partners in israel. i think you've probably seen the press in recent days. we're still crunching the data, but we think very, very successful flight tests of the system, which you briefly saw in the video there. lots going on in international cooperation. we can talk a lot more about it in the q & a. so, again, i covered a ton of ground in a very short amount of time. w again, i'm open to your 0l questions in a moment here. one area i didn't talk about is technology, and what mda is doing in the technology realm. and that's because we've got our chief technologist here. in my mind having been around mda now for going on a year, close to still the bread and butter. lost sight of that. so i'll close, again, put my war fighter hat back on. you can say what you want about missile defense generally or about the system or about the

cost and the expense. and we used to banter this around in the cheyenne mountain on a lot of cold, dark nights on alert and doing an exercise or for real world contingency. and often times, we would sort of come to the conclusion, what is it worth to us? is it worth seattle? san fransbn, or los angeles, or increasingly now colorado, denver, heartland of america. potentially in the future eastern seaboard, boston, new york, washington, d.c. is it worth the investment in :f. these systems to pretend -- to ok protect what we value the most. that's our homeland, our way of life.

i think the answer, my personal answer is yes. and so, i'm an optimist about this. not without our challenges. we continue to deal with those challenges. we've got the best and brightest people. i can tell you. i wish you could meet a lot of them. phenomenal people working these issues. i'm really proud to work with them and be their deputy director. i'm humbled to do that. they're doing some really important work. and i thank you all again for your contribution to this debate. look forward to your questions. thank you very much.n >> so now< e're going to up the questions. >> i think we've heard now repeatedly just how much the -- c

how much the conversation's changed in the past decade and change. that it's no longer a question of whether, but how and what way and talk about if you walked through just many of the systems that we're actively deploying. i guess one word that didn't come up is sequestration, that 13-letter word. and given everything budget wise, i wonder if you might, first of all, elaine, speak to the relative weight given to the missile defense mission that you feel in the pentagon. and perhaps, you might weigh in for mda's priorities in answering that. >> you know, i'm not sure that i'm totally objective because i am in the the nuclear defense policy. so i spend a lot of my time on missile defense. but having been in broader meetings on setting budget priorities in the demag and so forth, there is a lot of emphasis on missile defense and the pentagon. there's, as we've said, a lot of combatant commander demand for the regional missile defense. there's a lot of focus on

weather north korea -- so it is a high priority mission. it is a balancing act, as i said, we have to constantly reassess priorities, where are fá we on technology development, where are we on fiscal constraints. following through, combatant 2tñ commanders who want more, can't cut the seat cord, that's a balancing act. you see that balancing act in the request for the missile defense project. and that's at the president's request level. cuts just hurt. they hurt all the way across. it's the old story.ú >> so, as you mentioned, it's and all of you know, you know,

resources aren't aplenty. so we've got to make careful decisions and choices about where we invest within the work that we're doing at the agency. so we obviously get our guidance from the department. so our priorities fall into the lump, the broad sum of homeland defense and maintaining our : commitment to european phase adaptive approach. within those sort of subcategories, i would say that clearly the work we're doing for gdi reliability, the work that we're doing in the upcoming flight tests, the work we're doing with rkb as i mentioned, falls at the very top. >> discrimination, making sure as this threat matures and evolves, we've got the ability to outpace it. and we are concerned about a growing threat.

and new capabilities to try to outmatch what we've got today existing. so for homeland, i would say gbi reliability discrimination, as well, at the very top. and again, maintaining our commitments to the european adaptive approach. and i think we're in a good it' place for all of that. all the while thinking about seed corn technology. never losing sight of bmds. >> is it outpacing us? >> we are outpacing the threat. we are ahead of the threat. yes. >> i would agree with that. i would say that sequestration, which you mentioned briefly is a dangerous thing. and my boss has testified he used these words. he says, should sequestration come to pass and we're forced to take cuts in the program, has the potential to be outmatched or overmatched i think is the word he used. that's of concern. but to answer your question, we are outpacing the threat. >> all right. well, why don't we take questions from the audience.

we've got some microphones going around. i see one at that back table. i think that's bruce. why don't you identify yourself and go ahead. >> hi, i'm bruce mcdonald, adjunct at john's hopkins. and i'm doing a study with the federation of american scientists. i've been to china a couple of times in the last few months. and thaad got a nice mention here. and it'll be no surprise up there, that in china, we hear a lot about thaad. and we say, listen, we have no problem with the interceptor, but that radar, that gives them a lot of heartburn. and so my question to you, i worked missile defense for a long time, what is the right response to that issue that is raised about why china -- they're worried that the thaa d radar -- what's the right way to respond to that? i have to say, my response i just covered.

i said, listen, if we wanted to go after china, we would be d%'wyjjá forces differently than we are. you can be sure. what's your perspective? what's the right answer to give the chinese on that? >> first, i need to clarify. you're talking about u.s. deployment, potential u.s. deployment of thaad in south korea. >> yes. >> and i want to make it clear that while that is something that the u.s. forces commander, usfk is interested in because it would provide defense for certainly for u.s. deployed forces and south korea. we have not had formal consultations with rok about our deploying for that. so the concerns are a little premature. that's one. two is that the threats from north korea are why usfk commander would like to look at

that. and so it's north korea that drives this. and i think any decision if we do have consultations with iraq on this would be for the u.s. and iraq to decide.ñi so this is not about china. >> nothing else? all right, right here. wait for the microphone? >> good afternoon, i'm charles newstad from the news department. i'm not speaking for the department at all. this is just me, the physicist in me speaking to you. and my question is this. given that mr. putin is increasingly behaving like he's the dictator rather than a more

benign russia we saw during the gorbachev et cetera era. how can you be so sure that we don't need to have defense against russian missiles? or for that matter, defense against the china which has tremendous capability. admittedly they're saying no first strike. what does that mean? and admittedly, they appear to be on a somewhat reasonable course. but that could change instantly. and how are we prepared to respond to that? >> there are a number of ways ") you can deal with other countries having policic missiles. it's not the only way. the soviet union, when it was the soviet union had many ballistic missiles. we had a missile defense system, it was not about defending

against soviet ballistic missiles. that was about detouring the use through the threat of nuclear retaliation. so if you look at countries where it's feasible to have a homeland defense and countries ñr where it's not feasible. russia, i think, falls in the not feasible. given the capacity, the numbers as well as the sophistication of their ability to develop countermeasures, the sophistication in many ways. the same can be said of china if it wants to be able, it certainly has the economic capability, the technical capability. and so the question becomes how many gdps would you like to spend on it? countries like north korea,

iran, where, again, there are multiple reasons. one is more limited capabilities, less sophisticated capabilities that you can't foresee staying ahead of. how much confidence do you have in your ability to deter a tax on the homeland? all of these we're talking about homeland. the homeland. how much confidence do you have in deterrence. i also do deterrence. but i think if you put confidence level about deterring a tax on the homeland the larger, more capable countries, russia and china i'd put on one side. and countries such as north korea, potentially iran i would put on the less confidence about other ways including deterrence. i'd put having less confidence there.

so there are several factors in why we have not chosen to defend the homeland from russia and china. >> anything on that? all right. we've got one up here. >> while we're waiting on this question, i wanted to follow up a little bit. what are the big muscle movements on the fy '16 budget that keep us ahead of the threat. this may be more for you, general. discrimination, you speak a little bit to that about, i know you talked about it briefly. and gave us an insight into how

little bit. but what are some of the other big muscle movements? >> yeah, i think i probably touched on them. but, just sort of repeat. big muscle movement. the long range discriminating radar as you mentioned. we're doing some things in technology, i think, that will start to change course, the course a little bit. we can't wait until we're, you know, the threat or we're behind it to catch up. we're doing things to try to stay up and you'll hear more about that in a moment. those are probably the biggest parts of the works we're doing. >> very good. >> hi, if the iran deal does come to fruition, would that change any of our plans for the homeland missile defense? and would it stay the same?w[s

would it give us more leeway for scheduling things further out? >> first, if iran, we foresee will continue to deploy ballistic missiles, but they're not nuclear armed would be a good thing. almost everything, well, everything we're doing for the north korean threat in any event. and we do have protection now against north korea as the threat could be even if it becomes operational. and iran. it might affect future, how you go forward in the future. >> it's a very good question as this thing develops. i would argue that it might make missile defense broadly more important. we outpace the threat, stay ahead of the threat. we were concerned about a breakout capability.

