accomplished now for the future. finally in the event my opinions might serve to be dated i've been fortunately part of serving more than three years as the national academy's institute of medicine standing committee on health threats resilience, workforce resilience national security department of health affairs whose focus has been biothreat preparedness, response and recovery. i also work for small business whose primary focus on interagency disciplinary support for state and local responders for ieds, shooters and weapons of mass destruction. when i began participating in the 1990s through interagency process known as then classified coordinating subgroup known as counter-terrorism security group supported national policy combating terrorism or

presidential directive 39. interagency and white house then began focusing on threats aimed largely within the united states and pdd 62 was born. i came aboard to nsc to implement president clinton's protection against unconventional threats to the homeland and americans overseas focusing on domestic cbrn preparedness and response missions. whereas we had the usual core players state fbi justice cia, cod and joint stas we were adding hhs and other departments and agencies which played important roles protecting against unconventional threats aimed towards the u.s. in the late 1990s our office under leadership national coordinator security and counter-terrorism rather quickly realized in order to populate newer mission we would have to figure out a way who in the interagency should

participate. one of the ways to do this was, one, uncover who had the mission, operational and it will capabilities and three budget authorities. unfortunately this time and as it stands now there's still no way to determine exactly which agency's budgets are in every element of the combat and terrorism portfolio. too often we become aware of interagencies exceeding their authorities and becoming self-approved or self-appointed experts. there's virtually no way to determine who was involved and more importantly where the american public's money was being spent. we then enlisted support of great office of management and budget personnel and undertook arduous task to develop ct cross cut budget involving every agency at that time in 1999 to determine where resources are being spent. we spent nearly a year looking at ct infrastructure protection and money laundering as well as

weapons of mass destruction preparedness. we thought this work would be invaluable to plus up agencies and pull back on others participating in certain missions but did not have the authority to do so. of course we had a lot of detractors to our idea. most importantly, we were nsc whose responsibilities were to ensure national security policies were execute bid interagencies not to determine where budgets were or how much researches best be spent for combatting terrorism. we also faced a lot of pushback by congress that the white house might be exceeding its authority because we wouldn't be explaining funding rational before congress. there were terms thrown around like terrorism are as we all too well know. most notably was that all agencies were aghast fsc staff might question why, how much or where their respective resources were being spent. nonetheless our idea held a lot of merit and omb counter-parts saw the value of comprehensive crosswalk for all ct program.

so this day after nearly 15 years, i've been asked about this proposal. we've discussed it in other studies such as project on national security reform headed by jim locker and a study i co-chaired on the national counter-terrorism and how it evolved after 911. the lesson to be learned from the story, i believe is that there's till no single person or entity that can review all ct budgets in the administration or congress as virtually every authorizing committee or appropriations subcommittee oversees a department or agency with a mission. for those that don't agree with me, explain came single contact that can explain how taxpayer dollars spent across federal level across ct community let alone how state and local are receiving much needed resources to execute their first responder mission. while the age old issue of politics often plays a role in this matter, it takes leadership

and trust to ensure spending critical resources in the most effective ways possible and all begins in leadership. if you permit me i would like to now fast forward to shortly after 911. in the midst of horrific attacks against our nation, we were quickly enveloped in the anthrax attacks. as you know and mentioned we first met the morning after president bush announced he was stack homeland security adviser at the white house. richard clark and i briefed you on ongoing domestic preparedness response programs that were part of my portfolio and would soon become yours. this is in the midst of anthrax attack. serving as point man we pulled together what i think even to this day, incredible group of unlikely bed fellows such as cdc, hhs, fbi, u.s. postal service and intelligence community to deal with daily threats, operational plans health care and remediation.

i must say many of the people participating are in this room and true heroes. we held daily if not more often when situations required interagency coordination phone calls to ensure everyone up to speed on medical law enforcement and other related matters. i've been reminded by several of the participants how invaluable those conference calls were to the process. it was also critical to ensure that both you and the white house press secretary were often briefed as often as necessary on the situation to ensure that the american public was updated on the crisis. i mention anthrax because it brings me back to my initial point, your leadership. without a point man that had the authority and support of everyone in the chain up to and including the president of the united states, there would have been no way to operate as effectively and admittedly sometimes on the fly as we did during the anthrax attack. i'll never forget what it took to make this critically needed coordination throughout interagency happen as i often

recall when one late evening we gathered department and agency heads in the white house to discuss interagency challenges and processes. when i looked across the room i saw the director of central intelligence sitting next to the postmaster general of the united states. i doubt anyone would ever envision that scenario. in an effort to keep with your panels' guidelines, i'd like to thank you for letting me highlight what i think are two critically important examples of what continues to be challenges to former, current and i assume future administrations, getting a handle on the interagency process from the nsc. a special assistant to the president on biodefense is a nice and important title but it is useless unless it has the authority behind it. we have tried and tried and tried again to determine who is in charge and eventually either politics or interagency infighting take over. someone needs to make a decision and execute. someone needs to undertake a serious review of the missions responsibilities and budgets of each participating department

and agency and then make the hard decision. to take resources away from some agencies which have unilaterally taken on migs for which they have no authority and then determine which agencies require additional funding to meet the needs in their areas of responsibility. if the interagency process or legislative branch find placing authority within nsc to extreme, the name and agency to take the lead -- and i mean lead -- by having the authority over budgets and missions, although there has been some progress made such, for example, office of director of national intelligence, that's only one aspect of the ct community. as long as there is a vacuum in leadership and execution in washington, we continue to fail state and local first responders who are our first line of defense risking their lives every day across our great nation. it won't be the feds who come to the rescue until many days or weeks after an event unfolded.

that said i firmly believe it's possible to get executive and legislative to work through strong leadership vacuum. the top must be fix before we can expect our front lines first responders to be effective in critical important missions. thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. >> thank you very much. >> it's really a privilege to be here. i look around the room. i think i know half the people, which makes me wonder why they aren't working in government and doing what we're talking about. i went into lisa gordon-haggerty's office not lonell after 911 and there was a special sources knife up on the wall and i realized she was not to be trifled with. >> i like that target. >> yeah. >> shooting target and all the holes right in the middle. >> yes. i've seen that one too.

>> got my attention. >> she always gained ascendancy by showing you a few of those items. seriously, i just want to mention lisa did an incredible job with an unexpected attack attack on america and we should be grateful to her. someone else we should be grateful to regarding leadership. it's interesting the two leaders i worked for towards the end of my career, secretary ridge, in 1988, i was in geneva and secretary decided hhs needed somebody at the white house because national security and health was becoming a more and more critical issue, whether hiv, biodefense. she called her buddy and said i'm sending you somebody.

that's the way she does things. >> and i'm paying for them. >> and i was the first person ever to do health policy at the white house, which was interesting because my first two weeks i sat on the steps of the old executive office building with my computer on my lap because there were no desks. when ilgt a desk it was with speechwriters who are now at the state department. i learned a lot about speech writing along the way. unfortunately at the end of that tour of two and a half years the bush administration came in and decided health and security was not their thing, the transition team, so they abolished the office which was a shame. i understand during transition. 911 happened. i went off to work at secretary choi was at the behest of

senator to learn about the hill and republicans. i went up to the hill, worked for him for a year. but during that time, the problem, post problem of leadership at the nsc related to health issues especially of anthrax attacks. governor ridge really took that to heart, so we had one serious leader in shalala and another serious leader in governor ridge on this issue. like i said i'm pleased to talk to you about this. he called me exactly one year after 911. it was on the anniversary. i remember that because he had just come in from a memorial service in pennsylvania that morning, hired me on the spot and said open an office. you have five positions which at the white house is unheard of. bob joined the office and curt

mann and a number of others and we started to role. i think we did a pretty good job considering we're starting from a system that didn't really have a place for health and security at that white house. we did hspd 10 and nspd 17. that is still the kind of guiding document for homeland security. i think it hasn't been superseded. hspd 9, agriculture bioterrorism. then i left in 2005, bob came on and took over the job. then at the end of the administration, they abolished the office again. the obama administration came in and thought, we don't do this. i was astounded. this was -- i didn't know what to say.

