lost sight of that. so i'll close again put my war fighter hat back on. you can say what you want about missile defense generally or about the system or about the cost and the expense. and we used to banter this around in the cheyenne mountain on a lot of cold, dark nights on alert and doing an exercise or for real world contingency. and often times we would sort of come to the conclusion, what is it worth to us? is it worth seattle? san francisco, or los angeles, or increasingly now colorado denver heartland of america. potentially in the future eastern seaboard boston, new york, washington, d.c. is it worth the investment in these systems to pretend -- to protect what we value the most.

that's our homeland, our way of life. i think the answer my personal answer is yes. and so i'm an optimist about this. not without our challenges. we continue to deal with those challenges. we've got the best and brightest people. i can tell you. i wish you could meet a lot of them. phenomenal people working these issues. i'm really proud to work with them and be their deputy director. i'm humbled to do that. they're doing some really important work. and i thank you all again for your contribution to this debate debate. look forward to your questions. thank you very much. >> we're going to open up the questions. >> i think we've heard now repeatedly just how much the -- how much the conversation's changed in the past decade and change. that it's no longer a question of whether, but how and what way

and talk about if you walked through just many of the systems that we're actively deploying. i guess one word that didn't come up is sequestration, that 13-letter word. and given everything budget wise, i wonder if you might, first of all elaine, speak to the relative weight given to the missile defense mission that you feel in the pentagon. and perhaps you might weigh in for mda's priorities in answering that. >> i'm not sure i'm objective because i am the nuclear defense policy. so i spend a lot of my time on missile defense. but having been in broader meetings on setting budget priorities in the demag and so forth, there is a lot of emphasis on missile defense and the pentagon. there's, as we've said a lot of combatant commander demand for the regional missile defense. there's a lot of focus on

whether -- it is a high priority mission. it is a balancing act, as i said, we have to constantly reassess priorities where are we on technology development where are we on fiscal constraints. following through, combatant commanders who want more can't cut the seat cord that's a balancing act. you see that balancing act in the request for the missile defense project. and that's at the president's request level. cuts just hurt. they hurt all the way across. it's the old story. >> so, as you mentioned, it's and all of you know, you know, resources aren't aplenty.

so we've got to make careful decisions and choices about where we invest within the work that we're doing at the agency. so we obviously get our guidance from the department. so our priorities fall into the lump the broad sum of homeland defense and maintaining our commitment to european phase adaptive approach. within those sort of subcategories, i would say that clearly the work we're doing for gdi reliability, the work that we're doing in the upcoming flight tests the work we're doing with rkb as i mentioned, falls at the very top. >> discrimination, making sure as this threat matures and evolves, we've got the ability to outpace it. and we are concerned about a growing threat. and new capabilities to try to outmatch what we've got today existing. so for homeland, i would say gbi reliability discrimination as

well, at the very top. and again, maintaining our commitments to the european adaptive approach. and i think we're in a good place for all of that. all the while thinking about seed corn technology. never losing sight of bmds. >> is it outpacing us? >> we are outpacing the threat. we are ahead of the threat. yes. >> i would agree with that. i would say that sequestration, which you mentioned briefly is a dangerous thing. and my boss has testified he used these words. he says, should sequestration come to pass and we're forced to take curtts in the program has the potential to be outmatched or overmatched i think is the word he used. that's of concern. but to answer your question we are outpacing the threat. >> all right. well, why don't we take questions from the audience. we've got some microphones going around. i see one at that back table.

i think that's bruce. why don't you identify yourself and go ahead. >> hi i'm bruce mcdonald, adjunct at john's hopkins. and i'm doing a study with the federation of american scientists. i've been to china a couple of times in the last few months. and thaad got a nice mention here. and it'll be no surprise up there, that in china we hear a lot about thaad. and we say, listen we have no problem with the interceptor, but that radar, that gives them a lot of heartburn. and so my question to you i worked missile defense for a long time, what is the right response to that issue that is raised about why china -- they're worried that the thaa d'rayd radar -- what's the right way to respond to that? i have to say my response i

just covered. i said, listen if we wanted to go after china, we would be deploying our missile defense forces differently than we are. you can be sure. what's your perspective? what's the right answer to give the chinese on that? >> first, i need to clarify. you're talking about u.s. deployment potential u.s. deployment of thaad in south korea. >> yes. >> and i want to make it clear that while that is something that the u.s. forces commander usfk is interested in because it would provide defense for certainly for u.s. deployed forces and south korea. we have not had formal consultations with rok about our deploying for that. so the concerns are a little premature. that's one. two is that the threats from north korea are why usfk

commander would like to look at that. and so it's north korea that drives this. and i think any decision if we do have consultations with iraq on this would be for the u.s. and iraq to decide. so this is not about china. >> nothing else? all right, right here. wait for the microphone? >> good afternoon i'm charles newstad from the news department. i'm not speaking for the department at all. this is just me the physicist in me speaking to you. and my question is this. given that mr. putin is

increasingly behaving like he's the dictator rather than a more benign russia we saw during the gorbachev et cetera era. how can you be so sure that we don't need to have defense against russian missiles? or for that matter defense against the china which has tremendous capability. admittedly they're saying no first strike. what does that mean? and admittedly they appear to be on a somewhat reasonable course. but that could change instantly. and how are we prepared to respond to that? >> there are a number of ways you can deal with other countries having policic missiles. it's not the only way. the soviet union when it was the soviet union had many ballistic missiles. we had a missile defense system,

it was not about defending against soviet ballistic missiles. that was about detouring the use through the threat of nuclear retaliation. so if you look at countries where it's feasible to have a homeland defense and countries where it's not feasible. russia, i think, falls in the not feasible. given the capacity the numbers as well as the sophistication of their ability to develop countermeasures, the sophistication in many ways. the same can be said of china if it wants to be able, it certainly has the economic capability, the technical capability. and so the question becomes how many gdps would you like to

spend on it? countries like north korea, iran, where, again, there are multiple reasons. one is more limited capabilities, less sophisticated capabilities that you can't foresee staying ahead of. how much confidence do you have in your ability to deter a tax on the homeland? all of these we're talking about homeland. the homeland. how much confidence do you have in deterrence. i also do deterrence. but i think if you put confidence level about deterring a tax on the homeland the larger, more capable countries, russia and china i'd put on one side. and countries such as north korea, potentially iran i would put on the less confidence about other ways including deterrence.

i'd put having less confidence there. so there are several factors in why we have not chosen to defend the homeland from russia and china. >> anything on that? all right. we've got one up here. >> while we're waiting on this question, i wanted to follow up a little bit. what are the big muscle movements on the fy '16 budget that keep us ahead of the threat. this may be more for you general. discrimination, you speak a little bit to that about i know you talked about it briefly. and gave us an insight into how you might feel about sbx a little bit. but what are some of the other big muscle movements? >> yeah, i think i probably touched on them. but, just sort of repeat.

big muscle movement. the long range discriminating radar as you mentioned. we're doing some things in technology i think, that will start to change course, the course a little bit. we can't wait until we're, you know, the threat or we're behind it to catch up. we're doing things to try to stay up and you'll hear more about that in a moment. those are probably the biggest parts of the works we're doing. >> very good. >> hi, if the iran deal does come to fruition, would that change any of our plans for the homeland missile defense? and would it stay the same? would it give us more leeway for scheduling things further out? >> first, if iran we foresee

will continue to deploy ballistic missiles, but they're not nuclear armed would be a good thing. almost everything, well, everything we're doing for the north korean threat in any event. and we do have protection fou against north korea as the threat could be even if it becomes operational. and iran. it might affect future, how you go forward in the future. >> it's a very good question as this thing develops. i would argue that it might make missile defense broadly more important. we outpace the threat stay ahead of the threat. we were concerned about a breakout capability. i'm not going to speak to the policy piece of the treaty itself.

but we can't, you know, take this as our pencil's down, we've got a breather now. we've got to continue, i think, to forge ahead. iran has the largest short medium range ballistic missile inventory in the region. it's a regional threat as much as well. i think it ups the ante in the game rather than allows us to relax at all. >> charles in the back and then right here. >> tom, thank you, charles ferguson working with bruce mcdonald on his project looking at china missile defense. i was recently in china about a month ago. my question i'm thinking about outpacing the threat. and could we imagine the scenario where north korea and i've been there a couple of times. i talked to north koreans. they're very proud of rocket developments they don't call it

missiles, obviously. but that's the way we look at it. could you imagine a time in the future where their threat is so advanced, they have advance capability including countermeasures, because of the things they could deploy against us. where it might become cost prohibitive for us through further and further defenses. and such that china enters the picture and china gets worried and china says, uh-oh u.s. capability in the region is getting so sad advance to deal with the north korea threat. that's our intention. but china feels now we've got to build up. may feel they have to build up because of india developing further missile capabilities. i guess my question about you is, are you playing out these scenarios, thinking about -- there could come a time it becomes so sophisticated where we have to think differently.

