so railroad passenger travel is still about the safest method of transportation. is that correct? >> we believe that, yes. >> and did you ever tell this committee or the congress that you didn't have the funds to move fast enough on installation of positive train control? >> we did not. >> all right. miss feinberg, how do you intend to -- what enforcement actions would you take against railroads that aren't moving fast enough would a railroad be given credit -- for instance, if one railroad is a little bit behind another railroad in installation, but they have a better safety record, or maybe they have the best safety record of any railroad, would they be given credit for that good safety record? >> we have having an internal conversation at fra now about how exactly we will plan to

enforce against the deadline. just as we discussed previously, there are some railroads have behaved here better than others. certainly, and we don't want to punish railroads further ahead for the behavior of railroads who have not done any work on implementation at all. so we're having an internal conversation. we have discretion within the statute on how we enforce against the deadline, it can include anything from very little enforcement to daily civil penalties. >> all right. thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. duncan. with that, mr. sires is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. you know, i ride the amtrak just about every week. i ride the amtrak just about every week. and this accident really hit home.

miss feinberg and mr. boardman, can you speak to the future of amtrak and passenger rail if congress continues to use patchwork approach to continued improvements? >> well, i would like to say, mr. sires, that my concern has been the reliability of the railroad. the reliability of what we do for our hardware on our system. the reliability of our use of tunnels. whether it's in new york or that our reliability on the portal bridge that's ready to be rebuilt that doesn't always shut properly. so the funding for infrastructure on the northeast corridor is absolutely behind the curve. in the last reauthorization of our funding in the pria act,

there was a commission established out of all the states, the federal government and amtrak, along the northeast corridor, and that's where the $21 billion backlog came from of the necessity for us to rebuild an equity investment in this corridor. we also have a requirement because of the growth of traffic on this corridor. we're handling over 2,000 trains a day on the corridor, amtrak does, is that we need more capacity. which means we need new assets as well. some new tunnels into new york. another new bridge going into new york especially. and we need to fix this baltimore trunk point that we have. from my perspective, that's where the funding is really needed. we make safety decisions based on safety.

and the infrastructure decisions were being made based on the available funds. >> thank you. mr. hart, i just can't understand -- this is 2015, and we're still analyzing whether seat belts would have made a difference. i still agree with the congressman that all these cars and planes, they have shown that it works, and i don't understand why in 2015 we're still analyzing this. and in terms of people walking around in the train, i mean, people get up and walk in a plane too, right. but you take your life in your hands when you walk around these trains back and forth, so can you answer that? i don't see why we have to analyze this any more. analyzing this to what? >> thank you for the question. we're looking at the total situations, not just seat belts

but integrity of the seats themselves. there are several seats that can be detached. we're looking at the totality of circumstances on how to protect the occupants. >> well, i got to tell you, looking at the seats, it just seems logical to me that seat belts would make a difference. and to wait to analyze it more and more and more, i don't get it. i would be comfortable wearing a seat belt, and i go on the train, monday, tuesday, thursdays and fridays. i don't see it. we have to wait for this. miss feinberg, can you talk to that? >> in my experience, the ntsb is not shy about recommending improvements to safety. and so we will work closely with them, and anything that comes out of the accident we will work very closely in. >> will you say this is one of the cheapest accommodations that you could make? >> on seat belts? >> no, i would not.

>> it's more expensive than other accommodations? >> it's implementing seat belts, and again, implementing seat belts on trains would require the change of every seat, which would again, expense is not the priority here, but we would have to harden all of the seats. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> that would cost billions of dollars is what you're saying? >> yes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first of all, mr. hart, i have a copy of the metro link crash report from 2008. you're familiar with that. >> yes, i am. and in that, you had two recommendations, major recommendations. one that we have cameras installed.

inward looking cameras? >> yes. and then you also had the positive train control recommendation, correct? >> yes. >> i want to talk about both of those. let's go back to the 2008 report f you just look at it. that wasn't the first time you recommended cameras or audio devices, correct? >> correct. >> in 1997, after a 1996 crash and no operating crew members survived. this was an amtrak train near silver springs, maryland, you recommended. that's r 97-9 recommendation. then you had another accident

with no surviving crew members that occurred in 1999 in bryant, ohio, is that correct? and a recommendation which is r-97-9. the first recommended fra that they install these devices, and then the second one was back in '99. also recommended that the fra install this. then your recommendation in 2005, there was a crash of a cn freight train in mississippi. ntsb made the following recommendations to fra. is that correct, sir? >> yes, that's correct. >> what did fra did, miss feinberg? >> previously the fra has not taken action on -- >> they have not taken action on any of these. okay, and then 2008 was also a recommendation. they did not take action on that, is that correct? >> that is correct. our recent actions -- >> in fact, it's been very

difficult. in fact since then, many freight rails have installed those devices. are you aware of that, ma'am? >> yes, sir. >> in fact, but it's been difficult. in fact, they had to go through lawsuits. i want this to be entered into the record. here's kansas city southern was attempting to put cameras in the cab. they were sued mr. mr. comstock and his group. not only will both unions fervently oppose the lawsuit, they will ask the court to join them from going ahead with a plan. could we put that in the record, please? ask unanimous consent. these cameras and history and nothing being done. let's talk about financing these and positive train control. you just recommended you're going to have fra financing available?

