party. >> that both parties areable of using challenges as we approach sequestration and defence spending. it is being used in the budget we are dewitting and passed in the house yet. rather than confront sequestration and be honest about the challenges we have in our base budget that we've all gave lot of time in terms of rhetoric to, we are now going further down the road of using oco as a slush fund. it's not good for physical accountability. it's not good for restoring faith that the american people can face the tough decisions and not retreat to rhetoric and gimmickery that is not really true. we're not going to build aspy colleague has said we're not going to build a px some place in america with oka funds t. question is i'll ask you all,

do you believe the army can buy back force with oka funds? >> do i not, senator. >> do you believe the navy can work with shipping in funds? >> no, ma'am. >> i just. >> i'm not saying we come to this as democrats because we have engaged in gimmickry also. i know the chairman wants to face this head on. i know it's a challenge in the environment. we have obviously not met the challenge with the bucket as it's currently configured. i wanted to specifically ask you, general austria austin, there has been a determination that freedom sentinel is a new operation. do you see it as a new contingency operation?

>> it's a continuation of our efforts, senator so you know in terms of the types of things that we are doing we are continuing to train the and advise and assist the afghan security force but in terms of you know how we account for the funding that we're allocating to that, that's a different issue. >> the reason i'm asking this is i am told there is an effort under way of naming a new lead inspector general in afghanistan as opposed to cigar, of the inspector general on afghanistan and i think if that determine is made, i want to make sure everybody understands, that's going to impose a lot of additional burdens in terms of oversight requirement on contracting, you know, i know there is continuity in cigar. i don't understand the value right now of changing inspector

generals at this point on the projects that are ongoing that the special inspector general in afghanistan is aware of and working on i don't get and if there is really a sincere attempt to labeling him a new contingency someone has to do explaining to me and others on this committee why there is a good idea. are you a aware of an effort at this point? >> i am not aware of the effort, but, certainly, i will find out. i'll look into it senator. >> that would be terrific. as you know we've worked very closely with the inspectors generals both in iraq and afghanistan. i think the bid of work they've done has been incredibly helpful to our nation's military as we look at how we honestly confront sequestration. one of the ways is being better southwards of the resources that

we have allocated to these efforts. general rodriguez i understand that most of the service members who deployed to africa as part of the ebola response operation united assistance have begun returning home. is there an effort to keep track of the contractors around this effort and how many have been pulled and how many remain in ebola as we continually try to stay on top of contractor costs? >> yes, ma'am, there is. there is a very strict accounting that has been done. we had oversight from the dod ig from the very beginning and we were very cognizant with contractor oversight from the beginning and paying too much for contracts out of line with the u.s. ideas as well as the host nation is providing. so we have a strict accounting, yes, ma'am. >> that would be terrific. we'd love it if you'd share that with our office. also, general austin if you could share with us how many contractors have been plussed up in iraq as a result of our

efforts against isil, you know, we have gotten to the point that we were just counting contractors in afghanistan. now we're back to counting contractors in iraq. we would appreciate an update on that number also. >> yes, sir, i'll take that, for the record. >> thank you so much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, gentleman, for all your service and the men and women sitting behind you, not just behalf of all the troops you represent. but you personally i know you have spent many years down range. i want to address the topics in tikrit. do i understand you correctly to say there are now know iranian forces in tikrit? >> the forces that are clearing tikrit are isf forces, special operations forces and federal police and as of this morning when i checked with my commanders the shia militia and pmh had pulled back.

>> by pull back do they remain there still shia militias like iranian forces from force in the vicinity of tikrit? >> i'm sure share in the area. i am sure there are forces on the east side of the river and as you know tikrit, the city of tikrit is on the west side of the river. >> do we know the whereabouts of qassim silomani? >> to my understanding, my last update he was not in tikrit or in that area. >> in anyway have we implemented fire control measures that issue we don't strike any of the shiite paramilitary forces or the elements in the vicinity of tikrit? >> we certainly have -- we caused the iraqi security forces

to develop a scheme of maneuver that can effectively accomplish the mission of clearing the tourn and our fires are supported of that effort. so we're focused on that we are always dos what we can to insure there is not excessive damage. the focus is on the isf forces with eare supporting. >> would you include the kuds force to include qassim silomani? >> i would consider that unintended consequences. >> does qassim silomini have freedom of movement in iraq? >> i believe he does, senator. >> general votel, six months ago, president obama cited yemen as the questions of our counterterrorism strategy. do you believe yemen is a success story today?

>> certainly with the withdrawal of our soft forces over the weekend, it certainly put us in a different posture right now particularly in the threat we were focused on there of al qaeda and the arabian peninsula. so it's much more challenging today than it was when we had people on the ground. >> general austin, do you consider yes, ma'am an success story today? >> certainly yes, ma'am isn't a very troubled country today with the challenges it is facing and the activities of the houthi s and so i think the country is in turmoil. >> general austin, approximately ten months ago, the president released five taliban commanders in exchange for bowe bergdahl, i believe the arrest expires in two months is that correct? >> i believe that to be correct sir. >> do we know what will happen to those five taliban commanders in two months in quater?

>> i think we probably have to consult the quater regovernment and also the elements in our our governments charged with monitoring the movement of these elements, so i can't answer that, senator. i can't take that for the record and try to do the research on it. >> i would like to get the record back for the record, thank you, general austin. and i will address this to general austin and general rodriguez. given the situation in yemen if there were action by militants there to drop the man state i presume american forces would immediately act or reopen that strike? >> we would work in conjunction with our gcc partners to ensure that those straits remain

opened. it's one of our core interests to ensure we have free flow of commerce through both straits. >> yes, sir, we would also work with beth of the host nations of africa as well as our uniform mean partners to support those efforts, sir. >> thank you gentleman. i appreciate your answers, once again, i appreciate your service to our country. >> for the record, i'd like a response to senator cotton's question, do you consider yes, ma'am an success story or not? yes or no? it's a simple straight forward question. >> it's currently not a success story. >> general votel. >> it's not a success story today. >> thank you very much, senator kain. >> when the president made that statement, he was talking about our anti-terrorism efforts against aqap, was he not senator votel? >> i believe that's correct. >> he wasn't talking about yemen, he was talking about the counterterrorism against aqap,

naturally the deter scevioriation in yemen is compromised. my follow-up question is how much is it excised? are we able to maintain that kind of counterterrorism effort against aqap or is that in a abayance? >> we will be talking to our partners int area to look at how we regain the situational awareness and understand what's happening on the ground and look at how we can continue to address the threats that emanate from yemen. >> thank you. i'd like to just briefly associate myself with senator mccaskill's comments about using oco for the sequestration problem. it obviously doesn't go to the based budget. it's unpaid for. it's just absolutely the wrong way to approach this problem. i hope the congress can find a more realistic and responsible

solution to sequestration also, general austin, again, because you talk to senator donnelly about this it seems to me it's critically important we use the leverage we have, which apparently was used in the tikrit battle to be sure that this isn't a shiite militia-led offensive, because if this becomes another version of a war of shiites against sunni, we've lost. this has to be inclusive and i hope that your relationship with the present body of the iraqi government emphasizes that. because it is just essential to a successful outcome in iraq regardless of the short-term advantage of tikrit or mosul. would you agree with that? >> yes, sir, i would. i would say further i take every opportunity to emphasize those exact points to the leader

scholarship in iraq when i engage them. >> and it sounds like, this airstrikes in the last couple of days in tikrit were, in fact, conditioned on that kind of consideration. is that correct? >> that's correct, sir. this operation had to be under the control of the government of iraq and iraqi security forces. there had to be a force once the city is cleared, to maintain stability in that city and that force need to be an iraqi security force and so those things, those conditions were met early on the terms of the planning and the sinksynchronization. we are able to provide some support. >> i certainly hope you stay. i think you know a lot of the problems in iraq are the maliki government's failure to be inclusive. we can't make that mistake again. let's turn to yank. we heard a wonderful, strong,

passionate speech with handi this week. i am concerned we are still in a calendar driven status in afghanistan and even though the president allowed troops to stay through 2015 we're still talking about kabul only at the end of 2016. do you believe that's going to be sufficient in order to support the afghans? we made such progress there. i would hate to see you pull out in terms of air support, authorities for air support and train and direct services, give me your thoughts on that. >> sir i certainly agree with you a new leadership in afghanistan causes all of us to be encouraged and optimistic. what i seen president ghani do and abdullah do in terms of

reaching out to the international community in terms of reaching out to the folks in the region as well, it's all encouraging. encouraging. the relationship with the security forces, the statement of common goals with the u.s. i think is all very encouraging. so i think this riffs us new opportunities we didn't have before we really have to think about what we want our relationship to be. >> i hope you you will won u counsel the white house to consider what i would think is a moderate investment in the gains that have been had. it's not for sure that the regime or the government of afghanistan can withstand the taliban on their own and after what we've invested over the past 13 years to walk away at