>> always good to have your challenging questions, charles. yeah, as north korea assuming they keep advancing and advancing, we go back to what we said earlier about regional missile defense. even when you are trying to missile defense, anything north korea could throw at you. that it is not the only capability that we have. what's the role of missile defense in the overall mix of capabilities becomes an issue. it doesn't -- it doesn't assuage part of what you're getting at my interrelated, the gears that are interrelated where you're turning one gear that is response to north korea's nuclear missile programs and others are watching that,

thinking it's about them when it's not. you know, and it's that what action do you take about some problem that others then take reaction that is not what you were trying to do in the first place. you're working on complex issues there. if you get to the point where missile defense -- always a problem to talk about. hypotheticals. we're constantly reassessing what's the role of missile defense against threats and what's the role of other capabilities in dealing with ballistic missiles? you're talking about future reassessment of that issue. >> i put my war fighter hat back on. and tell you that you know, again, sitting in the mountain, these capabilities, particularly

if we go the route that we're going in terms of our programs the work that we're doing, i've already mentioned the technology work that he's going to talk about. never say never, but i'm not sure that's that achievable of a goal, first of all. for them to outpace us if you will. and as a war fighter, again what i said about a continuum of capability for the war fighter. an offense, defense mix. this is just one piece. any capability, maybe not designed to catch every single thing they could. but to sort of buy some time to make an assessment and have options, if you will. the nation would have options. so i continue to believe that we're on the right path. that's part of a larger continuum of capabilities. and i don't think we ever want to give up on the idea that we have some capability in the missile defense tool kit. >> all right. i think we'll take one more question right here.

wait for the mike. >> yeah. >> for the first and only time in history, i attended the 35th reunion of the graduates of the science high school in 1970. and this is, i call it learning trips. okay. and this is what i learned because they're assessing, because i'm an american okay. and this is a reminder to me by my -- joint chiefs and economic minister remind the americans that to us zero based budget is zero, nothing. we don't have anything to spend at the end of the year. so that means you know -- >> all right. >> that's easy, but i retired from the navy. >> let's keep it on missile defense. >> good-bye. >> thank you very much.

>> we have about seven minutes before our next panel. we're going to have frank rose secretary of state and steve from brookings and we'll be back in about seven minutes to continue our conversation for some international dimensions. thank you very much. thank you both of you. >> thank you.

so as you heard, there will be a short break in this discussion on missile defense and technology. and we'll continue with live coverage in a moment. while we wait for it to resume, we want to let you know that utility officials are trying to figure out why a maryland power plant exploded that led to

widespread power outages across the district and surrounding suburbs. the white house and state department were affected along with the smithsonian museums. about 8,000 customers here in washington were affected by the power outage. while we wait for the discussion on missile defense to continue we'll show you an interview. a short time ago, we spoke with oklahoma congressman steve russell about his first weeks in the house. >> steve russell is a freshman representative a few months into the job. is it what you expected? >> i think the legislative pieces are. i served a term in oklahoma. kind of got to see how the sausage is made. and whether you're playing junior varsity or pro, the rules in the stadiums are about the same. one's bigger. in terms of the dynamics i

think the surprising thing has been a lot of the division and gridlock that we often get accused of, it's surprising it's not fomented by us. it's outside groups that seem to profit from that division. and dust it up to raise money. >> how do you fix it? >> i think you fix it by the american public. they have such a low opinion of congress. and yet, most people like their particular congressmen or congresswomen. the things that we are trying to communicate back. if they're in contradiction. whichever it might be, maybe take the information that we have and realize that there's

some truth behind it. >> walk us through your routine. oklahoma is not the easiest place to get to from washington, d.c. how often are you in washington? what's your daily routine here in d.c.? and then when you go back to your district. >> well, oklahoma city it is, you know, in the middle of the country. and it does take time to get here. i will typically be hereo home. some weekends there's just things to do. if there's a particular large bill that's going to be in mark-up in committee, and 600, 700 pages long. that takes time to read. i try to do the due diligence. other times i was a national speaker for eight years with premiere speakers bureau and traveled all over the country. and i still do some of that, although the rules have changed. on what that is. i still get around.

i was from missouri this past weekend speaking. so i won't get home every weekend. but i try to get home about two weekends a month. >> let's talk about you. why did you decide to run for congress? and when did you first think of public office? >> politics has been a surprising path. i retire edd in 2006. i've been deployed 3 out of 5 years. so it was pretty hard on my family. my oldest daughter at the time was a -- she was a senior in high school. and so i took the last chance. did a lot of veterans advocacy work, traveled around the country, trying to take my personal story to convince people to back our troops while they were fighting rather than bickering about it. let them get it done. and in the course of that, that

gathered the attention of politicos and others and party officials and before i knew it i was approached to run for state senate in oklahoma and ran in 2008. i did a term there left in 2012 under my own volition. and did my own business. and i wanted to pursue that in my book and my speaking. coming to congress was not on the horizon. it was a result when dr. tom coburn decided to retire early. in doing so it vacated oklahoma's fifth district. and i looked at it i could see a path to get there. i don't want to look back on my life thinking maybe i could have helped my country and didn't try.

i thought win or lose, i'm going to try. people of oklahoma sent me here. it's been a real honor. >> you come from a long military tradition, the army in particular. talk a little bit about that. and also, why you decided to begin your career in the military. >> well, my ancestors go back all the way to the revolution serving in uniform. my sixth and seventh great grandfathers were captured in 1780 by the british and were imprisoned in detroit until the treaty of paris. and they you know, were eventually released, and then all, nearly every major war since that time on one side of the family or the other. i always wanted to be a soldier. most of my family were not career soldiers. but they did serve. my brother served eight years in the navy. it was just something that in our family, it was always an interest.

it was always a topic of discussion with relatives. and so anyone that knew me as a child would not be surprised that i became a soldier. >> where did you grow up? how many in your family? and where did you go to college? >> i grew up in oklahoma. as far as we can ascertain, i'm the only federally elected congressman ever to come from del city. it's a small suburb of oklahoma city. and i have an older sister and then an older brother. he's in the middle of the three of us. and i had a four-year army scholarship, an rotc scholarship. and that allowed me to be able to afford to go to college. got a degree in public speaking and debate. and never thinking i would ever use it for a living.

something i enjoyed. and so it turned out to be a good decision on many levels. i met my wife there. we've been married, it'll be 30 years this year. and embarked on a military career. >> what's the key to being a successful public speaker? and what's your approach? >> i think a lot of times the most effective speakers are those that can relate. >> about not too finally disaggregating homeland and regional missile defense. of course, the capabilities go beyond that. but this panel's going to be on the international dimensions, in part working with allies. and to begin this discussion, we're going to first have assistant secretary of state frank rose who is always flying somewhere to talk about these issues. followed by ambassador steve piffer to talk about other things, as well.

