwhelming force and we need an exit strategy. so let's start with you on that, general allen. what is our exit strategy? >> the exit strategy is an iraq that is ultimately territorially

secure sovereign, and isil that has been denied safe haven ultimately has been disrupted to the point where it has no capacity to threaten at an existential level the government of iraq and the nation of the iraqi people and it ultimately ends up in a state that does not permit it threaten the united states or our homeland. >> general allen, that doesn't sound like a strategy to me, that sounds like a wish list. you certainly understand the difference between a strategy and a wish list? >> and i do. and the strategy in fact, has a whole series of lines of efforts that converge on daesh to prevent it from doing the very things that i just mentioned. >> but what is our strategy? >> strategy is to pursue a series of lines of effort from defense of the homeland to the stabilization to the iraqi government to the countering of the daesh message to the disruption of its finances to

the impediment of the foreign fighters. to the leadership of a coalition ultimately aimed to the defeat of daesh is a strategy. >> none of those are exit strategies? >> there is no exit strategy for this. this is about dealing with daesh. this is about defeating daesh. the success of the strategy is about empowering our partners so that they can ultimately restore the territorial part of the country and deny daesh ultimately to do that. if you're looking for an exit strategy with respect to our presence in iraq when we have successfully concluded that part of the strategy we have said that our forces will redeploy. so if that's the term that you are seeking in terms of an exit strategy, then i would say that is the mechanism by which we redeploy our forces from iraq, but the strategy is oriented on

an effect that we hope to achieve with daesh. >> general olson, you will agree that we are not using what colin powell considered to be overwhelming force, correct? >> we're using an appropriate level of force -- >> which isn't overwhelming force, not as colin powell would see it right? >> i don't want to speak for general powell. i believe the resources we are applying to the strategy to achieve our ends matching ways and means are appropriate for the strategy designed. >> general fantini, yes or no, are we using what you would consider to be overwhelming force? >> congressman, i would submit that american air power gets an ak-47 could be construed as overwhelming. i agree with general olson that the use of the resources and the force applied to support our

coalition partners to enable these ground operations are appropriate for the strategy and for success in this fight that will take a clear eyed and long term commitment. we have stated at least lee years. >> my time is up. >> thank you, mr. grayson. there's just one vote on the floor so we'll keep this hearing moving. some of the members have left to cast that ballot. they'll be back. and those members waiting to ask questions, if you -- some of you want to vote and come back, we'll work right through. empowering our partners is sort of the theme, general allen, that you've used successfully in the past with the anbar awakening. one of the questions though is which partners end up stepping up to the plate and will they do more harm than good and i am

speaking of the militias the iranian led or encouraged militias because that's my concern in all of this. many of our partners in that theater are already frustrated about our syria policy. we hear from these ambassadors in the gulf states and through the region, and i wonder how much longer the sunni states will stick with the coalition once these shia militias go on the rampage. and that's the part i'm concerned about. in some areas these shia have burned and bulldozed thousands of homes in sunni villages. you've seen the reports on the front pages of the papers about some of the atrocities committed, and this is our concern about the iranian terrain and equipped fighters stepping into iraq. i'll just give you what i recently heard about the breakdown. this is how general dempsey described the tikrit operation.

a thousand sunni tribal folks about 3,000 folks, that's what we want to see happening, but then 20,000 of the popular mobilization force which in this count seems that they're shia militia, and so given that some of those militia are the same militia in the pasta tacked u.s. forces during the height of the iraq war some are known to have targeted these sunni iraqi citizens during the same period, given iran's, you know, involvement in this how do we -- how do we reconcile their role then and now and to what extent are iranian forces on the ground taking part directing these militias? i see some of it in the interviews and certainly coming from the region the iranians are

trumping this. >> prime minister abadi has been pretty clear, very clear actually, that it is not his intention that there be developed any parallel security structures in iraq. to that extent the popular mobilization forces have been generally organized in a manner that ultimately they'll either be disbanded or will be subsumed under the national guards organizations once the national guard legislation is passed and they become a reality. i think your question and your concern is very well placed. we are attempting to ensure that we understand what it is that the iranians have done and what they've not done with respect to the militias as well and with regard to tikrit in particular. you are also correct that there are elements of these militias which are the ones that we have seen before, that we saw during our period of time in iraq in

large numbers, hezbollah and others that have the potential of creating a long-term security problem for the central government in iraq. so we're watching this closely. we're working closely ultimately with the central government on the assimilation of those popular mobilization forces. those shia forces that came forward in the aftermath of the attack on iraq last june to try to preserve the integrity of iraq. ultimately it is thought that those will be disbanded or go home. the longer term issue your question, i think implies we're going to have to deal with hezbollah and those elements are directly supported by the iranians over time. i think that is a security issue that the iraqis are going to have to address. i think their time will come as this campaign continues to

unfold. >> yes. i think some of this talk about iran being a very successful regional power long term if it does this nuclear deal, the choice of words here by the administration i think is concerning to others on the ground who don't -- who have noticed, you know, the iranians were bragging the other day about four arab capitals being under their control and talking about maybe taking a fifth you know? and this kind of rhetoric coming commensurate -- of course, i'm bothered by three days ago the death to america quote from the ayatollah. in the middle of all of this pushing the envelope and saying we control four arab capitals now and we're on our way to

controlling a fifth, and they're talking about saudi arabia, and they're trying to support a low level insurgency, the shia there. i mean the sunni tribes will be there. the sunni tribes will be central to this fight in terms of turning back isis and they've been squeezed between the terror of isis on one hand and the brutality of the shia militia on the other because of your experiencens in anbar and the fact is that helped turn the tide, i just look at the resources and the capabilities that were deployed then versus what we're doing to work with them now and we've got to do more i think to fully engage the sunnis tribes in this struggle against isis. as an alternative to having iran bringing in as they're doing you

know, today, and syria and lebanon and yemen and frankly, trying to do in saudi arabia and trying to do in bahrain as we know to the extent that that you can succeed at this is going to be essential. >> i agree with that 100%, chairman. that the unfolding of the counteroffensive in iraq needs to liberate large numbers of the sunni population. numbers that have really very few options with respect. >> my time's expired. i need to go to mr. meeks. he has enough time to make that vote. >> generals i want to thank you. and what i appreciate is i think is what i'm hearing some honesty in that sense that i hope we play, even if it's short-term pain for long-term gain.

