know, i think feel more comfortable and know about us, so we're getting more cases. >> all right. thank you. >> i want to give you a chance to speak. i don't know you've been heard from enough. tell me what your response is today to the testimony of miss flanz and miss lerner? >> well, i can tell you by illustrating that we had a whistleblower who reported an inappropriate practice of giving medication to help people who have addiction problems. and you're really technically not supposed to continue giving that medication if someone has abnormal urine drug screen. so repetitive positive urine drug screens should be a cause for not giving that medication anymore. we had a clinical nurse specialist who reported that practice going on, and rather than investigate, they investigated that nurse.

he has been sitting in a clinical, clerical position, even though he's a nurse specialist. he's essentially doing no functions. he's a windowless office, reporting to clerks who need, you know, something moved or carried around. when he has a masters degree and is going for his ph.d., and he is on active duty, just this past weekend, in the reserves. they have now proposed on friday, he did contact the office of special counsel, back in august when he was first detailed. and they did propose discipline on friday on something that occurred in 2013. and a couple of other things that they alleged occurred in 2014. >> i don't mean to interrupt you a minute, because i've heard of this before from the other members, other physicians saying they get a peer review gig. something they can put against you without a reference, saying the thing that you brought up. >> right. >> is that your experience as

well? >> yes, my personal experience when i have been in the limelight for reporting things. i only had one time when i was called to a peer review committee, and i've worked for the v.a. over 26 years. in this particular instance, there was no peer in the room or on a telephone to be my peer. there was a dietitian in the room. and there were, you know, a few other occupational therapists in addition to a smattering of physicians. but there was no true peer for me to address my concern to. that was number one. number two, is that the -- >> the peer review process is flawed at your facility, it sounds like. >> yes, for in certain circumstances, very flawed. because people they want to, you know, in a sense harass, i had another colleague, well, several colleagues who had no true peer in the room when they went before the peer review committee. then we have people in the sinner circle who are the team

players, who don't get peer review cases when they should be and other get peer review cases that really should not be peer reviewed. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> miss rice, you're now recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. miss flanz. i just want to go back to the conversation we were having where you were talking about the burden of proof or retaliators. what is the burden of proof you apply when looking at allegations of whistleblowers? >> in any case it depends on the tribunal who might hear an action. >> say it's you. >> i'm not a tribunal. >> say it's you making a recommendation to a d.a.'s office or who? u.s. attorney? who are the possible -- >> in most cases employee discipline is going to be subject to appeal to the merit system's protection board. the merit system protection

board in almost all cases applies a preponderance of evidence standard. >> is that true for retaliators and whistleblowers? >> if an action is going to be taken against an employee, if it's subject to appeal, most actions, now there are differences if we're talking about title 38 doctors and nurses who have their own disciplinary process. but if we're talking about a government employee under title 5, if the allegation is that person did something wrong and should be disciplined and the appeal goes to mspb, in moes cases, the preponderance of the evidence would apply. >> and in terms of any disciplinary action, that is meant to be taken against a retaliator or a whistleblower, they both have protections in the law. whether by the union representation or whomever.

no? there's none? >> not for peer title 38. that's a glitch in the system pertaining to section 7422 of title 38. the secretary veteran affairs control, our clinical practice, our clinical competence. so what the secretary says goes, and that's typically delegated to a chief of staff locally who can be very, very, very retaliatory to physicians who do not play according to the party line. or who are not team players. >> that's interesting. mr. chairman, i would -- obviously, maybe that's something we as a committee should look into trying to fix. so in my prior life as a prosecutor, there was a saying that is true not just in the world of criminal justice, but unfortunately i see it here in the world of v.a. and specifically whistleblowers. and that term is snitches get stitches. and while mr. head and -- dr. head, dr. hooker and mr.

tremaine don't have the actual physical stitches, they are surely bearing the figurative ones. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, miss rice. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'm still trying to figure out parts of the testimony. i am looking at a document from november 2014. rebuilding trust from the va secretary. at that time you did note there were over 100 investigations currently being undertaken. do you have a rough figure of what those numbers are today? >> i believe he was speaking to the i.g.'s ongoing investigations into alleged misuse of scheduling and wait list systems. the ig was at its most active point, active at 98 sites. they have completed their work at several of them.

just to make sure i have the right data here -- they've completed their work at 43 of those sites. they have substantiated some scheduling and propriety at 14 of the 43. they found no particular impropriety at 29, and their investigations are ongoing at the balance. >> so that's at the 100 from november still haven't got to the second half of those. are my numbers correct? >> the ig has not delivered to the department its reports in the others. yes. >> okay, so five months later from this report to the public by the secretary, and half these investigations have yet to be completed or we don't know the status of those? >> you have to ask the i.g. >> this comes for the secretary. i appreciate you're representing the department. can you ask them for me? this is from the secretary that says working diligently to

cooperate with investigations by the inspector general, the justice department and the office of special council. so this is all those together. do you know roughly a comparable figure today, more or less? but if i understand correctly, half of these have yet to be completed or start the investigation. >> i believe the i.g. has started them all and probably finished quite a few but probably not yet delivered their reports. >> and this would be presumably where three individuals have been fired out of 100 investigations. is that what we're looking at here? >> the question that you posed before about individuals to which i gave to you the answer three had to do with whistleblower retaliation. the i.g. is looking at something different. and, so, that would be a different number. >> okay. what is that number then? >> i'm here today to talk about whistleblower retaliation, and i apologize. i don't have the number of actions taken as a result of the i.g. findings.

>> well, one thing i'll ask about your testimony and before the sub committee in the last month. i'm just curious, when you put together this testimony, you visit with above, you declare this testimony. do you visit with the secretary himself and the deputy secretary and they clear this testimony before the committee? >> there is a process that includes our leadership, yes. >> so they approve everything in your testimony? >> the front office approves all testimony, yes. >> so nobody in the the front office knew mr. head did not have the opportunity to visit with the secretary. even though reading this, i would suggest you assume that he -- you're suggesting everyone was talked to. somebody looked at this and let you say that a visit might have been made. am i understanding that correct? >> my testimony is that the secretary makes a point of meeting with whistleblowers as he travels throughout the system. my testimony didn't specifically speak to any meeting with dr. head. >> what about the other two individuals?

>> when the secretary veteran affairs came to our facility, he did not meet with any whistleblowers, per se. we asked for a private meeting with him because we had sent a letter in november about a number of people under investigation that we felt were inappropriate administrative investigation boards that appeared to be a sham investigation board. he had a strict schedule. we were allowed to go with another union for 15 minutes together jointly. i was unable to go because i had patient care duties, so my colleagues in the union went. >> dr. tremaine. >> the secretary didn't visit our facilities. the deputy secretary did, but he did not meet with any of us. >> i'm just about out of time. if i might ask of miss flanz. of the 15 corrective actions that were identified from the office of special council, i would like to know how many of those actually have visits with senior v.a. officials? >> i don't know.

>> would you please find out and report to the committee? >> yes. >> i yield back, mr. chairman. >> thank you. mr. walsh, you're now recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, and i'm going to venture out on a limb. i bet you get a call from the secretary now. miss flanz might back me on that, i would bet. it goes to something bigger for me. i would argue and go back to the issues with secretary shinseki and others, i think many times they're let down by others around them. it takes us back to the core issue of delegation and authority. and in an organization that big, this has to happen. so how are we going to change it? how are we going to make it better? i want to talk about osc 23 oc. i would bet everybody in this room at one time another has gone gone through some form of professional training. whether it's on a friday afternoon or a retreat or something like that. i bet in our professional careers, you can count and tell the ones that were highly effective and those that were forgettable. this is an important issue.

