north korea hypothetical, always a problem for officials to talk about, hypotheticals. but then you have to reassess as i said, we are constantly reassessing what's the role of missile defense against which threats and what's the role of other capabilities in dealing with ballistic missiles. you're talking about future reassessment of that issue. >> i put my war fighter hat back on. and tell you that, you know, again, sitting in the cheyenne mountain, these capabilities particularly if we go the route that we're going in terms of our programs, the work that we're doing, that i have already mentioned, the technology work that rich matlock's going to talk about never say never but i'm not sure that that's achievable of a goal for the north koreans, first of all, for them to outpace us if you will. and as a war fighter, again, what i said about a continuum of capability for the war fighter. an offense/defense mix, this is just one piece of it.

any capability, maybe not designed to catch every single thing that they could lob at us. but long enough to buy our leaders some time to be able to make an assessment and have options, if you will. the nation would have options. so i continue to believe that we're on the right path. that's part of a larger continuum of capabilities. and i don't think we ever want to give up on the idea that we have some capability in the missile defense tool kit. >> all right. i think we'll take one more question right here. wait for the mike. >> yeah. i'm anna wilderman. for the first and only time in history, i attended the 35th reunion of the graduates of the philippines science high school 1970, and this is, i call it learning trips, okay? and this is what i learned because they're assessing, because i'm an american, okay. and this is a reminder to me by

the general, joint chiefs and economic minister, remind the americans that to us zero-based budget is zero, nothing. we don't have anything to spend at the end of the year. so that means, you know -- >> all right. >> that's easy, but i retired from the navy. >> let's keep it on missile defense. >> good-bye. >> thank you very much. >> we have about seven minutes before our next panel. we're going to have frank rose, assistant secretary of state and steve pifer from brookings, and we'll be back in about seven minutes to continue our conversation for some international dimensions. thank you very much. thank you both of you. >> thank you. here are a few of the book festivals we will cover this spring on c-span 2's book tv. in the middle of may we will

visit maryland for live coverage of the gaithersburg book festival with david axelrod. we will close out may at book expo america in new york city where the publishing industry showcases their upcoming books. on the first week in june we are live for the chicago tribune printers row lit-fest including our three hour long in-depth program with pulitzer prize winning author lawrence wright and your phone calls. that's this spring on c-span 2's book tv. >> remarkable partnerships. iconic women. their stories in first ladies the book. >> she did save the portrait of washington which was one of the things that endeared her to the entire nation. >> whoever could find out where frances was staying, what she was wearing, what she was doing, what she looked like, who she was seeing, that was going to help sell papers. >> she takes over a radio station and starts running it.

how do you do that? and she did it. >> she exerted enormous influence because she would move a mountain to make sure that her husband was protected. >> first ladies now a book published by public affairs, looking inside the personal life of every first lady in american history, based on original interviews from c-span's first ladies series. learn about their lives ambitions, families and unique partnerships with their presidential spouses. first ladies, presidential historians on the lives of 45 iconic american women, filled with lively stories of fascinating women who survived the scrutiny of the white house, sometimes at a great personal cost, often changing history. c-span's first ladies is an illuminating, entertaining and inspiring read, now available as a hard cover or ebook through your favorite bookstore or online book seller. >> more now from this forum on

missile defense. this panel looks at the international implications of u.s. missile defense including concerns of russia over advancements in u.s. technology. speakers include frank rose, assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance. >> all right. we're going to now resume with our second panel on the international dimensions. there was a comment made by the general on the first panel about not too finely disaggregating homeland and regional missile defense. he specifically pointed to aegis but of course the capabilities go beyond that. but this panel will be on international dimensions in part working with allies. to begin this discussion we will first have assistant secretary of state frank rose who is always flying somewhere to talk about these issues. followed by ambassador steve pifer to talk about some other things as well. we're going to start with assistant secretary rose.

>> well, tom, thanks very much for that kind introduction. and it's actually good to be back here in washington. by the way of introduction, my name is frank rose, i'm the assistant secretary of state for arms control verification and compliance. my work at the state department is focused on enhancing strategic stability around the world. arms control, verification, compliance are some of the tools that we use to enhance strategic stability and reassure our allies and partners that we will meet our security commitments. missile defense is another tool to do just that. at the state department, i'm responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense issues, including missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners around the world. in this capacity, i serve as the lead u.s. negotiator for the

missile defense basing agreements in romania, turkey and poland. so i'm pleased to be here today to discuss our efforts at enhancing missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners. one of the key goals from the 2010 ballistic missile defense review or bmdr. now, you have already heard from elaine and the general about our missile defense policy and operations. so, instead, let me focus my remarks on three areas. one, the significant progress we have made in implementing the european phase adaptive approach and nato missile defense. two, cooperation on missile defense with allies outside of europe. and three, i'll conclude with a few points on russia and missile defense. before i do that, i do want to reiterate one point that you undoubtedly heard from elaine and ken.

the president's fiscal year 2016 budget protects and enhances our important missile defense priorities such as european phase adaptive approach and reflects the high priority we place on these efforts. as such, the u.s. commitment to nato missile defense and the sites in romania and poland remains as former secretary of defense chuck hagel said, quote, ironclad. with that, let me take a few moments to discuss where we are with regards to overall implementation of the president's european phase adaptive approach or epaa. and the united states' national contribution to the north atlantic treaties organizations missile defense system. in 2009, the president announced that the epaa would, quote, provide stronger, smarter and swifter defenses of american forces in america's allies. while relying on, quote, capabilities that are proven and cost effective.

since then, we have been working hard to implement his vision and have made great strides in recent years. i just returned from turkey and romania last week and had the opportunity to discuss our progress with these two key partners. tur tur kay turkey was the first to receive in phase one with the deployment in 2011. at the same time, we began the start of a sustained deployment of aegis ballistic missile defense or aegis bmd-capable ships in the mediterranean. with the declaration of interim ballistic missile defense or bmd capability at the nato chicago summit in may 2012, the radar in turkey was transitioned to nato operational control. additionally, spain agreed in

2011 the to host four aegis-capable ships at the existing naval facility as a spanish contribution to nato missile defense. in february of last year, the first of four missile defense capable ships, uss donald cook arrived in spain. a second ship, "uss ross" joined her last june. during 2015, two more of these multi-mission ships, uss porter and uss carney will forward deploy. these multi-mission ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, training exercises, and support u.s. and nato operations, including missile defense. currently, we are focused on completing the deployment of an aegis ashore site in romania as part of phase two of the epaa. romania's strong support for the timely completion of the arrangements needed to implement this deployment in romania's

provision of security and its infrastructure efforts have been superb. in october 2014, the u.s. navy held an historic naval support facility establishment ceremony at the missile defense facility at the air base in romania. this ceremony established the naval facility and installed its first u.s. commando. currently, this site is on schedule to be completed by the end of this year. and when operational, the site, combined with bmd capable ships in the mediterranean will enhance coverage of nato from short and medium range ballistic missiles from the middle east. and finally, there is phase 3. this phase includes a site in poland equipped with the new sm-3 block 2a intercepter. the site is on schedule for deployment in the 2018 time frame. for example, this, the president's fy '16 budget

includes approximately $200 million for the establishment of this site. the interceptor site in poland is key to the epaa. when combined with other epaa assets, phase two -- phase three will provide the necessity capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all nato european territory in the 2018 time frame. so as you can see, we are continuing to implement our president's vision for stronger, smarter and swifter missile defenses in europe. i would also like to highlight the efforts that our nato ally, of our nato allies to develop and deploy their own national contributions for missile defense. a great example is that today patriot batteries from three nato countries are deployed in turkey under nato command and control to augment turkey's air

defense capabilities in response to the crisis on turkey's southeastern border. voluntary national contributions are the foundation of the nato missile defense system. and there are several approaches allies can take to make important and valuable contributions in this area. first, allies can acquire fully capable bmd systems possessing sensor, shooter and command and control capabilities. second, allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key ballistic missile defense capability. finally, allies can contribute to nato's ballistic missile defense capability by providing essential basing support. such as turkey, romania, poland and spain have already agreed to do. in all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is nato interoperatability. yes, acquiring a missile defense

capability is good in and of itself but if that capability is not interoperable with the alliance then its value as contribution to alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished. it is only through interoperatability, and enhance nato bmd through shared battle space awareness and reduce interceptor wastage. let me now turn to some of the other regions of the world. the united states in cooperation with our allies and partners is continuing to bolster missile defenses in other key regions such as the middle east and the asia pacific in order to strengthen regional deterrence architectures. in the middle east, we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through such as

the recently established gulf cooperation council or gcc strategic cooperation forum. at the september 26, 2013, strategic cooperation forum, secretary kerry and his foreign ministry counterparts reaffirmed their intent first stated at the september 28th 2012 strategic cooperation forum to quote, work towards enhanced u.s./gcc coordination on ballistic missile defense. several of our partners in the region have expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. for example, the united arab emirates or uae has contracted to buy two terminal high-altitude area defense or thaad batteries when operational will enhance the uae's national security as well as regional stability. the uae has also taken delivery

of its patriot pac 3 batteries, which provide a lower tier point defense of critical national assets. we look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperatability with our gcc partners in the coming months and years ahead. additionally and separately, the united states maintains a strong defense relationship with israel and our cooperation on missile defense has resulted in a comp comprehensivecomp hensce hence comprehensive missile defense architecture for israel. the weapon system, and the arrow weapons system in conjunction with operational cooperation with the united states create a multi layered architecture designed to protect the israeli people from varying types of missile threats.