i'm not going to speak to the policy piece of the treaty itself. but we can't, you know, take this as our pencil's down, we've got a breather now. we've got to continue, i think, to forge ahead. iran has the largest short d medium range ballistic missile inventory in the region. it's a regional threat as much as well. i think it ups the ante in the game rather than allows us to relax at all. >> charles in the back and then right here. >> tom, thank you, charles ferguson, working with bruce mcdonald on his project looking at china missile defense. i was recently in china about a month ago. my question i'm thinking about outpacing the threat. and could we imagine the scenario where north korea, and

i've been there a couple of times. i talked to north koreans. they're very proud of rocket developments, they don't call it missiles, obviously. but that's the way we look at it. could you imagine a time in the future where their threat is so advanced, they have advance capability, including countermeasures, because of the things they could deploy against us. where it might become cost prohibitive for us through further and further defenses. and such that china enters the picture and china gets worried and china says, uh-oh, u.s. capability in the region is getting so sad advance to deal with the north korea threat. that's our intention. but china feels now we've got to build up. may feel they have to build up because of india developing further missile capabilities. i guess my question about you is, are you playing out these scenarios, thinking about --

there could come a time it becomes so sophisticated where we have to think differently. >> always good to have your challenging questions, charles. yeah, as north korea assuming they keep advancing and advancing, we go back to what we said earlier about regional missile defense. even when you are trying to missile defense, anything north korea could throw at you. that it is not the only capability that we have. what's the role of missile defense in the overall mix of capabilities becomes an issue. it doesn't -- it doesn't assuagexd

part of what you're getting at, my interrelated, the gears that are interrelated where yo$ñ turning one gear that is response to north korea's nuclear missile programs and others are watching that, thinking it's about them when it's not. you know, and it's that what action do you take about some problem that others then take reaction that is not what you were trying to do in the first place. you're working on complex issues there.6úvát$u)q oint where missile defense -- always a problem to talk about. hypotheticals. we're constantly reassessing what's the role of missile defense against threats and what's the role of other

capabilities in dealing with ballistic missiles? you're talking about future reassessment of that issue. >> i put my war fighter hat back on. and tell you that, you know, again, sitting in the mountain, these capabilities, particularly if we go the route that we're going in terms of our programs, fá the work that we're doing, i've already mentioned the technology work that he's going to talk about. never say never, but i'm not sure that's that achievable of a goal, first of all. for them to outpace us, if you

will. and as a war fighter, again, what i said about a continuum of capability for the war fighter. an offense, defense mix. this is just one piece. any capability, maybe not designed to catch every single thing they could. but to sort of buy some time to make an assessment and have options, if you will. the nation would have options. so i continue to believe that we're on the right path. that's part of a larger continuum of capabilities. and i don't think we ever want to give up on the idea that we have some capability in the missile defense tool kit. >> all right. i think we'll take one more question right here. wait for the mike. >> yeah. >> for the first and only time in history, i attended the 35th reunion of the graduates of the science high school in 1970. and this is, i call it learning trips. okay. and this is what i learned because they're assessing, because i'm an american, okay. and this is a reminder to me by my -- joint chiefs and economic minister remind the americans that to us, zero based budget is zero, nothing. we don't have anything to spend at the end of the year. so that means, you know -- >> all right. >> that's easy, but i retired from the navy. >> let's keep it on missile defense. >> good-bye.ñr

>> thank you very much. >> we have about seven minutes before our next panel. we're going to have frank rose, secretary of state and steve from brookings, and we'll be back in about seven minutes to continue our conversation for some international dimensions. thank you very much. thank you both of you.

there was a comment made about not too finely disaggregating. but the capabilities go beyond that. but this panel will be on working with allies. we're going to first have assistant secretary of state frank rose who is always flying somewhere to talk about these issues. followed by ambassador steve piffer to talk about other things, as well. we're going to start with assistant secretary rose. >> well, tom, thanks very much for that kind introduction. and it's actually good to be

back here in washington. by the way of introduction, my name is frank rose and my work at the state department is focused on enhancing strategic stability around the world. arms control, verification, compliance are some of the tools that we use to enhance strategic stability and reassure our allies and partners that we will meet our security commitments. missile defense is another tool to do that. at the state department, i'm responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense issues, including missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners around the world. in this capacity, i serve as the lead u.s. negotiator for the missile defense basing agreements in romania, turkey and poland. so i'm pleased to be here today to discuss our efforts at

enhancing missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners. one of the key goals from the 2010 ballistic missile defense review or bmdr. now, you have already heard about our missile defense policybdñ and operations. so, instead, let me focus my remarks on three areas. one, the significant progress we have made in implementing the european phase adaptive approach and nato missile defense. two, cooperation with allies outside of europe.kwj and three, i'll conclude with a few points on russia and missile defense. before i do that, i do want to reiterate one point that you undoubtedly heard from elaine and ken.

the president's fiscal year 2016 budget protects and enhances our important missile defense priorities such as european phase adaptive approach and reflects the high priority we place on these efforts. as such, the u.s. commitment to nato missile defense and the sites in romania and poland remains as former secretary of defense chuck hagel said, quote, ironclad. with that, let me take a few moments to discuss where we are with regards to overall implementation of the president's european phase adaptive approach or epaa. and the united states' national contribution to the north çóv atlantic treaties organizations missile defense system. in 2009, the president announced that the epaa would, quote, provide stronger, smarter and swifter defenses of american forces in america's allies. while relying on, quote,

capabilities that are proven and cost effective. since then, we have been working hard to implement his vision and have made great strides in recent years. i just returned from turkey and romania last week and had the opportunity to discuss our progress with these two key partners. turkey was the first to receive in phase one with the deployment in 2011.bfl at the same time, we began the start of a sustained deployment of ballistic missile defense. capable ships in the mediterranean. with the declaration of interim ballistic missile defense or bmd capability at the nato chicago summit in may 2012, the radar in turkey was transitioned to nato operational control.x÷ additionally, spain agreed in 2011 to host four capable ships at the existing naval facility as a spanish contribution to nato missile defense.

in february of last year, the first of four missile defense capable ships, uss donald cook arrived in spain. a second ship joined her last june. during 2015, two more of these multi-mission ships, uss porter and uss carney will forward deploy. these multi-mission ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, training exercises, and support u.s. and nato operations, including missile defense. currently, we are focused on completing the deployment of an egis ashore site in romania as part of phase 2 of the epaa. the support for the timely completion of the arrangements needed to implement this deployment in romania's provision of security and its infrastructure efforts have been superb. in october 2014, the u.s. navy held an historic naval support facility establishment ceremony at the missile defense facility

at the air base in romania. this ceremony established the naval facility and installed its first u.s. commando. currently, this site is on schedule to be completed by the end of this year. and when operational, the site, combined with bmd capable ships in the mediterranean will enhance coverage of nato from short and medium range ballistic missiles from the middle east. and finally, there is phase 3. this phase includes a site in poland equipped with the new sm-3 block 2a intercepter. the site is on schedule for deployment in the 2018 time frame. for example, this, the çó president's fy '16 budget includes approximately $200 million for the establishment of this site.

the interceptor site in poland is key to the epaa. when combined with other epaa assets, phase 2, a phase 3 will ( provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all nato european territory in the 2018 time =ñ frame. so as you can see, we are continuing to implement our president's vision for stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses in europe. i would also like to highlight the efforts that our nato ally, of our nato allies to develop and deploy. of three nato countries are deployed in turkey under nato command and control to augment turkey's air defense capabilities in response to the crisis on turkey's southeastern ok border. voluntary national contributions are the foundation of a missile defense system.

