they will be looked at on their merits and understand the material and produce a good work product that they have a shot of heading this agency. i would get that message out. i would say if you took that advise that they put a lot of research and putting it together, i think you'd see some differences and i'd like to hear the response if you get back to the chairman. try it for a month.

try it for two months and see what the difference is. thousands a dying and sick because of the exposure to the deadly toxins at the work site. they issued a report called the 9/11 commission report that

sold more copies than harry potter. most read document in the history of our country. i nominated them for the national book. they didn't win. they should have. if we can't protect our president, our workers our people, then we can't do anything. your department is the most important department in the entire government. you took 22 different agencies that weren't talking to each other on intelligence and other areas and are forcing them to talk, share information and protect this country.

you're doing a great job. we haven't been attacked again but people are trying. in the great state of new york they have tried 14 times. because of your agency and the locals, we prevented it. we're preventing the attacks on our great country. i'd like you to take your workers down to 9/11 and hear the stories of the families of the people that were killed and hear the stories of the seals and governor cane and hamilton that worked to put these pieces back together and to make kourn tri even stronger they should have the best morale of the whole government. the way we treat people nominated for positions and

people that are working in government i think is tremendously disgraceful. he was recommended for a job in treasury. i never met him. i don't know him. he was vilified. he was vilified that somehow he caused the 2008 economic meltdown on wall street. he was basically in verj and analysis and advice. he wasn't trading. he wasn't part of any mistaken that were made. they said because he was from a firm, this firm wasn't involved in wall street or the trades or that but he was in a firm, in this case doing research and advice, he wasn't fit to serve. we have a strong public sector.

if we vilify people who understand how they can volunteer and help the public sector, we're making a big mistake in this country. his children are saying why are they saying you're a horrible person that caused the financial crisis and you can't serve your government. it might be good to have somebody who understands finance to serve finance. i used that as one example. we could also talk about loretta lynch, a distinguished, accomplished leader in the justice department her entire life. her appointment being held up. no one says anything bad about her but her appointment is held up. often people are vilified if they want to serve in government. if we continue that, no one is going to want to serve. it's absolutely wrong. i think it's very unfair how we

vilify federal employees. it's the employee's faults instead of trying to work together. >> i think that is what we're doing. >> we need to improve. you have a great job to do. i think you want to go back to your agencies, turn this around and help us move forward in a positive way. we have the greatest country and we don't have the greatest country without the greatest work force. your u you're part of it. i think we in congress and the public and other people vilify public servants. they don't deserve it. >> today is the start of trying to get in the brute of that problem. that's why i felt like it was important that we held this hearing. i will say to each one of you i'm a tenacious and unforgetting individual. i make notes and i remember

things. well, i make notes and don't remember. i will say this i do want you to report back. i do want to see progress. i do want us not make this a hearing that goes away each and every year we'll have this. the committee will be asking you for additional information to provide. i thank each you have for your testimony. this goes off like clock work not because of my preparation but theirs. i want to thank them. for those that are streaming and watching today, thank you for your service. thank you truly for being

willing to be public servants and if there is no further business without objection the subcommittee stands adjourned. yesterday the senate confirmed loretta lynch to be the new attorney general. live coverage of the farewell starts at 2:00 p.m. eastern on c-span.

jeh johnson holds a meeting with reporters. c-span2 will have his comments. both the house and senate are not in session today but lawmakers will return next week. senators plan to continue work oen a measure that requires obama administration to submit any nuclear agreement with iran. house members will meet with senators for a joint meeting of congress to hear comments from shinzo abe.

u.s. pacific and u.s. forces testify before the senate armed services committee last week and again warned of north korea's nuclear capabilities saying north korea has the capacity to place it on a missile that can reach the u.s. senator john mccain chairs the hearing. >> thank you. i'd like to thank both of our witnesses for appears before us today. these leaders have all told us we're experiencing a more diverse and complex array of crisis since the end of world

war ii. put simply, if the 21st century is to be another american citizen is united states must remain an asia pacific power. we seek to defend ourselves and our allies by maintaining the capability to prevent, deter and if necessary prevail in conflict. achieving these objectives will require sustained american leadership. we must use all elements of our

national power and particularly i'm hopeful that congress will pass trade promotion authority with the transpacific partnership. this will open new opportunities for trade and level the playing field for american businesses and workers while sending a powerful strategic signal about america's commitment to the asia pacific. we must remember that our soft power is the shadow cast by our hard power. from projecting power over long distances and exploiting undersea to investing in innovative ways to rebuild the

resiliency of our forces. we have a great deal of work to do if we aim to sustain our traditional military vangsadvantages in the asia pacific region. none of these will be possible if we live with mindless sequestration and a broken acquisition system. as we build and posture forces to secure america's interest in the asia-pacific, we must remain clear-eyed about the implications of china's rise and its evolving foreign and defense policy. as director of national intelligence james clapper told this committee back in february, china is engaged in a rapid military modernization deliberately designed to counteract or thwart american military strengths. i believe china can and should play a construct up role in the asia-pacific region. unfortunately, in recent years, china has behaved less like a responsible stakeholder and more like a bully.

in the south china sea, we have seen the latest example of a trend toward more assertive behavior. china's land reclaimation and construction activities on multiple islands across the spradly chain and the potential command and control surveillance and military capabilities it could bring to bear from these new land features are a challenge to the interests of the united states and the nations of the asia-pacific region. such unilateral efforts to change the status quo through force, intimidation or coercion threaten the peace and stability that have extended stability across asia-pacific for seven decades. as a wrote in a letter together with my colleagues reid, corker, and menendez, the united states must work together with like-minded partners and allies to develop and employ a comprehensive strategy that aims to shape china's coercive peacetime behavior. this will not be easy, and will likely have impacts on other areas of our bilateral relationship. but if china continues to pursue

a coercive and exclusive tory exclusion, the cost to regional security and prosperity as well as to american interests will only grow. i'm also concerned by the recent assessment from admiral bill gortney that north korea has a missile that could carry weapons to the united states. general, i look forward to hear your assessment of this potential breakthrough and the implications to our national security if the erratic and unpredictable regime of kim jong un achieves the ability to carry out a nuclear strike against our homeland. i thank the witnesses and look forward to their testimony. senator reid? >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me join you in welcoming the

generals. thank you, gentlemen, for your service and sacrifice and that of your family. and particularly convey to the men and women under your command our deepest appreciation for what they do every day. on tuesday, we had an extremely insightful hearing on some of the challenges we face in the asia-pacific region. the consensus from the panel is that we face some very serious challenges, especially in light of china's increasing military budget and destabilizing activities in the region. and one of the biggest challenges will be to continue to provide as we have for 70 years security, stability, and free transit in the pacific. particularly as senator mccain has said with pending sequestration in the face of declining resources that we have. and i echo his call for the end of sequestration. admiral locklear, we'd be very interested in your views about

the land reclaimation activities of china in the spradlys and elsewhere. that is something that we both, along with senator and menendez and corker objected to or at least criticized. what more must we do to build a capacity of our partners in the region to help them with their maritime awareness and encourage all of the regional actives to seek legal redress to problems, not to invoke lethal threats with respect to sovereignty and stability in the region? as the chairman indicated, admiral gortney's comments this week, as he said, north korea, quote, has the ability to put a nuclear missile and shoot it at the homeland, quite disturbing. and general, would you in your comments or questions please let us know about the dimensions of this threat as it exists today and as it might evolve in the future? again, we thank you because the north koreans appear to be not only unfortunately well armed but very difficult to predict

their behaviors. and your views and insights will be extremely important. also, if you could comment on the possible deployment of thad missile defense system and its contribution to the defense of our allies in the republic of south korea. we are concerting all of these challenges once again under the constraint of serious budget limitations. and admiral locklear and general scalparotti, please indicate the impact of sequestration on your operations. it would be very helpful, i think. thank you for joining us. >> i thank the witnesses. admiral locklear. >> thank you, mr. chairman, senator reed, and distinguished members of the committee. thank you for this opportunity to appear with you today. before we begin, i would like my

