but we stumbled upon a brilliant and helpful counterpart at it is -- and it is my pleasure to introduce. that is kt mcfarland. you know kt as a fox analyst. everybody has to start somewhere. kathy troia started as a typist on the graveyard shift when she was a sophomore at george washington university. kt: i was a freshman. >> my facts are wrong. she grew in stature and importance under nixon. she was a contributing member of the national security council. she has kindly consented to moderate a series of these nixon legacy forum's on foreign affairs topics. and in that particular series, this is our third one. and i am very, very happy to introduce kt. thank you. kt: thank you. and i do want to add thanks to

all of us from the nixon-kissinger community, the importance of doing this. the documents are one thing but to hear from the people who made history is a great addition not only to the nation's knowledge , to the history, but the next generation of americans who will have to grapple. as geoff pointed out, this was the third in a series. we covered -- the was to cover -- the ones we covered so far have been the reorganization in structure and sudden diplomacy in china. the five years of the administration were very fruitful and many called it the golden age of diplomacy. this one is going to focus on the vietnam war, negotiations and the paris peace accords. it was one of the biggest

problems that nixon faced when he walked in the door and took office. it is difficult today in 2014 to comprehend the vietnam war. the country was already on the edge because of the kennedy and martin luther king assassinations. the war exacerbated those tensions. and the draft meant every family was effected. we had over half a million american troops halfway around the world in a war we cannot seem to win but we do not know how to end. there were demonstrations across the nation. young man burned their draft cards. risking prison. and some fled to canada to avoid going to war. as the war dragged on, the antiwar sentiment crept across the country. dividing family and friends. lyndon johnson, who was the president, had no choice but to withdraw for reelection. his vice president, hubert humphreys, ran instead, but

cannot escape the vietnam legacy. in november 1968, richard nixon became president and inherited a full-scale war in southeast asia. the war went on to become one of the seminal events of the 20th century. ultimately, 50,000 americans lost their lives. that shaped a generation of military leaders and politicians. joining us today are the men who made history. they helped and the war and the hammered out the paris peace accords. i want to introduce william smyser. he served in germany with u.s. forces. including as a witness to the berlin crisis in 1961, the beginning of the cold war. he was an advisor in 1969 and became a senior member of kissinger's national security council. he was responsible for vietnam affairs. after leaving in 1971, he served

as political advisor and became deputy high commissioner for refugees and he is now a professor at georgetown university. next is winston lord. he was one of kissinger's closest advisers. he worked on every aspect of american foreign-policy, including the opening to china arms control negotiations, peace talks. weston went on to become president of the council of foreign relations and assistant secretary of state and u.s. ambassador to china in which he helped establish diplomatic relations. john negroponte was an officer in saigon in the late 1960's before joining the delegation. he was at the first paris peace talks.

he went on to work on the -- he later served as ambassador to honduras, mexico, and iraq. he was also an assistant secretary of state and secretary and most famously known as the first director of national intelligence after the september 11 attacks. i want to turn to the effectiveness of the national security council staff. kissinger did establish one of the most successful steps in history. that was very small by today's standards. in the kissinger era, there were probably 35 members and equal number of support staff. of which, i was one. compare that today to about about 1700. the kissinger staff, they went

on to dominate a generation of american diplomacy. as i mentioned, these men went on to very senior positions and subsequent administrations. i want to get back to the beginning and get the personal story from each of you. how did henry kissinger who was looking for the most brilliant people, how did he find you? professor smyser: i am not sure i was brilliant but i got to know him when i was doing graduate studies at harvard. later when he came to washington to work on the national security, he knew i was there and so he asked me to join him. kt: had you been in vietnam before? have you met kissinger in vietnam? professor smyser: i had been with kissinger in vietnam when he went to vietnam at the request of lbj to see what the situation was. i was the control officer.

which is rather a loose term because controlling henry kissinger is not an easy thing to do. [laughter] >> an oxymoron. professor smyser: oxymoron. i did it and tried to give him the best possible introduction to vietnam including -- [indiscernible] and others. and the briefing from myself. but the point was that was where i first met him on vietnam. kt: the two of you were in vietnam before kissinger came in , before it nixon was elected and that's when you met him. >> that is correct. we were in saigon. i was a recording officer and i covered a particular area and when henry came out, i was assigned the task of taking get to the northern part which is called in -- that is how i got

to know henry and then i went to the paris peace talks as you mentioned and i was recruited. in 1970. kt: i do not know if it is true or not, but there's a story when kissinger was in saigon, there was a few incidents. john: indeed. he was there as an advisor. on one of his last days there was november 1, the anniversary, there was a big parade and site -- in saigon and my apartment overlooks the parade route. i had champagne breakfast. and when henry came, dick brought him up to my apartment. when he got up there, he realized he lost his wallet. he said what really bothered him was that he lost his white house pass. [laughter]

winston: we took him to a cabaret. kt: is this a story we can say? is it a pg story? professor smyser: of course. who would think i would tell anything that wouldn't be proper? the idea was he wanted to meet some characters that were not in political office. we took him there and he got up to the bar and a young lady of uncertain background came up to meet him. and rather touched him tightly. and he turned to me and said i think i have been discovered. [laughter] professor smyser: that was a pretty thorough briefing. [laughter] kt: i do not know how you will top that one.

winston: i was working in the pentagon in 1968. my boss was a man named nmoore -- -- he had asked me to go with him. i was interviewed by henry for half an hour and it went pretty well. i started out with moore doing 2 things. in the executive office building across from the white house. one was, putting it under the nes system. the agendas, briefing and implementation. the other was a many policy planning staff where we sent him memos, look into the future and playing devils advocate. the first year i was doing that,

in 1969, i sent henry several memos some which were critical. this is the point that henry does not like yes men or yes women. as long as your arguments are well put forward, he would respect them. i caught his attention to these memos. in february of 1970, i was very fortunate because i did not have expertise like these guys on the vietnam, others on china, others on the middle east. he wanted one person with him at all times with these developments so we could have a global perspective. for example, the impact with relations on china and russia and on and on. i got to participate in all of these initiatives. and i was with the real experts. professor smyser: henry said -- he has the fastest pen in the west. [laughter]

kt: let set the stage for hicks three -- four history. when nixon took off we were in -- took office we were in war. , what was the context? why were we in vietnam? professor smyser: the french wanted us to be in their -- there and we did not want to be as involved as they wanted to. they asked us to drop an atomic bomb when it was surrounded by vietnamese troops. nixon refused to do it. we were very cautious particularly about anything that had to do with china. then john kennedy became president. kennedy felt that even though he didn't want to drop a bomb either he was more ready to practice what they called warfare.

i can't remember -- counterinsurgency. counterinsurgency. one of his ideas was that he anon was a perfect place to practice. what he thought would be the new american doctrine, which would win these wars. kt: where were we went president -- when president johnson was in office? what happened? professor smyser: by the late 1960's, it became clear that counterinsurgency could not win the war. because the north vietnamese kept sending troops in it and -- in. and counterinsurgency couldn't stop them -- could not defeat them. so we had to send in american truce. kt: you were in saigon at the time. john: i was there from 1964 to 1968.