they volcanized the issues and divided them up between directors. to this day i cannot figure out on biosecurity and bioresponse recovery plan preparedness counter-measures, development, who at the white house is really in charge of what issue. i can figure it out but it takes a while. this is interesting because in the latest national security strategy which is published last month by president obama health is quoted as one of the top strategic risks to your interest. there's only eight. health is one of them. health and pandemics. it's still a pretty mushy system. the ebola outbreak continued to puzzle me as to why they had

divided up the response and coordination of the agencies among so many different parts of the white house. i was out in california, i'm going to just finish because i want to hear what bob has to say as well. i was out at stanford teaching a class last october. there were a whole bunch of faculty and stanford students. these were pretty smart people around. i said in october, who is in charge for ebola response for the u.s. government. dead silence. these are all internationally savvy people. i said, okay who is in charge for global community global effort? silence. it made the point we are not putting the right people at the senior positions to manage crisis that repeat every two or three years we get another one, whether it's pandemic flu

ebola, whatever it is we are not managing leadership properly. the fact that both donna sal sallala, governor ridge understand leadership makes it more personal to me. i'll stop there. >> thank you. >> first i'd like to add my thanks as ken and lisa have already done to the panel and people who made this panel possible. talk about leadership, look to your left or right and see future leaders here. i hope that won't be overlooked by anybody. in commenting or asked to come here i feel like i'm preaching to the choir. individuals who i had the pleasure to work with or serve with or know about and to go from left to right secretary i didn't fork for you but red stuff, did bureaucratic archaeology and found a document

that characterized important things that at the end of the clinton administration you highlighted as being first down payment of issues on biodefense. that didn't come just out of the blue. it came from bold decisive leadership. i think that's part of it. inglis, a and ken have talked about governor ridge's role but talk about heroism and great leaders. someone sitting governor gets a call from president of the united states and jumps in his car and calls three or four closest advisers and confidentes and tells them we're going to the white house and does so dropping everything is just an indication of what leaders do. they lead by example. they take risk taking. they have a bold vision. i think in some ways. >> smart enough to get people like the three of you around them. >> the nut doesn't fall far from the tree. how is that.

i look at camden worked for him again. >> i worked for you. >> no, sir. i work for you. but it's the whole point that in some ways having the opportunity to work for leaders who are comfortable in themselves have confidence in their capabilities and who have a desire to learn and understand what's right is very important. i look at jim greenwood representative greenwood who bought bioterrorism act to the fore. it takes a collective set of leaders to effectively do things. i look to my left here and i think it's pretty self-evident that these people led by example. i was a very good fortune disciple of theirs to do so. but i'm going to limit my time -- >> give him as much time as he wants, by the way. >> advise and extend and extend. >> sir this is not the congressional floor so i'm going to try to keep it short i think

the thing is what makes leadership special leadership important is clearly identifying the mission and having a vision of what needs to be done. i can't think and i'll use this anecdote, where i learned about the mission not working at the white house but working working with a group of air force power rescue men. many of you may not know them. but there are enlisted personnel who jump out of airplanes, fast rope out of airplanes scuba dive. their only mission and moto is so that others may live. it just happens to be, i think, the very nature of this business biodefense, which is really about saving american lives. there is no greater mission for those mission oriented like me to say that's what i do every morning when i get up every day 24/7, 365. i think it's the very nature of the leaders that we have here today. i'll look to my left at scooter

libby and jerry parker and troy and others and gigi who have all kind of armored up, if you will, with that mission vision and know whatever they do regardless of what their interests are they know that that's an inherent thing they have to contribute to. i think that's what motivates many of us in this room. i think that's one of the essential elements. leaders articulate the vision clearly for everyone. the other critical thing, you can talk about integrity but standing for and doing what is right, to be the advocate when oftentimes there are no others. quite frankly for this kind of arcane subject, for people who haven't had a lot of steeping in biology or medicine or haven't had a personal life experience around this, it can be a little off putting. i think for the leaders that have been here again to my former leader ken, who enabled

me, looking to me as his subject matter expert, was giving me the opportunities to pursue those issues that he knew were the right ones and stood for them and stood by me and basically allowed me to do what i articulated as the right thing to do to again, protect american lives. the other element is persistence. not quitting or taking no for an example. i have to admit there were times during my second time at the white house where i found persist hence can be a virtue and liability, particularly when i had to write a personal note of apology to deputy omb director. the point here is. >> he got over it. >> and we get on with it. >> i never did that. i never apologized. >> the point here, it is about risk taking. that's what leadership, the

epitome of leadership is whether power rescue man jumping out of an airplane ranger, you knew who the leaders were. they didn't have bars on their helmets but stripes on their shoulders who would take charge and move out. i think that's part of this. there's a great quotation i like since it's about baseball season. you can't steal second base when you're standing on first. that is in some ways you have to stretch yourself and basically take those rifgssks you're given. use responsibilities you have others you may not have, argue vociferously for the mission you're doing to basically do that. the last thing is this is to the point as i highlighted to a number of people in this room, leadership is not about an individual but alliances. leaders create alliances they put their arms around each other and find other leaders and basically motivate each other to

basically do what oftentimes is said can't be done but they do it not with the expectation they will succeed but they know they can't fail. so i may have taken a different tact than my colleagues here to talk about what leadership is, but it's the leadership that they did during my tenure know them in my professional life. it's the kind of qualities you all have and ex-officios have and many in this room have that in some ways the positions by their title are important and in some ways, as lisa said, is right. it's the authority you have and the authority you're permitted to use and willing to use. sometimes that's more of an issue what you're willing to do than what you can do or what you're allowed to do. with that sir, i'm going to end my comments and just say thank you. to the lovely ladies to my right who represent the next generation, i know they represent the best that we have.

there are many in this room who stand ready got willing got for bit, that we have another set of events like we had in 911. here is a lesson i learned. we had 911, anthrax katrina, ebola, and who knows what's next but you know there will be something. it really does require our best efforts now before the crisis occurs. >> because we know there's going to be something and you've all been in the white house, i'm particularly interested in how the white house needs to organize itself. i know more about the cabinet agencies. what's your recommendation in there's a new president coming in in a couple years. what would you say to the new president, to the new chief of staff, to the new nsc director about how they ought -- given our experience how they ought to organize the white house on these issues? >> my first comment because i've gone over this over and

over with everybody who would listen at the beginning of this administration. it ought to be pretty much what governor ridge set up. i think it's just about right. you develop put the right people as a leader. have you a few people help do the day to day work. you let the agencies have their own budgets. you let the agencies do what they know how to do. pretty hard from that spot to control budgets without having to testify because under the circumstances caught in testifying so you have to be careful with budget. on the other hand you need to have the respect of the community. if you just share interagency groups or specifics like were done right after 911, you bring everybody to the table and let everybody present what they are going to present and figure out what the president's primary policy will be and everybody

moving in the right direction and components. i think that works. i've seen it work. i've done it. it works. bob has done it. lis ashes has done it. it does work. >> should there be someone omd that watches the budgets. >> yes. >> so they can be better integrated? so there's a designated person, staff person that actually keeps that data up to date so when the president puts -- omb director and president put together the budget, actually got that information. they don't have to ad hoc dig it up? >> absolutely. i couldn't agree with you more. perhaps that would be the person the omb director that would go and testify before congress. as i mentioned all of the subcommittees, virtually every subcommittee touches counter-terrorism budget in one way or another. there's no way to enlist the support of congress in working with the white house, regardless of who is in the administration and who is in the leadership of

congress, we've tried this decades and decades and decades and it doesn't work. one of these days somebody is going to have to come up with a different idea. that idea is really i think starting with cross-cut -- across all budgets and different agencies. if agencies aren't going to pick single point of contact, it's either going to have to come out of the white house nsc or omb that can go back to the hill and explain exactly what's gone on. i really think with respect to ken, dr. bernard, the system that has been in place prior to this administration, many previous administrations, it works from interagency coordination mechanism. until such time there is a real leader in place that has the backing of the agency officials as well as the white house leadership, we'll be in the same old situation that we've found ourselves in in the past and we're in in the present situation.