written statement to be submitted to the record. for three years, i have had the honor and privilege to lead the men and women of the united states pacific command. these volunteers are skilled professionals, dedicated to the defense of our nation. they are serving as superb ambassadors to represent the values, the strengths that make our nation great. i want to go on record to formally thank them for their service and their families for their sacrifices. in u.s. pay com, we continue to strengthen alliances, our partnerships, maintain an asured presence in the region, and demonstrate an intent and resolve to safeguard u.s. national interests. when i spoke to you last year, i highlighted my concern for several issues that could

channel the security environment across the indo pacific. those challenges included responding to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, dealing with an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable north korea, a challenge that general scalparotti and i remain aligned in addressing, a continued escalation of complex territorial disputes, increasing regional transnational threats, and the complexity associated with china's continued rise. in the past year, these challenges have not eased. they will not go away soon. but the asia rebalance strategy has taken hold and is achieving intended goals. however, the greatest challenge remains the continual physical uncertainty resulting from sequestration. the greatest challenge in the indoasia-pacific will be dealing with the national interests as we respond to a rapidly changing world. i echo the secretary of defense, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and the service chiefs testimony before congress. our nation is being forced into a resource driven national security strategy instead of one properly resourced and driven by our enduring interests. in the indo-asia pacific, we are

accepting more risk, not less. sequestration will force harmful reduction in force size, structure, and readiness that will reduce my ability to manage crisis space, provide options to the president, and diminishing the united states prestige and credibility in the region and around the globe. in the last year, at great expense to the readiness of the forces in the continental united states, pay comhas been able to maintain forces to protect the homeland, deterring aggressors such as north korea, strengthening alliances and partnerships, and developing the concepts and capabilities required remain dominant in a world that is growing in complexity with threats that continue to increase against a seemingly unending stream of constraints. without adequate resources, we will be forced to make difficult choices today that will have

strategic consequences to our goals. >> i am honored to testify today as the commander of united nations command and the combined united states forces korea. on behalf of civilians, contractors and their families who serve our great nation in the republic of korea, one of our most important allies, thank you for your support. i prepared brief opening remarks, but i would like to ask that my written posture statement be entered into the record. last year i testified that the combined and joint forces of the united states and the republic of korea were capable and ready to deter and if necessary respond to north korean threats and actions. due on our accomplishments in 2014, i report to you that our strong alliance is more capable of addressing the rapidly evolving and increasingly

asymmetric north korean threat. in recent years, they have utilized abilities such as cyber warfare, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles to advance its interests. to put this in perspective or time, in 2012, my predecessor noted north korea's advancements in cyber and nuclear capabilities during his opening statement to this committee. a year later, north korea conducted cyber attacks on south korea's banks and broadcasting stations. and in 2014, they boldly projected their cyber capabilities against sony pictures in the united states in an effort to inflict economic damage and suppress free speech. this example represents a trend that is persistent across several north korean capabilities.

my top concern is that we have little to no warning of a north korean provocation, which could start a cycle of action and counteraction leading to unintended escalation. this underscores the need for an alliance to maintain a high level of readiness and vigilance. last year, the alliance took significant steps in improving its capabilities and capacities to deter aggression and reduce its operational risk. but our work is not done. in 2015, we will maintain this momentum by focusing on my top priority, sustaining and strength being the alliance, with an emphasis on readiness. this includes improving isr capabilities and critical munitions. the return of sequestration would negatively impact these priorities, reduce readiness, and delay deployment of the forces required to defend the republic of korea and u.s. interests. in crisis on the peninsula, this will result in more military and civilian casualties for the republic of korea and the united states and potentially place the mission at risk. the men and women serving on freedom's frontier, defending the republic of korea, remain thankful for this committee's unwavering support and

prioritizing resources that enable us to defend our national interests in asia while advancing universal valley values and international order. i am extremely proud of our members serving in the republic of korea who never lose sight of the fact that we are at freedom's frontier, defending one of our most important allies and vital american interests. thank you, and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much. general, i mentioned in my remarks, admiral gortney said that north korea has an operational road mobile missile that could carry nuclear weapons to the united states. do you agree with that assessment?

>> senator, i believe that they have had the time and the capability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead. they have stated that they have an intercontinental ballistic missile as a nuclear capability. they paraded it. and i think as a commander, we must assume that they have that capability. >> admiral? >> i would agree with that assessment. i mean, we haven't seen them effectively test it. but we -- you know, as commanders, all the indications are that we have to be prepared to defend the homeland from it. and we are taking actions to do that. >> and those actions are? >> first, we work very closely with north com to endure that the defense capabilities of our systems are optimized. forces forward in the theater that i and general scalparotti have command of. and the ability to work with our japanese and korean allies to bring capabilities to bear has been productive. and in addition, we've been in discussions about potential deployment of additional thad

battery beyond the one that's in guam but on the korean peninsula. >> general, this is rather disturbing, particularly given the unpredictability of this overweight young man in north korea. is that -- is that a disturbing factor? >> that's a disturbing factor, sir. and i think, you know, i believe that kim jung unis unpredictable. he has a mind that he can intimidate. he does that with provocations. he has committed provocations this year. i think it's a grave concern given the leadership there as well.

>> let's talk about the china and the reclaimation, admiral. we from time to time put a picture up of the areas that are reclaimed by china out in the east china sea. our south china sea. and the problem is our pictures don't keep up with their activities. it's my information that they have now in the last year filled in some 600 acres of land and are constructing runways and possibly artillery and missile defense systems. the congressional research service, congressional research service on april 6 issued a report on this issue. and i quote their report, saying, quote, the publicly visible current u.s. strategy for dissuading china from continuing its land recmation activities appears to focus primarily on having officials make statements expressing the u.s. view that china should stop these activities on the grounds that they are destabilizing and inconsistent with commitments china has made under the nonbinding 2002 doc.

do you know anything else about our strategy concerning china's continued expanding and filling in these areas which are international waters? and how great a threat do you -- does that appear to you, admiral, as far as long-term threat to our commitment to freedom of the seas? >> yes, sir. well, the overall u.s. strategy, i think, goes way beyond the military component of what i deal with each day. and so i only make a recommendations on that military side. so i'd refer the policy decisions about how we deal with it -- >> and your recommendations are? >> well, in general, where you find that the u.s. has a clear

policy on how it feels about something, military solutions or diplomatic solutions become easier for that. the policy we have in the south china sea as i understand it today is as we take globally on territorial disputes is we don't take sides in those territorial disputes, but that we do want them worked out in peaceful, noncoercive ways and legal matters. >> and that in time could impede our ability to navigate through those areas of waters? >> yes, sir. given the fact that my view of all of the claimants in the south china sea, and some of them -- they all own some of these land features and have different postures in different places. >> only they don't fill in some areas of 600 acres either. >> no, sir, they don't. so my assessment is that all of the claimants for china are doing what they agreed to in 2002, is they are just maintaining them while the legal process would work out. the chinese, however, are doing much different than that. they are obviously as you have

stated have been aggressive. i think it's been -- how fast they have been able to do it has been astonishing. they are building a network of outposts to enforce control over most of the south china sea. the southeast asian nations are increasingly worried that the prc's new capabilities will allow china to take de facto control of the surrounding waters. places like fiery cross reef where they are putting in a runway. in the last 10 months it went from a barely noticeable feature to now having a deep water port on it and a potential runway. this will allow the prc number one to put their maritime security force down there, which is equivalent to a coast guard or fisheries patrol, which to give you the magnitude of the size of the prc's capability is if you take all of the southeast asian countries coast guards and put them together, it's still a

smaller number than what china has been able to produce. i have also observed that they have taken what would have been considered a couple of years ago gray hulled warships and painted them white and turned them into maritime security craft. so we portray this, i think, or try to, to the prc, to china. and their response is generally, well, this is our sovereign territory and stay out of our business, which is for them to enforce their nondash line claim. so the implications are that if this activity continues at pace is that it would give them de facto control, i think, in peacetime of the -- much of the world's most important waterways, where much of the world's economic energy is created. it would -- if they desired, it