what you had was hanoi decided in 1964, maybe late 1963 to -- after the overthrow, that they couldn't win the war just by political means alone and they had to ratchet up the level of violence. let's have no doubt about it, it was to reunify the country. they introduced north vietnamese troops. by the time we left, the administration transitioned from johnson to nixon, we had 510,000 troops. winston: it was more than that. about 550,000. john: there was something like 10 regular divisions in vietnam. this insurgency in 1969 evolved. into large-scale escalation. kt: it started as a small scale counterinsurgency.

professor smyser: i would call it mission escalation. because there were a lot of people. john: it is also a demonstration. that the north vietnamese, poor as they were, we are prepared to go to just about any less to -- any length to achieve their object. kt: what was happening in the united states at the time? 1969 he comes into office, what was nixon thinking when he took the oath of office about vietnam? winston: there was some foreshadowing in an article he wrote that suggested opening in china and also asia generally and after vietnam. no matter how it came out, we were going to look like we lost or we were in between. during the campaign he gave suggestions of a strategy, no

actual secret plan, but he did not say that. when he got into office, it was clearly the most urgent issue he had to face. it was clear that he was under tremendous domestic turmoil and in -- an escalating threat in american involvement in southeast asia. he was caught in between the desire of many in the u.s. to get out and the military powers. he and kissinger had a real dilemma. future historians and young people have got to remember the context he inherited. in judging how he and kissinger did. it was a very tough challenge. the first thing they did was to reissue a memorandum to all of the agencies, gathering every conceivable type of information that we could of state

department and political departments, the cia and what was going on, from the pentagon on the military developments, every conceivable aspect we could collect information. i was in charge of helping to collect this. i was orchestrating it. one of the people i worked with went on -- he went on to become -- and was responsible for leaking the pentagon papers. we assembled that in order to have nixon and kissinger make up their minds on what kind of strategy they wanted to pursue. they probably had ideas before the study. but all of the information helped to shape it. if you like, i could tell you the options. one option they had, look, the democrats did this. kennedy and johnson. it is not our fault. we are just going to get our prisoners back and get the hell out. nixon rejected that because our position in the world of sacrifice and credibility of

america and its allies and what it would do to our world position. the other was incredible escalation trying to force north vietnam to be more reasonable. i think nixon and kissinger felt domestic support for the war would not be maintained under those circumstances. they chose a middle path, which they felt was a way to get an honorable emd -- end to the war. it consisted of two main elements into supporting elements. one was to successfully turn over to the south vietnamese this would take several years, training and supplies and would have them take in the u.s. would be able to withdraw successes segments. they had to realize they had a sense of urgency. but above all, it would maintain support in the united states for

continuing involvement. people can see the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel. we were reducing our presence, and therefore, they would support ongoing efforts. the main element was second negotiations. we will get into that, but it had to be done secretly in order to be possible success. there's no other way to get others involved, propaganda exercises and tears so they had to be done secretly. the supporting elements was china and russia. china's 2 major patrons. to improve relations with them to isolate psychologically hanoi. at least the urge hanoi to be reasonable. so that they could get on with their relationships with us. and finally, to use military pressure when required

especially with north vietnamese provocation. and the last point i will make that is the one flaw -- and they understood that, next and and kissinger at the time, was that there was a certain tension . gradual u.s. resolve. unilateral withdrawal. and negotiations. because you could argue that the north vietnamese knew we were getting out, anyway, and they judge that the south vietnamese could never be strong enough to take them on themselves. kt: the leverage that you might have thought was not there? winston: it was not any better off than -- without an endless involvement. secondly, we planted hope to get the vietnamization to get the training to tackle the north

vietnamese and the vietcong and hanoi would be forced to negotiate more reasonably. they could see that over time, they cannot prevail. kt: you were there? john: can i mention two points. one with regard to the position. i knows that -- notice that dr. kissinger's book on the negotiations was dedicated among others to general abrams. there is an important point. in 1964 when lbj had to choose the next commander, the next american commander, he had to choose between 2. regrettably, he chose moreland. moreland took emphasis on the americans doing the fighting. he stuck to that right to the end of his command.

it is abrams came in and his view of how to fight this war, it was nicely with that henry and kissinger approach of training the south vietnamese troops to fight. the reason i think vietnamization is so important it is a principal that is and -- that to carry over into the future. what we did in afghanistan and what we are doing in iraq. the second point i wanted to make is that although winston was not there and dick, there were secret negotiations. and they never got very far. they did get so far as to achieve a bombing halt at the end of 1968, in october of 1968 and they ended up getting a seat at the table with the vietcong and the south vietnamese.

prior to that, we had been conducting these talks bilaterally with north vietnam. kt: we are talking about north the enemies, the south vietnamese, the vietcong, who are all these groups? professor smyser: they were all controlled by the same group. the chinese communist party which had been developed before world war ii and at one point, wanted to close ties with the united states. they were groups that wanted to fight against the west in order to make it truly independent. and so they were people who would normally been our friends but because the french were also affects, we couldn't very well work with the vietnamese to make

vietnam independent because that would be against the french. we were stuck with working with our allies in europe or working with countries that actually wanted to be our friends in asia. it was a very difficult situation. we finally decided that the best thing to do was just to work with our friends in europe and to try and help our friends in europe achieve some kind of peaceful settlement for their war with independent people are -- or those seeking independence. it was never quite right and never works quite the way we wanted it to work. it was one of the problems. because we were stuck between people who want to be our friend and whom we wanted as friends, but were fighting each other.

one of the most difficult situations in international politics, it is worthwhile to look at this as a situation of incredible difficulty for the management of foreign affairs. john: to underline his point the north vietnamese always acted out the charade and had no troops in south vietnam. this was all vietcong and a civil war. their rationale was we undermined elections which have been agreed upon. therefore, they had a right to challenge of us on this front. the fact is that in this was not -- that this was not a civil war primarily. kt: will you talk about another part of the decision nixon made was to have negotiations? you were already negotiating publicly in geneva.

in paris. and that was going nowhere? john: we were negotiating publicly and privately and we had some secret talks. and we reached an agreement that -- an agreement just on the eve of the presidential election in 1968, a pattern that repeats itself for years later. the greatest pressure to reach some kind of agreement was before our election on a bombing halt exchange and we would stop bombing in exchange for them lowering the intensity of their attacks on south vietnamese cities. we also agreed the south the enemies parties would be represented at the peace talks which is what led to what for many people was an absurd discussion for many people on the shape of the table. how do you shape the negotiating table in order to reflect the 2

opposite views? we felt that the vietcong should not be viewed as a separate party and the south vietnamese government wanted to be viewed separately from us. how do you achieve that in the shape of a negotiation? we had an oval table with 2 small tables, but they did not quite touch the oval table. [laughter] >> is sounds of a work of art. john: it was like a contest. we got so much mail from people around the world suggesting different shapes of tables. [laughter] professor smyser: an interesting thing about this also. johnson was more involved in this than i was. was that -- this was the ambassador, our negotiator -- in the johnson administration. and he knew very well nothing could ever be done in public so he tried very hard to get the

north vietnamese to join us for secret talks. and the idea was that we would have breaks in the talks and during the breaks he would hook his arm and take him aside and say don't you want to have a , little coffee break or a little tea? at first, the north vietnamese resisted. they wouldn't play that game because they wouldn't want to do something with what the russians and chinese would wonder what is going on. then, finally, they did. john: i had been responsible for finding the safe house we would meet at along with the cia. he gives me a few francs out of hundred his pocket to buy caviar. because we are going to serve caviar during the breaks.