we're going to start with assistant secretary rose. >> well, tom, thanks very much for that kind introduction. and it's actually good to be back here in washington. by the way of introduction, my name is frank rose and my work at the state department is focused on enhancing strategic stability around the world. arms control verification, compliance are some of the tools that we use to enhance strategic stability and reassure our allies and partners that we will meet our security commitments. missile defense is another tool to do that. at the state department, i'm responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense issues, including missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners around the world. in this capacity, i serve as the lead u.s. negotiator for the

missile defense basing agreements in romania turkey and poland. so i'm pleased to be here today to discuss our efforts at enhancing missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners. one of the key goals from the 2010 ballistic missile defense review or bmdr. now, you have already heard about our missile defense policy and operations. so, instead, let me focus my remarks on three areas. one, the significant progress we have made in implementing the european phase adaptive approach and nato missile defense. two, cooperation with allies outside of europe. and three, i'll conclude with a few points on russia and missile defense. before i do that, i do want to reiterate one point that you undoubtedly heard from elaine and ken. the president's fiscal year 2016

budget protects and enhances our important missile defense priorities such as european phase adaptive approach and reflects the high priority we place on these efforts. as such the u.s. commitment to nato missile defense and the sites in romania and poland remains as former secretary of defense chuck hagel said, quote ironclad. with that, let me take a few moments to discuss where we are with regards to overall implementation of the president's european phase adaptive approach or epaa. and the united states' national contribution to the north atlantic treaties organizations missile defense system. in 2009 the president announced that the epaa would, quote, provide stronger smarter and swifter defenses of american forces in america's allies. while relying on quote capabilities that are proven and

cost effective. since then we have been working hard to implement his vision and have made great strides in recent years. i just returned from turkey and romania last week and had the opportunity to discuss our progress with these two key partners. turkey was the first to receive in phase one with the deployment in 2011. at the same time, we began the start of a sustained deployment of ballistic missile defense. capable ships in the mediterranean. with the declaration of interim ballistic missile defense or bmd capability at the nato chicago summit in may 2012, the radar in turkey was transitioned to nato operational control. additionally spain agreed in 2011 to host four capable ships

at the existing naval facility as a spanish contribution to nato missile defense. in february of last year the first of four missile defense capable ships, uss donald cook arrived in spain. a second ship joined her last june. during 2015, two more of these multi-mission ships, uss porter and uss carney will forward deploy. these multi-mission ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, training exercises, and support u.s. and nato operations, including missile defense. currently, we are focused on completing the deployment of an egis ashore site in romania as part of phase 2 of the epaa. the support for the timely completion of the arrangements needed to implement this deployment in romania's provision of security and its

infrastructure efforts have been superb. in october 2014, the u.s. navy held an historic naval support facility establishment ceremony at the missile defense facility at the air base in romania. this ceremony established the naval facility and installed its first u.s. commando. currently, this site is on schedule to be completed by the end of this year. and when operational, the site, combined with bmd capable ships in the mediterranean will enhance coverage of nato from short and medium range ballistic missiles from the middle east. and finally there is phase 3. this phase includes a site in poland equipped with the new sm-3 block 2a intercepter. the site is on schedule for deployment in the 2018 time frame. for example, this the

president's fy '16 budget includes approximately $200 million for the establishment of this site. the interceptor site in poland is key to the epaa. when combined with other epaa assets, phase 2, a phase 3 will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all nato european territory in the 2018 time frame. so as you can see, we are continuing to implement our president's vision for stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses in europe. i would also like to highlight the efforts that our nato ally, of our nato allies to develop and deploy. of three nato countries are deployed in turkey under nato command and control to augment turkey's air defense capabilities in response to the

crisis on turkey's southeastern border. voluntary national contributions are the foundation of a missile defense system. and there are several approaches allies can take to make important and valuable contributions in this area. first, allies can acquire fully capable bmd systems possessing sensor shooter and command and control capabilities. second allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key ballistic missile defense capability. finally, allies can contribute to nato's ballistic missile defense capability by providing essential basing support. such as turkey romania poland and spain have already agreed to do. in all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is nato interoperatability. yes, acquiring is, of course,

good in and of itself. but if that capability is not intereperable, then its value is significantly diminished. it is only through interoperatability, and enhance nato bmd through shared battle space awareness and reduce interceptor wastage. let me now turn to some of the other regions of the world. the united states in cooperation with our allies and partners is continuing to bolster missile defenses in other key regions such as the middle east and the asia pacific in order to strengthen regional deterrence architectures. in the middle east we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through such as the recently established gulf

cooperation council or gccc strategic cooperation forum. at the september 26, 2013, strategic cooperation forum, secretary kerry and his counterparts reaffirm their intent first stated at the september 28th 2012 strategic cooperation forum to quote work towards enhanced u.s. gcc coordination on ballistic missile defense. several of our partners in the region have expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems and some have already done so. for example the united arab emirates or uae has contracted to buy two terminal high-altitude area defense or thaad batteries when operational will enhance the security as well as regional stability. the uae has also taken delivery

of its patriot pac 3 batteries, which provide a lower tier point defense of critical national assets. we look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperatability with our gcc cooperators in the coming months and years ahead. additionally and separately, the united states maintains a strong defense relationship with israel and our cooperation has resulted in a comprehensive missile defense architecture for israel. the weapon system, and the arrow weapons system in conjunction with the united states creates a multi-layer architecture design to protect the israeli people from varying types of missile threats. turning to the asia pacific region, we are continuing to cooperation through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships. for example, the united states

are working closely together to develop the 2a interceptor which will make a key contribution to our european phase adaptive approach as well as being deployed in other regions of the world we also recently completed the deployment of a second antpy2 radar into japan which will enhance the defense of the united states and japan. and finally we're continuing to work on enhancing between u.s. and japanese forces which will be aided by recent changes to the defense cooperation guidelines, which we expect to be completed soon. we also continue to consult closely with our allies in australia. for example as a result of u.s. australia foreign and defense ministerial consultations over the past year, the united states and australia have established a bilateral missile defense working group to examine options

for potential australian contributions to ballistic missile defense. additionally, we are also consulting closely with the republic of korea as it develops the korean air and missile defense system, which is designed to defend the republic of korea against air and missile threats from north korea. the republic of korea recently announced it plans to purchase patriot pac 3 missiles which will enhance its capability to defend against the north korean ballistic missile threat. finally, let me say a few things about missile defense and russia. prior to the suspension of our dialogue on missile defense as a result of russia's illegal actions in ukraine russia continued to demand that the united states provided legally behinding guarantees that our missile defenses will not harm or diminish the strategic nuclear deterrent. these guarantees would have been

based on a criteria that would've undermined our ability to stay ahead of the ballistic missile threat. the ballistic missile defense review is quite clear on our policy. u.s. missile defense is not designed nor directed against russia and china's strategic nuclear forces. however, at the same time, we have also made it clear that we cannot and will not accept legally binding or other constraints that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies and our partners. the security of the united states, its allies and partners is our first and foremost solemn responsibility. as such the united states will continue to insist on having the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats. free from obligations or constraints that limit our bmd capabilities. let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense cooperation with our allies and

partners around the world over the past several years. this was a key goal of the 2010 ballistic missile defense review. in europe implementation of the epaa in nato missile defense is going well. for example, the missile defense radar in turkey has been operating since 2011. in the site in romania is scheduled to become operational later this year. in the middle east, we are continuing to work bilaterally and multilaterally with our partners in the gcc to deploy missile effectiveness. later this year the united arab emirates will take delivery of its first thaad battery. furthermore, we continue to work with israel to expand its multilayered architecture to protect it from missile threats. in the asia pacific, we are working actively to enhance our missile defense capabilities in the region. on that note we recently

completed deployment of a second missile defense radar in japan, which will enhance both the defense of the united states and japan. finally, we continue to impose russia's attempts to impose limitations on our defenses which would limit our ability to defend ourselves allies and partners. suffice to say, defense of our allies and partners through missile defense cooperation is and will remain a key priority for the u.s. government. thank you very much, and i look forward to your questions. >> great. well, first of all, let me thank css being on this panel today. it's a pleasure and honor for me to follow in frank's footsteps here. and he talked a lot about cooperation and missile defense area between the united states, europe and asia. and i'll talk a little bit about

potential cooperation that might have worked out but so far has not. i'll pick up on the last remarks about the united states, nato and russia. if you look back over the last ten years, missile defense has been one of the truly contention issues on the u.s./russia relationship. there have been attempts to resolve the issue to look the a the possibility of koongs between the united states and russia or nato and russia, thus far without success. if you go back to 2007 a conversation between president bush and president putin about, could there be a cooperative effort between washington and moscow? when the george w. bush administration plan was to deploy ten ground based interceptors interceptors. accompanied by a supporting radar in the czech republic.