would in the future give them an opportunity to have outposts to put long-range detective radars in there, a place to put more warships. they could put warplanes to force potential down the road air defense zones. those are the kind of scenarios we have to think about. and it essential complicates the security environment. so far, the asean nations who have tried to work with china on this to develop a code of conduct in my view has not produced very much at all. in fact, you know, the asean is an effective diplomatic organization, but it's not designed to handle these security issues that pop up. so i think we've got to watch this situation very carefully. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. general scaparotti, we have a very complicated relationship with chinese, particularly in the context of north korea. to what degree do you have sort of a contingency plan to communicate with them, if there say provocation, or serious provocation, by the north koreans that would introduce the

idea of using force? >> yes, sir. well, you know, as we -- even in our exercises, one of the first priorities is communications with china if there's conflict on the peninsula. so we exercise that in communications even in our exercises and of course it's very important for us to understand that. and to ensure that they understand our intent. >> uh-huh. now, that's one side of the equation. the other side of the equation is to the extent that they are facilitating these activities, particularly the cyber. do you have any sense of the degree of facilitation? and the general question is, you know, they have to appreciate the instability of this regime and the irrationality of the regime. they like the buffer between

south korea. they like because they are affecting our behavior and disturbing us. but they have to, i hope, realize that there's a danger of, you know, looking the other way. >> yes, sir. and i think they do. my sense is, and those who have had conversations with them, i haven't talked to their military directly, but that they also are concerned and have some frustrations with the kim regime. in terms of cyber, you specifically asked that question. you know, we know that north korea has some of their cyber activities take place in china. but i don't know, and i haven't seen intelligence that lead me to believe that they have had a direct relationship with north korea and their cyber development. >> and just to finally -- and this spans not just military capacity but diplomat capacity. are there efforts to try to move the chinese government to be more pro active in terms of --

with financial pressures, with diplomatic pressures to at least demonstrate to the north korean regime that, you know, they can't do these things? >> yes, sir. there has been. >> okay. admiral locklear, you have described a situation in the south pacific and the southeast pacific is one where china is exerting itself. the witnesses in the last panel suggested that in terms of an officer career in japan, et cetera, we're fairly well positioned against potential operational threats. but it's not the case in the southern pacific and the southeast pacific. is that fair? >> yes, sir.

it's a large region. as we talked about at the beginning of the whole rebalance discussion was trying to move ourselves from what had been a post cold war to kind of a location in northeast asia. and to bring that to be more relevant to the security challenges throughout the region. so a number of initiatives. one is that we -- with our filipino allies have reinvigorated that alliance and helped them improve their minimum defense but also to improve access to the region to ensure better security. we've opened partnerships with nations in southeast asia that we probably wouldn't have considered possible in the last couple of decades. vietnam, malaysia, indonesia, countries that have become increasingly important to the security of the region and to the global security environment. >> as the chinese are creating these artificial islands in the

pacific, there are a lot of, you know, real geographic islands that our allies control. are we thinking about in conjunction with our allies positioning forces forward, in effect using islands as sort of a way to deny, you know, oceans to the chinese as they appear trying to do to us? >> well, i wouldn't go into specifics of where our plans would take us in this forum, sir. but i would say that first we're ensuring that the five alliances we have there are set right for

the security environment that we're going to see ourselves in in this century. and we're encouraging -- and to their credit, most of them are spending money and spending money on defense assets. and they want the things that allow them to be able to be complimentary to us. so we're -- we are working hard in that area. >> final question to admiral lock here. it was indicated that one of the clear advantages we have is our submarine fleet in the south pacific. in fact, he suggested doubling the number of deployed marines. is that your view also particularly with their aerial denial, their surface capabilities. is that your view also? >> we have the best submarines in the world. we continue, i think to outpace the rest of the world in that capability. in my a.o.r., they are essential to any operations that i have both in peacetime and in crisis and contingency. i have concern about the size of the submarine force as we go into the middle of this century. and its ability for its to remain relevant globally. plus, we're going to have to figure out this replacement of our strategic nuclear submarine force, which is the most survivable leg of our triad.

and the importance of that as we see the modernization of strategic nuclear capabilities in both countries like china and russia. >> just finally, the submarine appears to be the only weapons system that still can approach virtually to the shores of china and deliver if necessary weapons. is that true? >> well, i wouldn't say it's the only system. >> okay. that's more encouraging. thank you very much. >> senator? >> thank you, mr. chairman. first of all, admiral locklear, let me thank you again for the hospitality you afforded us in our whole group when we were in hawaii and we laid the wreath on the memorial of the uss oklahoma. that was -- you went beyond your call of duty. on that same trip, we went to south korea. at that time, i recall in some

of our meetings there they were talking about the use of a -- or now the use of the cluster munitions. because of the proximity between north korea and south korea, that's where they were most effectively used at that time. now we have a policy which is a self-imposed policy. i'm not criticizing it. i know the reasons for it. but we're being forced to discontinue in that. and i'd like to ask you, what are we doing in the place to perform those functions, those missions, that we were depending upon in the clusters? >> yes, sir. as you know, the cluster munitions as you indicated very important to our plans and particularly on the peninsula if there were a crisis. there's presently work underway to replace our present munitions with those that will provide the same effects but with less -- you know, with meeting the

requirements of the treaty. in essence, less than 1% dead rate. >> you're talking about -- you both talked about the increase in the casualties as a result of some of the lack of the ability to use some of the equipment we've used in the past. is this something that could expose more risk and more casualties by not having this capability and not replacing it but something as effective? >> yes, sir, absolutely. it's a critical component of our

planning on the peninsula. >> okay. let me -- i know that both of you agree with this statement that was made by james clapper, so we don't need to rehash all of that when we say looking back over now more than half a century of intelligence, we have not experienced a time when we were beset by more threats and crises around the globe. i think both of you agree with that and you have stated so in the past. i'd like to get into the remainder of the time, admiral locklear, talking about the submarines thing. senator rounds and i were on the uss carl vincent last week. without having any details in this setting, they were very busy. we're now down to 10 submarines. admiral roughead said on friday that we're going to have to be moving one or we should move one of those into the pacific. now my question would be -- and admiral locklear, i think it was a year ago, that you were quite outspoken in the fact that we should have 11 carriers to carry out the missions. we still -- do you still feel that way? >> i do. >> you'd like to get back to it, wouldn't you? >> i'd like to get back to it. i think the navy is undergoing a bathtub -- i call it a bathtub of readiness now because we delayed through the war years maintenance on these nuclear aircraft carriers. on one hand, they are magnificent machines. on the other hand, you have to take care of them correctly to

make sure they're safe. so we'll be enduring that the next five to six years before we get back to the level we need to be, i think, for kind of day-to-day operations in my a.r. >> of course, maintenance and organization are the first two things to go when we're faced with what we've been faced with. in the event that you do move one into the asia pacific area, where would it come from? what kind of a vacuum would be left behind in other aors? >> well, i think that decision would have to be made at the secretary of defense level. but we have, you know, generally 11 aircraft carriers. and out of that 11, they generate a global presence of some number kind of for day-to-day operations and another level that would be able to surge in times of crisis or in times of conflict.