i am going to go to this. have any of the three of you dr. head, dr. hooker and dr. tremaine, have any of you received osc whistleblower certification training? >> no, i have not. >> i have not. >> no. >> don't you wish those three would have got it? >> can i speak to that? >> yes, i think what the certification training is, it's not a specific training. there are five steps that agencies have to take to become certified. one of them is -- i mean a lot of it is a training component. but it means putting posters at facilities. providing information to employers about retaliation and their rights. providing information to current employees. >> is there any confusion on that? >> i'm sorry. >> is there confusion on that in the v.a. that if someone tells you about a practice, isn't it widely known that you don't move them from their office without due process or anything? and again, yes, facetiously, but

i'm fit to be tired here. do you believe this is going to work? >> you know, i think the problem is that it has to filter down to the regions. i think the message is good coming down to headquarters. but the folks are actually implementing it need more training. >> dr. head, is this going to work? >> i think the current practices need a big change. >> so there's a step in the right direction. i always think about this. training folks is on technique and content. development focuses on people. in these positions, i would argue, and this is what always pains me is lo the vast majority in the hears are very different to me. there's a bunch of employees out there giving and sacrificing and giving great service and their morale is hurting when we do this. the problem is it tends to be some folks in that management

chain doing this. my question to the three of you would be effective thing that we can do? i don't want to belittle the training part of it. i should go on record and be clear. it's good to get a refresher course on what's legal and all of that. so i'm going all of that. it seems to be a central focus on what we're going to do to this change that. i would ask the three of you, what should we be doing more of? >> i think the definition, when you use the wester's definition of a whistleblower, that in itself is really derogatory. and you know, i don't think that in itself just ills a lot of i think, kills a lot of people, when they think whistleblower, they think negativity. i think that again, you have to embrace that. you have to embrace the whistleblower and acknowledge that. and acknowledge that there are problems and you have to resolve those problems. so i think that, you know just the acknowledgment and the openness, the transparency, is critically important. we just don't have that. we have the retaliation. that seems to be the first step on any time a whistleblower

comes forward. >> why the fear? why not wanting to be better? why not wanting to hear that? you can take everything with a grain of salt like each one of us in our personal lives. when you get positive feedback, especially those you trust, those around you, why the resistance to hearing the truth? >> you know, i don't know. i think what -- you hit the nail on the head when you said there are many v.a. employees. the majority, 99.9% of v.a. employees are going to work every day and love taking care of veterans. you have the small minority that feel they can utilize taxpayer money to do whatever they want and retaliate and call -- >> do you think ms. rice is right, that there needs to be teeth in this thing? that folks need to know it's not going to be tolerated? is there a patience on this? i don't want to step on anybody's due process rights but you hear the frustration that nobody is ever held accountable. it's not a juvenile desire to

see punishment for the sake of punishment. it's about making sure good people are served. >> for professionals we don't have due process rights in the traditional sense. 7422 prevents us from having the due process right. in the community i'd be held to the standards of my peers. in the v.a. the secretary tells me what i do and how i do it. so i can't argue in a sense the way i could with colleagues. i don't have the oversight. i have clerks in a sense telling me how to practice medicine. then if i call the office of special council and i report -- because i did -- >> that's a big problem. >> well, i came across evidence that another veteran employee reported two years before i discovered it through a proposed termination of another employee who had brought up some issues. so she was put in another windowless office in the basement. she had two masters degrees and a counseling degree. but where i'm going with this is

that when i reported to the i.g. -- i'm sorry -- the employees went to the office of special council. i went to the inspector general. the report basically goes back to the v.a. actually, i did call the osc on all the nine people i currently have sitting home, getting paid at high professional salary levels for not doing their job, when they haven't really -- they don't know why they're at home. i have an employee who was just removed, threatened. when we do reports with outside agencies, they turn it over to the v.a. for investigation. i'm not a farmer but i'd have trouble asking the fox how many chickens were in the coop when the feathers with out of the fox's mouth. >> this is how deep this is. what's the deal with the office thing, and moving people to the basement? it boggles my mind. that is your definition of

violence in the workplace, in my opinion. >> it's unacceptable. >> i went over my time. i don't know if the secretary or chairman wants to follow up. >> one final point. there has to be accountability. you know moving me to a storage bin makes me feel bad. but they're trying to send the message not only to me, they're trying to send the message to everyone there. saying, look at dr. head he thinks he's great. he went and testified in front of congress. they say they're going to protect him. you know something, on my v.a. no. they listen to me. congress can't do a thing about it. they're trying to intimidate all the other potential -- i like to label whistleblowers as patriots. these patriots are trying to suppress their willingness to try to make a better life for these veterans. it's shameful. >> thank you, dr. head.

let me say also that the retaliation isn't limited to employees of the v.a. but also patients who step forward. in colorado, we had a case last year where a patient gave the statement to an investigative reporter. the reporter then called the v.a. and called to the public affairs individual for that particular visin. they said, you really don't want to talk to this person. he's a patient undergoing psychiatric care. i sent a letter to the secretary of the veterans affairs and never have gotten a response, to this date. all thanks to the witnesses. you are now excused. today, we have had a chance to hear about problems that exist within the department of veterans affairs with regard to whistleblower retaliation. from the testimony provided and questions asked today i am dismayed at the failure of the

department to adequately protect conscientious employees who seek to improve services to our veterans. this hearing was necessary to accomplish a number of items. to, number one, allow v.a. to highlight the efforts its made to improve whistleblower protection practices and processes. two, address where improvements either have itnot been made or insufficient attempts give way to continued retaliation experienced by whistleblowers. and, three, assess next steps to be taken both by v.a. and by the committee to ensure those employees who seek to correct problems within the department are adequately protected. i ask unanimous assent that all members have five legislative days to revise remarks, including extraneous material. without objection, so ordered.

i'd like to once again thank all of our witnesses and audience members for joining us at today's hearing. with that, this hearing is adjourned. we'll hear more about operations at the veterans affairs department tuesday, when

v.a. secretary robert mcdonald testifies on capitol hill about his department's 2016 budget request, which includes $73 billion in discretionary funding and $95 billion in mandatory spending for disability compensation and pensions. live coverage of that hearing begins at 2:30 p.m. eastern here on c-span3. in congress this week, the house is expected to consider cyber security legislation while the senate continues work on an anti-human trafficking bill. it's also possible that there could be a vote on a bill that would grant congress oversight of an iran nuclear agreement. for more on the week ahead, we talk to a capitol hill reporter. >> the phone this morning is sarah mimms, staff correspondent and journalist set up this week in washington. sarah mimms, let's begin with what's happening on the floor in the house and the senate.

>> sure. so the senate particularly this week is really interesting. they're coming in this week in very much the same position they were last week. they still have that human trafficking bill holding them up. they still need to confirm loretta lynch at some point. they're still looking at the iran nuclear deal. mitch mcconnell indicated at the end of last week he thinks they're makeing good proguessress on the human trafficking bill. that'll be a series of dominos that will allow lynch to get done the iran deal to get done. all of that probably this week. it looks good this afternoon. >> the house is looking at cyber security legislation that they'll vote on. off the floor house and senate negotiators are meeting today to try to iron out the differences on the budget, the 2016 budget. what are they looking at right now? how long is this process likely

to take? >> that's a good question. at this point they have already missed the april 15th deadline. the budget document, you know, as you know it is non-binding. it's more of a series of recommendations and also a chance for the republican party, now that it sort of owns both chambers, to lay out, this is our fiscal vision. this is what our party believes the country should be doing, the direction we should be headed in. i think because of that, they do have a little bit more -- there is not a serious hard deadline anymore. that said the house and senate budget document are really not that different at this point. i think one of the big arguments we're seeing now is what they're going to end up doing with reconciliation. we saw the senate just decided to use that for the affordable care act, whereas the house left that much more open ended. gave a lot of committees a lot of jurisdiction there. we'll sort of see who prevails in that argument. >> republicans in the senate

want to use the budget to deal with obamacare the reconciliation process on that, to try to repeal it. and republicans in the house, there's different camps? >> right. exactly. the house has tried to reveal obamacare, you know, dozens of times. the feeling that we've heard from folks in the house is just you know we've tried this. the president is still in office. he's just going to veto that legislation. you know, maybe we should try to use this reconciliation process. something that sebdsnds a stronger message. there's been talk about using it for tax reform. a variety of other ideas. for the senate republicans, sort of pushed this in the first place, they're feeling is that this is our number one priority. yes, it's probably going to be vetoed. so is anything else we send.