and there are several approaches allies can take to make important and valuable contributions in this area. first, allies can acquire fully capable bmd systems possessing sensor, shooter and command and control capabilities. second, allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key ballistic missile defense capability. finally, allies can contribute to nato's ballistic missile defense capability by providing essential basing support. such as turkey, romania, poland and spain have already agreed to do. in all of these approaches, however, the most critical ok

requirement is nato < interoperatability. yes, acquiring is, of course, good in and of itself. but if that capability is not intereperable, then its value is significantly diminished. it is only through interoperatability, and enhance nato bmd through shared battle space awareness and reduce interceptor wastage. let me now turn to some of the other regions of the world. the united states in cooperation with our allies and partners is continuing to bolster missile defenses in other key regions such as the middle east and the asia pacific in order to strengthen regional deterrence architectures. in the middle east, we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through such as the recently established gulf cooperation council or gccc strategic cooperation forum. at the september 26, 2013, strategic cooperation forum, secretary kerry and his counterparts reaffirm their intent first stated at the

september 28th, 2012 strategic cooperation forum to, quote, work towards enhanced u.s. gcc coordination on ballistic missile defense. several of our partners in the region have expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. for example, the united arab emirates or uae has contracted to buy two terminal high-altitude area defense or thaad batteries when operational will enhance the security as well as regional stability. the uae has also taken delivery of its patriot pac 3 batteries, which provide a lower tier point defense of critical national assets. we look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperatability with our gcc

cooperators in the coming months and years ahead. additionally and separately, the united states maintains a strong defense relationship with israel and our cooperation has resulted in a comprehensive missile defense architecture for israel. the weapon system, and the arrowr weapons system in conjunction with the united states creates a multi-layer architecture design to protect the israeli people from varying types of missile threats. turning to the asia pacific region, we are continuing to cooperation through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships. for example, the united states are working closely together to develop the 2a interceptor which will make a key contribution to our european phase adaptive approach as well as being deployed in other regions of the world we also recently completed

the deployment of a second antpy2 radar into japan which will enhance the defense of the united states and japan. and finally we're continuing to work on enhancing between u.s. and japanese forces which will be aided by recent changes to the defense cooperation guidelines, which we expect to be completed soon. we also continue to consult closely with our allies in australia. for example, as a result of u.s. australia foreign and defense ministerial consultations over the past year, the united states and australia have established a bilateral missile defense working group to examine options for potential australian contributions to ballistic missile defense. additionally, we are also consulting closely with the republic of korea as it develops the korean air and missile defense system, which is

designed to defend the republic of korea against air and missile threats from north korea. the republic of korea recently announced it plans to purchase patriot pac 3 missiles, which will enhance its capability to defend against the north korean ballistic missile threat. finally, let me say a few things about missile defense and russia. prior to the suspension of our dialogue on missile defense as a result of russia's illegal actions in ukraine, russia continued to demand that the united states provided legally behinding guarantees that our missile defenses will not harm or diminish the strategic nuclear deterrent. these guarantees would have been based on a criteria that would have limited our missile defenses and undermined our abilities to stay ahead of the ballistic missile threat. the ballistic missile defense review is quite clear on our policy. u.s. missile defense is not designed nor directed against

russia and china's strategic nuclear forces. however, at the same time, we have also made it clear that we cannot and will not accept legally binding or other constraints that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies and our partners. the security of the united states, its allies and partners is our first and foremost solemn responsibility. as such, the united states will continue to insist on having the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats. free from obligations or constraints that limit our bmd capabilities. let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners around the world over the past several years. this was a key goal of the 2010 ballistic missile defense review. in europe, implementation of the

epaa in nato missile defense is going well. for example, the missile defense radar in turkey has been ;v< and the site in romania is scheduleded to become operational later this year. in the middle east, we are continuing to work bilaterally and multilaterally with our partners in the gcc to deploy missile effectiveness. for example, later this year the unitedw3 arab emirates will take delivery of its first thaad battery. furthermore, we continue to work with israel to expand its multilayered architecture to protect it from missile threats. in the asia pacific, we are working actively with our allies to enhance our missile defense capabilities in the region. on that note, we recently completed deployment of a second missile defense radar in japan, which will enhance both the defense of the united states and japan.

finally, we continue to impose russia's attempts to impose limitations on our defenses which would limit our ability to defend ourselves, allies and partners. suffice to say, defense of our allies and partners through missile defense cooperation is and will remain a key priority for the u.s. government. thank you very much, and i look forward to your questions. >> great. well, first of all, let me thank css being on this panel today. it's a pleasure and honor for me to follow in frank's footsteps here. and he talked a lot about cooperation and missile defense area between the united states, europe and asia. and i'll talk a little bit about potential cooperation that might have worked out but so far has not. i'll pick up on the last remarks about the united states, nato and russia.fá if you look back over the last

ten years, missile defense has been one of the truly contention issues on the u.s./russia relationship. there have been attempts to resolve the issue to look the a the possibility of cooperation between the united states and russia oréx = and russia thus far without success. if you go back to 2007, a conversation between president bush and president putin about, could there be a cooperative effort between washington and moscow? when the george w. bush administration plan was to deploy ten ground based interceptors. accompanied by a supporting radar in the czech republic. has been since closed down. and also a radar under construction. both of the radars having good views of iran. but the problem, the nub of the issue was the u.s. government

was interested in that idea in addition to american plans. the russian proposal was providing the radar data in place of the plans to deploy missile defenses in europe. that never really got started. the second attempt came up at the end of 2010 at a nato/russia summit in lisbon, where it concluded with the meeting of nato and medvedev where they agreed to explore the possibility for the nato russia cooperation on a missile defense arrangement to defend europe. and in early 2011, you actually had quite active dialogue including between the pentagon and the ministry of defense, but also dialogues in track to the security initiative had a dialogue going on. at brookings, we were running the conversation led by former secretary albright and former '7ó minister. and a lot of these ideas seemed to complement each other. and by 2011, there was a fairly

rich menu of ideas out there as to what a nato russia cooperative would look like. and it included four or five central elements, which it seemed that most of these dialogues were talking about in one form or another. when was the importance of transparency? and that proceeds from a logical point that each side had to understand the capabilities and the plans of the other if you were, in fact, going to have a cooperative missile defense system. second, the advantage of joint exercises, where there was u.s. russian experience going back to the late 1990s, joint exercises as a way to develop that cooperation. third, sort of the sense on both sides that you couldn't have a single combined system.

because russia was not prepared to work for a nato commander and nato was not prepared to work for a russian commander. seemed to revolve around two independent systems that interact at key points. with nato retaining the control over decision to launch the nato intercepter and russia retaining control over a russian decision to launch a russian interceptor. but they would interact through jointly manned centers. that would give them presumably l f1 o a better sense of what was happening in the missile defense environment around europe. second center also jointly manned would be planning an operation center, where nato and russian officers would talk about threat scenarios. what sorts of attack scenarios are they worried about and what would be the rules of engagement. in the e extreme, you wanted the situation where there was a ballistic missile attack towards europe and both chose to engage the target you wanted to know enough about what the other guy was going to do so they engaged

the baa lstic target and not each other. but the official dialogue in 2011 bogged down. and then there was the talk that not be oriented against strategic missiles. that demand was accompanied by what the russians called objective criteria, which when you asked for explanations meant limits on the numbers, velocities and locations of missile interceptors. in effect, a resurrection of the missile treaty. i'll make a couple of comments on this. in 2010 2011, it might not have been hard to work out an arrangement of ten years duration that would do two things. that would limit missile defenses in a way to address state concerns, even if we did not think there was much basis to the concerns. but would still allow the u.s. to do everything it wanted to do in terms of addressing a rogue ballistic missile threat pose ud