has been since closed down. and also a radar under construction. both of the radars having good views of iran. but the problem, the nub of the issue was the u.s. government was interested in that idea in addition to american plans. the russian proposal was providing the radar data in place of the plans to deploy missile defenses in europe. that never really got started. the second attempt came up at the end of 2010 at a nato/russia summit in lisbon, where it concluded with the meeting of nato and medvedev where they agreed to explore the possibility for the nato russia cooperation on a missile defense arrangement to defend europe. and in early 2011, you actually had quite active dialogue including between the pentagon and the ministry of defense but also dialogues in track to the security initiative had a dialogue going on. at brookings, we were running the conversation led by former secretary albright and former

minister. and a lot of these ideas seemed to complement each other. and by 2011 there was a fairly rich menu of ideas out there as to what a nato russia cooperative would look like. and it included four or five central elements, which it seemed that most of these dialogues were talking about in one form or another. when was the importance of transparency? and that proceeds from a logical point that each side had to understand the capabilities and the plans of the other if you were, in fact, going to have a cooperative missile defense system. second the advantage of joint exercises, where there was u.s. russian experience going back to the late 1990s joint exercises as a way to develop that cooperation. third, sort of the sense on both sides that you couldn't have a single combined system. because russia was not prepared to work for a nato commander and nato was not prepared to work for a russian commander.

seemed to revolve around two independent systems that interact at key points. with nato retaining the control over decision to launch the nato intercepter and russia retaining control over a russian to launch a russian interceptor. but they would interact through jointly manned centers. one was a data fusion center, which would take data information from satellites radars on the nato side, take information from the russian side, bring it to a single point, combine it to generate a common operational picture. and then that picture would then be shared with both the nato and russian missile defense headquarters and give them, presumably, a better sense of what was happening in the missile defense environment around europe. a second center also jointly manned would be a planning and operation center, where nato and russian officers would talk about things like threat scenarios, what sort of attack scenarios they worried about and what would be the rules of engagement. in the extreme, you wanted to have a situation where if there

was a ballistic attack coming toward europe you wanted to know about what the other guy was going to do so your interceptors engaged the ballistic missile target and not each other. the official dialogue in 2011 bogged down. then you had as frank mentioned a russian insistence on legal guarantee that american missile defenses not be oriented against russian ballistic strategic missiles. that was accompanied by what russians called the objective criteria. when you ask rex it meant limits on numbers velocity of missile. make a couple of comments on this. first, i think in 2010-2011, i actually -- it might not have been hard to work out an arrangement of ten years duration that would do two things. that would limit missile defenses in a way that would address stated russian concerns

even if we did not think there was much basis to those concerns but would still allow the u.s. to do everything it wanted to do in terms of addressing a rogue ballistic missile threat posed by north korea or iran. i think that agreement, which might have been possible, was simply not doable here in the united states for political reasons. the second observation i would make is that looking towards the future, if at some point we reach a point where there's some greater degree of equivalence between missile defense capabilities and strategic offensive forces we may face a decision where we have to look at a missile defense treaty in parallel with the treaty that reduces and limits strategic offensive arms. but the point i would make is that area -- that time of equivalence is not now. we're far from it. in fact, there's a huge gap now between offense and defense. in february of 2018, when the new start limits take full effect russia will have on order about 1500 deployed missile warheads and submarine

launch missiles and the rate against that will be at most 44 american interceptors with the capability, with the velocity to attack strategic missile targets. at this point in time a missile treaty is not necessary. there was an offer in 2013 from the united states government as a replacement to look at an executive agreement that would provide transparency on the two sides missile defense forces. on current programs and also looking out ten years. the essential philosophy behind that was to give each side so much information that the russian military could look out and say, well, here's where the americans are going to be on missile defense in 2021. here's where we'll be. is that a threat? my own view is that they would conclude -- looking at that objectively, they would conclude it's not a threat. if i threat were to ee emergency room, they would have ample time to react in advance. at this point there's been no interest in that idea. the question is, where do you go next? seems to me arms control particularly regarding further nuclear reductions was fairly

stuck in 2013. and since then, you've had the crisis over ukraine, the broader deterioration and relations between the west and russia and that's only going to make the atmospherics more difficult. the question is at what point would the russians be interested in a more serious dialogue and arms control? there may be some possibilities there, if the financial burdens financial difficulties in russians continue. at some point, perhaps, as you get closer to 2021, which is when the new start treaty would lapse on its own terms, perhaps the russians will then wish to explore a successor to new s.t.a.r.t. if you get to that point will the russians be prepared for a more serious discussion, more successful discussion on missile defense that could perhaps get back to an idea of nato/russia missile defense cooperation. first it will depend on the russian attitudes. at this point it's probably not easy to be optimistic. i try to understand where russia's going on missile defense. it seems to me there may be two

or three reasons that explain their reluctance to engage in a more cooperative approach. quite apart from the general deterioration. one is i think the russians have a certain fear about american missile defense capabilities and the potential. even if they understand some of the limits of current american missile defense programs, the russians give great credit to american technical prowess and our ability to do things. when i was assigned to because this can hold up an opposing

american missile defense program as a vehicle to secure more resources for the russian s-300, s-400 and s-500 programs. finally, an additional impediment to talking to the russians about cooperation in europe is that at one level that's going to mean the russians having to accept there will be american military infrastructure in romania and poland. that's something that in general, they've opposed since nato enlargement began 20 years ago. also the ability to reach some kind of a -- get back to a more cooperative discussion with russia is going to depend on how far and how fast the u.s. proceeds on missile defense. i would argue that missile defense against a limited icbm against the united states launched by north korea or iran -- but it seems to me when you look at -- dealing with a larger scale attack such as might be moubted by either russia or china, offense still has the advantage over defense. as one example, i would note

that the plan to deploy 14 additional interceptors in alaska is going to cost roughly $1 billion. my guess is either russia or china could add 14 additional offensive ballistic missile warheads for significantly less. but at least until at some point there may be a technological breakthrough it's not immediately evident now. it seems to me if you want to get back to something like a more cooperative discussion with the russians on this, which will require moving past the difficult point in the broader relationship, reassuring the russians that our intention is not aimed at blunting a russian missile attack is going to be key to a more productive discussion. thanks very much. >> we'll keep the conversation going. i think i'll kick it off, actually with a comment about

an article you wrote this past -- maybe ten days ago or so on the limits of missile defense. it was kind of the anniversary of the 32nd anniversary. and you gave a history of how addition how the expectations are relatively modest in the big scheme of things. it reminded me of a comment by condi rice where she said what we're pursuing it's the star wars its not the son of star wars, it's not even a grandson of star wars. it's so different. in a way i'm struck by you know, why is it that the russia thing keeps recurring? why do we need to worry about reassuring russia when it is so limited, after all? let me throw that to you, first of all? and should we be having that conversation? >> i guess i would say i mean, you don't want to reassure russia for -- the reason would be to try to reassure russia is

to enable you to achieve other things. if you could find a way to diffuse missile defense as a problem, does that make it easier for russia to address things like further nuclear reductions. you've had over the last three years, i think, the russians in my view for whatever reason have concluded they don't want to proceed past the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty so they've linked nuclear forces, three or four others, but they have these linkages and they haven't moved to solve any one of those problems. it seems to be aimed at providing a pretext for why they shouldn't do more on nuclear reductions. so if you could get this to a more serious discussion, could you find a way to remove missile defense as a problem? that would be one reason for assurance. again, there might be advantages we could get back to a cooperative nato/russia. we could take an issue that's been contentious and as difficult as it would appear now, perhaps make it a cooperative development in a

west/russia development. >> i don't have too much to add to what steve had to say. i think he's essentially right. but let me go back to a point steve mentioned in his remarks about russian concerns. i would say that the russians aren't especially concerned about the u.s. level of nuclear missile capabilities. they know that 44 long-range interceptors are not going to negate their strategic deterrent deterrent. what they're concerned about is what comes next. in the fact there are no legally binding limitations on numbers. and more importantly, the potential for u.s. technology to leap ahead. i remember an interaction i had with a very senior russian general. and he was giving a briefing showing u.s. ships in the baltic shooting down russian strategic

missiles. and i looked although him and i said, general, that's a very interesting slide. can i ask you a question? and the question is this how fast are you attributing that sea base missile defense missile interceptor? he looked at me in all seriousness and he said well i believe it has a velocity burnout of ten kilometers per second. now, there has never been a missile defense or any rocket that has a burnout of ten kilometers per second. i said, well, general if you can find me a sea base missile defense interceptor that has a velocity burnout of ten kilometers per second please let me know because i want to buy stock in that company. and his response was very telling. he goes, you may not be there today, but you'll eventually get there. and that's really the driver of their concern. because, quite frankly, the russians are much more dependent

on nuclear weapons in their strategy and doctrine than we are in the united states. if you look at the history of u.s. nuclear policy indoctrine over the last 25 years through democrat and republican presidents, the objective has been to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy. it's been the exact opposite with regard to russia. from the russian point of view, missile defenses and the potential for even more advanced missile defenses call into question not just from a technical perspective but a political perspective, the viability of their deterrent. that's fundamentally what the russian concern is. >> i wonder if you might speak a little more to in a way, what -- okay, put aside for a moment where the technology might leap frog to ten years from now and that kind of world. what ought more we be doing in middle east and asia?