>> the rif program does have financing available. >> okay, since 2012, how many riff loans have there been? >> i believe there have been three. >> two up till this year, i think. well, a total of three. the joke is there are more fra administrators, we've had more fra administrators than we've had rif loans. so you have the capability to loan money if you need adjustment and you need to get to us. in fact, the private sector has the responsibility for installing positive train control. they've actually run into some problems, haven't they, with fcc? so another agency has delayed this. this is part of -- part of the problem was native americans and

approval by fcc of those requests. isn't that true? it's not all the freight railroad. some of that has been delayed. i would like that submitted for the record to all show that there have been problems with fcc. in fact, do you know how many licenses fcc has done per year approved on average? >> i do not know how many a year. >> they do 2,000 a year. you know how many the freight company is approved to get this done by the end of the year? >> in terms of antennas? >> it's 22,000. there's a little bit of a backlog, and it's not right to penalize the freight trails for delays by an agency and things beyond control. when you say you're going to take them to task i don't think that's the right thing to do. just getting started here, mr. chairman. i yield back the balance of my time at this point. >> i thank the gentleman.

>> miss nor ton is recognized for five minutes.ton is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. the focus here has been on positive train control. i'm leery of silver bullets. and i note miss feinberg testified human factors continue to be the leading cause. she says on page six of her testimony of train accidents. i think this train was going at what was it? 150 miles an hour at that curve? >> 102. >> 106. now mr. pierce, on page six of his testimony says although there has been concern about sleep disorder, he focuses on poor lineup information and far too many surprise calls for work. and he says we have identified

these were more than a decade. confirmed data shows variable work cycles where engineers move from shift to shift, routinely contribute to fatigue. yet very little has been done to address any of these issues. mr. boardman, on november 25th, i wrote you a letter concerning precisely the issues of fatigue, and i must ask you today particularly considering that these very tracks carry volatile substances as well as passengers, i must ask you about the amtrak proposal to

reconfigure work schedules for train and engineer service employees at union station and service elsewhere on the northeast corridor. i would like to know if you are continuing to reconfigure these work schedules even after this accident or whether you have stood down on the work schedules for the time being. >> the route couplets that were changed along the northeast corridor remain. and the kinds of difficulties testified to in terms of unpredictable schedules doesn't really exist at passenger railroads unless there's unpredictable weather or if we have a problem out somewhere on the long distance trains. there's a pretty predictable schedule that occurs for amtrak engineers. >> so you are mandating 12-hour shifts for tne employees. >> they're not mandated at 12-hour shifts. they have a period of time that

they have between the work schedules that they have. >> mr. pierce, let me ask mr. pierce. mr. pierce, would you comment on what mr. boardman has said and on this notion of poor lineup and surprise calls to work. whether that continues and what the effect has been on workers. >> my comments were inclusive of freight and passengers. and because they interact on the same tracks, we view that as a related issues.. amtrak jobs are scheduled much more so than the freight environment. there are cases where shift changes that come and people rotate from one shift to another do contribute to fatigue. our comments were intended to at least note the things that can contribute and it's been identified by the ntsb for a very long time.

and it's something that we still try to continue to get our arms around. >> could i ask the witness from ntsb whether you are looking at fatigue along with the obvious absence of ptc, if you are looking at issues of possible fatigue, i'm concerned about this. i'm assuming we don't have people ordinarily riding the trains that go 100 miles an hour around a curve. i'm asking if you're looking at what may have caused this engineer to be driving at excessive speed around this curve. >> yes, we typically look at fatigue in all accidents. we are looking at it in this accident. we have been recommending for years fatigue management programs to determine issues like shift changes. >> have you worked at the 12-hour work shifts as whether or not those are consistent with safety and these surprise calls?

>> we've looked at a number of methods of work shifts and cycle shift changes and made recommendations these need to be made on science based fatigue programs and look at the total picture and base it on science. >> mr. gibbs. >> thank you very much. >> thank you. mr. gibbs. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. boardman, i'm confused. on the ptc we talked about this track, i think it was a conscious decision. first of all in your testimony you said on the southbound that was instituted. but on northbound it wasn't because i think i read a report that it was you said the speed, maximum speed you can get up to was 80 miles an hour in your testimony. is that correct? >> no, sir. >> no? >> it's not. it's not ptc.

it is not acceleration it's a maximum allowed speed at 80 miles an hour. and the turnover speed on the corner is 98. >> i understand that. but i think i read in the report the reason it was on the southbound and ptc was implemented on the southbound -- >> excuse me, sir i just want you to understand it's not positive train control. it is automatic train control, a major difference in how it operates. that's all. >> okay. so automatic train control is on the southbound track. >> yes, sir. >> and not the northbound track. >> yes, sir. >> so when you were talking about megahertz, that was ptc, not automated? >> i was talking about positive train control there. >> there's no positive train control in the southbound. it's automated.

>> there's no positive train control on that at all. it is using a code coming out of the automatic train control. there's four codes. they were really made initially for not having one train run into each other on an automatic block system. i am digging into a much deeper piece. >> i'm trying to understand this a little better. since this was a new engine, this engine, this train have the capability to gain speed faster than previously thought? >> the new have a difference performance metric, just like we have three or four different kinds of locomotives out there that have different characteristics, so it wouldn't surprise me that it does. >> okay, back in 2013, in a hearing you told mr. shuster the biggest priority was the northeast corridor or long distance services.

i believe you responded at long distance services. in light of this accident, are you looking at revisiting that? i mean, the big question today is why wasn't ptc implemented sooner in this highly traveled northeast corridor? you know, where dollars reprogrammed others in the country for long distance services? >> no, they weren't. we made decisions based on safety, and we knew what our scheduled time was and the deadline was going to be december 31st of 2015. so we were working against that and resolving the problems that we moved along with on that process. >> okay. mr. pierce in your written testimony, you talk about ptc

replacing the second member of the crew in the cab. two-person crews were determined, ptc would have prevented them. do you agree with that, or not? >> there is one example cited, i believe in red oak, iowa, that was not a ptc preventable accident, when two trains get into the same block as we call it, of signal, there is no meaningful way to avoid collision in that circumstance, so we do not believe it can replace the second crew member because it doesn't do what he does and isn't going to prevent a majority of collision. the majority of them will be prevented, but not all. >> miss feinberg. apparently it's not where i thought some of it was. you know, billions of dollars cost. >> i would defer to amtrak on the actual cost because i think they have predicted it. but it's less in terms of what

