[ speaking foreign language ] >> translator: there are many groups in yemen and now apparently there is the remnants of whatever is left of the yemeni state that are being destroyed by coalition of arab, american, and european forces. i am not a houthi lover. actually have attacked my family, my people, and they have basically carried arms against the central state. [ speaking foreign language ]

[ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ]

>> translator: the houthis have actually used the libyan example. they have used arms against everybody else, but they have expelled the president from -- the legitimate president. they have basically attacked the state. the problem is that the current conflagration, the current war, is actually assisting the houthis. [ speaking foreign language ] >> translator: both saudi arabia and iran have their own agendas. they are basically using yemen, libya, iraq, syria to basically eke it out with each other.

[ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ] >> translator: iran supports its own groups.

at the same time saudi arabia supports its own groups. and the u.s. have committed many egregious mistakes in afghanistan and iraq and libya. and the problem is you get rid of somebody else but you don't build something instead. [ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ] >> translator: yemen basically

has a 2,000 kilometer border with saudi arabia. there's 1,800 borders on the sea. it has become really grounds for a lot of groups that are doing harm. [ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ]

[ speaking foreign language ] >> translator: the state is weak. president saleh's republican guard has helped the houthis do what they want to do. the republican guard has actually helped the houthis gain whatever ground they have been able to gain. the houthis are not necessarily state builders. i myself hate a war. war is only for destruction.

[ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ]

>> translator: it's said that this war is a war of necessity. i really don't think so. there have been many opportunities for a political solution, but it's said that saudi arabia does not have a choice. it does have a choice. all parties have a choice for a peaceful resolution of the problem. basically the idea is that this war is really helping the houthis do whatever they want to do instead of weakening them. my apologies. i missed out on one thing. he did mention something about there are probably at least 15 million pieces -- weapons among the people in yemen. >> thank you, mr. almosawa and thank you, dr. huff. [ applause ] our last resource specialist is miss sama'a al hamdani. any of you students of genealogy

and ethnic groups, travel groups, historical dynamics in arabia know that the al hamdani have strong roots. impeccable roots. sama'a al hamdani. she's an analyst for al jazeera english in arabic, bbc, npr and cnn's analyst on yemen. >> i'm very happy to be here and to see so many people in the audience who care about yemen. to the yemenis here and to our brothers and sisters, thank you for coming. i'm actually going to do something different here that i don't usually zo at my other talks. rather than focusing on politics and the analysis behind everything, i would like to say that when i first came here i came to study university and i never thought that i would stay in this country.

my hope was to go back. of course, this is is becoming less and less of a reality. the situation in yemen has gotten worse every year. recently a friend of mine sent me a photo of a drawing done by a child who's 6 years old of planes dropping bombs on them and i realized how bad the situation has gotten. i myself was in yemen in 1994 during the civil war and i participated in the children draw for their rights program, but i never thought i would draw a plane with things falling on my head. having said that, i would like to represent the voice of yemeni people considering i speak to so many people on the ground in the north and south of yemen. i want to begin with aden that is really suffering today. so many people have died. people are talking about bodies piling up on the ground without being able to pull it away. the fighting in aden is a result of houthi fighting with elements of aqap and the locals.

the shootings are random and have targeted everyone. in one area alone there are 63,000 internally displaced people. people from sanaa have fled into villages, and at the moment a lot of people can't go anywhere because of the shifting of movements. the air strikes won't stop. rather than talking about corruptions and politicians and having the blame game when we talk about iran and saudi arabia fighting each other, we forget that there are 26 million people stuck between these names that we talk about. everything that we see today, it's important to note, is a result of having a weak government, having a weak leader. the government had an opportunity from 2011 to 2014 to deliver services to the people to do anything which left a vacuum for the houthis to step up and take the plate. yemen at the moment is surrounded. our territorial water and our airspace is considered a no-fly zone. nothing can go in or out.

a lot of yemen's population is dependent on humanitarian aid. having said that, besides the humanitarian aid, we actually import a lot of our oil. about 80% of our gasoline is imported from the outside and our revenues can only last for up to three weeks. right before this war started, we were expecting another shipment that we did not receive. that means that there is inflation. oil prices are going up. the dollar is really, really up. it's impossible to find it in the market. and there are laws now restricting people on how to find gasoline. of course, in yemen we depend on gas for more than just cars. we need it for electricity. we don't have electricity. the country is running out of water. at the moment a lot of countries participating in this coalition are claiming they are there to save yemen. however, 4,900 people -- more than that actually. it is increasing every day. are stuck at airports worldwide because no country would grant them visas. yemenis have been eliminated --

don't have the opportunity to get visas to enter anywhere, and at the moment the only country accepting yemenis as refugees is somalia. in yemen we have 2,400 refugees on the ground. yemen has worked as a home and opened its doors up to these refugees. no other countries are opening their doors for our refugees or immigrants and that is very tragic. past that, since we are technically in a siege, we don't have medical supplies for those who are wounded. we don't have enough doctors. we don't have enough medication. and the situation in aden and sanaa is getting really, really bad. this could expand. talking about this air strike i constantly think how can you curb an ideology by launching air strikes against the people? we've learned before through

the drone strikes or through other experiences that you cannot fight an ideology by dropping bombs. you need a proper government infrastructure. you need a better education. you need a development plan. you need to employ people in order to shift them from fighting with militias into participating in good governance. moreover, a lot of the air strikes have targeted military sites and military bases, meaning if there is a leader that's going to go back to yemen and if president hadi goes back to yemen, he will not have a military to lead. they will have to start everything from zero. they have to build that infrastructure from nothing. everybody here on this panel has talked about the role of al qaeda in the abianrabian peninsula in yemen. just yesterday they freed 300 prisoners from a prison and are taking advantage of this opportunity to expand on the ground. the problem with this war is that the only group that was capable of defeating and fighting al qaeda in the arabian peninsula was in fact the houthis.

and what's worse is that the houthis took these air strikes to go to the south and commit atrocities and they're blaming everything on president hadi from escaping claiming that the dragged the war there. of course our southern brothers and sisters are suffering from the consequences of these politicians. at the same time, aqap, al qaeda in the arabian peninsula has looted sanaa's central bank. and we still are not sure how much money they took. what's worse than that, we have on the ground, if we talk about the scenario of having on-the-ground troops, it is going to be really hard to distinguish who's who in yemen considering that the military going in is not going to know the geography of yemen very well and is not going to be able to distinguish who they're shooting at by just looking at them. i call on the ethics and rules of just war theory. i request that the saudi government reveal the targets that they've attacked and i actually ask them to be transparent about who they're attacking and to give people notice of the areas they're going to target.

just a few days ago in sanaa, they attacked a weapons depot that was in the heart of sanaa and this weapons depot was targeted -- or blew up all the weapons in there, self-imploded and missiles came out of that mountain in every direction. that was in a heavily populated area. all of the areas where these air strikes are taking place are in tads sanaa and aden, and they are the most heavily populated areas again. so far we have no international ngo workers in yemen. we can't get the right statistics. however, within the last 24 hours we had several ngos come up with rough drafts of the number of deaths that are happening there. considering that there are no journalists on the ground, and it is very hard to tell what's happening and who's killing who, i personally depend on the saudi government to provide us with their targets to know what's going on. besides the effects on human beings, whether psychological or physical, i want to pay attention to what's happening to

the biodiversity of yemen. a lot of these weapons are going to cause environmental damage and probably are going to affect people's health long term if we don't know what weapons they're using and who they are targeting. the repercussions of this could be very great. we already have smuggling in yemen and illegal markets. for me personally as a woman, i wonder what that means to my sisters back home in yemen. are they going to be part of a smuggling operation? would they be trafficked as wives? would they be -- i just don't know what's going to happen and the idea itself terrifies me. looking at what's happening in aden at the moment and this chaos, i'm very worried about other minorities in yemen as well. this is the time to launch attacks on them and we have to look at other minorities and protect them. i guess this is me stepping out of my professional realm and i do request that the humanitarian law is implemented in yemen.