by north korea or iran. but i think that agreement, which might have been possible, was not doable here in the united states for political reasons. the second observation i would make is looking towards the future, if at some pointv)q reach a point where there's some greater degree of equivalence between missile defense capabilities and offensive forces, we may face a decision where we have to look at a miss lg defense treaty in parallel with the treaty that reduces strategic arms.çó that time of equivalency is not now. we are far from it. in fact, there's a huge gap now between offense and defense. in february of 2018 when the new limits take full effect rush ra will have in effect 1500 deploy ballistic missile warheads. and a rate against that will be at most, 44 american interceptors with the capability and the velocity to attack missile targets. so at this point in time, a missile defense treaty is not

necessary. there was an offer as a replacement to look at an executive agreement that would provide transparency on the two sides. on current programs but also looking at the enyears. and the essential philosophy blind that was to give each side so much information that the russian military could look down and say well here's where the americans are going to be on missile defense in 2021. here's where we will be. is that a threat? myr conclude looking at that objectively, they will conclude it's not a threat. if a threat were to emerge, they would have ample time to react. at this point there's been no sign of russian influence in that idea. so the question is where do you go next? it seems to me that arms control, particularly regarding further nuclear reductions and missile defense was fairly stucki] already in 2013. and since then, you've had the the crisis over ukraine the broader deterioration in relations between the u.s. and russia, and that's only going to make the atmosphere more difficult. the question is at what point would the russians be interested

in a more serious dialogue in arms control? and there may be possibilities there if the financial burdens the financial difficulties continue, and at some point perhaps as you e get closer to 2021, perhaps the russians will then wish to explore a successor to new start. and then the question is, if you get to that point, will the russians be prepared for a more serious discussion a more successful discussion on missile defense, that could perhaps get back to an idea of nay to russian and missile defense cooperation. much is going to depend first of all on the russian attitudes. and it's probably not easy to be optimistic. it seems to me there may be two or three reasons that explain their reluctance to engage in this approach. .

one is i think the russians have a certain fear about the potential. even if they understand the limits of american defense programs, the russians give great credit to american technical prowness and our ability to do things. when i was assigned to american embassy moscow in 1986 and had the arms patrol in the embassy, it's fair to say the soviets were still somewhat panicked that it would put them out of the defensive missile business. that lingers that the americans minds to it. there are some in the&ñ ministry of defense who don't want+ to cooperate because they can hold an opposing defense program as a vehicle for the s 300 is 400 and s500 programs. an additional impediment to

talking to the russians about cooperation in europe is at one level that will mean the russians having to accept that there will be american military infrastructure in romania and poland, and that's something in general they've opposed since nato enlargement began 20 years ago. also the ability to reach some kind of -- get back to a mor:'r cooperative discussion with russia is going to depend on how far and how fast the u.s. proceeds on missile defense. i would argue missile defense against a limited attack against the united states, such as might be mounted in the future by north korea or iran is a sensible part of an overall american force mix. but it seems to me when you look at a larger scale attack, such as might be mounted by either russia or china, offense still has the advantage over defense. as one example, i would note the plan to deploy 14 interceptors in alaska is going to cost roughly $1 billion. my guess is either russia or china could add 14 offensive

warheads for significantly less. but at least until at some point there may be a technological breakthrough that changes that equation, but is not immediately evident now. and therefore it seems to me if you want to get back to something like a more if you want to get back to a more cooperative discussion, it's going to requireym moving past the point refined in the broader relationship reassuring russians that our intention is not aimed at a russian missile attack will be key to a more productive discussion. thanks very much. [ applause ] >> so we'llú conversation going.t( i think i'll kick it off actually with a comment about what you wrote this past maybe ten days ago or so on the limits of missile defense and anniversary of the 32nd anniversary and you gave a history in a way how the

expectations are relatively modest in the big scheme of things. tradeoff and that sort of thing. reminded me of a comment by condy rice who said what we're pursuing is not star wars, it's not the son of star wars, not even the in a way i'm struck by why why is it that the russia thing keeps occurring. why do we need to reassure russia when it is so limited afterall. should we be even having that conversation? >> i guess i wouldq. say, you don't want to reassure russia for -- the reason would be to try to reassure russia is to enable you to achieve other things. if you can find a way to defuse missile defense as a problem, does that make it easier to address issues such as further nuclear reductions. you've had over the past three

years, the russians have completed they don't want to proceed beyond the new start treaty at this pointkg; in time in terms of new directions. they've linked missile defense and third nuclear forces and three or four others but they have linkages and they haven't moved to solve any one of those problems. it seems to providing a pretext for why they shouldn't do one nuclear reductions. if you get this to a more serious discussion, could you find a way to remove missile defense as a problem. that would be one reason for assurance. if you can get back to a cooperative nato russia you can take an issue which has been contentious and as difficult as it would appear now, make a cooperative element in the relationship. >> i don't have anything to add to what steve had to say. he's essentially right. let me go back to a point steve mentioned in ñ his remarks about russian concerns.

i would say that the russians aren'txd especially concerned about the current level of u.s. missile defense capabilities. they know that 44 long range intercepters are not going to negate their strategic deter rent. they are concerns about what komgz next in the fact there are no legally binding numbers and more importantly, the potential for u.s. technology to lead ahead. i remember an interaction i had with a senior russian general and he was giving a briefing showing u.s. ships in the baltic shooting down russian strategic missiles. and i looked at him andgmx

burnout of 10 kilometers per second, let me know. i want to buy stock in that company. his response was very telling. he goes you may not be there today but you'll eventually get there. that's really the driver of their concern. because quite frankly, the russians are much more dependent on nuclear weapons in the strategy and doctrine than we are in the united states. if you look at the history of u.s. nuclear policy and doctrine over the last five years through democrat and republican

presidents, the objective has been to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy. it's been the exact opposite with regards to russia. in the russian point of view missile defenses and potential for even more advanced missile defenses call into question not just from a technical perspective but political perspective the viability of their deter ent and that's what the russian concern is. >> i wonder if you might speak to where the technology might leapfrog to ten years from now and what more who we be doing in europe and the middle east and asia? you alluded to some of that in the way the activities -- how much more can we work with allies in a way to alleviate our own burdens we're putting a good part of our own budget towards regional missile defenses,

potentially -- what can we do to boost our allies further? >> well, i would say there are a couple of things. first and foremost i talked about this in my opening statement, it's one thing to have a missile defense system. it's another to ensure that we can share information amongst our systems and with our allies. so i think that has got to be a number one priority. and we're actually making a good deal of progress in that area. second, we can encourage our allies to develop their own and purchase capabilities. i understand that we are in tight budgetary times but i think there are useful things we can do with our allies to leverage existing capabilities. for example, the netherlands has on there air defense radar

called the smart l. and they have announced a decision to invest and upgrade that radar. the more information we can share and take advantage of existing capabilities i think that is really where the focus needs to be. >> all right any comments on that? why don't we open it up to the floor and please state your affiliation and ask. >> i'm a retired d.o.d. former missile defense agency employee. but, i have been working the last few years exploring this concept of inner openability, it is defined as more than exchange or sharing of information. it's the ability to use that information for operational effectiveness. so since you mentioned it a

number of times and you've alluded to it when you talk about things we tried to do and even missile defense done a little bit in the command and control area with russia as you know. where is the champion or center of gravity or the inner agency effort that's looking at inner inneroperability as processes and as well as the i.t. where you exchange and share information? >> you know fundamentally i think it's a partnership between dod and state. i think there's a general recognition across most senior level folks who work these issues both in dod and state, that this is where we need to do a better job. i think we have made some progress over the past couple of years. that said, is there a lot more

work to do to make us effective in this area? absolutely. but, are we doing things to ensure that we can share more information number one and two effectively use that information. i think the answer is yes. i talked in my remarks about the u.s. japan defense cooperation guidelines. we hope to finalize that soon and one of the key elements where we hope is increased ways we can work together effectively in the area of missile defense. >> over here in the back. >> it's coming, wait one second. >> u.s. atl and cape. i have a fundamental question. is either the ambassadors aware