five minutes of midnight and see it all collapse i think would be a real shame. so i hope you will urge that on the policy makers based upon general campbell and the other information you are receiving from the field. they need not only those troops but they need authorities. they, the president ghandi talked about air support. i think that will be crucial. so carry that message with you, sir. >> thank you mr. chair. gentleman, thank you very much for being here today and also to your staff. thank you for your many years of combined service to the united states. general votel, i just want to mention in your testimony today i would like to thank you for mentioning not only our active duty forces but the reserve and national guard components. your operators lor analyst and so forth it's all one team one fight. so i appreciate youing a only ining that today. something else that you brought up and a country him others have

mentioned, too, is stress and suicide with our active duty members and with our veterans, those that have gotten off of active duty. it is important that we continue we are silliency programs and making sure that not only are they physically fit for the fight, that they're mentally fit as well. so thank you for bringing that forward. a number of us are working on initiatives to make sure they are well cared for. i would like to address my question and thoughts general austin and general votel. last week was the 12th anniversary of our entrance into iraq with the iraq war. we've had 3,000 excuse me 4,000 american service men and women that have lost their lives in iraq and we've had another 40,000 that have been injured in that war. and i want to thank you for your service in that war. i know all of you have engaged

at one point or another in the war in iraq. many of our service men and women will come home with not only is e ininvisible injuries, but physical injuries that will impact their lives for many, many years. but before we ever entered into iraq on march 20th of 2003 the iraqi kurds were already engaged and preparing the battlefield before we ever got there. they have been an important part of our effort in iraq. and so i would like your thoughts on involving more involvement of the iraqi kurds the peshmurga in this fight and really what their role has been from 2003 forward if you would please address that general austin. >> thank you, senator. and i agree, you know, i was as you probably know with the elements when we went into iraq

back in, you know 12 years ago and whereas i didn't initially make it all the way up to kurdistan, i can tell you that what the kurds were doing in the north at that point in time was very instrumental to the forces, our forces that followed in or flowed in later and facilitated our work there. most recently with their efforts in the current fight against isil they really have done a terrific job and, you know, i've talked with president barzani and his staff on numerous occasions about you know, what we're doing, what the requirements were and what they needed to do more. as you look at what they've done in the north up there in terms of actually infliblthing damage on isil i think their efforts have really shaped this overall fight in a very positive direction and they continue to do more on a daily basis.

so they're a big part of this fight. they've punched above their weight class and i think they'll continue to do so. >> general votel. >> thank you senator. i absolutely agree with what general austin said. i would only add that a key part of the kurdish relationship really has been the long-term relationship with them. so they were a key partner with soft forces when we were there from 2003 through 2011 and helped us ademocracy variety of networks and do i believe the great and enduring relationship we've had with them from a soft force to kurdish force aspect really was one of the initial successes we were able to achieve when we were back in there late last summer. we were able to quickly renew those relationships, draw on those partnerships and get going very, very quickly in some areas. so to me that highlights the importance of that long-term relationship that we have been able to develop with them. >> do you believe that our resources would be best utilized if we were directly arming the

peshmurga, the kurdish forces? >> well, i think that i think is a policy question. certainly, they are very capable forces, so i do think they would make use of any resources provided to them. >> yes i think they have an exceptional force and allie to our american forces in that region. thank you very much gentleman for your service and also to your staff for being here in support today. thank you, mr. chair. >> thank you mr. chairman and to your witness and strong testimony this morning. i want to begin with yemen. i was intrigued with the account in news this morning about the saudi and other action in yemen and, in particular, the numbers of partners that have been a part of this in addition to saudi arabia, bahrain kuwait qatar, uae, jordan morocco. there is press reporting they are involved and pakistan and

sudan, so nine nations in addition to saudi arabia springing into action to deal with this threat of the houthi takeover of the government in yemen. i'm gratified by that. i want to see a region that will stand up and try to deal with its own problems rather than telling us you know, quietly they think it's a problem they're not doing anything. but i was also struck by the fact that those nine nations haven't come together and acted with dispatch against isil. they're involved but they are not acting with dispatch against isil nearly a year into isil's accelerated taking of territory in syria and iraq and just, you know, as experts who spent a lot of time in the region what explains why these nine nations would react with such speed and force to the houthi takeover of yemen but would not be so engaged in the fight against isil? >> sir like you i am very encouraged that we've seen, what we've seen here recently with

the number ofgations coming together to address a problem, the core of these nation's are gcc nations. and i certainly believe that they all think that yemen is a very critical piece of real estate, just based upon the geography. most important it shares a border with saudi arabia and oman and i think so, the gcc countries are naturally predisposed to helping protect another gcc country and then the relationships between the saudis and egyptians and others are really what's driving tear participation there. i would remind you senator, i know you are very, very well aware of this. the fight we flew into syria for the first time we had five sunni arab-led nations fly in that formation with us, which is really unprecedented and we

continue see them offer support if terms of material support. they also have offered to train and equip forces but throughout they have remained with us in terms of flying strikes if syria. they have mulligan to participate with us on that. as they focus on the yemen problem, naturally because of resources, we will see less of a report in syria. >> you indicated that you thought in response to earlier questioning that you thought that isil was our most pressing challenge but iran was our greatest long-term challenge. is a possible explanation is all of these nations believe iran is their more pressing challenge and they don't think of isil as the same pressing challenge that they view within they look at

iran? >> yes, i can attest they do see isil as a pressing challenge. i think a big driver here is that the geography associated with that yemen borders saudi and oman and clearly a direct threat to their homeland. >> each of you work in the military lay and with partners state, a.i.d. doj, dea, dhs the intel agencies. there has been questions here about the effect of a sequestering on the military. do you agree the sequester affects your allied agencies you work with and your co-coms in special forces, that is also an aspect of sequester we need to take seriously if we are avoiding challenges to our national security? >> i agree, sir.

>> i do, too senator. >> i definitely agree, senator. >> general rodriguez, the attack on tunisia tunisia a small country but a bright spot in a way in terms of how they have come out of the arab spring with a constitution, with islamicic parties participating and in democracy, even stepping back from power. what has your observation been about the tunisian governments and newly formed newly elected government's reaction to the terrorist attack at the museum in tunisia? what's your assessment of how they are going forward and how we can help them succeed? >> i think that their response has been very effective. their military institutions are strong and it was also a stabilizing influences that they went through that transition and we continue to work with them to build some of their capacities with some of our inner agency partners. those elements were involved in that effort.

and we continue to also share intelligence with them and we will continue to build up their capacitys to make sure they move in a positive trajectory, sir. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and gentleman, thank you for your service. >> mr. chairman, i want to let you know ten years ago as a marine corps major i had the privilege of serving with general austin and i can tell you, he's one of the finest officers i have ever served with. so i am very heartened eis in this very important position. >> he's not very generally nice to marines so i'd like to hear 245. >> i see he has one on his staff, keeping in full of the respect for the marine corps, i appreciate that. general votel, i want to ask you a question relating to really some clarification.

one of the things i think is very important for us in the congress and in the military and in the administration is to speak with language that's that gives our citizens a sense of what's really happening and one of the things that you hear a lot about now, the president the administration talks a lot about, you know, winding down combat operations combat operations are over. we've ended combat operations in afghanistan. that's been stated several times. the president of afghanistan even mentioned that in a joint session of the congress yesterday. but you also mentioned we have a ro bust ct effort. so are we kind of speaking out of both sides of our mouths? isn't a ro bust ct effort the very definition of combat operations? don't we still have combat operations going on in afghanistan? >> we are, senator, thanks, for question. we are obviously supporting our afghan partners and their execution of what could be

determined as combat operations at their effort. to your first part of your question with respect to counterterrorism, you know counterterrorism i think is as we pursue this here is not just a kinetic aspect of it. >> but it is kind of epitome of combat operation? aren't american soldiers when they're conducting combat operations in afghanistan or counterterrorism operations in afghanistan, isn't that the definition of combat operations? they're going in with weapons killing bad guys, correct? >> we are not doing that today. >> there is no ct operations? >> there are ct operations, but ct operations involve not only helping and enabling our partners who are helping us with our ct objectives, the conduct of discreet action that we are taking like kinetic strikes that are specifically against threats there and then how we address the overall ideology and narrative aspect of this. >> but our ct operations are not

members of the u.s. military in action against enemy forces? >> right now today, we are not putting people on unilateral u.s. operations in against forces on the ground in afghanistan. we are supporting our afghan partners as we get those and we are doing other operations related to those networks. >> okay. i again i think that clarification is important just because it seems to me if we have special forces operators in afghanistan in direct combat, we should let the american people know. but if you are saying that is not the case, there is no combat, no sf actions direct actions against al qaeda operatives or anything else like that. >> i'm not saying there is no combat going on. what i'm saying is there is no