unfortunately, yemenis now are stuck between fire coming in and between fire from within. a lot of the people have not been -- have not had the chance to make plans to evacuate. there are no flights coming in or out of yemen. for instance, yemen has many, many yemeni-americans. roughly there are 40,000 american citizens in yemen trapped in this fire. and so every other country has citizens there that they cannot evacuate. i think that it is very necessary for the government of saudi arabia that is leading the coalition -- of course, it is not the only country responsible for this, but to reveal what political agenda they have in the future for yemen, what is their plan. and i also urge them to have a plan -- another back-up plan because everything that is happening in yemen now is a result of having only one plan in yemen which was yemen's national dialogue conference which i have to say failed miserably. having said all of these things, i think that we need to pay

attention to the governance of the areas with a lot of turmoil in the future. talking about the military, moving forward i really urge the u.s. saudi, and other countries, the nine other countries participating, to pay attention and learn lessons of the nato in libya of the dcc in syria, of the u.s. in iraq. it's very important moving forward of paying attention to how we restructure the military. everything that we're talking about today, analysts like myself have warned of long time ago. we've warned about the failure of yemen's national dialogue. we've warned about the expansion of the houthis into the capital. we've warned and warned and warned and, unfortunately, i feel that our voices are not heard. and here i am today, i'm warning about the repercussions of this war continuing. it is going to be -- yemen is going to be a disaster and al

qaeda in the arabian peninsula is ex panning. isis declared a state and has carried out an operation in sanaa. so this is an opportunity for me to warn that if this war is continuing without a clear plan, without an opportunity to save people, it is just going to recruit more people in the fight against -- into the houthi side or the al qaeda side but it definitely is going to move all yemenis against the side of saudi arabia and the u.s. therefore, i urge all the analysts to request a humanitarian cease-fire for the people to make plans of evacuation to find places to move. a lot of people are trapped in their own houses and our resources are about to go down. i also ask for the allowance of shipments of aid and so on to enter the country, for the return of some ngos in for allowing doctors without borders to come in to treat the patients.

otherwise, a lot of those who are wounded would die out of not getting the proper health care. and at this point i'd like to end my conversation but i'd like to point out that i'm also very well versed in yemeni politics and in the saudi war, so if you'd like to ask about that too, ooimd happy toi'm happy to answer. thank you. [ applause ] >> thank you, miss al hamdani. i commend all of the speakers for confining themselves to the assigned ten-minute period. now we have the time for discussion and questions. we've asked individuals to write their questions on 3x5 cards. bring them forward so that we have real questions as opposed to statements and valedictorian addresses. several have been asked to me. while i'm standing i'll answer them as quickly as i can. one is, hasn't too much been made of the sunni/shia divide here?

i made it my opening remarks, yes, in the case of yemen because the divisions between the sunnis and the shia there are rather soft. historically they've cooperated. there's intermarriage. there's nothing nearly as pronounced as you find to the northern part of the arabian peninsula, although it does exist. it is true that egypt came and had 70,000 to 80,000 troops in support of the so-called sunnis from '62 to '67. and it's true that saudi arabia, plus iran -- i pause there -- plus iran backed those in northern yemen who were the monarchists, as such. now that itself is a window for one. secondly, in terms of people saying that saudi arabia is adamantly anti-shia, ponder the following. throughout the '60s and the '70s, saudi arabia cooperated most closely geopolitically, geostrategically with iran whose

head of state was shia. in terms of the yemen government over the years, who has saudi arabia supported most? a shia head of state. and indeed, saudi arabia's aid to northern yemen and southern yemen has been greater than that of the world bank, the imf, the united states, great britain, the netherlands combined. aspects of it have pertained also to lebanon and the accord in 1989. it was saudi arabia that pushed for a reconfiguration of power in lebanon which enabled the shia elements in lebanon to have a greater percentage of power and authority and influence in position than they had before. these are four cases there. and one can add with regard to syria.

saudi arabia's long-standing relationship with syria before the recent troubles has been with a government headed by an offshoot of the shia face. so these are four examples of reaching out beyond ethnicity, beyond religion, beyond sectarian dynamics and divides to cooperate on interest and strategic commonalities and identicality. with regard to saleh, what is he into? i subscribe to what dave roches and some others have said. here you have the situation with an vid who feels that he was ditched or not supported when the arab spring came about and did not want to see yemen devolve into what happened in iraq when you got rid of a strong person but did not replace the strong person with another strong person. and the same thing in libya.

that situation is in shambles. one has to ask with regard to syria what after bashar al assad? it is most of the 17 christian sects in syria happen to be beholden to the al assad family. this doesn't come out in the media, but it's on one of the questions here. what are the implications for that? in terms of getting rid of a strong man in yemen. here we have ali abdullah saleh, over 30 years in power. no one in yemen knows the ethnic groups, the geographic groups, municipalities more than that individual. he's still there. yemen yaerns for security and stability. to completely rule him out on grounds of dislike, of corruption, of misrule, all understandable. but what about the implications of doing that given what we've

seen where other strong people have been removed there. and this aspect with regard to the united states goes back to the '90s when yemen held the chair of the united nations security council and did not go along with the consensus to use force to restore kuwait's national sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity. yemen paid a big price for that and ali abdullah saleh was the one who drove those policies. so the country did indeed suffer from that aspect of his leadership. but when people talk about dictatorial, okay. authoritarian, okay. strong-person rule? okay. backwardness? yes and no. backwardness development wise, economic wise, but not necessarily in terms of a civil society. having been the observer from

'93's election, '97's, 2000's and 2006, it was just 1 of 33. but the consensus was these elections were as fair, free, open and transparent as anyone would find among the 130 developing countries. do not overlook that. and in 1998, secretary of state madelyn albright chose yemen, of all countries in the world, to host an emerging democracies forum. so these windows on yemen that must not be overlooked and the development in the south. aden was almost an overdeveloped city in comparison to the other cities in arabia up until independence in 1967. so we're talking about the waste of a lot of talent with regard to the yemeni people who are extraordinarily hard workers and productive and contributive. this, part, too seems to be lost in the account. and then lastly with regard to

the south, it's not unanalogous to south sudan and khartoum. south sudan is but one part of sudan. it demanded 50% of the country's oil revenues leaving out darfur in the west, leaving out the north in nub ya, leaving out the east. and one wonders why you had a reaction of violence by these three other regions. in the case of north yemen and south yemen, with the unity in 1990, south yemen played a hard hand and ended up with 50% of the power. 50% of the cabinet posts. and the other 50% the deputy ministers. when the percentage of the population was only 1/7, 1/15. you can see why the south wanted to the retain its powers or regain its powers, but you can also see the animus of the north, many of whom thought the

south took too much got too much, didn't deserve as much. jeremy sharp on the questions of the united states' relationship with yemen, what are all the implications of this? is this likely to result in an increase, depth and breadth of anti-americanism? hatred towards the united states the longer that this conflict continues? >> sorry. i feel like i should give my opening remarks all over again because i was sitting down and not at the podium. look, one side of me is -- thinks that on any given day even when there's not a major international operation in yemen, it's never a good situation, as my panelists described.

