going to be reversed on them because of this type of mental illness, or whatever motive that we will ultimately discover. thoughts people died because we are engaged today in the global challenges that we're facing because of the tactics that are being used. we've seen it in copenhagen, where the effort there was to try to enforce a certain approach towards the muslim faith. and a likewise in paris where a certain effort was being made to enforce a certain approach to the muslim faith, which was to not be critical or challenging in any way. boko haram which is now trying to legitimate kidnapping, rape, slavery. isis, which is probably the worst example of all, where we are seeing beheadings people thrown off buildings, people being trapped in cages and burned alive before our very eyes, all the modern akrout rements of western civilization through video. these are crimes.

these are crimes against not just -- these are crimes against humanity. and it has to be said as such. and it couldn't be said in the most strongest way. terrorism, ladies and gentlemen, is a tactic. it is a vehicle, it is a methodology to conduct it by people. and what we have to constantly be asking ourselves, what do these people want to achieve by the use of these kinds of tactics. i would suggest that they are trying to destabilize the modern world, they're trying to undo the modern world, they're trying to change the status quo which has been in place at least since the end of world war ii. we are seeing the legitimatization of a tax on civilians. and saying that civilians are in fact combatant in the global war that we are seeing. so civilians are not safe. and our states which set up our security systems are not legitimate because they cannot protect the civilians which can be attacked at any point in time.

and that is the point that the enemy is trying to make. they are attacking the economy. bin laden said that the goal was to attack the western economies to bring down the western economies through the investment of small terrorist attacks and then requiring the nation states to respond very expensively. we have now seen a few hundred thousands dollars spent since 9/11. we have seen recently the consistent facts on tourists in various parts of the middle east. why? in order to discourage tourism. so in fact the economies of the target countries can in fact be weaned away from the tourist opportunities that are there. the chairman of the gilmore commission, we worked for five years, and we concluded that the only type of approach in response to this everywhere in the united states, and across the world, was in fact a

decentralized response, build up police, fire, rescue, emergency services. we'll be building up security systems in other countries and they will be building up their military, and it will have to be a decentralized response just as the attack is decentralized across the world today. but there are some things of course, that can be very bad. for example, the attempt to fight these kinds of decentralized attacks through the police states. or preemptive war. several of the panelists here have been somewhat critical of the bush doctrine, and unilateral strikes and so am i. about you nonetheless, i would suggests to you as has been suggested on this panel, there is a need for a new united states foreign policy in the face of this challenge. now, what i think has been alluded to on this panel already is there is a line of thought

and a publication by the cato institute that the dangers are really not that bad and that we can pull back in such a way. i think that reflects much of the united states foreign policy today. on the other hand, the panel has been, and i think justifiably critical of the neocon, who have a tendency to get out there use military first impose nation building, in places where it simply will not work. and is not wanted. and i believe that there is a middle ground that should be offered that uses all the advantages of ourselves and our allies with our economic diplomacy, military, and above all, cultural strengths in order to achieve a specific goal and a specific mission. well what is that? i think it's time to ask ourselves, what we're trying to do here. one thing i believe we're trying to do is to preserve, as was alluded to on the panel the

creation of nation states. a whole structure that was put up as far back as 1648. that says that you have nation states in order to promote certain cultural values and values of individual people within those states. today that is directly under attack by the russians who right now are making it very clear that borders no longer matter in western europe. and that if they desire, the ukraine, or even the baltic states, that it's all in play, but much more in line with our panel here today the issue of these radical jihadists who not only want to undermine specific countries, they want to undermine all countries. they want to see in fact the elimination of countries and borders in the creation of a caliphate. and that is in fact what isis proclaims that it wishes to do. what is the purpose of the nation state if it isn't security of our people? but it can't be just security of our people. nation states, particularly the united states, has an obligation

to assert its values. and what are these values that are worthy of putting forth across the world that begins to allow us to win the war of ideas. because we are in a conflict not merely of car bombs and military weapons in news rooms, but also in the minds of people as has been alluded to here today. what are those values. democracy, the free enterprise system, which i would recommend to the united states, by the way. the rule of law the freedom of religion and tolerance of religion, the advancement of women. at least these values should capture the minds of people no matter where they are worldwide. and i think as the former governor of virginia one of my predecessors in the office of virginia, a man by the name of thomas jefferson who before he was governor of virginia wrote the declaration of independence.

