liddy greatly at the time and he snapped. he looked at mitchell and said general, i can assure you this is a good operation and these are the finest girls from baltimore. it was that kind of conversation. i never believed mitchell would approve that. i was surprised when a second meeting -- i did not inject myself any further. mitchell had said gordon, when he put a million-dollar price tag on this. mitchell said that was high and we are interested in the antiwar movement. his plan for the antiwar demonstration was quite incredible. he said we will kidnap the leaders of the antiwar demonstration. we will take them below the mexican border and keep them out of commission during the campaign. i later talked to a lawyer for the antiwar movement and he said what liddy did not realize about that plan is a number of those

guys would have loved to be drugged and taken below the border. that was the ilk of this plan he envisioned that included everything from using prostitutes to gather information to wiretapping. it was a whole illegal plan. i did not think mitchell would give it a second look. liddy did revise it down to, i think, a quarter of a million dollars. it was a half a million the next time. i went back and i was not planning to attend any more meetings. i have now realized that i went to haldeman. i was able to document from haldeman's calendar years after the fact and long after this was available -- i went to haldeman twice on this, once after the first meeting and said it was absurd and went to him the second meeting and said this thing has to be cut off. i only testified to going to him the second time because that was the only one clear in my mind.

haldeman knew i had been in there twice to talk about this plan. i was invited back by mcgruder the second time, went up the elevator. have been been in the department i knew how to bet into the office. the meeting was in progress i heard them talking about wiretapping and targets and all that. i threw pretty cold water on the whole thing, i said these things should not be discussed in the office of the attorney general which mitchell later said in that ended the meeting. i was dumbfounded to later find that a month or so later, magruder and mitchell meet in florida and approve the liddy plan. it did not take me long to put the pieces together that they had gone forward. i had gone to haldeman after both meetings. after the second one which i

testified about, i remember haldeman said to me that you should not involved in this at all. >> haldeman had a representative at these meetings, didn't he? >> it was magruder. >> not in the meetings with mitchell but strong was the liaison with the re-election committee and talked to magruder many times a day. he's aware of something i'm not aware of. and looking at some of strom's notes, his political action memos, he was aware that liddy got hired and got an intelligence plan up and going. straun has testified a number of times in a civil lawsuit i brought that he is not clear and has no distinct memory of it ever being approved to have the

illegal activities in what he has told me. he said i just did not focus on it. it. it. he saud the whole -- we should probably spend more time talking about this. the whole haldeman staff and the way they operated, it was very efficient but it also was not very thorough. it made sure that the trains were running on time but not always very careful about which direction they were going. so, but that is a whole other explanation. you could have the impression that straun might've known more than i thought he knew. he knew about intelligence gathering and he knew he was a wacko but he had also probably knew i had been taken out of it and told not to be involved. >> to jump ahead, after the break-in, the second one, straun

comes to you like on the 20th of june and what does he say? >> he said he has cleaned his files. he said at haldeman's request. obviously, what this means -- you can read it as well as i can. i try not to get too much into supposition because i don't know what was in there. this is where i come from on this -- it's difficult for me to believe that haldeman and nixon did not know there was somebody over there with that capacity. i have never found any evidence they knew someone was going to break into the watergate. i don't have any evidence he knew they got in there the first time and screwed it up and were going back in a second time. the fact that somebody was over there doing that could not have surprised anybody when it surfaced.

you've been watching american history tv in prime time. part two of the interview with john dean begins shortly. and every weekend on c-span 3, 48 hours of people telling the american story. eyewitness accounts of the events that shape american history. american history tv all weekend, every weekend on c-span 3. and our primetime presentation continues tuesday night, a seminar on the closing of the civil war in 1965. the that begins tuesday at 8:00 p.m. eastern, right here on c-span 3.