let's try to reveal obamacare. >> on the iran nuclear deal, the senate foreign relations committee last week overwhelmingly approving that legislation that would allow congress to review any deal. you said that the senate needs to deal with the trafficking bill first, before it can move on to the other bills. but where does it stand, this iran nuclear legislation in the senate? are democrats -- the full senate, are they on board? >> yeah. it very much looks like that. senator chuck schumer, who is going to be taking over more hairy reid in 2015, he's the supporter of the bill. he's a co-sponsor. a number of other democrats are supportive of this. it looks like it's something that's going to pass very easily this week. then the big question becomes can congress pass any legislation either approving or

disapproving of the deal. this bill just gives them the opportunity to do that. it will give them 30 days to make a decision about how they feel about the deal once it's finalized. if they do nothing, which many senators joke, that's what we're best at, then the deal will be deemed approved by congress regardless. >> also in the papers today are stories about trade. where does the vote on fast track stand? >> the fast track vote is really fascinating because this is another situation where you have democrats, vast majority of them, on one side of this issue, and then you have the white house and democrats, like senator widen who helped write the bill on the other side. this deal was just announced at the end of last week. i think a will the of members spent this week sort of looking it over and getting a feel for it. but it does seem like there is a lot of democratic opposition to this bill. it's going to be interesting to

see if republicans can sort of get a coalition better to send it to president obama's desk where he appears interested in signing it. >> could that get a vote this week? >> i think tpa looks unlikely in the senate this week. of course, the house has their big cyber security week planned. that might have to wait until next week with so much on the calendar. >> sarah mimms, staff correspondent with the national journal. thank you for setting up the week. appreciate it. >> thank you. bye. coming up on the next "washington journal," linda dempsey of the national association of manufacturer's joins us. she'll discuss legislation that would give the president fast track authority in negotiating the transpacific partnership trade deal. then congressman of colorado talks about his role in bolstering discrimination protections for the lgbt

community. then why young americans are turned off to politics. "washington journal" is live every morning on c-span. you can join the conversation with your calls and comments on facebook and twitter. here are a few of the book festivals we'll be covering this spring on c-span2 book tv. this weekend we'll be in maryland, state capital, for the annapolis book festival. hearing from new york times reporter james risen. in the middle of may, we'll revisit maryland for live coverage of the book festival. with former senior adviser to president obama david axelrod. we'll close out may at book expo america in new york city where the publishing city showcases their upcoming books. first week of june, we're live for the lit fest, including ourin-depth program. that's this spring on c-span2's

book tv. on thursday greek finance minister yanis varoufakis spoke at the brookings institution in washington, d.c., where ministers are attending the world meetings of international monetary fund. he talked about his country's economic challenges, including the debt crisis, and the negotiations between his country and the european union for financial assistance. this is 1 hour and 15 minutes. >> good evening all of you, ladies and gentlemen, friends. good evening yanis. welcome to brookings. this was a much expected event. we've had trouble accommodating everybody who wanted to listen to you. i'm really grateful that you took the time out of the very busy meetings here, of course to share your perspectives with you. you're well-known phd in

economics. many books, 15 books. i don't know all of them. i noted two in particular. america, europe and the future of the world economy. and a modest proposal for solving the euro crisis. two years ago. you were elected to the parliament in january 2015. i welcome you very deeply on the part of brookings, the whole brook igs brookings community, the programsprogram s hosting you today, the whole family. i welcome mr. ambassador -- not yet -- and also personally and i can't help saying that i also welcome the minister yanis varas a neighbor, as a turk.

okay, it's your floor. then we'll have a discussion. >> thank you. it's with the deepest gratitude that we should thank you for this honor and privilege, to be addressing a fine institution. at the crucial moment when our government is shouldering a momentum task, that of completing successfully, and as soon as humanly possible, the current negotiations with our partners, both european and international. the reason i shall be focusing on these negotiations is their global significance. not so because of the risk of contagious through the circuits that frightened people back in 2010 and again in 2012. but because the outcome of our negotiations, the greek government's negotiations with the institutions, would influence, i believe, europe's attitude toward a larger problem. located in the fiber of our democracies and within the

foundations of our real economies. after all, lest we forget, the greek debt drama of 2010 was followed by large sways of europe. its resolution, one way or another, in 2015, now, will surely prove equally influential at the global level. one may be excused to think, influence by the dominant narrative, that europe is on the mend. it's overcome its crisis. that the combination of large bailout loans and stringent austerity has worked. and only greece has failed to jump on this band wagon towards recovery.

for reasons that have to do with our own greek, peculiar failures. the greek private and public sectors have been for a long time complete with malignancies which require urgent and extensive and intensive treatment. there's no doubt about this. indeed, the greeks themselves were so incensed by lack of reform, that they even went as far as to elect us, the party of the radical left, to lead the country. nevertheless, greece's chronic malignancies cannot explain the depth and stubbornness of our current crisis. of what has become, sadly, greece's great depression. our seven-year-old and long winter of discontent. to explain this, one needs to cast a critical gaze upon our monetary unions design folds,

and how they went. they design folds of the rozone went into an unholy alliance with the greek nation's failings to produce the crisis in greek. one that has degenerated into a humanitarian emergency. and one crisis and emergency that has global significance, as i was saying before. now, take a look at the rest of europe. even in nations portrayed as the shining lights, the beacons on the hill, what you will find is investment, productivity growth, and improvement in living standards. they can only be described as dismal, even when compared to the american recovery of the last few years. europe's powerhouses -- forget greece for a moment -- europe's

powerhouses, the surplus economies of northern europe, countries that are turning the corner, we lie exclusively for doing so on building up services. either in relation to other euro zone member states. this is an intra-european beg of thy neighbor zero sum game, or against the rest of the global economy. of the kind that we thought was confined to the distance past around the conference. the combination of debts and interest rates is causing europe to address its crisis by exporting it to the rest of the globe. while undermining further the real economy of its own

peripheries. the peripheries of the euro zone and within the states. simply, the current policy mix is increasingly turning europe into a force that behaves as an exporter of idle savings. exporter of deflation. if the balance was a problem few years back, there's a good cause to think of europe as a concern for the global economy. none of this is well for europe or the global economy. as likely as it may sound at first, i submit to you ladies and gentlemen, that the outcome of greece's negotiations with the imf, the european central bank, the coalition, our partners, fellow europeans, the outcome of this negotiation will play a major role in determining whether europe aids or impedes

the rest of the world's efforts and the united states's efforts. to put behind them the crash of 2008 and its stubborn repercussions. within this context context of the global significance of greece's negotiations with the european institutions, our global partners. i'll return to a couple of pertinent questions. i'm often asked, why are you being difficult with this negotiation? why can't you settle it quickly? rest assured ladies and gentlemen, that our government is keener than anyone to bring these negotiations to a successful and quick conclusion. we certainly do not believe that we have any kind of monopoly on good ideas regarding the kind of reform program which is necessary in our country and in the rest of the uroeurozone. the longer these negotiations go on, the greater the asphyxiation

of our social economy, and the greater the delay of essential reforms. so certainly we're more eager than anyone else to conclude them. however, the words here, a successful conclusion. not yet another version of extending and pretending. of the sort that, for five years now, has been turning a drama into a crisis of global significance. extending and pretending that gives greece's debt deflationary spinal yet another 12. let me share a thought. nothing would be easier for me personally. nothing would be easier for my prime minister. nothing would be easier for our government than to sign on the dotted line of the existing memorandum of understanding, of the existing program. nothing would be easier than pledging to do as it says.

