the government. i think that's very dangerous. i'm all for cyber security. i think there's a flaw in current law that doesn't allow companies to share what they ought to be able to share they ought to share but that the legislation is going way overboard in terms of describing and permitting the sharing of that information. >> great. that's very helpful. let's get the panel's thoughts on the categories of debates you've talked about. first, bulk collection then the warrant for content and geolocation information and then some of those cyber security issues. ahmed, you're counsel for chelsea manning. is a bulk collection ban by congress necessary or do you believe bulk collection as currently practiced by the nsa violates the fourth amendment, as at least one court has held? >> i think a ban is necessary

because i'm on the fence as to whether there's doctrinally an issue. there might be an issue. so, i think that's why. i think a ban is necessary for normative reasons. however, however, the examples we give as to the harm that derives from bulk collection, especially 215 bulk collection, is a result of the use of the data. again, i think that's -- i distinguish collection and use. can -- we saw recently the obama administration had considered ending bulk collection before the snowden revelations. would a ban on bulk collection harm law enforcement and be a bad idea? >> why aren't you answering that one? >> yeah, why? >> why aren't you? really subtle moderation here. look i'm not sure those

accounts about how -- it was considered whether or not to end the bulk metadata collection under 215. i'm not surprised it was being considered. i think those programs should always be subject to a cause/benefit analysis. but i'll be interested to hear the follow-on reports as people reaction to that initial report about how serious that consideration was. that raises an interesting question. i think in the public debate you have the constitutionality and legality -- constitutionality, whether that collection fits under 215 whether that's stretching of the term relevance allows for that bulk collection. and then you've got the question about utility. the utility of the program. that's really on the executive branch to make that argument. and it's important that they make that argument to congress. really, this is important. and defining the "this ". what core of that authority do they really need?

at some level i think that argument can be made because the question then, and i'm going back to my old slippery slope argument as an advocate for the government. in this situation i'm sort of doing that. what is bulk collection? bulk collection is a broad term. once again just like the 24/7 drone, we're talking here about the collection of millions of millions of phone calls. so in sort of a relatively speaking extreme form of bulk collection. and the question -- the legal question under 215, is it relevant -- every piece of that information relevant to a terrorism investigation, national security investigation, to have all that? the argument is we need all those telephone numbers in order to see those patterns the type of thing that greg was talking about in relation to banks and cell tower information. you get all those phone numbers together, you can see, this is a bad guy's number here and he's in touch with this number and that number and that then, helps you to potentially unwind

a terrorist cell. and the question is, well yeah but, you know and all those millions of phone numbers, the vast, vast majority are going to be phone calls made by people who have nothing to do with terrorism and are completely innocent. well, that's true. and in that sort of extreme example, you say the government is taking hold of all of this information, most of which does not have a direct connection to terrorism. then take the direction to a little smaller level. the government here through some intelligence channel that a terrorist just got on a plane from paris to jfk. no idea. don't know who it is. you want the government to be able to immediately get the manifest of all the names of all the passengers on that plane. there are 110 passengers on that plane. 109 of them have nothing to do with terrorism but one does. in order to find out who that person is, you want all those names, you want to run them against your database to see if you can identify who the bad guy is before he chose to blow his

underwear up or something. at a practical level have you to think about what is bulk data collection? it's not just the extreme. and there are situations where, i think, most of us would agree, boy, that's actually the kind of thing we want to be able to do and do quickly and shouldn't require a warrant. >> we have a technical term for that collection of all the names of everybody on the airplane along with the terrorist. it's bulkish collection. so, what happens in the case of bulkish collection, right? bulk collection means they're not using an identifier to collect on that specific term, okay? they're not saying give me everything. it's not like a pen register, all the numbers dialed to or from a phone number. it's all the numbers dialed. all phones. that's bulk collection. so, in that scenario, the airplane scenario the key issue for the privacy folks, i think, is not whether you can get the manifest.

it's what happens to all the other names on the manifest that are of no interest. >> that goes back to ahmed's point, which is, it's the use -- i'm sorry. it's the use of the information and the limitation. so not limitation on the collection on the front end, but how it's used. the nsa went to great pains to say there's a limited number of people who can access it. very limited reasons -- purposes for which it can access x number of authorities, et cetera, et cetera. joe nsa operator can't just check to see if his girlfriend is making phone calls to somebody he doesn't like. >> but here's the problem. the fbi doesn't have a rule that says they have to throw out that data after they make the match. and that's really where the fight is or a big part of the fight on the section 215 reform right now. make the match throw out the data for the people who don't fit the match.

you're going to save it for a little while while the information is happening and making sure the terrorist cohort is or is not on the plane. i get that. but at some point, relatively quickly, after that assessment is made, they should get rid of the data about the innocent people and there's not a good rule about that now. >> david, does google have a position about whether bulk collection should be renewed or banned? >> yes, we do. so, we've been strong supporters of the usa freedom act. there were several iterations of that bill last year. it's interesting to hear the discussion. i don't know actually can ditly at the end of the day, from a functional perspective, whether there is that much disagreement in the sense that there's been a lot of discussion around the bulk metadata program and the bulk communication metadate program and the solution that has been offered is to require that the government use a specific selection term.

it's part of the usa freedom act. it's also part of the ongoing discussions around surveillance reform legislation. and i think there's been a lot of discussion about how to get that to the point where it doesn't permit bulk collection. where it doesn't open the door to the types of surveillance that we've seen in recent years. at the same time, gives the government the flexibility particularly in some of these cases and the hypothetical that ken raised so that where they can't, example use a very specific identifier, whether that be an e-mail address or a phone number, that they're able to obtain records that enable them to identify and/or thwart a terrorist attack. at the same time, to greg's point, the more they focus on the use of that date tashgs i think that heightens the importance of making sure minimumization procedures protect the privacy of that data for any subsequent use. those are the issues we're talking about. with the usa freedom act, what

we saw last year, is that industry, privacy advocates, the administration, the intelligence community coalesced around a way to get this so there was not bulk collection. i would say we don't need to start necessarily from scratch. we have a solution that's on the table that works. we have about two months to get it right. i'm hopeful we can move forward with that bill. >> it sounds like the perfect reform supported by the administration and industry and google and yet it didn't pass last year. why not? and will it pass this year? >> so i think a lot of it had to do -- i think a lot had to do at least last november, there were some process-based objections about the way that the bill came to the floor. it didn't go through committee first. there was an opportunity to pass it in the lame duck session and there was a sense understandably from some who felt like it should go through regular order. that opportunity is there now.

and i think, you know congress probably should avail itself of that regular order process to the extent that that's important. there were 58 votes in the senate. two short of moving it on the motion to proceed. some of those in the senate who have supported that reform are gone. if you sort of take a look at the numbers it's difficult from both sides. on the one sense, you know in the senate, when you have to get to 60 votes, you've got to make -- you've got to be able to bring along the other 40 in some way. last year it was the burden of those who wanted to move that bill. this year it's the burden of those who may want to simply you know reauthorize section 215 in its current form. i would submit that that's not truly in the realm of reality. you know, i think it's incumbent upon everybody to sit around a table and figure it out. we've done it to some extent with the usa freedom act. what i'm hopeful is folks can

sort of recognize the types of solutions that are being forged here are relatively modest ones in the grand scheme. there are broader reforms that have yet to be undertaken. there are really important concerns. i want to underscore very important concerns outside of the confines of the normal fourth amendment we discussed what types of rights non-u.s. persons have going forward. the u.s. is a global medium. it does not have borders. folks look at the way our laws operate and the way that we operate our surveillance programs and can't seem to fathom why it is we focus solely on the rights of u.s. persons. that's a really important debate we're going to have. i think it's important -- really important to get this right here because it does in some way frame the terms of the debate going forward. >> you talked about how hard it is for congress to scale back powers to congress once granted. will the usa freedom act pass and should it?