i think that the aircraft carriers are probably best suited for the types of missions that we do in the asia pacific today. and where it would come from, i can't say, but my guess is it would probably come out of the middle east, given that that's been the primary demand signal for a carrier presence in the last decade and a half. >> senator reed, in your final response to his last question, that came to my mind that the carrier capability. well, that's very helpful. and i -- but i'd like to have for the record something a little bit more detailed, because some of us are not as familiar as we should be with that capability. in fact, i'm going down to norfolk this weekend to try to become a little bit more informed on this. so if you could for the record

try to come out with where might have the capacity where we could afford to move something into the pacific, and then how busy everybody is at the present time. that would be helpful. >> all right, sir. >> senator? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank both of you gentlemen for your service and of course the service of the men and women who serve under your commands. admiral locklear, my very best to you in your future endeavors. thank you very much for being paycom commander. admiral locklear, i know that secretary of defense ash carter spent as i continued a day with you. so were the discussions that you had with him reflective of the priorities as you've laid out in your testimony today? >> yes, ma'am. >> you did mention that with everything that is going on in south and east china seas and the provocation of north korea that we do need to strengthen our alliances with our partners and also establish new relationships. and in this regard, despite historical differences, last december the u.s., south korea and japan signed an information sharing arrangement on what appears to have been a first

step in what deputy secretary of state tony blinken calls, and i quote, a profoundly positive trajectory, end quote. admiral, please discuss the relationships between south korea and japan and the challenges we face in furthering our trilateral u.s.-japan-south korea alliance. >> the challenges we face from my perspective are primarily political and social challenges. on the military side, the militaries, if allowed, are able to work together for i think the common good of the security in northeast asia in particular. the impediments -- what's happened thus far is because of the political pressure to not have a true information sharing agreements between japan and korea. limit our ability to allow us to

bring together in a trilateral way that optimizes the forces that they have invested in and we've invested in. particularly in critical areas such as ballistic missile defense, et cetera. so i highly encourage both korea and japan to move forward at the highest level of governments with the types of agreements and allow us to optimize a military capability that this trilateral arrangement can bring. >> so the information sharing arrangement that was agreed to, you're saying that that is not enough? it's not what you would consider a true information sharing arrangement? >> well, it is a good start. >> again, to you, admiral, many countries within the region are increasing their defense capabilities. china is procuring submarines quickly. japan, india, south korea, singapore, and australia have

been shoring up their military capabilities. malaysia and indonesia have a couple of more sub marines, and vietnam recently announced the purchase of russian-made submarines. how will the continued growth of the region's submarine fleet impact the balance of power within the south china sea region? does this cause us to adjust our strategies or basing decisions if growth continues on its current trajectory? >> well, the indo-asia-pacific region is the most militarized part of the world. and it's increasing its militarization because most of the countries there have the resources now and the will and the desire to grow their militaries. those that have the military capability to actually operate a submarine force are pursuing that because they understand asymmetric advantages that it brings and realize the access and capability that submarines

bring and also the deterrent value that submarines bring. so my numbers are roughly there are about 300 submarines in the world that aren't u.s. in the world that aren't u.s. submarines. 200 of them are in the indo-asia pacific. some are owned by our partners and allies but many are not. so the increasing number of submarines that have been increasing in technology, it changes the dynamic of how we have to operate in the area. and the type of tactics and procedures and operational concepts we have to develop to ensure we remain dominant. but i look at it as like a fact of life. it's going to happen. we have to deal with it. >> so in our dealing with it though especially with our partner, our allies does this require us to be very much more

collaborative and to share information so that we're on the same page, so to speak, in that part of the world? >> it does. it not only requires us to share bilaterally more in a particularly difficult environment, undersea and maritime domain but it also requires them to be able to share with their other neighbors that have that capacity as well. as you know in the indo-asia pacific, those multi-lateral organizations don't exist to facilitate that. we're seeing the growth of that but it's a work in progress. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, gentlemen, for your service. we have a memo here. talking about note worthy challenges in the pacific area. they list of course north korea as the most dangerous and unpredictable challenge. i'm sure both of you agree with that. also territorial disputes in the east and south china seas natural disasters, including

weather and disease violent extremist, transnational crime, russian intent and chinese intent. are there any of these gentlemen, that would not involve a need to deliver our marines quickly and effectively through amphibious ships? admiral? >> well, i think historically, the marine corps is a cornerstone of the structure we have in the asia pacific. i mean, it's uniquely suited for a large archipelago uses the sea as the highways to move on. of all those you listed, i can't think of one that the marine kroerp corps doesn't play as a joint

role. yes, they play in all of those. the question of whether or not they have enough lift the answer is no. we don't have enough lift. i've said this before, we have to -- not only is the number of ships we can build in our shipyards, but we have to look at connecters. we have to look at the types of alternative platforms that allow us to -- >> connecters and alternatives? >> i mean, connecters are like joint high speed vessels that move marines and troops around faster. so it also gets into the whole issue of how, do you, in huge and large crisis what is your military sea lift command? what is the condition of that? >> i want the general to get a crack at this question, too. but let's talk about that. we understand that we have a requirement for 50 amphibious ships.

is that correct? >> well, i don't know that i would -- i've heard the number 50. i think you'd have to go back to the department of the navy for them to calculate globally how many they need. we've had a greater pressure on our amphibious force particularly in operations in the middle east which require us to put marine units in position to be able to monitor things like embassy safety and for embassy extraction in hot spots. that's a demand signal that pulled the amphibious -- >> it's any real contingency that happens right? >> yes, sir. >> we have a requirement for 50 and we only have 50 in our inventory. of those 15 to 20 are operationally available. would you they that that is pretty close to being correct information, admiral?

30 in the inventory and 10 to 25 operational? >> 30 is about my understanding. operational ability, i have a group that's west of the dateline all the time that's available on a much greater basis than that. globally, i'd say that's probably about right. >> generally let's let you weigh in on that. how would the effectively of our marines be diminished if there were insufficient amphibious ships? >> they're very important for me in the peninsula for rapid response, and they're a critical part of all of our plans. operationing on the peninsula it's the marine corps and their ability to be lifted. quickly to different places. they provide me agility. it's the most succinct way to put it. i'm concerned about the lift

available and the maintenance of the lift as well. >> so if we don't have enough am amphibs, the correctors alone are not the solution are they? >> we've looked at alternative methods and the use of alternate ships in order to help us with the delivery of marines. i can be more specific, you know, in a response for record, as to how we look at our planning. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator heinrich? >> mr. chairman thank you. admiral locklear i want to start with a little bit on missile defense and obviously, the asia pacific is a critical

importance to the u.s., both economically and strategically. yet, the current security environment in your combatant command is increasingly complex. countries in the region continue to invest in greater quantities of baa lizllistic missiles and new capabilities. i think we should keep in the missile improvements but be in non-kinetic means of defense. given the vast number of incoming missiles that an adversary can use to overwhelm u.s. missile defense systems i want to get your thoughts on what steps are being taken in left of launch technologies, like electronic warfare, cyber, that could blind or deceive energy sensors before they actually launch. >> senator i agree very much with your assessment, that the

ballistic missile defense threat grows because of the ability for them to -- for people to produce ballistic missiles at greater distances and greater accuracies and multiple re-entry vehicles and those types of things that complicate the problem. and you can't build enough interceptors to take them all out. you're in a tail chase that you can't do. that said, i think there is a good place for good solid amount of ballistic missile defense. it makes the decision for whoever is going to fire it at you harder for them to make. when they do, it gives your troops that are in the way of them some confidence that at least they'll be able to get to the first few minutes of this thing before we have to take other action. so we are working left of launch. in thinking differently about how we would produce -- how we would attack this particular problem. one of the things that is not

just about certain events that are being worked. they're being pursued. it's also more about thinking differently about how you employ your forces, and what trigger points would you do things like dispersal of your force in a different way throughout the region. how would you do selective hardening of places that would -- and put in place things like rapid runway repair kits in the places you have to have them? through this body, y'all have allowed us to go forward with those initiatives in the places we have in the asia pacific. hardening some fuel heads and those types of things can make a big difference. so left of launch is a priority for us. >> let me ask a question that sort of overlays on that in terms of emerging technologies. what's your assessment at this point on the value of directed energy systems to support defeating missile threats and do you think that directive energy should be a priority for

the research and development community, given the advancements in the last couple years? >> well, we've seen some progress. i think the navy has directed energy systems employed in operations routinely that have proven effective, at least in the tactical area. i'm in favor of directed energy weapons if they get the job done. if the technology is there. i kind of live in the here and now problem. i project and hopefully project in the future what we might need. directed energy if it's solved, if it's a good, solid solution set for the threat we're facing, we should pursue it. >> speaking of the here and now, are you familiar with the champ project? >> i am familiar with it. >> what kind of value do you think that could bring? >> i think if it was properly