and japan are working closely together to develop the sm 3 block 2a interceptor which will make a key contribution to our european phase adaptive approach as well as being deployed in other regions of the world. we also recently completed the deployment of a second antpy2 radar into japan which will enhance the defense of both the united states and japan. and finally we're continuing to work on enhancing interoperability between u.s. and japanese forces which will be aided by recent changes to the defense cooperation guidelines which we expect to be completed soon. we also continue to consult closely with our allies in australia. for example, as a result of u.s./australia foreign and defense ministerial level consultations over the past year, the united states and australia have established a

bilateral missile defense working group to examine options for potential australian contributions to ballistic missile defense. additionally, we are also consulting closely with the republic of korea as it develops the korean air and missile defense system, which is designed to defend the republic of korea against air and missile threats from north korea. the republic of korea recently announced it plans to purchase patriot pac 3 missiles, which will enhance its capability to defend against the north korean ballistic missile threat. finally, let me say a few things about missile defense and russia. prior to the suspension of our dialogue on missile defense as a result of russia's illegal actions in ukraine, russia continued to demand that the united states provided legally binding guarantees that our missile defenses will not harm or diminish its strategic nuclear deterrent. these guarantees would have been

based on a criteria that would have limited our missile defenses and undermined our abilities to stay ahead of the ballistic missile threat. the ballistic missile defense review is quite clear on our policy. u.s. missile defense is not designed nor directed against russia and china's strategic nuclear forces. however, at the same time, we have also made it clear that we cannot and will not accept legally binding or other constraints that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies and our partners. the security of the united states, its allies and partners is our first and foremost solemn responsibility. as such, the united states will continue to insist on having the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats. free from obligations or constraints that limit our bmd capabilities. let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense cooperation with our allies and

partners around the world over the past several years. this was a key goal of the 2010 ballistic missile defense review. in europe, implementation of the epaa in nato missile defense is going well. for example, the missile defense radar in turkey has been operating since 2011 and the aegis site in romania is scheduled to become operational later this year. in the middle east, we are continuing to work bilaterally and multilaterally with our partners in the gcc to deploy effective missile defenses. for example, later this year, the united arab emirates will take delivery of its first thaad battery. furthermore, we continue to work with israel to expand its multilayered architecture to protect it from missile threats. in the asia pacific, we are working actively with our allies to enhance our missile defense capabilities in the region. on that note, we recently

completed deployment of a second missile defense radar in japan, which will enhance both the defense of the united states and japan. finally we continue to oppose russia's attempts to impose limitations on our defenses which would limit our ability to defend ourselves, allies and partners. suffice to say, defense of our allies and partners through assistance on missile defense cooperation is and will remain a key priority for the u.s. government. thank you very much, and i look forward to your questions. [ applause ] >> great. well, first of all, let me thank css for being on this panel today. it's a pleasure and honor for me to follow in frank's footsteps here. and he talked a lot about cooperation in the missile defense area between the united states europe and asia. and i'll talk a little bit about potential cooperation that might

have worked out but so far has not. i'll pick up on the last remarks about the united states, nato and russia. if you look back over the last ten years, missile defense has been one of the truly contentious issues on the u.s./russia relationship. there have been attempts to explore the possibility to resolve the issue to look at the possibility of cooperation between the united states and russia or nato and russia thus far without success. if you go back to 2007, a conversation between president bush and president putin about, could there be a cooperative effort between washington and moscow? when the george w. bush administration plan was to deploy ten ground based interceptors in poland, the missles now deployed in alaska accompanied by a supporting radar in the czech republic, the russians were opposed to this plan and what you had was an offer from the russian side to make available to the united states radar data from the

russian radar actually now has been since closed down and also a radar that was under construction. both of the radars having good views of iran. but the problem, the nub of the issue was the u.s. government was interested in that idea in addition to american plans. the russian proposal was providing the radar data in place of the plans to deploy missile defenses in europe. that never really got started. the second attempt came up at the end of 2010 at a nato/russia summit in lisbon, where it concluded with the meeting of leaders of nato and then russian president medvedev where they explored the possibility for nato/russia cooperation on a missile defense arrangement to defend europe. and in early 2011, you actually had quite active dialogue including between the pentagon and the ministry of defense, but also dialogues in track to the atlantic security initiative had a dialogue going on. at brookings, we were running the conversation led by former secretary albright and former

minister ivanoff. and a lot of these ideas seemed to complement each other. by the spring of 2011, there was actually a fairly rich menu of ideas out there as to what a nato/russia cooperative agreement on defense would look like. and it included four or five central elements, which it seemed that most of these dialogues were talking about in one form or another. when was the importance of transparency? and that proceeds from a logical point that each side had to understand the capabilities and the plans of the other if you were, in fact, going to have a cooperative missile defense system. second, the advantage of joint exercises, where there was u.s. russian experience going back to the late 1990s, joint exercises as a way to develop that cooperation. third, sort of the sense on both sides that you couldn't have a single combined system. because russia was not prepared to work for a nato commander and nato was not prepared to work for a russian commander. so the idea seemed to evolve

around two independent systems that would interact at key points. but with nato retaining the control over a decision to launch the nato intercepter and russia retaining control over a russian decision to launch a russian intercepter. but they would interact through jointly manned centers. manned by nato and russian military personnel. one was a data fusion center which would take data information from satellites radars on the nato side, take information from the russian side, bring it to a single point, combine it to generate a common operational picture. that picture would then be shared with both the nato and russian missile defense headquarters and give them presumably a better sense of what was happening in the missile defense environment around europe. second center, also jointly manned would be a planning and operation center, where nato and russian officers would talk about thing like threat scenarios. what sorts of attack scenarios are they worried about, and what would be the rules of engagement. in the extreme you wanted to

have a situation where if there was a ballistic missile attack coming towards europe, and both nato and russia chose to engage that target, you wanted to know enough about what the other guy was going to do so that your intercepters engaged the ballistic missile target and not each other. but the official dialogue in 2011 bogged down. and then you had as frank mentioned this russian insistence on a legal guarantee that american missile defenses not be oriented against russian strategic ballistic missiles. that demand was accompanied by what the russians called objective criteria, which when you asked for explanations meant limits on the numbers, velocities and locations of missile interceptors. in effect, a resurrection of the anti-ballistic missile treaty. i'll make a couple of comments on this. in 2010, 2011, it might not have been hard to work out an arrangement of ten years duration that would do two things. that would limit missile defenses in a way to address stated russian concerns, even if

we did not think there was much basis for those concerns. but would still allow the u.s. over the succeeding ten years to do everything it wanted to do in terms of addressing a rogue ballistic missile threat posed by north korea or iran. but i think that agreement, which might have been possible, was not doable here in the united states for political reasons. the second observation i would make is looking towards the future, if at some point, we reach a point where there's some greater degree of equivalence between missile defense capabilities and strategic offensive forces we may face a decision where we have to look at a missile defense treaty in parallel with the treaty that reduces and limits strategic offensive arms. the point i would make is that area or that time of equivalence is not now. we are far from it. in fact, there's a huge gap now between offense and defense. in february of 2018, when the new s.t.a.r.t. limits take effect russia will have in

effect 1500 ballistic missile warheads. and a rate against that will be at most, 44 american interceptors with the capability and the velocity to attack strategic ballistic missile targets. so at this point in time, a missile defense treaty is not necessary. there was an offer in 2013 from the united states government as a replacement to look at an executive agreement that would provide transparency on the two sides, missile defense forces on current programs but also looking at ten years. and the essential philosophy blind that was to give each side so much information that the russian military could look down and say, well, here's where the americans are going to be on missile defense in 2021. here's where we will be. is that a threat? my own view is they will conclude looking at that objectively, they will conclude it's not a threat. if a threat were to emerge, they would have ample time to react. at this point, there's been no sign of russian interest in that idea. so the question is, where do you go next? it seems to me that arms control, particularly regarding further nuclear reductions and missile defense was fairly stuck already in 2013.