unilateral u.s. combat going on. we are working through our partners and when we do operations on the ground. >> do we have j tacks on the on the ground either in syria or calling mission? >> which have j tacks operating at the command and control locations. >> but they're not on the ground, front line troops? >> they're not. they're company enforces, where we're doing operations. >> general austin i was wondering, you mentioned the whole of government approach with regard to isil. i present that. i appreciate the fact that you're focused on the military aspects of that. but what are the other instruments of power that we're bringing to bear with regard american power with regard to isil and i haven't seen the administration articulate that at all. you mention it in your testimony i think that's very encouraging. but what is it? we haven't really soon it. again, i know it's not your realm that you are responsible for, but it would be heartening

to know what other instruments of our american power we're integrated to the fight with regard to defeating isis? >> there are a couple of important things that have to be done, senator, as you know, in order to really defeat this enemy, the kenetic piece of it is one issue, but you really have to do some very constructive things to begin to cut off the enemy's ability to resource themselves so countering the threat financing is one issue and in stopping the flow of foreign fighters or slowing down the flow of foreign fighters, both of those issues have to be worked by in our government, all of government and they have to be worked in conjunction with other countries that not only in the region but internationally. and also there is a requirement or a need to counterthe narrative and so i think we have to do more there. i know there are some initial steps that have been taken to get them to do that. but there is a lot of work yet

to be done. >> thank you thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank thence withs for being here and what have you done for our country and continue to do. i wanted to ask general austin again, a couple questions about yellen. senator kain had pointed out that there were, in addition to the saudi, there were nine other countries that were participating in this coalition to assist in yemen. so just to be clear we have been, obviously participating state department side on negotiations with iran for very intensely probably for the last year at least if not more. and during that period what has iran been doing in yemen? and is it not the fact that iran's influence and support of the houthi s, which is in part, prompting the saudis and others to engage in this?

>> certainly, senator, iran is, has been enabling the activity of the houthi s as they've done what they've done. and i would go further to say that you know, iran's desire is to be a hedge in this region. >> meaning regional domination? >> right >> as it seeks to include various countries, it does so through the shia populations in those countries. >> that won't allow iran to dominate any specific country in the region. what it does do, it increases, it serves to increase sectarian tension. thereby, it serves as a destabilizing effort. >> let me just be clear when we're talking support both i know, general votel you are familiar with this, so when we are talking about the support

we are talking about money and arms, aren't we? we are not just talking about, boy, we support you because you are shia? we are talking about actual support? aren't they giving on the ground? >> yes, yes, sir we are talking about material support as well and again that support is provided through the shia. >> through their proxy they give them the money and the arms, which has undermined our mission that we had in cooperation that we lad to try to deal with al qaeda. isn't that right, general votel in yemen? >> yes senator i think that that's true. >> so the other thing i wanted to ask general austin, bahrain we have an important partnership in bahrain do we not? in fact, we have the location there of the united states fifth lead, is that correct? >> that is correct. >> what is iran doing with regard to the bahrain government which is a sunni government. as i understand it they are

also trying to destabilize that government, which would, of course, in my view, threaten our interests there? >> correct, senator we see the same reach through the shia population, which increases sectarian tension and serves as a destabilizing effect. >> which you know obviously bahrain is a different country than yemen, but it's a similar playbook in a different country. is it not? >> it's a similar approach. >> similar approach but, obviously, they're very different countries? >> yes, ma'am. >> but i think you need to be clear here what iran's activities have been and as i look at your testimony, one of the things you pointed out, general austin, that the iran routinely engages in the line activity through the iranian threat network, iran is also engaging in maligned activity to support through proxy actors such as lebanese hezbollah and hamas, which threatens the

sovereignty security of israel. this has all been going on in addition to undermining our interests in yemen correct? >> that's correct. >> so, you know this is obviously, i think as we look at this issue of the regional attempts at regional domination by iran, this is a deep concern to us in the long term and even in the short term in terms of how this region can be destabilized further. is that true? >> there is a significant concern for long time long-term effects in terms of this type of behavior destablizeing the region and asking the effects in other parts of the globe as well. >> and, in fact, i think can further fuel sort of a sunni shia fight in the region if they continue their efforts towards regional domination, would you agree? >> yeah, i would. >> thank you. i just wanted to comment as well on senator cotton's question to you about the status of the

taliban 5 and i know you will get back to him on it but i have to say i find it shocking the fact that you are commander of africom and that the state department has not already coordinated with you. it's not, not putting this on you is my point is the fact that are you the commander of sencom these two countries, qatr and taliban is from could return and present great danger into afghanistan. it would seem to me that you would be, i would hope, most closely consulted on this. i'm actually kind of dumb founded they aren't consulting you noud and there doesn't appear to be a plan. so you know i look forward to the follow-up. but to the state department, everyone else out there to this administration it seems to me the commander of centcom needs to be brought in, in terms of

the five commanders that can come into afghanistan and threaten our troops. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> and thanks to all of you here today and the men and women who serve under your command and all you do to help protect us. last years ago i expressed some reluctance regarding the syria train and equip program based on concerns that any lethal assistance we may provide might end up inadvertently or in some cases, perhaps purposely, ends up in the hands of some of the very extremists we are attempting to fight against and that could possibly fuel further violence in the region. while i believe the service members who are under your command who are in the process of executing this program are the most skilled in the world at

what they do. and that's what gives this program the best chance of success. the losses of u.s.-provided equipment by the iraqi security forces last year and in yemen this year are historic lessons that the fluid and volatile nature of the middle east can compromise even our best laid plans. i'm further concerned that for this program to have the best chance of success, the lungs need to become more militarily involved in this conflict than many americans may realize. secretary carter stated recently when referring to the forces we train in equipment in syria, we will have some only gax to support them after they're trained, close quote. yet, we didn't know what that support would look like nor do we know at this point what the costs associated with that would look like. this program is a part of the administration's strategy to address the isis threat should

be fully and openly debated in this body, so the american people might have a say in how their military forces are used. general austin, since the program was conceptualized, it was reasonable to expect the situation in which syrian rebels we armed might face a larger or better equipped army larger or better equipped enemy, why was the decision made to start the train and equip program? why was that decision made before determining whether the united states would provide further protection or support for the groups once they were trained and equipped and returned to syria? >> it was made because we need, we will need a, an element on the ground to compliment the work we are doing with our fires to begin to counter isil in

syria and, you know, my best military advice as we go forward is that as we introduce forces that we've trained and equipped, then we should provide them support. we should not only look to provide them fires we should provide them logistics and intel support as well. so i think that gives them the best opportunity for success. >> so do you think that assad's forces in syria will attempt to attack some of these open six members we have trained and equipped and if so, what level of military involvement should we expect from american forces? >> i think there is a likelihood that that can happen. we'll try to initially as we put forces in and begin to build combat power we'll put them in those positions where they are

focused on isil. >> that itself first task at hand and then it again, if they are attacked then i think we should protect them. >> what do we do if the forces that we train around and equip end up attacking assad's forces? >> well, initially, that's not the folks, that's no what we are focused on. so we will discontinue providing support to those forces if a investigator often do things that we haven't designed them to do initially and asked them to focus on initially. >> do you think that the success of the opposition groups that were training and equipping, that we're supporting, do you think that will require a new governing structure in damascus and, if so would the u.s. military be involved in helping facilitate that change?

>> i think eventually forces whether need to plug into some type of structure for sure. and again that's not what the military typically does. but again and this is a whole of government approach here. so. >> okay. thank you, general austin, thank you, platform. >> general, i'd like to follow up on what senator lee said. in syria, these young people we are training and we send them back into syria, if they are attacked by assad, we're not going to protect them? >> sir -- >> are we going to protect them. >>ny my thought, my recommendation is we probably protect them no what's who is attacking them. we have to protect these forces once we put them on the ground. >> are we going to have a provision to protect them? >> we currently don't that that policy decision sir. >> so we are going to train them to go back into syria and if

bashar assad barrel bombs them we are don't have a policy yet as to whether we protect them or not? >> currently, sir that decision has not been the taken. >> then why are we training them if we can't tell them whether or not we will protect them or not. >> i am very hopeful we will be able to tell them that. >> i am very hopeful too, but hope doesn't stop barrel bombing. could i ask you again, when it is that the saudis notified you that they were going to begin attacks in yemen? >>. >> sir, i had a discussion with saudi the day of the attacks, so it was not much before they actually started the attacks. >> isn't that quite a commentary on our relationship with saudi arabia and the other 13 countries and their coalition that they would literally on the

day of their attacks they tell you that, the united states of america that they're going to launch a major campaign? i mean that is really a fantastic indicator of the deter scevior -- deteriorator and the trust they have with us. it's been authenticated some people believe it's better on the an enemy of the united states than a friend. this is really quite remarkable and again finally, i do not know how you recruit young people to try to fight and tell them they're going to go back into a country. and we don't have a policy yet whether we're going to protect them or not. general, that's immoral. it's not only inworkable. it's immoral to tell people to not be able to tell them if we

train and equip them to go in and fight that we're not going to that we haven't yet got a policy on whether we're going to protect them or not. i would say that would also be something of a dulles inisincentive for recruitment. so i hope for the sake of these young people's lives that we are training now that we at least have a policy decision as to whether we're going to protect them or not and, of course the best way to do that is with a no-fly zone, which has been recommended years ago without any result from this president. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to follow the chairman's line with of questioning. so what do you believe the strategy is for this new campaign and what's the ultimate goal in yemen, sorry? >> i don't know what the saudis the specifics of their goals and objectives.