>> you know, i'm not overly optimistic that it will pass in the current form. especially given -- given the geopolitical events since last year, so i'm not really sure that they would trend toward passage as opposed to the other direction, frankly. >> let's talk about the other category of bills that greg flagged for geolocational '1da information. i'm interested in the political landscape. will those pass, or should they? >> i think on the -- in terms of the content and now this is about the 180-day rule and whether you need to get a warrant to get e-mail content, even if it's over 180 days and hasn't been opened i think there's a strong movement for that. and i believe, actually, that the justice department has come out and supported it, hasn't it?

as a matter of practice, i believe the justice department is getting -- i believe they're getting warrants now as a matter of practice even though they're not statutorily obligated to. i think that will less up the speed on the geolocational aspect of it or the geolocational legislation, but i could certainly see, especially in the aftermath of the jones decision, that they would stand a fighting chance. >> interesting. greg, do you agree with ken's analysis? and if so, why is it congress might be more willing to restrict private sector collection of data than to restrict government surveillance? >> i don't see congress actually passing a meaningful bill restricting writ large private collection of data. the white house has proposed a rather week consumer bill of rights recently. so, i just don't see a strong

one going through, at least in this congress. now, on the usa freedom issue i think it's an open question about what -- i think some legislation will pass. it almost has to right? it's going to be hard as david said, for congress to reauthorize section 215 as it is. jeff, we're really in a debate about to what extent will section 215 be amended to prohibit bulk -- bulk collection or to permit it in some circumstances but more limited than not. i think that's the debate. i don't think there's going to be a completely binary question on that. and as for reform, i'm pretty confident that there's enough support to get it through. from the government's perspective, all the large provider -- virtually all the large providers, not all of

them virtually all of them are requiring warrants for content. they're basing that stance on a six-circuit case called the warshack case where the court found a warrant is required and no court has gone the other way, no circuit court has gone the other way, so all the providers are pretty much lined up behind that case saying if you need content, you need to come back with a warrant. so what's the big deal about statutizing it? >> great. i want to take up the last big issue on the table and that is cyber security and ahmed, i love the fact your biography says you're accused of being -- >> that's a client. >> are you in fact, the spokesperson? >> no. my client, barrett brown, was accused of being the spokesperson -- >> i'm sorry. there's a big misreading of the bio. you were not the spokesperson. you were the lawyer for the spokesperson.

so, i can still ask you the question. the argument against recent lose by apples and others to encrypt data is it makes hard for law enforcement and others to get law enforcement and other really serious bad guys. what do you think of those arguments? >> it certainly makes it more difficult but i don't think those are good arguments to prevent a maker of technology not to provide secure and robust technology to customers. for me it's really open and shut. but it's interesting because you've got a lot of different technologies being developed and having dual purposes. the notion is -- someone mentioned vpns earlier. the idea of sort of cloaking your online identity or 8 using

anonomizing technology to the computer on the end point from whatever communications you're making will not where you're located, will not know your ip address. that's a huge problem for law enforcement because law enforcement generally likes to go through friendly thirty parties, like the isp. as a result of that, for instance there's been a mod -- or there there be a modification of rule 41 of the federal rules of criminal procedure allowing fbi agents to hack into computers as a mode of search. now, when you apply that to targets whose location is unknown, almost 90% of those targets are going to be outside of the united states. so now you have a situation where an fbi agent or a prosecutor with an fbi agent are making an application to a magistrate judge getting a warrant to conduct a hack. there's a nine out of ten chance that hack is going to be abroad and it's unilateral. you haven't gotten consent to

that country. and so all of a sudden you've got a magistrate judge and law enforcement engaging in what i would think of as foreign relations. so, i guess -- i'm telling this story to sort of underscore the complexity of all these technologies but also the fact that law enforcement is not and should not trump everything. i would also note this rule modification would be used in general crimes so we're not just limiting it to national security. cyber security is the new national security. and so when kenneth -- the great examples kenneth gave on stopping a terror attack, those exact same type of scenarios could be presented in the cyber security context because in fact, cyber security is a higher national security threat than terrorism. so, i'm wondering -- and that is the perfect slippery slope

right? so, you've got a lot more information sharing between private companies and a very vague indicator of whatever cyber threat information is. i don't know what it is. and that also being shared with governments. at the same time you're trying to protect for certain abuse of that information sharing, such as anti-trust violation, for instance. so, a great deal of that has to happen in a black box where nobody can really be exposed to it. and some would argue that makes it private as well. in fact, i think the leading view in scholarship on privacy is that you need some form of human exposure. all to say, that we've got more information being exchanged or shared and analytics being conducted on that information. and then outcomes that are pretty opaque to the naked eye. and for me again i think

that's -- it's not just a privacy issue. it's also a chilling of speech issue but really a due process in the end. >> nice to draw those connections. david, does google have a position, first on -- what's google's reaction to apple's decision to encrypt and what's its position on the cyber security bills? >> thanks. yeah. we're sort of moving toward the result of encrypting devices in the same way. we've encountered some issues just with the performance of devices that run on the android operating system it's a little different, as you know because apple has a soup to nuts operation whereas we work with different carriers, different original equipment manufacturers but we're very much heading in that direction. just to take a step back there is a tendency to view the movement toward end-to-end encryption as necessarily

responsive to the snowden revelations. i think that's oversimplifies the debate. at least vis-a-vis google. we've been working on that encryption transit to the browser and now end-to-end encryption but we were working on these things for quite some time, well before the snowden revelations. and i think looking at surveillance as a common denominator is the wrong approach. looking at it from a security lens is exactly the right approach. if you look at the number over the last 15 years the top complaint made to the federal trade commission is identity theft, we take that pretty seriously in terms of trying to think about the ways we can protect our users. it is true the snowden revelations in some senses have created additional sort of -- if you want to call them sort of vectors for you know for

compromise, the revelations have certainly taught us a lot about the ways that theoretically the government is obtaining data and service providers have reacted in some ways accordingly. but this is a much more complex debate than simply like whether companies are nsa-proofing or law enforcement-proofing devices. that's really not what this is about. in a lot of sense it's you know, one of the reasons i think folks in the smartphone space have been doing this is because of complaints around lost and stolen phones and the fact that a vast majority of consumers, unfortunately, don't avail themselves to even basic security measures to data stored on those phones. part of that is about protecting users just with basic security so that they -- that that type of data isn't compromised. you asked about cyber security. let me say briefly we filed comments in this proposed change

to rule 41 of the federal rules of criminal procedure. and for some of the very reasons that ahmed was just mentioning. i mentioned before that we need to think more in our privacy policy debates about the rights of non-u.s. persons. one of the reasons we wanted to file is because of the concerns about how -- you know, how these sort of cross-district searches would be undertaken in light of some of the network sort of investigative techniques we know are out there. and the fact that the rule assumes that the outset that the location of the electronic media or storage is going to be unknown, it is a virtual certainty there will be instances where those devices will be located oversea. so, it's important for us in that respect, i think, to engage. on the cyber security bill i mean, we haven't -- we haven't taken a position on the bill

itself. i will say that you know there are obviously some concerns about, you know, sequentially taking up a bill that has real concerns around privacy before we sort of take up surveillance reform legislation. so i would say that, you know, particularly given the expiration of section 215 coming at the end of may, that ought to be the priority. but i also think that we should -- if we're having a debate about cyber security, i think information sharing is not in and of itself a panacea. i worry the debate has been sort of -- sort of reflects that as a truism when that's not necessarily the case. i think we can have a broader discussion about zero vulnerabilities, for example whether those vulnerabilities are being disclosed to the private sector in a timely manner, what are the government policies around that, whether those policies ought to be codified so there is as the

administration alluded to clear sharing instead of stockpiling. that's a real issue and i hopeful we'll have that discussion in the context of the broader cyber security policy debate. >> thank you for those thoughtful comments. i want to get to questions right away, but i have to ask ken as a former prosecutor, are you concerned by the movement by apple and now we learn by google toward encryption? >> yes i am. i'm very concerned about it. i mean and the government has expressed -- the executive branch expressed its concerns. jim comey, most recently last week in congress was taking a very strong stand about the dangers of absolute encryption, that it puts content beyond the reach of law enforcement. and jim comey is a man who picks his battles carefully and calibrates the strength of his position and he did so i think very intentionally in this case because of the seriousness of the issue. i think someone said earlier on, data security or communication