and since then, you've had the the crisis over ukraine, the broader deterioration in relations between the west and russia, and that's only going to make the atmosphere more difficult. the question is at what point would the russians be interested in a more serious dialogue in arms control? and there may be possibilities there if the financial burdens, the financial difficulties in russia continue, and at some point, perhaps as you get closer to 2021, which is when the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty would lapse on its own terms perhaps the russians will then wish to explore a successor to new s.t.a.r.t. and then the question is, if you get to that point, will the russians be prepared for a more serious discussion, a more successful discussion on missile defense, that could perhaps get back to an idea of nato/russian missile defense cooperation. much is going to depend first of all on the russian attitudes. at this point it's probably not easy to be optimistic. i try to understand where russia is going on missile defense. it seems to me there may be two

or three reasons that explain their reluctance to engage in a more cooperative approach. quite apart from the general deterioration. one is, i think the russians have a certain fear about american defense missile capabilities and their potential. even if they understand the limits of american defense programs, the russians give great credit to american technical produce prowess and our ability to do things. when i was assigned to american embassy moscow in 1986 and had the arms portfolio in the embassy, it's fair to say the soviets were still somewhat panicked that it would put them out of the defense missile business. that lingers that the americans can do a lot if they put their minds to it. there are bureaucratic reasons in russia that argue against cooperation. there are some in the ministry of defense who don't want to cooperate because they can hold

an opposing defense program as a vehicle to secure more resources for the russian s 300 s 400 and s 500 programs. an additional impediment to talking to the russians about cooperation in europe is at one level that will mean the russians having to accept that there will be american military infrastructure in romania and poland, and that's something in general they've opposed since nato enlargement began 20 years ago. also the ability to reach some kind of -- get back to a more cooperative discussion with russia is going to depend on how far and how fast the u.s. proceeds on missile defense. i would argue missile defense against a limited icbm attack against the united states such as might be mounted in the future by north korea or iran is a sensible part of an overall american force mix. but it seems to me when you look at a larger scale attack, such as might be mounted by either russia or china, offense still has the advantage over defense. as one example, i would note the

plan to deploy 14 interceptors in alaska is going to cost roughly $1 billion. my guess is either russia or china could add 14 offensive ballistic missile warheads for significantly less. but at least until at some point there may be a technological breakthrough that changes that equation, but is not immediately evident now. and therefore it seems to me if you want to get back to something like a more cooperative discussion with the russians on this, which is going to require moving past the very difficult point we find in the broader relationship, we assuring the russians that our intention is not aimed at blunting a russian missile attack is going to be key to a productive discussion. thanks very much. >> we'll keep the conversation going. i think i will kick it off

actually with a comment about an article you wrote this past i think it was maybe ten days ago or so on the limits of missile defense, it was kind of the anniversary of the 32nd anniversary, and you gave a history of in a way how the expectations are relatively modest for missile defense in the big scheme of things. the offense/defense tradeoff. that sort of thing. reminded me of a comment by condi rice during the bush administration. she said what we're pursuing is not star wars, it's not the son of star wars, not even the grandson of star wars. it's so different. so in a way i'm struck by why why is it that the russia thing keeps recurring. why do we need to worry about reassuring russia when it is so limited after all? let me throw that to you first of all and should we even be having that conversation? >> i guess i would say, i mean, you don't want to reassure russia -- the reason would be to

try to reassure russia is to enable you to achieve other things. if you could find a way to defuse missile defense as a problem, does that make it easier for russia to address issues such as further nuclear reductions. you've had over the last three years i think the russians, in my view have for whatever reason concluded they don't want to proceed beyond the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty at this point in time in terms of nuclear direction. they have linked missile defense, prompt global strike, prenuclear forces, three or four others, probably, but they have these linkages and they haven't moved to solve any one of those problems. it seems to be providing a pretext for why they shouldn't do more on nuclear reductions. so if you can get this to a more serious discussion, could you find a way to remove missile defense as a problem. that would be one reason for assurance. i think if you could get back to a cooperative nato/russia, you could take an issue which has been contentious and as difficult as it would appear now, perhaps make it a cooperative element in a

west/russia relationship. >> i don't have anything too much to add to what steve had to say. i think he's essentially right. let me go back to a point that steve mentioned in his remarks about russian concerns. i would say that the russians aren't especially concerned about the current level of u.s. missile defense capabilities. they know that 44 long range intercepters are not going to negate their strategic deterrent. what they are really concerned about is what comes next. and the fact that there are no legally binding limitations on numbers and more importantly the potential for u.s. technology to leap ahead. i remember an interaction i had with a very senior russian general and he was giving a briefing showing u.s. aegis ships in the baltic shooting

down russian strategic missiles. i looked at him and i said general, that's a very interesting slide. can i ask you a question. and the question is this. how fast are you attributing that sea-based missile defense intercepter and he looked at me in all seriousness and he said well, i believe it has a velocity burnout of ten kilometers per second. now, there has never been a missile defense or any rocket that has a burnout of ten kilometers a second. i said well general if you can find me a sea-based missile defense intercepter that has a velocity burnout of ten kilometers per second please let me know because i want to buy stock in that company. his response was very telling. he goes you may not be there today but you'll eventually get there. that's really the driver of their concern. because quite frankly the russians are much more dependent

on nuclear weapons in their strategy and doctrine than we are in the united states. if you look at the history of u.s. nuclear policy and doctrine over the last 25 years through democrat and republican presidents the objective has been to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy. it's been the exact opposite with regard to russia. from the russian point of view, missile defenses and the potential for even more advanced missile defenses call into question not just from a technical perspective but a political perspective the viability of their deterrent. that's fundamentally what the russian concern is. >> wonder if you might speak a little more to what -- okay, put aside for a moment where the technology might leapfrog to ten years from now and that kind of world, but what more ought we be doing in europe and the middle east and asia? you alluded to some of that.

how much more can we work with allies in a way to alleviate our own burdens, we're putting a good part of our budget toward regional missile defenses potentially one might say at the expense of homeland. what can we do to boost up our allies further? >> well i would say there are a couple of things. first and foremost interoperability. i talked about this in my opening statement. it's one thing to have a missile defense system. it's another to ensure that we can share information amongst our systems and with our allies. so i think that has got to be a number one priority. and we're actually making a good deal of progress in that area. second, we can encourage our allies to develop their own purchase capabilities.

i understand that we are in tight budgetary times but i think there are useful things that we can do with our allies to leverage existing capabilities. for example, the netherlands has on their air defense frigate a radar called the smart l. they have announced a decision to invest several hundred million euros to upgrade that radar. so fundamentally, the more information we can share and take advantage of existing capabilities, i think that is really where the focus needs to be. >> all right. any comments on that? why don't we open it up to the floor. please state your affiliation and ask in the interrogative sense. >> i'm retired d.o.d., former missile defense agency employee but i have been working the last few years with exploring this

concept of interoperability and you know, even in the d.o.d., interoperability is defined as more than just the exchange or sharing of information. it's the ability to use that information for operational effectiveness. so since you mentioned it a number of times and you have alluded to it when you talk about things we've tried to do and missile defense we've done a little bit in the command and control area with russia, as you know, where is the champion or the center of gravity or the interagency effort that's looking at interoperability from the point of view of, say, policy, of processes as well as the i.t. where you exchange and share information? >> you know fundamentally, i think it's a partnership between d.o.d. and state. i think there is a general

recognition across most senior level folks who work these issues both in d.o.d. and state that this is where we need to do a better job, and i think we have made some progress over the past couple of years. that said is there a lot more work to do to make us effective in this area? absolutely. but are we doing things to ensure that we can share more information, number one, and two, effectively use that information, i think the answer is yes. i talked in my remarks about the u.s./japan defense cooperation guidelines. we hope to finalize that soon and one of the key elements in there, we hope is increased ways that we can work together effectively in the area of missile defense. >> over here in the back.

it's coming. wait one second. >> james kiesling, u.s. [ inaudible ]. i have a fundamental question. is either the ambassadors aware that the putin 2007 offer was actually a re-up of a u.s. offer put together by dr. bill frederick working for the mdo in 1997 and provided over to the russians in 1998, specifically one major motivation on the part of the russians may be that they felt that we disowned our own offer. >> well you know i have worked missile defense cooperation between the u.s. and russia in the clinton bush and obama administrations and quite frankly, despite a lot of politics, there's a certain amount of continuity in u.s. offers to the russians.