i remind you of the words all men are created equal. these are not just american values when he wrote them they became universal. human values. and remain the ideas that america and their allies must put forward today in order to win the war of ideas. and that must be the mission for all of us. [ applause ] >> thank you very much, governor. i think we would like to develop a q&a discussion with the audience. and then the speakers will have another chance to respond. would you please raise your hand, those who are interested.

and please come to the mic. sharon would you please? please identify yourself for the record. and just a question, not a statement, please. >> my question is for dr. abdalaziz. the nbc review conference is scheduled to begin the end of april, into may in new york. what positive outcomes do each of you expect from this conference? what are the important issues? and in particular, for example, the failure of -- to hold a conference in hellsinkihelsinki, one of your favorite cities in the weapons of mass destruction free zone as ordained by the 2010

review conference? thank you. >> thank you sir. yes, we are heading into the new conference next month. and, of course we are each going to this conference. i think all the countries are going to the conference with a very constructive approach in order to make it a successful event. we have a clear mandate to have a conference in hellsinkihelsinki. despite all the concessions made by our countries obviously

egypt, as well as other countries are going in 2015, with the hope that we will have maybe a better mandate in order to have the conference as soon as possible. because we believe that freeing the middle east from the weapons of mass destruction is a necessity. it has to do also not only with the efforts of the immediate area. thank you. >> anyone else? okay. >> amin mahmoud. my question to ambassador kattouf is how would you advise the administration of the latest

law in egypt after the coup especially as we know that oppositions have broken agreements. but the goal is to become anti-american. do we know that the opposition will soon produce terrorists -- and i can go on and on. thank you. >> you know, in foreign policy in any state, but particularly i think in the united states there is always great tension

between our values on one hand and our vital national interests on the other. and as the governor pointed out it's the first job of government to protect its citizens. the united states tried to back democratic elections in egypt. and it seems that everybody blamed us. i don't think he would mind me saying it but almost exactly a year ago i met with the -- i was honored to meet with the shaikh -- the oldest maybe education, higher education institute in the world, and a leading -- obviously a leading figure in sunni islam. and he was convinced that the united states had backed the muslim brotherhood, and that it

had been our intent all along to put the muslim brotherhood in power. nothing that i said to the contrary was going to change his mind. that's the view of many egyptians who back the current government. and at the same time, those who backed the brotherhood and other similar islamist organizations are convinced that the u.s. colluded in bringing them down. so as itches saying in my talk, i think the u.s. has to look out for our interests first and foremost. it doesn't mean that we don't still stand for democratic elections, and human rights, and pluralism and the like. but it still comes down to the peoples in the region, having to decide what they want. and as i said there are so many

fundamental differences including this idea of -- is god sovereign, although i'm not convinced that god talks directly to anybody and tells them what it is he wants here on earth, or is it a people that they are sovereign. i know that doesn't really answer what you would hope i would say, but it's the best i could do. >> okay. back over there. the mic? give him the mic. >> i think the room agrees with me in thanking you for a fantastic panel today. one of the things we address is we talked about three things. who are the terrorists, what are the root causes of their angst, and what we can do about it. i think we did a great job talking about who they are, and what we can do about it. but we never really spoke to root causes.

ambassador haqqani's well stated point about sunni/shia issues should be dealt with by muslims. what is your sense on the counternarrative? i really ask the entire panel. how do we define an entire narrative when we haven't really discussed academically what the root causes are? what are your suggestions, and should america stay out of the counternarrative as your point was well taken again, ambassador regarding shia/sunni issues? >> i didn't limit myself just to the sunni/shia issues. i think muslims, american or otherwise, do have a role in defining islam. but if nonmuslims start taking upon themselves as the president did in saying these people who are attacking are not really muslim, because i mean, i don't think he has a degree that

qualifies him. that was my observation. my observation was that the ideological divide win the muslim community has to be addressed by muslims. and if the united states wants to help, as ambassador kattouf did, that they have the shared belief system, that's absolutely something that you should do. and it is something that i would urge you to do. because it is useful. as far as the roots of angst, there's no single root of angst. and there's many groups. each one has a different agenda. some started out into local groups, morphed into something else. and some of them are groups that basically want, as governor gil gilmore pointed out, that they want to rule back through what they see as sub conventional military capability. i remember distinctly once being at a demonstration and some

smart aleck there had a poster which said, a suicide bomber is a poor man's f-16. the argument he was making was, we don't have f-16s, we don't have modern technology the way we do so in order to bring you down, we're going to use this unconventional capability. so therefore, the root -- there are multiple roots. but the groups which are basically to quote unquote, level the field in their opinion. so it is in all of our interests not to let them level the field in that particular manner. lastly, as far as the the counternarrative is concerned, actually the counternarrative exists. the problem is that the 24/7 media here and elsewhere, essentially treats all stories in a certain manner. and the counternarrative is not a story.