like previous governments, always pledged everything that was asked of them. in that way, to collect $7 billion very quickly, and immediately answer the questions that the good people of the financial press are posing full of angst for us, regarding our liquidity situation. except that it would be the wrong thing to do. it would be the wrong thing to do by our creditors. wrong by our partners. wrong by our people. i mean not just the people of greece, but equally every citizen of every member state of the eurozone. we are one people. why would it have been wrong and add our signature to the logic to the philosophy of the existing-preexisting program? because, ladies and gentlemen, this program constitutes a recipe, a treatment, that no reasonable person can consider

to have been successful. the insistence to continue with the logic this is bound in the medium term to reinforce an image that we need to expunge. the image of greece as a bottomless pit. an image that causes must frustration amongst our global partners, while it engulfs our nation in unbearable hopelessness. now, track records matter. the track record of this program that we inherited from the previous government is a sorry one. to paraphrase kane's economic consequences of the peace, we are not going to sign up to targets. we know our economy cannot meet by means of policies that our partners should not wish to impose upon us. not just for our sake. but for the common european and

global interest. ladies and gentlemen, in 2010, the greek state seized to be able to service its debt. while nominal gdp was falling. europe's banking system had become more orless involume vantsolvent. the credit krun kcrunch ensured that interest rates would go up. how did we deal with this problem? by means of the largest loan condition of a massive internal evaluation and program that was bound to shrink the incomes from which the old and new debts would have to be repaid. those loans were naturally extended to the greek government in the context of a debt stability analysis. i don't have a diagram to show you. i had one, but in the end, it turned out we don't have the facility to project it. if you look at projections of

nominal gdp growth made in 2010 by the imf, again in 2011, again in 2012 the reality, you realize that seen dispassionately, we're talking about a massive predicted failure. in an important sense and these are heavy words i'm going to use, greece went from a period before 2008 of ponzi growth. growth fueled by unsustainable borrowing. to a period of austerity, which is what i call serious stringent austerity funded by unsustainable borrowing. i'm asked also these daysdays, why did other countries on which the same policy was tried, not experiencing a collapse like greece's. the reason, ladies and gentlemen, is very simple.

they suffered significantly less austereity austerity. we are the champions of fiscal consolidation. we had more than 11% of a reduction in the deficit. this is unprecedented in peacetime. if you plot a diagram with fiscal austerity, fiscal consolidation on the one axis, and what happens to nominal gdp on the other, you'll find that greece is following a pattern but because fiscal austerity negative relationship between the two, but because ours was more stringent than anyone else's, the collapse of national income and all the repercussions that come with that was much greater. in this sense, greek is a classic outliear having been the first to be bailed out when, in 2010, bailouts were banned.

we were in an experimental lab where benefit went to others. greece took a hit because of our own economic and social failures. i insist on that. we took a hit because of our economic and social failures that made sure we were the first to fall. and, of course due to the euro zone's design folds. so our particular failures were exacerbated by the hit we took for the team. history will tell the story of how a series of insolvencies in the greek spryprivate and public sectors were pushed under the carpet. this is an abuse of the notion of solidarity. greece was never bailed out. 9% of the loans we took over the last few years went to the greek state. the rest went to the banking sector. finally, the historical record would show the reform program

that accompanied the loans was precisely wrong. if one is to rank all the cases of malignancy practices in greek, to the worst to the least offensive one you'll find that the reform program over the last five years started from the bottom, not from the top. and it did the vested interests that lurked at the top, were the ones backing the government that was pointing moralizing fingers at the majority of greeks who may have been microparasitic, but didn't reform themselves when told by the thinkers. unsurprisingly, as a result of this extent and practice debts, both private and public

skyrocketed. banks seized to function as credit providing institutions. investment write investment went up. all we've had over the last few years was a slowing down of the rate of shrinkage of our economy. as all the fat went, then the muscle and then we were proceeding to the bones of our social economy. it is often said that 2014 marked a recovery of sorts. a mild fragile recovery, but a recovery. i beg to differ on this. what happened in 2014 was nominal gdp, gdp in market prices, continued to fall. but at market prices on average were falling faster. that is not my definition, or anybody's definition of recovery. it's the definition of what happens when you go through a

recession to depression. but that's all past history. we're now negotiating a very simple principle. on the other hand, we have an existing program that the greek state is committed to, legally. legally bound. surely states have continued, and therefore, there's no doubt our government even though we were elected to challenge the philosophy, the logic, the essence of the policies we're bound to them. this is a principle of democratic states. but there is another principle, too. that democracy should matter. we have a mandate to challenge the flosphilosophy of the program we inherited should make a difference. what happens when you have two different principles that are clashes with one another?

that's what democracys are for. you have various principles that clash. liberty versus justice or equality. the rights of the individual against the interests of the collect collective. this is what we do in democracys. we blend together contradictory principles. this is what we tried to do upon our election. we tried to convince our partners in the euro group in the european union, the imf that what we need to establish is a common ground on which to build a new set of conditionalties. a set of conditionalties that i'm sure we all would have agreed upon, had we started fresh. so that we overcome the inertia the institutional inertia, of a

program which i'm not sure -- or i am quite sure that almost everyone, had they had the chance to start afresh would have considered to be a failure, and would not want to continue along those lines. but you know how bureaucracies are, how complex organizations are. there's nothing more complex than the eurozone system or lack thereof managing our collective economic prospects. they tend to develop a life of their own and they tend to be subject to inertia. it's very difficult to shift once you have embarked upon a certain path. we would not be putting ourselves in this situation in this very harsh negotiation, if we didn't think that the path we have embarked upon, for greece, is a path that could get us to a good place.

we are convinced that it can't. the greek people did not vote for us because they believed the greek success story of last year. they voted for us because they knew that it was smoke and mirrors. in this negotiation, we're not trying to impose our will upon our 18 partners in the euro group. we have a mandate, and so do they. i accept this fully. what we're asking for is for the opportunity to do two things. firstly, to be heard. to have our proposals for the way in which the greek social economy must be reformed. discussed in good faith. and the second thing we're asking for is for the time and the space in which to allow this conversation to take place, so that we can do the one thing that needs to be done. what is that one thing? we need to convince our

partners especially in northern europe, that this government is not about going back to the prophecy of yesteryear. they need to convince us that they're serious about rebooting a series of measures programs, fiscal consolidation plan that has failed. this negotiation must succeed. and the reason why it must succeed is because as it was correctly said a few months ago, for the euro project to succeed anywhere, it must succeed everywhere. greece insists on being part of the everywhere. greece believes that a new government, that the greek people have elected is offering our partners, despite a significant political differences, a chance for

pluralism and democracy to prevail within a monetary union that knows how to acknowledge errors and do what the united states has done with such great success in the 19th and 20th centuries. what is that? create consolidation out of a crisis. in europe, we like to think that we have achieved that. that we've learned the lesson. we have consolidated. that we've created new institutions which are allowing our monetary union to evolve and to develop the mechanisms that it lacks or lacked, by which to counter a major earthquake shock like that of 2008. i do not believe we have done that. i believe that in many ways we have proclaimed a name that which we have denied in practice. for instance, a proper banking

union. this government with our quirky left wing background i admit, is dead keen to come to an arrangement with our global and european partners that will have europe consolidate in a manner that creates greater efficiency genuine growth overcomes the investment failures of the last few years, not just for greece but everyone in a way that allows all europeans, especially those who are critical of the institutions of europe to remain within the europeanist camp which is where our government firmly locates itself. thank you very much. [ applause ]

>> i want to thank again, minister varoufakis again for his excellent speech i will say. i want to say two things. one, i want to introduce david wessel, my partner and friend here today on the panel who is the director of the fiscal and monetary policy. he joined brookings about a year and a half ago. he was at the wall street journal most recently as economics editor. he is the author of two new york times best sellers, in 2009 and 2012. in fed we trust the war on the great panic. published in 2009. and red ink, inside the high stakes politics of the federal budget 2012. he shares two pulitzer prices in '84 and 20023. one for the persistence of racism in boston. that was 1984.

in 2003, for stories on corporate scandals. i'm glad that david is here, and i'm also very glad that this is made possible. i let david ask the first question. >> thank you. minister thank you for your clear remarks. to an outcider,siedde it seems that the policies fall from the outside to what the european partners are insisting. it's hard to see how this comes to a happy conclusion. there's been speculation that one option here is to have some kind of referendum on staying in the euro zone, or a snap election that ends up with a different coalition. is that part of your game plan

now? >> this is an easy question to answer. absolutely not. let me be precise. >> that was pretty precise. >>. >> in terms of the first question, now, you mentioned or you eluded to a great gap between the policies that are being pursued by our government, and the policies that would be acceptable to our partners. i don't think it's that great. remember what i -- the "p." word i used pluralism. we tolerated different mixes of public and private virvirtues. in the '70s and early '80s, we took great pride of the fact we lived in a mixed economy. we had the public sector playing an important role. where we had conventions and

norms of collective bargaining. that created a safety net in the workplace. we had the social welfare net that always playso played the same role regarding humanitarian issues. you have public and private enterprises. i remember an argument in favor of capitalism in the old cold war days is pluralism. what we are bringing to the table here is the notion that this culture, where everything public must by definition, be problematic, and everything private, everything that is deregulated, must necessarily be on the road to virtue. that culture has not worked very well. it hasn't worked very well here in the united states. i don't believe it's worked very well anywhere. what precise mix we use is another matter.