i'm not specifically aware of that specific proposal that you mentioned back in 1997 but what i would say is that across the spectrum of administrations on the u.s. side, there have been very similar proposals to work with the russians on missile defense cooperation. unfortunately, none have worked. because we always at the end come to the challenge of russia wants guarantees and limitations on u.s. missile defenses. i think that makes cooperation very very difficult. >> i think that goes back to the problem you had in 2007, the russian offer of data i think was very attractive, but the price of getting access to that russian radar data would be

vergoing the planned deployment of intercept ors in romania and poland. if you have given up the intercepters you have negated the plan which was to provide some missile defense capability. >> richard, up front. >> suddenly a microphone appears. thank you. so i want to bridge between the points you were making and ask about the potential effect of having the epaa deployments take place at the end of this year and then again in 2018 time frame, and if we remain sort of consistent with our principle of transparency and we say hey, this is what we told you we were going to do, this is what we're doing, this is as far as we're going, obviously it's threat dependent, and over time, and i'm discounting ukraine mess right now because that's stopping everything from going

forward, do you, steve or do you, frank perceive the possibility that russia's level of anxiety might diminish as they see that we are in fact doing what we said we were going to do and not going to 10,000 intercepters or do you anticipate that the anxiety will not change despite the fact that we have been consistent and been transparent and told them exactly what we're going to do or is that a basis for maybe racheting down the anxiety and maybe thinking about something, because this is really designed to avoid instability, miscalculation, drawing responses that we would not think are in our interest, et cetera. >> well, i think the first question is do the russians wish to have their anxieties relieved. i think this is the distinction between the anxieties that they portray and the anxieties that they really feel. my guess would be is that the

smarter people in the administration understand this, have a fairly good appreciation for what our missile defenses can do and what they can't do, albeit i think frank's exactly right. there is that fear what will the americans come up with 10, 15 years down the road. but there's that distinction between their real understanding of what we can do and what they have chosen to portray. now, sometimes i think it's kind of interesting, i think they actually get themselves caught up a little bit where they begin to talk so much about missile defenses and then you have deputy prime minister comes out periodically and talks about their new icbm which is the killer of missile defenses. so they are trying to modulate this message which on the one hand is a message targeted primarily at europe. the americans are doing things making us concerned it's contributing to a bad relationship, and what is it really getting you in terms of missile defense production but then they have to go back and reassure their domestic audience the americans have these missile defenses and don't worry too much because we have icbms that can penetrate it. i think the real question comes

down to are the russians prepared to have those concerns allayed and if they are, my guess is that it would not be hard to come up with ways to do it. >> the only thing i would add is that in addition to the technical concerns that the russians have about the future capabilities of u.s. missile defense systems, they are also concerned about the permanent presence of american military capabilities in eastern europe. a lot of their concerns are driven by this. >> although i would add what they did in the last year has pretty much taken care of that issue. i think the pentagon term is we now have as i understand four company sized units in each of the baltic states and poland and the pentagon explains it as a persistent deployment. my guess is persistent doesn't have much difference from permanent and that those deployments are going to be there until you see a fairly major change in russia given the force that russia has used in

ukraine. some of the rhetoric that's coming out of moscow now and the fact you see heightened military activities like russian bombers flying around nato air space. >> we heard a lot earlier this afternoon from those generals that missile defense is becoming less exotic. it's one piece of a much larger portfolio of capabilities et cetera. it's also becoming very firmly entrenched in how we think about our national security. it's not going away. so even though it's not the silver bullet, it's key. so in a way, notwithstanding the insincerity, you might say, of strategic insincerity on the russians on some of these things, i wonder if you might speak, both of you, about in a way the changing perception among everybody else among our allies, for example, about just the appetite for missile defenses. there seems to be a lot of it in the middle east, they are putting real dollars behind it. certainly in asia. in nato, it was part of the 2010

strategic concept. that is going to be rewritten sometime in the near future, probably not going to be any less. where do you see the appetite for all this going? >> up only up, especially as the threat continues to increase. you know, sometimes here in the united states, we try to separate missile defense from our larger national security strategy. i think one of the things that the ballistic missile defense review from 2010 does a really good job at is putting missile defense at the heart of our overarching national security strategies. quite frankly, effective missile defenses are a key enabling technology for our other defense and foreign policy goals, especially as countries try to keep and deploy capabilities to

keep the united states out of regions. it is a key enabler. so i think cooperation is going to continue to expand and i also think that again i think also that again, missile defense is a key element of our overarching national security and defense strategy. >> any thoughts on that. >> all right. bruce? in the back. >> hi again, bruce mcdonald. federation of american scientists, peace institute, john hopkins, science. russia has said multiple times over the last several years that they are going to develop more missile defense and that's of interest to us, the work we are doing on what's looking a little bit more looking into the future as more like a multipolar missile defense world, u.s., china, russia, india. of course they say that they will. so my question is to our esteemed guests here, that what

have you heard russians say about what they plan to do on missile defense? and more importantly, what do you believe? what's blue jacketser? what's beef? what are they up to? >> that's a good question. maybe steve has some more insights on that. i've been trying to ask myself this question for many years. >> i think there is a disconnect, you see between the way they talk about american missile defense and when you look at russian missile defense programs. s 300 s 400, the s 500 are all basically designed to represent li cat design capabilities we have in pack 3, fad, and the sm 3. so it's not unusual for the russians to say one thing and do something else but i think they are looking at these sorts of missile defense capabilities as a logical part of their force next. >> in the back. >> greg tillman, arms control association. frank, you mentioned the importance of the sm 32a

deployments in poland by 2018 for providing territorial defense for all of europe. there has not been yet an iranian icbm flight-test. there is not been a north korean icbm flight-test. that would, by my calculations mean that this threat is 12 years overdue from the rumsfeld commission's prediction. when does the more slowly developing threat start to impact the adaptive part of the european phase adaptive approach? >> well, that's a good question. i would say the sm-3 bloc 2a, which will be deployed in poland in the 2018 time frame is not designed to deal with icbm-class threats. but medium and intermediate

range threats. but you may recall back in 2013 the administration decided to restructure the sm three block 2b missile for a variety of reasons, technological challenges, financial challenges, and a number of other problems. but the bottom line is phase three of the european epaa is designed to deal with medium and intermediate range threats. and i would noted that despite the fact that iran has not yet developed a icbm to date, they are continuing to develop medium and intermediate range class ballistic missiles. and therefore we are working with our friends and partners to deal with that threat. >> and presumably stay ahead of it. >> and presumably stay ahead of it.

>> gentleman in the front. >> thank you. edward f., georgetown university. i was the last u.s. commissioner for the abm treaty. so i have mixed memories of all these issues. let me come back to the question of why are the russians being so object city nant here. the fundamental problem, it seems to me is that all of the u.s. assurances are in the present tense. we are not. but almost by definition assurances have to be in the future tense we will not. and that's what the russians are asking for. and that's what we've been unable to do, fined a sentence that begins with "we will not" and then finish it in some way that we can live with. seems to me that really is our if you know problem. thank you. >> as you noted it's been the administration's hard policy not to agree to any legally binding restrictions. >> or other limitations. >> in exactly that way.

>> yeah. >> let me say a couple of thing. one, we are not just looking at -- well we're not looking at russia when we're dealing with our missile defenses. we're looking at other capabilities. and fight frankly, sometime we are surprised. for example, two years ago when we made the decision to deploy the additional 14 gbis in alaska, that was driven by the fact that north korea had paraded a new mobile icbm. and we had not seen that before. so i would say, number one we need to have the flexibility to deal with surprises like north korea's new mobile icbm. secondly, the u.s. budget process is fairly transparent. you can, by reading the missile defense agency's annual press release when the budget comes out -- you can determine where

and how many missile defense capabilities that we currently have and plan to have. and i would argue that the u.s. missile defense levels have been very structured to the threat. you are not seeing hundreds of long-range missile defense interceptors. you are seeing 44. so i think, you know quite frankly, we are not going to agree to limitations. but if you look at our budget projections as well as our deployments, i think it's very, very consistent with our rhetoric. >> i think i understand the dilemma as you describe it. but therefore it is a little bit surprising for me that the russians didn't pick up more on this idea that the administration offered in 2013 of transparentsy which actually would have put a -- at least as i understand the proposal, who have laid out, here are the plans look out ten years, here

are the limits. so they would hadv had not limits but they would have had a very clear picture at a time where i think the numbers of missile defense interceptors would still have been way below anything that would have proposed a threat to russian strategic missile capabilities. and so you could have handled that problem that way. later on if you got into defenses go up and offenses come down, then i think you have to look at the question of legally binding limits if you want to get to further reductions. but the russians didn't seem to pick up on that idea. at least have not so far. >> but we're not there year. i think we are going to come out there. we're going to go five minutes for another panel, our final panel will be mr. rich matlock and admiral archer macy. that will be on directions technological and otherwise. allow five minutes and we'll be back for that. gentlemen, thank you, both of