security is good for the bottom line. that's true. but terrorist attacks are bad for the bottom line. the reality is there is -- the concern here is not that encryption might make it more difficult for the government to get information that might relate to terrorists or other threats, it's that this encryption could make it impossible. and so the battlefield here is not we need to give the government full rein and open season to go get -- you know, access this content whatever they want. no. the question is, if the government goes through the process of getting a warrant, meets the criteria for a warrant, has the predicate information to get a warrant gets a warrant should they be foiled by the fact that that information is encrypted? and we know it's going to happen. once a certain category of communication or providers are recognized as having encryption as beyond the capabilities of the government that's exactly

where the bad actors are going to gravitate to. so the question is, i've heard two arguments in the press about this. one is as a technical matter it's really not possible to put a back door or some kind of access that just the government can use without creating a vulnerability that others may use. and i -- you know, that's a technical matter. you know my first reaction is there's got to be a way to do it but that's really for the technical people to iron out. i've seen both sides of that issue played out in the press. the second argument is gosh, if you did create a process like that for the u.s. government, shouldn't we also have to do that for other governments? and i get that argument. i get that argument for an international, multinational corporation. but at the end of the day, i'm personally looking out for the interest of this government and my feeling is this government needs that information. i see how critical con tense

surveyillance of communications is in just the counterterrorism fight as opposed to any other area of enforcement or intelligence operations. and to have that put beyond the reach of the government, i think, could be very dangerous. >> thanks very much for that. we have about ten minutes for questions. both for your questions and questions submitted through gmail with complete security and privacy, i'm sure, thanks to david. so, are there any questions from the audience? or we can begin with some of our great gmail questions. >> so, there's currently three of them. i'm going to go through all of them. the first one is, it's another hypothetical. but what about left clear surveillance. consider a street level robot segway up and down streets observes and reports traffic congestion and also collects face imagery and location information from every pedestrian it passes. so, someone is giving you a hypothetical. >> great. shall we start with that or -- >> sure, go ahead.

>> what a great hypothetical. kind of real. i was at -- now, this sounds name-dropping but i was at south by southwest the other day and there was a cool robot going down the street. i don't know what the app is but it was a woman in some other city who was skyping at her computer and was walking down the street and this robot observing the scenes. so the hypo takes it a little further where the robot is recording information like a roving google street view and collecting and aggravating. i guess this -- greg, is that any less problematic than the flying drone? it's the street level rather than overhead. >> again, for both i don't think we have laws that really deal with either. the drone that can collect data 4/7 and follow an individual around no matter what their mode

of transportation is seems a lot more intrusive than a robot that probably only moves a few feet an hour and can't really follow one person around for a long time. but i do want to follow up on the encryption comments ken was making. we are -- we have to be encrypting more and more data. every time you buy something on the internet, that communication, it has to be encrypted. if it's not, bad guys can get it and get your credit card information and then you're not going to make purchases on the internet. you're not going to go to different places on the internet where it's not secure to make the queries you want to make. so, we are going to have more encryption. and we're going to need it. and i can't fathom, i really can't fathom, congress coming up with legislation that would actually make communications and communications devices less

secure. i just can't believe that they would do that at the same time there's all this debate about cyber security. i don't think we're going down that road, ken. >> thanks for that. yes, sir? >> ahmed, this is related to the proposed rule changes to rule 41 specifically. i'm wondering what you think might be potential kind of avenues of attack for defense attorneys in the future that are going to be you know, defending cases where the fbi -- i mean, we've seen cases already where the fbi has been hacking into servers located abroad. unfortunately, being able to, you know, get away with it. but maybe somehow under these new rule changes, when they do come into effect, there will be some -- some possible grounds for -- for attack from defense attorneys and, you know, defending against this type of4l[p

hacking by law enforcement. i'm just wondering what you anticipate might be some of those arguments. >> so i think -- i think one good argument of course it would depend on the method of attack so presuming that one very popular method of executing a network investigative technique is a phishing attack which is essentially sending someone an e-mail and duping them into clicking into something and the malware gets installed on their machine. at that point the fbi agent/hacker is in control of the machine. something like a phishing attack, for instance, might violate the fourth amendments requirement for particularity. and that is because you are sending essentially your identifier is not the actual computer, it is somebody's e-mail address. that e-mail address can be

accessed from any computer. if i were at a public library or if i were at your computer, i got a phishing attack, your computer gets infected and then they find some sort of criminal activity you're up to, i think that would be a great challenge. i think there -- the -- the international issues and the territorial issues are not as easy to challenge, obviously, because we've just heard throughout the day that the privacy rights abroad exist even less than they do in the united states. so, it would be -- i would be very hard pressed to find a judge that would actually register an argument that, a, i had a reasonable expectation of privacy being abroad, for instance, or using the synonimizing technology or b, the violation of another state's

sovereignty. i think you might be referring to like the silk road case for instance. silk road case you had the fbi agents -- well the fbi agents were alleged to have typed in a series of key strokes at the capture page for the silk road. and that that series of key strokes was equivocal to hacking the server. and that is what got them to know of the location of the machine. its true ip address. and i think you'd be very hard pressed to say that, well you know, you violated another state's sovereignty in hacking a machine abroad without taking their consent and somehow that relates to a suppression motion somehow. of course the fundamental problem with all this is the fact that you are -- you're asking for ex-relief in a world

where the exclusionary rule does not really help you very much. and professor kerr explained that all in the last panel. >> that sounds great. we have just four minutes left, so why don't you give us one more gmail question. >> justice sotomayor wrote in jones, even short periods of -- because of the associational and private information it reveals and the technology allow searches that were once prohibitively expensive. to what extent does our right to travel and cheap information protect fourth amendment analysis? >> greg? >> so i think it affects both fourth amendment and first amendment analysis, right? because there is a chilling effect surveillance can have on the exercise of free speech rights.

but sotomayor went even further than that quote that -- that she just gave us. she questioned whether the third-party dom trin, the doctrine that says when you entrust data to a third party, for example, to -- so it can be transmitted in connection with a communication, whether the third-party doctrine which says that data isn't protected by the fourth amendment, continues to serve us well. so, she's -- it's a fascinating opinion. she's questioning really the whole basis for law enforcement access to a lot of information without a warrant. and i just -- i'm waiting for that location case to get in front 69 court so we can see where the third-party doctrine is going. >> well, i would love to continue this thoughtful, diverse and fascinating discussion but all panels have

to end on time and some of us have to get home for passover. happy passover and happy easter and join me in thanking our panelists for a great discussion. tonight on an encore q & a dick lehr talks about his book "the birth of a nation." about the 1915 movie of the same title. the film by d.w. griffith was shown to president woodrow wilson at the white house and across the nation despite attempts by african-american civil rights advocate and newspaper publisher will yan monroe trotter and others to stop it. mr. trotter took griffith to task for his portrayal in the film of african-americans in the post-civil wear era. you can watch that q&a interview today at 7 p.m. eastern on c-span2. this sunday on q&a senior

editor for "the weekly standard," and what voters are looking for in a candidate. >> they want somebody who looks like he's stood up for them. i'm amazed to which the degree of which primary voters on both sides are motivated by resentment and the sense of being put upon. you know those people really don't understand us. here's a guy who does understand us and he's going to stick it to them. and that happens on both sides. hillary clinton will give her own version of that kind of thing. and i don't think that was actually true 30 years ago. i mean resentment has always been part of politics obviously, but the degree to which it's almost exclusively the motivating factor in truly committed republicans and democrats. >> sunday night at 8 p.m.