you alluded to that in a way the activities. how much more can we work with allies in a way to alleviate our own burdens? we're putting a good part of our own budget toward regional missile defenses potentially one might say at the expense of homeland. what can we do to boost up our allies further? >> well, i would say there are a couple of things. first and foremost, interoperaability. i talked about this in my opening statement. it's one thing to have a missile defense system. it's another to ensure he can with share information amongst our systems and with our allies. so, i think that has got to be a number one priority. and we're actually making a good deal of progress in that area. second we can encourage our allies to develop their own and purchase capabilities. i understand that we are in

tight budgetary times but i think there are useful things that we can do with our allies to -- for example, the netherlands has on their air defense the radar called the smart "l." they have announced a decision to invest several hundred million euros to upgrade that radar. so fundamentally, the more information we can share and take advantage of existing capabilities i think that is really where the focus needs to be. >> all right. any comments on that? why don't we open it up to the floor and please state your affiliation and ask the. >> i'm retired d.o.d. missile defense agency employee, but i have been working the last few

years exploring this concept of inner operatability. even in the d.o.d. it's defined as more than just exchange or sharing of information. it's the ability to use that information for operational effectiveness. so since you mentioned it a number of times and you've alluded to it when you've talked about things we tried to do even in missile defense we've done a little in the sea -- in the command and control area with russia as you know, where is the champion or the center of gravity or the interagency effort that's looking at interoperability of, say, policy, processes, as well as the i.t. where you exchange and share information? >> if i might add -- to that as well. >> yeah. fundamentally, i think it's a partnership between d.o.d. and state. i think there is a general

recognition across most senior level folks who work these issues in both d.o.d. and state that this is where we need to do a better job. and i think we have made some progress over the past couple of years. that said, is there a lot more work to do to make us effective in this area? absolutely. but are we doing things to ensure that we can share more information, number one? and, number two effectively use that information? i think the answer is yes. i talked in my remarks about the u.s./japan defense cooperation guidelines. we hope to finalize that soon. you know, one of the key elements in there, we hope, is increased ways that we can work together effectively in the area of missile defense. >> over here on the back.

>> it's coming. wait one second. >> jim, u.s. atnl and cape. i have a fundamental question. is either the ambassadors aware that the putin 2007 offer was actually a re-up of a u.s. offer put together by dr. bill frederick working for the mdo in 1997 and provided over to the russians in 1998? specifically one major motivation on the part of the russians may be we disowned our own offer. >> well, you know, i have worked missile defense cooperation between the u.s. and russia in the clinton, bush and obama administrations. and, quite frankly, despite a lot of politics, there's a certain amount of continuity in u.s. offers to the russians.

i'm not specifically aware of that specific proposal that you mentioned back in 1997, but what i would say is that across the spectrum of administrations on the u.s. side there have been very similar proposals to work with the russians on missile defense cooperation. unfortunately, none have worked because we always at the end come to the challenge of russia wants guarantees in limitations on u.s. missile defenses. and i think that makes us -- makes cooperation very, very difficult. >> and i think that goes back to the problem that you had in 2007 was the russian offer was very attractive. you know, but the price of getting access to that russian radar data would be foregoing the planned deployments of

interceptors in poland. you have to ask the question then, if you have the data that shows the missiles coming but you've given up the interceptors you really have i think negated the plan, which was provide some missile defense capability. >> richard, up in front. >> suddenly a microphone appears. thank you. so, i wanted to bridge between the points you were making and ask about the potential effect of having the epaa deployments take place at the end of this year and again in 2018 time frame and if we remain sort of consistent with our principle prance parency, this is what we said we were going to do this is as far as we're going, obviously it's threat-dependent, and over time, and i'm discounting the ukraine mess right now because that's stopping everything from going forward, do you steve or you,

frank, perceive the possibility of russia's level of anxiety might diminish as they see that we are, in fact, doing what we said we're going to do and not going to 10,000 interceptors with dbos of ten et cetera or do you anticipate the anxiety will not change despite the fact that we have been consistent and been transparent and told them exactly what we're going to do or is that a basis for maybe ratcheting down the anxiety and maybe thinking about something? because this is really designed to avoid instability miscalculation drawing responses we would think are not in our interest et cetera. >> well, i think the first question is do the russians wish to have their anxieties -- this is the distinction between the anxieties that they portray and the anxieties that they really feel. and my guess would be is that

the smarter people in the administration understand this, have a fairly good understanding of what our missile defenses can do and can't do. albeit, i think frank is exactly right, there is that exact fear what will americans come up with 10, 15 years down the road? but there's that distinction of their real understanding of what we can do and what they've chose ton portray. sometimes i think it's kind of interesting, i think they get themselves caught up a little bit where they begin to talk so much about missile defenses and then you have deputy prime minister coming out. they're trying to mark the message, on the one hand, a message targeted primarily -- the americans are doing things, making us concerned, it's contributing to a bad relationship. and, you know, what is it really getting you in terms of missile defense production? but the domestic audience americans have missile defense but don't worry too much because we have the icbms that can penetrate it.

i think the real question is are russians prepared to have concerns allayed, and if they are, it would not be hard to come up with ways to do it. >> the only thing i would add in addition to the technical concerns that the russians have about the future capabilities of u.s. missile defense systems, they're also concerned about the permanent presence of american military capabilities in eastern europe. a lot of their concerns with driven by this. >> i would ask what they've done in the last year is pretty much taken care of that issue. i think the pentagon term is we now have, as i understand four company sized units in each of the baltic states and poland. and the pentagon explains it as a persistent deployment. my guess is persistent doesn't have much difference from permanent and that those deployments are going to be there until you see a fairly major change in russia, given the force that russia has used in ukraine.

some of the rhetoric that's coming out of moscow now and the fact you see heightened military activities like russian bombers flying around nato air space. >> let me say two things. one, i think we heard a lot earlier this afternoon from both general todorov and elaine bunf. missile defense is a larger portfolio and also becoming fairly entrenched about how we think of our national security. it's not going away. even though it's not a silver bullet, it's key. notwithstanding the insincerity as you might say what if you might speak, both of you in a way the changing perception among everybody else, among our allies, for example, about just the appetite for missile defenses. there seems to be a lot of it. in the middle east they're putting real dollars behind it. certainly in asia. in nato it was part of the 2010

strategic concept. that is going to be rewritten some time in the near future and probably not going to be any less. where do you see the appetite for all this going? >> up only up, especially as the threat continues to increase. you know, sometimes here in the united states we try to separate missile defense from our larger national security strategy. and i think one of the things that the ballistic missile review from 2010 does a really good job at is putting missile defense at the heart of our overarching natural security strategies. quite frankly, effective missile defenses are key enabling technology for our other defense and foreign policy goals, especially as countries try to keep and deploy capabilities to keep the united states out of

regions. it is a key enabler. so i think cooperation is going to continue to expand. and i also think that again, missile defense is a key element of our overarching national security and defense strategy. >> any thoughts on that? all right. >> hi. again, bruce mcdonald at federation of american scientists peace institute, john hopkins. russia has said multiple times over the last several years that they're going to develop more missile defense. and that's of interest to us the work we're doing on what's looking a little more -- looking into the future is more like a multipolar missile defense world. u.s., china, russia, india. of course, they say they will. so my question to our esteemed guests here, what have you heard

russians say about what they plan to do on missile defense and more importantly, what do you believe? what's bluster? what's beef? what are they up to? >> that's a good question. maybe steve has some more insights on that. i've been trying to ask myself this question for many years. >> i think there's a disconnect you see between the way they talk about american missile defense and when you look at russian missile defense programs. the s-300 the s-400, the s-500 are all designed to replicate we have in pac 3, and the sm-3. so, it's not unusual for the russians to say one thing and do something else but i think they're looking at these sorts of missile defense capabilities as a logical part of their force mix. >> in the back. >> greg tillman arms control association. frank, you mentioned the importance of the sm-3 2-a