i can tell you that they're interested, number one if protecting their homeland. they have a border with the yemen, obviously and also that they receive requests from the president of yemen to help with military assistance. >> what advice have you given or will you give the president about what our role should be? >> our current position is that we'll help the saudis with intelligence and logistics and planning support and again they're great partners. i think they're very much appreciative of the help that we'll provide them. >> what's your assessment of the likelihood of success? >> in yemen? >> yes. >> again, senator i don't

currently know the specific goals and objectives of the saudi campaign and i'd have to know that to be able to assess the likelihood of success. >> i do hope you get that information sooner than later because, you know more than $500 million in military assistance to yemen can no longer be accounted for. it's fallen into the wrong hands. we have a role if yemen we have to have much greater accountability for. how does something like that happen and given the instability in the region what steps should the u.s. be taking to prevent losses like that in the future? >> yes. so the $500 million as i understandt, for were, is the amount of an investment over an eight-year period that we've made to help the yemeni government, the yemeni military forces or security forces build capacity. this not only includes

materials, but it also includes training. as you know, training can be somewhat costly. when we are there, we have the ability to monitor how this equipment is being embassy's no longer there and it doesn't have a -- an office of security cooperation that would typically do these things. we don't have that ability currently. if we have the ability to go back in and partner with a in you government or a government, then i think that will be one of our focus areas. >> well given that the houthis are still in control, how do you believe we should deal with al qaeda in the arabian peninsula given the state of yemen? >> thanks, senator. i think that as we have done, and will continue to do in every case, where we don't have people on the ground but there is a threat there that we need to be

concerned about, we'll use every intelligence collection capability that's available to us to continue to monitor what's going on with this extremist network. and we do have resources that are in the region that we can use to apply to counter this network once we've received the appropriate intelligence. >> what do you see is the presence of isil in the region and is that going to be affected by the state of yemen today? >> if i could get you to -- if i could ask a question, get you to ask that question again senator. i missed a piece of it. how do i see -- >> how do you see the threat of isil in that region? >> well, i think the threat of isil in the region senator, is the most pressing threat that we're facing. as i -- >> in yemen.

i'm still on yemen. >> in yemen that's really undetermined. i know that the most recent attack was attributed to an isil element in yemen. but i think the intelligence agencies are still working their way through that to determine the veracity of whether or not this is really a hard-core isil element or someone claiming to be isil or what this really is. clearly, aqap is dominant in that country, and whether or not isil and aqap can co-exist is left to be seen. >> thank you very much. >> i thank the witnesses. >> senator mccain? >> senator cotton. >> to follow up on something that he just said, breaking news alert from the associated press, general austin, that egyptian and saudi arabia have begun a ground incursion into yemen. did saudi arabia or any other country give you or central command advance notice of this

if this report is accurate? >> no. i did not have advance notice of that. >> thank you. >> quite a commentary. this hearing is adjourned.

tonight on c-span we begin a week-long series of profiles on congressional freshmen. starting with republican steve russell of oklahoma. he talks about his career in the army, his new life in congress and his childhood experiences. we'll show a different freshman profile each night at 9:00 eastern. and with congress on break this week, it is american history tv in prime time starting at 8:00 eastern with

daniel elsberg who became a consultant to the nixon white house on matters concern being the vietnam war. he talks about the pentagon papers and his opinions on vietnam. that's followed by an interview with john dean part of the nixon white house in july 1970 as counsel to the president. he talks about some of his early assignments, watergate and the people behind the 1972 graek 22 break-in at dnc headquarters. american history tv in prime time tonight and all this week starting at 8:00 eastern here on c-span3. next a hearing with john allen. presidential envoy for the global coalition to counter isis. he says the u.s. and its partners are clearly degrading isis' capabilities. he testified before the house foreign affairs committee. the chair is congressman ed royce of california congressman elliott ingle of new york serves at the ranking member. this is 2 1/2 hours. this hearing will come to order. this morning the committee continues its examination of the

threat that is posed to the middle east and the united states by isis. and one of the things we're trying to do here is to look at the administration's strategy to destroy this brutal terrorist organization, and assess the proposed authorization of military force to be -- to be used. they have sent an authorization to us. the goal of isis, i think, is pretty clear. it is to wreck everything and every person in its path, to establish a caliphate, and then fight to expand that caliphate. isis affiliates are growing in power and presence throughout the region. in the last few weeks, we have seen attacks in yemen. we have seen attacks in tunisia and libya. what is less clear is the administration's approach and its determination to tackle this threat. many of you know that for some time some of us on this committee have been pushing the

idea of hitting isis from the air. we went through many months of isis going town by town in syria and then in iraq, without the use of u.s. air power against isis. as a consequence, isis ended up taking many major cities across the region, ended up taking the central bank of mosul. if we count the number of sorties against isis to date, there is 2,959 that have been flown. if you compare that to the 116,000 air strikes during the first gulf war when iraq moved 40-some divisions into -- into kuwait, you get an idea of the difference in magnitude between the way this has been conducted, versus the very real deterrence that we utilized in the past. we also have the fact that at least among the canadian forces their spotters are forward deployed so they can hit their targets when they call the

targets in. and when -- in the u.s., with u.s. forces, our forces are not forward deployed, so when you're calling in an air strike, and you're not forward deployed to do it, there is some question about how effective that is going to be. most americans would be puzzled to learn about a lot of this. and i think that the piecemeal attacks that the obama administration has been systematically using here has been squandering our air power advantage, at least one observer tells us that's the case. and adding to the problem, the regional forces on the ground, these air strikes are supposed to be supporting are badly undersupplied. after seven months of fighting, this committee is still receiving troubling reports from the kurdish peshmerga and visits from the kurdish representatives about how out-gunned their men and women are on the front line.

37% of their battalions are female, and those women are fighting against isis and they're fighting with small arms, and they have yet to receive the artillery and the long long-range mortars and anti-tank weaponry that they have repeatedly asked for. this morning, ranking member engel and i are re-introducing legislation to allow u.s. arms to be sent directly to the kurds, they're strung out on a 500-plus mile front, against isis. these brave fighters, these women and men and battalions need better equipment to defeat isis and we can't allow iran through its influence over baghdad to continue to prevent that type of weaponry from coming from the center. so we should provide it. we should sell it to them directly. and the sunni tribal fighters who will be central to this fight are yet to trust baghdad as you know. strong local police and provisional national guard

forces are desperately needed to protect sunnis in anbar province and elsewhere. into the void, on the ground in iraq, have stepped iranian-backed shiite fighters. the leading force behind the recent tikrit offensive. senior u.s. officials have put this development in positive terms. the reports indicate that u.s. intelligence and air power will now support this iranian-backed mission. "the washington post" wisely cautioned in an editorial this week, "the growing power of the militias with their brutal tactics, sectarian ideology and allegiance to iran's most militant faction has become as large an impediment to the goal of stabilizing iraq as isis. shiite militias taking on isis may serve the immediate interest of killing jihadis, but it is hard to see how empowering iran's proxies is in the short, medium or long-term interest of

an inclusive iraq or a stable middle east. the fear that many of us have is that sunni iraqis who have been tortured by isis will get the same brutal treatment by their shiite militia liberators and that would fuel endless conflict. to see how this is viewed in the region with respect to iran being on the march, the other day, the iranians boasted that they had taken four arab capitals. well, in taking yemen, you've set off a situation now where the saudi -- the saudis and others are reacting, a ten-nation coalition is reacting. and saudis are making preparations to hit that iranian proxy on the ground. we know that qods forces and other iranian agents have helped organize and topple that government, and now that the iranian regime is crowing about

it, other countries in the region are taking action. and this is complicating the circumstances here. in other words, iran is very much complicating the ability in the region to get some stability. political reconciliation in baghdad must be central to u.s. policy. the committee will be interested to learn what the administration is doing to press prime minister abadi to ensure he doesn't become former prime minister maliki, a disastrous sectarian. and we'll hear today our u.s. strategy is focused on iraq first. that's what we'll be told. but until the meltdown of syria, what general petraeus termed a geopolitical chernobyl, is capped, until that meltdown is capped, it is going to continue to spew radioactive instability and extremist ideology over the entire region. last fall congress voted to

authorize training in equipping the syrian opposition forces. but to our great frustration, that is still not up and running. and when pressed on the path forward in syria, most administration officials seem to suggest we can figure it out later. our slow action is creating a crisis of confidence among our allies. our witnesses are here to explain the president's strategy and when the committee returns in april, we plan to hear more from the secretary of state and defense about the president's aumf request. i'll turn to the ranking member for his opening statement. >> mr. chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing. general allen, general fantini, general olson, welcome. we are delighted that we have such a distinguished array of generals to really speak with us this morning. thank you for appearing here today and thank you for your tireless service to our country.