eastern and pacific on c-span's q&a. the national council on u.s. arab relations head a discussion analyzing the iran nuclear framework agreement. a panel talks about the specifics of that agreement and gives assessment on implications for iran's regional neighbors, the relationship with the u.s., its impact on the energy sector and its potential to be finalized by the end of june. speengers include a former nuclear negotiator for iran. this event was hosted by national council on u.s. arab relations. thank you for coming this morning on such short notice we put this together on sunday

monday, and to hear from a distinguished panel who follow these matters and events on a daily basis. this morning i'm -- i'm honored to be your moderator. i'm john pratt. i joined the national council on u.s. arab council after spending 35 years in the gulf in the energy field. i'm well aware of the impact, implications and the importance of the iran nuclear deal for the peoples of the region. before we begin i would like to thank c-span for covering this event live today. and for covering our public affairs briefing last thursday on yemen, held in this room, at which the saudi ambassador to washington spoke at the conclusion of that session. c-span coverage of last week's briefing is available on our website, www.ncusar.org. a quick brief -- a quick word

about the national council on u.s./arab relations. established 33 years ago as a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization. its guiding vision is one of education. it seeks to educate americans about the arab countries, the middle east and the islamic work. and place relations between our friends, allies and strategic partners across the region on as firm a foundation as possible and to continuously expand this relationship to mutual benefit. the council accomplishes this through a varietybñ(÷ of programs. aimed at policymakers in congress, students academics and our armed forces. it organizes an annual policymakers conference here in washington conducts study abroad internship and youth leadership development programs, such as the ones held this weekend in houston and washington. beginning tomorrow over 400 young americans will represent 22 arab countries in model arab

league program to debate pressing issues of the day. with over 38,000 alumni, this program serves to ensure that the next generation of americans are better prepared to plan predict and conduct economic political and commercial relations in a region so vital to the united states. today our panel will assess the iran nuclear deal, its issues and implications. it will be -- it would be incorrect to say that this is a done deal. this is a preliminary agreement. a framework with many so-called technical issues to be sorted out in the coming months. by june 30th to be precise. as has been said repeatedly, the devil is basically in the details. in the meantime, the public debate will be vigorous and intense. is this a good thing or a bad thing? what do our regional partners and allies think? will this define the legacy of a

president in the home stretch of his administration? to be sure, the president has described this has a once in a lifetime opportunity, to see if we can, quote/unquote take the nuclear issue off the table and bring regional stability to the middle east. let us today and in the coming months see whether these noble objectives are possible or achievable. before we kick off just a few housekeeping details. each of the speakers will have 10 to 12 minutes for their remarks. in the interest of time, i refer you to their bios in our announcement. this will allow for a full hour of questions and discussions. and on your chairs you'll find three by five cards. please write your question on these cards and pass them to our ushers, who will bring them forward. and we will do our best to respond as fully as possible.

we will wrap up promptly at noon. to start, i'm pleased to introduce our first speaker, the founding president and ceo of the national council on u.s./arab relations, dr. john duke anthony. dr. anthony is well known and well respected in the region and in washington. he is the only american observer to have attended each gcc minister on heads of state summit since 1981. after dr. anthony ambassador mousavian of the woodrow wilson school at principle ton, followed by dr. mattair and then dr. kenneth katzman, specialist on congressional research service will present his remarks. next we will hear from dr. imad harb distinguished fellow at national council on u.s./arab relations. concluding, dr. paul sullivan,

senior international affairs fellow at national council and professor of economics at the national defense university will wrap up the panel presentation. dr. anthony, if you would kindly come to the podium and kick off our discussion on this deal. >> thank you john. when we were putting together this seminar, we came up with 14 aspects, 14 factors fa nom that windows, prisms through which one could look at what has just occurred with the preliminary agreement. the framework. and the challenges it represents. but the opportunities it also represents. and we are only going to be able to address perhaps, around eight of these 14 factors. but we will be as frank and candid as we can. much is unknown.

in my brief remarks here has to do with the fears, the needs, the concerns of three of iran's neighbors. oman, bahrain, saudi arabia. and tom mattair will deal with the united arab emirates country and kuwait. and this is a division of labor here. but first a few statistics so as to keep certain things in perspective. with regard to say, saudi arabia's concerns, saudi arabia is the epicenter of prayer and pilgrimage, of faith and spiritual devotion. for some 1.5 million muslims worldwide. and inasmuch as iran is the

leading country with a largely shia orientation on the theological stage, there is inherently implicitly, explicitly, a degree of competition, though neither would express it as i just did. iran is perceived as being on a roll in a run. above the beyond the nuclear agreement in terms of its leaders making reference to iran's unprecedented influence and four arab capitals. this itself would be of concern to a country such as saudi arabia, but also others in the league of arab states. but on the figures there of the 1.5 billion muslims in the world, 2 billion christians 1 billion of those 2 billion being

roman catholics some 200 million muslims identify with the shia sect of islam. overall, we're talking about some 12% of the world's muslims being shia. this is important to keep in mind when one reads the media and listens to people speak about the threat that iran poses. 12% taking on 88%? something's wrong with that picture. so, the framing needs to be radically different. and at the governmental level the highest organization to which muslim countries belong is the organization of the islamic conference. it has 57 members. no more than 4 of those 57 would be predominantly shia in the

orientation of their government. and so the numbers there are heavily imbalanced and not in favor of iran. and this too, needs to be kept in perspective. now, with regard to oman, saudi arabia and bahrain these three are profoundly similar in their concerns regarding iran, because they're neighbors of iran, they have issues with iran, they have similar needs and concerns and similar interests and similar foreign policy objectives. and yet there are divergecies in and amongst them. when people talk about threat analysis, it's usually where they're located. people in maine and vermont, for example, are not really so concerned about jamaican and

haitian boat people coming to their shores. and likewise those in florida are not obsessed with the same kinds of concerns that people who live in new england are concerned.concerned. and so this is another way of looking at the needs and concerns, interesting and foreign policy objectives of these countries. oman is different from all of the gcc countries in the sense that it has the best -- the most amicable smooth, stable secure relationship with iran and this is not new. this has been the case almost since the beginning of the iranian revolution in 1979 and it dates from before then. part of it has to do with the body of water between them known as the hormuz strait. many people have the image that most of the shipping goes through iran's waters coming in to the gulf and exiting the gulf.

this is not the case. the overwhelming vast majority of the sea born traffic goes through oman's waters. there are three lanes. one two-mile wide lane for ships coming in to the gulf another two-mile wide zone for ships going out of the gulf, and a two-mile zone between the two that is a safety zone. and so the strategic and geographic challenge is far greater on the omani side than on the iranian side. and you can look at the map here to see what we're talking about. that little piece of oman at the top of the peninsula. it's separated from oman like alaska is separated from the continental united states. but this drives the strategic aspect between oman and iranian relations. that's not going to be a

conflict between the two. certainly that started by oman. oman's citizen base is less than 2 million. whereas iran's is 80 million. and so the numbers there again should drive your perspective, your analysis, your assessment of what the issues are and the implications. but there's more. iran sent close to 30,000 soldiers to oman in the period from roughly 1972 through 1974 to help oman put down a guerrilla rebel marxist oriented uprising in oman's southern most province. no other country -- arab or non-arab -- did as much as iran did to help oman regain its

security and stability. there are no territorial issues either between the two, unlike territorial issues that exist between some of iran's other neighbors and iran. with regard to bahrain, the situation there is also numerically fruitful for your analysis. if people made frequent reference to some 60% of iraq's population being shia and yet ruled by a sunni government under the regime of saddam hussein, you have a situation that's even more imbalanced in the case of bahrain where you have the last remaining arab country with a sunni government ruling over a majority shia population. and despite the much renowned

report that came out as a result of bahrain's uprisings in 2011 in which there was a declaratory statement that there was no evidence of iranian involvement in those uprisings. here is where perception comes in and perception is often mistaken for or even more powerful a force than reality. around 3,000 bahrainis have been trained in oman coming straight out of secondary school. financed by the shia merchants in bahrain. and they go at age 17 16 18. some stay for a semester. some stay for a year. they go largely to kom, not tehran, the theological seminary base of shiaism in iran. and then they return to bahrain.

some of those are recorded by the bahraini intelligence security services as forming sleeper cells. in other words, one day they may be called upon to return the favor of the education and the training and the leadership development that they acquired as a result of iran. and so when the bahraini government speaks about iranian involvement, there is this dimension that does not come out in the media but should help one frame bahrain's concerns on top of periodic statements not from the most senior iranian officials but iranian representatives of the government, nonetheless, that bahrain should revert to iranian control and influence. this is, of course, disturbing to any bahraini tasked with security and stability issues.