they haven't implemented and how far they have to go to complete implementation. >> mr. boardman. >> i'm sorry. i didn't hear the base question. >> in my previous question that ptc is not implemented at all in the northeast corridor or in parts? >> it is installed, but we need that radio frequency. >> what's the estimated cost? >> $111 million is where we are for the ptc. >> thank you. my time has expired. >> thank you, mr. gibbs. miss edwards. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman, and thank you to the witnesses today. i know there's still a lot of facts and many questions we have to examine before we get real answers, but there's some things, and i want to follow up with miss norton's comments. on may 12th, my understanding, mr. pierce, is that the engineer who was operating was doing so under a new rule, under a new controversial work schedule that

began on march 23rd of 2015, and that included shorter turnaround times on most runs that had happened before march 23rd. i guess i'm curious whether the union or workers were consulted prior to the the new work schedule as to what they believe the impact would be on them? >> yes. they have been. the unions are in discussion with amtrak about the scheduling of the workforce on the assignments that you're talking about. the assignments in place do not violate federal hours of service and they are not constricted by the current contract language. it's something the parties work out between themselves as the best ways to assign the jobs, and our representatives on

amtrak are involved in those negotiations now. >> and did you express concerns to amtrak about the schedules or the inclusion of the schedules in the new modeling of scheduling? >> i know our representatives have shared our concerns over the schedules, yes. >> and do you feel it's been incorporated by the rule in place. >> i'm not sure i understand the last one. >> do you think the concerns you expressed about including the demands on scheduling issues that impact the workers have been appropriately included in the new work requirement? >> i don't think the process is kpleeptd yet -- completed yet, so i can't comment on what the final product will be. the parties are discussing it now as to what the appropriate assignment and the respite time should be between the runs. >> and to mr. boardman, can you describe for us, if you would, how you incorporate fatigue as an element of the modeling when it goes into the work schedules.

>> i cannot. >> you don't incorporate it in there? >> i can't describe if we have a modeling for fatigue in there. i know in this particular run there were no changes. it was the same schedule. >> but in developing the model, what is it that amtrak does to incorporate worker fatigue, engineer fatigue in the model? >> in terms of whether we would have sufficient rest for the employee, we ensure that that's the case, but having a model differently from a mathematical model, i'm not sure of your question. >> okay, so mr. hart, when you examine what it is that the number of things that may have gone wrong, how do you look at fatigue, and how do you look at the modeling for work schedules? >> we start with the 72-hour history of the person involved

and look at what that reflects. if that commands us to dig deeper and find out what kinds of programs does the employer have, that would result in these -- the 72-hour pass that this employee encountered, then we would dig deeper. then we would start with the 72-hour history. >> and miss feinberg, have you -- has the fra engaged in a process of implementing recommendations, previous recommendations from the ntsb? >> on this specific issue, we have done work on fatigue and generally for quite some time and are now working on comprehensive rule making that would address fatigue. among others. >> so when recommendations, because we have done this when there have been, you know, transit accidents and other things. when recommendations come from the ntsb, how do you decide if it's not a requirement, they are recommendations, how does the

fra decide to implement them. it seems that many of them remain on the list forever until there's an accident. and then we look at the recommendations again. >> well, i wish it were as easy as the ntsb giving us recommendations and us implementing them. but it doesn't work that way. we have to enter into a rule making, or we would have to go into an emergency order, which probably wouldn't stand up in court. but generally a lot of times we would have to enter into a rule making that would take years. there are occasionally recommendations that we may not agree with, and chairman hart and i will write back and forth together to talk about it. our staffs will work together to see if we can come together on it. but when i arrived, we had 72 outstanding recommendations. i have said it is one of my top priorities to clear the deck. i think we're down to 63. we meet weekly and work to clear

the deck every week. >> my time has long expired. thank you, chairman. >> thank you, miss edwards. >> thank you. among other things, and there are members who would defund, cut back on amtrak generally, this accident, and this tragedy, pointed out the importance of amtrak, i think in ways that we should observe. and i think, mr. boardman, maybe you can speak to that. because i view transportation of goods and people up and down the corridor as a system. and what we noticed in those days, and you were back at work very quickly. a matter of days. a tremendous increase in some of those tickets and difficulties on the highway. i wonder if you and miss feinberg would speak to that

anecdotally. >> certainly. i believe that you're right. i think that people understood i think intellectually at first that shutting down the railroad was going to cause a major economic blip for people that wanted to do business and conduct their work in that particular part of the railroad. and then i think they understood it after almost a week, much more emotionally and in their pocketbook because of the problems that occurred in that period of time. they can take one or two days, but when it became a shutdown for that period of time, their personal economy had suffered. and the mobility and the business community had suffered, and was suffering from the increase in the number of cars

that were on the highway and the inability to find a seat. by aviation. >> i read the tickets were over $2000 from new york to d.c. >> i read one report where they were pretty high levels. i think one of the things the aviation people did say is the last seat is always much more expensive because the way they price their services. but it was definitely a problem. >> miss feinberg? >> if i'm remembering the numbers correctly, i think it's $100 million a day entity. and so any time service is shut down on a portion of the northeast corridor, it has a dramatic impact. we're talking about making sure the northeast corridor is making sure it's in a state of good repair. >> we're fairly well concluded

it's not in a state of good repair. >> the one bridge over 100 years old, that could shut down virtually everything. the plans are done. and it could be built if it were funded, and that is a point in the system that could wreck everything for a long, long time. and so the $100 million a day in a week would be 700 million, whatever. >> an there are multiple choke points like that. >> you know others? >> the tunnels underneath the hudson, the baltimore tunnel, it depends where, but there are multiple choke points like that. >> you and mr. pierce have disagreement about audio and inward facing cameras. i can understand both points of view. but i would like to give you a minute to maybe explain yours