this is a country with incredibly low socioeconomic indicators in terms of human development. now on the u.s. side, i mean we have a history now of u.s. kinetic operations in yemen. we've talked about publicly in our own discourse here in washington where mistakes have been made. civilians have been killed. that obviously engenders a great deal of discord directed against the united states. certainly, like my panelists said, if there were more air strikes that hit dairy factories or weapons depots in civilian areas, i mean that's also going to sow a lot of discord. in terms of u.s. operations, maybe not necessarily saudi, you're getting into sort of broader questions about how we conduct counterterrorism operations, not just in yemen but in pakistan and afghanistan and iraq and syria. these are questions that are

unresolved and sort of open for big debate. how do we protect our own homeland security without creating new breeds and generations of terrorists. and it's being tested in yemen and it is going to be tested elsewhere. i don't have the answer to that debate but it is worth revisiting certainly. >> colonel des roches how long will the logistics, the operational assets on the ground in yemen likely last, including munitions, ammunition? and what are the implications for u.s./yemeni defense cooperation that's now on hold, paralyzed, idling at the intersection. how do you assess this situation? what is your estimate prognosis?

>> thank you, sir. well, the saudi military spokesman has said that the saudi targets are depots, missiles, installations, then vehicles, and then rebel lines of communication. and unfortunately, a rebel line of communication is what you and i would call a road. so the target set is already fairly broad. what you'll see happen is some forms of precision guided munitions will run out relatively quickly because there's just not a lot of stocks of them and they're difficult to replace. we don't know for sure what's been used, but based on what they've bought i assume paveway and brimstone which are both british produced and only used by britain and saudi arabia. so if those -- the production lines are relatively small, it is incapable of surging. they'll probably run out of that very quickly and what you'll see is typhoon and tornado will have to move back up to the north.

the jdams the former mcdonald douglas snap ons to dumb bombs that are allowed to beg ps guided, those are very cheap there is a lot of them and they're easy to move around. those will probably become the target. the paradox is the saudi stocks of pgms will probably decline at the same time the targets become harder to find so you have fewer precision guided munitions at the time when your targets require more precision guided munitions and your political frustration increases which leads to a sense of doing something. which is why i think it is time to put away the stick and show the carrot. you have to have a political solution here because we're not going to be able to make it happen. the second question about the u.s. military support to yemen, right now there is a lot of -- i would imagine there is a lot of consternation within u.s. circles because a lot of things we've given to the yemenis, such as night vision googles, we simply can't account for.

these are things we try to track closely, that we inventory on a monthly basis. i actually inventoried the yemeni parachute brigade's night-vision goggles. i got to inspect it several years ago. it was immaculate. we don't know where those are. unless we can establish where they are we're not going to send more things of that nature. so there will be cooperation if there is an entity we can cooperate with, particularly against a common enemy like the guys who just busted out. it will be very, very low level and very, very low tech until such time as we can be assured that the tiehigh-tech things people ask for, such as night vition-vision goggles goggles, are capable of being accounted for. thank you. >> two more for jeremy sharp

and then panelist on my right, your left. can you talk about the implications, potential, for this ten-state arab coalition to be engaged in the challenges pertaining to syria? and possibly against isis or to try to restore somewhat security and stability in iraq. jeremy sharp. >> is there an egypt question? >> and then if one could analyze egypt's position, egypt's role. we've read in recent days that the united states has lifted its ban or sanctions or hold on munitions and armaments to egypt and that egypt is to be ground force for this

united/arab joint defense command for which there is an air component which is much smaller -- just a few thousand -- and a naval component to perhaps double that. but those two combined multiplied by seven would be the ground forces. now who's paying for this? largely saudi arabia and the other gcc countries. but not all. and who else is involved in this? morocco is. jordan is. you may recall in the last four years a geostrategic pronouncement that the gcc countries would be more aligned, associated with jordan and morocco, fellow monarchies. so this is not completely new in reaching out to those two countries, but reaching out to sudan is in part because sudan is a neighbor of egypt and has its own armed forces, but in an

effort to broaden the diversity of the coalition. mr. sharp. >> i would say that it's certainly not new, as john points out. but we are at a moment. one of the interesting strategic things to think about in terms of this conflict in yemen and really what's been going on since the so-called arab spring began in 2011 is this concept of regional integration, albeit military or economic, something that's been talked about for decades, right? if you look at just from the economic side, saudi arabia, kuwait, the uae are financially supporting countries that fiscally can't do it themselves anymore, whether it's egypt, jordan, certainly yemen needs the assistance, all of these countries. now the gcc states, they have the reserves right now but

they're already running budget deficits. and the costs of the region are going up exponentially. whether it's military integration or economic integration. we may be at a moment here. who knows how operationally this joint force is going to work or where it will be deployed in the future. but this may be the beginning of -- we're at a point where we just can't sort of laugh this off anymore. like, oh, yeah, they talk about integration, they make these deals, but if never really happens. no, this actually may be the start of something both financially and militarily that has some legs. just because the region itself is getting to the point where it's so bad that they need that kind of assistance. >> these questions, shifting gears here to abbas almosawa

and sama'a al hamdani. could you comment with the way this discussion is going with regard to the questions asked and the answers provided? is this another case of american lack of empathy and inability or limitation of americans to project themselves into the shoes, souls, situations, needs, concerns, interests and objectives of the peoples? your comments on the americanism aspect, anti-americanism, the american role, backing saudi arabia, saying it will support this ten-state coalition providing intelligence, operational, logistical, and munitions support. are you in accord with these answers, these american perceptions?

in iraq hundreds of americans were cock-sure that they knew iraq and could plan and predict and anticipate effectively. cost-effectively and efficiently what the united states did. and most would agree it's a disaster. that iraq was smashed to smithereens smithereens, lost its national sovereignty, lost its political independence, lost its territorial integrity, lost the four things that are in america's constitution as to why america exists namely to provide domestic safety, to assure for the external defense, to enhance material well-being and to ensure the administration of an effective system of civil justice. all four of those things were also smashed. the united states cannot blame others for those results. what are your answers to these

controversial implicitly challenging kinds of questions? [ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ]

[ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ]

[ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ]

let let. >> let him translate. >> translator: i tried to get as much of that as possible. there is definitely a great lack of information on yemen. yemen is a tribal society, yes, but it is a very, very loving tribal society. they love each other, they love their neighbors. the idea of sectarianism, sunni/shiite, as far as he's concerned, they are closer to the sunnis than they are the shia, and the houthis are part of yemeni society. they have been there and they will remain there. [ inaudible ].

>> translator: the issue is that, you know, the u.s. relation with yemen basically is based on security issues. what do we do with al qaeda. what yemen -- what kind of role yemen plays as far as that is concerned. the question is definitely broader than what the united states wants to look at yemen around. i don't like to talk of sectarianism, and yemen is for everybody. [ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ]

[ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ]

>> translator: waiting for the story to end. okay. [ speaking foreign language ] [ speaking foreign language ] >> translator: i'm sorry, what? [ speaking foreign language ] >> translator: he's relating a little specific piece of

information that before the operation to -- before the current operation between saudi arabia and gcc, he adds the united states to it, we wanted -- basically everybody wanted to limit the houthi influence in yemen obviously. there actually were very many tribes who have actually secured large areas on the saudi arabian border. there is a story that ahmed abdullah saleh, the son of the former president come to saudi arabia basically to tell them to stop the media campaign against him and his father to basically lift the sanctions on his family, and basically he promised that he himself will be -- will lead a campaign to really end the houthi threat in yemen. >> thank you.