i told the governor, enemies do not like caviar, they light sweet things. they like cakes. so we got to the tea break and there was all this caviar. no one in the vietnamese delegation it the caviar. kt: how did the nixon administration deal with this? winston: they knew the frustrations. and the history. there was an attempt to see when -- whether we could start secret talks with the vietnamese. again, recognizing that only secret talks would make success. in may, the president made his first speech which was how tough the north vietnamese were. the efforts he had already made, sort of setting the stage for what would be a difficult process and making clear the north vietnamese were tough to deal with. the next significant event was

june of 1969. nixon was in one on part of an asian trip. he thought about it in advance. it gets back to a point about how this applies to other issues, the principles beside vietnam, namely, he set out that we are going to be world leaders. talking primarily about asia. it had global implications. we look to our friends and allies to take more of the burdens of the frontlines. we would always provide a nuclear umbrella and train and provide aid to other countries. but they increasingly have to take on these responsibilities. this clearly was the theory of vietnamization. it turns out we then developed that in to a more general into world policy.

that was the next step. in august -- let's see, it was the first secret meeting with the north vietnamese. none of us were involved in this . i believe it was before we took over. that's was rather fruitless. that leads to the next major speech in november 1969. this is the famous silent majority speech. the purpose of the speech was to rally american domestic support for continued efforts. part of that as we indicate -- as we have indicated was about the vietnamization process and he was beginning to announce incremental withdrawal as we turned over responsibility to the south vietnamese. to show american people it was not open ended up. and he turned the draft into a lottery as opposed to one of the other aspects which -- and they helped to ease the situation. the main point of the speech was very tough on the north

vietnamese. and designed to show how intransigent they were. that is what happened in 1969. kt: what about the secret negotiations and how were you able to have them and nobody noticed? winston: this is quite instructive on how we did this and the logistics. when we did secret negotiations, and they picked up speed in february, march, and april with the next ones. in paris. we are working all week and i'm -- and i would say the work week was between 80 and 100 hours a week, literally. already exhausted. we have a secret meeting coming up. only a few people know about. three or four of us, that is it. we started secretly, during our work week, preparing for the

secret negotiations. this included a memo to the president laying out our strategy and the goals for the meeting including an exhaustive briefing on kissinger. probable north vietnamese positions, transcripts of previous meetings, profiles of leaders. we go home from the nse, this was always done on weekends and holidays. because kissinger's absence was not so glaring if it was over the weekend. if you did it during the week, you cannot get over it. -- did away with it. we went home and everybody was exhausted. saturday morning, a white house car picks us up at our home. i do not remember how we got our classified materials on the plane. we join henry on air force 2 are -- 2, one of the presidential planes. we then fly over the atlantic and into the center of france.

a military airport in the middle of france because we have a cooperation of the french. john: orleans. winston: at 1:12 -- on the way over -- kt: nobody noticed air force one was landing? winston: it was not air force one. our cover was it was a training mission. john: it actually was. winston: in some ways it was. [laughter] all the way over for eight hours, we are redoing the briefing. we got into the center of france , the special assistant to the president, he became prime minister. he led us to a small french plane in the middle of paris france. we take that plane to an obscure airport on the outside where we

are met by general walters. he went on to be ambassador for the u.n. he was fluent in french and loved the "james bond" aspect . he rented a car. he used a code name. he checked code names. we had to encounter a safe house. the cleaning lady, we did not want her to know who we were. we go to the apartment at this time it's about midnight paris time. it is about late afternoon in washington. we have trouble getting to sleep. it is late afternoon our time. in my case, i would finally get to sleep about an hour or two before we had to get up which was 6:00 or 7:00 a.m. paris time. we then it go into a meeting. it was 6 to 8 hours. verbatim notes.

we finish the meeting and we go back to the airport. we take the plane back to the center of france and get on that plane and fly over. all the way, we are writing a memo to the president of what happened. we are typing up the transcript. we get to washington, it was about 6:00 a.m. paris time. but midnight washington time. we go to sleep and go to the office on monday. it was like the whole weekend off. john: henry was general kirschbaum and winston was colonel landry and i the junior person was -- winston: you must've been -- >> each of us had the same initials.

>> i just remember being human. professor smyser: i wondered if henry would give proper credit to -- he regarded that as a nonessential question. [laughter] kt: when you were preparing the briefing materials, 2 problems. we do not have the ability to one, pick up the phone to north vietnamese, how did we communicate with them? secondly, you are this staff of young guys and you are assembling mountains of briefing paper, how did you do that without the state department or anybody know you were doing this? winston: like dealing with china or the russians, we had plenty of papers. and the state department was not involved. also, continuing the public aspect of the war and so on and the paris peace talks. we had lots of background materials.

we had expert. not me but these two guys knew a lot about vietnam. there was enough firepower for these memos. and it does underline the relationship between nixon and kissinger. nixon had to decide on a key decision and strategy for each meeting, but henry would give ways of how to converse that and then go negotiated. kt: how did you contact the north vietnamese? you were not going to the state department which would've been -- professor smyser: we were going -- were not going to embassies. that is a diplomatic channel and we did not want to use a diplomatic channel. instead, we used general walters. that is not formal state department. kt: 1969, really nothing, a -- there was a silent majority speech, the talks were really

going nowhere and the fighting was escalating. and in 1970, what happened in 1970? winston: there were three meetings in the spring of 1970 that did not really get anywhere. this led us -- first, let me say we had ongoing secretly started -- starting in 1969 a bombing in cambodia along the border with vietnam. kt: that was part of the original nixon decision? winston: part of the decision. the problem with vietnam, of course, is that they have sanctuaries in cambodia and laos which were untouchable. they would come across the border and go back over or go down the trail. it was a very tough fight. but to have the sanctuaries made it even tougher. so, we bombed cambodia secretly only close to the border. but it was secret. when this leaked out, there was outrage from the congress and

media. the rationale for doing it and doing it secretly was that we only want to hit the bases along the border because they were coming for us and slaughtering americans and going over to cambodia. secondly, it had to be secret because he like the north did not vietnamese in his country and cannot do a hell of a lot about it. he cannot tolerate. then he would admit he was letting americans a bomb his -- americans bomb his territory. but he fully approved of it and it was done along the order. it became very controversial. and then it leaves us, we're nowhere with the secret talks to what we call the cambodian insurgent. kt: that was in the spring -- john: i am at stanford university at the time. in a way an interesting , perspective for having seen that. i was on sabbatical.