more thoroughly. clearly you have a difference of opinion over privacy and what mr. pierce referred to as un-american. >> yes, thank you for the question. the more we know about what caused a crash, the more specifically we can recommend remedies to try to prevent it from happening again. and that's the the additional information that we get from video and audio sources that helps us to be more specific about what caused a crash and be more specific about our recommendations. >> so would you say as a public servant that it's not too much to ask? >> well, congress asked us to improve safety, and that's one of the ways we're trying to improve safety. >> i think our position on cameras has been misrepresented. there's no legislation in effect that govern the installation. and railroads are running programs on their own they have

imposed or implemented from the labor unions or people being filmed. >> we have made i don't know how many proposals go through the process. we met to try to come up with ways to have a reasonable implementation. we have not satisfied our goal yet. >> my time is expired. thank you, mr. chairman. >> miss frankel, you're recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. well, one of the great things about being sort of at the end of the questioning is to get to hear all the good ideas. and so this is what so far i've heard suggestions for cameras, seat belts, hardening of the seats for seat belts. more training, more employees, better infrastructure, positive

train control, and i know that, and i join my colleagues in extending sympathies to all the folks who lost loved ones and who are injured. and i know there are those back home very angry wanting to know why we can't do more, why we don't do more. i think it's pretty obvious. you give billions of dollars in figures every time we mention one of these suggestions. so my question is from a practical point of view, what do each of you recommend as the best way to proceed that will keep train travel affordable and recognizing this congress has put a sequester on itself? >> humans make mistakes.

that's fundamental. the engineers are a very good population of people. they're hard working and try to do the right thing. they make mistakes because they're humans. that's not criticism. that's a statement of facts. humans make mistakes. that's why positive train control is the most important single backup to respond to human error. >> i'll stay on the positive train control for a minute. and i believe we will be done on the spine of the northeast corridor by the end of this year. that will contribute the greatest leap in safety for the northeast corridor and positive train control in this nation should be done by this generation of railroaders. in terms of infrastructure on the northeast corridor, it is no different than what is happening to our interstate highway system and to our aviation system. we as a nation must begin to make an equity investment, even

if we have to find other ways to do it with third parties, public/private financing, it has to occur for the future. or our economy will begin to suffer. that needs to happen. >> in terms of human factors, positive train control is the main factor. fatigue management and bringing our infrastructure up to state of good repair. >> i think positive train control. the only thing not a machine on the locomotive is the crew. and they are humans. and it would be like walking a tight rope without a net not to have ptc, and this comes down to a discussion over what level of risk we're willing to take as a nation. and how we fund avoiding that risk. >> and whoever wants to answer this question. just for the public's purpose could you explain why, what is the difficulty of getting positive train control. is it just the cost? is it getting the airwaves?

is it the technology? what is the biggest obstacles? >> i'll take the first stab at it, at least. for amtrak it has been recently getting the spectrum of radio that we really need to ensure the reliability for a system that needs to be vital and needs to be fail safe. and that has been the hold up. we moved it quickly with the ftc. the testing has occurred and we will get this done by the deadline on the northeast corridor. >> so do you believe the fcc has been responsive enough? or could they be more helpful? >> we think they've been very responsive in the last couple three weeks. yes. >> how long have you been trying to push through. >> we began to run into problems with this in 2012, and they

begin to point us to the private sector to buy the spectrum. >> miss feinberg. >> funding is certainly an issue. spectrum has been an issue. ptc is a complicated technology. it requires, you know, a back office. it requires the antennas, the spectrum transponders. it is a complicated technology, and it takes time. you know, the fra requires railroads to submit a safety implementation plan to us so we can go over that plan with the railroads, provide edits and working together to get them to a place where they're able to implement it. we've received one safety plan from a railroad. it was more than 5,000 pages long. and it was appropriately long. so it is a massive undertaking. it's complicated, and it's expensive. we were able to get back to that railroad and provide them with

feedback so they can move forward and start implementing. but it is certainly complicated and expensive. >> thank you very much. and i yield back. >> before i recognize mr. rice, let me remind members that we have about 20 members waiting in line with seven still before the gavel, and it is quickly approaching 12:00. if there are any members that would like to submit their questions in writing, this committee would be happy to accommodate them. mr. rice, you're recognized. >> mr. chairman, point of information. >> yes, sir. >> did you just ask that members who may wish to submit their questions in writing, or are you limiting the people to ask questions allowed? >> there is no -- we are not dictating when this committee will adjourn. we're only saying if there are members that would like to, by

choice, enter questions in writing, we would certainly accommodate them. >> thank you. >> mr. rice. >> thank you mr. chairman. i'll start with mr. hart. mr. hart, we've talked about a number of safety measures that could be added that would increase safety on these lines and some were cheaper. we talked about the positive train control. we've talked about adding seat belts and having to bulk up the seats. we talk about inward facing cameras among others. between those three, which would be the cheapest to implement, do you think? >> we don't get into the cost of implementation. we look at what most effectively improves safety. >> thank you, mr. hart. mr. boardman, which do you think would be the cheapest among those three? >> well, for us, because we have already gotten the positive train control moving forward, it's not a great expense at this point in time.