tested and fielded that it would be something that would be of interest and benefit. >> thank you very much. i'll yield back, mr. chair. >> senator fischer? >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you, gentlemen for being here today. general, in your prepared remarks, you talk about north korea's emphasis on asymmetric capabilities especially its missiles and cyber threats. can you elaborate on north korea's ballistic missile and cyber programs and discuss what the command is doing to counter them? then can you let us know how do you see their investment in these areas impacting your needs in the future? >> thank you senator. first of all, north korea has focused its resources within its military on the asymmetric

capabilities, which are several. probably the most important are the ballistic missile and nuclear. we discussed the nuclear here. you know, we've seen a number of indicators of how they're advancing their nuclear capabilities. then within their missile force, they have more than several hundred ballistic missiles. the predominance of those are close range and short range ballistic missiles that affect or influence the peninsula. they've also deployed both medium and intermediate range which influence the region. of course, the development of the inter continental ballistic missile has impact here in homeland security in the united states. they've not slowed down at this. as you've seen this past year, they demonstrated their capabilities and conducted tests. they had more missile events or launches in '14 than they've had

in the previous five years together. each of these being a violation of the unscrs. we have been taking steps, both in material capability in terms ofballistic missile defense to counter that, as well as work with the republic of korea and their ballistic missile defense. they recently funded an upgrade to their patriot 20ss to pat 3s, which is important. we're working with them in op operability. the system they've recently established, we're working closely on that. finally, as the admiral noted we look at the posture of our force. the preparation of our force and our plans. all of those things in the last

couple of years has been rather dynamic in order to change as our threat in north korea changes. >> as we walk about missile defense, how do you interpret china? their vocal operation to placing a thad battery on that peninsula. >> personally, i think this is a decision for south korea. having to do with the defense of their country. from my perspective as a commander there a defense of our troops. >> but do you think that they are narrowly focused on missile defense, or do you think they're trying to maybe exert some greater influence over the republic of korea's defensive strategy as a whole? >> i think it's a greater influence. the the thad system if employed is focused on the defense of the

peninsula. that's what it is specialized to do. it doesn't have any influence beyond that. >> so that would improve their defenses then against north korea, correct? >> yes, ma'am, it would. >> and do you think that south korea and the united states would push against the chinese reaction to that? >> well, ma'am you know this is -- the decision process is underway right now. it is -- i can discuss it from a military perspective but, you know, from a political and strategic perspective, i think both countries are taking that into consideration right now, in terms of the other impacts that have to do with thad on the peninsula. >> as we look at the north koreans and their missiles, are they moving away from their more traditional, conventional forces, which they have -- what is it -- the fourth largest in

the world now? are they moving away from that? >> ma'am, i wouldn't say they're moving away from it. i think they changed their strategy a bit. it is the fourth largest military in the world. it's a very large conventional force that's postured along the dmz. it is a -- it's still a very present and dangerous threat. they're not resourcing it in the same way they had in the past. we've seen a reduction in their capability conventionally. >> thank you general. thank you, mr. chair. >> thank you admiral, we had fascinating testimony two days ago on this subject. i commend the record to you. one of the pieces of testimony was the historical record of the confrontation between a rising power and an existing power. grahamal allison from harvard

called it the trap. 12 of 16 instances in world history where a rapidly rising power confronted a rising power and it ended in war. obviously, it's a daunting observation. there's never been a power that has risen as far and as fast as china in the last 25 years. do you see military conflict with china in any way inevitable but given the trap, how can we avoid it? >> well, i don't think that conflict is inevitable. i think that the world we're in today is probably a different world than the ones we've been in before, when a great power rose. the effects of globalization, economic globalization, the movement of people the inter connectiveness of banks and

industry, all these thickngs you know well about have made it imperative that we understand the rise of china. in that we, to some degree, accommodate the rise of china where we can to attempt to shape the rise of china. i've said on many occasions that a china that would -- a china with a military that would come forward as a net provider of security rather than a net user of security would be beneficial to not only the region but would be beneficial to us as well. i think that's an achievable goal. i think it has to be looked at at how do we deal with china globally and global institutions from their role in the united nations, to how they're behaving and conducting themselves in other regions of the world, how we interact with them there. i think it will require us to have a pinpoint focused on how we see their influence in this region that we've been talking about today which is primarily

southeast asia and northeast asia and to understand -- we have to try to understand what their side of the equation is. to be honest with you, some of the things they've done aren't really clear today. we always get into a debate if we should continue mill to mill when we're unhappy with things happening. i'm a proponent of taking risks there, because there is benefit in us continuing to have dialogue, to try to establish those types of frameworks and allow us to communicate with each other in crisis. we've had good work with the prc lately of building some confidence-building measures that allow us to understand how to operate with each other in these waterways so we don't have a bunch of lieutenants and captains and commanders of ships out there making, you know, bad decisions that might escalate us to something we didn't -- escalate us into a flewtrap.

we have to see what the u.s. position is on behavior when it doesn't match what our allies and our parters and our value systems support. >> in recent years, the thrust of the chinese has been economic, but in even more recent years, it's been military, as you have testified today. tremendous growth, sub surface everything else. what do you make of these actions which can only be characterized as aggressive, building islands off the shore increased patrols in the south china sea? what do you read into that in terms of china's military or expansionist intentions? >> yes, sir. i think the chinese communicate to us pretty clearly what they're doing. they see themselves as a renewing power. they have the assets to build a

military. they're building, specifically in the navy and the air force because they understand the importance of protection of the global areas. they operate in global areas which they didn't years ago. they told us over and over again that they believe the line in the south china sea is their historic territorial waters. as far as i understand, they refuse to participate in international legal venues. the philippine knowfillipinos have a case to seek tribunal out challenging the line, and the chinese have refused to participate in that as far as i know. what they're doing is through what they articulate as peaceful means, they're building these land reclamations, establishing their place in the south china sea, which opens their options for down the road as this

situation unfolds. >> i'm out of time. one-word answer. do you believe it would be beneficial to the united states to acede to the law of the sea treaty? >> yes. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. gentlemen, thanks for your testimony and your service. admiral locklear, thank you for hosting me a couple weeks ago. i appreciate the time. please send my regards to your staff. three hours on a saturday is well above and beyond the duty for anybody. let them know how much i appreciate that. you know, i've been critical of many aspects of the president's security strategy because i think we've lacked credibility. when we say something we're going to do as a country, we need to do it. i think in certain areas of the world, we haven't done that. i think it undermines our national security when we do that. one area of the president's strategy that i have been

supportive, both militarily and economically, is the chairman stated about tpp is the rebalance to the asia pacific. i believe we need to make sure this rebalance and optimization of the military forces in the region is credible. we're saying we're going to rebalance. we need to actually do it. do you agree with that? >> yes, sir, i do. i think that the rebalance is -- goes far beyond military. i think we have to also get our economic house in order as well. otherwise, all the military rebalancing will not have the effect we want it to have. >> i agree with that. i appreciate the map. i wanted to talk briefly. alaska is no longer in the aor. as we discussed the troops that are significant, a robust air

force presence, those troops are still available to you in the event of contingencies, aren't they? >> that's correct. >> how critical do you see these troops -- and general please comment -- in the region in terms of not only shaping but also contingency forces with regard to your plans? >> senator, the forces in alaska if you look at the globe, they're as far west or farther west than hawaii is. so the response time that those forces would have in any significant contingency to northeast or southeast asia is good and important. that's why those forces can be pay come for a long time. there are a variety of forces important to us. the bcts that are there. including the ranges.