let me be more precise regarding some of the policies. and this is where i'm going to be specific. >> privatization, labor markets. pry sithivatizationings privatizations. our policy on this firstly, look at the privatizations that took place in the last few years. we were disasters. firstly, they were a disaster from the point of view of legal property rights. a number of significant ones collapsed when they were taken to the high court, greek high court, the european competition commission. so you have private investors that go through the arduous process of securing a bid of winning a bid in auction. they get the problem rights. they make an investment and then the whole thing goes belly up.

there is this aspect it's neither left or right. it's a question of efficiency and the security of property rights. we want to change that. i can give you many examples. secondly we are in the middle of a great depression. how clever is it to try to sell public assets when asset prices are through the floor? at such a time, take these few pennies you get and put them into the bottomless pit of an unsustainable debt. i don't think this is an apt use of public assets. we're against privatization and this kind of fire sale that doesn't even dent, even a little bit, our debt situation. so our policies, just to wrap this up is simple. we want to impose minimum

investment levels on the winning bid. so as to give a developmental dimension to a denationalization of privatization. secondly, we want to have a deal with the winning bidder regarding minimum labor standards. minimum environmental standards. we also want to ensure that the local economies are cut into the deal so that there is both national and local developmental effect. is this something we cannot discuss sensibility with our european partners? i think it is. i don't think privatization would be done the way the previous government did. take pensions. there's no doubt our pension system is in trouble, but how could it be otherwise? we have a collapsed labor market. we have a massive reduction in

number of people who work and who are capable of making pension fund contributions. we have more than 30% of paid labor being undeclared labor. so when we look at the problem of the pension system and the labor market, that intertwined. our government is saying, cutting and pasting from the imf rule book, the ideas about labor market deregulation is completely useless in greece. we have the most regulated market in the world. we are as i keep saying libertarian swept dream. 90% of ununemployed don't get benefit. how much more can you deregulate the labor market? 500,000 workers haven't been working for months and not paid

a cent. why? because of the recession. they keep reporting to work in order not to lose their dignity, in order not to lose their claim to the company, to help the company survive so they don't lose everything. now, what we're saying is that in that environment smart collective bargaining agreements, similar to the ones they have in germany, that we want to hammer out in unison together in clap ration with theollaboration with the ilo, will help reregulate markets. bring the labor markets into the formal part. at the same time, deal with the pension problem. one of the things that's impeding the conclusion to the negotiation -- i'm not breaching confidences by saying this -- is the demand that we do not stop automatic laws voted in by the previous government that would have secretary pensions cut by

90%. that can mean somebody on a 600 year a month pension would have to lose 108 euros. in the middle of this recession, we want to put a freeze on this. we are accused of rolling back reforms. now, why is it reform, to relouisreduece low, low, low pensions? it's a cutback. we want to reform the pension system. of course, when they ask us so how do you envision the pension system to function in the next 20 years? i have to admit to you i don't have an answer that goes beyond a general description of principle. but when france germany and the united states manage to answer that question, we will answer that question, too. it may take a little bit more than a few weeks -- to be serious now -- what we're asking is for the absolutely sensible

principle that we're a new government. we need to come to terms with our partners on four five large reforms that need to be instituted tomorrow, which we can do because we have common ground of these, a number of them. maybe if there are disagreements, we will compromise. we are perfectly prepared to compromise. introduce these reforms. come up with a rational fiscal plan for the next five, eight years. not the one we have now. surpluses for the foreseeable future without a banking system that functions like a credit system is absurd. once we get this agreement going, then we can keep negotiating until, and our intention is in good faith to reach a new contract with our partners by the end of june. and it will create a sustainable

greek economy so we can seize having these conversations. >> let me ask -- make two points and ask a question. the two points i think which you partly already covered, but i want to emphasize them, that balance sheets are more important than flaws. i mean we had the same discussion before. if you focus just on the flaws of one year, you miss a lot of the story. if a country -- we're talking about germany -- can invest negative interest rates and create positive assets, expenditure may go up, but in fact, the balance sheet of the public sector improves. that's a point for example, larry somers makes all the time. i think a difference between the programs and discussions not just on greece but other countries, is this importance of having truly a medium framework

rather than an expenditure limit. the second point, and i can't help wanting to support yanis, is privatization. i had the same experience. when i was in kind of your job in turkey. yes, i was in your job. you know, one demand was privatize everything immediately, at whatever price you can fetch. it's not good for public finance. i'm sorry. i refuse. we were asked to privatize turkish airlines and allow a strategic foreign investor to buy it. we refused. today, turkish airlines is the airlines that flies to the greatest number of countries in the world and is quite profitable and still a state enterprise, but open to small, private investors. so when we talk macroeconomic policy we discuss primary surplus. when we say structural reforms,

there's something under there which i think we have to get into the details of to see whether they're good or bad. and replacing a public monopoly by a private monopoly, even if one is a perfectly liberal economist is not a good idea. anyway, two things i had to get off my chest. but i think yanis, there's one thing that could have, i wonder, you made a very strong point very, very strong, by saying, you know the people of greece are the same as the other people in the eurozone. we are the people of the eurozone. don't you think that the beginning, it would have been better to somehow give the message, or maybe the press distorted the message i don't know, but the press was quite careful at times, that there are two sides to this being part of the eurozone. that they have to respect.

i mean, they being your creditors, have to respect greek democracy and the will of the greek people and realize the suffering the greek people have gone through. at the same time, the greek government, if it wants to be in the eurozone and the european union cannot just do whatever it wants. the message came out, we've been elected. we've got the support of the people. we'll do whatever we want. that, you can do it outside europe, you know but inside europe, you do have to kind of stress that the european agreement is needed. >> let me start with your last point and then go back to some of the earlier ones. only because i'm very interested in them. you are quite correct. i did mention it before, that having one mandate ton 25th ofon the

25th of january, we didn't win the right to do what we please. the point i made was that it gave us that mandate, the right to put our hand up and say, we would like to be heard about issues of the utmost importance to our social economy. when we are in a great depression we have a humanitarian crisis, we want -- and my request of the first euro group i attended -- was i asked for four weeks, during which, in peace and quiet without the threat of liquidity asphyxiation, the values reports and actions that gave rise to -- to sit down and once we have control of our own ministries, to come up with a plan and present it to our partners.

then i asked for another month during which to come to an agreement, a bridge agreement we called it. this was our strategy. we never said that we are going to -- you know, we're not irresponsible and think we have the right to do whatever we want. that was never the point. but that we have the right to be heard. we have the right to challenge the logic of a program that has clearly failed. i believe that that was not -- on the other two points, first regarding privatizations, we are utterly undogmatic about privatizations. we don't have an answer to the question, are you in favor in are you against? the answer to this question is, which privatization? if you ask me about the railways, the ports, about electricity generation and distribution, if you ask me

about the horse racing outfit or electronic gambling i'll give you different answers depending on the particular case. lastly, and that is something very important, you mentioned the distinction between balance sheets versus shocks flows and regular economy. we are a very particular economic union. we have governments without central banks backing them. we have a central bank without a federal government backing it. this is a unique state of affairs. ideally, we should complete this by creating a central governmentfederal government and a fed. of course, this is a sad realization, that i am sharing with you this crisis that begun in 2008 '09, '10 instead of

helping us come closer together it is creating centrifuge forces that make the process of unifying harder. that is something that we should lose sleep over. as germans, as greeks as portuguese, fins slavics, frensfrens french -- i left out the irish and some others -- please forgive me. once you are caught up in this monetary union that has very peculiar forms of governance as well as constraints to labor under, you end up with a complete lack of coordination when it comes to investment policies. so the argument that you mentioned earlier that you discussed -- i wasn't here and didn't listen to it. i wish i were -- about germany's capacity to invest, to borrow,

at negative yields, negative interest rates okay, that is very different, i understand your argument. i also understand the fareear of a government that doesn't want a gdp exceeding 50% debt. there's no fiscal room for a standard deficit spending investment program. however, and this is a however, the euroowe zone as a hole is dignified not only by a mountain of great private and public debts, which we do have but there is another mountain hiding behind it, a huge mountain, i do savings with nowhere to go and it should be a joint project to energyizeenergy jazz and motivate and channel them into productive investment not

investments to us, but investments into real productive capacity. now, how do we do this? well, we have a european investment bank that could do this. and we have the european central bank, which is a backing on quantitative easing. why can't they fund a major new deal for europe that channels investment to the private sectors all the countries and the regions within countries that have a major output gap, great deflation forces oning through them with the ecb standing by ready to jump in the markets to purchase bochbdsnds if the yields are not going up. have you noticed there's no mention of government here? there's no need for government to be involved. this is not deficit spending by anyone. this is money borrowed by the taxpayer. it is money borrowed by the eib on banking principles as it's.