it took place in april of so. -- or so of 1970. i was at the hoover institution. for those of you, they have this big glass building next door. there was not much left of the glass. after the cambodian -- campus erupted. winston: let me explain the rationale here. the nsc -- and as he -- nse and cabinet had to debate whether to go into the sanctuaries. or whether to do it at all. second, do you do with just south vietnamese troops or do you do it with just american troops? and third, how do you do it? kt: how do you know you succeeded? winston: we had to do a because -- do it because americans were being slaughtered. we were not extending into cambodia.

we had an obligation to our troops and the south vietnamese troops to do something about it. we decided to go in there. it was also decided to make a joint -- and the south vietnamese and militarily wanted to be with them. thirdly, however, to show it was not an evasion. it was decided to limit the duration, mainly about two months, and the deaths, only a pure miles going in and that was the basic decision. the problem was that since it was limited because of reaction due to the duration and scope it was less effective militarily. and we had to announce we were going to headquarters and no such thing existed. as if there was some building we could capture. the headquarters was the leadership moving around. of course, they moved deeper into cambodia to escape. we never got to the headquarters.

so it was considered less than successful. it helped speed up the vietnamization and had military impact. but counterbalanced against that was tremendous domestic reaction. one other episode i might add -- just before the announcement kissinger, as i said, did not like to hear yes people. he wanted to hear different views. he had five staff members who he knew was opposed and i will not get to all of the names and i was one of them. but, i was somewhat dovish in terms -- as result of this meeting we had a very stormy meeting. why we didn't think it was a good idea. after the meeting, three of those and a couple of others outside of the meeting over

-- meeting resigned from the staff over cambodia. two of them were going to resign anyway, but they moved it up in order to make a statement on cambodia. they were about to leave anyway. out of exhaustion. i did not resign. the other person who do not -- did not resign was a systems analysis -- analyst. my reasoning was not like the others for moral reasons. i thought it was entirely moral and ethical. these people were killing american troops and south vietnamese. we had a right to go after them. and we had a legal right to do so. i did not argue emotionally like some of the others. they felt we were extending the war. i didn't feel we are extending the war. the vietnamese extended the war. i thought it was a trade-off between the military impact and the duration and scope limited versus the of war domestically

and support of the war was not worth it. i argued on those lines, but i did not resign because i do not think it was a moral or ethical, but a practical problem. i was asked a couple months later to write a report. i handed kissinger the penultimate draft. we had 48 hours to go. he comes in, and 48 hours it is -- it would be published. he took the draft and throws it on the ground and said it is useless, which did not help my morale. so i had one night to redo the whole thing. which i did. i went to bed and he woke me up and he said, this is terrific. [laughter] john: one upshot of this is a direct segue are there are resignations and so henry started casting about looking

for replacements for those people. that is how i got recruited initially to be a sort of planning staff for the nse in september of 1970 and later on took over from dick who was running the indochina. the following summer. professor smyser: can i say something general? it is very difficult. when i look around the faces in this room and i see many faces that were not in washington alive and kicking in the 1970's. the mood of this country is so difficult to describe to anybody in that group because we were not fighting only the vietnamese , we were fighting the americans. "the new york times" would write lengthy editorials criticizing

whatever negotiating position we took. other newspapers would do the same. not all, some were quite positive. nonetheless, the campuses were literally hotbeds of resistance. i went to harvard after having been in the kissinger staff for a while and faculty told me they would never mention to anybody whom they dealt with at harvard that i had been on the nse because i would be kicked off the campus. so, it was that kind of mood that was absolutely poisonous estimate it very, very difficult because no matter what we did , there was always somebody who would criticize. and what do you do when you are fighting a war and every move you make is criticized?

not only by your opponents but by your friends? this was a very difficult decision. kt: i was a student at george washington university and in 1971, all the classes were canceled so that my university could house the students coming all of the country to participate in the demonstrations. we all got pass fail in our classes, but we didn't go to class. winston: henry and nixon were bitter because some of the stiffest critics were from the johnson and kennedy administration who got us in the first place and then they turned. and turned on people on kissinger. john: and kennedy administration had not withdrawn one true.

-- one troop- -- troop. they were never prepared to step up. winston: and that made all of us bitter. they got us up to 550,000 troops. like i said and we are getting out, it is their fault. and a secret talks, nobody knew -- the secret talks, nobody knew we were negotiating seriously. we would make offers to the north vietnamese then what the "new york times" was calling for. and all of my friends and everybody said why are you not negotiate seriously? they can see it as a propaganda situation. i knew every single effort we were making was painful. and not that we had much

socialization, everybody was beating us up for work on this war without trying to negotiate an end. i'd came from paris trying to do the same thing. kt: whose decision was it to make these talks top-secret? winston: we thought you had to do a secretly. the north vietnamese probably was not that interested in negotiating is -- except to wear us out and to see if we go make this deal they could live with. they didn't want to be accused of being overly soft. what do you think, john? john: winston and i might differ slightly. i think it's important to have secret negotiations because they accompany almost any negotiation about a serious issue. i think henry had a somewhat expansive view of that which included keeping a secret from our bureaucracy.

winston: that's a different issue. i've met at the public. john: i understand that. it means you are not -- keeping somebody in the dark. kt: on one hand, you were negotiating. you were exhausted and negotiating in good faith. everything you tried wasn't working. you were being beaten up in the press. and people were demonstrating and calling you "baby killers," it was a terrible time. you were keeping -- president nixon had the courage take it. talk to me about why was it kept secret from the rest of the government. was that essential? professor smyser: because everything leaks in washington. winston: that is the quick answer. >> henry, for both good and ill

was very possessive of our national security -- >> he could have been because nixon was possessive. >> there is not been anybody since henry kissinger was had as much authority or power over our national security. no one individual. kt: and the state department or any job? professor smyser: anywhere. incredibly difficult. you have to see the mood of the country. it was incredibly difficult to keep a secret. kt: because the passions? professor smyser: "passions" is a moderate word. winston: when these secret talks became known and we had semi-secret talks in 1972 which we were not announced in advance where having talks. we would go over and have them. afterwards, we and the north vietnamese would brief the press

on what happened. they were secret in a sense that nobody knew what was having on but a sanitized briefing. kt: escalation, negotiations nothing seems to happen. when did the breakthrough come? middle 1971, kissinger made a secret trip to china. winston: we had the laos invasion and they has sanctuaries. in this case coming down the ho chi minh trail. the quick answer is, it was the south vietnamese expedition with our support because other restrictions of congress and was not really effective. and then, what happened though , very significant, and that is

why we have to stop, in may 1971, we had a secret meeting in which we set forth with nixon's full approval which became the agreement a year and a half later. essentially was the following -- military and agreement. -- military only agreement. the north vietnamese position for the beginning to what will get to was not only are we supposed to withdraw unilaterally but as we leave it no we are supposed to overthrow the governments. professor smyser: and not forcing them to leave. winston: yes, unilaterally. nixon was prepared. -- he was repaired to have a military only solution, but he was not prepared to overthrow in our life. -- overthrow an ally. the proposal, and this is important for history, because a lot of provisions are saying that we could've had the final

agreement earlier. we could not because of the break which will get to in 1972, north vietnam insisted on replacing the government. in may of 1971 we put a seven-point plan forward. unilateral withdrawal, but no further infiltration. we were not insisting on module with all -- on mutual withdrawal which had been our position up to that point. neutral had been our point of to that point. cease-fire, get our prisoners back and independence as cease-fire in laos and cambodia and international supervision. that is essentially what the final paris accords with light. and for the first time the north vietnamese began to take us. there was something to negotiate. they continued to hang on to the political settlement. and so, we could not strike a deal.