and the overall part of it. but we don't think the inward facing cameras is an outrageous cost either. that's reasonable cost. >> pretty reasonable price, right? >> why would they increase safety. they're just taking a picture. >> because we can use them for efficiency testing. we can see what's going on with the engineer itself. we've had -- >> you think it may change the the behavior of the engineer some? >> we have a pilot program and a system that we operate now, metro link, where there is much less stress than what the engineers thought they were going to have, and actually it's really helped in a lot of situations. >> stress. mrs. feinberg, among those three, the seat belts and inward facing cameras and train control, which would be the cheapest to implement, do you think? >> the most inexpensive would be inward facing cameras. you would get more bang for your buck with ptc, but we are moving

forward with both. >> mr. pierce, which do you think would be the cheapest? positive train control? >> i think the jury is out on inward facing cameras. the technology has not been measured to crashworthiness standards. the technology failed in several collisions, so the data was not available. it didn't provide the post accident testing supposedly being provided for. >> why don't we have inward facing cameras? it's been recommended and suggested. miss feinberg, why don't we have those now? >> we do have them now. many have implemented inward facing cameras? >> why don't we have them on all the trains? why wasn't there one on this train? >> because some have chosen not to implement inward facing camera. we are moving ahead with the rule making, although we may take interim steps to recommend inward facing cameras -- >> why haven't they been mandated?

>> well, the issue has rarely been for us to mandate them. it's been that railroads are moving ahead with them regardless and should we put some sort of -- >> mr. boardman, why are they not mandated? >> i don't have the answer to the mandate. we've been supporting that it occur. >> why haven't you required it? it would be very inexpensive to put a camera? >> i have required it at this point. the decision is we are doing it. >> why hasn't it been required until now? >> because i did not make the decision myself to do that. we have been supporting the rail safety advisory committee and discussing how this -- >> who would have argued against putting in inward facing cameras? >> a lot has to do with how the data is going to be used, and whether it's going to be appropriately used. >> you know, is it privacy issues with engineers? is that one of the issues? >> i would have to let the engineers answer that. >> mr. pierce? >> it's not only a privacy issue, as mr. boardman said, it's the way the cameras are utilized and how they're implemented.

there are no safeguards. >> safeguards. all it's doing is taking a picture. what do you mean safeguard? why wouldn't that have inward facing cameras? a cheap way to increase safety? why would they not have an inward facing camera. >> you're suggesting that we're going to change behavior, and that suggests there's intentional bad behavior, and i would argue that's inappropriate or not an accurate representation. the bottom line is -- >> we had -- we've had proven cases of bad behavior. two years ago there was a driver who said he fell asleep, i believe. going into a curve. and people were killed. we don't know what happened in this case. >> i don't consider fatigue bad behavior, congressman. >> i would think if they're on camera, they might be a little more aware of their surroundings. >> i do not think a camera will cure fatigue. it will not make you less tired. >> i suspect that it will -- would be a great increase in safety in terms of change

safety in terms of change in behavior. i want to ask one more question. mr. hart, you said you were looking at phone data the last three weeks, complicated by changes in time zones. how many time zones do you cross in philadelphia on this line? >> mr. hart, i would ask for a quick response. >> the time zones we're talking about is in the phone system. it's a california based carrier, california numbers in. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. miss brownlee? >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. boardman, i wanted to ask -- i feel pretty confident based on you testimony that at least for the northeast corridor that you're going to be able to complete pdc in a timely way by 2015. i wanted to know whether you believe we have the resources and technology for amtrak at least to complete ptc across the country by 2015? >> well, amtrak doesn't have the responsibility to actually implement the ptc across the

country on host railroads, for the most part. there have been a couple of class three railroads that believe, one in kansas city, and the other in st. louis, that believe we need to be the ones to implement positive train controls in those communities, and the rest of it is primarily the class one railroads, and our part would be to implement it in the locomotives. and we'll be ready, we believe, when they have their positive train control available. >> so amtrak in california, for example, you're saying you're not responsible for ptc there? >> yeah, if it's not our line -- >> i see. >> -- we're not responsible. >> i see. okay, ms. feinberg, in terms of implementation are there penalties imposed for railroads that have not met the ptc recommendation.

-- implementation? >> we're having an internal conversation at fra on how to go against the deadline. >> how will you complete the task and the public would know? >> in the coming weeks i would say. >> in the coming weeks. >> i also wanted to follow up with you just in terms of your opinion in lieu of full implementation of ptc. do you think two-person crews is something that would be an appropriate safety net for the short term? doesn't sound there's going to be full implementation by 2015, certainly the airlines have two crew members. do you think that's something that is -- could be a short term or interim safeguard? >> certainly that is one of the

things we're taking a close look at and we believe could be an interim solution along with probably additional backstops as well. and there are some places where that two-person -- two people in the cab may not be possible but you could have additional folks on the train communicating back and forth to each other. >> why would two people in a cab may not be possible in some instances? >> not enough room. >> mr. hart, also the same question to you, do you believe that a two-person crew might be an interim solution before ptc is fully implemented? >> it would be based on experience, we don't find two person crews are an improvement over single person crews. >> why is that? it seems common sense if you have another two people driving a train, that if one person falls asleep, then the other person is there to take over.

>> in theory that's true but two people can fall asleep and be distracted, we're not finding from experience and it is limited because we don't have that much two-person crews. based on the limited experience, we're not finding two-person crews to be a safety improvement over single person crews. >> thank you, sir. i'll yield back, mr. chairman. >> mr. chairman, thank you. it's my understanding you would like me to yield some time to you. >> thank you. just one quick question for ms. feinberg, safety is important across the entire country and my home state of california, ptc is slow to be implemented as well. 3.7 billion was put to california high speed rail. that money has been transferred to the cal train, to electrify cal train, $400 million of that to help implement the trans bay terminal.

why are we not transferring money to do ptc on the connector routes in california? >> we have asked for significant funding for ptc for commuters. if you're asking specifically if we would transfer money from the high speed rail authority into ptc? >> you're using stimulus dollars in many different places in california for electrification and changing the terminal but not using it for ptc, which it's my understanding high speed rail will need ptc and connector routes should have ptc already. why are we not using money that will revert back to the federal government next year if it's not spent? if that money is available today why are we not using it for ptc in california? >> it will be going to ptc in california. most of our money that has gone out, $600 million has gone towards ptc.