john dean joined the nixon white house in july of 1970 as counsel to the president. coming up next, part two of a two-part interview with mr. dean. he talked about the fallout from the watergate break-in. and talks about his eventual sentencing. the richard nixon presidential library conducted this interview. >> tell us when you heard about the break-in. >> i had been in manila giving a

speech for a graduation speech for a bunch agents that had been trained by the dea. crossing the dateline is always a body twister. i arrived in san francisco, and feeling just jet-lagged badly. and i called my deputy, and said i'm going to stay in san francisco, rest today, and come back tomorrow. this is on a sunday night. he said, there's been some activities here that you should know about, you should come back. and fred wouldn't say that if it wasn't serious. so i flew back met with fred, who lived down the street from me in old town. and he tells me about the arrest at the dnc. and my reaction immediately is

colson has gone crazy again. the next morning, magruder calls me says it's liddy. he said, i can't talk to liddy, you have to talk to him. and i learned from liddy, the same men he used working at the white house doing the ellsberg break-in are sitting in d.c. jail. to this day, i don't think the coverup would have ever gone where it went had it not been for liddy's bungling tracked back to the white house. if it had been just in the re-election committee, they would have cut them off and let mitchell sink or swim on his own.

but because ehrlichman is involved in the ellsberg break-in, he blames liddy and blames ehrlichman for it. and mitchell is denying the fact that, well, i shouldn't say deny. when haldeman asked him, monday morning after the break-in, john, did you approve this mitchell said he just stone-faced him like the question hadn't been asked. and it wasn't until a year-plus later that mitchell has approved the liddy plan. just as magruder testified. >> what is your job?

what are you supposed to be doing when you come back from manila? >> i learned quickly and realized it could cost the president the election. and white house aides, young haldeman, if not the president i don't know who-all is involved. they bring me in slowly into the thing that is sort of, haldeman and ehrlichman take charge immediately. i'm invited to the second part of a meeting, and i can tell nobody is really sharing anything. and my former boss from the justice department asked me to come back to the justice

department with him and talk to him. because liddy has gone out over the weekend while he was playing golf at burning tree, and told him, and just blurted the whole thing out. these are my men, they were arrest arrested, we have serious problems. so he's told the chief law enforcement officer, who's compromised. he asked me to meet with peterson. and the men heading the criminal division, who i know well. and i've had heart to hearts with peterson, as well. when the white house was leaning on people not to be arrested in the labor movement. he said, they don't understand what an fbi investigation is, it

comes to my office, you don't turn off a prosecution you can't put a fix in. it just won't happen. you have to tell these people to back off. which i did. and i had these heart to hearts when people had done things they shouldn't be doing. but peterson he wasn't just being stupid. i tell peterson because i know about the ellsberg break-in and other wiretaps i know about. caufield running a wiretap on nixon's brother, and ehrlichman running a wiretap -- >> you know this before the break-in. >> so i just know we have a disaster on our hands. so, i talk to henry peterson. i say, henry, the fbi has by this time made it a federal case. they have come in after the

arrest initially, it's a local burglary. electronic equipment found, which makes it a federal case. and peterson is in on the case. i say, henry, listen i don't know all the details of this. and i obviously wouldn't be in a position to tell you if i did. but i don't believe the white house could take a wide-open investigation by the fbi. if the fbi agents start coming in there following this lead after this lead, i'm thinking about what i don't know is national security or not national security this break-in to the psychiatrist office which krogh is calling national security. and it's real trouble. henry says john, i will tell you this. i, the fbi and the department of

justice is going to do a very narrow investigation. we will only investigate what happened at the democrat headquarters at the watergate. >> are you winking back and forth at each other? does he know the implications? >> to my knowledge, peterson never obstructed justice. he spoke with the president later, after i had broken ranks. you have to draw the line somewhere, because i'm dealing with the authorities. it's not much different than a lawyer going in to tell, informally you talk to prosecutors. he could have said well, i don't believe any department of justice, probably in any era

would feel they have the where wherewithal to investigate a white house. they work for the president. peterson served at his pleasure. he happened to be a career guy. i'm not trying to obstruct justice. this had been something on my radar for a long time. had i been trained in criminal law, which never occurred to me. now, today, after i realize it's essential. it's very essential in the nixon administration. post-watergate someone with prosecutorial experience on the staff. it's a sad commentary.