the terrorist narrative is. and so it actually gets am pli fid much more than the counternarrative does. within the islamic thinking, there are many people who have a different view on things. the shia divide goes back to the succession of the prophet muhammad. people would say the succession of the prophet muhammad is over. anybody can have an opinion on it. but as far as my faith is concerned, and my practice is concerned, and my ability to do good deeds, and endure bad ones is concerned what happened in history is not going to determine that. and so therefore, my faith should be focused on a faith defining my action, rather than fighting with somebody over historic fact that took place 1,400 years ago. it's a bit like if the americans had a religious sect, or a

religious-political sect who still wanted to influence the election that took place in what, 18 -- any american history buffs here? the disputed election after president grant, 1866 or something, '64. >> 1868. >> thank you. whenever. it was a disputed election. and basically -- huh? yes, president hayes won, of course. and i'm sure there's somebody who argues still. same goes for the shia/sunni divide. is the success correct. many of these issues are not part of the modern life. the counternarrative is the modern life. if the muslims of the world felt they had an equal stake and that their future was what they were building rather than arguing

over the past and killing over the past we would have a much better muslim world. >> may i add something? >> when i mentioned the aspect, i meant what you said. the lack of economic growth, the widening gap between rich and poor, this is root cause of terrorism, of course. but not only economics without some political if you look for something at the israeli conflict. when we have a conflict without a resolution that's a motivation for young people to tend to be extreme, or something like that. other root causes are related to what he mentioned.

there are a lot of things that need to be discussed. we thank you. >> professor may i add something? it's such a great question. you just heard all kinds of interest, i think, from the panel up here. we have the phenomena that there are people today who purport to wish to go backwards into a more barbaric time. but at the same time, using modern civilization to do it. modern communication, cell phones modern jet airplanes, jeeps machine guns all these elements of modern life -- modern transportation, communication. i believe that we can't ignore -- i would never presume, ambassador, to ever lecture to anyone of the muslim faith. i'm not a muslim i'm a christian. so i would not presume to do that. but the reality is that we're not going to be able as

westerners and as americans to ignore this. the united states stands as the protector of the modern world today. it is not only viewed as such, purr perceived as such, it's a reality today. it's well understood by people who wish to undo it. therefore, they have to attack the united states. and we have to be prepared for that. now, we can't get lured into every conflict because of the return on investment argument that i made a few minutes allege. that we can't be bled down, and that is a good approach to attacking a modern power and we have to be careful about that. that's why i advocate a new foreign policy. one that doesn't simply pigeon hole us into a neo-isolationism, aggressive type of approach. i believe a nuanced foreign policy has been discussed and can be created in a way that is not just american interests, but security, but also the values of all humanity across the world.

>> anyone on the panel would like to make a statement? if not, we would turn it over for closing remarks. >> ladies and gentlemen, i'd like to quickly introduce the commandant of the marine corps the chairman and soul of the potomac institute. general gray? [ applause ] >> that's a pretty good speech, mike, why not keep going. i want to thank our colleagues on the panel for a super presentation. you covered a whole area of matters and the like. and i think you did it in a very distinguished way. i think that -- many of you heard me say these things before at these seminars -- but i think we have to remember that it

truly is an international challenge. it's an international challenge in any form or measurement. because we're talking about the people of the world. we're talking about our friends around the world. we're talking about really trying to stabilize the world, trying to make it better trying to give people a better opportunity to live. and it has nothing to do with combat, and war, and dropping bombs and all that kind of thing. it's a much higher cause. i agree with my colleagues terrorism is a tactic. and i've said that many times and others have too. and you really -- i have never have agreed on the gloeblg war on terrorism. it is the global war against ideas. it's the global war against ideology. it is the war against the idea of people trying to do things