that the putin 2007 offer was a re-up of a u.s. offer put together by dr. bill frederick working for the mdo in 1997 and provided over to the russians in 1998 specifically one major motivation on the part of the russians may be that they felt that we disowned our own offer. >> well, i have worked missile defense cooperation between the u.s. and russia in the clinton, bush and obama administrations and quite frankly despite the a lot of politics there's a certain amount of continuity in u.s. offers to the russians. i'm not specifically aware of that specific proposal that you mentioned back in 1997. but what i would say is that across the spectrum of

administrations on the u.s. side, there have been similar proposals to work with the russians on missile defense cooperation. unfortunately, none have worked because we always at the end come to the challenge of russia wants guarantees in limitations on u.s. missile defenses. >> i think that makes cooperation difficult for him. >> the problem he had in 2007, the russian offer was very attractive, but the price of getting access to that russian radar data would be intercepters in poland. you have to ask the question, you have the data that shows the missiles coming and given up the intercepters and you have negated that plan which was provide some missile defense

capabilities. >> so i want to bridge between the points we're making and ask about the potential effect of having the epa deployments take place at the end of this year and again in 2018 time frame. and if we remain consistent with our principle transparency and say this is what we told you we were going to do, what we're doing, this is as far as we're going. obviously it's threat dependent. and over time this ukraine mess is stopping everything from going forward -- do you steve or frank perceive the possibility that russia's level of anxiety might diminish as they see that we are in fact doing what we said we're going to do and not going to 10,000 intercepters with bbos of ten, et cetera, or

do you anticipate that the anxiety will not change despite the fact that we have been consistent and been transparent and told them exactly what we're going to do? or is that a basis for maybe ratchetting down the anxiety and maybe thinking about something because this is really designed to avoid instability and miscalculation and drawing responses we would not think are in our interest et cetera. >> well, i think the first question is do the russians wish to have their anxiety relieved and this -- this is the distinction between the anxieties that they portray and anxieties that they feel. and my guess would be that the smarter people in the administration have a fairly good appreciation for what missile defenses can do and can't do. i think frank is exactly right there is that fear, where will the americans come up with 10 and 15 years down the road. but, there's that distinction

between their real understanding what we can do and what they have chosen to portray. sometimes they get themselves caught up say little bit, where they begin to talk so much about missile defenses and you have deputy prime minister comes out periodically and talks about their new icbm, the killer of missile defenses they are trying to mock this message on the one hand and the americans are doing things and making us concerned and contributing to a bad relationship. what is it getting in terms of missile protection. then they have to reassure the domestic audience, don't worry too much because we have the icbms that can penetrate it. i think the real question comes down to are the russians prepared to have those concerned allayed. if they are, my guess is it would not hard to come up with ways to do it. >> with the technical concerns that the russians have with the

future capabilities of missile defense systems they also concerned about the american military capabilities in eastern europe. and a lot of their concerns are driven by this. >> what they do in the last year is pretty much taken care of that issue. i think the pentagon term is we now have as i understand four company sized units, each of the baltic states and poland. and the pentagon explains it as a persistent deployment. my guess is persistent doesn't have much difference from permanent and those deployments are going to be there until you see a fairly major change in russia given the force that russia has used in ukraine. some of the rhetoric coming out of moscow now and the fact you see heightened air bombers flying around air space. >> we heard earlier this afternoon from the general that

missile defense is becoming less exotic. it's one piece of a much larger portfolio of capabilities et cetera. it's also becoming very firmly entrenched in how we think about our national security. it's not going away. even though it's not a silver bullet, it's key -- in away notwithstanding the insufficientin seert and changing perception among everyone else among our allies and the appetite for missile defenses, there seems to be a lot of it. in middle east they are putting real dollars behind it. certainly in asia and nato is part of the 2010 strategic concept. that is going to be rewritten sometime in the near future and probably not giving you any less. where do you see the appetite going? >> only up, especially as the threat continues to increase.

you know sometimes here in the united states we try to separate missile defense from our larger national security strategy. and i think one of the things that the ballistic missile defense review from 2010 does a really good job at is putting missile defense at the heart of our overarching national security strategies. quite frankly, effective missile defenses are a key enabling technology for our other defense in foreign policy goals, especially as countries try to keep and deploy capabilities keep the united states out of regions. it is a key enabler. i think cooperation is going to continue to expand and i also think that again missile defense is a key element of our over arching national security

and defense strategy. any thoughts on that? all right. bruce in the back. >> hi bruce mcdonald federation of american scientists johns hopkins. russia has said multiple times over the last several years they are going to develop more missile defense. and that's of interest to us work we're doing on what's looking a little bit more -- looking into the future more like a multiforward missile defense world, u.s. china, russia and india, they say they will. my questions to our he steamed guest here. what have you heard russians say what they plan to do on missile defense and more importantly, who do you believe? what's bluster, what's beef? what are they up to? >> that's a good question. maybe steve has some more

insights on that. i've been trying to ask myself this question for many years. >> i think there's a disconnect you see between the way they talk about american missile defense and when you look at russian and missile defense programs. yes, 300 and 400 and 500 are designed to replicate capabilities we have in pac 3 and sm3. so it's not unusual for russians to say one thing and do something else. but they are looking at these missile defense capabilities as a logical part of their -- >> in the back. >> arms control association. frank, you mentioned the importance of the sm32a deployments in poland by 2018 for providing territorial defense for all of europe. there has not been yet an

iranian icbm flight test, there's not been a north korean icbm flight test. that would by my calculations mean that this threat is 12 years overdo from the rumsfeld commission's prediction. when does the more slowly developing threat start to impact the adaptive part of the european phase adaptive approach? >> well, that's a good question. i would say the sm3 block 2a which will be deployed in poland in the 2018 time frame is not designed to deal with icbm class threats. but medium and interimmediate range threats, they decided to restructure the missile for a variety of reasons, techno

technological challenges and financial challenges and number of other problems but the bottom line is phase three of the european epaa is designed to deal with medium and inter intermediate range threats. despite the fact that iran has not yet developed a icbm today they are continuing to develop medium and intermediate range class ballistic missiles and we're working with our friends and partners to deal with that threat. >> presumably stay ahead of it. >> and staying ahead of it. >> gentlemen in the front. >> thank you. edward, georgetown university, i was the last u.s. commissioner for the abm committee so i have mixed memories of these issues. let me come back to the question of why are the russians being so

ob city nant. all of the assurances are in the present tense. we are not -- but almost by definition assurances have to be in the future tense. we will not that's what the russians are asking for and we've been unable to do find a sentence that begins with we will not and then finish it in some way that we can live with. seems to me that really is our fundamental problem. >> it's been the administration's hard policy not to agree to any legally binding restrictions. >> or other limitations. >> let me say a couple of things. one, we're not just looking at -- we're not looking at russia when we're dealing with our missile defenses. we're looking at other capabilities and quite frankly

sometimes we're surprised. for example, two years ago when we made the decision to deploy the additional 14 gbis in alaska, that was driven by the fact that north korea had paraded a new mobile icbm. we had not seen that before. i would say number one we need to have the flexibility to deal with surprises like north korea's new mobile icbm. secondly, the u.s. budget process is fairly transparent. you can by reading the missile defense agency's annual press release, when the budget comes up, you can determine where and how many missile defense capabilities that we currently have and plan to have. and i would argue that the u.s. missile defense levels have been very structured to the threat.