but i knew you couldn't lie, and do things like that. and i was very distressed by the hush money and tried to say this wasn't a good idea. but higher powers than me are making these calls. henry is playing it perfectly straight, and i think he just did intend, and in fact that's all he did do, make a very narrow investigation. but they started picking up all kinds of other stuff the fact these burglars had cash in bank accounts in florida they had been laundering money for liddy for him to get back into the campaign. it just opened up a can of worms, it just kept unraveling each day a little bit further. i always hoped that nixon would get out in front of it. >> when did hunt get on your

radar? >> i met him once in colson's office. hunt recounts two times he said that colson introduced him to me in the hall once. i didn't remember that, i remembered meeting him in the waiting room area of colson's office. i had never had any dealings with him in fact had very few dealings with liddy after he went over there. i said he could have all of my files, but i found that gordon wasn't much of a lawyer, but fortunately he got someone else in that was competent to handle. >> when did you get involved with the hush money? >> the hush money what liddy claims he told me when we met on monday morning that he needed

funds for, a commitment, someone had made a commitment to him to take care of his people. that how did i know he was going to screw it up and take care of his people? and bob had moved over as mitchell's assistant, he said a commitment had been made to take care of these people. and they were in trouble, they needed money to live on needed lawyers. it wasn't initially hush money but it soon became evident, if they didn't have a way to sustain themselves, they were going to have to talk. so, that's how that evolved. >> when do you first talk to the president after the break-in? >> i think the first time, other

than i'm in there for some -- just, you know, will signings or other unrelated matters is in september, the day after the indictments come down against hunt liddy, and the four cuban-americans and mccord, who had been arrested inside the watergate. nixon is pleased that the case had been held at that level. and mitchell and magruder, up to their eyeballs in this thing they approved it. but the cover story that the money that was being given to liddy was to protect surrogates and do intelligence gathering of a general nature has held. and liddy and his men aren't talking. so, you know what's interesting some of the cases that actually some of the burglars had their

cases reversed by the court of appeals in the district of columbia. they had a legitimate right to rely on hunt's representations that they were doing this for the president. which tacitly gives you authority. >> and august 29th the president's public statement which surprised you, making mention of the dean investigation. >> well, he was asked by the traveling press corps why he wasn't appointing a special prosecutor to look into it because of potential conflicts of interest. he said there's no need for it and congress has a number of committees investigating it and

the general accounting office was investigating it and the s.e. s.e.c., and my own lawyer has been investigating it and nobody in this administration was involved. this was the first time i had heard of that and when he made that announcement, ziegler said can i have a copy of your report for background? i said there's no report. i don't know who put that in the president's ear, or he just dreamed it up but there was never a report from me. and after that, there was a great deal of pressure to write such a report. and i refused. when haldeman asked i said, i

will get everybody to write an affidavit, and summarize it, but he knew as well as i did the problems with this. but there was never a dean report. >> so, you meet with the president in september -- >> incidentally, on the report it was a shrewd move if i had done it. the thought was, the president would be able to pull that out of his drawer and say, listen, this is all i ever knew. and i relied on my counsel. so, i wasn't going to lie to the president about it. and i wasn't even thinking in those terms. but when i realized the way the game might be played as we were getting towards the shorter strokes, i was very glad i hadn't written that report. >> it would have been used

against you. and you now, whether you like it or not, are the intermediary for extortion. >> yes, the next time i get a direct request, about march 19th or 20th of 1973. and i'm dealing with the president on a fairly regular basis. after the president wins his re-election overwhelmingly we wants watergate to go away. wants it to stop. it's taking too much time of haldeman and ehrlichman to deal with it. so deal with dean, he knows everything about this and can keep you abreast of it. i don't know how much they have or have not told him. i've never looked back to construct that. but i had the impression they

hadn't been fair with him, keeping him away ofre of the problems. they're up to their eyeballs with their own problems. so i try to start educating him. by the time i get the first direct request from one of the lawyers at the re-election committee, who has met with hunt's lawyer, comes in after the break-in after the democratic national committee brings a lawsuit, he's one of the civil lawsuit attorneys. he meets with hunt, and gives him the message to give to me if hunt doesn't get paid his money, something like $120,000 he needed two days ago he's going to have a lot of things to say about what he did for

ehrlichman. that's, to me, this is the first time i get a direct money request. that, to me was the end. i said, that's it. just happens that krogh was over that afternoon. and i said, bud, i have to tell you that i'm about to blow this up. i'm sorry that people are going to be hurt but it's getting too far, there's no end in sight. and i'm going to try to get the president to put an end to it. and i come in on the morning of march 21st to get his attention i told him, after a little introductory chatter, there was a cancer on his presidency. it was consuming, and getting worse. and i figured he had to do the surgery. oftentime, i went in he had his feet up on the desk and you talked to him around his shoes.