>> you're saying it's a priority. you haven't been able to spend it quick enough in california? >> no, i believe it will get spent on time by the end of the year. >> just for the record, we're spending california high speed rail dollars, federal stimulus dollars in california on many different things other things. far behind on ptc and it is not been a big enough priority to use those stimulus dollars on ptc in california. >> sir, if you're asking if we can take stimulus dollars that is going to high speed rail and transfer to ptc, i don't believe that would be in keeping with grant agreement but we can take a look at it and come back with a formal response. but i don't think that would be in keeping with the grant agreement. >> thank you, mr. perry. >> reclaiming my time, ms. feinberg, there's been an implication made in this committee that congress itself and maybe certain individuals,

certain party are responsible financially for the mishap in philadelphia. i want to get the facts straight. it's my understanding as well fra stated that a lack of public sector funding may cause unwanted delays in fully implementing ptc. and it also according to my records would cost $131.2 million. $131.2 million to fully implement positive train control on the northeast corridor, the track that amtrak owns. now over 12 years they lost billion dollars in food service and inspector general's opinion that amtrak paid large bonuses to ineligible management and staff. the 31 million amtrak tickets

that were sold were subsidized to $250 a piece and this particular portion of line makes anywhere from 400 to $500 million a year. it seems to me plus we give amtrak to the tune of 1.3 to whatever two point something billion dollars a year. how come they can't spend 10% of what they lost on positive train control and is it congress's fault -- is it fra's assertion that it's congress's fault that ptc wasn't funded in the northeast corridor? >> on amtrak, they said they will implement ptc by the congressionally mandated deadline of december 31st of 2015 and we agree with them that they can meet that deadline. >> it's not a funding issue? >> amtrak does not have a funding issue in terms of ptc. they have said they will meet the deadline. >> amtrak -- just to be clear, amtrak does not have a funding issue with ptc by the deadline,

it's not congress's fault it's not implemented timely, correct or not correct? >> amtrak specifically has said they will meet the deadline. we have had many conversations about the need for our request of the congress to give additional assistance to commuter railroads to meet the deadline. we've also requested additional assistance for amtrak to meet the deadline. >> one last question, mr. chairman. before i came here, i think about 2009, $800 billion of stimulus passed and majority to go to infrastructure. if ptc was such a concern, how much was spent, understanding 131.2 million, a very small percentage, if you look at that, would be required to fully implement ptc in the northeast corridor, how much was spent allocated by this congress, how much was spent if it's such a priority? do you know? >> we'll have to get back to

you. >> thank you, mr. chairman, i yield back. >> miss brown, you're recognized for five minutes. >> thank you mr. chairman. as former member of the strong supporter of rail, my heart goes out to family and individuals who suffered in the wake of amtrak train derailment that occurred recently in philadelphia. i personally want to thank today's panelist for the hard work and dedication and the employees that they showed in dealing with the terrible disaster. mr. boardman, i want to particularly thank you for your leadership but my question -- i know you all monitor the trains and rates of the speed. can you discuss what safeguards that you have in place to check

speed of locomotives and engineers? >> yes, ma'am. we have a regular series and i don't think you were here earlier when i said we looked check the speed -- we've had 16,000 checks of speed since january 1st of '14. we do that through radar and by downloading the equipment in the locomotive to find out what speed they are traveling. >> yes, sir. i was here the entire time. i wanted you to repeat it again. >> thank you. >> positive train control, that is one of the most important aspects of safety and what we talked about the cars itself. and we talked about the crew. it's the combination. can you expound on that a little bit?

>> certainly. positive train control is a system that's layered on top of several systems we operate today, one being positive train control. every time there's a temporary speed change, we use a manual system because the dispatcher and the engineer has to write down what has occurred here. we use from the manual system up to a positive train control system in order to ensure that we operate safely and do run a safe railroad. >> mr. hart, other than positive train control and the facing cram as what are some of the other safety measures do you think we need to put in place? >> thank you for the question. we've heard questions about fatigue and we're looking into that. infrastructure in terms of maintenance -- the state of good repair, we always are looking at that. we're looking at the totality of circumstances, the best situation is for the train to

stay on the track in the first place. we want to make sure that happens. we want to provide survivability for passengers if it doesn't stay on the track. >> you all acted quickly and i want to thank you all for that. do you think there's additional training that the employees need? >> that is something we're taking a look at now. when i referred to the potential -- the package we're putting together that would address potential human factors, that's something we'll take a close look at. >> mr. pierce, what are your concerns about the training of employees for a disaster. i want to commend that the employees did an excellent job. i was being -- it was being monitored and started to get calls as soon as it happened and i want to thank you for that. what additional training do you think the employees need for disaster?

>> i think the training that the employees receive is in large part the normal operations type training, disaster training is obviously something that we don't hope we'll ever have to experience. i'm not sure exactly to what extent the difference is as to how much actual accident type training that the employees are receiving on amtrak right now. i have to defer to mr. boardman on that one. >> mr. boardman? >> so what amtrak does today as emergency management system, we're working in concert with first responders up and down the corridor and across the country with police departments and have an incident command structure that was a requirement in the law we have a family assistance program and work with the ntsb to stand that up properly, we depend on those first responders in the community such as -- and i talked about it earlier, philadelphia in this particular case. but we have an ongoing good relationship to make sure we

have the proper training and disaster drills across the country. >> my time is running out, what i would like from each of the members in writing, what are some of the infrastructure projects that we need in the northeast corridor like the baltimore terminals and other things to make sure that we are -- we in congress are doing what we need to do because when my colleagues try to imply that money is not an issue, money is an issue. and some of the tunnels and we went up on the train and we talked to people along the way. we know that there are many tunnels and infrastructure conditions that need to be upgraded. >> mr. boardman i ask for a quick response. >> we will provide that list for you. >> i would like to -- [ indiscernible ]