saudi arabia likewise, is concerned because of the significant shia population in its eastern province. with respect to which, there is far less evidence than there is and has been in the case of bahrain's needs and concerns but saudi arabians have become quite open in accusing iran of being behind in terms of the inspiration of the attacks on the al qoba towers in 1996. lots of people americans and others, were killed. this is just a brief overview to begin the discussion by showing that there's no unanimity of viewpoint in assessment and analysis of all of iran's neighbors. it differs from one to the next like snowflakes and finger sprints, no two are the same. now we have the privilege and

pleasure of listening to ambassador saad hossein. >> iran and the world powers both conceded the deal agreed in switzerland as a win-win deal. to my understanding, there is five reasons why iranians they would concede the deal with iran. number one is that the deal contains respect for iranian nuclear technology including enrichment, heavy water and light water. number two is ultimately the

sanctions would be lists even gradually. number three is that ultimately the iranian nuclear file at the iaea would be normalized. and number four is that again ultimately the iranian nuclear file would be removed from chapter 7 united nations security council and all resolutions would be terminated. and number four is that iran after a period would be able to have a normal peaceful cooperation on peaceful nuclear technology with the world powers. this is something iran has been sanctioned from the day one of

revolution. the world powers they considered the deal a win for themselves. again, i would like to give you five reasons why they believe this is a win for the world powers for the u.s. number one, iran accepted the maximum level of transparency and verification measures within nonproliferation treat yaytreaty. we have safeguard agreement. we have additional protocol and we have subsidiary arrangement called 3.1. these are three arrangements for verification and transparency with nonproliferation and iaea. iran has been present for all three arrangements. number two is iran would agree -- has agreed to add all

possibility issues which would need to give verification, trainers transparency inspection to the iaea. practically the world powers, they have got the most intrusive, strong, powerful verification history. during the history of proliferation in the deal with iran. no other member state of npt has ever been committed like iran on verification and transparency measures. number four is they were looking for a break after one year in case iran decide to go for nuclear weapon. there would be a written break-up of one year, they have got it. and number five, for confidence building measures, the u.s. and the world powers they need a time due to 35 years of

hostility. and this deal implementation for measures are about 10 to 25 years. therefore, they have got enough time for almost a decade to a quarter of century. to my understanding this is a mutual win the deal for both. and again i would like to give you five reasons why this is a win-win -- a mutual win for both of them. first, through diplomatic solution they were able to escape a devastating war in the middle east. perhaps this is one of the very rare occasions that big crisis in the middle east has been resolved or is going to be completely resolved through

diplomacy. second, they have been able to set a new mechanism for verification for. nondiversion toward representation. many nuclear experts they believe npt is not enough. many many they believe even additional protocol which is the maximum level of transparency, is not enough. and the sets of measures is practically a new mechanism of verification and transparency assuring nondiversion toward politicization for the first time for beyond npt. therefore if they are wise enough, the world powers to embed the agreements with iran on broader scope regionally and

internationally, this would be a big, big gain for proliferation globally. number four is that perhaps this is the first evidence the engagement policy of president obama announced in 2009 has worked. the world and the u.s. have been trying for 35 years to improve relations. lot of efforts. all have failed. and this is the first time a success is stamped at the highest level of negotiation between iran and the u.s. which definitely would have implication on relation between iran and the west. and number five, it opens the door to a regional dialogue between iran and the world powers, iran and the west, iran

and the u.s. tehran and washington they decided not to go for broader dialogue, cooperation, negotiations on other issues unless they reached something on the nuclear. therefore, this deal, if it is finalized by july 1st can open door for iran and the u.s. to cooperate on -- to have a regional dialogue to cooperate on common interests, common threats. it's obvious now the extremism, terrorism, isis al qaeda, they are threat to the region to even u.s. allies, to iran to international community, and there is a consensus that the threat number one to

international peace and security today is isis and other versions of isis like al qaeda. and there is indirect cooperation between iran and the u.s. americans are leading the air strike against isis. iranians they are key element, key force on the ground battle against isis. they have common interest for peace and stability in iraq, peace and stability in afghanistan, and many other issues like security of energy. so therefore, this is step one toward -- if they want, now they can open a dialogue to cooperate on commonalities and common threats. giving five reasons why iranians are happy, giving five reasons why the p5+1 is happy and five reasons why the international

community and the region should be happy. i believe everything is not over yet. they have a lot to do until july 1st. many, many technical issues have remained unresolved. therefore, i cannot say the deal is 100% done. second, with a nuclear deal 35 years of hostilities between iran and the u.s. is not going to be over. there is a huge mistrust between iran and the u.s. iran and the west. and some u.s. allies in the region, even israelis they are very much worried whether after the deal iranians and americans they would go to bed, i want to assure them they are not going to bed soon. it takes time and this only could be the first step.

thank you. >> i now ask the next speaker to address you. >> thank you. ten minutes isn't a lot of time, but what i want to say is that there is -- there are positive developments in this nuclear framework agreement, and enough progress to go forward with more months of negotiations over technical details and find out whether it's -- it can be implemented. the gcc states, particularly uae, kuwait and qatar which i've been asked to talk about, are making cautious statements about a willingness to see what the

details are and to see whether more progress can be made and whether something air-tight can be developed and implemented. but i say it's cautious because there is a lot of skepticism in these states. and it's not just skepticism about the nuclear deal itself. the other concern which is perhaps even greater in some cases is that united states in exchange for this agreement is going to acquiesce in the expansion of iranian influence in the arab world. they are looking at iran's influence in iraq after the u.s. invasion and toppling of that whole system. iran's relationship with the assad regime and its help for the assad regime. its influence over hezbollah.

its influence over shia communities in bahrain, et cetera, and now in yemen. so that concern about what the united states is going to do is really great on their part. in fact they're concerned that the united states might even consent to iranians in the region. when we hear talk about isis or al qaeda, these states are also asking that the united states pay equal amount of attention to iranian backed shia militias in iraq, syria and elsewhere. if we are not doing that and are concentrating only on city jihadists, it concerns them pretty gravely. now, about the uae in particular they have a special

reason for being skeptical about iran. and i was specifically asked to address this issue so i will. it concerns three islands in the approaches to the shipping lanes inside the gulf to the west of the strait of hormuz. they lie along the shipping lanes. if you control them, you control the shipping lanes. at least for a period of time. and the shah of iran wanted those islands and took them just before the united arab emirates became independent in early december 1971. he explained that he wanted them for strategic reasons because he was concerned that radicals in the region might take them, might be able to interfere with shipping. john was talking about the dofar revolution and the shah's intervention there. he was concerned that those people might take them for example. but, it's also very much the

case that the prime minister's of iran were telling the british in the 1950s and 1960s they were also interested in potential oil deposits and gas deposits offshore of those islands. so they did take them, although the uae has a strong historical and legal claim to the islands, and has ever since tried to press that claim in the international arena. and it has had the support of other gcc states and it has had the support of the arab league. and this support has continued during the 19 -- after the revolution, of course, in 1979. and one could see during that period of time that those islands can be useful because during the tanker war when iran was interfering with shipping

coming out of kuwait and other states in the gulf it did use those islands, and it did use its military assets on those islands, as well as its offshore oil installations to interfere with shipping and the united states eventually got involved in escorting convoys of kuwaiti and other gulf shipping out of the gulf. but it demonstrated the military utility of those islands. and even when there was a thaw, in the early 1990s, after the iran/iraq war was over the gcc states, the uae, kuwait qatar were interested enough -- concerned enough about iran's general military capabilities in the region its conventional and its asymmetric military capabilities in the region on its coast and on the islands and the monitorization of its military after the iran/iraq war. they were concerned enough about that to start signing security

pacts with the united states, to open up their space for american airfields and to face centcom and that concerned iran greatly and they complained about that greatly during that period of time. iran has conducted naval exercises in the region. some of those naval exercises have involved attempts to block passage through the strait of hormuz. uae, kuwait, qatar and others are participating in gcc and u.s.-led naval exercises so they would be able to counter that. they're certainly purchasing a great deal of american military agreement to modernize their forces to be a ibl toble to contain any potential iranian aggression. although it is impossible to tell what iran's intentions are, these states are looking at iran's capabilities.