>> okay. >> in some ways that's a memo to the new president. >> if i could follow up on that to try to put a finer point, the question is exactly the one i have. we can look at this issue this issue being weapons of mass destruction, terrorism bioprimarily. from a number of different perspectives agencies and departments. i'd like to focus on interagency itself and what it is missing now that maybe used to be there other than we heard from a prior panel should be cloned and trotted out for every administration. but your position, the position you had authority you wielded in that position, maybe that's what's missing. but structurally what is it we need? i think a bridge too far to talk about bringing budgetary authority underneath this person. i actually tend to be a believer interagency process can work with a strong person who is

fully authorized by their delegated authority, by their position and by the trust and relationship they have with the chief of staff and the president. do you see that maybe we can scratch this itch by going back to a senior director we had before? do you think we need something at a higher level? i'm opening that up to any one of you. >> i'm going to just comment to say ken's earlier comment about the current state of affairs has been volcanized, broken up. what's interesting, seems to be a practice, you'll have the same group of agencies, interagency partners going to meetings on different areas with different parts of nsc. right there i think that creates a little bit of a challenge for department and agencies when on any given day they may have three different meetings on three different topical areas that are not necessarily coordinated in the white house. >> or in the agency. >> or in the agency.

i think in some ways it requires a come lessalescence. the second thing is in some ways it does require a political level person whether that's a staff or senior director but has to be someone not imbued with -- will be imbued with the authority of the president not particularly one agency. to get to one comment about omb, i'll tell you an anecdote. when i shoot back up in the white house in 2007, i went to omb director who had the preponderance of funding oversight, health pad, and found out that person did have security clearance. i spent my first 60 days justifying with people in the white house that that individual needed security clearance because they need to have the basis, the understanding of the

threat that i was privy to so he could understand why i was arguing we need to do more. there is a lot of little things that need to be done but i think coalescing it into one office, again, cross cut budget is very important. again, it has to be a priority. i think it's clear in the current national security strategy it is a priority. how it's manifest in beaurocracy or organization, to your point, ma'am, is the essence of the issue. >> could i add one thing about omb? when we were doing the bill, $5.6 billion, which we got through based on scooter libby's friends and everybody else's friends in and around town, we had an omb person in every single policy in drafting meeting, every single one. they had a cross --

administration had cross-cut, not all counter-terrorism but bw cross-cut. we had somebody there. there were times i would cancel a meeting if somebody couldn't come because it was so critical policy without money is shelf wear. so the idea that you can incorporate omb into this it can be done. >> doesn't mean the office has to have control of the budget, just means everybody has to understand the budget so they can press the right button to get the proper coordination and really depth. i remember why i sent ken over to work for senator frisk the other point was to bury him in public health service. we really didn't have a place there, so i called senator frist and begged him to take ken. he tells me every time i see him -- it was an interagency transfer so the department ended up paying his salary i think. but senator frist to this day says it's the best thing that ever happened to him because it

opened up a window for a senior member of congress to a whole new area. that, of course, helped with congress. so more of those interagency transfers as part of this, seeing this is part of the education process both of the cabinet of the white house and of the international glonl staff as well. >> just comment on that point one of the benefits having ken there was when i went to work on capitol hill for senator richard burr back in 109th congress senator frist was the leader at that time. senator burr given the opportunity to be chairman of terrorism and that no longer exists. his side kick was senator kennedy -- that was huge a lot

of the same ground but more complete and further endpoint. >> the other thing is you need doctors in this discussion. i had a rule when you were talking about complex terrorism thing i made them wear their white coats. you just need the trust of the american people. with all due respect you cannot put political appointees in front of microphones to manage complex questions. you really do need -- you need docs that understand policy and politics at the same time. they are not going to do that unless you put them into the system, into the structure of the system. >> can i make a comment about the process and what the coordination might be, a logical step to putting a national security team together in this area. i'd look back to late '90s where we did have national coordinator

for infrastructure protection for counter-terrorism and all-encompassing office that looked at the area of the issues of the day combatting terrorism. under those different tranches of personnel, if you will, traditional ct weapons of mass destruction preparedness that i ran, crisis management response to -- quick response to emergencies that happen, crisis that happen overseas and within the united states. so the u.s. coordinating interagency coal boehm bombing embassy, 911 that kind of structure actually worked quite well. of course it goes back to leadership. that person was dick clark. most people remember dick and know dick as a formidable entity. you know what i can't think of a better person i'd rather have in my fox hole. maybe about five or six other people in the room that could jump in that fox hole with me but i wouldn't want anybody other than dick clark when it

comes to these kinds of issues. when we look back and do a case study that might be the opportunity to say that's interagent coordination, bring them together make the tough decisions and movoon. take it up to deputies principles or nsc meeting and a decision is made. but to sit around and flounder and wait for the next event to happen is not the way to do business. >> also requires you have cabinet officers that understand the role of the white house and nsc. you can't turf fight. you have to be clear in your mind. talk about federated systems you have to be clear in your head about what the appropriate role is of the white house. it's not that you're giving up turf, is that you're putting appropriate leadership roles in the right places. >> on behalf of hudson institute i would like to say it was bob who persuaded us to help support this endeavor and then he quit

halfway through. [ laughter ] >> kept going. >> just want to review your comments about leadership by example and then move onto your comments about persistence if i recall. i've made notes here. when i think about this problem, there's been a lot of discussions throughout panels and several meetings now which i would say go largely to the tactical level. when i think about this problem what comes to mind is ballistic missile submarine. you didn't get ballistic missile submarine in one funding cycle. you got it through long national consensus that the president -- should i repeat all those jokes, that the president and congress are willing time after time to say it's unacceptable for

american population to be vulnerable to millions of people dying. that's what kept us going through the cold war. i would submit the chance of a bolt out of the blue attack, which was what the triad was all about was lower than the chance we might get and was lower than the chance we might get some type of mass casualty event coming out of what has brought everybody together to this meeting today. so the word that hasn't come out enough is the president. the president has leader to say this is a national priority so we're fighting this war the way we fought the american revolution. a burge of guys in concord doing what they can somebody in valley forge bringing wood. what we need, if you really wanted to get ahead of this problem, is a much larger national consensus effort led by congress, led by the president

to say, yes, we may end up funding nuclear abm machines that don't really work at the end of the day but somewhere along the line we'll get ahead of this problem. we can be defense dominant instead of offense dominant. in the process we'll make americans a lot safer than they are going forward where as we heard from the opening panel today and from the opening panel at the first of our session there are enormous vulnerabilities out there which we have groups with the resources to exploit and willingness to exploit. so proposal number one is to make this a large national priority. if the president were behind it, i submit, you know somebody like governor ridge and the job could get it done. >> i like the idea about the president getting behind it. >> not the other one.

>> comments? >> i do think very appropriate, because so much -- those of us privileged in executive branch or with the executive branch you do have a certain structure. you've got interagency process, come to a consensus and get to the deputies and up to the principles and you get up to the -- back to the president. but if you've got a president that is engaged and making a priority that process is very necessary but it sure accelerates the process because everybody knows at the end of the day the president wants this done so he damn well better do it. we'll get the money if we do it the right way. i think everyone has been hesitant to raise that issue of presidential leadership but i think it will be important. raised a little earlier we take this and turn it into a memo to presidential candidates on both sides to determine who their

nominees are and drive it that way. time being we need to drive it to the congress of the united states. ken. >> scooter captured thinking exactly right and i concur with everything said how it needs to be prioritized at the presidential level on down. in addition i think it does take organizational changes for the white house. i think this is one of these areas, you look at a threat that america faces like isis whatever, everybody gets it. that's a big threat. everybody coalesces and responds to it. but sort of like cyber this is one of those threats people don't really understand. somebody said very arcane, seems remote in most people's minds, think about 19th 20th century. it's not something that really stands out plus operationally it's one of those areas that requires coordination among disparate parts of the government. even worse you've got the health community and then intel

and law enforcement, all have to be coordinated currently difficult to do. it seems to be one of those areas that screams for competency of a high-level entity being an official or group within interagency instruct you're that's going to keep a strategic focus on this because that's what happens. we don't maintain strategic focus on the front page. i would love to hear from you all. you've given it to us in different forms. specific recommendations where you would see structurally the consistency we need in the organization in the white house to maintain strategic focus on what is right now being neglected. >> i said it before, recreate governor ridge's structure. it worked. it wasn't perfect and it needed refinement but i think it belongs in the nsc.

argue whether homeland security council, too should be at that level. should include somebody needs to be respected. it's all about personal relationships, the way you get things done in the white house when your staff is -- you can figure out what the president wants, that's your policy, then you develop the relationships with your counter-parts and all the agencies so that you're on a common course. and then you get it funded and move it forward. it's all doable. none of this that we've heard about all day today isn't doable. it just requires focus leadership and needs trust. the trust between the person in charge of this component wherever you decide to place it. i think it should be nsc. that person needs to be an honest broker with their counter-parts in all the agencies. i think that's completely doable. >> you're thinking? >> i couldn't agree more. i go back to the process that

had been in place in the 1990s. most people didn't even know they existed. that was before 911 before this was cool and everybody was doing it being counter-terrorism experts. we had a core team, core community of state cia joint staff osd, bureau of justice. everyone knew everyone's telephone numbers. you pick up the phone in the middle of the night, have an issue, on a phone call on a stoop in 15 minutes and everyone knew what the mission was. everyone knew how to go forward. everybody had the same goal in mind. it is. it's personality dependent. the people working the issue are all mission oriented. they know what they have to execute. they know what they have to do. it's been done before. we can do it again but takes leadership. it's leadership challenge and formidable force to remind agencies there's only one aspect of the entire piece. the nsc is the honest broker.