the range complexes we have in alaska are very important because that's where we get our high-end training for some of our hardest types of environments the aviators may have to fly in. >> general, how about you in terms of the korean contingency issues? >> i agree with the admiral. we rely on the forces which we'll need in crisis. we train with them regularly and send forces to train there, too. >> do you think if we removed one or two bcts from alaska, that would show we're committed to a rebalance or undermine the rebalance commitment? again, this goes to credibility. >> well i think that from a perspective of what the other outcomes were of that from a regional perspective, there would be questions about the loss of troops -- >> and the credibility of our rebalance strategy? >> i think you'd have to look at

it wholistically. i'd have to understand the remainder of the changes that were taking place if in fact, that were to happen. >> admiral locklear would it undermind a rebalance credibility? two bcts in the region leaving? >> i would answer in general terms. i think that any significant force structure moves out of my aor in the middle of a rebalance would have to be understood and have to be explained. because it would be counterintuitive to a rebalance to move significant forces in another direction. >> i agree. i think it's an important issue as we look at the rebalance as a successful rebalance that's credible. i want to also commend you for what you stated and senator wicker, on the strategic lift issue. it was something i saw in my recent trip that was a concern. moving forces to different parts of the region, but the strategic

lift seems to be lacking, both air force and our capacity. to get there, we need to have a successful lay down. are you confident the realignment of forces from okinawa to guam and australia and other places is going to be on schedule in terms of costs and tomblines s timelines the department laid out? that's been something this committee is very focused on. >> yes, sir. in the last three years, i had a lot of time to look at this and work through it. my overall assessment is that we're on plan at this point in time. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> admiral, in march, the gop published a report on operational contract support. i'm nerdy enough about operational contracts that i pay close attention to this stuff. we wasted billions of dollars in iran and afghanistan because we

had not embraced training on contracting as a core capacity of our commands engaged in the contingency. in that report, it indicated that your command is the furthest behind in encorpincorporating operational support in the operational plans and trainings. i know gao noted you took recent positive steps to address this, but i'd like you to lay out if you would briefly the steps you're taking to include operational contract support in your commands joint training exercises. >> well, thank you. not to make excuses but i think the reason we're behind is because we haven't had the demand signal that was put on the commanders in the middle east in the last several wars. we haven't had that type of a massive, rapid buildup to support a war effort anywhere.

that said, we did recognize it after that report as a deficiency. we're looking hard at where are those contracted decisions made? how is the commander have visibility to the contracting decisions during the execution of a crisis or execution of a campaign? because when a crisis occurs, stuff starts coming. that's good. that's what makes us strong. but when it comes, you have to decide, what's enough and what's not enough? who is going to be the steward of it down the road? we're trying to understand the command of control of those contractings and how much the leadership knows and what they need to know and when. >> i think it's so critical that we never lose sight of this contracting oversight and planning and training as a core capacity. because we're never going to go back to the day my father peeled potatoes in world war ii. we're not going to have our trained war fighters peeling potatoes ever again.

all we have to do is look at the long ugly saga of all the logged contracts to realize what happens when contracting is not considered a huge priority. i appreciate your attention to that. on another note, i know that you are the primary jammer provider in the navy for dod. could you speak about the role of airborne electronic attacks and how critical they are, and how critical is the asset of our only electronic warfare capability that is provided by the growler? >> i've been a huge supporter of growler for my entire navy career. the transition of the prowlers which are significant in many of the conflicts and provide us with what i thought was within asymmetric advantage in the air space because of their capabilities. i was glad to see that those

capabilities and jammer capabilities transitioned to a fourth generation plus aircraft that can operate effectively in denied air spaces. in any campaign i would envision that would be of a higher end warfare, electronic warfare attack provides me with battle space that i may have to fight for. those growlers and to some degree, the other higher end capabilities we have are critical to allowing us to have that access. >> finally, i want to touch on the stresses that we're feeling on remote piloted aircraft. as you know whiteman is the home to the 20th reconnaissance squad run. those pilots and the sensor operators and the intelligence personnels along with the airman who are operating the predator and the reaper are very important. we're putting high demands on

these folks. they're not getting normal rest. we are they are not getting time for training. we can't rotate some of them into a training capacity because the demand is so high. could you briefly talk about what steps can be taken to alleviate what i think is a critical problem? i mean, these guys are -- they're working around the clock and getting very little break. i don't know that we would do this to a traditional war fighter, but we're doing it to the rpas. >> the advent of these systems, and in the past couple of decades, and the obvious benefit that they've brought to the battle space, has put pressure, i think on the air force to be able to produce the types of people and people to man them. but, unfortunately, the demand signal goes up and occupy andskpand up.

one of the acy metalstrengths of the united states is this. we need to rationalize what are the platforms we're going to invest in in the future and build a structure of man training equip underneath it that's sustainable. >> i worry because i think we have a tendency to think of these asthma sheen machines and don't realize the human component and the stresses they have. these guys are manning these things for 10, 12 hours and going home to their families for supper and homework. then getting up quickly and going back at it. it's a unique kind of role and currently non-traditional as we look at the history of the military. i want you to share with your colleagues that talking to some of these folks, you know it's clear to me that we need to be thinking about their well-being and whether or not we are overutilizing them and what kind of stresses we're going to see

in that personnel. thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you mr. chair. thank you, admiral locklear and general scaparrotti for being here today, and for your men and women that serve as well. i appreciate it very much. as you know, the dod is planning to transfer operational control of south korea forces to the south korean government, in the event of another conflict on the peninsula. this transfer has been discussed for many, many years. it was originally supposed to take place in 2007. it's been delayed many many times in the past number of years. and it does appear to be currently indefinitely postponed. so can you describe some of those challenges that we're being faced with, and those that the south koreans are facing, and their efforts to create

conditions which would allow us to successfully do the up con transfer? >> yes, ma'am, thank you. as you know, this past october the secretary of defense agreed upon the conditional approach to up con transition. in the past it had been focused on a date with capabilities. so in short, i agreed with the change that we made to focus on capabilities and conditions, as opposed to shooting for a date. three general conditions. the first is that south korea developed the command of control capacity to be able to lead a kpien combined and multi-national force in a high conflict. the second is that they have the capabilities to respond to the growing nuclear and missile threat in north korea. the third general condition is that this transition take time and take place at a time that is

conducive to a transition. now, there's specific capabilities i mentioned that are listed in detail as part of this agreement. i'll cover generally the main areas. the first was c-4, command and control computers. in terms of their capability there, which i mentioned earlier. ballistic missile defense, generally in their capability there. the munitions they have to have on hand for us to conduct a high intensity conflict. and finally the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets necessary in an environment that's very challenging for isr. particularly with the assets and the asymmetric assets that north korea are developing. in a nutshell, those are the challenges we have as an alliance. republic of korea is focused on

enhancing that. >> thank you. admiral, do you have any thoughts? >> i think the dynamic that's most changing in this dialogue about up con transfer is the behavior of kim jong-un. it has to be brought into the calculation as well. >> thank you. general, i do agree absolutely. it's capabilities versus calendar. we have to look at the capabilities. realistically, do you think moving forward with the transfer, is that in the foreseeable future? if it is, what are the benefits to us then of doing the transfer? >> i think it is foreseeable. i don't think it's in the short term. i think it's a benefit in terms of -- you know, our presence in the alliance we have with republic of korea, i think is

very important for regional security and plays into global security as well. because they've been a very good partner of ours for a number of years. they're developing the capability, and they've employed forces around the world. they've deployed in support of us as well. in some of the conflicts we've been involved in. so i think in the long term, the alliance and its development in this regard is good for both countries. >> very good. i know the south koreans were engaged at an air force base when my trucks were rolling through the area. we appreciate their support with those types of efforts. i have very little time left but i want to thank you, gentlemen, for being here today, as well as the service of your men and women. thank you, mr. chair. >> thank you mr. chairman. to the witnesses for your testimony today. mr. chair, i appreciate the way you're doing these hearings.

i see the method in the madness to have the strategic hearing a couple of days ago. we had a wonderful hearing with strategic experts on this topic before we get to ask you questions. actually makes this discussion work well, and i appreciate the chair setting it up that way. three quick questions. admiral locklear, as our military lead in pay com, describe why u.s. support of the treaty is what you support. you gave the one-word answer to senator king, and i'm asking the why question. >> well, i'll speak about it from the military side, or from the seaside. i won't comment on certain elements because it's not my area to do. first of all, it's widely accepted. after a lot of years of deliberation by many, many countries, most countries in my aor. it provides a framework that we -- that most countries look

at it and believe is useful for determining who, particularly in these sea spaces and these places that aren't clear provides a framework in how to deal with the disputes. it's a rule of law, a rule of process that's a good thing. by not being -- and to be honest with you, on the military side, we've been directed by numerous presidents to comply with the law of the sea at least as it reflects in the way we interact with other countries and our partners. that said, when we're not signatory, it reduces our overall credibility. when we bring it up as a choice of how you might solve a dispute of any kind. >> second question to the trap. you indicated the u.s. should do what we can, that's within our interest to accommodate the rise of china within the network of

global institutions. i think you laid out a pretty good rational. the more they're engaged in the global institutions that can have a pro-stability effect. one current matter that is pending before congress is reforms to the imf. they would enable china to have more of a role, more voting power, but also more of a financial obligation in terms of the work of the imf. i don't want you to comment on imf reform if that's not your lane and you don't have an opinion, but that is the kind of thing, wouldn't you agree, that we ought to be taking a look at. if we're going to try to accommodate china's growing influence, having them more engaged and play more of a leadership role in global institutions, you mentioned the u.n. as one, but the global institutions like the imf is one way to accomplish that integrate that can be a pro-stability move. would you not agree?