the main purpose of this hearing is to get an update on the progress of the anti-isis coalition. and the significant challenges that remain. but we must also address the elephant in the room, in my opinion, the need for a new authorization for the use of military force or aumf. as i said again and again, this committee, and this congress have an important role to play in our foreign policy. i believe that's the case with our negotiations over iran's nuclear program. and the same must hold true when it comes to our effort against isis. congress needs to play its part. i will resist any attempt to marginalize congress fulfilling its constitutional role. by passing the new aumf, our service members, the brave men and women in uniform, risking their lives against this enemy would feel the full support of congress. our coalition partners would see if the american government is united in our commitment to

degrade and destroy this enemy. congress would reassert the important role we are empowered to play by the constitution. and we as lawmakers would show that congress doesn't shrink away from the tough decisions because if we do, we're setting the message that congress may put itself on the sideline the next time the crisis erupts and the time after that, and the time after that. that's simply unacceptable. the language sent to us by the president with the aumf isn't perfect, but i believe it is a good start. so let's work together to craft a bipartisan aumf. let's tailor it to the needs of our troops and this mission, because everything we're dealing with today is taking place under the shadow of the vital unfinished business. i know that we're talking a lot about iran these past days, as an impending agreement, the deadline for one is rapidly approaching. and talk about an aumf seems to

have faded in the background. but i believe that's something that cannot fade in the background. it is something we have to tackle and this is the committee to do so. and we will do so. generals, we look to you for leadership. and clearly explaining our strategy to degrade and defeat isis through this committee and to the american people. in my view, the international coalition has made real progress, conducting military operations and advising our partners on the ground, working to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, cutting off funding sources for isis, taking steps to stem the flow of foreign fighters, and pushing back against the toxic message of isis propaganda. this strategy is making a real difference isis is losing ground, much of its top leadership has been taken out. obviously we still have much more to do. thanks to our training iraqi security forces are improving, so they can better deal with the isis threat. regional partners are playing a bigger and bigger role in the

coalition is holding steady. but we're still facing a lot of challenges and i would like to touch on some of those today. first of all, i'm concerned about iran's growing foot hold in iraq. the iran guided operation in tikrit has faltered, but shia militants including some fighters trained by iran's qods force are playing a more influential role in iraq. what are their intentions and had how do our own plans take these elements into account? secondly, i'm struggling to see the path forward in syria. i think you know that i view our efforts to aid the opposition as too little too late and far too slow. two and three years ago i was yelling we should be aiding and abetting and providing weapons to the free syria army. what happened now through years later is the forces are barely hanging on. they have been focused on fighting the assad regime and that would be hard enough, especially with an adequate

weapons and training. but they also have to face off against isis and other battle hardened groups like the nusra front. they need more training and equipment as quickly as we can get it to them. and lastly, what more can we do, what more can we do to support the syrian people? more than 200,000 syrians have already perished in this war. nearly 10 million have been driven from their homes. this crisis has spilled over borders into turkey, iraq, jordan and lebanon. this is a humanitarian catastrophe assad has blood on his hands and the syrian people desperately need relief. so, gentlemen, i look forward to covering these issues with you. i thank you, again, for your courageous service. and i say, again, that it is past time for congress to give you the support you need for this vital mission. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. engel. this morning we're pleased to be joined by senior representatives from the department of state and defense. general john allen is the

special presidential envoy for the global coalition to counter isil. appointed on september 16th, 2014, by president obama. general allen is a retired u.s. marine four star general, former commander of coalition and u.s. forces in afghanistan from 2011 to 2013, during his combat tour in iraq he played a critical role in the awakening movement in al anbar province. brigadier general michael fantini is the middle east principle director for the office of the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. previously he served as commander of kandahar air field. brigadier general olson is with us. the deputy director from middle east joint staff strategic plans and policy at the department of defense and previously he served as the deputy commander for marine forces central command. brigadier general olson, as i understand, you'll not be giving oral testimony, but will be available to answer any members' questions.

we thank you for that, sir. without objection, the witnesses' full prepared statements will be made part of the record and members will have five calendar takes to submit statements or questions of you or extraneous materials. we would ask that you would summarize your remarks and we'll begin with general allen. >> esteemed members of the committee, thank you for providing me this opportunity to update you on the progress of the global coalition to counter isil. more broadly, let me thank you sincerely, the members of this committee, for the tremendous support that you have been giving our men and women in uniform, and also our diplomats within the foreign service at far-flung posts and stations around the world who served our country so well and we're deeply grateful for the support of this committee in that regard. a return to washington this past week after ten day visit to coalition capitals where i met

with partners in rome and ankara, berlin and finally in brussels where i briefed the members of the european union in the north atlantic council. my engagements in each of these stops reinforced my confidence in the coalition strategy to council -- to counter isil across the informational, the physical and the financial spheres in which it operates. the territory isil has lost in the increasing financial strain on the organization and the diminished morale and increasing desertions of its fighters were clearly degrading its capabilities. the so-called caliphate is under direct assault. to date, the coalition has conducted nearly 3,000 air strikes, i believe in fact one over that number last night. against isil territories. more than 1600 of them in iraq and nearly 1300 in syria. we have taken out isil's fighters, many of its

commanders, as well as infrastructure, support to its terror infrastructure and facilities and including 20 training camps, and over 200 oil and gas facilities. so as the coalition campaign began, isil lost more than a quarter of the populated territories it held in iraq. because we lack the same kind of partners on the ground in syria, the situation there is more challenging and complex. still, we're working closely with regional partners to establish sites for training and equipping vetted moderate syrian opposition elements in order to train approximately 5,000 troops per year over the next three years. syrian opposition groups to counter isil continue to make strategic gains, expanding west and east from kobani and retaking territory from isil. coalition air strikes against isil in syrian territory continue to degrade isil's sanctuary and limit its freedom of movement and military capabilities as well as its capacity to resupply its efforts in iraq. in iraq, coalition air power supported many iraqi security

force led operations and we're actively supporting the training of iraqi forces at four training camps where nine iraqi army and three peshmerga brigades are being or will be trained and equipped. coalition is planning to build on this initial success as well as to prepare to meet a set of critical challenges in the months ahead. as isil is defeated in the population center and military forces must move on to their objectives, there will be an immediate need for policing and public security efforts to set the conditions for essential services and delivery. populations that have fled the flighting will need shelter and assistance and security until they can return home. in many cases facilities have been destroyed or made insecure by improvised explosive devices and providers will need to rapidly assess and respond with basic medical care, with water and electricity and other municipal services. as a successful stabilization

effort begins with fair treatment during military operations, we applaud iraqi leaders including the grand ayatollah saeed ali sistani who called for the protection of civilians and warned against acts of revenge and recrimination or abuse. and i might digress by saying it is worth reading his 20-point code of conduct that he issued last month with regard to the fighters in the field to liberate iraq. it also means protecting the schools and hospitals and water treatment facilities and securing antiquities and libraries. these measures begin the process of reunifying iraq and building trust between the liberated communities and the government of iraq. these critical stabilization efforts were at the center of my consultations last week in baghdad, and on the first day of the meetings we heard from the iraqis about their need to plan for idp return, support ied removal and provide services and expertise to assist with stabilization efforts. on the second day, a team of experts and coalition members

met with their iraqi counterparts and discussed iraqi plans in greater detail. throughout my meetings, i emphasized that iraq's stabilization efforts will be the most important signal of the intentions of the government to fulfill its goal of rebuilding iraq for all iraqis. we know from experience that these kinds of essential services are delivered nor effectively and efficiently when sequenced and planned early on with military operations and civilian cooperation. we also know this, stabilization operations require significant resources. we as a coalition will work together to assist and support iraq as we are able to. but we do not have the resources to support all of iraq's needs, nor can money alone, whether from the iraqi budget or the trust fund, or from any number of partners achieve the full effectiveness of that appropriate prioritization, planning and sequencing. from baghdad, we travel to berlin, for first meeting of the coalition stabilization working group. there under the leadership of

german and other governments we convene a dozen coalition partners to identify specific areas where the coalition can support the iraqis and establish a shared understanding of what we hope to achieve. the working group on stabilization is just 1 of a 5 coalition working groups coordinating coalition activities on specific lines of effort. including military support counterfinance, countermessaging and efforts to stem the flow of foreign fighters. among coalition members disrupting the flow of foreign fighters it is an urgent concern and rightly so. partners are working together to make it more difficult for their citizens to fight in syria and iraq through criminal justice reform and enhanced border control and better intelligence sharing. 18 coalition partners have passed new foreign terrorist fighter legislation over the last six months in order to stem the flow of fighters traveling to the region. more action is being contemplated. in fact, just this week the italian government broke up a