barbaric, horrific, et cetera through terrorist type tactics and the like. i mean, what are they trying to do. i mean they're trying to scare you. they're trying to worry you. they're trying to put fear in the minds of all. they're trying to separate what we believe in, from what they want to accomplish. they're trying to attract attention. there's all kinds of things that they try to do, terrorists, activities and tactics. it's not new. you can find examples of terrorist type tactics in the tora, in the bible, in the koran. you can find it in our history. you have to look only as far south as the carolinas and talk about what we were doing in the

revolutionary war. these are the type of things that people do when there's nothing else that they can do. and they believe in what their cause and the like, so they adopt these kinds of tactics. mao tse tung made it part of his philosophy in his four ways of fighting a war. and as i've told the story sometimes, he talked about vietnam and indochina. if you're with me in the middle of october of 1965 south of de nang you would have seen a small 12-year-old vietnamese girl crying and running into our lines. her father had been a district chief. he was the -- one of 1000 district chiefs that was assassinated by the viet cong in 1966 alone. she was crying and coming into our lines because her arms had been severed off at the elbows by the viet cong.

not a nice story. but these are the kind of terrorist activities that people will do. they don't deserve to live. they don't deserve to be supported. they don't deserve anything. and we have to understand that. but it's an international type of a thing. it's not just the united states. and i'm concerned a little bit about these vital interests and national interests. i'm not so sure that the national and vital interests of all nation states, and all those who desire to be free and desire to get ahead, i'm not sure they aren't the same. and so i think truly we could do something about this. there's no question that the military capability is really the least of our concerns right now. you're quite right when you talk about the political, the economic, the societal technology, all the elements of national power and influence. they've got to be woven together, not just by america, but by the international

community that we know of today. the united nations and all the others. we've got a big, big challenge in front of us. we need a new kind of a strategy that's adaptive that's smart and resilient. and that understands what we really want to be free. we want to be -- we want to prosper. in my own country i remember in 1974 at the army war college when i asked max learner, i used to escort everybody around because i was a dumb marine and not smart enough to attend some of the classes. but at any rate i said, what the -- and he talked about the national purpose. and he said to survive is a great nation to flourish. that's the kind of thing that i think our world is all about. we want to survive. we want to flourish. we want our children to have it better than we had it, et

cetera et cetera. and above all, in the case of my country, our country we need to learn more about the world. we need to understand the moras and cultures and languages and what they think about. we need to understand and look at their world through their eyes, not ours. so i think collectively we can do this. i wish my colleagues would get hot on this strategy right now, governor, and the rest of you. you have all the right words. but i do think that it's a clash of ideas. and i think the good ideas win out as long as everybody understands what this is really all about. so thank you all again for joining us. and it's been a great seminar. [ applause ] >> see you next year.

with congress out this week we are featuring "american history tv" in primetime. tonight, a seminar on the closing of the civil war in 1865. at 8:00 the battles of sailor's creek, followed by a look at the battle surrender and legacies of the battle of an po mat ticks, tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span3. next, three former u.s.

ambassadors to afghanistan look back on their diplomatic roles and discuss the planned withdrawal of u.s. troops. all three ambassadors are under the bush and obama administrations. they look at future relations with afghanistan and pakistan. hosted by the middle east institute, this is an hour and a half. welcome this afternoon to the middle east version of the three tenors. the washington version is three ambassadors. and we're very pleased to have the same level of talent that you got from three tenors. i'm delighted, really, to begin this session. this session which is part of the series sponsored by louis hughes who is sitting down front here. and where we have been able to

have a -- really, i think, a fine production of presentations over the years. and again, lou, thank you for making this possible. [ applause ] our three ambassadors are indeed well known. ryan crocker, to my left here, was ambassador in afghanistan. and more recently than our other two participants but well known not just for his service in afghanistan, but elsewhere. and so we're delighted that he could be with us. he is dean at the texas a&m university presently. and zalmay khalilzad to his left is at the center for strategic

international studies and served as our special envoy to afghanistan from 2001 to 2003. of course, always at the united nations, and so many other places. and ron neumann well known to us here in washington for his presence at many events. ron was the ambassador in afghanistan from 2005 to 2007. and is presently president of the american academy of diplomacy. now, some of you may wonder, afghanistan, middle east institute, i have to remind people that when the middle east institute was created in 1946, afghanistan was included as part of the middle east. now, this is foresight, really. we were already thinking of the greater of the middle east. and of course, when pakistan