>> yes i absolutely agree. if china is inevitable rise to be a world power in the many different venues, they have to participate and be a part of the institutions and take responsibility for these things. >> the common sense you know, the law firms that get founded by strong partners, they often run aground when the next generation of young, excited partners want leadership roles. law firms that don't make room for the young leaders as they come up find they split away and end up being harsh competitors, if they find a way to accommodate them it holds it together. it seems like that's kind of a basic analogy we see a lot in human situations. well, i would hope that on both reform, we'd take it seriously. while they have non-military dimensions, i think they bear directly on the military issues we might have.

the last thing i want to commend you on, i like the fact that you in your written testimony, and i like the fact that some of our witnesses yesterday talked about indo-asia pacific. india has had an interesting history militarily, with the united states and more generally, the congress party have a long non-aligned position that made them slant toward russia in terms of purchasing material. now, they are significantly engaged with the u.s. and u.s. companies. they do more military exercises with the united states than they do with any other nation. i think there is an opportunity under prime minister modi. i know the chair and others have spent time with him, to deepen the relationship. as i conclude, could you share your thought on the u.s.-india military partnership at this moment? >> yes, sir. part of rebalance was to develop a strategy for a longer term security relationship with india. we're doing that. we have, i think, a tremendous

opportunity here. as the leadership changes in india and the world changes for them to be a growing partner with the united states. not necessarily an aligned partner but a growing partner. i believe the defense trade initiatives we have with them will help bring us together in a more productive way for many years to come. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much. thank both of you for your work. general scaparrotti, i do believe that the work in south korea is important. we've been able to draw down the numbers, and i know the south korean military is more effective in many ways than they have been. i think it is an important relationship. they've been good allies as have the japanese and others in the pacific. that long-term umbrella

relationship partnership that we've had remains important, i think, to the world and the united states's interest. i appreciate the work you're doing. i appreciate the importance of the pacific. it's undeniable, it seems to me. our strategic subcommittee has dealt a good bit with nuclear weapons. our relationship with russia, the treaty of the nuclear weapons system, admiral locklear. we don't talk enough about china's position. they've piltbuilt a nuclear weapons capability, and i assume they have the ability to surge that at any point they choose to. they have the finances and the technology and the capability of doing that. is that correct? >> yes, sir. we've observed them pursuing a

deliberate modernization of their nuclear forces. both those that are land based and the ones that are sub surface based. they now have, i believe, three operational submarines in the pacific. ballistic missile submarines. it could grow to four or five in the future, i think. we know they're pursueing missile systems to be able to put on there that would extend their ability for nuclear or second strike nuclear attack is what they explained. how they explained it. but it is growing and i think that it will be a continued consideration for us as war planners. >> we in congress and policymakers in washington need to understand the reality of the nuclear armed submarine. how many missiles would that --

those submarines chinese submarines, be able to handle and launch and how many warheads could they launch? >> to give you an accurate answer, i'll respond to that for the record if you don't mind. but multiple. >> would it compete with our capabilities? if you're able to say? if not that's all right. >> i wouldn't say, sir. >> all right. one of the strategies that china has used has been to create a zone outside the nation. to make it difficult for our ships to inhabit. put them at risk. is that part of the df 21 missile plan, and do they have other plans designed to make it more difficult for our ships to

be within hundreds of miles of the shore? >> across the board, the chinese have improved their ability to build missiles of all kinds. cruise missiles ballistic missile defense, air missiles. i think they have credible technology. the df-21 missiles you're talking about is a missile that they're fielding and testing and producing that could potentially, if work right, could put u.s. forces at sea at risk. at greater and greater distances. it's one of those things that we are dealing with and trying to answer. >> i think you're correct. i think the navy is thinking clearly about that and in a wise way. what about the capabilities we have? army has some potential land-based missiles that could create also a zone around our

interest, our country, our territories, that could protect us. has any thought been given as i believe secretary hagel mentioned, to provide a safe zone around our bases and tech territories? >> i wouldn't know what secretary hagel was talking about, but i'd be glad to get specifics and answer it. >> well, thank you both for your service. i believe we have a fabulously capable military well led by talented leaders, and we thank you for that. >> senator donnelly? >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you both for your service. admiral locklear, what would you say is -- and i apologize. i haven't been here the entire time. when you look, the two biggest

challenges you look at in your command. >> well, the biggest challenge is making sure we can respond effectively to what i think is the most dangerous situation, which is the north korea peninsula. i have a huge responsibility for helping north com with the defensive homeland defense of hawaii defense of guam, and then follow law forces and supporting general scaparrotti on what could be a short line problem in north korea. that's the number one problem. >> okay. >> the second i think, is just ensuring that the rebalance does what it needs to to ensure that u.s. is properly positioned in the asia pacific for the rest of this century. under that fall a lot of things. ensuring that the alliances are strong as they can be. building new partnerships. in some cases, ensuring that the

rise of china doesn't turn into a trap. >> general scaparrotti, as you look at kim jong-un, when you look at the decision making process he uses, and i don't know if the appropriate word is "random," but would you say there is a chain of common or general structured way decisions are made? or is it pretty much you're not usually certain what way something is going to go with him? >> yes, sir, thank you. we don't know a lot about the decision making process inside of that regime. if you look at just the three years he's been the leader he's changed his senior leadership more than his father and his grandfather put together. from one perspective, the use of carrot and stick the use of brutality in many cases in order to ensure absolute loyalty to him, i think, undercuts and leaves concern with me that

one, he's got a group around him that will be frank with him. that won't only tell him what he wants to hear. so i think that's a dynamic within that decision-making process that gives me concern. >> as you look at the way the decision making has gone on right now, it appears there is somewhat of a move toward russia, toward creating an additional strengthening of bonds between them dochlt. do you think it provides stability for them or makes them more dangerous? >> you can see not only the outreach to russia but others in the last year as an attempt by them to get around the actions, which are having an affect, and to develop others that would provide trade and funds with them. their economy is very tight, given the percentage of it he puts into his military. that's his attempt there. we don't see a lot of return on those efforts at this point. >> admiral, when north koreans

part to saber rattle and make a lot of noise often times your command brings a presence into the area there and helps to change the discussion. do you have fears or concerns about any plans they might have to come after your fleet in particular? >> well certainly, we're talking in the context of the north koreans. you can't rule out any unpredictable type of activity. so we know that they also pursue a pretty significant missile program. whether how good it is sometimes we're not sure. but that's not just the ballistic missile capability but a cruise missile capability. it would have to be considered when forces are put in the area.