ring of smugglers, of foreign fighters, operating between italy and albania, the ct operation flowed from the use of information as a result of our coalition actions, and prosecution of those individuals will flow from legislation as a result of our coalition actions. we must continue to improve how we harmonize border and customs processes, track potential and actual fighters en route to the battle and share intelligence with partners. this kind of information sharing and creative thinking between partners is also vital in meeting a related and similar urgent challenge, containing isil's access to financial support. here the coalition made gains in synchronizing practices to block isil's access to banks, both region and globally. this includes stemming the flow of private donations and limiting isil's financial options by restricting the ability to generate oil revenue. we're now expanding the efforts to be counter isil's access to local and informal financial networks. there is also broad consensus

among partners in the coalition counterfinance working group, which met for the first time in rome last week, that we must closely examine any financial ties between core isil and terrorists linked to isil throughout the region. we're also beginning to better prepare ourselves for isil's violent messaging. last month the president announced the creation of a new joint operations online center with the uae where we will collaborate with regional partners who take on isil in the online information space. efforts like these to sount -- counter violent messaging were to take on isil's recruitment capabilities and efforts to generate revenues will endure long after the defeat of isil and will support long-term u.s. counterterrorism goals. the united states and coalition partners are also supporting thecounterterrorism goals. the united states and coalition partners are also supporting the united nations efforts to provide food aid and supply critical assistance to protect vulnerable women and children and men in an attempt to limit the suffering caused by isil's excesses and advances. best way to protect vulnerable communities from isil's barbaric campaign of death and terror is

to degrade and defeat the organization, militarily and ideologically over the course of several years. president has outlined a framework for authorities he believes will be necessary to pursue this campaign with his formal request to the congress with the authorization of use of military force against isil. the aumf request foresees using our unique capabilities and partners on the ground instead of through long-term, large-scale deployment of u.s. forces. at same time, the president asked for flexibility to fight an isil -- an enemy, an adaptable enemy, one that hopes to expand its reach and capabilities well beyond the borders of iraq and syria. as the president said, the world needs to know we are united in the effort against isil. we're strongest as a nation when the administration and the congress work together on issues as serious as the use of military force and the new aumf will prove that we stand united against this threat. a powerful message of support for our leadership with our allies and our coalition and a powerful message of defeat for isil.

taking the fight to isil also requires our close coordination with this committee, and with the congress so that we can constantly evaluate our tactics and strategy and that we are resourcing them appropriately. this hearing presents an important opportunity to continue that important dialogue with the congress and coordination and consultation. and i want to thank you, mr. chairman, and ranking member engel for calling this hearing. and permitting us to appear before you today and i look forward to taking your questions. thank you very much. >> thank you very much for your testimony. we now go to general fantini. >> mr. chairman, ranking member engel, members of the committee, thank you for having me here today. i will briefly describe our efforts that we are undertaking to counter isil in iraq and syria and as general allen mentioned, the u.s. strategy to counter isil is a whole of government effort supported by a broad international coalition and includes multiple lines of effort across the government to

counter this threat. the department of defense has lead responsibility for denying isil safe haven, and building partnership capacity. this means conducting strikes against critical isil assets and supporting our partners on the ground. principally the iraqi security forces and vetted syrian opposition. under the denying safe haven line, to deny isil safe haven the coalition has conducted approximately 3,000 air strikes including more than 1,600 in iraq since august 8th, 2014. additionally over 1,200 strikes have occurred in syria since december 23rd, 2014. we have taken out isil fighters, commanders more than a thousand vehicles and tanks, over 200 oil and gas facilities. we've taken out isil fighters, 2,000 fighting positions, check points, buildings, barracks in

both iraq and syria. as a result of this effort the coalition has arrested isil's momentum, degraded its ability to mass and maneuver forces and pressured or eliminated its leader cells and disrupted its supply lines. overall we've put isil on the defensive in iraq. under building partnership capacity, countering isil will not be possible without our local partners in the league to build partnership capacity in iraq the u.s. and coalition partners are supporting the government of iraq in its efforts to strengthen and reconstitute the iraqi security forces by assisting with training, equipping and advising iraqi security forces. this includes kurdish fighters as well as sunni tribes. last summer we stood up a team to parter in with local forces and earlier this year we began training iraqi security and kurdish forces across four sites in iraq. i was able to visit tagi site recently and saw firsthand the partnership that we have undertaken with our iraq forces. with the help of congress, the

quick train fund will enable us to train three peshmerga brigades and nine iraqi brigades that was mentioned by general allen as well as tribal and sunni forces. under the syria train and equip in addition to our efforts in iraq we are working with our coalition partners to build the capabilities of the moderate syrian opposition. with training of the first class that began later next month in april, the goal is to train vetted syrian recruits to defend the syrian people, stabilize area under opposition control, empower trainees to go on the offensive against isil and promote conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in syria. our partners in the region, including saudi arabia turkey, qatar and others have offered strong support to host and quickly stand up the program. u.s. forces in the region strengthen our partner's abilities to fight terrorism locally.

it will be with the iraqi security forces and syrian fighters who will serve to secure the gains against isil and inflict a lasting defeat. we look forward to working closely with you and we will continue to keep you and your colleagues informed. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much. let me begin first of all, general allen, from a purely military point of view, is the current military strategy -- is the current military strategy to defeat isil deficient in any way? >> well, obviously as the strategy unfolds we know it's a long-term strategy. we'll keep a very close eye on the progress. we'll evaluate the resources against our expectations. again, as the strategy unfolds. as i watch the pieces of this come together with respect to

the training, with respect to our enabling with respect to our fire power and fire support provided to the iraqi security forces, it seems to be unfolding in a manner which i think will be successful in iraq. so we'll keep a close eye on this and obviously we'll remain in close consultation with the congress on the issue of resources. >> let me ask you if i could, two days ago i chaired a hearing on the increase of anti-semitism in europe. ambassador robert lauder who is obviously a former assistant secretary of defense for european and nato policy testified. he is also the president of the jewish congress. he said there were thousands of young european muslims that left to fight with radical muslims in iraq and syria. there's a fear they could have returned bringing the bloodshed with them. some have returned and we have seen the consequences. he referred to the increased attacks on jus throughout europe especially where radical muslim elements appear. to what extent are we examining the threat of returning muslim

extremists to the united states, not just a threat to europe, but to the united states. i noticed in your testimony, general, you talked about how the coalition members are trying to disrupt the flow of foreign fighters. you made a very cursory reference to some of the things. i know you can expand upon it. you mentioned 18 coalition partners have passed new foreign terrorist fighter legislation and so on. this is a rear guard the likes of which i think we have never seen before. your thoughts on that and what can we do to mitigate the threats in the u.s.? >> you've put your finger on one of the greatest threats ultimately of the -- of isil as it exists today. it is a threat in iraq, it is a thread in syria and the region. the return of fighters is a threat to our homeland and the homeland of our partners as we have seen tragically in places like ottawa and in sydney, paris, koeppen haggen and brussels, and other places. so you are correct, this is a real issue for us.

that's why there is in fact a working group with an entire line of effort within the u.s. strategy as well to stem the flow of foreign fighters. it begins by dealing with issues at home where we have encouraged through best practices and consultation and exchange of information where nations will work with at-risk populations at home with clerics, teachers, with family members, with tribal leaders in those populations in our coalition partners homes. >> is there recognition, if i could interrupt, among our partners that jew ares at heightened risk? >> absolutely. absolutely. this is, of course, an issue, the anti-semitism that has arisen from this. this an issue that the jewish population is at risk. but more broadly than just the jewish population, it is the security of these countries. so they are fixated on this, gentlemen. >> if i could, many of us have noted with a great deal of dismay the president's earlier dismissal of isis as a j.v. team, the equivalent of, we've seen this happen on a number of

fronts. i held a whole series of hearings on boko haram and tried desperately to get the administration to declare boko haram a foreign terrorist organization. went tries to nigeria. where to where firebombing was occurring in churches. it was as clear as the nose on my face that boko haram had a global -- not a global but more of a regional terrorist mindset. we seemed to not have assessed the scope, lethality of the threat. it's part of the coalition of the 60. is nigeria part of that? you know, again, to my dismay and shock and many others, all of a sudden we walked away last december from helping the nigerian government combat the very real threat that they're facing with training, with vetted -- lengthy vetted individuals. it all can be done, it's a matter of political will. if you might speak to that and finally, very quickly -- because i'm almost out of time --