its fast attack craft, its anti-ship missiles and so many other acquisitions that they've made over the past decades and they believe they need at least the ability to deter that and are getting that from the united states. however, as i said when i began they're not just concerned about the nuclear agreement. they're concerned about the trustworthiness of the united states. there was a time -- i heard one of the officials say there was a time when the united states was a force to be reckoned with. and now it is a problem to be dealt with. which means that they are not sure that they can trust the united states. united states does say we have your back whether it comes to an external aggression. but they're looking at our intervention in iraq they're looking at our hesitation in syria. they're looking at our repeated failure, decade after decade to help the palestinians liberate themselves from the israelis and

they're asking what kind of political judgment does the united states have. so this is all part of their concern about the nuclear agreement and why they want assurances from the united states that we're going to do something about iran's presence in the arab world. they are actually concerned we might go back to the concept we had when the british withdrew from the gulf in the early 1970s. which was the twin pillar policy where we supported both iran and saudi arabia against the soviet union. but more of the support went to iran because it was more highly developed. that concept comes up. they're concerned about that. they're also concerned that -- but as i said before, they're even more concerned that we would tilt toward iran an recognize iran's power andr

populationçó and industry andñi÷ú technological base andxdó[think their aspirations in the region should be accepted. so while these countries will stay that they have a cautious willingness to consider this agreement, i would say that there is a substantial concern there. you can even say it in the case of qatar that although it's often said that their relations with iran are cordial, almost as cordial as oman's, i would point out that they did vote in favor, when they had a rotating seat on the security council they did vote in favor of security council resolution 1737 in december of 2006, and voted in favor of security council resolution 1747 in march 2007.

both of those resolutions imposed sanctions on iran because of its nuclear program and ballistic missile program. and identified people who should be sanctioned and institutions and banks that should be sanctioned. so they're on record as being concerned about that program. and i would even say that in these capitals there are people who who, if this agreement fails to satisfy them if they feel that they are in danger because of the potentially additional boldness that iran might think if it were allowed eventually to escape from these inspections and restrictions in 10 or 20 or 30 years, these are states that might think about other options very reluctantly but they are countries that have talked about how we need to keep all options

on the table if this agreement doesn't work out. thank you. >> thank you very much john for inviting me. i will probably not talk for ten minutes since my medicines wear off in eight minutes. so that's my limit. i am in a crs capacity today so i will be in crs style today which is objective, nonpartisan. if there's congressional staff in the room, i work for you. so ask away. i can plan to see you afterwards and clear up anything that's unclear. i will confine most of my comments today to the sanctions part of the deal the issue.

it's clear from both the iranian and the u.s. faqs sheet that all of the sanctions that have been imposed by the u.s. and the eu other than human rights related sanctions that have been imposed since 2010 u.n. resolution 1929 of june 2010 are going to be relieved as a consequence of this agreement if it's finalized. that means iran's being shut out of the international banking system would come to an end. iran's being shut out of the swift electronic payment system would end. sanctions on iran's sale of oil sanctions on iran's shipping of oil, sanctions on insurance of iranian oil tankers. sanctions on buying iranian petro chemicals. sanctions on supplying iran with

automotive geef. sanctions with supplying iran with oil drilling exploration equipment. all of these would presumably come to a conclusion if this deal is finalized and when the iae certifies that iran has complied. this is still a little bit unclear, has to be clarified a little bit more when the deal is finalized. but apparently the iaea is going to be the arbiter. they are going to certify that iran has reduced its stockpile to the 300 pounds, or whatever the agreement says that iran has dismantled 15000 centrifuges and put them away. when these things are certified that's when the sanctions would be relieved is my -- is what i'm seeing. even though the two facts sheets differ a little bit.

iran would by these measures gain access to approximately $130 billion to 150 billion mr. in hard in hard currency reserves, some of which is in south korea some of which is in gentlemanjapan. these are hard currency payments made for oil and that iran is unable to move back to the central bank. no government has impounded this money. no government has taken title to this money. it is iran's money. these are in bank accounts under iran's name but because of the banking sanctions iran -- no bank will cooperate in helping iran move this money back to the central bank. that's why it's overseas and iran has not been able to get to it. so theyed that these are frozen assets or impounded assets that is ñnb incorrect. that these are

frozen assets or impounded assets, that is incorrect.id that these are frozen assets or impounded assets, that is incorrect.e that these are frozen assets or impounded assets, that is incorrect.a that these are frozen assets or impounded assets, that is incorrect. i see many so oil people in the audience here. like i said, one of the big things is that iran would be able to freely export oil again. what does that mean. well, there are five countries currently that have active exemptions to avoid u.s. sanctions to buy oil. they are buying iranian oil. japan, south korea, china turkey and india. these countries could conceivably, as soon as the sanctions are relieved they could increase their orders for iranian oil and iran could start supplying those five with more oil. the eu which -- the eu enacted a ban on purchases of iranian oil so it will take longer for the eu to start buying iranian oil again because the eu would have to meet, they have to get a consensus, there has to be a political decision to lift that

ban so that could be perhaps maybe early 2016. the other five that i mentioned could conceivably -- let's say there is a deal in june. let's say the iea gives the go-ahead. september, october those five could conceivablebly start buying more iranian oil right away. the iranian economy in my estimation is likely to rebound fairly quickly. this 1$130 billion $150 billion that i mentioned that iran would get access to, that is virtually equal to iran's year -- one entire bug year that they would instantly have hard currency. the value of iran's real would rise instantly. inflation would fall. employment would increase. the people whose shops are shuttered, their factories are shuttered would reopen. people would go back to work. some people go to work but they

don't, right now under the sanctions regime they are going to work but they basically drink tea all day. they may get paid three months late and the boss might give them maybe a quarter of what they're owed. i mean this is what is going on now. basically the entire iranian economy is in a state of suspension suspended animation. the entire economy is waiting for this deal to get done and the sanctions relief to occur. that's when everybody goes back to work and starts getting paid again, starts buying clothes again, buying electronics. this is when the economy fires up again. and just to close, i'll just talk a little -- since i am with crs obviously, the administration plan is if this deal is finalized there would be use of presidential waiver on

the u.s. sanctions on the foreign companies that have been so effective. and then after some period of iranian compliance no one has specified how much. i personally think it is about a year, but don't quote me necessarily on that. the administration plans to then ask congress to enact legislation that would change modify or repeal or revoke the u.s. sanctions that have been put in place by statute. and then it would be a congressional decision at that point. the u.n. sanctions under the deal apparently will be relieved. and so if congress did not act, obviously those sanctions would stay in force and there could be obviously debate between the united states and u.s. allies as far as the sanctions relief because the u.s. sanctions on the foreign companies would still be enforced. but anyway the plan would be to

have a period of iranian compliance, and then ask the congress to enact sanctions relief under the agreement. i think i'll stop there. thank you. >> good morning, everybody. thanks for being here on such an april shower morning. while i was asked to speak about basically the agreement as it applies or does not apply to what's going on in lebanon and syria where iran has a lot of influence. basically the negotiations themselves as far as we know did not discuss anything outside of the negotiations on the nuclear program. so there were supposedly no --

there was no connection, specific connection between iran's other issues in its foreign policy and the region or the world, for that matter. but generally speaking, everybody knew -- everybody knows that the nuclear program was only a part of iranian foreign policy but -- or negotiations on the nuclear program, but also it, itself, no matter how much we deny there is a connection, there is a connection to iranian influence in other places and that specific negotiation had its impact on other things. basically two perspectives, that iran basically used the issue of its role in lebanon and syria to try to get a better deal on the nuclear program.