you. [ applause ] this third panel from the conference looks at the future of missile defense systems and the technology behind them. defense department missile defense officials, a retired rear admiral who heads the navy program at sigh breast, international. a d.o.d. consultant for the business development and marking of defense and aerospace products all take part. >> third and final panel. this is on future directions for missile defense. both on the technology side. also on the -- you might say the mix of capabilities. we've heard about that several times today about the offense, defense, mix various capabilities. to address this, we have two very able gentlemen. first mr. rich matlock from the

missile defense agency working with wisty, and secondly, retired admiral archer macy. so mr. matlock why don't we get started with you. >> thank you. good afternoon. i'm rich matlock i work over at the missile defense agency i'm the program executive for advanced technologies. that means i've got the best job in the agency. most exciting job in the agency. i want to spend about ten minutes or so talking you through some of the challenges that we are facing over there for the future and what we think we are going to do about those challenges. i came to the missile defense mission just a few years after president reagan challenged the nation to look at ways that we might solve the problem of defending our nation against

ballistic missiles as opposed to avenging our nation. so i came back as a young rocket propulsion engineer from the air force with about 10 of my come pay tree yots. i see several of them here in the audience today, with the goal of sponsoring research, and really capitalizing on the creativeityeity in our industry and our academia and our national laboratories to go after that challenge. so we made a bet in those days. i think it was on the order of about $2 billion or so a year in research. research in a broad spectrum of technologies and areas that would hopefully pay off down the road and get us that sort of capability. so there was a great focus broadly -- that's an interesting term, great focus broadly on towing those technologies that

might pay off in the future for us. some of those didn't pan out. some of those did much better than others. we were looking at a lot of thing. as you might recall, we were looking at you know, at nuclear pumped lasers. we were looking at micro -- high powered microwaves. we were looking at rogts. of course in my case, we were looking at electromagnetic rail guns giant 100-ton satellites that would launch small projectiles at 20 kilometers per second at a reign of 10,000 or so entry vehicles coming in. so as i mentioned the $2 billion or so we spent those first six or seven years eventually paid off in some areas. and we got more focused after desert storm and looking at how we might apply these

technologies to defend our -- against missile in the theater as well as against our nation. and i want to take one of those examples, one that i worked on in particular, to walk you through how we built that foundation and where we're going to head to i think here in the next few years. in the early to mid-'80s the army's ballistic missile defense command, now i think it's strategic missile defense command -- was looking at ways to apply hit-to-kill technology to destroy an incoming rv. and so they built an experimental set called the homing overlay experiment in which we launched using essentially icbm rocket motors a very large, about the size of a refrigerator kill vehicle and an -- at an incoming rv and they had success. but we recognized that that would be a challenge for us in

the future. so for thing like the electromagnetic rail gun, we were talking about launching project tiles of about a kilogram that were the size of a bread box. so we needed to significantly miniaturize that capability if we were going to get to that -- to realize that sort of capability in the future. over time, i didn't get to a kilogram or the size of a breadback box, but we did reduce the size of those project tiles down to about six kilograms or so, and a little bit larger than a bread box. the electromagnetic rail gun technology didn't come along very well in that same time frame but we recognized by applying these project tile technologies to some of our existing systems like for example, the standard missile system in the navy we could change answer aircraft missiles into ballistic missile defenders. so the standard missile 3 that we have in the field today is

essentially the grandson of that technology that we invented in the '80s and the early '90s. and the foundation for the systems that we have today are primarily based on that investment that we made in that time frame. so as we look at the system that general totorof described earlier today and look at what do we need to do in the future to make our ballistic defense systems more capable, i think there is two key areas we want to focus our attention on. one is to reduce the number of shots that we take at each credible object. i'm not going to discuss in any depth here the sort of shot doctrine that our war fighter ploois employs today in order to assure ourselves that we are going to reliably defend our nation, but needless to say that if he is going to have to shoot interceptor, since we use hit to kill technology against credible

objects then it would be important for to us reduce the number of credible objects. as well as the shots that we take against each credible object. and so that's where we're focusing our technology now in those particular areas. we want to fined a way to reduce the number of shots that we take at each credible object and we do that by several ways. one is we look at ways that we can improve the reliability of the interceptors we have today. that's one of the bets we are making in this year's budget is looking at ways that we can do that for our ground base and mid-course defense system. we also look at the possibility of bringing more capability to each interceptor by adding more kill vehicles to each one of those interceptors. in other words, instead of taking several shots being able to take one shot with several kill vehicles against that particular object and then if you think about the

probabilities of reliability, there our effect goes up in that way. our system today as you probably know, is beyond the missile warning message that we get from our overhead sensor systems in space, a primarily a terrestrial radar based system. all the sensing that we do, the tracking of the missiles that come are base on the ship bay sensor the sea based radar and our other terrestrial radar including early warning radar and what we call our continuey two, our or x band radar that does discrimination. and so all of that is what we base our decisions on in terms of how we launch our interceptors and on what path we launch our interceptors.

for very long-range systems like the homeland defense system where we expect an icbm to travel a very long distance, you can imagine how tral i thinking it would be to get a terrestrial radar all along the path of that icbm, especially if you might envision the rate of icbms that would take different paths. so the challenge of the earth's curvature and these radar systems then brings us to the issue of how do we fine a way to more reliably track from birth to death these incoming ballistic missiles? so our vision is to do a couple of thing. one is to bring new phenomenonology, in other words, gain more knowledge about what this system looks like what the ballistic missile raid looks like, by bringing additional sensors into this architecture. and not only radar systems, but systems that use electrooptical

phenomenonology in order to determine more about that system. so you can imagine the power of having much greater knowledge, especially knowledge that is relevant to the same sort of sensors that are on our interceptor kill vehicles. we want to get more knowledge about that system, and we want to understand it from birth to death so that we can discriminate and determine which are the two objects that we ought to be shooting at. and so getting a more capable discrimination system here now would be a way to improve the number of shots that we have to take or reduce the number of shots that we have to take by reducing the number of thing that we might consider to be a credible object. so our vision here in the technology exploration now is to look at ways to bring electrooptical sensors into this

architecture beyond that opir sensor, that missile warning sensor that kicks these things off. and we're going to do that by capitalizing on the work that's being done in industry today. both on sensors as well as on building unmanned aerial vehicles that fly at very high at attitudes. a high altitude platform is also key to one of the other investments we want to make. so if we go back just a few years here, we made a big bet on airborne layser in the light '90s and early 2000s. and that system that we built although it was very effective in doing that one particular job we had for it which is proving that you could shoot down a rocket at the speed of light using light -- a tremendous accomplishment. although it proved impractical from an operational standpoint you can imagine have a fleet of

737s flying at 33,000 feet with a laser system in them. there is a lot of challenges in that. what we know now from that the next time we do this work we are going to be looking at getting above the known atmosphere where the aerosols won't affect the lasers and at at attitudes where the turbulence is significantly lower. so we want to fine a regime that's high above the 33,000 feet. for all of us who fly on 747s on a regular basis here we know it can get shaky at 33,000 feet almost any time of the year depending on where you are flying. so we want to make that more like 60000 feet get to the sfrats fear, where it will be a much calmer place for us to work. we're making investments in laser technology today that both in our national laboratories and in our industry that goes beyond those chemical laysers that we looked at early whier to new solid state electric lasers which will be much more

efficient, effective as well, i believe. and ones that we can scale up and reduce the size of the laser necessary to get that job done. if we can find a way to make that happen -- and we believe these technologies will lead us there -- that we'll be able to -- excuse me -- to get those lasers on an unmanned arrow platform at very high at attitudes and make that case for the entire logistics and infrastructure which goes along with that much much more simpler, and make the technical challenges less daunting than they have been in the past. i mentioned earlier it might have been during our discussion at lunch, that there are other areas which we want to go back to. and so i'm sort of going back to my past in this one. we left the rail gun in 1989 because there were challenges with getting a rail gun.

and the idea that we would build a new launch infrastructure that would get these 2,000 or 100 ton satellites in orbit with rail guns on them was not achievable. however, the services have been making investments in bringing that technology along primarily for close-in engagements, and primarily for long-range fires. and so as they continue to develop that technology we are looking at that as a possible way to get at some of our missile defense challenges. again, having a magazine which is very very cheap project tiles with the capability of electrically generating the power makes it possible for us to get away from this challenge that we fine in terms of expensive interceptors against other rocket systems. so our goal ultimately is then to fine a way to get more

capable sensors into the architecture, to improve the knowledge that we have from birth to death of this launch, and to reduce the number of credible objects by understanding what objects are there. with the ultimate goal of reducing the objects dramatically by destroying the rocket booster in the boost phase. that will revolutionize the capable for missile defense and dramatically change the calculus of many of our adversaries. we're working today with industry. we're working with academia, and we're working in our national laboratories to make that vision come true. we're shifting our -- the overall balance in our investments this year which had been primarily focused on increasing capacity over the last few years for our regional missile defense systems and

looking now at shifting the balance somewhat, ramping over the next couple of years, to get at the advanced technology challenges that we're going to need to build that foundation for the missile defense architecture i just spoke of. we hope to have that here in the next decade based on those investments. we recognize that just like in the past, it won't be a challenging en -- will be a challenging endeavor and we may not rush forward with continual success towards that goal but we're excited about having u.s. partners and making that a true reality over the next ten years. thank you. [ applause ] >> good afternoon, everybody. i'm arch macy. and now a private consultant.