it was said to us it was dishonorable. they would not budge on that. and so promising negotiations of of the seven points we agreed on 5.5 with details. we could not get to the seventh point, which was the future of the south vietnamese to be determined by the vietnamese themselves. which was the overthrow of the government. in july of 1971, coming back when he was on the trip with me. and when we came back from the trip to china including a trip to paris and let's get some of the color on how we got that secret negotiation. this is before the president

announced -- we started in paris publicly. and you may explain how we managed to have a secret negotiation in paris. professor smyser: we were dinner with an attractive young correspondent. in paris. that provided a cover for business. since she was having dinner no one suspected that she may also be having a negotiation with the vietnamese. winston: everyone knew they were in town. professor smyser: and why you are seeing this woman who was a reporter, i think for the new york times, why is henry seeing this woman instead of meeting. which had been doing an hour earlier.

it was crazy. there is one very important point. which i think i focused on more than anyone else, though it later became moot. when hendry said that we would do a unilateral withdrawal, that was the first time that we went into a negotiating session with the north vietnamese and a private villa that they had tables for us to negotiate. up until then we had sat in chairs and the north vietnamese did not think that was a real negotiation. and we said we will bear to withdraw unilaterally, they said they have come to one of our most basic points and we will now have a table. it is the little things, again diplomacy is a funny game. you look for little things that tell you a great deal about what is behind the thinking of people who are not ready to articulate it.

it is tricky, but on the other hand it is essential. winston: the pentagon papers were released at this time. they were a review of vietnam's situation. it had nothing to do with nexen. it was no embarrassment to nexen, but he got hammered for opposing the leak of the papers. as if he was trying to cover things up. he thought it was important. he and kissinger were particularly upset. in june 1971 was one month before we were going to china secretly. we were in the vietnamese. they were doing this on behalf of their successors, trying to keep relevant secrets. the timing was atrocious. professor smyser: are you going

to talk about china? kt: in the fall of 1971, you think things are going well, but you detected the vietnamese are gearing up for another offensive. and then 1972 was the big break. the momentous year. president and went to china moscow the water break -- the watergate break-in occurred, and a landslide reelection of richard nixon. winston: we have to circle back to the spring of 1971 when in the north vietnamese unleashed a major offensive -- in the spring of 1972, excuse me. kt: they were gearing up at the end of 1971. let's go to 1972. january, neck single is public with the secret talks. winston: he gave a speech on

january 25 because in proceeding months, despite the seven point plan over the summer, the north vietnamese into later talks and started giving military offensives. we were getting hammered by our domestic audiences of negotiating seriously. he decided we had to go public with the fact we have been negotiating for three years and it was north korea -- and it was north vietnam being unreasonable. to make clear how reasonable we were and put pressure on hanoi. and it changed public opinion a great deal. professor smyser: for a while. winston: the north vietnamese did not respond. they launched an offensive. we had one last chance, a secret trip to moscow. professor smyser: let me pick

up. i think it was march 30, 1972 that they launched the offensive. it was easter. there were a lot of casualties in be it known. it was called the easter offensive and was major. it was right across the dmt. they came up against an army division we threw everything we had at the offensive. over time, we succeeded in turning it around. it was not a bad test, but it required a lot of our air support. it was a major effort and a precursor to what ultimately happened. the north vietnamese were willing to send conventional forces. kt: the 1972 february trip is

one that sent -- is when nixon went to china. what happened? lord: the chinese agreed with the vietnamese. it was complicated by the vietnam war. they wanted us to balance the soviet union and they knew that if we were preoccupied with vietnam we would not be an effective global balance. the chinese had an interest in us ending the war, but we try to make it clear, and i think henry did for success, we are killing to get out of a cease-fire. we are not interested in overthrowing the government, and it is not in china's interest to look like an unreliable ally.

we had to make a reasonable settlement. they probably said, wait out the americans, get them out of vietnam, don't insist on humiliation and a political setup. in a few years, saigon will fall into your lap's anyway. also, with the russians we had a trip in april to set up the may summit. and another isolation of hanoi. we try to get them to get the vietnamese to meet. the offensive was taking place. we had one may 2 meeting. they were arrogant, said we were on the offensive. as a result, we decided to bomb hanoi. kt: this is important. the chronology is in the single's in february. the north vietnamese invade south vietnam in a spring offensive a month later. you are negotiating with a planned trip to moscow to have president neck send visit moscow

for the moscow summit. the north vietnamese are winning. what was the thinking of his decision to them escalating? negroponte: it was an important weekend. we had meetings. i remember the general calling me in on friday afternoon. he said you should stick around. the president has decided with a certainty that he will mind haiphong and bomb hanoi. we will do staff work and then have an nfc meeting on monday. he asked me to write a justification for doing this. kt: what was the background in mining haiphong harbor? it was the largest harbor in vietnam. negroponte: is the escalation we had previously avoided. mr. nixon felt that he could not

go to moscow on his summit with mr. brezhnev while his client was invading a friend of ours. so we had to take some firm action. so we had an nfc meeting that monday morning. then, the action was undertaken. it continued -- kt: president next and -- president nixon decided we were going to bomb hanoi and mine haiphong harbor knowing that moscow hung in the balance. why did kissinger say to get your -- negroponte: on that saturday we had a meeting in the situation room with all of henry's closest to staff. lord: most people in favor of doing this for military reasons

they understood nixon's viewed that you do not go to russia looking weak while american soldiers are killed with russian weapons. as i recall, and correct me, everyone thought this was the end of the moscow summit. that the russians would not greet nixon in moscow when he was bombing and mining -- kt: essentially their ship. lord: one of their ships got hit on accident, and it did not help. he said it was a good chance it would get canceled. i remember nixon saying no. the russians have too much at stake bilaterally. and i will look better go there -- i will look better going there being strong. others that we would lose the berlin agreement, arms control and other things we have worked out with the russians. i remember knowing with henry and a helicopter to camp david

to help write the speech announcing hanoi and haiphong. i said to myself, and henry and i were depressed on the aircraft. not that we were against what would happen, but all of the work on the tube. nixon was right, we were wrong. we went ahead with the summit while this was happening. negroponte: we have slightly different recollections of the saturday meeting. i thought there were more opinions expressed to the point the summit is not likely to be canceled. including from the european director and john holdridge who was the asia man. being that as it may i attended an nfc meeting on monday and i recall henry saying that he thought there was a 50-50 chance. kt: so the small inner circle,

took you into the white house situation room, and said this is what the president has decided. what do you think? what do you think will happen? lord: he told us before the decision. and then we were getting views on the impact. kt: nixon never wavered? lord: and he was willing to risk the moscow summit. in his mind he was not risking that much. kt: when people go back and say was it kissinger, nixon, the golden age of -- professor smyser: i want to add one thing on china. when kissinger went to china on the secret trip he took me with him. which surprised me. when henry asks you to do something, you do it. the interesting thing to me was

that at a certain point, we began talking about vietnam. he mentioned a number of key points. afterwards kissinger asked is there anything in the key points which deviated in a substantial way than what the vietnamese are saying? he said no, he is taking the same lines. to me, that meant we could not count on the chinese to pull us out of the fire in vietnam. that is a key point. negroponte: they wouldn't pull out of the fire. we had to send his transcript to hanoi. secondly, and i do think they were not going to pull our irons out of the fire.