came into being in 1947, we threw pakistan in as well. so we're not new to this part of the world. and we're delighted to have you here today. and our speakers. and so the format here is going to be that i'm going to pose some questions, and have our participants respond to them. we'll leave enough time certainly at the end of this session for your questions. so let's get started. gentlemen, this panel is going to be essentially looking forward. in the role of the united states in afghanistan and in the country's future. but before we do that, can i ask you, looking back, what gave you during your time in afghanistan what gave you the greatest

satisfaction and what was your greatest disappointment during that period that you were serving this country in afghanistan? whoever would like to start. there's no order of things here. okay, zal. >> well, for me, first of all, i want to thank lou for his leadership on this. and thank him for his service in afghanistan during the period that i was there. and i'm delighted to be here tonight with my distinguished colleagues. especially ryan and i, we've done quite a few things together. >> some of which we won't tell you about. >> but for me of course, i was in afghanistan besides having been born there and spent a lot of my early life in afghanistan, twice in an official capacity, once as was said, as the

president's envoy right after the agreement. and that lasted until 2003. then i went to ambassador from 2003 to 2005. so if i have to kind of think of the emotional sense that i have of returning after 30-plus years, and seeing kabul devastated, a dead city essentially when i arrived in 2002 my first kind of trip after 9/11 flying in in a small plane. when i landed at kabul international airport, which is now busy and japanese have built a terminal that is open, and there's a new vip lounge that's quite impressive. i remember a very elderly man

who has since passed away pushing a ladder to the planes so we could get off. we had a little bit of a hard time synchronizing the ladder and this little plane that the government has provided to take me to kabul. if i had to reflect on the positive -- the positive experience, that afghanistan was very divided politically. the pro-soviet takeover in '78 and then even the fighting there. there are a lot of afghans in the audience or afghan-americans and other experts. and the soviets coming in, and fighting the soviets and the

mujahadin fighting, and fighting the taliban. so there's been a history of not coming to agreement on key issues. and the politics of helping the united states in the aftermath of 9/11. the critical role with the help of the united nations playing important roles, to get an agreement on the constitution, and participating in the constitution, and getting the various groups -- i know that some might ask about the taliban not being part of that process at that time. and i'd be happy to engage on that as to what exactly happened, or did not happen with regards to the taliban participation in the early period, in the political process.

but it was a high point, as i have felt myself i mean, there are so many of them, because the school opening there was very emotional. i'll never forget until i die that all adults who were in the audience, including a couple of foreigners at that time was in tears the day that schools were reopened. and both my colleagues of remember in march, the opening of the school there after so many years president karzai then -- the first time it happened he was chairman. that was a high point. but i think the constitutional agreement, the compromises that were made, that they seized the moment and did agree was very positive for me. on the negative, and i want to hear my colleagues on the negative, i would say that my

own frustration, and i obviously value ryan's comments too because he served on both sides of the border with distinction and i would say that my own frustration, the inability to get an agreement between afghanistan and pakistan on the kind of cooperating against extremism and terror and facilitating a settlement that would have brought the taliban into the political process was my greatest frustration. because i could see and sometime out of frustration i would even speak publicly that the sanctuary was in the process of being developed that was going to make the task much harder, would take a lot more time and would be far more expensive than what we initially were willing to invest in afghanistan. that changed over time but our

initial strategy was to be a minimal footprint some effort not a lot we didn't want to own the problem, we wanted the afghans to take care of it. so that, i think, i would say in terms of big issue was my biggest frustration. >> are ron? >> ron? >> they're hard questions to answer, actually. but i'll tease out one or two things from a massive impression. on the side of satisfaction, partly just reconnecting to afghanistan. i didn't grow up there as zal did. but i visited in 1967, and was in there in the country. just reconnecting with the country and the society and the people was enormously satisfying.

one of the things that continues to give me enormous satisfaction, that i began to see there, was the younger generation of afghans. the 20-somethings, 30-somethings, who are really a different group, and who really hold out the promise of a very different, better future for their country, if we can get through the short term. and some of the old leadership i have great faith that it can go a long way in the longer run, and with the younger leadership. i remember going to what's now the american university of afghanistan, which zal gave a great deal of help to get started, and which all of us have worked on that project, but it was very emotional for me because it was on the grounds of what was the american international school in kabul where my brother graduated from high school. so to go back in the very early days and to find the students as inspiring as they were.