doing for decades, but you have the ecb playing the role that simulates a federal government and in the cop text of doing smart quantitative easing. so i'm only mentioning this because we need to have an answer to the question, okay, you don't have federation. you don't have the political dynamic to lead you to one. how can you spawn differently from self-defeating ourselves? i just want to give one small example of the kind of out-of-the-box thinking to get there. to do this, we have to begin trusting one another so i come back to the original question. we greeks have to earn the trust of our partners. they must also acknowledge the fact that for five years now, the particular program has been imposed upon our nation that has been making everything worse. >> okay. so let's say i buy your

analysis, but there's a certainly reality. you owe some money yet you can't afford to pay unless they open up the spigots. saying to us, it's up to them. they meet my conditions, but i'm not going to let them have any money, not quite how he put it. he says that, look what's going on, greek yields rising in the bond market, no conthing to spain if you leave the euro, it could be done, though aren't you walking here to a point at which you have little leverage left and you basically have to default? what happens after that? i would willingly and enthusiastically accept any terms offered to us if they made sense.

i would have no problem with a memorandum of understanding if it was founded upon a reform program that attack the worst case scenario in greece and made the reforms necessary in order to enhance efficiency and social justice. if it came from the berlin if it came from brussels, portugal from slo vok ya i don't care where it comes, i would have embraced it. the problem we have with the conditions the take limit conditions, is not so much the authoritarians, but the fact we tried that method, and it did not work. >> what happens if you don't come to a resolution? >> that's the second question. these days i'm told that liquidity's drying up in greece. it is. but you know what? there's a reason why it's drying up. the reason is that the previous

government in its infinite wisdom tried to retain power by starting a background by saying in no uncertain terms that if we win, the banks will be shut the next day. how irresponsible is that for a sitting government when the opinion polls clearly showing we're going to win to stop the bankers? at the very same time you have voices from within the system, the euro system the system of the european central banks warning the people we win there would be liquidity restrictions, and the moment we want restrictions, it starts happening, on the fourth of february, the day after i visited london inspired some enthusiasm in minds that it was up 11% the next day. they removed the waiver and they started imposing stricter

and stricter restrictions on the commercial banks, capacity to participate are running over so the lekdty was squeezed while at the same time the demand for liquidity due to the fear it was being propagated within the system increased. you imagine i take a band tied around your arm, very tightly, i said, oh, you have a liquidity problem with your blood. you're going to become gangrene. what will you do about it? i don't think this is the way that our european union and monetary union was meant to function. our answer to the question is simple. we'll compromise. we will compromise. we will compromise in order to come to a speedy agreement. we're not going to end up being

compromised. this is not what we were elected for, but to draw a line and to the fact that the reform program that was perpetuated in greece proposed in greece was badly design and administered by those who had to be reformed, but who were refusing to be reformed. if this means that europe is going to with stand idly by while a young government is snuffed out, i have to say that our only rational response is to spend every waking hour, moment second, trying to reach an honorable agreement with our partners, we shall endeavor is to come to reforms along the lines i mentioned and at the same time make a commitment that

is cast in stone and even penned in our own blood to increase accountability that we shall never slip again. this is what we're committing to inviting our partners to meet us, not halfway, but one fifth of the way, and we expect them to do this, why? because something we don't do, we are refusing to discuss it because as i said before even worrying about it is worries about a comet hitting you in the universe universe. worried ideas in greece is profoundly european. anybody who claims they know what the effects are are diluted. >> let me come in and hearsay.

i have to say when he was here an hour ago, he also ruled out this and expressed confidence that a solution would be found. i was happy to hear that. he said it strongly. i think, i mean i think everybody is trying to find a solution. in the experience of the world bank, and that issue there is the precedence of saying to a group of countries, bring up your reform program. we will suspend your debt payments but the time agreement will come two or three year later provided that your reform

program -- i mean there can be changes in the two to three year, but provided that your program has been carried out. in other words, greece would suspend payments with the agreement of the creditor including, by the way, imf payments, in exchange of an agreement of reform, but would also commit -- this is not restructuring done up front, but the real legal restructuring or reprofiling if you like or change of interest whatever you call it comes after let's say two or three years of a period during which the program is carried out. so there is this experience that's been successful for a group of low income countries. it's never been used forever a middle income country p p i

wonder when you make the debt payment, you run out of money, and you don't have the time now to build the whole program. that way you could have the time to build up the program, and in the meantime debt program is relieved primary surplus goes down and at the same time, the creditor community and international institutions would not write off any part of your debt in a complete way or agree to any change in interest rate in the time way. >> this is such a radical proposal i didn't think about it myself. our proposals are by comparison. if this is good to me, i can assure you i'm going to look at it firstly with this belief, and then a few minutes later, with glee. and satisfaction. we don't need that degree of generosity from the creditors. if we get it, we'd be very

happy. what we need is to stay faithful to the spirit of the 20th of february agreement at the euro group level that allowed greece to be the author or coauthor of the reformed agenda and we'd like to get down to work and discussing the actual bills that go through parliament with the reforms, pushing for this, instead, however we hear there has to be a comprehensive review, the kind that never happens in the last two years. it has to happen within a few weeks of our governments being elected, but nevertheless, we go along with that, and what would be i think, very previous would be to separate the conditional conditionalties for closing the final review of this current program on the basis of four or five major reforms that need to be done and can be done in the space of the next few weeks.

let's face it, it's a time frame we face and do what you suggest by the end of june, again, fairly soon, but nevertheless, prepared to do this, by the end of june come to an agreement about the long term. now, that is what we are proposing. that's what we've been rightful of the beginning to effect. the separation, therefore of the current review from the medium and long term is i think, essential for avoiding the accident and creating circumstances for greece's government, which would, by the way, say a few things on the optimistic note, if we make this, and i believe we will, and i'm greatly encouraged by what was said in the whole conversation an hour or so ago. if there is a declaration

similar to mare owe draghi's of 2012 that the euro zone does whatever it takes to remain indy visible, and at the same time there is an announcement of an agreement between greece and the international partners on a number firstly, fiscal matters, let's agree on appropriate fiscal surpluses that are not exorb tapt as they are now, substantial investment packages in the european investment bank a way of writing off nonperforming loans from the banking sector, and clog the credit circuits privatization policies aimed at development and social security and safety and others, and debt restructure proposals with no haircuts and in the end gives more value back to the creditors, and at the same time attack the -- what i call the trilogy of sin in

greece, which is procurement, bureaucracy, the political system, the way that has a cozy relationship with the ag gark ki that plays a toxic role in society and always have done. at the same time, we have reforms that calculate down to the level of product markets, supermarkets, then down to pharmacies if we need to but let's be patient before we attack all the rent sources. these are things i believe we can agree upon in one amp. the announcement of the agreement will unleash such a wave of optimism about this. remember, asset prices in greece are on the floor. suddenly, greece will be a great field for bargain hunting.