as many of you know i had a background in some of this for a few years. if you don't like ballistic missile defense review, you can blame me. i've heard it before. but go g. i was one of the coauthors. i'd like to talk about missile defense and thinking about next steps in missile defense from a somewhat different, perhaps look at rubic's cube. this panel was -- is about future directions that's what it was titled. and so the question i'm thinking about is what are the future elements of missile defense that need to be developed, melded with each other and demonstrated and made known to potential antagonists? let me develop that for a moment. we've talked today a lot about intercept activities. there's been some comment on left of launch. i'll phrase the question this way, what is the right of launch activities and plans other than that of intercept? my basic premise is that the

missile defense system that is generated by mda and the services does not and cannot provide the overall defense of the nation against ballistic missile threats. we acknowledge for the moment that the -- a massive attack from china or russia the only response is in kind. and that has long been our explicit policy and will not change unless there is some breakthrough in physics, which no one expects. but letsthat's the everything else. we talked earlier about defending against ballistic missiles cannot be an inventory challenge. you are always going to lose there is there are always going to be more threats than interceptors. at some point, in addition, the laws of physics, the laws of probability and statistics say that even as you are taking on incoming threats some are going to get through. i mean, no system is 100%. i am answer aerospace engineer

by trade and experience, you hate to admit that but you cannot build a perfect system. so there is no way to assure somebody i can gitd get them all even if i have a perfect inventory. why do we have an bmds? you need to destroy threats. what it does is provide protection against critical assets long enough that the national command authority, the president and our leadership can take steps to end the threat by other means, get them to stop launching. if they don't launch, it's not a threat. as rich pointed out, if we can get them on launch, that's great. at some point there, i would submit that particularly in a short and intermediate range scenarios, you are going to run out of boost phase interceptors or whatever your tech neck may be, and boost phase to me can include directed energy, light, rail gun -- i'm agnostic as to the technique. so the question is, what is does this thing need to do?

the ballistic missile defense system, that capability produced by mda and the services, has to buy time, and it affords time to the leadership to take other actions and to make decisions. and they are going to have to have to happen in pretty short order. it gives the nca the chance to choose other methods. all of the elements of national power, the classic four that you learn in war college diplomatic, information military, and economic. and using all of them in whatever way is appropriate to get the threat to cease to occur. the strategic necessity is to protect the homeland our own forces, friends and allies from ballistic missile attack. so the key word there is it's about protection. it's not about just flight destruction. so ballistic missile protection planning must encompass a continuum of capabilities, plans, lines of authority and

communications and training to negate or interrupt the ballistic missile threat sequence from its threat planning to preparation to targeting to launch to subsequently launches. so i submit that perhaps an idea for future discussion is that what we need is a ballistic missile protection plan of custom the ballistic missile defense system is an element. this to achieve and maintain a comprehensive all of government approach to negate potential or actual ballistic missile threats. today we've been talking a lot about systems. we started off with the sdi concept of ways to protect us from the missiles, to protect us from the war heads. that's a kinetic approach. to people like me in the department of defense that's where we tend to go to. we grow up that way. i'm an arrow space engineer, i think like that. since the advent of even the sdi

concept we've been focused on developing and fielding the capability to perform threat negation by interceptor destruction in flight. but we know that we can keep doing that because we'll lose the inventory game. it's clear that mda owns the intercept part of ballistic missile protection. who owns the rest? do they know that they do? do others know who owns what? then the question is what is the rest? what are the methods, the techniques by which you are going to get an antagonist to stop launching? now, it can range from the absolutely terrifying to perhaps something less. i'll go back to that in a bit. but that range of action needs to be thought about and understood developed to prevent launch in the first place or prevent subsequent laurchs and melded with each other to

provide a developed and understood comprehensive protection. the longest flight time of a ballistic missile is icbm range of 40 minutes. assuming it's a one after the other, the best time you have is 40 minutes. it is probable depending on what you think the inventories of limited number of launches may be, that the ballistic missile defense system could provide protection to a certain level for hours to maybe a day or two. that's how long you have in order to accomplish another effect, to end the launches. so i said what capabilities need to be developed to prevent the launch, to prevent subsequent launches? something that will have to be considered at some point is who is responsible for the attribution that can be made public to explain what you are doing in an unchallengeable manner? who knows where it came from? well, we know where it came from within the bmds and the

overhead sensor systems. we usually tend to be loathe to put too much accuracy into our reports on that. but in the case where you are going to take action now, at some level you are going to have to convince the world as well as your antagonist that in fact they are the ones doing and it you know where it's coming from and you can prove it. so we need a comprehensive basis for bmd protection. it can be intercept alone. the overarching goal, as i said has to be to deter or prevent launch in the first place. and if the launch occurs to inflict sufficient pressure to end further launches and do so? a timely manner. we need to determine what constitutes effective deterrence to dissuede an antagonist from launching based on two principles the antagonist must be led to understand. first the attack will not succeed in its objective and that the penalty for the attempt

will be too high to be borne. this is understood new concept. it's the basic statement of any deterrent strategy. the challenge for our discussion is what are the steps, the factors, the plans and capabilities necessary to accomplish these two principles in defending against ballistic missiles? the first principle is addressed in prime by the ballistic missile defense system, the intercept destruction capability. the second has to be addressed by a variety of means, depending on the situation. bmd planning, i believe will have to account for different categories of attack. i put them into four sectors or judgment. extensional, a violent statement, a rogue, or an accident. an extensiontial attack which against the united states would at this time be provided only by china or russia. we have a declaretory policy on how we will respond.

we have been clear on that for many, many years. that is not a function of bmd protection per se. a violent statement by an antagonistic state. a number of missiles, a limited attack. a rogue attack of a limited number of missiles are two different conditions. the roguish you being who do you pressure? if it's a violent state if it's an act of state x, then you can pressure state x, you can figure out how to do that, one would hope. if it's a rogue attack -- and i would pick isis as a classic -- how and where do you pressure? if isis gets its hands on mrbms and uses them europe, what's the point of attack and what do we do about that? in some cases the answer may be no and that will affect your response. and then you have the accidental one. and then how is that communicated? if an accidental launch occurs how does the owner of the

missile after launch tell i'm very sorry but i wasn't me and it won't happen again. he maine may be right, or he may be faking it. if anyone remembers the terrifying "seven days in may "that's a very hard decision. and then how do these questions differ between homeland defense and regional? are you going to when a launch comes at you, a limited attack, are you going to take a massive, violent kinetic attack on that nation? it may be appropriate. it may not be. because then you run into issues of escalatory response. so we need to consider and preplan our responses to these other types of attack. as i said -- and i think i bring it up again -- there is a limited time line here. when this happens we can't then summon the first national

security council meeting about it. and going back to what i mentioned about all of the government, whole of government part is that the defense department tends to be very, very good at planning. they do branches and sequels they do con plans and o plans and all that kinds of thing. the government as a whole does not. but you are going to have an interleaved way of political pressure economic pressure, diplomatic pressure, steps you are going to take and they have got to be work together to be maximally effective. i said one of the differences between ballistic missiles and other kinetic threats, particularly for the homeland is the time span from first action to war head arrival is shorter than other threats. cruise missiles, bombers sea and land forces all are viewable in hours to days before arrival. you can take steps to crank things up. but once the first launch has occurred inbound is less than 40 minutes.

so we have to have a method of response that starts to apply effective pressure in hours to a very few number of days. the capabilities and actions across the spectrum of necessary responses and responders must be prepared, equipped and train before the threat situation develops to the point of requiring action. putting to the all the elements the dime elements. the plan will need to consider, particularly in the area of regionol defense, interaction with alabamalies and partners. how it may add to our defense or limb our ability. nato for instance has a detailed bmd plan for the intercept let me of missile defense protection of nato territory in europe. what are other elements that the nato alliance can bring to bear against an antagonist?