i suppose professionally, perhaps most satisfying was the recognition that we were working on the energy side in too many stovepipes. we were working too much -- not wrongly -- but that our focus had become so internal, that some of what we were doing was sort of like building an extension cord without making sure we had a socket to put it into. and to get the afghan government to start the discussions with uzbekistan and kyrgyzstan that led to the energy agreements that could put the power down through the lines. and like everything else, getting those things done was a great deal more than -- effort than con sellceptualizeing of what needed to be done. my father told me years ago, that as ambassador you neither finish what you start or you

start what you finish. you come and pick up what your predecessor has done, and you build on it and start things which you don't necessarily finish. it's not a one-year efficiency report cycle. i would say my greatest disappointment was the absolute inability to convince washington that 2006 was going to be a bloody bad year, the insurgency getting much worse. and we reported this. we predicted it. general eikenberry agreed. iraq was just sucking up the energy. and not alone, because iraq had its own share of problems. the most visible example of this is we had recommended $600 million which seemed like a very big number then, now it seems kind of small but it seemed like a big number, for additional economic assistance to use in a variety of ways including some of the north that

needed stabilization, if it wasn't a combat area. and out of that request, $600 million, months of bureaucratic wrangling, at the end of the day, we got 43. we got less than a nickel on the dollar. actually, much less, because 1 11, almost a quarter of that was not aid for afghanistan, but a paper transfer to make up for the cost of debt rescheduling. so actually for money on the ground, we got 32. out of the $600 million we asked for. and it was the manifestation of the fact that we lost a lot of valuable time even when it was possible to see that we were really going to need it. anyway, it's a different comparison now. in zal's first tour, this was a period where everybody thought the taliban was really defeated. there was no neon sign flashing

on the hill that says by the way, you've got to be done by 2006, the war's going to start. but by 2005, we were able to analyze what was going to happen, and to know that -- not know, we were able to predict with a great measure of assurance that the insurgentscy was going to get very, very bad and bloody in the next year and we got absolutely no help to do anything about it. and that certainly is one of my greatest disappointments. somebody asked me at a much later period after big budgets came in, how does it feel, you know, to essentially have been right. i said bittersweet. it's nice, but that doesn't help. >> you might have gathered from ron's remarks that his father was the ambassador to afghanistan from 1967 to 1973.

ryan? >> as zal noted, we were both engaged in afghanistan after the fall of the taliban. i reopened our embassy there in the beginning of january 2002. and i couldn't even land in kabul. the runways were completely inoperative. we had to come in at bagram. ford a river go through miles of devastation to get to what was left of the capital. that perspective left me with a sense that the glass was really at least half full. when i returned subsequently. and then as ambassador in 2011. given the absolute nothing with which the country started, the achievements always seemed to me even greater than the obstacles. it also left me with a deep

sympathy, and affinity to the afghan people generally, and to president karzai in particular we certainly had our rough innings with him. but given what he went through, absolute nothing with which he started, and what he was able to oversee, i think history and i hope this country is going to look at him in a more kindly light than maybe the case now. so we fast forward to my time there. the achievements that occurred on my watch for which i really can't claim credit but i will, because, of course in my career, i was blamed for a lot of things, and i really don't think were my fault. [ laughter ] the achievements were to put in

place a bilateral and international architecture. for the long-term security for afghanistan. these things came together fairly quickly in the spring and summer of 2012. the strategic partnership agreement between afghanistan and the united states that i led the negotiations for, i saw really as an historic moment. we had never had that kind of written alliance, if you will, between the united states and afghanistan. president obama flew out to afghanistan to sign it with president karzai, the beginning of may. and it seemed to me that we had the bilateral bloc in place. we then went to -- all of us

went to chicago later in may for the nato summit. and what that summit did was solidify international commitments to the did -- to the long term out year international support for afghan security forces. there we were much more motivated by what happened in afghanistan after the soviet defeat. the afghan forces literally soldiered on with the soviets gone. they kept on fighting. until the money ran out. that's when the state effectively collapsed and the civil war was on. so getting that second bloc in place was very very important. and then the third came in july

of 2012. the tokyo economic ministerial in which the international community then stepped up to the economic side of the challenge with some $16 billion pledged in economic support against afghan undertakings that they developed themselves for steps they would take to ensure these funds were indeed a good investment. my greatest disappointment was the flip side of this. in which the united states seemed to lose interest in afghanistan afghanistan. and a fundamental truth here whether it's in iraq or afghanistan, you don't end a war by withdrawing your forces. and simply leave the battlefield to your adversaries. and it's not just a failure to