they could get us out of vietnam and away from the borders in a way that would not undercut our world credibility and balancing of the soviet union. it was worth it, i think they did argue to hanoi to settle for a military settlement. you'll get your prize in the long run. that would be the only new wants. professor smyser: that is an important modification. kt: that is talking about vietnam with the chinese a year before. when you want to moscow, did you also talk -- lord: we did. professor smyser: moscow was a very different kettle of fish. kt: the trip was on. the russians, the soviet union didn't object. now, you are in moscow. >> we had one meeting. with their national security advisor, interpreter and he was

the president, henry winston and myself. we had a nice long for our thing. where they basically vented about vietnam. i think the longer they spoke it was a question of sending the transcript. they were doing this for the record in hanoi. winston may want to talk about these details. winston lord: one of the worst moments of my life was that they missed the presidential motorcade. this meeting was just going to be on vietnam. there was a big sign for a space agreement, i don't know what it was. in the motorcade was supposed to go at half hour later. brezhnev says to henry, let's go

to the president. let's go early. the motorcade takes off and we are left behind. henry is a great guy, but he can get a little upset when things don't go well. missing the motorcade, even though it was not our fault that is irrelevant though, right. we were agonizing. he went to the kgb and said please let us go out. they said, no, you can't go out. so we went out behind brezhnev and nixon. we were contemplating suicide, i don't know. [laughter] luckily, brezhnev took nixon on a boat so we did not miss anything. can we had a meeting with john a vicious meeting. and nixon stood there and did not try to debate. and this is significant.

because the russians had nixon during the bombing and mining, it sent a message about how loyal their ally was. at the end of that, nixon leaves. kissinger goes off to negotiate the salt agreement until midnight. i don't think he was drunk. >> henry used to say, -- kt: example number one. let history no. in the audience are several key members of henry kissinger's staff. they were chuckling when winston lord and john negroponte: talk about contemplating suicide because henry kissinger would have been disappointed. winston lord: there are very

magnanimous, but they did not need a briefing because there was a four hour lecture from the other side. kt: we've gone through salt negotiations, arms control opening to china the vietnam college campuses, smyser said harvard was incognito. in october 1972, a breakthrough. winston lord: we got the north vietnamese's attention with hanoi and haiphong. as you can see in a later episode, when you talk to hanoi you get their attention when you are nice -- you don't get their attention, unfortunately. we resumed talks with the words the enemies in secret and got a few inklings that they may be more flexible, even on a political settlement. the tone was different. we just bombed the hell out of

them. we had a forthcoming proposal still on the table. to make a long story short, the breakthrough came on october 8, 1972. why? we went to another sacred talk. they presented a proposal. elaborating our points with their own proposal. for the first time in the history of negotiations they dropped the political conditions. up until then, even in 1969, if we said of us are prisoners and we would get out it would not have worked. they would have insisted on overthrowing the government. their prime minister had a public proposal sometime during this time with eight point basically said, unilaterally u.s. withdrawal, and then overthrow qu. when you have done that, we will discuss prisoners.

then the presidential election. he was ready to give to the vietnamese everything they wanted. as long as they thought mcgovern would when they would wait. that is why they petered out the negotiation. they would wait to see if they could give them what they wanted. when they saw an october that nixon would win by a landslide they thought we would have a performer years. he doesn't have to worry about getting reelected. we should make a deal. they were eager to have a peace agreement before the election. then he might be more flexible.

he was the opposite. he was not in a have an agreement that look like a sellout. he was a going to do it and he did not need it. john negroponte: one of the things i learned from the negotiations if you can avoid it, don't negotiate something critical to the united states national security one month before presidential elections. winston lord: critters could say we rushed it, and john may want to comment as we get further along. we spent three days, three exhausting days, fleshing out our counterproposal. i remember one night, john, we were at the embassy, i don't know where we were, this was public. henry said take the proposal and we do it. john and i stayed up until 3:00

a.m. henry woke us up. he was generous and did not wake us until 7:00 a.m., he wakes us up and says it is too tough. in any event he said it is too tough and we have to loosen it. three or four more exhausting days and we finally settled on the basics of an agreement with some details. henry was asked to go to hanoi to complete it. he was contemplating that. we were keeping nixon and the president informed. so, we went back to the agreement. i stayed behind and negotiated with the vietnamese on a lot of details. is still hireling. i thought we succeeded. i was woken by a phone call the next morning saying you have to

go back to the north vietnamese to get more points. i flew back on a commercial airline. i went into the restroom on the airplane and cried out of exhaustion and joy. then, we get back to washington. we decided we have to go tell mr. thieu what the agreement is about. john negroponte: we went to saigon on the 17 of october. the scenario henry had in mind was we would go to saigon for a couple of days, then go to hanoi , initial the agreement, and the cease-fire would go into effect on november 2. several days before the elections. when we got to saigon unfortunately, we did not even have a fully completed text. but thieu reacted.

-- winston lord: i'm going to interrupt you. we had discussions on how thieu would react. henry and i had analysis and wishful thinking thinking that he would not like it but would accept it because we got rid of the political condition he would be overthrown. a year before we had one of our proposal saying we were willing to have elections after an agreement, six month after under international supervision. and if he would resign a month before the election, leaving the implication he would still run. he was willing, a year earlier. tang i won't even run. he was very forthcoming. there are many other reassurances of continuing eight. john was more press yet.