i came to the nsc from an agency so i was a career civil servant. i might have been aghast if at that time i said nsc looking at budget on emergency response to see what we were spending on what and if it was in our mission. i look at it now and say, you know what, somebody has to do it. i can't depend on the bureau to do it. i can't depend on dhs to do it. somebody has to be an honest broker to look across all the agencies and say this is our mission, this is our goal now who has the capabilities, who has the responsibility who has the budget authority. if you don't have budget authorizes, it's within your mission, we're going to get you the budget and get you the people to execute that mission so we have a cross-cut and coordinated interagency effort to execute this important national security. >> i just concur with my colleagues and say with nsc.

i want to point out one thing, coupling of presidential leadership with someone who will be the leader, execute president's policy and maybe a matter of subject or discussion but when president bush learned of the pandemic influenza risk he held five policy times, organized a very robust government response that was one of the individuals that occupied the office i did and ken, basically managed that effort building a strategy and implementation plan that basically necessitated about another $5.5 billion investment by the united states government to prepare for a pandemic that had not happened at that point. so unlike 911, unlike anthrax, here you had the coupling of presidential focus and an arm or

arguon nsc or hsc basically organize interagency and do so in a manner that it was very effective. i think when you have those two things together, there's no stopping it. >> we haven't talked at all about the importance of the nsa having this capability and international protocols when the president goes off to have conversations with his counter-parts, because setting the international agenda on health on bioterrorism became just as important to get those inserted into those international meetings. >> an editorial comment talk about presidential leadership i'm going to draw back on my own experience. my colleagues at the table could confirm it. also very helpful to have vice president being advised by one scooter libby particularly to elevate within, a great

opportunity for the vice president to influence policy conversation not only with the president but scooter you and vice president cheney and biological and nuclear initiatives. you could say i'm not sure we could have got than far without you being personally involved and the vice president and your team pushing that agenda. it's the capabilities and commitment of the white house president and vice president that really led to a lot of things we're discussing today. >> any further comments, observations from the advisory panel? >> all been said well. >> very, very well said. >> my colleagues here. >> thank you very much. thank you for your service. >> thank you very, very much. by the way, don't be surprised if we knock on the door and say take a look at recommendations, with your experiences and recommendations. all right? thank you very, very much. [ applause ]

[ applause ] we begin week long series starting with steve russell of oklahoma. he talks about his career in the army, his new life in congress and his childhood experiences. we'll show a different freshman profile each night at 9:00 eastern. with congress on break this week, it's american history tv prime time starting 8:00 eastern with danielle ellsberg who became white house and defense department with matters concerning vietnam war. he talks about his motivations leaking the pentagon papers and his opinions on vietnam. that will be followed by an interview with john dean, part of the nixon white house in july, counsel to the president. he talks about early assignments, watergate and people behind practicin at dnc headlines. prime time tonight and all this week starting 8:00 eastern on c-span3.

>> senate armed services committee held a hearing with leaders of u.s. central command u.s. africa command and special operations forces. they discussed u.s. posture and they discussed u.s. military posture in the regions they cover and threats posed by terrorist groups like isis and boko haram. the hearing's led by john mccain. >> well, good morning. good morning and welcome to general lloyd austin, general david rodriguez and general joseph, the committee meets today to receive testimony on the posture of u.s. central command, u.s. african command and u.s. special operations command. i extend our appreciation to all three of you for your long and distinguished service into the troops and their families who defend our nation every day.

from yemen to iraq and syria the old order across north africa and the middle east is under siege. both the regional balance among states and the social order within states is collapsing and no new vision has emerged to take its place. unfortunately, the lack of clear u.s. strategy and lack of strong u.s. leadership has confused our friends, encouraged our enemies and created space for malign influence to flourish. despite the fact that dr. kissinger testified that the united states has not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of the second world war, to quote. the looming threat of sequestration serves to compound that threat and help create a leadership vacuum that fuels the chaos of our current predicament predicament. told this committee, quote no fall in the field can wreak such havoc that mindless see sequestration is achieving today. i couldn't agree more. our witnesses are uniquely

positioned to describe the increased risk due to sequestration. to navigate this chaotic time successfully, we must have unambiguous national security priorities clarity in our strategic thinking, and an unwavering commitment to the resources required to support the necessary courses of action. for your sake general austin, let's hope your job performance is not measured by it have number of crises you have to juggle, but how you handle them. my fear is you're expected to juggle with one hand tied behind your back. not to upset iran during sensitive nuclear negotiations yours has to be one of the most difficult jobs on the planet. i'm deeply troubled by comments from senior administration officials on iran. secretary kerry recently said and i'm not making this up that the net effect of iran's military action in iraq is quote, positive. similarly the chairman of the joint chief said, quote, as long

as the iraqi government remains committed to inclusivity of all the various groups inside the country, then i think iranian influence will be positive. again, that's in the category of i'm not making this up. general austin, i know from our conversations that you do not suffer the dangerous delusion that somehow iran can be a force for good in the region. in your position, you can't afford that fantasy. today, i wanted to discuss our strategy to address the situation on the ground as it is rather than as we wish it to be. general david petraeus gave a realistic picture in a recent interview which is worth quoting and a quote. it's partly problem not the solution. the more likely it is to fuel the rise of groups like the islamic state. i'll be interested if our witnesses agree with that

assessment from general david petraeus. iran is not our ally. yet, we learned just yesterday that the u.s. is providing air support into creo. and only 3 to 4,000 iraqi security forces. i have many concerns and questions about how and why we are doing this. which i hope you can answer for us today. model for u.s. counterterrorism a success story. and i'm not making that one up, either. the process of radical groups like militants in charge of an air force and possessing ballistic missiles was more than our partners could stand. stems in part of their perception of america's disengagement from the region and a total absence of u.s. leadership.

in a scenario that, again, you could not make up while our arab partners conduct air strikes to halt the offensive of iranian proxies in yemen. another tragic case of leading from behind. the complex intertwining of isil and iranian problems sets in iraq and syria challenge us on an area the administration has poorly handled to date. the ability to prioritize and deal with multiple crises simultaneously. we're also seeing increasing links throughout africa including a growing presence in libya and a newfound relationship with relationship. adding to the threat across the continent, africa remains plagued by long standing conflicts resulting in large displacements of people and

rising instability. general rodriguez, it's obvious from our discussion this week in my office that none of this is news to you. despite a growing array of threats, africa command suffers from resource shortfalls. one of our key components to combat global terrorism is the team of men and women of special operations command. the general has said our special operators are deployed in more than 80 countries and often our first line of defense against an evolving and increasingly dangerous terrorist threat. requiring direct action operations. however, demand for special operations forces continues to far exceed supply placing an enormous strain on the readiness of the force. compounding the strain the looming threat of sequestration which will not degrade the

capabilities of the force but also the service provided enablers it depends on. i look to you to update the committee on the impact of sequestration on the men and women you lead. and the increased risk to the troops you would be forced to accept as a result. we need a strategy that spans the same geography of the threat from isil to al qaeda to iran. our witnesses worked tirelessly to combat these threats together. and we owe them and their forces. they lead better than a piecemeal approach that lacks resources and fails to address the full spectrum of threats we face. i look forward to hearing from our witnesses senator reed. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman, and good morning. let me join senator mccain in not only welcoming the witnesses but also thanking them and the men and the women of the commands for the extraordinary service to the nation.

threats that no geographic boundaries and that require a regional and sometimes a transregional approach. isis threatens to erase the boundaries. and they're providing a training ground for foreign fighters who threaten to spread violence upon or returning to their homes in europe, asia or even the united states. the issues in iraq have to have a political solution that military efforts will buy time, but not ultimate and decisive success. similarly in syria, addressing a root cause, promoting the conditions for ha political

arrangement as well as success on the battlefield. threatens to alienate the sunni communities. the reports of human rights abuses by shia militia may lead some to believe they are better off with isis under the control and that would be an extraordinary setback for all of us. and general austin would be interested in your assessment of building up the kurdish peshmerga as they begin to retake territory from isis. we're also interested in your views on the growing influence of iran in iraq and the threats it poses long-term. and overnight as mccain indicated, you were given an additional task of supporting gcc operations. and their operations in yemen.