and the other one is that it didn't. but the way it's seen in these two countries with iranian influence in both countries, both through its support of the syrian regime, and support of hezbollah in lebanon, it's -- everybody there thinks that there has to be some sort of an outcome that may reflect on political positions -- or political conditions in both countries. in other words if iran resolves its issue on the nuclear file like the ambassador already mentioned, will there be basically outcomes related to other foreign policy issues in which iran is involved. in lebanon, the country's actually almost on the verge of collapse. the state is slowly almost

imploding. there is a condition where it's almost like ken said earlier suspended animation in lebanon. there's no president. there's no presidential elections have been held to elect the new president since last may. and basically hezbollah and its ally on the christian side are the ones who are holding up the process. why that thing is going on is really beyond in he rational interpretation because if it is really the person of the president that's important everybody's influence is thinking what about the future of the country, what about the fate of that country. without a president there is no constitutional continuity so to speak. and today the executive

authority is in the hands of the prime minister who at any time can be sent home basically by specifically if hezbollah and its allies in the lebanese political system just simply withdraw from that political process. so that is a very, very important consideration. there are obviously other issues. sectarian polarization in the country where unfortunately, a lot of -- some sunnis -- not a lot because the traditional leadership of the sunnis in the country in lebanon is still able to really maintain control over its community. but there are those people out there who are basically starting to voice the issue of okay well, we, the sunnis are not getting what we are supposed to be getting. the shia are basically controlling the country. on the other hand, through hezbollah, that is. on the other hand, the shia and hezbollah are also worried about a very very important development in lebanon over the

last three or four years, the presence of 1.6 million syrian refugees. the overwhelming majority of them are sunni. and, unfortunately, these refugees are not expected to return to syria any time soon because syria is destroyed and these people will have, if they were to be repatriated to syria, there will be some sort of an infrastructure that would receive them. so both people in lebanon are not happy with the situation that's going on in syria. so the imposition of the syrian civil war and the lebanese political system is really a very serious issue. what's interesting also is, hezbollah, for instance, has not -- while it criticized really hardly -- hard -- criticized hard the operation decisive storm in yemen, they

haven't necessarily really said very much about the nuclear deal itself. it's -- it was very, very strange that people in tehran were celebrating that this is a good deal we want to get out of sanctions, all that. hezbollah didn't say very much. they probably are waiting to see how things shape up over the next couple of weeks, or maybe over the next few months until the technical issues are resolved. but it is really very very interesting that hezbollah would not come out with any specific statement on the negotiations. and the syrian situation the regime over the last probably two weeks to a month has really experienced a lot of setbacks and underground specifically in the south, and in the north. the regime has suffered military

defeats and so despite the fact that hezbollah has really thrown its full weight behind the regime and is fighting on many fronts in syria, despite the fact that there are shiite militias who are being impocketed from iraq, and even afghanistan in south asia. and despite the fact of the russian, basically, open spigot -- military spigot, so to speak, for syria things are not going very well for the syrian regime. so if you look at this very very brief overview of all this we can imagine -- okay, what now? i mean would there be some sort of a change in the situation in lebanon and syria? and this is something that really is quite important to answer, because if iran were -- going back to the two perspectives on whether iran was using lebanon and syria as a bargaining chip in this nuclear

program negotiations, or whether it was not, it's really very, very important to try top answer this. okay. the nuclear negotiations are done. iran does not necessarily need to use the nuclear issue to hold off political development or other development in lebanon or syria. will there be some sort of a rethinking of the syrian and lebanese situation. and this is something that obviously everybody is speculating on. the arab governments are obviously now they're very busy with the war in yemen. definitely the gcc countries are very busy there. but at the same time, they are looking at the nuclear negotiation as how it might reflect on their interests in those two countries. so whether we -- if we talk

about lebanon and syria we also need to talk about gcc situation and how the gcc really deals with this. there is a wild card here. and this is something that we really don't know how it is going to really shape up over the next three months until the end of june. and that is specifically is will anybody in it the iranian political system that is -- when we look at iran we really are looking at not looking at a rational actor. but at the same time the nature of the iranian political system it is very fragmented. it is a very factional kind of political system. so obviously the ayatollah khomeini will try to rein everybody in whatever program

or whatever decision the iranian political leadership should have. but yet at the same time there are those different factions within the system who may not be necessarily very very open and very accepting of the nuclear deal. in other words -- actually, just only yesterday something positive came out of the leader of the revolutionary guard, general where he said our negotiators really worked very, very hard to get a really good deal. so in other words this was some sort of a way of saying, yeah okay, well you did okay. it was all right. and this might reflect on how hezbollah, for instance, looks at this issue. but yet at the same time there are other people within the political system. it was described as in suspended equilibrium. all the different factions have their own interests.

all of them are trying to pull to their own position and so not very much really happens on the domestic scene. so are these different factions -- will they do something in the foreign policy arena. in other words, will there be somebody who might think that it is possible to activate for instance -- for instance activate the lebanese/syrian front with israel. a couple of rockets here, a couple of rockets there. something might happen like that and israel is not in any mood to let things go and it might respond. and if it does respond, then there goes the deal the nuclear deal itself. because hezbollah would have to respond and then things will really fall apart. i'll be happy to answer your questions if you'd like. and i give you dr. paul sullivan. thank you.

>> good morning. thanks for the invite john duke. they've asked me to talk about energy and how the potential relaxation or nullification of the sanctions, whichever might be happening, can affect energy systems. not just in iran, but regionally and globally. to put this into perspective, iran is an energy giant. it has either number one or number two in conventional natural gas reserves in the world. trades that off between russia and iran depending what you're looking at. it is number four in conventional oil reserves in the world. i'm no the talking about shale gas or shale oil. this is conventional. so when this is opened up if it's opened up -- and that's a big "if" -- and i'll get to

that -- then this will definitely change energy markets globally because oil markets are global markets. it won't affect just crude oil but also refined products and petro chemicals. opening up iran if it does open up, will also change natural gas markets. lng markets are developing as world markets rather than regional ones, and if iran hops into this, it could change things considerably. one reason why iran has not been involved in lng is because they can't get at the right technology to develop lng export facilities or to develop these south pars field which is a gigantic field they share with qatar. which gives me the impression if this opens up too much, it could be that iran and qatar could come to some joint agreement, even in the use of an export

facility. all you need is a pipeline. another part of this whole you shall u is pipelines and other export venues going into sencentral asia and the caspian. don't just look south. don't just look at asia. look at right nearby to the north. iran is on the caspian sea. you have major oil and gas producers in the caspian. those pipeline systems connecting iran's fields are mostly in the southwest, but if the profit's right you can build the pipeline. could change the entire network of pipeline politics going into europe, russia central asia and beyond. this is a huge deal. we shouldn't just be looking at paper dollars and paper oil -- the henl fundsdge funds are going to have a great time on this one all guessing what's going to happen to the price of oil tomorrow. how many in this room get that question? it's like a parlor game. what's the price going to be

tomorrow? will the price go down $3? will it go up $3? we're talking about trillions of dollars of paper oil trading regularly. people winning and losing regularly trying to figure out what's going to be going on. now another thing that really is not talk about too much in this whole situation is the pipeline going to pakistan and india. which has been discussed with iran for some time. the sanctions are taken off, that constraint is taken off to make this happen. although there is a bit of a problem in a place called balukastan. some border guards got killed recently. there is a great deal of instability but i think money may talk in that situation as well. another part of the energy system that people are not discussing is electricity. iran, if this is completely opened up, could be part of a power pool of electricity production and consumption and sharing through regional

transmission networks and so forth, going into central asia, the caspian, possibly across to iraq and to many other places. afghanistan. so forth. this could be a huge change. but they are big "if"s. energy efficiency technology. some think dual use could enter iran. they could be more efficient with their energy. i think i can hear the investors salivating right now. could you imagine the tens of billions of investment that could flow in to these things that no one's even talking about. energy efficiency. what about renewables. geothermal. solar. wind. this is not happening. now think of the idea of the snap-back of sanctions which i think is absolutely absurd term. you have tens of billions of dollars flowing into iran. oil going here oil going there. mostly to asia probably into the

caspian, pipelines being built. and then someone says they didn't follow it the game we're going to snap back on sanctions? anyone ever heard of lobbyists? money will talk in this. snapping back the sanctions is not as easy as -- that. taking off the sanctions is not as easy as that either. another part of the energy change in the region i would expect to happen if this goes forward is a nuclearization of the gulf. and that is kind of a focus on electricity for nuclear power, decell from nuclear power but also nuclearization in another way. and it could be that the arab gulf states will see this as a green light for them to move forward with this. but of the threat that they feel. all right. i should say caveats in the beginning. all of my opinions are mine alone. do not represent those of the u.s. government the national

defense university or any other organization i am a part of. okay. now if i get into trouble i've given the caveats. i'm not talking for them. and what i'm about to say will be clear that i'm not talking for them. this is not a deal. i wish the newspapers and the tv and internet would stop using that word. at least put quotes around it. it's a framework for discussion of a deal. if you were about to buy a house or a small business and the person you are buying it from said, here is the framework for discussion, you woents beuldn't be asking when can i move in. this 2 1/2-page document is less complicated than the merger of two small green grocers in cairo. it is too simple. it is too vague. and it opens up for trouble. negotiating the details of any agreement to sufficient clairety could be far more complex than