deployments in poland by 2018 for providing territorial defense for all of europe. there has not been yet an iranian icbm flight test. there's not been a north korean icbm flight test. that would by my calculations, mean that this threat is 12 years overdue from the rumsfeld commission's predictions. when does the more slowly developing threat start to impact the adaptive part of the european phase adaptive approach? >> well, that's a good question. i would say the sm-3, bloc 2-a which will be deployed in poland in the 2018 time frame, is not designed to deal with icbm class threats, but medium and intermediate range threats. you may recall back in 2013 the

administration decided to restructure the sm-3 bloc 2-b missile for a variety of reasons. technological challenges financial challenges and a number of other problems. but the bottom line is, phase three of the european epaa is designed to deal with medium and intermediate range threats. i would note that despite the fact that iran has not yet developed a icbm to date, they are continuing to develop medium and intermediate range class ballistic missiles. therefore, we are working with our friends and partners to deal with that threat. >> and presumably stay ahead of it. gentleman in the front. >> thank you.

edward f. georgetown university. i was the last u.s. commissioner for the abm treaty so i have mixed feelings about all these issues. let me come back to the question of why are the russians being so obstinate here? the fundamental problem, it seems to me all the u.s. assurances are in the present tense. we are not. but almost by definition assurances have to be in the future tense. we will not. and that's what the russians are asking for and that's what we've been unable to do. find a fence that begins with we will not and then finish it in some way that we can live with. seems to me that really is our fundamental problem. thank you. >> as you noted, it's been the administration's hard policy not to agree to any legally binding restrictions -- >> or other legal restrictions. >> let me say a couple of things. one, we're not just looking at

at -- well, we're not looking at russia when we're dealing with our missile defenses. we're looking at other capabilities. quite frankly, sometimes we are surprised. for example, two yeeshgsz when we made the decision to deploy the additional 14 gbis in alaska, that was driven by the fact that north korea had paraded a new mobile icbm. and we had not seen that before. so, i would say, number one, we need to have the flexibility to deal with surprises like north korea's new mobile icbm. secondly, the u.s. budget process is fairly transparent. you can by reading the missile defense agency's annual press release, when the budget comes up, you can determine where and

how many missile defense capabilities that we currently have and plan to have. and i would argue that the u.s. missile defense levels had been very structured to the threat. you're not seeing hundreds of long range missile defense interceptors. you're seeing 44. so, i think, you know, quite frankly, we're not going to agree to limitations but if you look at our budget projections as well as our deployments, i think it's very, very consistent with our rhetoric. >> i think -- i understand the dilemma as you describe it. therefore it's a little surprising the russians didn't pick up more on this idea that the administration offered in 2013 of transparency which actually would have put -- at least as i understood the proposal, would have laid out who the plan is looking out ten years. here are the numbers. so they would have had not limits but they would have had a

very clear picture at a time where i think the numbers of missing defense interceptors would still have been way below anything that would have posed a threat to russian ballistic missile defense capability so you could have handled the problem that way. later on 23 you got into -- as defenses go up and offenses come down, you might have to look at the question of legally binding treaty agreements if you want to get to further reductions but the russians didn't seem to pick up on that idea at least not so far. >> but we're not there yet. i think we're going to cut it off there. we're going five minutes for another panel. our final panel will be mr. rich matlock and also admiral archer macy. on future directions about technological and otherwise. five minutes and we'll be back for that. thank you, gentlemen. appreciate it.

as you heard, this is only going to be a five-minute break on this discussion of missile defense and technology. we'll continue with live coverage in just a moment. while we wait we'll show you part of a conversation we had on this morning's "washington journal" looking at the errors "rolling stone" magazine made on reporting an alleged gang rape on the campus of the university of virginia. >> getting your thoughts here for the remainedder of today's "washington journal," "rolling stone" issuing an apology to the university of virginia to the fraternity there and to its readers for a story that it wrote, put in its magazine on an alleged rape at the university of virginia.

it has now apologized and officially redacted that story after university of columbia journalism school did a report at the request of "rolling stone" magazine. two of the three authors yesterday held a news conference answering questions about their report on this story. take a look at what they had to say. >> this report is very much intended as a piece of journalism about a failure of journalism. and in that sense, our first objective was to lay out what had happened at "rolling stone," how it happened and why it happened. and although we did concentrate our efforts on the detail of rolling stone's reporting and editing, we also had the freedom to investigate any aspect of the story we thought was germane and in the public interest. so in the end the final report had, at least in our minds several intended purposes.

one was to illuminate the key reasons why "rolling stone"'s" reporting in this case, why the failure was avoidable. and to draw lessons from that. another reason was to assess independently -- another purpose was to assess independently some of the subjects "rolling stone" covered beyond jackie's narrative, particularly the timeline of how a uva handled jackie's information. and then the report also addresses "rolling stone's" editorial policies and makes some recommendations to the magazine. finally, it trues to evaluate how journalists might begin to improve our own practices to define best practices when we're reporting about rape cases on campus or anywhere else. >> that is the two of the three

authors from columbia university's school of journalism yesterday holding a news conference, talking about their report. joining us via skype here this morning is tom rosensteel, executive director for the american press institute to talk more about this report and "rolling stone's" piece. so, i just want your initial reaction to the "rolling stone" magazine, their reporting and how they handled this story. >> well shockingly badly. and i think we've known that for months. the columbia journalism review -- or the columbia journalism school review confirmed, i think failures in the erroring that had already been identified by other publications such as "the washington post" and others. it's pretty fundamental in journalism that you don't write what you believe is true.

you write what you can prove is true. and in the language of the "rolling stone" authors, when they were apologizing for the mistake initially, which they did, by the way, many months ago, they said, our trust in jackie, the center of the story, the youj young woman who was apparently attacked was misplaced. well, as a journalist, you don't simply trust sources. you have to verify what they say. your job is to find out, can we corroborate what our source is telling us? and what can we corroborate and what can't we? "rolling stone," as the columbia university report establishes, the object have i skated what they didn't know, they made it sound like they had more sources than what they did. much of their story almost all

of it, relied on taking jackie's word, the columbia journalism report refers to confirmation bias, which is the concept in social science that you want to -- the story to prove something you already think is true. well it's pretty fundamental as journalists, as a professional what you do is you overcome your confirmation bias through methodology to check the facts like a policeman, like a prosecutor, like anybody who's in the fact business. the essence of journalism, as identify said in some of my books, is a discipline of verification. and there wasn't much of that. >> and what do you make of the "rolling stone" reporter and editors granting jackie's request that they need speak to anybody else until this story was published? >> well, one thing mentioned in the columbia report is -- jackie didn't actually prohibit them from trying to reach these

people independently. she just said i'm not going to put you in touch with them. i'm not going to tell you who they are. which is a sort of funny zone. jackie, who, you know is an unlee right eye liable witness, as turns out, as people often are when they're victim of things like this and the more time that passes, the more unreliable any witness' account becomes, she was -- sometimes she would answer their e-mails, sometimes she was responsive sometimes she would sort of disappear on them. so, they had signs of her -- of her unrely anlt. they thought she was fragile and they explained to columbia journalism school that they were trying to protect her. you're not protecting a witness if you publish her story uncorroborated. you've thrown her, in a sense into a deeper pit. >> what cow make of this

headline, front page of "usa today," the fraternity at the heart of this story is going to sue "rolling stone"? >> yeah. so, you know this is -- this is what happens when you write a story, an expose and you get it wrong. you actually embolden the people that you were the targets or you think were culpable in some manner. there's an old adage in this business, which is, there's no -- there's no benefit in ever getting anything wrong. there's no benefit in being first with anything that's wrong. you know, you essentially -- the other thing is investigative journalism, which is what they magazined this piece was, is a kind of prosecutorial brief. the standard of proof is higher. you are taking a side pointing a finger. it's not he said/she said journalism. and that raises the stakes for