you're not seeing hundreds of long range missile defense intercepters. you're seeing 44. so i think quite frankly, we're not going to agree to limitations but if you look at the budget projections as well as our deployments i think it's very, very consistent with our rhetoric. >> i understand the dilemma as you describe it but therefore it's a little surprising for me that the russians didn't take up the idea that the administration offered in 2013 of transparency, which actually would have put -- as i understood the proposal would have laid out here are the plans looking out ten years and numbers today. they would have had not limits but they would have had had a very clear picture at a time where i think the numbers of missile defense intercepters would still have been way below anything that would pose a threat to russian strategic missile capabilities and so you could have handled the that

problem that way. later on, if you got into defenses come up and down you may have to take a look at the question of legally binding limits if you want to get to further reductions but the russians didn't seem to pick up on that idea, have not so far. >> but we're not there yet. i think -- we got cut off here we have five minutes for another panel. our final panel will be mr. rich matlock. and also admiral archer macy and that will be on future directions. please five minutes and we'll be back for that. thank you, gentlemen, both of you. [ applause ]

taking a look at congress this week, the house and senate are back to work. the house at 2:00 eastern time for a number of bills including one dealing with annual privacy notices from banks and other financial institutions. any requests votes held at 6:30 eastern and we expect work on the tax code and irs oversight. the senate is considering a judicial nomination alfred bennett, up to be a u.s. district court judge for texas. senators will vote to confirm today at 5:30 eastern time. you can watch the house live on c-span and senate on c-span 2. another republican is set to join the race marco rubio expected to announce his candidacy later in miami. we'll have live coverage. further into the week we'll be live with a hearing on immigration issues the head of the immigration and customs enforcement agency will testify before the house judiciary

committee. you can watch that starting at 10:00 a.m. eastern tomorrow on c-span3. and also tomorrow senate foreign relations committee chair bob corker would like congress to review any iranian nuclear deal. he's introduced a deal that would make that a reality and working with further committee members 2:15 eastern time. you can watch that live on c-span3. >> tonight on the communicateorcommunicators, the importance of spectrum for the government and the public. >> the last two administrations have both written presidential memorandum on spectrum. when i first started in spectrum management back in 1979, i came out of the marine corps after being artillery officer, i didn't know anything about spectrum. most people that i met and even those -- often times i work with didn't understand much about

spectrum but nowadays everybody realizes the important of the daily lives completely rely on it. our ability to communicate and do our jobs stay in touch with our family. tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span2. were you afan of c-span's first ladies series, it is now a book published by public affairs, looking inside the personal life of every first lady in american history, based on original interviews, learn details of all 45 first ladies that made these women who they were. their lives ambitions and unique partnership partnerships, the book, first ladies, presidential historians on the lives of 45 american women provides lively stories of these fascinating women who survive the scrutiny of the white house. sometimes a great personal cost while supporting families and famous husbands and even changed

history. c-span's first ladies is an entertaining and inspiring read and is now available as a hard cover or an ebook through your favorite bookstore or online book seller. >> i'd like to now introduce the moderator for our next panel. thank you. and she will provide brief introductions to our panelists but for mow demore detailed information, you'll find it at your seat. marsha kumar as a scholar with research focus on the white house, she's interested in presidential press relations and

white house communications operations. she's also director of the white house transition project, which is a nonpartisan effort by presidency scholars to provide information on presidential transitions and white house operations to those who came into the white house in 2001 and 2009. she worked with the transition operations of presidential candidates, barack obama and john mccain and with the team representing president george w. bush. again, i refer your program for more information on her publishations and finally and proudly i can say she is a proud member of the board of directors of the white house historical association. >> thank you very much. neil. we have a wonderful panel here that represents people who have worked in the white house over several administrations for in the resident staff and people who have come with particular

presidents and first ladies. and through our discussion we will get a sense of the environment that a first lady operates in. it is a difficult place to be and in some ways beautiful as the white house is. it has many different roles it is a museum. it is obviously a residence. it is a park, president's park and it's a workplace. and all of those combined to -- for first lady as opportunities for her and for her husband and also some hazards as they live their lives in the white house. it's also a place for children. it's a place to raise a family. and so with a first lady who

receives no compensation for what she does, it is a difficult thing to say exactly what her -- what her role is. and so we will talk about the environment and talk about the particular first ladies because among our panelists they have been in the white house since the period when betty ford was first lady. and anita mcbride was chief of staff to laura bush and she also worked for presidents reagan and george h.w. bush and knows a great deal about the operations and comings and goings and gary walters worked as chief usher from 1986. but he came during betty ford's time as first lady. and he worked into the bush

administration. susan was chief of staff to michelle obama and can speak to us about both the west wing and east wing and came in the carter administration as the chief pastry chef and betty is curator at the white house position that came about as a result of all of the work that jackie kennedy did. and so as a way of introducing you to our panelists and what kind of operation a first lady comes into we're going to talk about a state dinner. and use that as introduction for all of us and where they are put on and where the first lady comes in and all of the various parts of the white house that get involved because it certainly is a big event and one that involves everybody. so gary, can you start us off? as a chief usher, you handle the

resident staff and you can begin. >> be glad to. the first notice of a state dinner or state visit comes from the state department. it usually goes through the social secretary at the white house. soon after they have conversations with the first lady to get direction, social secretary would come to the chief usher and layout the who when and where and how and what of what the state visit was going to be about. there's a lot of planning. usually these events are planned three, four, sometimes as much as a year in the future. sometimes a lot less time depending on world situations but certainly the planning is intensive and i think one of the things that most people forget about state dinners is they set a style for the white house from

the social aspect and they also set a first lady style. we deal with things like the flowers, the table settings and what color dress is the first lady going to wear at a state dinner because things get coordinated. i can remember the chief florist at the white house getting together with the first ladies and actually having a sample of the fabric and color and texture and planning flowers and color of the table cloths and what the table -- how the table was going to be set with what kind of decorations. but basically the first lady has a tremendous responsibility to set the tone for a state visit. i wrote down a number of different things that the first lady gets involved in first through the social secretary and then things that she deals directly with the chief usher

with the chefs and they include about eight different things. i've mentioned a few already, flowers, first lady helps choose the flowers, whether they are in season or a particular flower that she likes. the decorations, not only the decorations at the table but what flowers or trees or plants are going to be put around the state floor for the official visit. what the decorum is going to be for the dinner, the kind of dress that's going to go forward at the dinner. is it white tie black tie business? the color choices, already went over that with the dresses and colors of fabrics and table cloths. but there are a couple of other things that usually fall under the first lady's aspect of what she is dealing with and that deals with a great deal of how the service personnel are going to present themselves. because quite frequently at these dinners we have individual

aspects of foreign countries and kinds of foods they like and whether or not we have allergic to certain aller gees or food or food groupz. there's a myriad of detail the first ladies need to go through both personally and involvement with the chefs, like rowland and other chefs at the white house and chief floral designer. she has to be involved in choosing the entertainment with the social secretary. >> what music is going to be played at the state dinner and for the dancing afterwards. there are a myriad amount of questions that have to be asked of her and that she will have to make decisions upon to allow these dinners to proceed in a good manner. >> can you tell us about the menu? >> yes. >> and make sure and talk about your dessert.

>> yes for a chef to be able to perform at the white house to be involved with state dinner or any level dinner, it's really an honor. there is not a better place to cook or bake in the world. even if the money is not so good, it doesn't matter. you're having fun doing it let me tell you. the involvement with the menu, it was quite a -- an ordeal to come for a final menu because we had many people who had -- so you know, you would start with a basic menu and then you know, you would come back as we say, people with allergy and also not only allergy but people from different denomination if you have kosher people or if you

have so many things you have to watch out all shell fish, these type of things. it's amazing what you have to go through before you have a final menu. usually what i did, i waited until the chefs in the kitchen fight it out on the menu. then i put the dessert down. it was a sure bet for me because all of the kinks had been worked out and i knew what was going to be. it was an easier way. for me for the dessert, i -- you know like everybody will come to the white house at first you don't know which way to go. most of the chef come from hotel, restaurant outside of places like these and you are going to continue what you have learned outside in the hotel restaurant business. i must say the white house, up to mrs. reagan's style, pretty much handle menus and dessert

like in every restaurant around the country. you can go back and look. you're going to find pies and chocolate cake all of this good stuff there. i don't think mrs. reagan cared for pie or chocolate cake. she said to me once, we in california don't eat cheesecake. actually she did but that's another story. so again, i knew right away that she was looking for something extraordinary. can i deliver? can i do it? i don't know but i'm surely going to try like hell. >> i did just that we had an interesting man who was the head decorator at the white house and he was very close to the family and he had a good eye for food and everything and colors. so he did work with us arot and help me a lot i must say. you get your sources from wherever you can.