[ speaking foreign language ] thank you. [ applause ] >> translator: basically the idea is that he is against the war because he doesn't think that it is going to resolve anything. >> yes. sama'a al hamdani. >> i'll try to be brief. i want to talk about how the americans are viewed from the yemeni perspective. given everything that's happening, i completely understand the u.s. being cautious in endorsing this attack in more than logistical support. they are already in a tough corner considering the drone strikes that are happening in yemen that are extremely unpopular on the ground. i think the problem -- or there

is an opportunity here for the u.s. to play the role of mediator and peacemaker for once in the region. they can help bring the parties together and reach a negotiation because at the end of all this war, at the end of sending ground troops or air troops, they are going to have to sit sending ground troops or air troops, they're going to have to sit down and come up with a solution. the yemenis are going to exist. i talked earlier about this being a war to eliminate an ideology. there's no such thing as eliminated the houthis or eliminating any of the rhetoric. it doesn't make sense. what yemenis can do is create a process that allows for pluralism. my opinion is, although americans try very hard to understand yemen, yemen is a very remote location. it's a very different culture. i think sometimes because we're so different, results in a creation of i versus you dialogue, or me versus them. i think there are yemenis who

speak english and can communicate these ideas. unfortunately, there are nuances that the west just cannot get unless there is a yemeni person translates that to them. there is a sense that yemeni life is worthless. this sense comes from yemenis themselves who kill each other and spill blood everywhere. this has been happening since 2011 to this point. yemenis feel their lives don't water. this is an opportunity for the world to say, no, your lives matter. do learn that you are worth something. the situation that we're in in yemen now can be narrowed down to the politics of five individuals. president hadi, former president, ahmad and houthi. four have been on the scene for years. houthi is the only newcomer to the spotlight. the reason he succeeded very

much is because he was able to take the youth and employ them in the houthi movement. all the other factions failed to include the youth in the movements. the houthis were able to construct a show to present that women are participating in this effect. it shows they are more political savvy than the other old parties that were on the ground. so i think everything in yemen is a result of lack of leadership. poor good governance. ever since 2011 till now, we had an opportunity to read -- to take yemen out of the situation that it was in and lead it toward knock sidemocracy. weave we've talked about the deal that remained the president solve sovereignty. the problem is, we have a president that's residing in -- his strength is yemen is getting weaker by the day. it's hard to imagine how he'd go

back and rule again by just issuing orders. that's the only thing he can do. it's how he ruled prior to 2014, by the way. he would issue orders for things to be carried out, but they'd not be implemented. i think in order to move forward, the analysts in general, whether american or saudi or any other part of the world, they need to sit down and take in yemen's history. i really do recommend to look at the history not just in the past four years, 20 years but look back. we are tribes by nature and we take pride in our genealogy and whatever vendetta we have from 50 years ago could apply to today. having said that if there is a process endorsed by the west it's been prove that every political party is willing to come and negotiate. a lot of people suggested oman as a neutral location, since it's not participated in the air strike, as a place where all factions can talk to each other.

that's about it. >> okay. >> thank you, ms. sama'a al ma'am hamdani. we westerners, i'm one of them, have a problem thinking about tribes. those who are americans here, over 50, perhaps have seen no fewer than 30 movies, cowboys and indians. the indians were all tribal. they were the bad people. the non-indians were the progressive good people. the indians were seen as violent, background, irliberal libnon-liberal or non-progressive. in terms of what has happened to them, the lands the resources,

their mountains and valleys their rivers and streams were all taken over by and large, from people white people, christian people largely who came from western europe. so americans have a difficulty on the question of tribes. i come from the state of virginia where many of the tribes are still in existence, but living on reservations. others of you come from elsewhere, where the tribes are larger and so are the reservations. think of it in this concontext because the british don't have this. hang on. the british rule role, power prestige largely was through the tribes in the region. so with regard to tribes in a british sense, that power that for nearly two centuries, held

the reign of security and stability, they could not have done it without tribes and through tribes. so the american experience is radically different. this means that we have proceeded with maybe two hands behind our back. because we say we don't do tribes. largely, we don't. but here is a self-inflicted wound. because what are tribes? tribes are groupings of people. they're sociological factors forces and phenomena on the ground. in places where the central government is weak where the resources are few and scattered, and there's no strong central government it is left to plan b, to the preexisting tribes, which have leaders. tribes are not ill liberal or non-democratic. they, too, live by consultation.

they, too, live by consensus. this building's ethos, in terms of democracy boiled down to a phrase, is the consent of the governed. how do you get the consent accept except by consultation? the tribes are steep in consultation. a largely peaceful interior rule, in terms of where people would go for security and stability. up until the last 40 years, but still in some places, you went to your tribal leader for a scholarship, to get help with medicine and health care even to have a job or get a position in the armed forces. so if you look at tribes from this perspective they're the glue. they're the adhesive. they're the lubricant. it's kept this particular

society together longer than -- and more peacefully and effectively than would otherwise have been the case. it sounds as though a tribe in yemen is the human tribe. we have his excellentcy. you were not here when many of the questions were asked but i will try to summarize some of them. if you would be good enough to respond. are you comfortable with that? >> yes. >> all right. we had questions that were divided in the external category of what other countries are doing, your country, saudi arabia other gcc countries, iran, on one hand, and then the united states and the newly formal declared arab

joint demand to be based in egypt with its ten countries. these are in the external realm. will the decline in oil prices how it will affect yemen which depends on oil and gas for its limited revenue as does your country and most of your gcc neighbors. so those would be on the external side with new addition. that is, several questions maybe half a dozen were asked about sunni, shia and iran/saudi arabia conflict, et cetera. on the other side, will saudi arabia give serious consideration to a ground offensive if it comes to that? what has been the price saudi arabia has paid economically, human resources itarian

humanitarianly, people who have been killed in the air strikes. other questions having to do with the internal dynamics of yemen. because your government support ed the leader for decades. also, your government had a close and extensive relations with most, if not all, of yemen's major tribes. people used to criticize you for doing this. in my own meetings with abbas al moes sa mosawa, he says, i don't have the resources for my people. if people on the outside are willing to help us reach the

needs, who wouldn't show gratitude for whatever country did it. the united states or even the soviet union, were it to be the case in years past. so this is a little bit of the nature of the external questions and the domestic ones. the domestic ones are charged with the understandable needs concerns and emotions of individuals who have relatives in yemen. who are suffering and who are uncertain about the near term president, let along the longer term future. i tried to summarize. would you respond to these questions? >> yes. >> thank you, john, for the opportunity to speak. thank you, everybody, for being here today. let me start off by talking a little bit about where we are in the operations. first of all, we -- this is not something that we wanted to do. this was an issue of last resort for us. nobody wants to use a force and

anger. we were left with no choice. we spent years trying to establish a legitimate government in yemen. years trying to help yemen move from the chaotic situation it was in in 2011 to a new, brighter, more stable future. the -- as time went by problems developed. we had the houthis regoing back on commitments they made. 67 to be exact, to which they signed and backed away from. their aggression kept moving. they kept moving and threatened to capture the president's palace. they imprisoned the president and the cabinet in their homes in sanaa. we had no choice but the respond to the call by the legitimate president of yemen under the u.n. charter to come in and support him and protect him and protect yemen.