but both feet were on the familiar after that chat. and lynn said, did you prepare those remarks? i said no, this was just a summary of the high points. i give him the gist of everything. and nixon would later rely on that as his defense. i've listened to that tape, and it was very clear to me what i was trying to do. trying to hit him with a fact about how bad things were. bud krogh believes he committed perjury when he was nominated for secretary. and when i tell him about krogh's potential to be charged with perjury, he said, john, perjury is a tough rap. it's hard to nail somebody for

perjury. he's got answers for everything. and when i say that these guys want money, and who knows how much. he said, how much could they want? and i pulled at that point, what is it, the spring of '73, i said a million dollars. just trying to take what i thought would be a rather ugly, awesome number not knowing if that's the amount or not. his response was that's no problem, john. i know where i can get $1 million. and i know after my meeting, we went to see rose in her office and said how much money do we have in the kitty? he was prepared and had the frame of mind, we had to pay them off. he would later claim, he didn't give an order to do so.

and i don't think he did, because it was handled by the re-election committee. >> would you like some more water? >> yeah. >> well, of course we have a tape of that meeting. but we don't have a tape of what happened afterwards when you left the oval office that day. what happened? >> i felt that i had -- the sequence of follow-up was to bring mitchell down, and get him to stand up and account for the burglary. and hope if he would do that, that no one would look into the coverup. what happened is, i later describe a meeting in haldeman's office, mitchell came in. nobody said everything. i thought i would see one of the

great confrontations but neither of them really had the guts to confront mitchell. and there's a later meeting with nixon when he wants to know what happened. and the answer is, well, nothing happened. and was kind of humorous in the way it was said. and that's just when the modified limited hangout happened. this is what mitchell or nixon may do when you say something but don't say anything. mitchell was prepared to go down in flames if necessary. he wasn't going to stand up and be accounted for. >> if you were the desk officer in charge of the coverup, who was the general in charge? >> it was mostly haldeman.

mostly haldeman. >> do you think he felt vulnerable? >> he had to make documents disappear. which would track back to him. haldeman, i believe, was aware of that as well. they just knew it was a huge disaster. but they thought that p.r. was the answer. i tried to dissuade them of that. he didn't want to hear it. i said well, john you better listen. we're on the other side of the law on this. >> what role do you think the president played in the coverup? >> well it wouldn't have

happened if he didn't want it. he knew very well. you go back he bases his defense on my march 21st conversation conversation, said before dean came in, i didn't know anything. some of my conversations before march 21st are highly revelatory. that's his defense. so, when the tapes come out that he has talked to haldeman within days of the break-in about using the cia to block the fbi investigation, it decimates his defense. so, he's clearly involved all the way along. i've never made an effort, because i don't think they're all available, but somebody someday will construct what

nixon's knowledge was along the way. what happened is i go, pat gray somebody else i know the head of the civil division of the justice department when i was there. so, you develop a working trust with people. which he didn't have for ehrlichman or haldeman. so i go over to gray calls me over after they've done some preliminary information. he says john this has to be one of two or three things. it's either the re-election committee authorized this, and it's a bungled operation but one of the other strong things that we're very troubled about

is the fact that howard hunt, an ex-ci ex-cia guy, all three of the cuban-americans have cia ties. he said, we suspect this may be a cia operation as well. i was reporting back to both haldeman and mitchell. when i give that report that evening to mitchell, he says to me john tell haldeman i hadn't brought him up to date. tell haldeman to call dick walters and tell him to tell the cia to go over to tell the fbi to stay the hell out of this. so, that's exactly what i did. i report to haldeman this is what mitchell suggests. and haldeman would go into the office and tell the president that. and the president not only tells him how to do it, but better

than mitchell could have suggested. >> tell us a little bit about what you did with hunt's safe in the white house. >> well there's a little misunderstanding on that. i didn't do anything dramatic at all. right after the -- when colson says that hunt has an office he's on the payroll i thought he was off, and i'm going to clean that up with personnel. but there's a safe in his office that's locked, and nobody has the combination. i believe today that colson's secretary, hunt did give him the combination. but colson says lord knows what's in there. but hunt dropped down to my office and said to my secretary, my safe is loaded.

ehrlichman says, to have the whatever procedure you use to open that safe, that happens when i'm gone. and the safe is opened, my deputy fred fielding is there. and they bring the contents a gun, some diaries, papers what have you. just dumped in my office. and fred says, the doctor's office is right across the hall. let's not touch the stuff without surgical gloves on. that makes sense to me. and we get gloves and start going through the papers. there's a lot of things about the ellsberg break-in there. hunt letters from his wife and drafts of letters to her.