general dempsey had pointed out that the security of the iraqi forces and the iranian support i should say, is a positive thing in military terms. then said we have to think what happens when the drums of isil stop beating and what about this -- the idea that we need an inclusive government in iraq? that seems to me to be a very far-away dream and not likely to happen. if you could speak to boko haram especially. >> boko haram is obviously a great concern. it has put its hand in the air to be a what they call distant province of the caliphate. they have ultimately established a relationship. so i certainly commend your having held hearings on this issue, because it is a very serious issue. nigeria is not a member of the coalition, but i am traveling to nations around the world and trying to explain the nature of isil and the nature of this threat, which is through franchises, local franchises expanding. >> if you could look to include

them as well as other countries in africa which are al shabaab, all the other threats that are being faced. deeply appreciate it. i yield. >> thank you, mr. smith. i want to talk a little bit in the beginning about iran. you know, we're negotiating a deal with them. they continue to be a bad actor all over the middle east and yemen. it appears that the iraqi security forces with the help of outside militias, including shia militias, were making gains in tikrit. what has been iran's role in this operation and what is the united states' current role in this operation? >> i don't think we have a full and complete picture on iran's role. there seems to have been some

organizational support to the shia elements in the popular mobilization force, potentially some direct fire support as well. how much command and control they were exerting as opposed to how much the shia militia elements, the pmf were exerting, i think remains ultimately to be determined. the u.s. role with regard to tikrit has to be considered in the larger u.s. role across all of iraq. but your question is an important one. as we watch the operation unfold in tikrit we established a very close relationship -- not established, continued our close relationship with the combined joint operations center. our conversation with the iraqi military leaders and political leaders continued. as the operation unfolded prime minister abadi and members of the iraqi security forces requested a u.s. and coalition support for the final phase of the operation ultimately to

liberate the city of tikrit. that began and i don't want to get into a lot of the operational detail to the benefit of the enemy who's listening to what we're saying, it began by the provision of information and key intelligence, but as i think, mr. engel, you saw last night, a large number of well-targeted and precise air strikes went in and are beginning to support the iraqi security force operations that are unfolding right now. it's specifically as a result of the request of the iraqi government and the iraqi security forces to assist them in tikrit. >> well, is it in the united states' interest to save what i call a failing iranian strategy?

i worry about iran's role in iraqi military operations because what does that portend for the political future of iraq? >> i don't believe at all that we're in our efforts at this moment saving or attempting to salvage a failed iranian strategy. the intent of course is to support the abadi government and support the iraqi security forces in the deliberation of a not insignificant urban center and population center with the idea ultimately of driving daesh out of the province. i recently met with senior leaders from that province and last week across iraq met with senior iraqi leaders. they're very keen on our role. our role across iraq and the role in the restoration of iraq's territorial integrity and sovereignty but are very keen on our role now to support the iraqi security forces in the final assault on tikrit and the liberation of that population center and that aspect of

saladin province. >> let me turn to the aumf because i think that's very important. the administration sent an aumf. i was one of the few people who thought it was a good aumf. i didn't like at it as a finished product. i looked at it as a jumping-off point. i think it invited some very important things. some in congress have called for a very broad ground aumf. how should ground troops be perceived in the countries in the middle east and by other coalition partners? would a large deployment help or hinder our goal of degrading and defeating isis? >> that's an important question. as i try to respond to questions like that i always try to start by saying the operational environment will clearly dictate the recommended or decision making with respect to what the

force will look like. if it is a major emergency, one that requires some significant number of troops, then that operational environment i think will be one that is clearly discussed with capitol hill and our congressional partners obviously to ensure that we're all of one mind on this issue. absent a specific emergency or absent an operational environment that would seem to require a large infusion of american troops i think we have learned now after many years and have discussed and consulted with, it may have a destabilizing effect. we are quite good at training indigenous forces and employing very precise special operations forces, either in support of indigenous forces or if necessary, in terms of direct action.

so there are many options for the commander in chief, whoever that will be, and there are many options that can be discussed and consulted with with the congress on our options. but i think we now know over many years now of experience in the region that the presence of large numbers of ground forces can sometimes have the reverse effect of our intention. which is to stabilize. it can sometimes destabilize the social fabric. so we need to be very conscious of that. that's why i think the aumf is important in that it gives us the ability to empower and enable and support indigenous forces, national forces to achieve the goals which otherwise foreign ground forces might have to undertake. it is a very important question. >> thank you. thank you very much. chairman rohrabacher. >> thank you very much. i'd like to thank our witnesses. thank you all very much for being with us today.

general allen, your last point about large deployments sometimes actually destabilize rather than stabilize the situation. it was very well-taken and i hope that my colleagues understand the significance of that point. and to the degree that you have outlined a strategy that does not require large -- a large deployment of american troops on the ground is something that i think we should all take very seriously, make sure we see how it works. this is a strategy that does work in the long run. let me ask you about letting the -- mobilizing the local forces, which is what you're outlining for us today. you were involved with the anbar

province and the efforts there? >> deeply involved, sir. >> okay. so are the sunni tribal forces that enabled you to succeed there, are they currently involved in the struggle against isil? >> anbar remains very contested at this moment. >> that's correct. >> i've met with many of the shiites of anbar. some of them have their tribal sons in the fight right now. without exception, however, the shiites that i've met from al anbar have said when the opportunities presents itself they will in fact join the iraqi government to oppose isil. >> general weren't these forces you were talking about were the most effective forces that we had when we were actually -- had large deployment there? weren't they actually the best forces? and what you're telling me now is those forces are not at play? isn't that correct? >> i like to think that the

marines were the best that we had at our hands. but i take your point. the environment was really dramatically different at the time. it was a contested area where once the tribes were properly supported by us, they were able to turn on the enemy. >> general, pardon me. my time is limited here to ask questions. >> of course. >> however, let me just note for the record that i -- looking from a distance, it seems to me that the reason these tribal forces that were so important to your success with an earlier strategy are not at play now is because the administration is insisting on a strategy that is based on keeping iraq together rather than working and deploying the forces within that region into the fight against isil. >> if i may comment. >> yes, sir. >> i've been to al assad airbase

just recently where i saw u.s. and coalition special operators training the tribal forces. it is the full intent of the iraqi government to leverage, and they now have about 7,500 or so tribal fighters on the payroll, to leverage the tribal fighters ultimately to do much of the same thing that we were successful in doing in '07. it is an intent of the iraqi government. >> i understand it's their intent, but the fact is that these tribal leaders don't trust the intent of the iraqi government and because of this -- by the way, i wouldn't either if i was in their spot. >> what about the kurds. you mentioned there are kurdish fighters that you are very high on, level on, then you've mentioned of course the sunni tribal leaders that we're talking about. where are the shiites? isn't this really the problem is

that when we come down to it, the shiites are not doing their part in this? >> this is a really important question and it's a bit complex, and i'm going to take a stab at it recognizing the time. >> yes, sir. >> last year when daesh entered iraq and we began to see the route and what ultimately looked like the loss of baghdad and points south, the grand ayatollah sistani called for the rallying of all iraqis to the flag. not shia but all iraqis to the flag, ultimately to help defend the country. at the time for obvious reasons many of those individuals who were able to get to the flag frankly were the shia elements and they were organized in something called the popular mobilization committee, of which we see in the field today popular mobilization forces. they are not -- they are not

hezbollah with the close ties to iran. i think we need to be very nuanced in how we look at them because these are organizations that were filled last year with young men that came from the tribes in the south. they were teachers one day and they were fighters the next day. they were bakers one day, they were infantrymen the next day. they came to defend their country. the fact that they organized in shia organizations -- and there is about 80000 of them, or so. the fact that they organized in shia organizations has been ultimately to stabilize the situation, and then participate conceivably in the counter offensive. it is not an intention, sir, that these groups remained permanently established. it is the intention ultimately of the iraqi government that elements would be subsumed under the national guard concept or they would be disbanded and go home. they already ceased paying