and i hope, general austin, you can give an update on those operations. of course, an additional concern is the outcome of the nuclear framework negotiations between the p5 plus 1 in iran and the implications of success, failure or something in between. we'll have profound impacts in the region and that, too, you'll have to assess. afghanistan military forces are focused on training afghan security forces conducting counterterrorism operations and solidifying gains. and we all had the privilege of listening to the president gani yesterday, and we have to move forward. understanding it's still a very fragile situation general rodriguez, you are increasingly facing challenges. located in adjacent o.r.s. the rise in somalia, their

operations challenge you in attempting to build the capacity up of the nations in that region. and also to work with our european allies. very effectively to present a united front against these terrorists. so, again, your efforts are critical and also let me command you and your forces for the resolve with respect to the ebola outbreak and what you were able to accomplish. senator mccain made this point very clear very eloquently. under sequestration, all of these efforts. they in the military interagency will be hammered if it's allowed to prevail. so i hope you can provide assessment, not just in africa, but the effects of sequestration on your ability to operate. general votel as a special operations forces, you are working across the globe. your missions are critical but once, again, i think it would help us if you could indicate where the effects of

sequestration would actually undermine current and projected operations. again, one of the points that you made is you are sort of a global force. you rely extensively on the base operations of the united states army, the united states air force and every other service and some civilian agencies. and that would be hopeful to point out. let me commend you for all of the operations you've undertaken in the last 13 years. there's no force that's more stressed. no group of individual men and women in their families that give so much and go so often to the battle. so thank you, general, for your efforts. and please communicate that to men and women you lead. thank you very much. >> general votel, can we begin with you? >> good morning members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the current posture of the united states special operations command or socom as we refer to

it. i'm pleased to be here with my partners general austin and rodriguez. it was created to ensure we had forces to meet the nation's challenges. our ability to address these challenges is due in large part to the strong support we get from congress. and especially from this distinguished committee. thank you very much. i'd like to start out by commenting on the amazing actions made daily by our special operations men and women. operators, acquirers, analysts and many others, active and reserve, military and civilian. the total soft force. alongside our conventional force partners of the 69,000 quiet professionals of socom are committed to service to our nation. they relentlessly pursue mission success, and today, roughly 7,500 of them are deployed to over 80 countries worldwide. supporting geographic combatant

commander requirements and named operations. we are a force who has been heavily deployed over the last 14 years, and our military members, civilians and their families have paid a significant price physically and emotionally serving our country. we are appreciative of the support to address the visible and invisible challenges and we never forget that for socom people are our most important asset. socom supports the combatant commanders and the missions they are assigned by the secretary of defense and the president. if they are successful, we are successful. if they fail, we fail. today, the united states is faced with many challenges. the spread of technology and the defusion of power are not only been used by responsible leaders, but by wicked actors to orchestrate terror and violence. nonstate actors like al qaeda and isil and other violent extreme organizations menacing state actors like north korea,

destabilizing actors like iran and the growingly coercive actors like russia. we are equally affected by the growing use of cyber capabilities and social media. which make it easy for our adversaries to communicate, coordinate, execute and inspire their actions. the fiscal environment is of concern, as well. while socom has been well supported in recent years i remain profoundly concerned by the impact of another round of sequestration. and not only how it impacts socom, but how it'll affect the four services upon whom we are dependent for mission support. to address the challenging security department. through small footprint operations and by relying on a network of purposeful partnerships provides a comparative advantage through persistent engagement, partner enablement network focus and

discreet rapid response to crisis situations. while we support military operations across the spectrum, soft capabilities are uniquely suited to operate and succeed in the gray zone between normal international competition and open conflict. and it is in this area that we see our best opportunities to help shape the future environment. to enable our efforts, i have established five priorities for the command. first, we must ensure soft readiness by developing the right people skills and capabilities to meet current and future requirements. to this end we want to ensure effectiveness now and into the future. with the best soft operators and support personnel enabled by the best technology and capabilities we can field. along the way, we want to make the very best use of the unique mfp-11 funding authorities that congress has granted us. second, we must help the nation win by addressing today's security challenges. we strive to provide coherent and well-integrated soft forces

for the combatant commanders. nearly everywhere, you'll find soft forces working alongside and often in support of their conventional force partners. to accomplish our security objectives. third, we must build purposeful relationships to improve global understanding and awareness to create options for our leaders. we don't own the network, but we are an important part of it. and working with our partners will always produce the best options for our nation. fourth, we have to prepare for the future. security environment to ensure that it's ready to win. our goal is to match exquisite people with cutting edge capability and the very best ideas and concepts to help our nation succeed against the looming challenges we will face in the future. finally, we must preserve our families to ensure their long-term well being. it is in this area we are specifically focused on a wholistic approach to address the invisible challenges of stress and suicide that are affecting our service members,

civilians and their family members. i remain humbled by the opportunity to command the best special operations forces in the world. i'm incredibly proud of each and every one of our team members and their families. i look forward to your questions and dialogue today. >> general rodriguez? >> chairman, ranking member reed, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to update you on the efforts of united states africa command. and i'm glad to be between joe and lloyd today. let me express my gratitude for your support to our service members and our families who underwrite our nation's security and an increasingly complex world. today our nation faces strategic uncertainty, risks to our national interests are significant and growing. part of our strategic uncertainty is our fiscal uncertainty. if sequestration returns in 2016, i'm concerned about our ability to execute the current strategy at a manageable level of risk. threats and opportunities to

address national interests are growing in africa. in the past year, we achieved progress in several areas through close cooperation with our allies and partners. we have built significant partner capacity over the years. this capacity has played a major role in regional efforts to contain violent extremism including other al qaeda affiliates and the islamic state of iraq and boko haram. and a small number of our unilateral operations have applied additional pressure. we also achieved success with other partners against other challenges. as an example, in liberia we supported usaid in the liberian nation. another illustrative example is our support to strengthening the capacity and organization of regional partners in the gulf of guinea. furthermore, in central africa combined military and civilian

efforts significantly reduced the army's ability to threaten civilian populations. working closely with the state department and our regional partners that has allowed us to improve our posture and capability to protect u.s. personnel and facilities. when security in libya deteriorated we assisted in the safe departure of personnel. conversely in the central africa republic. we've had a lot of successes, but many challenges remain and there's much work to be done. transregional terrorist and criminal networks continue to adapt and expand aggressively. while al shabab has weakened in somalia, it remains a threat to u.s. and regional interests. al shabab broadened operations to conduct attacks. libya-based threats are growing rapidly including and expanding isil presence.

if left unchecked, they have the highest potential among security challenges in africa to increase risk to u.s. strategic interests in the near future. boko haram threatens the nigerian government. boko haram has extended the reach to niger and chad. in somalia libya and nigeria, the international community is challenged to implement the comprehensive approaches necessary to advance governance security and development. declining resources will make this more difficult. to mitigate increasing risk africa command is sharpening our priorities and improving the alignment of resources to strategy. we are coordinating with international and inner agency partners to harmonize across the country. and we are seeking progress flexibility.

thanks for your continued support to our mission, and the dedicated people advancing our nation's defense interests in africa. thank you. >> general austin, welcome. >> thank you, sir. good morning. chairman mccain. senator reed distinguished members of the committee. i want to thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to talk about the broad efforts and the current posture of united states central command. up front and most importantly, i'd like to thank all of you for your continued and strong support of our men and women in uniform and their families. i look forward to talking about them and the exceptional contributions that they continue to make on behalf of our command and our nation. i'm pleased to appear alongside my teammates general rodriguez and general votel. and i'll join them in making a few brief comments and we're prepared to answer your questions. ladies and gentlemen, much has happened in the area of

responsibilities since i last appeared before this committee a year ago. indeed, the central region is today more volatile and chaotic than i have seen it at any other point. and the stakes have never been higher. the forces of evil that threaten our homeland and our interest in that strategically important part of the world thrive in unstable environments marked by poor governance, economic uncertainty and ungoverned or undergoverned spaces. and therefore, it's essential that we be present and engaged and cultivate strong partnerships and continue to do our part to address emerging threats and to move the region in a direction of greater stability and security. we must be properly resourced to do what is required to effectively protect and promote our interests. at sentcom, while shaping future

outcomes we spend a great deal of our time and energy managing real world crisis. we transition from combat operations to a train advise and assist and ct mission focus in afghanistan. yemen, egypt and lebanon and a host of other locations throughout our area of responsibility. we actively pursued violent extremist groups and we took measures to counter the radical ideologies that are espoused by these groups. we also dealt with iran which continues to act as a destabilizing force in the region. primarily through the forces and the support actors such as lebanese hezbollah. while we were hopeful an agreement will be reached with iran with respect to the nuclear program, either way, whether we

reach an agreement or don't reach an agreement, iran will continue to present a challenge for us going forward. we are faced with a number of difficult issues in our region. however, i firmly believe that challenges present opportunities. and we make progress primarily by pursuing those opportunities. and we do pursue them. and i am confident that our broad efforts are having a measurable impact. of course, the most immediate threat facing us now is the threat posed by isil or dash. this barbaric organization must be defeated, and it will be defeated. we are currently in a process of executing our regional military campaign plan. and i'm pleased to report that we are making significant progress. at the outset, we said that we'd have to halt isil's advance. and we've done that in iraq. we said that we're going to have to regenerate and restructure iraq's security forces and help them to reestablish their border.