>> we'll provide the questions in writing but ask for a response on infrastructure needs from each of you, thank you. >> you're recognized for five minutes. >> i thank the chair and witnesses for their testimony this morning. following up on questions that might have already been asked, i want to go to you, sir, about what seems to be i think, in your testimony, a right to privacy. in the kplotive cab with regard to inward facing cameras. is that the position of the brotherhood or not? >> i didn't say right to privacy. there are privacy concerns about the storage of data. i don't think anyone wants to see their last minutes if they are killed in a locomotive collision to be floating around on youtube to be honest with you.

there are steps that need to be taken to make sure that the data is protected and the data is used for what everybody seems to think it is used for which is post accident testing. >> it seems that's covered and other modes of transportation and other industries. surely that could be worked out. >> to date it has not been worked out. there is no regulation, fra has started the rule making process on cameras but until there's regulation, the railroads are running programs, each one independent of the other and the data storage is something that's different on every railroad. >> right, but however gruesome the photo or whatever the situation might be or whatever goes on youtube, when you're on the job you don't agree there's a right to privacy, do you? >> you're kind of putting words in my mouth. our concerns are many -- it's a yes or no question. you might have answered already. you don't agree there's a right

to privacy, is that correct? >> i don't see it as a yes or no answer. >> there is a right to a privacy? >> there should be a reasonable installation of cameras and have not been afforded that opportunity yet. >> do airline pilots have a right to privacy in anything recorded on the black box or anything in the atc communications or anything like that? >> it's my understanding faa made a presentation to the group about the model that the airline industry uses and we have -- that was at our recommendation because we would embrace that. it has not been offered to us. >> okay, but you would embrace it if that was the case. >> yes. >> following up on congressman perry's line of questioning on the $800 billion spent on stimulus projects or other things regarding -- i'm sorry, a head in the way.

do you have any experience or recollection or numbers to give us regarding how much of the $800 billion was spent on ptc on your railroad? >> 800 billion? >> yeah, part of the stimulus package. >> no. >> any of the money or any of the subsidized money that was given -- >> 800 billion is not a number that rings with me, of course, amtrak would love to have $800 billion, don't get me wrong but -- >> any stimulus funds whatsoever, how much was spent on ptc in your estimation? >> we did not spend any stimulus money on ptc per se unless there was some particular part of another project. >> why not? >> because that wasn't what it was used for. it was looking for real investment in the bridge, for example, and also rebuilding a

whole section of the railroad. >> was there a legal prohibition? >> i'm sorry? >> was there a legal prohibition in your experience against using stimulus funds? >> they were looking for infrastructure projects -- >> was there a legal prohibition, do you know? >> i don't know. >> can you add anything to that? do you think there's a legal prohibition against using stimulus funds for ptc? >> i'm sorry, i don't think there's a legal prohibition against -- i don't think so. >> why do you think we didn't use funds for ptc if that's the case? or do you have any estimation of the amount of stimulus funds that might have been used? >> to take all of the stimulus dollars and give it to amtrak and class one to implement ptc, i'm not sure that is something that occurred to anyone. i don't think it was even discussed. >> really? it's being discussed like it's a

no brainer high priority that has been wanting to be done for decades since 1969. this never occurred to anyone? that you might use some of these funds? >> it was the congress that mandated that we use the ptc funds by the deadline that we're approaching now. i do not know if it was a subject that you all discussed. >> i'm asking if you discussed it. if anyone in the industry, the regulator all testifying here today that this was such an important provision who's concept came about in 1969 i think is what ranking member defazio stated. in all of that interim time and having the stimulus money, no one thought to use that money for ptc? my question is, if so, how much was used for ptc? >> we would ask for a quick response but this is another one we would ask in writing for all of the stimulus dollars. why wasn't ptc a priority during that spending? >> mr. chairman, if you can get

a date from the witnesses when they can respond. >> absolutely, we'll get that final testimony -- >> if we can get it on the record, that would be great. >> ms. feinberg? to you care to have a quick response? >> we're happy to get that to you all. >> you're recognized for five minutes. >> thank you. mr. boardman, the $800 billion of stimulus funds, isn't it true amtrak got $1.1 billion total? >> i'm sorry, sir? >> of the $800 billion stimulus funds, $240 billion was tax cuts not spending, isn't it true amtrak was allocated $1.1 billion not $800 billion? >> i think it was 1.4. 1.3. >> 1.3. and the total cost of -- that was basically congress instructed you to spend that on projects that were ready to go as fast as possible, infrastructure projects, is that correct?

>> that's correct. and you spent it on what in broad terms? >> on the bridge and some additional infrastructure -- >> infrast not spent on those it would have been safety problems? >> yes. >> so the basic -- okay, thank you. amtrak has requested for fiscal year $36 million to implement ptc in 2016. now does this go beyond finishing the implementation of ptc by the end of this calendar year? >> yes. this is off the northeast corridor. this isn't on the spine of the corridor. the spine of the corridor will to be done by the end of december. but we have other work we need to get done. >> could amtrak have implemented ptc sooner if it had more federal funds. >> if they had come a while ago

yes, but not now. >> if amtrak had funds two or three years ago it could have implemented? >> we had a dependable amount of money to move forward, yes. >> to switch topics for a moment, the tunnels into new york have been described as ticking time bombs because of damage from salt water during hurricane sandy. what's the status of those tunnels. what would happen if they go out of service. how much funding is necessary to prevent that from happening. >> we found out this winter what would happen if they went out of service because we had so much ice that we had regular ice patrols that had to knock down the ice in one of the tubes. when that happened you went from being able to move 24 trains an hour down to 6 trains an hour. so we got a lot of complaints from new jersey transit and from amtrak riders that they had to wait outside one of the tubes in order to get into new york city. that's exactly what -- >> going from 24 trains an hour to 6 trains an hour is the only rail access into new york city from new jersey would have a