you know when iraq we thought that after shock and awe just a few days later, it was all over then was in iraq another ten years. from what i'm hearing from you, we know it's going to be a long-term fight. this is complicated and they're going to have at least i think you're saying at least three years. and i hope that that then means you know a lot of these regional entanglements that we try to figure it out because unfortunately, have to run out but i'm told that yes, some of our troops on the ground, if you have troops on the ground, that's not going to help. exacerbate the situation. large numbers special forces in training, do what we have to do in that railroad, bringing them together, because in my estimation, it's going to take everybody in the region working together and not just the united

states by ourselves and going to take the cooperation of the number of individuals in the region, so, with that in mind, my questions would be twofold. one is with reference to qatar and them and are they cooperating with us. there's been some differences in their approach to syria. which complicated things and whether or not they're able, have the ability or desire to cut off the finances to the terrorists. and the second question would be in reference to turkey. whether or not they are cooperating. how they add in so it's very important i think that we have those two countries intracattily involved if they're going to win these things.

>> they're both critical to the outcome. in the case of cut r amir has recently visited here. he has reenforced something we have heard in the last couple of years, which is that qatar has taken measures to begin to stem the flow of deonations an the enormous wealth many of the individuals have there, not the government, but individuals. money ultimately -- and amir had been clear on that issue. we have seen that money has diminished. whether it still flows in any form or not, i can't answer today, but qatar has been very clear that it does not intend to tolerate the funding of those kinds of organizations. that's a positive trend with regard to qatar and it's also a

very positive public statement by the amir. it's also to important to understand that qatar has flown air operations with us on the wing of u.s. air force aircraft in syria. qatar also hosts aluda one of our largest air bases in the entire region. the forward headquarters of sent com and the forward headquarters of our special operations committee in the region, so qatar is a very important partner, not just in dealing with dennish but also deeping and helping us to continue as a flat form for preserving regional stability. turkey is an old friend of the united states and we are an ally with nato. then now four times in the last four months where we have had a number of conversations with the turkish leadership one of which specially late one evening with the prime minister resulted in

the turks. my direct conversation with the leadership resulted in the turkish decision to permit the peshmerga to reenforce the defenders of kobani by moving through turkey to do that. turkey has made a series of additional decisions ultimately to expand its support to our coalition efforts. we continue to have productive conversations with turkey. we have more ground to cover in terms of how turkey might participate. but it's not just in the military context. turkey is now co loading the coalition working group on stemming the flow of foreign fighters. it's in turkey's interest to do that and they have embraced that as a responsibility within the coalition, so we'll continue to work closely with both countries and they are critical to the outcome. >> thank you. >> yes, sir, thank you. >> thank you mr. meeks. now, recognize myself for five minutes. wanted to start off by thanking all the generals who are here

for your service to our country. dedicating your entire life to protecting our freedoms and liberties, being responsible for making critical decisions that not only impact the welfare of the men and women under your commands, but also their families back home so thank you for a lifetime of service to our country. i was in iraq in 2006 with the 82nd airborne division and towards the end of that year, general was taking a role in the strategy and i remember a counterinsurgeonveygeonsy model coming out, articulated really in written form on the internet. he would say things like give flexibility to local commanders so they can adapt to changing circumstances. try to tackle the conflict of

iraqi law enforcement. in many cases, not even showing up for work. how can we ensure forces are going to be there in the morning? my first question and i apologize if it was answered while i was away. who's in charge on our side on the ground in iraq? >> united states central command is ultimately responsible for the campaign plan that's been written. there's a three star general who is the commander of the joint task force combined joint task force or operation inherit resolve. he's headquartered in the central command o.a.r. on the ground in iraq is an american two star commander who commands the joint combined land forces there. >> general austin is three star? >> four star. >> right so who's the two star? >> major general funk.

>> major general funk. now, so i remember -- >> 82nd's coming in big red by the way. >> good decision. the, as far as major general funk goes or the three star that is over him, who's vision, one of the things in my analysis of others, who's in charge and are they given the flexibility and resources needed to accomplish their mission? when the president sent the authorization to congress, accompanied with that was a five-paragraph letter from the white house to congress and in one of those paragraphs it is indicating an understanding that the use of special operations, the use of ground operations would be important. the white house was careful not to word it where you know specifically saying it was going to be u.s. special forces or

u.s. ground operations. but one of the things in my analysis of whether or not we're going to be able to defeat ice is is that we are diving the recommendations from the ground up. when you have a very talented two star or three or four star with a a lot of combat experience. they understand the enemy, the government, the culture. without their hands being tied behind their back they are able to say quhakt xaktly what we need to do to defeat isis s. that two star does he have the flexibility he needs to if he wants, in his mind, if he wants to send an army ranger unit or marines or navy s.e.a.l.s or delta force or