and we're in a process of doing that right now. we said that we'd have to help our partners in the region to bolster their defenses against isil. and we continue to help our friends in jordan and lebanon and turkey. we said we'd guard against ungoverned spaces, and we'll soon begin doing so as part of our syria train and equip program. ladies and gentlemen, we are making progress. in fact, we're about where we said we would be in the execution of our military campaign plan, which supports the broader whole of government strategy designed to counter isil. and we're having significant effects on the enemy. attacked the command and control capabilities, we've destroyed its training sites and storage facilities along with hundreds of his vehicles tanks and heavy weapons systems. and in doing so we have significantly degraded his

capability. the ability to command and control his forces and also his primary sources of revenue namely his refineries and crude collection points. the fact is that isil can no longer do what he did at the outset. which is to seize and hold new territory. and he has assumed a defensive crouch in iraq. although, he has greater freedom of movement in syria he's largely on defensive there, as well. having a tough time governing. and this is crucial to his claims of a caliphate. he has begun to expand into other areas, namely north africa. in part because he knows he's losing in iraq and syria and needs to find other ways to maintain his legitimacy. in going forward we should expect to see this enemy continue to conduct limited attacks and to orchestrate horrific scenes in order to create opportunities and distract and intimidate. but make no mistake, isil is

losing this fight. and i am certain he will be defeated. however, there is still work to be done to get to that point. and we intend to continue to execute the campaign as designed. and i say that because how we go about this is very important. if we don't first get things under control in iraq where there is a government that we can work with and some amount of reliable security forces, if we don't get things there right first before expanding our efforts in syria then we risk making matters worse in both countries. but done the right way, in light of the limitations that exist, i believe that we can and we will be successful in our efforts to defeat isil. at the same time, we can be assured continued progress in pursuit of our principle goal, which is to move this strategically important region in a direction of increased stability and security. going forward, we will all be required to make tough choices.

we'll need to find ways to do more or at least as much with less in the current fiscal environment. that said i remain concerned by the fact that capability reductions can and will impact our ability to respond to crisis. and especially in the highly volatile central region. the resulting loss in flexibility makes the u.s. and our interests increasingly vulnerable to external pressures. i would ask congress to do its part to make sure we avoid sequestration and other resourcing limitations. chairman mccain senator reed, members of the committee, i want to thank you once more for your strong support that you continue to show to our service members, our civilians and their families. they are the very best in the world at what they do. and they continue to demonstrate absolute selflessness. and they make enormous sacrifices on behalf of the mission in support of one another. thank you, sir. >> thank you, general.

i'd ask the witnesses do they agree with general petraeus' comments a few days ago that iran was as great or greater threat in the middle east than isis? do you agree with that? general austin? with that statement? >> sir, i would say that in terms of the long-term threat in the region, iran is the greatest greatest greatest threat to stability. i would say the most pressing threat is isil. in one that we have to deal with and defeat in the near term. >> general rodriguez? >> yes, i agree, sir. with both general austin and general petraeus, the short and long-term challenges. >> general votel? >> mr. chairman. i agree. >> so now we are seeing oh general, austin when were you told by the saudis that they were going to take military action in yemen?

>> sir i had a conversation right before they took action. shortly before. >> right before they took action? >> yes, sir. >> that's very interesting. now, you were talking about how we're defeating isil. right now, the battle to crete is stalled and we've been launching air strikes into crete? that's obviously correct. and it's my understanding, please correct me if i'm wrong, there's about 2,000 iraqi military fighting there and about 20,000 shia militia doing the majority of the fighting. is that roughly correct? >> so there was about 4,000 iraqi security forces combined in that area. currently, there are no shia militia, and as reported by the

iraqis today, no pmf forces in that area, as well. >> so there's 4000 iraqi. who are the others? >> the shia militia that were there have pulled back from that area, sir. >> so the fighting is all being done by the iraqi forces? >> sir when the -- >> i've only got a few minutes. maybe you can shorten the answer. pretty straightforward questions. >> yes, sir, the clearance of the town as you know on the west side of the river is being done by the iraqi special operations forces. and the federal police with our -- >> so why do we see pictures everywhere leading and orchestrating this effort. >> those pictures were from before. and as you know that effort, the iranians were sponsoring.

it stalled. it stalled because they didn't have -- >> they're no longer in the fight. >> he is no longer. he was no longer on the ground. >> the shia militias are no longer in the fight. >> the folks that we are supporting in clearing -- >> see if the militia's still in the fight. >> no, sir they're not a part of the clearing operations in. >> so we are the air strikes that we're carrying out in support are only in support of iraqi militaries? >> that's right sir. precondition for us to provide support was that the iraqi government had to be in charge of this operation. they had to know, we had to know exactly who was on the ground. we had to be able to deconflict our fires. they had to have a credible scheme of maneuver, which not only replanned, but we caused them to rehearse it.

and they had to be able to talk to the folks on the ground, as well. >> we -- in our air strikes in -- by the way, i totally disagree with you about ignoring syria. there's no strategy for syria. and we all know that. and isis doesn't respect those boundaries, but somehow you seem to and the president does. there's no -- they know no boundaries. and so to say that we are going to have a strategy for iraq first and syria, of course, is softest softestry. of the 12,000 3000 of them actually drop weapons. is that true? >> i think that's about right, sir. >> don't we put our pilots in great danger if they're not going to drop weapons? and isn't it the argument that we really need the terminal attack controllers, the jtacs on the ground if we're going to be

effective? or are you going to have 3 out of 4 fighters fly around in circles and then return? >> sir, the hours flown to ordinates ratio, one is the type of enemy we're imposing. and the second is are the distances we're dealing with on a daily basis. if you take a look at an operation like desert storm where you have fielded forces and infrastructure that you could attack with preplanned sordys. you have a greater ratio to ordinates employed. the type of enemy we're facing started out as an extremist element. and because of that we were able to attack the mass

formations early on, but he very quickly resorted to behaving like an irregularly force where he began to blend in with the population. as he did that, it became more difficult. >> which surprise no one. >> but the nature of this fight is we need to be able to report the -- >> we're satisfied with a situation to launch 12,000 sortis, where only one drop weapons. that is not a viable or frankly a good use of the taxpayers' dollars. >> sir, i would just make the point. as we compare that ratio to what we've done in afghanistan. it's equal to that -- because it's the same type of fighting there, principally. and the ratios are comparable. even better than what we saw in afghanistan. >> well, i would argue that's

comparing apples and oranges but my time has expired. senator reed. >> thank you very much mr. chairman. general austin again, returning to . we set conditions as to what we would require before we would be engaged. is that correct? the mobilization forces of militias have withdrawn initially they were engaged in the fight. they've pulled back and now the operation is being conducted by iraqi regular forces. special operations. >> special operations forces. yes, sir. >> it appeared a few days ago that this fight would go succeed simply with the mobilization

forces, the militias which added a significant sort of, at least rhetorical claim to both the militias and to the iranians. now it appears they cannot effectively clear the city without the support of the united states and our air power. is that? >> that's correct, sir. and if i could make a point here to highlight why it failed. it's the way the forces went about trying to do this. these forces obviously were not being controlled by the government of iraq. they didn't have a coherent scheme of maneuver, command and control. they didn't have precision fires to support this effort. and so trying to go about the difficult task of clearing a place tikrit.

and once those conditions were met, which included shia militias not being involved, then we're able to proceed. and i like to highlight, sir, you know, three tours in iraq commanding troops who were brutalized by some of these shia militias, i will not -- and i hope we never coordinate or cooperate with shia militias. >> and part of the operation in tikrit. and we're doing all we can do to assist the regular forces to succeed will be a prelude to mosul, which have always been contemplated to be conducted but iraqi security forces with, if they make the conditions with our support. is that accurate? >> yes, sir. >> all right. general, we have the assistant secretary of defense. and he is the service secretary

of special operations forces, your forces. do you have any views? because he's established a special operations policy council. do you work with the council? what's your relationship? >> senator, we absolutely do. and i meet with secretary lumpka on a regular basis. provides a good forum to pull together a number of senior leaders within osd and, frankly on the joint staff to ensure we are looking at the requirements for soft forces and ensuring it's well coordinated within the building. and getting both oversight and advocacy for our activities. >> let me ask an additional question. you have to talk about it in your prepared remarks. the campaign plan for global special operations which of necessity has to interact with the campaign plans of sentcom and north com and south com, et cetera, et cetera.