and i think this is when the dessert took off, on the mrs. reagan's -- at the white house in those years because she definitely wanted to take a different route. and if you study the desert and look at the dessert totally different from what was done before and i'm sorry to say after i left, it stopped. j you want the truth i'm giving you the truth. you can research simple as that. but it was such a pleasure and you know, i learned one thing, mrs. reagan really taught me a lot. she's a mentor to me. she told me that in the days of work you don't have eight hours, you have 24. she did teach me that. on a certain occasion where she's requested a special dessert that was so tid yus and

those years i was the only pastry person in the white house. there was no assistant. there was no part-time staff. she requested this special dessert. and we had two days before the state dinner, 140 people. when i said mrs. reagan the dessert is wonderful i've only two days left and that's when she collected me and said you have two days and two nights. and you know it sounds very harsh at first but it is the best lesson i had been told then because the sky is the limit if you push yourself. and you can make it happen. and if you do make it happen, you feel like the king on the hill. and she is the one who made it happen to me. >> can you tell us about a particular state dinner or just how the process worked? >> sure, actually as gary was

talking, i was thinking about when he said about the colors and matching the colors for the fabrics on tables and flowers and what dress the first lady is going to wear. i remember that visit the queen elizabeth ii, the first white tie state dinner that the bush administration did in working closely with mrs. bush and the team around you and the social secretary. one of the most fun calls i got to make was to the queen's dresser, angela davis, the most wonderful personality to say what colors the queen wearing because you certainly didn't want the first lady of the house and then queen elizabeth to be in the same color. and so that was one of the little items as gary said, there's so many people and so many things that go into making this a beautiful and flawless event that is respectful of your guests but also reflective too of the president and first lady and we all want to put our best foot forward when we're working

in the white house. this is a time to showcase everything that's perfect. >> did the first ladies talk about a state dinner as being an event that was show casing america? >> definitely. >> and what their goals were. >> definitely. can you tell us about that, susan? >> certainly. the state dinners are about diplomacy and the role of the first lady and her office are with the help with great help from the state department, there's a huge amount of protocol involved and that's -- there's no detail that is too small because whatever one does, one doesn't want to make a mistake, that would be insulting in any way. there are a great number of details so it's important to remember it is about diplomacy and enhancing diplomacy between the two countries. i was thinking about our second

state dinner which was with mexico. because of some of the personal touches part of it was table cloths that were mayan blue and roses and brickly p extears that were stunningly beautiful. there was a piece of it, we had in the east room was a dinner and tent for lovely wonderful entertainment by beyonce. but there were baskets of flowers on the top of the tent with monarch butterflies looking like they were floating down. and the reason that's significant is that monarch butterflies fly from canada to the united states in the summer and then in mexico and where they land for the most part is the birth place of the president

of mexico, president calderon. so that's meaningful and these kind of -- these touches make a difference. one other thing i would add, he had an outside chef who helped the terrific white house chefs who rick bayless who is a very well known mexican -- his food that -- his american but his food is mexican and people at the time questioned why we would do such a thing since obviously the best mexican food is in mexico. well because we had had conversations the first lady had visited mexico and was with the president and his wife and they had heard about rick bayless, a chicago chef and expressed an interest. that's why we had that particular chef at that time. >> betty, can you tell us about some of the research that goes into first setting up state

dinners and then first ladies might do -- >> we do keep in the curator's office records of clipping file of information -- historical information on entertainment over the years and particular state dinners. we were a resource for many ideas for desserts which were themed to the particular countries that were being entertained at a state dinner. i also should say that we worked with the first lady's office the first lady and usher's office in terms of needing to order additional pieces of presidential china that would be used for state dinners as well. i know we had supplements made at the fdr service and wilson service to fill out those services as -- because they had been depleted by breakage over the years. in the year 2000 when the white house historical association

offered to find a new state service, we worked closely with mrs. clinton in deciding about the colors, the designs that would go on the service how those particular colors would look in the on various settings in the state dining room or east room. and i do remember mrs. clinton mother was living in the house at the time and she would come to these meetings about showing samples from the porcelain factory. and none of them seem to be satisfactory. she said you know, up in my bathroom of my suite is a beautiful yellow color. i think we should try that yellow color. we got a sample of the wall paper and sent it off to lennox and they did samples and it worked out beautifully. that was mrs. rodham's legacy in terms of state dinners.

>> well, let's go to looking at transitions, the transitions into the white house that the family makes and the transitions out as well. because often for a president he's been running for office for a couple of years and he's a political person who is most likely been at the white house numerous times. but in coming into a white house, there are first ladies who have not spent much time. we have an example with michelle obama was not familiar with the white house whereas laura bush was very familiar with coming in with george w. bush during the george hw bush presidency. so can you tell us a little

about your transition and michelle obama's transition in and how she prepared for it? >> well, michelle obama is a serious student but i have to say i don't think there's any way one can really be prepared in a sense that to really know what it's going to be like. you know her husband had been a u.s. senator for a few years. but she and the girls had stayed in chicago where her whole family and support were. and the bush people were incredibly helpful and generous in what the office was like and structure and all that. and the bushes were as well personally when the obamas visited but i have to say there's no statute forubstitute for being there. mrs. obama and the family were

first at the adams hotel and blair house and came to the white house for coffee as is the tradition inauguration morning. and everyone went off to the inauguration and then what the white house resident staff does is just unbelievable where they all in that time when this inauguration is going on, they move in this case the bushes out and obamas in so they get back from the festivities parade and et cetera and walk in and now they live in this new home. it's really quite startling and i don't think there's any amount of preparation that really can help one understand what this all means. >> yes and then anita can you tell us about the bushes coming in and then gary can tell us from the viewpoint of running the whole operation, how that transition works but personally when she came in what she was

thinking about. >> well, i wasn't working with her directly, of course, at that time in coming in in 2001, but i had been part of the transition team, the one that was set up in virginia before the election actually was finally decided and then once we were in the government space, we were planning from the personnel side of it. but one of the first visits that a president and incoming first lady gets is from gary walters or chief usher with a list of things they need to think about and be knowledgeable about when they come into the white house. i'll let gary talk a little bit about that. but 2001 you know, was a very different experience than some past transitions. we didn't know for six weeks who the president of the united states was going to be. no real official conversation could be taking place to prepare for transitions, certainly very

different than 2008 to 2009 when in fact mrs. bush had everything packed up and almost out of white house, well before we left in january of 2009. there were just a few itty bitty little boxes in the china room that morning that needed to be moved out. and she was -- she would be saying through the summer it's not like we don't know we're going to leave. she was very prepared. it is incredibly seamless the chaos that maybe goes on that morning to unpack boxes and move people in. the new first family is not aware of it. it's so extraordinary, which is what gary can talk a lot more about and how the staff handles it. >> well, transitions are unique. there's a four-year transition when presidents are running for re-election as president obama

just did and the staff has to start gathering information on those people who are in the opposition party and also expecting to be inaugurated on january 20th. i know when i was there i started six to eight months before the election started gathering information on the candidates running and then once the political parties had their conventions certainly and selections were made, became more intense on gathering of information on the nominee. and sometimes that's difficult after four years you have to be loyal to the family that's there. it is and you used the right word, it's their home that we're talking about. luckily i was involved in the home, not the political aspect of the white house. some people forget that. this is a family moving in and out of the white house and establishing a new home but when you have a transition after four years, you are wearing two

hats, loyal to the family that's there and want the staff to spend 100% of their time doing what has to be done for the family that lives there and the president and first lady, but you also have been preparing for what may happen in the future. but on inaugural day and luckily, when you have a second term, there's not much going on on inaugural day. everybody kind of takes a deep breath and let's things proceed. >> when you're doing a transition from one family to another. after eight years the family knows they are leaving on january 20th four years in advance. plenty of time to prepare themselves both mentally and start moving their furniture and furnishings out. when you have a four-year term it's an entirely different ball game. and the family that's coming in once you have the election if the family that's moving out is