i believe, i've never known this for a fact. she may have been a cia agent as well. at a time when women were few and far between in the ranks of the cia. so it there was an address book and a lot of other things. and the other thing in the safe, a big attache case filled with electronic surveillance equipment. wires, bugging devices, what have you. and we find out, mccord had given hunt this. he had come over to the white house after the arrests at the dnc. stuck this into his safe. and i turned, you know, i say to

ehrlichman, what the hell are we going to do with this stuff? the fbi is going to want this sooner or later. he said, john you drive across the potomac every night. put it in the poetomac. i said, i can't do that. we turned it over, give the rest of the stuff, or what i thought was the rest of the stuff, to pat gray in two envelopes. he's called over by ehrlichman. and he says, this stuff should never see the light of day. it should be kept in whatever secure file you have. and then the white house can say, we turned everything over to the fbi. much later, we learned that pat gray, on his own initiative, i was there, i don't know if anything was said to him.

he destroys all that data. two envelopes, puts it in a burn bag, and burns it with christmas wrappings in his open in connecticut. this is clearly obstruction of justice, but he didn't get nailed for it, because he claimed, again he had been told. to the best of our knowledge none of it related to the watergate break-in. there was a stack of cables from the state department, i gave to david young, there was one in there that showed that hunt was playing cia forger and making the kennedy administration if not the president himself responsible for the killing of d.m. during the time he was president of south vietnam.

that assassination. there were some memos relating to that trying to peddle it to people in the media. so, there's a lot of really troublesome stuff. not any of it related to watergate. i'm not sure if it was obstruction. obstruction of justice is a crime which nailed most of the people involved in watergate that i know a lot more about today than i did then. but it's still as fuzzy a crime as a prosecutor has in his kit. it's pretty much anything that you don't give the prosecutor that he wants. or he thinks may be somehow relevant or find in his interest

to be a very serious crime. and you just can't, i don't see, you know, how, when you get into a situation where the politics are such high-stakes at that level, that you would expect to turn over, the kind of data that would have destroyed richard nixon and call that obstruction of justice. >> let me ask you about the enemies list. >> that's one of the things that got vastly more attention than it probably deserved. i certainly hadn't planned to testify to it. -- he and i had had some conversations. he knew there were some collections, i guess. and as i tried to explain to the

senate when i revealed this information, there was a man named george bell who was anything sort of a tough guy. mild-mannered, very successful businessman, working on a dollar a year basis for the white house. just volunteering. and colson said to gather the names of the people that were less than our friends. and got shortened down to the enemies list. it started out with the people we don't want to invite to white house functions and expanded. then there was an enemies

project to try to screw these people in essence. so, i learned by going through files at haldeman's aides, they're the ones that are constantly putting pressure on me to come up with the so-called enemies project. i wrote a memo that i put into the report during the senate hearings on how to screw our enemies, was the title. i used it and it was as blatant as possible, that it was ridiculous, but haldeman loved it. i learned i was almost fired, because one of the things i had made it clear, the counselor's office had nothing to do with it. maybe you can get someone to take it on.

but i had no interest in it, and didn't think it was the right thing to have our office doing. so, i was passing the buck. but the names that actually appeared before the senate, there were a hundred or so names. they were just collected, bell had come up with i had this file full of them. when i narrowed the project down, i went to colson and said who do you think should be our top ten? and he gave me the top ten, knowing what the project was going to be. it never went anywhere. got in a modified form with fred malick and his trying to not make sure that no people who were less than friendly to the white house got any federal

contracts. there was an effort to lean on the irs to start tax audits. and finally, they insisted, because i knew him, the commissioner was johnny walters. and i told him listen you can handle this request in any way you want. but this is what the white house wants. it's something you may be uncomfortable with. i wasn't pushing him, these are people they want tax audits on, they think are people that have earned them. and i said, you handle it however you want to. i've done my task. and he left and apparently he took it up with george schultz. who vetoed it, to nobody's

surprise. one of the conversations i had with nixon, i think it was the september 15th 19th conversation, whatever it was. he said he was expecting better out of schultz than he was getting. but i knew he wouldn't buy into this. and almost 99% sure that walters wouldn't do anything with it. and i learned before i had been there that they had had open access to irs files when a guy who was a sort of a special counsel title, may have worked in ehrlichman's office, or a freelancer. but a well-known, established sort of super-ethical journalist, he was going to go in and look at irs stuff and was

getting a lot of irs files over. we didn't do that in my office. caufield pulled some tax returns. >> and roger barth was involved. >> i was going to say that, ehrlichman had a guy that was very friendly to the white house in the irs named roger barth. he was able to get several audits, one of them larry o'brien. >> tell us a little bit about your role in the it and t story.t story. >> i had very little to do with the itt matter.