fulfill the promise of the strategic partnership. but we're america. where america leads others will follow. that's what we demonstrated in chicago and tokyo. if america doesn't lead everybody else finds something else to do, particularly if it involves money. so we are gathered here today at what i hope and would like to believe is the beginning of a new dawn for afghanistan and the united states community in the wake of president ashraf ghani and c.f. abdullah's very positive visit here just a bit ago. so from home to depression to hope again. some of us never learn. we keep hoping. >> you've just mentioned the

visit of ashraf ghani president ashraf ghani and ceo dr. abdullah here last week. and there was much talk in town on what the contrast was here between that visit and our relationship with hamid karzai before. and in fact also continue remarks about how fortunate the united states is to have these two 34e7bmen, yes two men because in many ways they seem to complement one another if given the opportunity. let me ask in this light how at this point in time can we best assure that these men are going to succeed? anyone? >> i'll make one comment but my colleagues know this subject betterbetas well or better than i do. first of all, they have to

succeed if afghanistan is to have a future. together they have a mandate. 70 mers of afghans who voted voted for one of the two of them. we're not quite sure which one but we all know they voted for one of the two of them. so they have a heck of a manneddate together. neither one of them despite what each believes have a mandate if they separate. i believe their personal relations are good. i believe they want to make this work. my colleagues can speak to this as well. there are a lot of tensions in this relationship. and that's inevitable. and there are a lot of tensions that are not in the personal relationship but in the fact that each rides herd on a dispratt group of supporters who are not necessarily loyal lieutenants but groups hungry for their own share of power. that's a very very tough act to follow.

to manage. and we should remember this is still a weak central government. for those of you who have some historical background, in many ways you can compare what you have in afghanistan to the middle ages, the period of state consolidation consolidation. it's not about decentralization. first of all, it's about having enough authority to control. so in this very difficult situation the united states has to play a very careful role. one thing it has to do is maintain its support, military and financial. without that everything falls apart. the second thing it has to do is to be willing to help moderate and arbitrate in some very difficult cases some of the frictions but not to be in it all the time. not to be responsible for governing afghanistan. dr. abdullah and dr. ghani have to have that responsibility. not to be jumping in taking

responsibility and not to be telling other people how to run things, but at the same time there will be issues where the face and the prestige and other things make it almost essential to have a third party involved. i do not believe they could have reached the political settlement they had without our intervention. that kind of work is what we need diplomats for. it's not the kind of work you can do with a committee in washington. it's an art form. it's not a science. but it's going to -- and if it's done well it's not going show very much. but it is i think going to be an essential piece of helping them get to success. >> i'd like to add to what ron said. one that generally when we look around the world the history of

unity governments is not a successful one. they generally do not work. on the other hand, i know both of these gentlemen quite well. ashraf ghani we were together. we came to america together and finished high school, in other words. and dr. abdullah at least since the soviet war, which is 30 years plus. and i think they've been witnesses to the tragedy of recent afghanistan where this not accepting each other wanting all for oneself nothing for the other side, has produced

great tragedies for afghanistan since there have been witnesses to the recent history. i think the agreement between them was not easy. but i know that in the discussions prior to the election both had talked about this concept of a jemaa, a consensus, the need for consensus on some issues. that's part of the platform of dr. ashraf ghani but also even dr. abdullah and his group talked about this. that they needed to accept each other and the winner take all approach would be disastrous for afghanistan given the complexities of the place. i agree with ron that our role was indispensable in helping bring them into agreement at the

tail, but i think the principle of wanting to work together was there. that makes me and that recognition makes me hopeful. but it wouldn't be easy. it would require constant work on the part of the two leaders because they are very committed to it in my judgment although necessarily in the teams there would be positions of power. there's so many slots that you can -- you have. and that are natural rivalries for those slots from the two teams. but i think it would require work on the part of the two leaders. but also i agree with ron's point that it would require that we continue to be attentive and helpful and i think there's been a qualitative improvement in our relationship with afghanistan

and with the team. there was a period, however lest we forget, that we had a tremendously positive relationship with president karzai before it went sour. and we have to take part of the blame for what happened. and he too. but we cannot take it for granted during my period at least, i had hardly any problem that we couldn't work out with president karzai at that time. and he was much praised in this town. his skills were compared to president clinton at one point when he came for a visit when he addressed congress. for him to be the successor to mullah omar obv