our object i haves sives in yemen are simple. protect the government of yemen and the people from yemen from a takeover by a radical group allied with iran and hezbollah. we had a situation where a militia that is in control of ballistic missiles, and it was now in control of an air force. i don't believe there was a situation where an armed militia had an air force. this cannot be tolerated. we tried to reason with them. we tried to reach agreements with them or broker agreements with them. as i mentioned earlier it all came to not. we ended up having to resort to force in response to the request by the legitimate government of yemen. the operations are ongoing. we have targeted the air force. we have targeted air bases. we have targeted ballistic missiles. we have targeted heavy weapons depots. we have tried our best to

minimize damage. a site not on our target list couldn't have been up. there were charges that saudi arabia bombed a milk factory a few days ago. it turns out that the factory was bombed by the houthis themselves in order to generate sympathy for themselves and hostility toward the coalition forces. so these things are going on. we believe that the coalition activities are achieving their objectives. it will take a little bit more time, but we're determined to prevail in yemen. we're determined to strengthen -- restore the legitimate government of yemen and protect the people of yemen from this radical group. with regards to the internal situation in the kingdom, of

course, everybody is apprehensive about the use of force. nobody wants to do it, but our people understand it was necessary. and we have total support, not only from the people -- the kingdom of saudi arabia, but people throughout the region for these military operations. the issue of yemen's oil, unfortunately for yemen, the oil -- yemen does not produce enough oil to export. most of the oil, if not all of the oil, that yemen produces is more domestic consumption. therefore, the drop in the price of oil in the world market has no impact on yemen. if anything, it reduces its import cost of oil that they have to purchase from outside. did i cover most of the -- >> yes. there's more. >> okay. if i may ask them from here -- >> sorry. the president, we've had ups and

downs. sometimes, he's been a friend and ally. sometimes, he's been hostile to the kingdom of saudi arabia. in 1990, when saddam hussein invaded kuwait, the president sided with iraq against saudi arabia and we cut off relations with him. the relationship was not always an amicable one over the past 35 years. again, he was the president of yemen, and we have to deal with yemen. we had to deal with him. so -- but now, he's been playing a very negative role and destructive role in yemen by aligning himself with the houthis. by using what influence he has in the yemeni military in order to persuade military commanders to side with the houthis. the houthis could not have made their advance without the expoliceexit explicit and implicit support of the former president and the units he controls. he know this. the world knows this. i believe history will judge him

harshly when it comes to yemen and what he did to yemen, and his role in the current crisis. we again have been targeting units that are loyal to him, or that are under his command, or virtually under his command, in order to degrade their capabilities and make sure that the role that he has in yemen and the role the houthis played in yemen as the militia are limited or non-existent. we recognize the houthis are yes, ma'am yemeni yemeni yemenis and have aprocess. the door was opened for them to par participate. they cannot be militia and have heavy weapons outside the scope of the state. it's not tolerable. we see the consequences of that in lebanon with hezbollah. the militia dominates the state

and threatens state institutions. we won't let it happen on our doorstep in yemen. >> these -- i'll just read them out. you're good on remembering them and answer them as you will. >> all right. >> does it matter, one way or the other, if the united states lists the houthis groups in yemen under the designation of it being a terrorist organization? as much as saudi arabia has designated of late various groups as terrorist organizations, is this among the options that saudi arabia has under consideration? might it rule it out, or what can be the implications either way if you did or did not. that's one. second one, your view of aiden. in the late 1950s, used to be the world's largest port in terms of ships there. things have moved on since then.

there's salala, oman near the east-west shipping routes. there is jazan and other places that you're developing along the red sea. and dukon in eastern oman is a story yet to be known and told. that's one question. i'll let you think about it, about how this strategic geo geoeconomic logistical economic support of imports into the peninsula, where does it come on the radar there? >> john i'm getting old, so my memory is limited. >> okay. those are two. >> i'll talk about these. the first was designating houthis as a terrorist group. it would be acknowledging a

fact. what they committed in yemen is nothing short of terrorism. they've terrorized the population and taken over government property, government equipment illegally. they have invaded areas. they've pretty much tried to occupy the whole country. if that is not terrorism, i don't know what terrorism is. it would have -- i don't know that it is -- it will have an impact, i guess from a psychological perspective in the sense of defining them and their actions as illegal and criminal. in terms of facts on the ground i don't know what impact it will have in the short term. the second question with regards to economic support for yemen, saudi arabia has been, by far, the largest contributor of economic assistance to yemen ever since the civil war in yemen ended in the late '60s and early '70s. we have built roads, schools hospitals. we have sent medical teams. we have brought yemeni students to saudi arabia on scholarship.

we tried to help yemen with its development plans and we are committed to doing so in the future. we have, with your partners in the gcc, we believe yemen has the potential to thrive. it has a large population base. the yemeni people are very industious and honest. we have in saudi arabia almost 4 million yemeni people working in the kingdom. we believe that yemen, were it to have the legal infrastructure and the bureaucratic infrastructure that is proper, could be a magnet for investments by gulf businesses, where they can set up shops or factories in yemen, fund agricultural projects in yemen, take advantage of the abundance of labor in yemen in order to produce items or food that can then be exported either to the gulf countries or even sold in yemen. so we have no hesitation about

continuing our vast support for yemen in order to help the yemeni people. so that's irrespective of what happened to the port of adan and the logistics in terms of shipping. we deal with the situation as it is. the situation as it is now, is we have a country that's one of the poorest in the world, with one of the highest unemployment rates in the world. with one of the highest malnutrition rates in the world. has no water to speak of. a country that is right with disease and needs the attention and the support of the whole world in order to get back up on its feet. we are determined to help the people of yemen and the yemen -- yemen as a country to overcome the challenges it faces. first, we need a stable and legitimate government. we need to find a way where we can end the divisions that exist in yemen and prevent a radical group from taking over the country.

and as part of a foreign-driven agenda that seeks to divide yemen and destroy yes, ma'am skpn -- yemen and destroy stability in the arabian peninsula. >> super. these are three questions. keying off the last one about those seeking to devour yemen others have investment in that outcome. there is a movement to the south that would love to see another independent republic of south yemen. would a two-state solution ever be possible in yemen? what would saudi arabia's view be about that? you dealt with that reality for a long time from 1967 to 1990 there. could there be a reversion to that? second question, is the houthis like iran, doing iran's 1949

revelation, of rejecting any form of western influence? what does this mean for your major partner, the united states, that is a ready and available to mediate. it takes two to tantango. if the houthis want nothing to do with washington understand, but what are the implications of that? want to answer those two, and then there's more. >> with regards to the different movements in yemen i think they're driven by the -- a sense of mismanagement. a sense of corruption. a sense of feeling that people's rights are being denied. i think if we can create a situation where we create a stable legitimate government that's balanced, represents all yemenis, that works for the interest of all yemenis we wouldn't see these movements in yemen. i can't common about a one-state or two-state solution in yemen because it's up to the people of

yemen. we have always maintained that it is important to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of yemen. the objective of our operations right now are to protect the legitimate government of yemen and protect the people of yemen and prevent the rise of a radical, militant armed group on our southern border. that's the first question. with regards to the second question, the houthi ideology is very clear. they've been very clear about what they stand for. their education system and textbooks have been clear about who they perceive as their enemies. i don't believe that the houthis would -- what they're advocating would be in the interest of yemen because it's not. they want to close yemen off from the world and want yemen to be a radical state that is allied with iran and hezbollah. that's not going to serve neither the yemeni people nor the people of the region. >> that last comment subsumed

one here about the alliance, rhetorical, politically, ied ideology of hezbollah in yemen. we won't go to that. at which point if any, of the houthis power increases would the saudi arabia withdraw its estimated $1 billion in the yemen central bank? assuming it has not been looted. second question, lots of these are great questions, coming from the media nbc, cnn c-span, and the like, they're well versed. they want to know how much hard evidence is there of iranian armed shipments and other support to the houthis? none, a little, a lot. >> a lot. >> all right.