so can you comment about how you manage this plan. and just quickly because my time expired. might make a comment, too. >> absolutely. so the campaign plan for global special operations is really designed to support my principle task of supporting my geographic partners out here, and designed to synchronize our activities to help prioritize our resources and where we are putting them in support of the gcccs. it's designed to address the partnerships we need to have in place. it's designed to look at the things that we will do to shape the environment for the geographic combatant commanders and it ensures we have aligned to those specific areas so they can develop the capabilities they need to best support the geographic combatant commanders. >> general rodriguez, your comments. >> when we make our strategic plans, sir, our theater special operation command is fully involved. and all of those things that joe

does about allocating forces and capabilities across the world support my plan exactly how i want it to be. >> general austin a quick comment or one for the record. my time's expiring. are you comfortable with the interaction? >> i am very comfortable with it, sir. >> thank you. thank you, gentlemen. >> thank you, mr. chairman. as i told you, general rodriguez, i was going to concentrate my questions on africa. when senator mccain talked about being underresourced. it is true when you were formed in up to the current time you don't really have resources. you depend on ucom for almost everything, is that correct? >> we got a little bit more resources in the last year and a half to include special purpose. a commander's response forces, special operations force and we've also got a couple key enablers for forces. i also do depend quite a lot on

ucom capacity, sir. >> yeah, i think you do. and i think other things that come up like the lra and things like that specifically. you inherit resources to help put out those fires. however, with the restructuring the european infrastructure consolidation, are you concerned about how that might affect what resources might be available when called upon? >> right now, from the european infrastructure consolidation, most of the moves have been to the south and east to help the responsiveness of ucom forces to support both sentcom and afacom. >> i don't know where you were when we put together the whole thing. before that it was three different commands and pay com u com and sent com. and that was a wise thing to do. but the discussion at that time was where to put the

headquarters. we were all promoting the idea it should be in africa. that continent is so huge. we understand what happened politically at that time that this fear of colonization and that people wouldn't buy it. i've talked to all of the presidents in the area. they thought that would have been a good idea. at the time we put it together africom, there was some discussion that after a period of time they might consider making that move. if you heard anything at all about that? is there anything in the middle talking about the -- >> no, many of the african leaders talked to me about that. but the current assessment by the secretary of defense is to continue to leave it where it is for the foreseeable future, sir. >> yeah. well you know, the foreseeable future is beyond us now from when they first put this thing together. i don't know, i know that would still be a problem. let me ask you, my first

experience with joseph coeny and the lra was way back in 2001. that's 14 years ago. joseph coney was old and sick then, how is he now? >> he's older and sicker. >> and do you think that we are getting in a position right now -- it appears to me from the reports we get, and i think you'd probably agree i'll ask you if you do agree that most of the stuff now he's doing is just trying to move around and avoid it. he's no longer making the hits that he did back at that time. and our involvement, which we have been involved in is actually being -- is working. >> yes, sir, it is working. and it's in a great team effort with all the country teams as well as many of the civilian organizations that have built the durability and the civilian population to better resist the problems he has. right now, he's about down to about 200 real fighters and the

impact on the civilian population is very minimal. he's using elicit trafficking to continue to sustain his efforts. but it's tough for him because the continual pressure over the last 14 years. >> being chased around places like c.a.r., eastern congo south sudan. it seems like it was a trail of blood following him. and it's not that way so much anymore. i just think that we haven't talked about that in a long time. we need to get on the record. some things are -- seem to be working there. >> yeah. it's a long-term effort against kony with really fairly modest resources. but the long-term effort has done exactly what you said. it has significantly decreased his impact on civilian population, sir. >> yeah. >> general rodriguez, last year you testified 12% of your requests are being met. i'm reading this from the transcript last year.

has there been any change in this intelligence gap? >> just a little bit more, sir. i'm about 13% now. but that's a great question as far as the impacts of sequestration. just for the committee. we will lose more caps in sequestration than i have in the theater right now. so you can see the impact that's going to have on our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. thank you. >> thank you very much. thank you. >> senator manchin? >> thank you mr. chairman, and thank you all three of you for your service to our country and things you do every day. with that, general austin i said last year, if i believe sending u.s. trainers and weapons to syria would make america safer, i would have supported it. i did not then and what i'm hearing further supports my belief. last week, reports emerged from the department of defense is unable to account for more than $500 million of military assistance to yemen including weaponry, aircraft and equipment. and i'm sure you've all seen the same pictures on youtube that

we're getting of our equipment being used for people against us and against our efforts. all of which could potentially fall into the hands of our iranian backed rebels or al qaeda. in syria, we've heard reports, seized u.s. weapons from cia trained rebels, and a tank missiles. two days ago video footage was posted. showing them using a captured u.s. missile in a fight. and these are not immediate events. we supported individuals in the '80s. 1980s in afghanistan. we watched isis capture vehicles and military equipment that iraqi security forces abandon. which are millions and millions and millions of dollars being used against us now. even after we spent the better part of a decade training them. we have a history of supplying weapons and training that ended up being used against us. general austin, who is responsible for the weapons and equipment the u.s. supplied in these cases? or are these reports accurate? and will any disciplinary action

be taken? >> clearly, sir, what -- with not having the ability to be in yemen currently to monitor the disposition of the weapons then certainly we can't, we don't have the ability to oversee the safeguarding or the employment of those weapon systems. that 500 million, i believe, was the amount of funds that were required for both providing weapon systems and training. and as you know, training is pretty expensive. >> this was yemen. >> yes, sir. >> i know about the 500 million requested for syria. is there nobody in our government, in our defense pentagon that's responsible like when we give all this equipment to yemen and then we see it falling apart. do we not have any way to retrieve that? >> certainly in a case like

yemen, sir. we don't have the ability to go back and retrieve it. we don't have it -- >> as we see it falling apart. we can't take any actions at all to keep from falling? >> once we've provided the weapons to them, sir. >> it's theirs. >> yes, sir. and we will continue to monitor the usage of those weapons and make sure that if they're not being used properly we don't continue to provide capability to them. >> do you all confirm. do you all agree with the reports of how much weapons and lethal volatility of these weapons being used against us. there are weapons being used against us. >> i don't doubt. >> are these accurate? they're widely reported. >> yes, sir, if we're not there and we provided weapons and it's reasonable to expect that some of that material will fall in the hands of the people. >> let's just -- let's go with

mosul first. and the iraqi forces that abandoned, that was substantial i'm sure. correct? >> it was, sir. >> okay. >> and we know that's being used against us. >> yes, sir. >> okay. then we know about yemen now. and we have concerns about you know, will this be repeated? and are we taking any steps from what we've seen happen? how can you assure me that syria, that whatever, whoever we support in syria that won't fall in the wrong hands. >> there's no way we can absolutely assure you that won't happen, sir. what we -- what we do is to try to train the folks that we're working with and providing capability to be responsible and safeguard these weapons. in any event they are not then we certainly quit providing them the capability. >> and one quick question for general votel. general votel.

in west virginia i had the privilege of observing the training. and both the 19th and 20th army special forces group have fought with great successes in iraq and afghanistan. how do you see the future of the national guard special operations community moving forward? >> well, as you just pointed out, they are absolutely integrated into everything we're doing. not just the army side, but on the air guard side. and so some of our unique isr capabilities, manned isr capabilities will reside in some of our air guard and air reserve organizations. they are absolutely and totally integrated into everything that we are doing now and will do in the future. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> general austin. when it comes to fighting isil, i appreciate your determination your military drive. and that's coming through.

i do question the sort of optimistic note that you have in your testimony. because it seems that things are not going as positively as you're suggesting. you mentioned beginning on page 11 of your testimony. the president's announcement this past september, five key elements to what the administration wants to do involving coalition partners, jordan turkey and lebanon, having reliable partners to assist on the ground. and then you say once we do all these things, we will have defeated isil through a combination of sustained pressure, dismantling of capabilities and expanding regional partners c.t. capacities. it's just hard to see hard to be very encouraged about that happening at this point. and i want to ask about our

partners. now, not everything we hear is in these big hearings. we met with the king of jordan not in a classified setting but the king of jordan tells us we can't want this more than the arab neighborhood wants it. and so i do want to ask you about that. and he said going back and trying to get the partners together and make this work on the ground. i think everybody has been saying boots on the ground are going to be needed to defeat isil. are those boots on the ground going to have to be iraq? the iraqi army boots on the ground. i don't see i don't see the jordanians having that capacity. we met with the ambassadors from uae and saudi arabia. just the other day.