the journalists in terms of what they have to prove, the evidence they have to have, the reliability that they have to corroborate anything that they offer. it's pretty different than covering a city council meeting. and they confused dazzling story telling with the requirementsen an exposterior. >> what's the responsibility of the reporter in this situation what's the responsibility of the editors? in your opinion, where does the onus lie the most to get it right? >> well, you know, we are all individuals with our own standards. so the notion that somehow the -- an$+ investigative journalist being very aggressive is supposed to dig everything up and the editors are there to

temper, you know, and say where's the proof? show us the proof. it doesn't work that way. it's not that simple. you are as good as your own personal standards. as a reporter f you're very careful, you make your editor's job better. >> the offense/defense mix various capabilities. to address this we have two very able gentlemen. mr. rich mat lock working with osd and secondly retired admiral archer macy. mr. matlock, why don't we get started with you. >> thank you. >> good afternoon. i'm rich matlock, i work at the missile defense agency and i'm the program executive for advanced technology. that means i've got the best job in the agency. most exciting job in the agency. so, i want to spend just about ten minutes or so talking you through some of the challenges

we're facing over there for the future and what we think we're going to do about those challenges. i came to the missile defense mission just a few years after president reagan challenged the nation to look at ways that we might solve the problem of defending our nation against ballistic missiles as opposed to avenging our nation. and so i came back as a young rocket propulsion engineer from the air force with about 130 of my comepatriots, i see several in the audience here today with the goal of sponsoring research and really capitalizing on the creativity and innovation in our industry, in our academia and our national laboratories to go after that challenge. we made a bet in those days, on

the order of $2 billion or so on research. research in a broad spectrum of technologies and areas that would hopefully pay off down the road and get us that sort of capability. there was a great focus broadly. that's an interesting term. great focus broadly on those technologies that might pay off in the future for us. some of those didn't pan out. some of those did much better than others. we were looking at a lot of things. as you might recall, we were looking at, you know, at nuclear-pumped lasers. we were looking at high-powered microwaves, we were looking at rockets, we were looking at -- in my own case, we were looking at electromagnetic rail guns. giant 100-ton satellites that would launch small projectiles at 20 kilometers per second at a

rain of 10,000 or so re-entry vehicles coming in. so, as i mentioned the $2 billion or so we spent those first six or seven years eventually paid off in some -- in some areas. we got more focused after desert storm and looking at how we might apply these technologies to defend our -- against missile, in the theater as well as against our nation. and i want to take one of those examples, one that i worked on in particular to walk you through how we built that foundation and where we're going to head to i think, in the next few years. in the early to mid-80s the army's ballistic defense command, now i think is a strategic missile defense command, was looking at ways to apply hit-to-kill technology to

destroy an incoming rv. they built an experimental set called the homing overlay experiment in which they launched using essentially icbm rocket motors. very large, about the size of a refrigerator kill vehicle and an incoming rv. they had success. we recognized that would be a challenge for us in the future. and so for things like the electromagnetic rail gun, we were talking about launching projectiles of about a kilogram that were the size of a bread box. so, we needed to significantly miniaturize that capability if we were going to get to that -- to realize that sort of capability in the future. over time i didn't get to a kilogram or the size of a bread box, but we did reduce the size of those projectiles down to about six kilograms or so a little larger than the bread box. the electromagnetic rail gun

technology didn't come along very well in that same time frame. we recognized by applying these projectile technologies to some of our -- some of our existing systems, like, for example, the standard missile system in the navy, we could change anti-aircraft missiles into ballistic missile defenders. so, this standard missile 3 we have in the field today is essentially the grandson of that technology that we invented in the '80s and the early '90s. and the foundation for the systems we have today are primarily based on that investment that we made in the -- in that time frame. so, as we look at the system that general todorov described here earlier today and look at what do we need to do in the future to make our ballistic missile defense systems more capable, i think there's two key areas that we want to focus our attention on. one is to reduce the number of

shots we take at each credible object. i'm not going to discuss in any depth here the sort of shot doctrine our war fighter employs today in order to assure ourselves that we're going to reliably defend our nation, but needless to say that if he's going to have to shoot interceptors, since we use hit-to-kill technology against credible obs then it would be important for us to reduce the number of credible objects. as well as the shots that we take against each credible object. that's where we're focusing our technology now. in those particular areas. we want to find a way to reduce the number of shots we take at each credible object. we do that by several ways. one is we look at ways we can improve the reliability of the interceptors we have today. that's one of the bets we're making in this year's budget is looking at ways we can do that

for ground base and mid corps defense system. we also look at the possibility of bringing more capability to each interceptor by adding more kill vehicles to each one of those interceptors. in other words instead of taking several shots being able to take one shot with several kill vehicles against that particular object. then if you think about the probabilities of reliability their effectiveness goes up in that way. our system today, as you probably know, is beyond the missile warning message we get from our overhead sensor systems in space, is primarily a terrestrial radar-based system. all the sensing we do, the tracking of the missiles that come, are based on the ship-based sensors, the sea-based x-band radar and our

oerter rest ral radars including early warning radar and our -- what we call our tippy 2, our x-band radar that do -- that does discrimination. all of that is what we base our decisions on in terms of how we launch our interceptors and along what path we launch our intercepts. for very long range systems like the homeland defense system, where we expect an icbm to travel a very long distance, you can imagine how challenging it would be to get a terrestrial radar all along the path of that icbm. especially if you might envision a rate of icbms that would take a different path. the challenge of the earth's curvature and these radar system then brings us to the issue of how do we find a way to more reliably track from birth to

death these incoming ballistic missiles. our vision is to do a couple things. one is to bring new fa nom that technology, gain more knowledge about what these look like, the ballistic raid looks like, by bringing additional sensors into this architecture. not only radar systems, but systems that use electro optical technology in order to determine more about that system. so, you can imagine the power of having much greater knowledge especially knowledge that is relevant to the same sort of sensors that are on our interceptor kill vehicles. we want to get more knowledge about that system and we want to understand it from birth to death. so that we can discriminate and determine which are the two objects we ought to be shooting at. and so getting a more capable discrimination system here now

would be a way to improve the number of shots that we have to take or reduce the number of shots we have to take by reducing the number of things that we might consider to be a credible object. so our vision here in the technology exploration now is to look at ways to bring electro optical sensors into this architecture beyond that opir sensor, that missile warning sensor, that kicks these things off. we're going to do that by capitalizing on the work that's being done in industry today both on sensors as well as on building unmanned aerial vehicles that fly at very high altitudes. high altitude platform is also key to one of the other investments we want to make. so if we go back just a few years here, we made a big bet on airborne lasers in the late '90s and early 2000s.

and that system we built, although it was very effective in doing that one particular job we had for it which was proving that you could shoot down a rocket at the speed of light using light. a tremendous accomplishment. although it proved impracticalal from an operational management, can you imagine having a fleet of 747s flying 30,000 feet with lasers in them. there's a lot of challenges to that. what we know from that, the next time we do this work, we're going to be looking at getting above the known atmosphere where the air cells won't affect the lasers and at altitudes where the turbulence is significantly lower. so, we want to find a regime that's high above the 33,000 feet for all of us who fly on 747s on a regular basis here we know that it can get pretty shaky at 33,000 feet. almost any time of the year, depending on where you're flying. so, we want to make that more

like 60,000 feet. get to the stratosphere where it will be a much calmer place for us to work. we're making investments in laser technology today that's both in our national laboratories and in our industry that goes beyond those chemical lasers that we looked at earlier to new solid state electric lasers, which will be much more effective, efficient, effective as well, i believe, and ones we can scale up and reduce the size of the laser necessary to get that job done. if we can find a way to make that happen, and we believe these technologies will lead us there, that we'll be able to -- to get those lasers on an unmanned aero platform at very high altitudes and make that case for the entire logistics and infrastructure, which goes along with that much much more simpler and make the technical challenges less daunting than

they have been in the past. mentioned earlier, it might have been during our discussion at lunch, that there are other areas which we want to go back to. and so i'm sort of going back to my past in this one. we left the rail gun in 1989 because there were challenges with getting a rail gun. and the idea we would build a new launch infrastructure that would get these 2,000 -- or 100-ton satellites in orbit with rail guns on them was not achievable. however, the services have been making investments and bringing that technology along primarily for close-in engagements and primarily for long-range fires. so, as they continue to develop that technology, we're looking that as a possible way to get at some of our missile defense challenges. again, having a magazine which

is very very cheap projectiles with the capability of electrically generating the power makes it possible for us to get away from this challenge that we find in terms of expensive interceptors against other rocket systems. so, our goal ultimately is then, to find a way to get more capable sensors into the architecture, to improve the knowledge that we have from birth to death of this launch, and to reduce the number of credible objects by understanding what objects are there. with the ultimate goal of reducing the objects dramatically by destroying the rocket booster in the boost phase. that will revolutionize the capability for missile defense and dramatically change the calculus of many of our adversaries.