anyone could imagine or think right now. the terms are not clear. what we're seeing right now is now version of group think. we saw group think before the iraq war. now we're seeing group think on this deal. everyone's hopping on board. read the documents. read the interprets. for example the fordow complex is to be converted into an atomic research center. okay, anyone developed an atomic research center lately? how long will it take? how complicated is that? how can you prove it is an atomic research center? i'm seeing people getting worried already. what is sufficient to make this deal kick in? what is sufficient for the iranians to accomplish and in what time period? oh, by the way, developing an atomic research center at a top

university could take years. years. any deal -- a real deal right now is an illusion. we have to get beyond that illusion and get to the details. otherwise, these sanctions are not going to be taken off. and all these things i'm talking about -- oil and gas and petro chemicals and electricity and all this really fine stuff that will get investors very fired up -- pun intended -- will not be happening. we have to do all of this by july 1st. anyone done negotiating on simple business deals? july 1st is pretty tough. now we're trying to figure out a nuclear deal by july 1st. could we please get real? all right. it's going to be very difficult to turn these sanctions off, and it is going to be very difficult to turn them back on again. ken alluded to something about

the waivers. some of these sanctions have waivers, some don't have waivers. some are law. you have u.n. sanctions. you have eu sanctions. you have combination sanctions. it's not the same thing as just putting a red mark through a piece of paper. what is meant by not using anything beyond the ir-1 centrifuge within ten years? ten years is a short period of time. 10 to 15 years everything could change. another thing that gets me kind of concerned is a one-year breakout time. wow. why is everyone saying that's a good thing? how about a no-year break-out time. i think i'd feel a lot more comfortable with that one. am i being outrageous enough? am i shattering illusions here? what that essentially says in

this agreement is the iranians can build a nuclear weapon in one year. i don't think we should agree to that. i don't think we should agree to 10 to 15 years either. i think this should be extended out. 10 to 15 years, everything turns around. this whole thing falls to the wayside and the use of different centrifuges, the fordow complex, just about everything else goes right back online at the end of 10 to 15 years. if you have patience, it all changes. by then the oil's exported, money is pouring in. this $150 billion that ken alluded to, as an economist when i hear $150 billion pouring into a country i hear inflation. i hope that the iranian leadership does not still follow ayatollah khomeini that economics is for donkeys because economics works and inflation and unemployment in a hyperventilating economy drove iran into its revolution in 1979. we seem to be in a dream world

here. what is the meaning of the term in the deal "significant amount of time." in the banning of technologies that might be used for producing nuclear weapons. you'll have to excuse me, i worked in a law office for some years and i learned from the lawyers how to parse words, how to tear them apart. how to try to figure out the real meaning as stated here. and if there is enough vagueness, change it. who controls the inspection decisions? the security council? the russians? who does that? that's a little bit vague. also, some of you may not know about nuclear technologies. every nuclear power plant that uses uranium in the world produces plutonium. produces enriched uranium. cesium and lots of other stuff in it. if it is the nature of the process of producing electricity in a nuclear plant.

one minute. okay. in one minute what can i tell you. i am concerned about how this is worded. and i'm concerned once the door is opened and the horses are out of the barn, how difficult am concerned once the door is hope can horses out of the barn how difficult it will be to get them back in. i can see the hope. i can see the potential for developing energy systems in the region and beyond and opening up world markets to iron and so forth. this is all great. but the deal must be struck with strict language strict timetables and no illusions. thank you. >> thank you all very much for a broad range of views and comments and insightful comments on the regional implications for

this deal. now to your questions. i think for the next 40 plus minutes we'll just go ahead and run through the questions we've received and turn them over to the panels. i'll read them as we go. and appreciate very much if you have got anymore just pass them along and we'll try to respond as best we can. for ken katzman. all the u.s. oil companies other u.s. companies like boeing will held up until congress acts? >> the fact sheet makes it clear that they will not be lifted under this arrangement. the sanctions that are to be relieved primarily refer to u.s. sanctions on foreign non-u.s. companies. it is very clear from the u.s.

statements that there will not, as a consequence of this particular arrangement if it's finalized. and u.s. companies might at some point be allowed to participate pursuant to perhaps the u.s. and iran clearing up their differences, quote unquote, on a range of other issues that have plagued the relationship over the past 35 years. thank you. >> the next question. might his pla's hesitation to comment on the deal be due to a concern that a warming of the u.s. iranian relations might reduce support for them? >> i don't think the iranians are combining their thinking of

what hezbollah representeds to them with their thinking what the nuclear deal would be like. the only thinking is maybe iran will tell hezbollah, indicate to hezbollah that it probably is time for hezbollah to help to assist in putting the lebanese, state back on track. and just a phone call from iran would really set things very very much straight in beirut. >> anybody else have comment to make on that one? okay. another question that's looking at the broader relationship between iran and israel is now that iran's nuclear power and the region is being analyzed is there growing concern with relationship between iran and israel? what do you think will happen? i think that is for everybody to comment on. because of the significance of the discussion, particularly recently on capitol hill here.

>> here i think context is important. for almost half the lifespan of israel from its establishment in 1948 to the present the relationship between iran and israel was intimate. it was strategic, it was economic, it was geopolitical. and the roots are very deep in terms of the stories pertaining to to to to ester persian who helped to free the jus from sjews from corrupt from babylon.

the degree of mistrust is deep. as times it's been massive. at times it's been pervasive. and when iraq's large jewish community went to israel, thousands went by way of iran. and during the '50s and '60s, the heyday of israel nationalism, they danced in each other's shadow. they didn't need each other's zip code or area code. there is only one israel, only one iran. each has opinion concerned about an intimate u.s.-arab relationship. because there are 22 arab countries. only one iran. only one israel. so that also was part of the glue or the adhesive. and many in israel regard these

last years since 1979 as an aberration. and what would ordinarily be a normal mutually beneficial reciprocally rewarding relationship between the two countries. so that is background. that is context. but it shows a degree of trust and commonality of interest. similarity of interest. complementary interest between the two that now may begin to come back in focus. but it will be quite a stretch in the near term, it is a bridge too far. but as recently as 1978, meetings i had a briefing by the head of israel's foreign ministry in answer to question of, where do you obtain your energy, your oil? and the answer was 90% we get

from iran. >> the issue is about nuclear. and and the impact of a nuclear agreement on the region, iran and israel. i think we need to be sincere to each other about iranian nuclear policy and israeli nuclear policy. iran is member of non proliferation treaty from day one. israel has never accepted to be member of the non proliferation treaty. iran does not have nuclear bomb. israel has about 400 nuclear bombs. recently pentagon accepted israelis have nuclear bomb. just in a decade iran has given

more than 7,000 man day inspection to iaea. no other members during the history of iaea have given such level and amount of inspection which iranians they gave. israel has never even given even one inspection. iran has initiated nuclear weapon free zone in the mideast in 1970. this is iranian proposal as insisted for 40, 50 years. israel is declining, is rejecting, is objecting nuclear weapon free zone. in mid 1990s, egypt proposed mideast free from weapons of mass destruction. wmd free zone in mideast. iran was the second country to support it. it is over 20 years israelis are

opposing weapons of mass destruction free zone in middle east. therefore we are talking about two very, very, very different policy on proliferation. and as an iranian i'm really shocked everybody is talking about iran and nobody is talking about israeli nuclear bomb and all pressures and sanctions are on iran while iran doesn't have nuclear bomb. and nobody is talking about israel. i mean this is a very double standard here in washington in the west about proliferation issue in the mideast. however this deal has a lot of new elements. which really can contribute to permanent removal of any proliferation risk in the

mideast. it says iran would be committed to have no reprocessing. okay this is first you have iranian good will, as long as you do not have reprocessing you cannot make nuclear weapon from heavy water facilities. israelis, they have reprocessing. would the u.s. and the world powers be ready to regional iez the measures agreed with iran for all regional countries nobody would have enrichment above 5%? as long as there is no enrichment above 5% there would be never nuclear bomb from enrichment facility. if there is no reprocessing, it is impossible to have nuclear bomb from heavy water