and they they want this coalition to take effect and they want egypt to be part of it. i just wonder who in that whole list of neighboring countries has the capacity to go in and retake this territory. you mention on page 12, we're doing precision air strikes. but i think we all know that's not going to get it done. and then you talk about the intent of the regional campaign is not to destroy isil, although that's our primary objective. so how is this going to be wrapped up by troops going in and taking the territory back? and the united states not employing boots on the ground? >> thank you, sir. a couple of the things we said up front was, number one, this would take time. because we are working with

indigenous forces. we are using the iraqi security forces to conduct the ground operations. as you pointed out, sir, we've also said that you can't do this with just air power alone. it has to be a complement of fires and maneuver forces on the ground. and our approach is to generate those forces by training and equipping iraqi security forces. and we're -- we're, you know, as we have halted isil's advance into iraq, we started the business of training and equipping new iraqi security forces so they'll have the ability to train -- to take back their borders and secure their sovereign spaces. >> is there any prospect of saudi forces? being there in numbers that

would be significant? uae, jordanian forces, they got a police force, but not much else. >> they all have capability, sir. none of them have volunteered to come forward and put boots on the ground in iraq right now. in iraq certainly iraq needs to want to be able to take that on and take those forces in. but to this point as you look at what saudi's dealing with the border dealing with yemen. there is capability with countries in the region but none, no countries have come forward and volunteered to put boots on the ground in iraq. >> thank you sir. well, good luck to you, and again, i appreciate your determination and resolve. i hope you're as successful as you believe you'll be. >> we will be successful, sir. >> thank you mr. chairman.

and thank all of you for all your efforts. general votel i'd like to talk about a different issue for one minute. and that is, i want to thank you for your top down leadership on mental health. with the special operations. since assuming command you've been incredibly frank about this challenge, and that alone sends an important message to the troops. can you talk about the psychological component of your preservation of the force and family program and how that's going today? >> yeah, i can, thank you for the question senator, and we appreciate the continued support we get from congress in this very significant challenge to us. we are looking at a variety of things, we are looking at peer-to-peer programs that we use within organizations to help provide access to our members and their family members and others to reach out and talk to their friends and their peers about that. and i think this is an important component. likewise, we are pursuing

programs to ensure leadership, chaplains and others are well trained in the ability to identify those behaviors we think are related to stress and potentially which can lead to suicide. and third, i think the -- one of the most important things we are doing is trying to send the very clear message across the entire soft force that it is absolutely normal and expected to ask for help when you need it. and you can do that without concern of stigma or any concerns about your standing within the command. and we are putting really working double time to put effort on that particular theme and message throughout this. the real census of our program is to empower people by communicating early and often by trying to enable them by giving them easy access to programs, and resources so they can get help and encouraging them. >> and will you work with us to

help us take the lessons that you've learned in socom and work with the other parts of our military? >> absolutely. >> thank you very much. general austin, it appears appears that the efforts in tikrit are stalled at the moment and so my concern my, one of the areas i'm looking at is how do we empower the moderate sunnis? are they the key to making this work? and if you are a moderate sunni and i asked this the other day the concern would be, why do you want to team up with a shiite militia when isis is also sunni? they may be like this bad cousin that shows you at the event, but they're still your cousin? how do we empower the moderate sunnis and do you see them the key to moving this along and having success in iraq? >> sir, i do believe that

getting the sunni population involved is really, really important in terms of being successful going forward. and you are right, the previous operation in tikrit did stall and it stalled because i think the wrong approach was taken. those, many of the forces tarp being employed were not controlled or supervised by the ministry of defense or government of iraq. >> that has recently changed as of the last several days and today when we started supporting this effort. we think this effort will begin to move forward with the employment of the special operations force and the help of our enablers. but i think it's absolutely key that, number one, the government has to be accommodating to both the sunni and the kurd population and we have to increasingly get the sunnis

involved. >> can you help make that happen? because the concern is a body, a lot of the folks that surround him are still from the prefer administration and -- previous administration and you had experience in the anbar area and the service you have done throughout iraq can you help to identify the key sunni moderate leaders to make them a part of this and is that what's going to you know, you look and say you think you are going to get it right this time. how do you think this turns out? >> sir, to answer both your questions, we are encouraged we continue to encourage the leader scholarship in scholarship shp /*ship -- leadership to do some things

that are demonstrable that they, that increases their confidence in the leadership and the government and you may know that we are helping the iraqi security forces and the government of iraq reach out to the tribal elements from anbar and bring in some of those elements to train and equip them and get them involved in the fight as well and those that we have trained and equipped have performed remarkably well. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general votel, when we met last week, you talked about how the resources allowed you to meet threats with moderate risks and over the past year we've seen that terror threat increase smaller problems become more serious, they become crisis and in this, you bloo everybody this is a part of the result of the

strategy that accepts moderate risks, are we less able to nip those problems in the bud and so that they grow in these serious threats? >> senator, thanks for the question. first of all, i think we can continue to. i think all commanders operate in an area where they're constantly balancing risks of their forces and many things are being done on a regular basis and i think that's what i'm principally paid to do. as we move forward, and continue to deal with the changing and complex situations, for me i think it gets down to prioritization and for us what we will attempt to do is offset the risk that is associated with increased operations by ensureing we prioritize on those operations for which we command the biggest impact and we can help support the broadest national objectives.

>> is libya a place where we are going to accept moderate risks? >> that, again, i think that perhaps may be a policy question. certainly, from my perspective working with my partner in afri-com, we are looking at this i think so to address the threats that are in libya today. >> general rodriguez in your opening statement, you say libya based threats to u.s. interests are growing, if left unchecked, i believe they have the highest potential among security challenges on the continent to increase risks to u.s. and european strategic interests in the next two years and beyond. you also describe libya as emerge as a safe haven where terrorists including al qaeda and the islamic state of iraq and the bond affiliated groups can train and rebuild with impunity. >> that, to me doesn't sound like we're on the right

trajectory. do you think our approach to libya is not adequate? are we accepting too much risk? >> to make sure what everybody is doing in and around libya, a significant effort is going around libya to prevent that from spilling over, we are working with our partners as much as we can and as much as we have the authorities to do that to strengthen their capacity to limit the spillover of that effort. we are also working with our european partners to increase their effort there and we are supporting at this point in time the u.n. effort to come to a diplomatic solution and anything past that will require a policy

decision then. >> how would you rate the success of the efforts that you just described, the spillover the work with our european partners in the u.n.? >> the the work with our partners has for the most part gone very well with the exception of one of two sensational attacks as you read about in tunisia the other day, but their capacities have continued to grow and they can handle that threat every day as does na jir and chad and the work of the european efforts and the u.n. has not had as much progress as anybody wants to date, ma'am. >> general votel if i can return to that idea of moderate risk for my posing questions here. over the long term do you think that if we see risks continue to increase and those smaller pod

problems continue to accumulate how do we prioritize that? if they're viewed as smaller problems at the time but yet they continue to escalate and become greater and greater risks to this country not just the region they're in. how are you going to prioritize? how are you going to address it and do you have the resources you need? >> thanks senator. right now, i think i do have the resources that i need to support the gcc commanders at a moderate level risk for the things i am being asked to do today. what i think we will do for the future as i mentioned in my opening comments here i think soft plays a particular role in the grey zone in the area before operations, before we get to open conflict and so i think the important piece that i bring to the geographic commanders is our and to come in and help shape, develop partnerships, help build capacity and support relationships in all of those areas so that we can strengthen

partners before big problems -- less small problems grow into big problems. and i really think that is the direction in which we should be focusing, soft into the future. >> general rodriguez, did you have a response? >>. >> thanks senator. that's done by the policy makers relative to our national security interests. what our partners can handle and what they're doing themselves and we prioritize it based on a whole of government and inner agency effort and who can help most in different places. so i think that is what is done every day in the defense department. >> thank you, gentleman and thank you for your service. thank you, mr. chair. >> thank you, i now have determined budget gimmicks have no attachment to party.

>> that both parties areable of using challenges as we approach sequestration and defence spending. it is being used in the budget we are dewitting and passed in the house yet. rather than confront sequestration and be honest about the challenges we have in our base budget that we've all gave lot of time in terms of rhetoric to, we are now going further down the road of using oco as a slush fund. it's not good for physical accountability. it's not good for restoring faith that the american people can face the tough decisions and not retreat to rhetoric and gimmickery that is not really true. we're not going to build aspy colleague has said we're not going to build a px some place in america with oka funds t. question is i'll