>> with regards to the -- what we'd do to withdraw our deposit from the yemeni central bank, we're not going to withdraw it. it cannot be looted because these are numerous on computers. it's not physical cash we gave the yemeni central bank. the hue nieceouthis -- we are less worried of them taking over yemen than we were when the operation started. we are degrading their capabilities, and we'll destroy the capabilities and protect the yemeni government and people. period. no question about it. and the operations are, as i mentioned earlier, ongoing. the objectives are being achieved, and we're working through these objectives in order to reach the conclusion that we all want. that's with regards to the issue of the central bank and the houthis. with regards to iranian support for the houthis it's very, very clear. there are -- the first thing the houthis did when they captured

sanaa was to release operatives of the iranian revolutionary guards and hezbollah from the intelligence jails in sanaa. the iranians have been shipping weapons to the houthis long before this conflict began. those weapons include even shoulder launch surface-to-air missiles. there was a shipment that was intercepted of iranian weapons going to the houthis. they're helping them build certain facilities. the evidence we have -- and they're providing them with financial support. the evidence is very clear to us. we have no doubt about it. we also see it reflected in the public position, that iran and hezbollah have taken with regards to the conflict in yemen and with regards to the houthis. >> okay. this next one has to do with various aspects of iran. perhaps three aspects.

several questions about if you would address the question of -- to what extent, if at all, is it really sunni versus shia issues idealogical, geopolitical, versus revolutionary viewpoints versus the legitimacy of the en incumbent governments in the region. haven't seen that question. that's an intriguing one. >> yes. i think the way we never wanted to have a sectarian conflict. all the rights that a saudi citizen has, another citizen has, regardless of what their sect or religion is. this is not something we -- a path we wanted to go down the

road to. the iranians and hezbollah have tried to stroke the sectarian fires in order to generate conflict in the middle east. you see it in the speeches they give. you see it in the actions they take. we on the other hand, and our allies in the gulf try to avoid this. we don't look at it at a perspective of sunni versus shia. we look at good versus evil. those want to build and bring countries together. there are those who want to create a better future for their people. there are those who want to do the opposite. so for us, any person or any leader, any government that wants to improve the lot of its people and take its country forward is a government that we're happy to work with irrespective of what their sect or ethnicity is. the kingdom of saudi arabia last year provided $500 million to the united nations organizations working in iraq in order to provide humanitarian assistance to the iraqi people.

we insisted it be irrespective of religious sect or ethnicity, and the aid should go to all of the iraqi people and be distributed through u.n. organizations. that's exactly what happened. so we don't favor one sect over another. we look at every country as being a country and all of its citizens being citizens of that country. we don't go beyond that. >> another related to iran. two really. various gcc heads of state summits for several years after the u.s.-led invasion of iraq in 2003, sort of a sick joke that passed was that the united states attacked or invaded iraq and iran won without firing a single shot or shedding a single drop of blood. something similar as a gift to afghanistan, earlier when the united states took down the

taliban. people would say this is rare in the history of geostrategic dynamics, that a country that has a lot of people who want to hate iranians more than others for the hostage taking. on the iran side, hating some americans or the american government for taking down iran's first democratically peaceful civilly elected government in 1953. there are those who ask, how has this complicated everything, that the united states is conducting these controversial, sensitive negotiations with iran and switzerland at a time when iran has leaders that say, we now control four capitals yemen, syria, iraq and one in lebanon. some think it was intentional. can you address this aspect?

because it's known that you and the other gcc countries would like to have at least been auditors or listen nerer participants in the negotiations between p5 and iran. you were excluded largely because, i believe, the united states asked iran. what do you think? is this all right? iran opposed. so we accommodated iran's position. how has this made things more complex, convoluted than might otherwise be the case? what are the implications? >> i think there are a lot of conspiracy theories, but i don't subscribe subscribe subscribe to them. there's no doubt iran benefitted from the invasion of iraq and the toppling of the taliban. the taliban was iran's idealogical enemies and saddam

hussein was the bull work against iran's stepping into the region. this happened. i don't believe that this was the objective of the united states at the time. but this is the situation we're dealing with now. question becomes how do you stop iran's mischief in the region? their involvement in lebanon, syria, iraq they're trying to cause problems in bayhrainbahrain, they're involved and it's a concern to the people of the region. it's ir the nuclear negotiations i don't know i'd characterize it as thecludeing the gulf countries from the talks. i think it was set up to the permanent five members of the security council plus germany, the largest economy in europe, negotiating with the iranians. we all -- we see the talks and hope that the talks will succeed. because everybody wants a serious agreement that stops

iran's weapons making ability. so we have been assured, we are continuously briefed by the united states about the status of the talks and where they are at any given moment. we have been assured by the secretary of state that the negotiations, the objective of them, is to deny iran the ability to make an atomic bomb. to cut off all paths that could lead iran to an atomic bomb. to limit the research -- iran's ability to conduct research. and to have intrusive and severe and continuous inspections on iran's nuclear program. that's what the objectives are. i think everybody would share those objectobjectives. the thing we cannot common on are the details because i don't believe the details have been worked out, in terms of how the inspections would work. how the limitation on research

would work. so until we see those details we really can't comment about whether this is a good deal or this is not a good deal. but like i said at the beginning, everybody wants a good deal that prevents iran from developing an atomic bomb. >> we have two more minutes in terms of our permission to be in here. your views about the newly formed arab league military coalition response force. with regard to, how can one really back president hadi when he did not engage in deliverables, in terms of what the yemeni people expected, demanded needed. would that not rule out a role for asali,if only a role for years but not decades.

is he completely out of the picture. in geneva with regard to syria, seems people lock themselves into a corner by saying that bashar assad must go. now you see references to maybe he can be part of the solution there. two last short ones, yes or no. are there saud ai arabian troops in adan? you noted yemenis in saudi arabia arabia. it was mentioned how many yemenis are trying to get out and can't get visas, except to somalia somalia. they're stranded in yemen and the rest of the world. >> that was a series of two questions. >> yes. the one about saudi arabia troops, adan, the visa one --