they are a military alliance after all. they are not the e.u. what sort of connections with the e.u., the economic deciders of europe need to be engendered in order to come up with an effective response? in the interleaving of these capabilities, do they fall under the nato command structure or some other entity? the e.u. council of governments, unclear. earlier we were talking about exchanging information, franks mentioned that. how do you coordinate this with other allies and partners? some of this can be very sensitive. again, some of it needs to be planned and thought of ahead of time. do we need to extend the concept of the phased adaptive approach to the whole of ballistic missile protection and not just intercept capability? so having asked all those questions and posited a

challenge, i have a recommendation. i warned alien lane about this before she had to leave. she smiled. i recommend that we extent the bmdr the ballistic missile defense review not as a revisit but as an extension to encompass the whole of government approach, to allocate responsibilities and tasks, and define the deturn points that need to be made and demonstrated to all who might consider threatening our homeland, forces, allies and partners. in other words to provide a ballistic missile protection plan. there have been and are still ongoing studies and plans addressing different elements of providing protection, including nonkinetic, nonmilitary. but i think it's time now to bring those desperate ideas and analysis together. and again as happened in the 2010 bmdr to use a cross-government interagency consultative approach. and it really was and i had the

pleasure of taking part in it. much more so than i had experienced at any other time in government. to interleave the knowledge and capabilities of this requisite approach. i do submit that the original premises and results of the 2010 bmdr remain volumid. however, i believe it is time now to extend its scope and direction to the whole of ballistic missile protection. with that, i'll close and look forward to your questions. thanks. [ applause ] >> thank you, gentlemen. i think this was very thought provoking. i think i'll start off with a question for mr. matlock. you laid out, and in the news really in the past discussion there will be a lot of discussion of r and d for mda. but you laid out several key technologies. you talk about space remote

sensing and other things. you talked about fast enter sentors, multiple kill vehicles things like that. airborne laser. first of all, i was hoping you might address, you know what kind -- what's the -- what has been the fruit of these past investments investments, number one? speak to that. have these been experiments that we have yielded nothing from? what kinds of things have they given us now that makes the future possible? and frankly, also, given the relative reduction of mda's budget for r and d, how are we going to be able to do with current budget levels or during the lower budget levels, do these more impressive types of capabilities? >> okay. i think that what you see in our -- as i mentioned a little bit earlier here, what you see in our system today is essentially the results of the technology investments that we made in the '80s and the '90s.

and so much of the interceptor systems, the command and control system the sensor network -- all of those things are a result of investments that we made broadly in that time frame. alain likes to use the seed corn analogy here. and so we it a a lot of our seed corn to get that. and in order to respond to the capacity, you know the requirement for greater capacity across the -- across the regions, we have had to transition that technology and make those investments. and so what -- whenever you are faced with the sort of fiscal realities that we face today in terms of those -- that balance

of capacity versus capability and the need to look across government for how do we do that in sequestration it tends to focus the mind a bit more on those things which have the most promise, and perhaps leave those -- the remainder to future investigations. so that -- that road map that i had laid out for you earlier here, tom, is based on some hard -- hard thinking and some hard choices that we made within the agency, as well with as with our partners in the war finding community, and in the acquisition community and with policy. so we think that we've got a road map now that is going to get us on a path to make those improvements and enhancements in the missile defense capability over in the next few years. i take archer's point in terms

of we probably need to go onthat just right of launch look and we will probably be looking with greater consideration this year how we start to broaden beyond that. >> great. let me i think turn to you admiral macy. i like your extent the bmdr approach. it kind of reminds me frankly -- i think it was the 2002 national strategy for countering wmd. >> uh-huh. >> which had those several pillars, what have you, i don't think that was updated or has been updated -- of course the national strategy has been updated since then which dealt with consequence management response and all that sort of thing. this seems to be really, this is where the rubber meets the road in terms of really maturing how we think about missile defense. how far along -- just so we have some clarity about -- in terms of thinking, and in acting, merely in the missile sponge

the catcher's myth as it were, how far are we to integrating those missile defense capabilities and plans to everything else? we've heard all day how this is just one piece of our larger national -- i think the bmd, ballistic missile protection plan that you articulate is a further step. first of all, how far along are we there? >> i don't think we are very far along, which is why i possiblitied the idea. that stuff has been talked about many times. how you put -- it's a classic problem of how you put whole of government approaches together. it's always hard to do. i try to argue that in the case of responding to ballistic missile defense events, to ballistic missile events the time line is much shorter than almost any other each occurrence factor when you have more than one launch. so you don't have days or weeks or months much less to say okay this is how i'm going to respond. you know, the other end of it

of such a thing would be the classic force on force even that occurred in desert storm and we had the luxury of month to prepare our response. you are not going to have that here. so therefore you have to build your capability exercise your capability, train the people in it much further ahead of time and maintain that level of training, that level of capability. my observation is we really don't have that. because this would encompass actions that certainly the deputy of defense will take, which is what general totooff. norad, sent com, pay comas appropriate. but it's also going to involve actions at the state department, justice department, test yuri commerce because you are going to need to apply pressure in a number of different ways in order to change the behavior of your antagonist. and i don't believe that we are

very far along at doing that now. if we had to do it tomorrow, it would be a significant pick up game. >> excellent. shall we go to the audience questions, especially on the technology and you might say the full spectrum responses. i guess right here. >> good afternoon, charles new stead, state department speaking just for myself as a fist cyst and not for the department or mr. carey will fire me. although he is doing a great job. two points, in terms of the technology mr. matlock talked about the various systems that we could have either terrestrially or in space. and as he point out, developing a capability in the satellites to shoot things down would be certainly better if we could do it. now, in particular laser interests me because those are

coming along very quickly. one not quite there yet. we don't have laser that we can direct and quickly take out an incoming attack. but the point is that you mentioned diode pumped solid state lasers, which are coming along very quickly now. and may be what we need. now we've got to be concern that this capability is being developed in a number of countries. the united states is doing it. and so is -- are the french for their stockpiled stewardship programs as you understand. but that doesn't have the strength that we need for knocking out a missile. >> what's the question? >> sorry. i'll get to the question. the question is this. because china and russia are both russia at saroff and china in their defense establishment

are developing what they call -- the chinese call define light, and what the russians call -- i forgot the name -- but at these are supposed to be even stronger that what we had at nif and laser mega tool. >> what's the question. >> i'm sorry. i will he get to the point. it's long road i'm trying to travel here. the main point is how do we defend against the chinese and the russians? because they may well have the capability of developing these lasers before we do? >> other people are doing directed energy as well? do you want to speak to that? we're developing the systems, but they can -- other folks are developing directed energy at well. any comment on that? >> well i hope we are going to -- i hope we're moving more quickly. no, i don't mean to be flippant. but i think what we see here in the last five or six years is we were very successful in the airborne laser in terms of

proving the physics and proving that we could generate power necessary to shoot down rockets. our big challenge there was that it was operationally impractical because of the nature of the system. so we're looking at the technology that the gentleman suggested there the diode pumped al colied laser system which is primarily published at our laboratory in california. we are also looking at the fiber combined laser along with our darpa and air force teammates and looking at scaling those up. so we are finding that the technology is moving along fairly quickly. we won't be at lethal capability here for some years to come but we're hopeful that we'll be able to focus that research here along with bringing our industry into the picture very shortly to

help us understand how we might transition that technology then to a effective missile defense system that could perform a number of missile defense funks. >> dupe to talk about the fy 16 uav proposal, the proposal for a laser mound on a uav that was alluded to? >> yes. we have -- we've seen in the last couple of years, as i mentioned, great improvements in these two laser systems. we also know that our partners at onr have been demonstrating lasers on ships for a particular mission. and the army has done some great work down at white sands missile range for -- with lasers. so we want to take the research that we've got in the laboratory as well as the research that's going on today in our industry and look at the possibility of

whether or not we can transition more quickly to an airborne laser demonstrator here over the next four years. and so we've made some bets in our budget and we'll be awarding contracts shortly with industry to look at what that -- excuse me -- what that laser demonstrator might look like and how we might be able to put it together, and on what time line. >> great. other folks? mike? >> hi mike agrees with spoois space news, mr. matlock, if you could elaborate more about sensor network and what you might gain from that and what kind of time line there might be for that. >> which sensor network? >> i'm sorry. there was talk earlier about i guess -- >> space based? >> right space based sensor that might be more elaborate than i guess what currently

exists. >> so what we're doing right now is looking at space for -- in the current fiscal environments, access to space for our research has been challenges. so what we've been looking at is other -- other modalities that we can use then to demonstrate the technology that ultimately we might want to put in space. and so we have right now a program that we're working to modify some of our unmanned aerial vehicles with this new sensor capability. and looking at doing that in the field. we had some success just this past fall at the pacific missile range facility in conjunction with some of our egis ballistic missile defense tests in which we took a eoir sensor that's being used in the field today for other purposes mounted it

on the front of a reaper unmanned arrow vehicle and moved the capability forward so that we could track missiles up in the atmosphere as opposed to look at targets on the ground. and with the stereotracking capability, with those reapers we found that we could generate the kind of track quality necessary to launch standard missiles against targets. tarts that were launched there at pmrf. we have a tech plan now to look at increasing that capability over the next few years with the primary goal of looking at the sensor capability as opposed to the platform and then making a decision down the road depending on the success of that sensor whether or not this is something we would consider deploying in space or whether it's something that makes sense to deploy terrestrial, an unmanned aircraft. >> sir?