-- he was more pressient kt: . so you think you got a deal after decade afford. john negroponte: what happens is, thieu says he won't do it. then the north vietnamese revealed the fact that henry cancels his trip to hanoi to carry out the scenario. a stories headlined in new york magazine. a deal with hanoi, a duel with thieu, and president nixon decides correctly that he could not go ahead with the agreement in october of 1972. it would look like we were in an ambitious way just dumping an ally that we fought side-by-side with for years. we decided to go back to washington.

henry had a press conference on the 26th of october. winston lord: the first press conference he ever gave. john negroponte: and said, peace is at hand. which was misinterpreted i many critics as henry trying to convince the american people to try to deceive them somehow. what he was really trying to do was send the message reassuring hanoi particularly and saigon to say, ok, we have had a stick up, but we will be back to sort this out after the election. kt: then you have nixon reelected, you don't have a deal, then what does he do? winston lord: we go back for more talks in paris which got nowhere. when it blew up with hanoi we said we have told you we can do the deal unless south vietnam is on board. if they are not we have to make

changes. we had to assure them the basic agreement was in place. and that we would try to get some changes, but don't expect too much. we go back, nothing happens in november. john negroponte: just to interrupt, all along we have decided to really ramp up the supply of the south vietnamese army to bolster their sense of security for any future agreement. winston lord: we would pack them up. we would get into that. nixon decides once again the only way to get the north vietnamese attention is through pressure. you have the famous christmas bombing that took place around christmas time since the november talks got nowhere. fact is, you could argue it is not a nice thing to do. within two days, the north vietnamese sent us a note saying they wanted to talk. we got their attention.

furthermore, and limited civilian casualties. the record stories about civilian national seas. i'm sure there was collateral damage but we did our best to minimize it. when we went to hanoi a few months later we could see in the populated areas there was no damage. the craters were in the areas not near the population. that caught their attention and we got negotiations. they made some changes, not enough, but we got the deal. kt: two days after the christmas bombing? john negroponte: we have pictures of the initialing ceremony on january 23, 1972. you want to add? kt: so this is the initialing ceremony. where is this taking place? john negroponte: in paris. that is the international conference center.

later, there is a picture of others coming out onto the street. professor smyser: can you go back i will explain who is in the picture. on the left-hand side is negotiations along with the state department. torch aldrich. they were negotiating protocols in indochina generally prisoners and supervision. so you have kissinger aldrich john dingell funny -- john who is less happy. and then to his right -- he was a functionary and a fire's minister of foreign affairs. that is who was on the other side.

john negroponte: in that conversation i recall one thing henry asked. i thought it was revealing. he said, do you decide these issues in the bureau by consensus or vote? i was sure he was going to say by consensus. that is the way communists work in my perception. he said, no, by vote. i think they are genuinely been divided in the previous weeks about whether or not to go forward with the agreement. they thought they were doublecrossed by us bailing out on the original scenario. resupplying saigon with equipment. there may have been some dissension in the public bureau whether to go forward or not. that is why just before christmas, he said he had to go back. the reason he introduced -- he

introduced a whole lot of changes. nine or 10 in the agreement just before we -- the november/december talks. i think it was to buy himself time. i don't think he realized he was going to buy the christmas bombing. kt: january 1973. what happens, next. winston lord: kissinger goes to hanoi. and we are with him. professor smyser: i declined to go. winston lord: i was with him. one to urge implementation of hanoi to the agreement and to reinsurer them about implementation. secondly to get as much information on prisoners of war as we could. very important. in the agreement, we insisted it was crucial for nixon and kissinger. we said we had to have all the

prisoners back and i had to come back while we were still in the country. the agreement was phased over two months incremental u.s. withdraw and prisoners. they lived up to that. we got them back on schedule. the list was shorter than we thought it would have been and week on laos and cambodia visitors. we even brought photos of those we thought were in the prisoners camps. it was a very unproductive trip, foreshadowing what was coming. the question, remains for many, did they hold back prisoners. they were brutal enough to do this, but didn't. if you hold them back, don't tell anyone you've got them, it doesn't give you leverage. if they tell the world to help these people back, it is world outrage. my yes those who we thought should've been on the list

probably died in captivity under torture, starvation, or whatever, and they did not want to reveal that. i think we got everyone back they had at that point. kt: the prisoners are back, the deal is signed, you are relieved we have finally ended the vietnam war with honor, integrity, and decency, then it all falls apart. winston lord: john was less relieved that i was. kt: when the deal was done, did you think -- john negroponte: i didn't like the deal. i foresaw in the agreement the scenes of what happened next. in honesty, it was a withdrawal agreement. in diplomacy, sometimes you use euphemistic terms for what you've done. the agreement is called the agreement to restore peace -- to end the war and restore peace in

vietnam. it wasn't that. it essentially turned out to be a withdrawal agreement. it ended up not being as descent as we would've liked. then, we had the discussion afterward. it'd unravel because of the agreement, or because the presidency was so weekend -- w was so -- was so weakened that it deprived president nixon the ability to respond in a forceful way? we could debate on that forever. winston lord: reasonable people can disagree on this. first, we felt that we for 10 years, had sacrificed blood and money on behalf of south vietnam . we tried to prepare them. we paid our price. secondly, we felt it was the

best deal we could get. better than most predicted. better than most editorials and peace people were saying. we at least gave thieu a chance to survive. there were four reasons we thought the agreement would hold up e.on thinking we were out of time and that it had gone on long enough. number one, we are not naive. we did not trust annoying. if they had some cease-fire violations, we felt the south vietnamese, with our supplies, with be able to handle that. they'd gone to the point to handle low-level violations. if there was a massive infiltration and evasion, which happened we -- the american people did not and we did not want, to go back on the ground to uphold an agreement after all of the sacrifices. that we would resume bombing.

we thought the military situation could be manageable. thirdly, there was a program. we called reconstruction, they wanted to collect reparations. we had it for laos, south vietnam, commodious, and hanoi. it was $2.5 billion. if they implement the agreement they get money for reconstruction. fourthly we thought the chinese and russians would weigh-in on implementation not wanting to ameliorate us and having their own states in the bilateral relationship. each of those assumptions did not pan out. the south vietnamese were not as capable as we hoped. the congress to its shame cut off economic and military aid to the south vietnamese. the practical and psychological impact on our allies trying to fight off a north vietnamese invasion -- invasion when we cannot give them it's on the

ground or air power. we couldn't do air power. kt: when did congress cut off aid? winston lord: they got more and more incremental about cutting off bombing and eight -- and aid. 1972, 73, 74. he kept going. in kissinger's book this is the most comprehensive account obviously from his perspective, everything we have talked about and more. those interested it came out in 2003 called ending libya no more. john negroponte: it ended our involvement in the been no more. -- it ended our involvement in the vietnam war. winston lord: these assumptions prove to be wrong. the way that we got thieu to go

along was the rationale i just told you. we could not back up. and threats. we were out of patience. he objected to the fact that there were north vietnamese in his country and he felt he had been misled about where we were and dumped it on him just before elections. that is why he reacted the way he did. he did not like it two months later, either. that is why we thought it could work. we did not think we would get a better deal. it did not work out, obviously the way we hoped. we did buy time. southeast asia had time to assemble itself and not fall as dominoes. it was purchased at a very tough price. kt: april, 1975, vietnam moved into saigon and we evacuated the american embassy in saigon? any final thoughts about this?