>> yeah. >> that's right. how can you support yemen when it's not a proven leader. >> we don't have troops in adan. we have the issue of using ground troops as something that's always on the table. the decisions will be made depending on the circumstances. with regards to president hadi, the reason he wasn't able to deliver deliverables, which i disagree with that premise because i think he has, the reason that he's viewed as not having delivered deliverables is because he was being undercut by the houthis and the former president. so we had the number of friends of yemen conferences. we had projects that we were working with yemen on with him as president. i believe that given the opportunity, that president hadi would continue to do the right thing for yemen. it's impossible to be effective

when you're being undercut. when people are taking away your ability to control your own territory. when people are undercutting you in the parliament. when people attack you and take over your capital. when people imprison you in your own home in sanaa. that's not -- so the problems were on the other side, not on president hadi's side. he is the legitimate president of yemen. the gcc initiative and the outcomes of the national dialogue in yemen call for a transition period, during which a constitution would be drafted. this was done, and then the houthis redrafted it to their liking, which we don't accept this as legal. then you set up an electoral process. then you go through elections and have a new president and a new parliament. life goes on, hopefully toward a better future. that's what we were working on with president hadi when these problems magnified and

multiplied and put a stop to it. i think he is -- i don't think -- i know he is the legitimate government. he is the legitimate president. he wants to do what's good for yemen. once yemen goes through the transition period and moves to a better phase, it's up to the yemeni people to decide who they want as their leader. we don't believe president sala has a role in yemen's future. he drove the country into the ground. he was played a dark role in the events in yemen. now, he was removed. he continues to cause mischief behind the scenes. we're doing our best to try to put an end to it. >> i want the audience if it will please remain seated for two minutes while his excellency

leaves. not before saying this is one of the best sessions we've had. this is standing room only in the room. on short notice, at that. it shows a concern, a care about yemen and the yemeni people and yemen-u.s. relations and yemen's plight humanitarian, political, geopolitical, strategic economic and otherwise. all the speakers kept within their ten minutes. we had more than 40 questions. i think we covered somewhat of the waterfront. especially, we're grateful to our speakers and to his excellency. ambassador ambassador adele al jubeir. thank you all. [ applause ]

we're go live to the carnegie endowment for the foreign affairs minister, who is expected to speak about the evolving violence in the middle east including turkey's role in the conflicts in syria, iraq and yemen. live coverage should get underway shortly on c-span3. news from the associated press as we set to begin, that they say the navy officials, u.s. navy officials say u.s. warships are headed to yemeni waters to intercept iranian weapon shipments. the latest from the associated press. live coverage here on c-span3.

welcome ladies and gentlemen. my name is george perkovich. i'm a vice president for studies at the carnegie endowment for international peace. i want to thank you for joining us for this important afternoon, and the opportunity to hear the remarks from the foreign minister of turkey. he'll be talking about absolutely vital issues today of the middle east turkey's relationship with nato the iranian nuclear negotiations all super important issues in the united states, in europe, middle east and with global implications. we are honored to have foreign minister cavusoglu here.

he will be making his remarks as we spoke, and then -- >> [ inaudible ]. >> then we will be taking questions, offering a discussion before he has to depart. as we mentioned, there's no challenge of difficult issues confronting turkey, its allies and other states in the region. he will be addressing those. one of them that we've worked on here at carnegie in particular, is the challenge posed by iran's nuclear program and the diplomatic effort to deal with that. we've just published a book here, a colleague and i, so it's available outside if anyone is interested. turkey's nuclear future looking forward. as i say, the minister will speak and cover a whole range of

these issues, and then we'll have a discussion from thereafter. minister kav koeg-- cavusoglu the past two years. previously, he was the minister of european affairs and also one of the founding leaders of the jk party and -- in turkey. so without further adieu, mr. minister please. [ applause ] >> thank you so much for the introduction. distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to be here with you all today. let me thank ambassador burns in his absence, and the carnegie endowment for the wonderful

reception. i'm here in washington d.c., on an invitation from my good friend, secretary kerry. i will also meet with counterparts from the administration and have contacts on the hill. of course i value all those meetings that i'm going to have during my stay but i'm equally pleased to address you at this century-old institution. over the years carnegie endowment turned into a truly global think tank. it has contributed to the international peace through creative ideas and strategic thinking. i am sure you know the famous quote, every great dream begins with a dreamer. the institution has been home to the many dreamers of the peace. that is why i am very happy to have an opportunity to talk to you under this roof about the

state of play in the middle east, and turkey's role. and this is a topic on which there has been much debate here in -- at this time. i know that not all the comments are being positive. i appreciate the opportunity to speak about our dream, our region of new and different middle east, one that rises on peace, stability and cooperation. ladies and gentlemen, today, the middle east is largely in a state of turmoil. but the same middle east has contributed greatly to the fill cultural and scientific progress of humankind throughout history. president obama himself highlighted some of these contributions in his historic speech. we believe that this region still has the potential to

create great things. so the question is, how do we turn this potential into concrete improvements? after decades of wars we witness the offspring. the people led the transformation process and it shook the foundations of the century old status quo in the region. in this process, we played a positive and supportive role as turkey. we extended around $3 million of financial assistance, as well as technical expertise to egypt, tunisia, libya and yemen. we also contributed to the efforts of the european union can the council of europe commission in all these countries. the transformation process is

categorized by a massive channel. let me identify some of them and also share my views for dealing with all of these challenges. the conflict in syria affects turkey the most. the situation has become more complicated with the emergence of daesh, or isil, you say in the united states. the situation in syria has become a serious national security concern for my country turkey. we have provided significant contributions to the international coalition as an active member. we have mobilized our military and other resources in its support. so we, on the existence of a major threat in our neighborhood. we say the selective approach, focusing just on fighting terrorism, will not remedy the situation in syria and in even

iraq. the political rhetoric in syria has to be filled with a representative government based on the legitimate aspirations of the syrian people. this is the only way to bring a sort of stability in syria. the declaration idend fiidentifies the road map for providing the solution. the parties for any negotiation is to end the conflict are clear. these are the syrian nation coalition and the regime. the coalition is recognized by 114 countries and 13 international organizations, as the legitimate opposition. however, after gaeneva, the institution thinks it has a free hand to continue its violence against the people. this has to stop. the international community must exert pressure on the regime

that saw that it will sit down at the negotiation table. we have been working closely with the united states to find a way to move forward for our political solution in syria. our efforts are implementing a program is a clear testimony. this program aims to create areas inside syria that are safe. it will also provide a food hole for syrians willing to fight daesh. ladies and gentlemen iraq has been in continuous crisis for many years. daesh is the latest episode in the drama and maybe the most complicated one. the terrorist organization has occupied more than 1/3 of iraq which is equal to the size of croatia in a short time. this was surprising for many. but we had been warning about this possibility for a long

time. why was iraq faced with such a crisis? what is the reason behind it? simply because of the sectarian and oppressive policies of the previous government, after the departure of american troops. so there is a need for a policy that reaches out to oppressed people and regain their trust and confidence. i mean the current administration. and new iraqi government started well in gaining international support. turkey has been fully in support of this new, inclusive abadi government in iraq. it is, again, our duty to remind the iraqi government that it needs to do more to winning the others in the country. promises must turn into country's actions without further delay. in iraq, in a short term there

might be some military successes, but lack of confidence between the people and the government is unfortunately continuing. military successes will not be enough. there is a need for political and humanitarian steps taken at the same time. tikrit and the other liberated cities should be held and run by the locals. people shouldn't feel that they have come under another term of oppression in iraq. iraq cannot be governed, as before, by daesh. it should evolve into the faction of federal and state. this is not something new, obviously. it was also foreseen in the iraqi constitution. we know -- we now know the task