>> scott -- from inside the pentagon. i wanted to go back to the airborne laser on the drones. how do you reconcile that with that it will be attacking the missiles in the booster phase and it will take a while -- they will have to be in enemy air space, deal with enemy fire and the lasers probably won't be powerful enough to destroy the missile instantaneously? >> i'm sorry what was the question? i didn't catch the last part of that. >> can laser won't be able to destroy instantaneously the missile when it's in the boost phase. it will take a little while until the missile is destroyed. how are you going to protect the drones in an enemy environment whiler shooting down a boost phase missile. >> i'm going to leave that up to my partners in the air force. my job here, and my goal is to

prove that we can make the technology work at extended ranges. so our goal would be rather than tens or hundreds of kilometers, to get much longer range capability out of these lasers. so that's why i'm driving at these more efficient electric lasers to be able to scale them up to greater power so that we can laze at longer ranges and get more energy on target, which would reduce the time that you talked about that we would have to spend lazing each target. the goal is to get a more efficient laser that's more powerful at longer range. of course one of the challenges we are looking at here with this laser demonstrator is then taking it to the field and working with our war fighter come padres on what would be a reasonable conons as we look at missile defense systems that use directed energy.

>> i have another question question for admiral macy. you talk about integrating these things and frankly thinking about integrating them more heavily to buy time. what's the role in working with our allies on that? what to -- the qdr talks about one of the pillars being working with our partners and allies. on the missile defense mission how reline is the united states going to be on our own capability and how much in working and integrating with, being interoperable with other folks in the east, asia pacific and nato, what do you envision there? i think it's continual effort. it's to get more and more reline and more and more capable of, would go to the. nato has done this already. the decision was taken to make ballistic missile defense a mission of nato. and further, that the ballistic missile defense plans, the rules

of engagement, the defended asset list and everything were agreed upon at 28 in nato, which is as complete as you are going to get. and by force means some areas get more protection than others but they all agreed to it. so you work with your allies and partners for a number of reasons, one is particularcally in the cases where you have treaties you have a responsibility to them. nato is probably the most classic and the fullest one under article 5, wheran attack on one is an attack on all. we are fully reline on our systems, one is by definition and then you are reline on other people's systems to the greatest degree that they can provide them and you can agree to them with it. you want your allies involved not only because you have a responsible to them as they do to you for join defense and cooperative defense but for whatever assets they can bring

to the table. not just military but economic and whatever a completely off the wall but not necessarily idea is have part of the declared response toll policy that if a launch comes from a nation that the other nations leave -- the other economic power nations which would be the united states and europe and japan, australia, and so forth -- would immediately shut down all banking transactions. i mean that would render any modern country essentially inoperable essentially in 24 hours because the world is interconnected on banking. that becomes part of what you would do. that would be part of a cooperative agreement where allies and partners could join in with providing this effect. >> good. other folks? let's mix it up a little bit. actually, you know, earlier you asked about the laser

technology. i'd like to go back and frankly this is for both of you. this was referred to earlier today, the >> i would like to comment on that. >> i'm giving you the opportunity to comment on that. comment on the memo. it said a couple of things. it talked about budget constraints. it talked about really the increasing stress on the services for the missile defense mission and we heard earlier about of course sequestration. that affects everything. it affects northern command, homeland defense and it affects others. so go at it. >> the reason that i'm personally convinced that that memo was written by the two primary providers of bmd capability among the services is that those two officers were fulfilling their professional and legal obligation. when you are a commissioned officer in command, you're responsible to keep your

superiors advised on your ability or lack thereof to perform an assigned mission. doesn't matter whether you like the mission or not. i didn't read that memo as saying that the bmd policy was wrong. i read the memo as the chief of staff of the army and chief of naval operations were telling the secretary of defense, sir, i don't think i can do what you want me to do. so something has got to change, the mission or the resources. but they were doing what one has to do in that position. in fact they would have been seriously at fault had they not done so. >> very good. very good. i'm going to keep going. i'd like to kick back to the mkv, multivolume kill and now the mokv. multiple object. what's the real potential, the long term potential of miniaturization of the kill vehicles whether it's on today's intercepters or something else?

what's the long term potential for miniaturization there? >> well we've been through several cycles of miniaturization. and let me kind of give you a feel for what we're at. i mentioned earlier that we had taken the refrigerator-sized kill vehicle and shrunk it down to the size of a bread box. that was primarily what got us the capability to turn a standard missile in a navy par lance into a ballistic missile defender. and that, that system is probably about the right size for what we need to get done. the last time we looked at the mkv program, our goal then was to look at very large number of intercepters on a single booster. we were talking in the order of 24, 25. as we improve our sensing network and improve our

capability to discriminate, the need to have 25 kill vehicles on a single rocket is certainly less necessary than what we would have perceived before. and we weren't striving for that kind -- we don't need to strive for that capability now. so my perception is, is that we will probably need some miniaturization this next go around. i don't think it's the two orders of magnitude that we achieved from the ho experiment to the elite projectile. but there's some work we need to do there. as we look at our rkv and the way that we formulated the new -- i'm sorry, speaking in acronyms. but the new kill vehicle improved reliability is we're looking at modular open system architecture there that would allow us to bring new systems in to broaden the vendor

space as well as for our contractors. in other words if you can design to this particular interface and have this set of -- meet this set of requirements, then you're a new vendor for the missile defense integrator. that will allow us to bring more to bear on that challenge. and so i think it's a combination of how do we bring a little bit more capability, perhaps a little more miniaturization. but i don't perceive it as going from one to 26. i perceive it going from one to some number much less than 26 in this next go around. we'll probably be making investments this coming year looking at how do we go from an rkv to an mokv and we'll be looking at our partners to help looking at our industry partners to help us decide what that -- what's required to make that leap. >> good. any other comments from either of you folks or anybody else? [ inaudible ]

>> twitter? >> for example going to poland. hi. you're going to poland right. who measures what? because i'm looking at it from the host nation standpoint and who sells that are a your rmd or the environmental assessment. >> i think these gentlemen are speaking to future directions mar than the political considerations for hosting and that kind of thing. any final thoughts, things that haven't been brought out? you want to get off? >> i think it's been a very interesting conference. my only encourage would be from my obviously demonstrated viewpoint is that we continue to look at the fact that we have to

do more than provide a kinetic answer to an inbound threat. >> hearing a lot about that. i think there's a lot of nodding heads on that. i think we've reached our conclusion. i want to thank both of you gentlemen for this. i also want to thank our sponsor, the boeing company for making this possible, larger work on missile defense possible. hopefully we'll be continuing this conversation in the coming months. thank you all for coming out. [ applause ] >> thank you. we spoke with three members of congresses, al franken bob good. there -- goodlatt and doris

matsui. >> i think if comcast could have bought time warner it would have led to less choice and higher prices and worse service. >> and we are work with technology companies dealing with privacy and civil lirktberties

so when that occurred that whole energy that happened with that, when chairman wheeler, because of the overturning of the open internet order, when he had to have a new proposal out there, when he just hinted that there might be paid prioritization in which that really means is that from the internet provider to the end user, which is the customer, in essence, that they may have to pay for faster speeds or whatever i mean 4 million comments? that was unheard of. >> tonight at 8:00 eastern on the communicators on c-span 2. the u.s. supreme court heard oral argument in april on the

armed career criminal act and whether the law triggers excessive sentences and is unconstitutionally vague. the law is a version of the 1983 three strike's law. convicted felons caught with guns face a maximum sentence of ten years but those with three prior convictions are subject to a 15-year mandatory sentence. the court is expected to decide this case before the end of the term in june. >> we will hear reargument today in johnson versus united states. >> mr. chief justice and may it please the court, the residual clause of the violent felony definition of the armed career criminal act is unconstitutionally vague because the text and structure do not set out with clarity what

predicate offenses fall within its coverage and what does not. after repeated efforts to decertain a meaningful and rep kabl framework that will guide lower courts. >> you are contesting only the residual clause not the rest of the statute. so if the statute ended with the list burglary, arson, or extortion, you're not attacking any of that? >> that is correct your honor. and we believe that the other portions of this statute shed some light on why the clause is unconstitutionally vague. the others tie it directly to the elements of the offense in question. the force clause requires that