there's going to be such a relief amongst greek investors amongst foreign investors, and we have the capital in growth industries that we can do the one thing we have not managed to do, and that is create an export-led developmental model that would be void by this initial enthusiasm and which will be refeeled immediately after that by a never ending sequence of great reforms. this is what we are striving for. it will be a great shame if this agreement is not concluded in the next few days weeks. >> thank you. >> we have to leave the room at 4:00. okay. let's see. what i will do if it's okay, take a few together, okay?

the lady up front. please identify yourself. >> thank you very much. i'm greek, and i'd like to thank you for the terrific analysis. i would like to ask request that they address the question to the policymaker because you're a member of the government who started your journey, and as we know, a popular party and the cities and know our families from our friends in greece, that day after day, greeks are waiting and the government is related to development. i would like to ask you do you have any ploem any development, a measure that this government took since january 2015? thank you very much. >> a gentleman there in the

middle. >> thank you very much. i'm a professor assistant professor at john hopkins next door. i have actually, a question for you as a politician. i think we agree with the economic analysis, and i think d.c. is your most favorable audience you're going to get, but as a politician, are you worried that being right is not going to be enough? the political economy is that the ret is you're one against 18 in the eurozone. how are the 18 other euro zone countries going to sell the concessions they are going to make to your government if they are going to meet you one fifty of the way? thank you. >> the gentleman all the way to the back there, yes, right there. >> i've been an observer of the greek economy for 30 years off and on and i have a suggestion regarding ones you find sensible

in dealing with the state-owned enterprises, and the suggestion that before you sell off the family jewels that you consider making them more productive by eliminating patronous jobs going on for 30 years or longer, and specifically you fire non-performing employees with very high salaries. in comparative private sector increase in contrast to many other countries, but they have extreme job security, and on top of this, give the jobs to the youth of greece which has 60% unemployment. and then to attract forp ineign investment, consider eliminating restrictions on mass dismissals. >> we'll take through. you answer this -- a few more? okay. then you'll have the floor.

lady in the back there. i'm trying to keep jendle balance. >> thank you very much. i'm from bloomberg tv africa. we know that a lot of economists bet on the fact that greece is going to leave the euro zone. that's what we are hearing. what do you do to ensure they do not leave, and the madame this morning said that all rules state there's no delay in payments, and we also heard from the german finance minister earlier that gives you advice to ensure you stick to the reforms. how do you plan to ensure you're not going to be compromised but instead ensure that you are going to compromise as much as you can without putting the greek economy in danger? thank you. >> one more. yes, you. zblimt subject to the imf friends in the room, there have been cases of arrangements conditional on future performance, so it is not

an undone thing that some payments are either refinanced or delayed. >> thank you very much. the question is a follow-up to what all the colleagues said before. it goes to the essence of negotiations taking place, and it seems to me and, you know reading the papers and trying to talk to some of the actors involved, that the piece that's missing is not so much the flexibility and trying to find a slightly different compromise on how to achieve the goals that you want to achieve, but the lack of specificity. basically, how i understand it your euro zone partners and the institutions involved are showing some kind of flexibility flexibility, but because there's been a break down in trust, what they want to see is not so much

generic goals formulated, but more specific actions to be taken, or at least the beginning of actions taken. these can sort of help restore the trust that's been broken probably over the past few year, not due to your actions, naes necessarily, but due to all the things that happened since 2010. what's your response to that criticism criticism? thank you. >> your turn now. >> yep. right. your questions. policies. what are we suggesting? actions. well, i did allude to some before, but, of course i did not get a chance to you know, each one of these topics would take half the whole lecture but the example i gave of privatization, so our policy of

developing public assets in con sanction with privateers with minimum investment standards, when it comes to the railways, right, now that is a very clear policy of saying that we are going to build a partnership with a private sector. we will allow them to manage it. we will give them a majority share holding but they have to ensure minimum investment, minimal environmental standards. that's policy. i could -- i don't have the time, but i could give you a lot of different examples on this talk to you about all right, here's ideas regarding the tax system. for instance in greece, we have the particular privilege offing with a country with extremely high tax rates and extremely low tax takes.

so how do we intend to tackle this problem? there are ways of doing it. we have been in the process. again, you have to realize that our sovereignty's severely circumscribed by the negotiation. in almost everything that we are introducing as ideas we've been told that it has to go through the filter of the negotiating process. that's slowing us down. we are much keener than it seems to legislate and put these actions to the policies in practice. on the question of your question because it is related on the question of lack of specificity. let me answer it just directly. our original suggestion was that we sit down and specify three, four, five bills that need to be introduced, particularly reforms, and indeed, we said to

them, to build trust, this is the only way we know how to do it. let's agree on three majors that need to be taken, and you take them, and you watch the limitations, and you pass judgment on us depending on that. we did not get anywhere because we were told that the review has to be comprehensive. everything has to be discussed. my fear is that when you discuss everything, you're not discussing about much. okay? so the -- you see, let me share another source of frustration with you. we entered into these negotiations. we constantly ask for narrowing down the talks, the specifity that you're referring to, and we present proposals, ten page, 20 page, 100-page proposals not discussed because we have comprehensive review that's effectively an avalanche of questions and questionnaires about this, that, and the other. it's not the same thing as

talking about specific policies, okay? and then the international press is becoming full of reports that we have no proposesals. in situation where if we reveal proposals, that's breaching faith. please consider that. on the questions that you asked me me, is it action to succeed? i don't know of any way in which i can argue in something i believe is wrong. consider this to be my personal failure as a politician. in this case, i'm very happy for you to say i'm not a good politician, but i'd rather tell you what i think should be done instead of using subterfuge. politicians signed the dotted

lines and played games and made commitments they never intended to uphold. that did not work very well. maybe the truth would work. not that i have the monopoly for that, but i tell you what i truly believe in. even though i train as a game theorist, this is not a game for me, personally speaking. and let me also just because you also asked the question how will you convince the team, and i don't believe it's as simple as that. appearances are deceptive. there's a great deal of commonground. there's something else happening here. there is a kind of e kwul lib yum that's not founded on genuine unity over conviction that everybody's on the right track and our suggestions are wrong. as of adam smith, the brewer and

the butcher, you do not speak to him of the needs but address them on basis of the interest. so we are always try to couch our arguments in terms of what's in the common interest of europe because we genuinely believe we're not in this for the greeks but to maximize the average european. it's the only strategy i'm willing to pursue. there was a question about state interprize enterprises. >> oh, yeah. >> and jobs that are secure and highly paid and effect efly reproduce this is one ambition that i share.

firstly, before i get to it, let me say that we have many fewer state enterprises than we do some years ago since you've been an observer. privatization is not a process that's going to happen. it's already happened to a large extent. very few state enterprises exist. all right? telecommunications, for instance, gone. the port authority partly gone. we are in the process of considering, you know, we -- there is a chance it's happening for the remaining and we'd be very happy to see the development of the railway system in conjunction with private partners and management teams that come from outside. but you are right not so much for state enterprise but the whole greek pure rocktykbureaucracy, the greek public sector. it's clear in order to do what you say we have to effect the

system of proper valuation. under the previous governments affected was a travesty. i know it from firsthand that in some of these occasions the people fired were the most younger, and then ones kept were the better connected ones. we know this from universities, don't we? [ laughter ] that systems of valuation are a double-edged sword. they great not just a system of migration, but a system of power. sometimes when the wrong people use it in order to propagate their own power, the result is precisely the opposite of what we intended. we have to do it carefully. we're working on it. timely, what would i do to stay in the euro zone? we are going to compromise, compromise compromise without being compromised. >> you choose the last two questions. very quick. >> one over there, and the gentleman here over here the -- stand up.