at hand is not easy. we shouldn't put undo pressure on the new government. unfortunately, the urgency is all too evident. that is why we're providing, political, military and human humanitarian support to iraq. we're carrying out a program to the government national guard unites. we've trained more than 1,600 peshmergas. on the humanitarian side we are hosting nearly 2 million people from syria and iraq combined. our expenditure has reached almost $6 billion, whereas we receive only $300 million war support from the international

community. we are also doing our part to stop the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. we have taken all the necessary measures. we have set our no entry lease, which involves more than 12,800 people, and we've captured and deported around 1,300 people in this context. about half of them, we didn't have any information from the source countries, thanks to the sensitive work of our security and also intelligentceintelligence, and we've captured and deported them to their source countries. we inform all the source countries of the foreign fighters. but this is not an easye issue that turkey can solve on it own. we need improved information

sharing and more international cooperation, particularly from the source countries. the source countries should also start asking themselves the hardest question who is really the weakest link in this chain? in addition to syria and iraq, we see sectarianism as a general threat to the region in the middle east. that is a standard message that we give to all actors and parties. sectarian based policies create -- first and foremost, those who favor these policies. yemen is the most recent example, pointing at such dangers. in both iran and libya, what we need is political dialogue. meaningful political dialogue. we need political solutions

based on the compromise and consensus in both those two countries. ladies and gentlemen, as a corn corner cornerstone of peace and stability, the middle east -- in the middle east, egypt is another potential risk for the region. egypt is an important country for the muslim world. egypt is important for the middle east, and egypt is very crucial country for not only northern africa but the -- for the whole continent. leadership pushes those people. they see it as opposition towards radicalism. our concern is that if the current trend is left unchecked a new and more violent social outburst in egypt will be inevitable. egypt's deep structural problems can only be solved in a liberal and political environment. we encourage all parties to

advocate the establishment of an inclusive political system in egypt, too. ladies and gentlemen, of course, one cannot speak about the middle east without touching up on the palestinian issue. because it remains the core challenge in the region. actually we all know parts of the solution. the state of israel, living side by side with an independent and sovereign state of palestine, on 1967 borders with east jerusalem has its capital. yet, despite the most sincere and best efforts of my dear friend secretary kerry the two-state solution is in a coma. you all know the recent palestinian initiative regarding u.n. security council resolution

to initiate peace conference. such a resolution will make the israeli side sit for serious negotiations for a two-state solution. try to open the way to peace failed at the united nations security council. the main body responsible for protecting international peace and security once again proved incapable of performing this task. ladies and gentlemen, yes, the general picture in the middle east is not very promising. but there are also reasons for being hopeful and to be optimistic optimistic, as well. look at the political process in tunisia. this country shows us that the political solution is possible to the problems faced by the countries in transition. the tunisian people deserve our

full support and solidarity. we are also very pleased with the political understanding reached between the p5 plus 1 and iran. we always advocated diplomacy as the only possible option for a solution to the issue of iran's nuclear program. that is why we hope that the ongoing negotiations result in a comprehensive agreement by the end of june this year. we are ready to offer our active support to the process. we also hope that the final -- issue might motivate our iranian neighbors and brothers to facility the resolution of other regional problems. in short, our approach in the middle east is based on finding

comprehensive, political and inclusive solutions. so let me put what we imagine into a picture. a secure and stable middle east where the energy and trade rules interconnected east mediterranean resources to all directions. a region which no longer makes the headlines with death tolls, but rather, with cooperation projects and success stories. turkey is doing its part to invest in the common future in the region. we are putting a lot of efforts in increasing and liberalizing trade, lifting resource, expanding investments in the region. on the humanitarian side being the third largest donor in humanitarian aid in the world, we continue to extend our helping hand. we are trying to ease the pains not only in syria but also in iraq and palestine.

in iraq, we are among the first to come to the help by sending 750 trucks containing tents, bedding, blankets, medicines and medical equipment. our official humanitarian assistance to gaza only last year is more than $19 million. we'll continue to work for better future for everyone in the middle east. ladies and gentlemen, dear guests, i know our topic is middle east. but speaking as the turkey foreign minister in washington, i will not be doing my job in full if i don't mention two other issues. two issues which have created mistrust and confrontation in our region for long time. first, cypress we have a window of opportunity to find the political settlement to a problem that has been with us for 50, more than 50 years. and we believe 2015 will be an

important year for the settlement of the cypress issue. our commitment for a solution is as strong as ever. we expect negotiations to resume very soon after the elections in the north. before the end of this year. ultimately, it takes two to tango. what is needed for a settlement is true political. if they show similarly strong political will, there is no reason why a settlement cannot be reached by the end of this year. as always, the active involvement of the u.s. will be important. in the political period ahead. second, the turkish army and relations. we have been working since 2009

to overcome the division teen these two ancient peoples. two people who for centuries co-existed in peace and harmony. let me underline this point. turkey shares the suffering ofwith armenians. patience and results to establish -- between two peoples. we continue to believe that we can build a peaceful common future only through dialogue. in this context our president's message last year on the events of 1915 was a historic step. the recent statement of our prime minister in january, was another step forward representing our humane perspective. and couple of hours ago prime

minister extended his condolences to the armenians who lost their lives under the tragic circumstances of world war i. and he also announced in parallel to the remembrance ceremonies on the wall, our ceremony will also be held at armenian istanbul of 21st of april. this is a step of historic significance. and we will continue on this path. and we will continue to work for a framework that both addresses the historic aspects of the problem and also helps solve the issue. ladies and gentlemen, it is destiny. and today, we stand at the cross roads for the region. we in turkey believe in the

promise of our region and its peoples. we are willing and able to stand up to the existing challenges. and so is the united states. history of turkish american relations is full of success stories we wrote by working together. our past in afghanistan in the balkans and elsewhere is testimony to what we can do together in the future. that gives me the confidence to say that turkey and the united states will continue to work as close partners. by working together, we have a better chance of creating a bright future we imagine, for the middle east. thank you very much. >> can i answer the questions? if you don't mind? >> please. he's going to stay here. >> okay. >> for technical reasons it's

better. >> much better for the vision. >> okay. good. >> thank the foreign minister for those. we're going to -- we're going to take questions. and we will do it in the normal way to do things here, which is raise your hand, call on several questioners take several questions together. the foreign minister has been kind enough to address those questions. make your question very brief. and also in the form of a question, please. and also, please introduce yourself before you start. so let's start these three right here in this row. >> thanks, george.

barbara from the atlantic council. mr. minister how do you square your views with those of the south dakota saudis, particularly when it comes to issues like yemen. your prime minister was in iran, you called for a political solution there. but you are also, i believe, supporting the saudi effort which is now apparently bombing the country with no apparent result. so how do you bring people to the table here? and if i may also ask a question, another question, is turkey taking a position on the direct supply of weapons to the kurds in iraq? thanks. >> kurds where? >> iraq. >> hold that question for one second and we'll pass it here. we'll start with you, michael. >> is that okay? >> yeah. go ahead. >> michael gordon "new york times." a different subject, sir. you mentioned the negotiations with iran. the details aren't known.

the principles are known. it will extend breakout time to a period of ten years. the breakout time will shrink after that. and iran will be allowed to do research and development on centrifuges. what is turkey's position on this agreement since the main elements are known? and are there any circumstances in which turkey would feel that it should pursue the development of nuclear technology on its own as a precaution against an iranian breakout? what would those circumstances be? thank you. >> okay. well unfortunately, yemen is concerned for all of us. and they took the control of the whole country. and democratically elected president