we're working today with industry. we're working with academia. and we're working in our national laboratories to make that vision come true. we're shifting our -- the overall balance in our investments this year, which had been primarily focused on increasing capacity over the last few years for our regional missile defense systems, and looking now at shifting the balance somewhat, ramping over the next couple of years, to get at the advanced technology challenges we're going to need to build that foundation for the missile defense architecture i just spoke of. we hope to have that here in the next -- in the next decade based on those investments. we recognize that just like in the past it won't be a challenging endeavor and that we may not rush forward with continual success towards that goal, but we're excited about having you as partners and

making that a true reality over the next ten years. thank you. [ applause ] >> well, good afternoon, everybody. i'm arch macy, and now private consultant. as many of you know, had a background in this for a few years. if you don't like ballistic missile defense review, can you blame me. i've heard it before but go ahead. i was one of the co-authors. i'd like to talk about missile defense and thinking about next steps in missile defense from a somewhat different perhaps, look at rubick's cube. this panel is about future directions. that's what it was titled. and so the question i'm thinking about is what are the future elements of missile defense that need to be developed, melded with each other and demonstrated

and made known to potential antagonists? let me develop that for a moment. we've talked today a lot about intercept activities. there's been some comment on left of launch. so, i'll phrase the question this way what is the right of launch activities and plans? other than that of intercept? my basic premise is the missile defense system that is generated by mda and the services does not and cannot provide the overall defense of the nation against ballistic missile threats. we acknowledge for the moment that the massive attack from china or russia the only response is in kind. that's long been our explicit policy and will not change unless there is some breakthrough in physics, which no one expects. we've talked earlier about defending against ballistics missiles cannot be an inventory

challenge. you'll always lose. there will be more threats than there are interceptors. so at some point in addition, the laws of physics the laws of probability and stiblts say that even as you are taking on incoming threats, some are going to get through. i mean no system is 100%. i'm an aerospace engineer by trade and experience. you hate to admit that but you know you can't build a perfect system. there's in way i can assure somebody i can get them all, even if i had the inventory. why do we have an bnds. obviously destruction of the threat is a part of what you need to do. what the bmds capability does is to provide the protection of critical assets long enough that the national command authority the president and our leadership, can take steps to end the threat by other means. get them to stop launching. if they don't launch, it's not a

threat. as rich pointed out, if we can get them on launch, that's great. at some point there i would submit that in particular in short intermediate range scenarios, you're going to run out of the boost face and that could be light, rail gun aim agnostic as to the technique. the question is what does this need to do. the ballistic missile defense system, the capability produced by mda and the services has to buy time and affords time to the leadership to take other actions and to make decisions. they're going to have to happen in pretty short order. it gives the nca the chance to choose other methods. all of the elements of national power, the classic four that you learn in war college diplomatic, information, military and economic and using all of them in whatever way is appropriate to get the threat to

cease to occur. the strategic necessity is to protect the homeland our own forces, friends and allies from ballistic missile attack. so the key word there is it's about protection. i's not about just destruction. so ballistic missile protection planning must encompass plans, lines of authority and communications and training to negate or interrupt the ballistic missile threat sequence from its threat planning to preparation to targeting to launch to subsequent launches. so i submit that perhaps an idea for future discussion is that what we need is a ballistic missile protection plan of which the ballistic missile defense system is an element. this to achieve and maintain a comprehensive all of government approach to negate potential or actual ballistic missile

threats. today we've been talking a lot about systems. we started off with sdi concept of ways to protect us from the missiles, to protect us from the war heads. that's a kinetic approach. to people like me and the department of defense, that's where we tend to go to. we grew up that way said i'm an aerospace engineer and so i think like that. so since the advent of even the sdi concept we've been focused on developing and fielding the capability to perform threat negation by interception destruction and flight. so but we know that we can't keep doing that because we'll lose the inventory game. it's clear that mda owns the intercept part of ballistic missile protection. who owns the rest? do they know that they do? do others know who owns what? and then the question is what is the rest? what are the methods, the techniques by which you're going to get an antagonist to stop

launching. now it can range from the absolutely terrifying to perhaps something less. go back to that in a bit. but that range of actions needs to be thought about and understood, developed to prevent launch in the first place or prevent subsequent launches and melded together for a comprehensive protection. we have to do this ahead of time. the longest flight time of a blisic missile blising missile is somewhere around 40 minutes. assuming it's one after another, the best time you have is 40 minutes. the ballistic missile system could provide protection to a certain level for hours to maybe a day or two. that's how long you have in order to accomplish another effect to end the launches.

so as i said, what capabilities need to be developed to prevent the launch, to prevent subsequent launches. something that will have to be considered at some point is who is responsible for the attribution that can be made public to explain what you're doing in an unchallengeable manner. who knows where it came from? we know where it came from. we usually tend to be loathe to put too much accuracy into our reports on that. but in the case where you're going to take action now at some level you're going to have to convince the world as well as your antagonists that they are the ones doing it and you know where it's coming from and you can prove it. so we need a comprehensive basis for bmd protection. it can't be intercept alone. the overarching goal has to be deter or prevent launch in the first place pap and if the

launch occurs to inflict sufficient pressure to end further launches and do so in a timely manner. we need to determine what constitutes effective deterrence to dissuade abantagonist from launching based on two principles. first, the attack will not succeed in its objective and that the penalty for the attempt will be too high to be borne. this is not a new concept. it's the basic deterrent. what are the steps, the factors, plans and capabilities necessary to accomplish these two principle nos defending against ballistic missiles. the first principle is addressed in prime by the ballistic missile defense system. the second has to be addressed by a variety of means depending on the situation. bmd planning, i believe will

have to account for different categories of attack. i put them into four sectors or judgment. a violent statement or a rogue. an exten shall attack would be provided by chew that or russia. we have a declaratory policy on how we would respond. we have been clear 0 on that for many years. that is not a function of bmd protection. a violent statement by an antagonistic state, a number of missiles, a limited attack. a rogue attacks of unlimited number of missiles. the rogue issue being who do you pressure. it's a violent state if it's an act of state x, then you can 0 pressure state x, one would hope. if it's a rogue attack, i could pick isis as a classic, how and

why do you pressure. if isis gets its hand on irbms and uses them against europe, what is the pressure point. what can be we do about that. and then you have the accidental one. how is that communicated. if launch occurs how du does the owner prior to launch tell owe i'm very sorry, it wasn't me and it won't happen again. and he may be right or he may be faking it. if anyone remembers the somewhat terrifying novel "seven days in may" and what the president had to agree to do at the end of it to end nuclear war that's a very hard decision. and then how do these questions differ between homeland defense and regional. are you going to when a launch comes at you, a limited attack, are you going to take a massic violent kinetic attack on that nation?

it may be appropriate. it may not be. because then you run into issues of es ka la toir response. so we need to consider and preplan our responses to these other types of attack. as i said, and i think i bring it up again, there's a limited timeline here. when this happens we can't then summon the first national security council meeting about it. and going back to what i mentioned about all of the government, whole of government part, is that the defense department tends to be very very good at planning. they do branches and sequel, they do con plans and o plans all that kind of thing. the government as a whole does not. but you're going to have to have a way of economic pressure political pressure, diplomatic pressure, steps you're going to take and they've got to work together to be max mali effective. one of the differences between

ballistic missiles and other kinetic threat for the homeland is timespan from war head arrival is shorter than other threats. cruise missile bombers are viewable in hours and days before arrival. you can take steps to crank things up. but once the first launch has occurred inbound is in less than 40 minutes. so we have to have a method of response that starts to apply effective pressure in hours to a very few number of days. the capabilities and actions across the spectrum of necessary responses and responders must be prepared equipped and trained before the threat situation develops to the point of requiring action. putting together all of the elements the dime elements. plan will need to consider plr particularly in the area of regional defense, the interaction with allies and