not going to be there any longer certainly, the incoming president there's a long conversation that goes on with both the first lady first and foremost but with the president also. because not only does the home transition on inaugural day but the west wing which is very symbolic of the presidency. one of the first things the president want to see on inaugural day is the oval office. what desk did the president choose? what paintings did he choose for the walls? what statues are in there? what ones went out from the previous addsministration. there's a tremendous amount that goes on related to it. we have about five hours from the time the president and president elect leave the white house, go down to the capital for the inaugural festivities and come back for the inaugural parade in front of the white house and one family is moved

completely out, another family is moved completely in and when i say completely, to the point of all of their clothes are hung up, all of their favorite foods are in the pantry. all of their toiletries are in the bathrooms that they've selected. all of the rooms have been changed to their desire. it's done in five hours. anita referred to as chaos i refer to it as organized chaos. we divided the staff up into two different groups, a group responsible for moving things out and group responsible for moving things in. we only have two elevators at the white house. the president's elevator is the larger of the two. >> and it's tiny. >> so it -- there's a lot of going up and down steps and a lot of elevator traffic and it -- luckily i got to be the my stroe that gave directions and wonderful staff, including rowland and kitchen staff preparing for the events going

to take place not only that evening but in the coming days. as the new presidents welcomes in and thanks those people who helped him get elected. >> well, i wonder if you can tell us about another aspect of it, and that is about the human relationships that form that are close that when the president and his family leave the impact that it has on the staff. >> yes, yes. it's a very strong bond between the family and the staff because we really get to know everybody from the president first lady on down family, pets name it. really, the white house is a big family, that's what it is. and everybody is there for only one thing, one thing only is to

please the family. whatever they want, whatever they like, whatever the family -- not only president and first lady but anybody on the family, so you don't really think about them leaving even a day before two days before, even though you know they are leaving, eight years gone or lost election or whatever purpose, but then when it hits you, it hits you bad really hard right here. and for me, i always said it's like funeral day. that's the closest thing i can describe it. because you know, i don't know about other staff in the white house but for me i've never been a party guy or don't care what party they belong to. president and first lady of the united states. that's what counts and who i serve. so you really love those people.

you'll do anything for them. i mean i mean anything. if you don't feel that way i don't think you should be there i really think. it's the same paying respecthouse, it's the same thing. it's a sacred house. everything goes hand in hand. so the morning of the departure of the family we usually gather together in the state dining room. all the staff will be around the room and waiting for them to come in, them being president, first lady maybe a child like when chelsea was in the white house, she was part of it. and pets, too. i mean, you know, when mrs. bush, mrs. barbara bush you know, she didn't go nowhere without her millie. millie was -- i call her the presidential dog. she was. she knew how to act very presidential at all times.

it was an amazing dog and she knew where she was at all time more than i did. but let me tell you, it is those days where i dreaded those days and even today it brings emotion to me. i mean although some of them were luckier than others. i remember when clinton left when president and mrs. clinton, they had done eight years so that was all good you know. there was a great finish. so it was more happy for them but for the staff it was very, very hard to see them go. when president bush, sr. left, well, he had lost an election. that was super sad because of that. and, you know, i never thought, i never even thought that a

president would cry. they're too big for that, too strong, but i have seen them cry and really cry, and that makes it double hard again. when i see president and mrs. bush coming into the room to say good-bye and president bush could not speak, he just cried. >> i remember it. >> that's it no more. >> i would like to say though, too, as close as people that work in the residence are to the family, we also work very closely with their staffs, particularly the first lady's staff, and all of a sudden they're gone by noon on inauguration day, and you've said -- you've worked with these people for four or eight years and many of them become your friends, and some in the west wing as well, those that we work more closely with but then all of a sudden they're gone, and

the next day there's a whole group of strangers coming in. they don't know you and you don't know them, and it's a very -- it's a very difficult time i think, much less having as roland expressed saying good-bye to these families but to then have a whole adjustment. it's like a whole new job sometimes. >> the new people coming in sometimes scare the hell out of you, too. i will tell you a very quick thing when the reagan were coming in, the day of the inauguration i was making raspberry sauce in a blender and the top of the blender came off and went all over my coat, so i was ready by the elevator to go to -- we have on the third floor a room where i could change and everything, and the decorator mentioned earlier that i was working with happened to be here, a little short man, never saw him before, and he came and he looked at me up and down.

he said, things are surely going to change around here. who the hell is this one? i mean i got scared. i said that's it i'm cooked. that's it. >> anita and gary want to chime in here. >> listening to betty and then roland, of course, he makes it so easy to be on these panels because he's so entertaining, but, you know, it speaks to the resiliency of the white house. how, you know, we expect political staff to come and go but it is the institutional staff, the residence staff that continues to support, you know every president that comes in and the staff, you know, around them, and they go through these adjustments as well and we don't often think about that, and when roland was talking about how difficult it is on that morning when all the staff is gathered to say good-bye to the outgoing president their first family, and there was a much happier time years later in

2009 when president george h.w. bush and barbara bush were there with their son and daughter-in-law to say good-bye once again under very different and happier circumstances after successful eight years and that was a historic moment and something i will never forget, and when i did leave that room for a few minutes to compose myself as well i saw around on the south lawn dale haney, the long-time residence staff member who was taken care of presidential pets since the '70s and gardener of course. i said you weren't upstairs, and he said i can't. i can't do it. it was too emotional for him, and he said not one time had there been a departure of a president and first family that he would ever go up to that historic meeting of all of them in the east room to say good-bye because it is so difficult and that really struck me. i have never forgotten it.

>> the one thing that we don't want to forget in this whole mix is the fact that the staff has done this time and again for the most part. the majority of the residence staff that comes stays for their entire career at the white house, and they have been through one or two of these. it doesn't soften the blow, as you can tell from roland's reaction. i have the same reaction, i can tell you. it is the most horrific day in our life. we have about five minutes to accept that and move on. there's another president and a family moving in, and we're going to meet them and be their staff in five minutes. so we have to turn that emotion around immediately from this very sad departure, and it is. on inaugural day when the clintons were leaving the white house, i was standing at the north portico as the last person to leave the white house was amy

carter. i mean chelsea clinton. everybody was had gotten in the cars and were waiting for the cars to be loaded to move out, and she came up to me and gave me a hug. a day i'll never forget, but we have to turn that right around immediately and get the new family moved in, and then the family thinks they have to come in and adjust to the executive residence staff, and that is probably the greatest mantra that the residence staff has to live by. no. it's not the white house way. it's the family's way within the white house, and you need to adapt to the new family. that takes a while. i think the residence staff does it better because they've been through it before than the families do. these are people who worked for the previous president. now you're working for me. how are you going to respond?

how do i respond to you? and we know in the residence staff when that's taken place because usually when you walk into the room when there's a conversation going on amongst family members or staff members with the president in the residence or the first lady, conversation stops. they don't know whether you're going to hold the information that you overhear or not because we're behind the screen that the secret service puts up for security. we go past that. we're with the family all the time. so the family initially is very reluctant to speak out openly. at some point, two weeks, six months a year, conversation continues when you walk into the room. there's a collective ah we've made it, that goes through the residence staff, and there is no greater grapevine than the white house staff, whether it be the residence staff or any staff

members. >> and betty we had talked earlier about the get-togethers that residence staff have after the president and his family has left when the presidential libraries are opened. so if you can just briefly tell us about those. >> well many recent administrations have been very generous in inviting residence staff members to the opening of the libraries, and many of them have taken advantage of it and have gone to them and it's sort of like a family reunion i think again, and just recently down at the national archives i actually started working there in the johnson administration. there was a panel on mrs. johnson there and they had a wonderful reception inviting all previous johnson administration staff to come and, again, after all those years had gone by 40

years, it was just absolutely wonderful to see people that you had worked with all those years ago, and i think there is that camaraderie if you worked very closely with an administration regardless of what position you held that you worked for a common -- i don't want to say a common cause but a common sense that you were in it together and you went through all of these crises or good times and bad times and have very fond memories particularly of the people that you worked with over the years. >> in looking at a white house, the organization has grown enormously that supports the president, but also the organization has gotten larger that supports a first lady, and both anita