20,000 of them to go home. so the shia are in fact involved here as an irregular force in a military organization that has played a role. >> has played a role. but again, underscoring the basic point that we just went through. these are not the -- the ultimate fighters that we have to rely on are now -- are really the kurds and the sunni tribal people. i believe in the strategy that you've set out. i believe it will work, but only if we are not hampered by the idea that we're going to keep iraq, which is an artificial entity created by the british a long time ago, make that our number one goal rather than defeating isil which supposedly is our goal. thank you, general and thank all of you. >> chair recognizes mr. deutsch. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i wanted to continue this line of questions about the shia and

iran and sistani's popular mobilization forces. i want to actually start with the news about our strikes in tikrit. the coverage in "the new york times" today included a paragraph that said, if the americans did not engage, they feared becoming marginalized by tehran, in a country which they had spilled much blood in the last decade the official said speaking on condition of anonymity. is -- if you could speak to the strikes in tikrit, the air support that the united states is providing, is it different than the support we have provided in the past? and is it being offered in part because there were concerns about being marginalized by the iranians? and in answering that question it gets to the broader point of the, again, same article, the preponderance of the 30,000 fighters on the iraqi side members of the militias fighting alongside the iraqi soldiers and

policemen. of those 30,000, how do we, general allen, following your last response, how do we view it in a nuanced way to distinguish between the iranian backed militias and sistani's popular mobilization forces? >> congressman, i think the answer to your question is, no. we work by, with, and through the iraqi government and so through the iraqi government and the iraqi security forces the iraqis came back and asked for support and we adjudicated that decision to the highest levels and decided to engage there. it's within the iraqi interest and the coalition's interests to be successful in tikrit because we don't want to have another success for daesh or isil. and we anticipate that the

support that we're providing, the iraqi security forces with the minister of defense -- with the ministry of defense in charge of the command and control of that operation, that we're in a position that we can provide that support to be successful. >> with regard to the command and control, the -- there's a difference between the role of the traditional shia elements that are aligned directly with iraq and supported directly with iraq and those elements of the pmf that have provided a larger force posture and a larger force generation capability. they are not -- they don't intend to be or are not intended to be a permanent part of the iraqi security force entity. they are viewed as a temporary organization that have played the role ultimately of blunting and halting the forward progress of daesh and as we continue to build out the capabilities of

the iraqi security forces across the board, we can provide you i think significant detail about the forces that are engaged right now in tikrit. it's actually quite encouraging to give you a sense of when the pmf elements are going to be in play and when they won't be in play and as we continue to force generate the regular forces, they will play an increasing role ultimately in the counter offensive ultimately to liberate the populations. >> carolyn, are you confident that the iraqi people view this action in tikrit as one taking place against isis by the united states through airstrikes and iraqi security forces or is it viewed as one that is a

combination of u.s. air strikes and iran any and shia backed militias? >> that's a good question. we -- again, from my time on the ground just last week there, i made an effort to meet with the provincial leadership in the saladin province in which tikrit is the largest population center. at the time the leadership in saladin and even recently have talked about focusing on the liberation of tikrit and have applauded the role of american forces in supporting the central government and the iraqi forces in liberating tikrit from daesh. so my sense is on the ground in saladin, their view is that the united states, as we have done in other places, multiple other places in iraq, are providing the enabling to the use of information and support to command and control and

ultimately firepower that will facilitate the iraqi government and security forces in liberating this population center. my sense is at least the key sunni leadership -- the speaker the vice president and others -- but also the sunni leadership of saladin have been clear that they support role of the united states in this particular fight, sir. >> mr. chairman, i just hope that that translates then down to the iraqi people as well and i yield back. >> thank you, mr. deutsch. chair recognizes the gentleman from alabama, mo brooks. >> i pass. >> chair recognizes david sisilini. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you very much for being here, general. you said, general allen, that you -- in response to a question you said i think we'll be successful, and you said in iraq, sort of emphatically. that caused me to wonder whether you had a different assessment with respect to the region or outside of iraq.

>> the pieces as we have assembled them in iraq, i foresee those pieces achieving the strategy that we have laid out for ourselves which is ultimately to we have laid out, i foresee the territory of iraq and the sovereignty of the country. with respect to syria, that situation is going to take longer. the training and equipping program again with great support of the congress is just ginger to receive trainees and begin the process formally of training elements of the new syrian army. and as those elements are introduced into the battle space. as we continue the work of working closely with the syrian moderate opposition the syrian opposition coalition. i just met the president last

week, the -- there is not the clear partner in syria that there is in iraq, there's not the governmental entity that there is in iraq. and so it's going to take more time obviously, and we're going to have to evaluate that strategy as time goes on. >> thank you general a shiite militia detroit a sunni village it it indicated that dozens of orvilleages were significantly targeted. how can we monitor retaliatory actions and will will include iraq's sunnis as their only protectors, what are we doing to

mitigate that, and what are the reconciliations because of iran's involvement. >> there have been excesses, they've been horrible i think we saw very quickly that the iraqi government condemned those and has initiate edd those to be accountable. that's an important first point. those excesses have been condemned by the iraqi government, those excesses have been condemned by the grand ayatollah, and it was part of -- because of that, it was part of the reason for his issuance of the 20.code of ethics, code of conduct which would be recognizable to all of us in uniform as something that would be admirable to be followed by anyone who's involved in combat

operations. so that's what i would say is the first part. the tribes the sunni trishs that i still remain in close contact with, and i had a conversation with one just this morning, the shiite have made it clear that they are willing to give this government and iraq a chance. the prime minister body has reached out the sheik's the tribes, he unlike his counterpart, who victimized the sunni tribes and the sons of iraq, he has also establish eded i think in an unprecedented way, relationship with the sunni governments in the region. he's been to visit the king of jordan. he has a close relationship with the turks he's going to be invited ultimately to visit the kingdom of saudi arabia shortly. he and his government have had close relations. so there's a regional relationship with the sunni

governments. there is a governmental outreach through his own government through his national security adviser adviser, and through his own personal actions to the sunni tribes in an effort not just to recruit them into the fight -- but also to establish the mechanisms and the environment in which reconciliation can occur. and i -- you know i speak frequently with the sheiks of these tribes and there isn't one of them who sees that isil is in some form or another an alternative to the central government of baghdad. there just isn't any. that may have been an issue last year, it may have been an issue around the invasion by dash in june of 2014, but the tribes with whom i have long relations and the sheiks with whom i maintain contact there season the one of them that sees the presence of dash as central to the government, they have told me that they believe that prime

minister abaddi is someone they can give a chance to. >> thank you. the chair recognizes gentlemen from texas randy weber. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general allen how many of those tribes and sheiks are there? >> i'll take the question, sir. there are many. in anbar, i think we tracked in '80, there were as many as 60 tribes and sub tribes. there are mult ial tribal confederations, the zobai, there are multiple tribal confederations. >> how many of them do you stay in contact with, you've talked to a number of them. >> i talked to ten or 12. >> and they have significant populations. >> case, and earlier, you said that grand ayatollah had a code

of conduct, i believe, that had 20 items on it? >> 20 points yes. >> where do we -- where do you -- >> i'll leave one with the committee. >> perfect. >> okay. >> do you view -- what do you think the chances are that when this is all said and done however long that takes that iran winds up with the country of iraq and they'll be in charge. >> i don't think that's going be the case. >> you do not? >> i do not think that's going to be the case. in the end, iraq is an arab country. while a large element of iraqi population shares a confession within the faith of islam with a large population in iran, they are a different people. >> what percentth of the fighters would you guesstimate is iranian guard or iranian and -- let's go to shiite and sunni and even the kurds could you divide that up for us?

>> no, i can't. we'll take the question. >> the preponderance now, the majority now in the battle space are shy eat militias that are of the popular mobilization force i described before. some smaller number of them are the direct iranian allied hez hezbollah and that type of group, we can provide you, i think, some pretty good fidelity on that. and then, of course, our focus is the iraqi security forces their counter terrorism service. and the training of the tribes as well. >> would you guesstimate that that's the total force of 100,000 or 200,000? what would you guess the fighting numbers are? >> i'll ask my military colleagues for that number. >> okay. >> general olson? >> congressman, there's about 90,000 fighters in the ministry of peshmerga. there have been as many as

80,000 militarized for the grand ayatollah. for iraqis under arms, there's a significant shiite population in the iraqi armed forces. both the counter terrorism services and the regular armed forces. about 80% of the iraqis in uniform are shiite. >> and what number would you put on that? >> i'll have do get back to you with an exact number of iraqis under arms. >> would you guess 10,000 to 80,000? >> it's upward of that sir. >> okay. and what is our current guesstimate on isil forces in iraq. >> the number is varied, i would defer to my intelligence committee colleagues about their best guess estimate of the current figures. i've seen figures as high as a couple dozen -- thousand, i've seen figures much lower than that. i think that's a better question we can get back to you with a detailed classified answer.

>> and are you guys watching the budget negotiations up here. >> it's okay to admit you're watching them. >> my portfolio on the joint staff does not include being mindful of budgetary restrictions. >> how many -- we don't call them boots on the ground. i think we call them advisers, but how many advisers do we have in iraq. >> the total force in iraq is up upwards of 3,000 americans. advising and assisting the iraqi counter parts and providing the basic security and life support. >> are you confident we have enough money in the budget to prosecute this war now, and in the next 2 to 3 years? >> currently the operations are being funded to a level that's appropriate for our current level of effort? >> and if you could come to us with an aumf, would you own it

for three years or longer. >> chairman dempsey has testified that the current aumf is important to support the strategy. >> thank you, i yield back. >> thank you, mr. weber. the chair recognizes the gentle lady from florida. >> thank you for your service to our ken country. i have a couple questions, first, relates to the underlying conditions that led to the rise of isil. would you agree that isil is not the cause of the turmoil in the region, but a symptom of a much deeper problems and i'd like to get your opinion, is it unstable governments, poverty, desperation, radical religion what? i'd like to get your take on that. and secondly, i think