what were we doing in vietnam, the successes, the lessons the nation should learn? professor smyser: the main lesson is don't get involved in things where you cannot count on your public being truly committed. a problem, and i want to stress this, i've set it again but i want to stress it, our problems were not only in vietnam. our problems were in the united states. for some odd reason, and maybe some not so odd reasons, we were unable to convince the american people there was a genuine american steak in this conflict. why were we not able to convince them? and how we could have done it is one of the great questions of the centuries. i suspect there are no answers

and no one can fully answer it. i teach a course in diplomacy at georgetown university. one of the things i go into not into the painstaking detail we do here, but one thing i go into is the question of how does one handle the problem of public opinion in a democracy when you're dealing with a diplomatic situation? and when you're dealing with people who are smart and as dedicated as the north vietnamese turned out to be. you have a genuine problem. you cannot solve it by memos and sending papers and taking a lot of trips. you have to solve it by convincing people that what is at stake is genuinely in the national interest.

there were times when able to do this, and times were not able to do this. that is the real question that the americans face in the coming years. in the coming century. we have a very difficult situation in terms of projecting power across the world in a complex environment. that is what we have to learn to do. if there's anything that comes to me out of this discussion and i think they have handled it brilliantly. you have asked the right question. the real issue is, how does one manage public opinion in a democracy in such a way that doesn't cheat people. don't think for a moment you can cheat them, because you can't. you have to do it honestly, honorably, but you also have to do it right. it is one of the questions i address with my students.

i hate to say it but even though is an excellent and brilliant course managed by a brilliant professor we don't have the answer in this course. i'm not sure anyone does. it is agent history to them, but they can be introduced to the elements of difficulty it had. it is difficult to do, particularly when you're dealing with someone who is as clever and is being\\ -- as clever and motivated as the vietnamese are. now, they have a different problem with the chinese. it is, however something that needs total commitment of american thought and conscience. the world is not going to get simpler.

and there we are. kt: well said. john? john negroponte: first of all that was more or less the beginning of my career, not the end. i went on and ended up dealing with situations like iraq and afghanistan. i was the ambassador to iraq. in central america. i was in a lot of conflicted situations. i carried my recollections of vietnam with me wherever i went. one of the most important things was the vietnamese asian -- the vietnameseation. the whole issue of, can we do it ourselves. do we have to be the policeman of the world or can we have friends in the endeavor? ever since vietnam, i have emphasized this aspect. i remember sitting in my office

as ambassador to the united nations, we had just gone into afghanistan. i said we've got to build up the afghan army. he shrugged it off. we didn't try to do that or another six or seven years. which, i think is unfortunate. i don't -- i hope we don't have to keep real learning this lesson when we want to help other countries in difficult situations. the second thing i would say obviously what ensued from this and i think we need to be fair to mr. nixon and mr. kissinger even though they ended it, they don't get responsibility. you can't just tag them with responsibility for everything that went before. in fact, their strategy was quite brilliant and would have been better if we had applied it sooner. for example, i think the entire lbj administration did not talk

through the implications of the science of soviet split which henry and president nixon did very thoroughly. lastly, and on a happy note, despite the loss of vietnam to the north, despite all of the human tragedy that ensued for both people, the vietnamese who migrated here, so forth i've found it interesting when i went back as the deputy secretary of state. the first time i'd been back and 35 years since the signing of the agreement, and saw the incredible enthusiasm that existed in the democratic republic of vietnam for good relationships with the united states, and i think it is spiritual. i remember leaving hanoi, and i gave a press conference as i would always do when i made it official stop, and a b enemies journal asked me, mr.

ambassador, if an american oil rig was attacked by the chinese in vietnamese controlled waters with the united states come to our assistance. when you think of that, that question -- that it was even conceivable -- 40 years ago, we have come a long way. i find it heartening that we have come back to having a healthy relationship with the democratic republic of vietnam. winston lord: what we just said, someone can correct me, that you don't have permanent friends or permanent enemies, you have permanent interest. we have come full circle with vietnam and we may come full circle again. a few years after the paris peace agreement, the chinese invaded. they had real conflicts over cambodia. for me personally, is the

beginning of my career, all of us were young. when i was the assistant secretary with clinton in the 1990's we were consumed with the question who is missing and getting back remains for the mia. i was the -- i was taking several trips to hanoi. you can imagine the memories i had trying to find out more about missing and trying to get the remains. we made a lot of progress. one of the most emotional moments of my life was in the hanoi airport and our efforts to see coffins going back to the united states with the remains of people who their loved ones to know where they were for 20 years. we decided we would move ahead and try to normalize relations with the amount. for me it was holding my nose.

they had broken the agreement and the sacrifices we made. i felt more importantly that it is the best way to get information on the mia's. it would help balance china that was going as a geopolitical competitor. vietnam at then was not a great friend of china. economically, it may be useful down the road. with help from people like senator mccain, senator kerry and the head of the foreign relations committee and pete peterson, they protected clinton's flag to go ahead with normalization. clinton invaded the draft. these were heroes stood up for normalization. they led the way. clinton had to go ahead. then, we normalized. we had the situation in the

south china sea were vietnam will not become our ally, but they do see the need for reassuring american presence in that region, as do all the other countries in the region. kt: if i could add my final thoughts, i have two. the debate we have had you could have today about the foreign policy of the united states today and the american war. we're talking about the same issues. public support for an unpopular war. you bomb someone that does not abide by the agreement. what happens to safe havens across orders. we are facing the same issues today. i must conclude with, as i listen to the three of you talking about, with enormous feeling it, concern, and honesty, with no naivete, the way you have conducted foreign

policy during a time of enormous crisis constitutional crisis people on the street, and dealing with one of the most intractable problems, i must say, it was an honor to serve as such great men. thank you for sharing your perspective with all of us and for putting it down for history. people can learn a lot from what you have done for your nation. with that, thank you very much. [applause] announcer: here are featured programs for this weekend. on c-span2, book tv, tonight at 10:00 p.m. eastern on afterwards. the president of americans for tax reform says americans are

tired of the irs and our tax system. sunday night at 8:00 allies during world war ii. susan butler on their unexpected partnership beyond the war. tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span3 lectures in history. university of virginia's college at wise professor jennifer murray on how civil war veterans reunion has changed from the reconstruction euro to the present. and american history tv is live from the appomattox courthouse commemorating the 150th anniversary of the confederate surrender and the end of the civil war. up next on american history tv, a panel of scholars discusses the major issues and policies that affect immigrants refugees and the catholic community today. they focus on the problem of providing health care for illegal immigrants.

this session from the catholic university of america is 90 minutes. >> american catholics have deep memory and sharp in experiences with immigration. our personal histories each of us, as a catholic in the united states is one that i am sure is marked with milestones of hardships. and good times associated with the immigration experience. we remember and our personal histories, both the americans who welcome us with such gladness and graciousness with open arms, and we remember the americans who did not. the experience of immigration has pressed its self into the way that we catholics in the united states understand ourselves as americans.

the same experience of immigration has also pressed itself into the way that we americans understand ourselves as catholics. ladies and gentlemen, thank you for coming today. our first panel. tim: thank you, steve. i am tim meagher. i am the associate professor at the catholic university of america. what steve said about catholic history and connections to immigration, we define -- we are defined by many things, common beliefs, shared rituals but they are also designed by a common history. central to that has been immigration. the first panel