>> very quickly. >> short. >> i work in local government, and we are looking at models that use collective impact for a rising tide raises all boats. it's compromise, but it's collective impact. it's cross after collaboration of nonprofits private sector and public sector and we're having good success with that, and i'm in fairfax, virginia, outside of washington, d.c. there's interesting progress made on social impact bonds. >> over here. >> how confident are you that if there will be an agreement you'll be able -- the agreement with the institutions, that everyone hopes that groemt is approved by parliament? >> with we reach an agreement, it will be approved by parliament. [ laughter ] i got a question i'm familiar with it's a very good idea.

first, we have to conclude this negotiation to get down to work. >> okay. we have to close. i'm very very grateful -- no, please stay so the minister is escorted outside first. that's the rule. many, many thanks to all of you, and many thanks, and i want to predict there will be an agreement. [ applause ] the senate finance committee has a meeting tuesday on u.s. trade policy. the witnesses are u.s. chamber of commerce president tom donahue and afl-cio president

richard trumka. they will consider legislation for international trade negotiations live 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. at the same time here on c-span3, the subcommittee hearing on ways to improve efficiency at the state department and make its operations more transparent. the state department's inspector general will be testifying. again, that's live 10:00 a.m. eastern. she was considered modern for her time call mrs. president, and outspoken about her views on slavery and women's rights as the prolific writer, she provides a unique window into colonial america and her personal live. abigail adams sunday night at 8:00 p.m. eastern on "first ladies: influence and image

examining the public and private lives of first ladyies and impact on the presidency" sundays at 8:00 p.m. eastern on american history tv on c-span3. as a compliment to the series c-span's new book is available, "first ladies: presidential historians on 45 iconic american women" providing stories of the fascinating women creating an illuminating, intertaping and inspiring read available as hard cover, e-book through your favorite bookstore on or line book seller. next a look at the u.s. health care system with former house majority leader eric cantor and kathleen kathleen sebelius part of a discussion dealing with technology. this is an hour.

good evening, everyone, i'm director of nyu washington, d.c. and happy to welcome you to the auditorium. tonight, we are honored to host the forum for discourse in the public square which provides nyudc for thoughtful discussion of controversial topics and issues. special thanks to the foundation for the support of the program. we are grateful for the institute of public health arming the next generation of health pioneers with the critical thinking skills, accum accumand approaches to address the world's most pressing health problems. join me in welcoming the dean of public health and nyu director of public health introducing our topics and special guests.

[ applause ] >> thank you michael for the kind introduction. good evening, everyone, delighted to welcome you to the development of discourse on the public square cosponsored by nyudc and institute of public health and thank you for the support for this important event. if the goal of our forum is to explore elements of a law of which americans disagree, the affordable care act is a case in point. last month, the foundation reported the narrowest margin of difference yet with 43% unfavorable and 14% in support of it. one thing about which we probably can all agree is that the situation that prevailed before the passage of the aca was not a good one. over 70 million americans lacked health care coverage, and millions more were under insured with little access to prevention

services. tonight's discussion will help us all better understand the nuances of this intensely debated act, but first, this complicated law deserves a very brief health reform 101. for that i turn to my long time friend and mentor joseph a., former secretary of health education welfare under president carter and previously the chief domestic policy adviser. there's an an ul lime nating story to recount here, one told in four distinct chapters, a winding tale of health care access for all americans. chapter one, the years before world war ii during which health insurance itself was actually quite rare. following the second world war, yun yours and large employers began covering health insurance for union members and employers. chapter 2, president truman was the first president to make a truly concerted effort to pass coverage for older americans and poor, but defeated as socialized medicine and he settled for a

few amendments to the social security act. the mills act in 1960 covered poor people and older people, but while it was meant for the rural poor dollars allocated were cop souped by high population states like california, massachusetts, and new york leaving sponsors disend chanted. from the time of troouman's effort forward, medicare medicaid was part of the democratic platform but yielded nothing in terms of legislation. then chapter three when president johnson was elected soon was elected or aappointmented after the death of president kennedy, he said we'll fight for medicare as long as we have breath in our bodies. using the failure of the mills act and other issues surrounding the lack of coverage for americans, they were able to pass medicare and medicaid linked to the welfare system. urn medicare part b, doctors were protected from socialized medicine allowing compensated by fees.

they were represented by the american medical association that did then and still does oppose socialized, quote, socialized medicine. president johnson traveled to missouri, the birthplace of president truman's wife, bess to sign the bill into law in which they were given a ceremony of the first two medicare cords: the recent expansion of medicare protected the pharmaceutical industry and some content the aca protects the health insurance industry by skirting an efficient approach to ensuring the nation an expansion of medicare or single payer approach. finally, we are now in chapter 4, raising the question did the path we set for ourselves then result in a series of finances? first, a bonanza for the doctors and hospitals, the pharmaceutical industry, and now for the insurance policy industry itself. or was it as others argue, just the american way? so here we are tonight traveling a long route to near universal

access to health coverage, something enjoyed by the citizens of every other developed country in the world. but we now stand in a cross roads with a pivotal supreme court decision on king in late june and election on the horizon in november. will we stay the course? if we do not, what's are the implications. for that discussion, we tern first to two people who arguably know more about the aca than most on the planet. first, i want to welcome secretary kathleen sebelius who served in health and human services from 2009 to 2013. she also served as governor of kansas from 2003 through 2009. secretary is a staunch support of the aca and honored to have her with us tonight. we are also privileged to have the former house majority leader, eric cantor serving the 7th congressional district of the senate of virginia in the u.s. house of representatives

from 2001 to 2014. congressman cantor is a strong voice in opposition to the aca. on a sad note, congressman cantor's father passed away over a week ago. congressman, we convey our sympathies to you and your family. finally, it will take a strong moderator to guide this discussion. [ laughter ] >> i got to go. >> steve mcman professor is suited to the challenge. steve is an attorney and cofounder of purple strategies llc, got a start in politics on the senate and political staff of the edward kennedy and worked on dozens of senate gubernatorial and mayor campaigns across the country. he's also served in senior roles in three presidential campaigns including that of president obama. he was a commentator on "hardball," and "andrea mitchell reports," he was on nbc evening

news abc world news tonight, the today show, cnn, and fox news. please join me in a warm nyu welcome for steve mcmahon, secretary sebeiluisebelius and congressman cantor. >> on behalf of nyu i actually teach here, american public opinions, too bad those of you who are students will not be here next semester because that's when i teach. thank you very much for coming. the course i teach talks about politics, public opinion, and moving and shaping of public opinion and how public opinion flows. there's nothing more controversial in politics over the past five or so years than the aca. beginning with the path to passage to implementation. i wanted to start with the notion that president obama came

into office with which was this notion that democrats and republicans could work together on matters of great importance to the country. and i think early on in the administration, there was contentiousness around -- there was contention around the stimulus bill, and the next bill thing on the agenda was the aca, which took quite a while to negotiate and pass. so i wanted to ask you both, was that dream or that vision of bipartisanship something that was not possible in washington in the political environment today? either one can start but i would like both of you to address it. i know democrats were frustrated that the president took so long frying to get republicans support or some republican support. it seem eded possible for a period of time, but it was passed on a very partisan party line vote. so, mr. leader, if i could start with you was it possible or is

it possible in washington today to get something like this put together and passed on a bipartisan basis? >> well, see, first of all i say yes, but unfortunately that did not happen in the case of the aca. as you rightfully suggest we were in a contest back in 2009 where the president had just got elected, obviously, his star collection, the nation's first black president, came in after the country had just experienced a horrific jolt in the financial markets we passed the stimulus bill, not a bipartisan affair, for a variety of reasons if you want to get into that. there was, certainly i think a commitment by all of us to want to try to address and to improve the situation of health care in america. and i want to start any

discussion about health care in the country and i know the secretary spent a lot of her times and years trying to make sure that this system we have here, despite what the international numbers say, like oecd rankings and the rest, i would still contend that no matter where you live in the world, if you can afford it you will come to the united states for health care if you are sick. that's the condition, though if you can afford it. when the president first started his discussion with us on the hill back in 2009, i remember that he had convened a session, and i know the secretary was probably there at the white house, and we were there with the premise that we had to do something about the cost of health care, and the cost because the government being the largest payer of health care could not afford it. the taxpayers could not afford

it, and businesses where people outside government programs get their health care through the employer plans, they were also saying that it was becoming too expensive. it was that premise that brought us all together. i think what happened later as we got in the spring months and june, there was a divergence, if you will and rather than that being the priority, increasing the cost to increase the access it was in my opinion, a sole focus on how to we guarantee universal coverage no matter the cost? i know that that would not necessarily be the view shared by the white house, but from what the input we wanted to have, it was just unfortunately not integrated into what happened resulting in the aca passing the way it did. so a little context. >> well, it's not c