they also have a submarine force that, if it's operational, could be quite unpredictable. how many subs and things like that. they're generally locally contained, not far reaching. at this point in time i'm not concerned with our ability with power. >> general, what's one thing in your command you're most concerned about? >> i'm most concerned about a provocation, which north korea commits two or three every year. one of those provocations escalating into conflict. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> admiral locklear, general scaparrotti, thank you both for your time and service. more importantly, for the service of all the men and women in uniform that you represent in your commands. admiral locklear, do you believe that china's increasing presence

in the south china sea shows they think the u.s.'s capability to challenge them in the south chi china sea is decreasing? >> you have to ask the chinese if that's how they feel about it. my guess is, as they always do, i believe they listen to how the u.s. feels about things globally, as well as in that region. where they have a clear understanding of u.s. position they have a tendency to understand it and respect it. >> do you think the balance of power is shifting to the point that they believe that they now have a military advantage over us in their regional waters inside the first island chain? >> i don't think they think they have a military advantage over us, because they also recognize we're a global power and they're not a global power. i think that they believe that their ability to build and produce the military they have has provided additional decision

space for them in their local region. >> one point you mentioned is the importance of clarity, deterrence works best when the lines we draw are clear and strongly enforced. i've read press reports that during prime minister abe's visit to washington later this month, the united states may make an explicit pledge to protect the senkaku islands which are under japan but china also claims them. do you think that would be a wise step to take for the purposes of stability in the east asian theater? >> my understanding is we have pretty much made it clear, our position in the east china sea as it relates to the senkaku islands. we still maintain we don't take a side on territorial disputes. in the long run, the issue of the sovereignty of senkakus is for them to figure out. what we have said, and it's been said at numerous levels, is that

the senkaku islands fall within the administrative control of japan and do fall within the mutual defense treaty with japan. i believe that alone has provided a level of stability to the issues in the east china sea, northeast asia. >> the press reports -- i appreciate and understand and agree with the points you've made -- the press reports i've seen suggest we'd be reducing that to writing. i think that can provide more clarity than words. can you comment briefly on your military to military relations with thailand at the time? >> well, we maintain military to military contact with thailand at a lower level. post-coup. we were on a very good slope, positive slope, i think. prior to the soupcoup the

opportunities we were pursueing together was and control of the government. >> thank you. general scaparrotti korea is a unique area of oopperations in the world, calling for unique capabilities. our stated policy to as of january 1, 2019, we will no longer use munitions that have a

greater than 1% unexploded rate. can you describe the effect this will have on current operations and contingency plans and the challenges it will face achieving that rate? >> yes, sir. the cluster munitions are an important part of the munition inventory i have. because of the effect they create for me. there are plans right now work being done, for replacement munition that would meet the requirements of less than 1% dead rate. that's a requirement we must meet, as you said, before 2019. we would use other my in addition s-- munitions but the ones we have available don't provide effect of the ones i have today in my inventory. >> thank you both for your service and the service of those you represent, their families and yours. >> thank you, mr. chairman. admiral locklear, general scaparrotti, thank you both for being here this morning.

admiral locklear in your testimony, you point out the significance of china's military modernization efforts. earlier this week, we heard from earlier this week we heard from admiral and other experts on east asia about china's modernization and how swiftly that has happened. what do we need to do to respond to what's happening in china? and can you also talk about how if we go back to level of funding that's required by sequestration, what that does to our efforts to make sure that we are technologically ahead of where the chinese are? >> well, we need to continue to encourage the chinese to be more transparent and be more forward

leaning in how they respond to their neighbors, how they respond in the international community. to be a responsible leader. if they're going to have a military and they're going to use it for security, then they should be part of the global security environment. that's a choice they have to make. we have to make a choice to accept them into that environment. and there may be some risks as we do it because as they rise as or the east china sea. so managing that friction and understanding how to manage it so it doesn't escalate is very, very important for all of us, particularly between the united states and china, so we're working that part of it. >> so, before you answer the

sequester question, how important is the effort to rebalance, i use that term in parenthesis, to asia that has been set out in doing those kinds of things with respect to china? >> the rebalance is not about china. china is just one of many issues around why the u.s. should be in asia pacific, why we should have a security posture there, but they are a big concern in that. so the rebalance, and on the military side, insuring that we have the right assets to be able to manage the situation, to be able to understand the environment, and to be able to respond effectively are extremely critical. the readiness of the assets, the readiness of the men and women

that man them are critical. sequestration, what happens is that in general, you have less force structure, less ready, that's less technologically capable. so we get under pressure like we're under now, one of the first things to do is technological advances because we have to keep what we got because nobody wants to change. the things we need to stay relative not only in that part of the world but globally in the technological arena in war fighting gets pushed off the table and to the right and into timelines that make us start to lose our technological advantages in war fighting. >> one of the things we heard from former admiral roughhead earlier this week was the importance of continuing the carrier launch uav and that that program would become even more important as we look at what we need to do in the asia pacific. do you share that view? and how do you see that -- that

effecting what we need to do in that part of the world? >> well, i think in general, whether it's launched off a carrier or launched anywhere else, in my particular area, the unmanned vehicles both air and surface and subsurface are a significant part of the future, because any time you can take a man out of the loop, you operate in denied environments much easier, a lot of benefits to it. so to the degree that the uav would be from a carrier, a carrier for me is just a very flexible air field that can operate widely through the theater. i would see huge benefits in being able to operate long range isr, long range strike if necessary from those platforms. >> and general, is this something that would be beneficial to you in the korean theater? >> yes, ma'am, absolutely. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, both of you, for

what you're doing for the country. i wanted to ask about a follow up, admiral locklear, on your written testimony where you said iran has built their robust nuclear structure and with materials that have passed through the u.s., pay-con, aor, can you help us understand how they're getting these materials and also could you describe for us what you understand is the cooperation between iran and north korea in particular on their missile programs? >> well, i think it's pretty well known that there's been a movement of proliferation of activity from north korea into iran, in this case, of the types of technologies that iran was looking for. i think that's been known through the interagency for some time. >> do you think that's how they're advancing their program? with advice from north korea? >> i would say -- i wouldn't discount that as a possibility. >> so in addition to that, you've also noted that north korea continues to procure for its nuclear ballistic missiles program, and from the region and a network of individuals and

enemies in the region, and as you know, that violates u.n. security council resolution 1718. in terms of the ability of member states to directly or indirectly supply to north korea these kinds of materials, and obviously, there are many u.n. resolutions that apply to iran as well. but so as i look at that testimony, what more can we do to isolate north korea in terms of those that are supplying the country of things we don't want them to have and are against u.n. resolution? and who do we need to be tougher on in the region in that regard? >> well, i think that primarily in terms of proliferation security, we have a proliferation security initiative that's global in nature, multinational. that's also an important key because we have to bring in, we have to deal with other nations to help provide intelligence and also forces that may help us in interdiction, et cetera. and continuing our training in

that regard, which we do. in terms of the nations that i think we have to be concerned about, i would prefer to answer that actually for the record in a classified document as opposed to here in the open forum if i in terms of the nations that i think we have to be concerned about, i would prefer to answer that actually for the record in a classified document as opposed to here in the open forum if i could. >> of course, thank you, general. i appreciate that. i also wanted to follow up,

admiral locklear, i note in your written testimony you mentioned taiwan, i believe, once in passing. in light of china's major military buildup, what is your assessment of the current balance of military capabilities in the taiwan straight between the pla and taiwan and where does taiwan have an advantage, and where does the pla's advantage? what concerns are you hearing from the taiwanese and what platforms, weapons, assistance, and training has taiwan assisted from the united states that we haven't yet provided? >> well, we have a robust interaction from the headquarters with taiwan. in fact, we have ongoing right now over there of their major annual exercise where we participate. we send advisers, overseers and go and in fact, we sent general thurmon who used to be the predecessor over there with them at my request advising them and assisting them.

so that's important. ing i think in general over time, the capabilities of the prc will vastly eclipse what the taiwan yeez could produce on their own. it's just a matter of magnitude of fore size if it stays on the course it's on now. to provide my advice to the osd and the president for him to decide on what kind of things we provide. i know that they have requested our assistance in submarine programs. we're contemplating that but have not committed them one way or the other. they are particularly interested in us helping them in cyber security are areas that will

imimprove their defense and improve their confidence that they can make decisions on their own and not be coerced. >> thank you. >> colonel graham? >> thank you, captain. would you describe it as provocative? >> i would call it aggressive and i guess provocative would be in the eyes of the beholder, but from my view it's aggressive. >> from the eyes of the japanese would you say it's provocative? >> i think they would say yes. >> north korea, general, would you say the regime on a good day is is unstable? >> no, sir. i'd say -- i'd say that kj yu is in control. we see no indications of instability at this time. >> so you think we don't have to