i had been away on a foreign vacation when that erespect respectrespect respectrupted in the press. all the business about the memo and the settlement of the itt case. i was out of town. came back in, and it was the hot subject. the most memorable moment of my involvement, when they wanted to prove that the memo to the boss that anderson had gotten ahold of was a forgery. it was not really from her and she had not really written it. i was not aware that howard hunt was putting on wigs and meeting with her in a denver hospital. fred from my office was covering

meetings more than me. but at one point, i was asked to go and meet with hoover to make sure they did the right thing about this forged memo. i had met with hoover in other meetings, but i had no rapport with him. i went to his office, and there was the storied director standing at the end of a glass table with his reflection in it and he said, come over and tell me what your problem is. i did, and took it under advisement. and he said, i'm not very fond of jack anderson. and it was a story that anderson had broken. he said i have a couple of small dogs, and we put down

paper in the hall every night for the dogs. and they do their business right there. and the housekeeper puts the papers in the garbage can out back. and i saw one of anderson's men going through my trash in the morning. and he said, it's lower than dog shit to get information. and he was being dead serious. i took that as a sign we may get a favorable ruling on this memo. but they came back and said, no it was not a forgery. so, that was basically the extent of my involvement. >> was there a connection between the choice of san diego and the decision not to pursue the anti trust? >> i don't know the answer to that. i do know that of course, dick,

when he would be nominated to be attorney general, lots of questions would come up about itt. and peter flanigan was being called as a witness and they weren't going to confirm him unless he testified. and nixon was very strong on executive privilege. and nixon was very much of eisenhower's frame of mind. and when i talked to flanigan i realized he didn't have anything to hurt the white house. he didn't have any harmful information, and was willing to testify. so, we made an exception, and flanigan went up and testified. but -- also testified, and per

perjured himself to get the nomination. >> and beard, her recollection was an honest recollection? it wasn't -- >> as best i can tell, it was an honest recollection at least her take on the facts. as i said, it's hard, the fella that headed the anti trust division mclairen, a very straight shooter. it's hard for me to believe he would have put in the fix unless he had a question about the case. so my antenna never particularly got quivering on that business. but it was effective, and why it plays in the bigger picture, it's how effective larry o'brien was in absolutely hammering the nixon white house with the fact that, of this picture of corruption, they were settling

anti trust cases getting all the money from itt to go to san diego, even though it was changed to miami. but that fit in the larger picture, when o'brien was targeted. they were looking for information just to discredit him. that's why nixon was hammering ehrlichman to get a tax audit on o'brien. >> caufield is following o'brien in '71. >> yes. >> they're getting ahold of his itineraries, they seem to be taping him. who was in charge of that

operation? >> that would be haldeman. because nixon doesn't like o'brien as a democratic spokesman. and nixon is still up until the last minute very distressed and concerned about having to run against teddy kennedy. >> who would be the desk officer in haldeman's operation for this? >> it was spread around. higbee, strong haldeman, he had morning meetings every morning in his office. the senior staff meeting and he would meet with his own senior staff. ray price myself fred malick. bill timmons, some others.

and these things would be shepherded around. so i can't recall ever, you know anything of an illicit nature coming up in those meetings. >> i was going to say you would think that would be closely held. >> it was. and ehrlichman was the one particularly giving the instructions to caufield. he was picking up the phone. and it's hard to separate haldeman and ehrlichman. and he would say, we need to get something for the boss on o'brien. >> and in the book you refer to the tickler. what do you mean by that? >> well there was a tickler file. it's a time-dated file, someone puts a date ahead to look ahead

at that date and see if something is due. and if it isn't, send a tickle memo out and call and say where is that, and keep the file going. it's a good management technique. captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2008 captioning performed by vitac