significant effect on the economy? >> absolutely. >> can you quantity -- quantify that at all? >> i will for you. i'll get back to you with that answer. >> please. >> i understand that amtrak is a $21 billion backlog of projects on the northeast corridor. is that accurate? >> that's what the commission developed and produced, yes. >> do you have any source of funding for the $21 billion? >> no more so than what we get each year. >> how much is in the budget that the house just passed? >> 1.39 was what we had last year. >> that's the total, that's not just for projects -- >> not just the projects -- >> $21 billion necessary to get to a state of good repair in the northeast corridor, how much was appropriated for that purpose or available for that purpose from the amount of funds voted by the house a couple of years.

-- couple of weeks ago. >> it was some dollars specifically identified for advancing our gateway system but not capital dollars for us to actually build it. >> no capital dollars at all. so zero of the 21. that's a pretty good ratio. now, we've heard that amtrak will have ptc, positive train control in place by the end of the year on the spine and elsewhere. and what's the status of ptc implementation on other commuter rails and what will it take for commuter lines to meet the deadline? >> they are struggling, very much struggling to meet the deadline. we just completed a loan to the mta for almost a billion dollars to assist with their ptc implementation. that will go beyond the deadline. >> do we have any estimate as to when the commuter rails across the country are likely to be able to implement ptc? >> it varies dramatically,

anywhere from 16 to 18 to 20. >> in other words a year to two to four years after the deadline, we know the possible safety repercussions. let me just say that the transportation appropriations bill includes no money for commuter lines such as metro north to install ptc. amtrak funds this out of federal capital grants which are cut by $290 million. despite the fact there's a $21 billion backlog to achieve a state of good repair, we spend about $50 billion on highways and about $16 billion -- $17 billion on aviation. and $1.2 billion on rail. there's something very wrong with the appropriations process and for us to sit here and not understand that the fact that congress has been starving amtrak has a large role to play

in what we're talking about is putting our heads in the sand. i yield back. >> mr. costello. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me start with ms. feinberg, i want to thank you for your time and attention the day following the tragedy when we went and visited the site. my question to you relates to 49 cfr part 220, restrictions on railroad operating employees use of cellulal telephones and other electronic devices. the final rule in which the secretary essentially delegated to you of employees using devices that might distract them.

were increasingly using distracting devices in a matter that created hazards. i'm going from the federal reg star dated monday 2010. he found this part particularly interesting. relating to access to employee's personal cell phone records, fra has decided that a provision mandating that railroads require operating employees to provide access to personal cell phone records in the event of an accident is unnecessary for fra purposes. instead, fra currently uses its investigative authority to obtain personal cell phone records when appropriate. is that what you're doing now? through your investigative arm, not in -- that's how you're getting the personal cell phone records? >> that's correct, following the accident we just subpoenaed those records. >> and in looking at -- we talked about inward looking cameras, i think that's the

term. if you had inward looking cameras, would the operating engineer at that point in time you would be able to ascertain whether or not a personal cell phone was being used is that correct? >> that's one of the purposes. >> is there concerns that without the inward facing camera there, i did also go through this rule in detail. there are times throughout the ride when it would be a legitimate -- operating engineer would legitimately be able to look at their cell phone? >> the phone should be off and stored. >> should be, right. >> okay. if we had an inward facing camera, we would know already if that were the case? >> yes, the inward facing camera would also provide us information after an accident, which would be useful. we wouldn't even be needing to have this debate at the moment. >> my question next turns to mr. pierce. i understand that you were -- i think making a distinction between privacy concerns and

right to privacy, i sort of got that from some of your testimony and some of the questions that you were answering. can you talk more about this reasonable implementation because i'm a little concerned when we're talking about the privacy concerns of an individual operating engineer who would be taped while in the performance of their duties because essentially you have to balance that against the public safety considerations of the 200 or 300 plus passengers who are in the train. i think a lot of us are concerned that your testimony seems to suggest that we need to really focus on the privacy concerns of the operating engineer and not some of the public safety assurances and some of the information that would be elicited if you had the inward facing cameras moving forward. so i want to give you an opportunity to sort of share with me a little bit more -- share with us a little bit more about what it is about these

privacy concerns that you hold so dear on behalf of your membership? >> thank you, i do want to first comment about the comments made earlier about litigation when cameras started. the unions didn't go to court to block cameras. they took us to court to install them. the record needs to be clear on who actually started the litigation effort to install cameras. cameras so far have been on freight railroads on class one properties. they run 24/7, whether the train is moving or stopped and we have crew members that can sit on a train up to six hours without moving. we've asked the railroad shut the camera off if there's no safety sensitive duties being performed and -- they have refused. >> what about about -- >> right now they run 24/7. the parts we have taken exception to, i'm trying to identify, we haven't said that there should be an outright prohibition, we said that the implementation has been done in a way there are disputes over it.

>> do you believe there's a sound public policy in favor of having an inward facing camera on the operating engineer at all times during the moving of the passenger rail? >> i know that's where the industry is headed -- >> that could be a yes or no answer. >> just so you know, all of the activities of the engineer are already recorded on an event recorder through the technology of the control stand. all we get is a picture of what he does. we already know with the exception of the cell phone use what he does. >> my time is up. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman, just to round out the point on funding -- well, first of all, congratulations on being named the future administrator. i want to point out throughout this process my time with the committee you've been exceptionally responsive and incredibly helpful to us in so

many ways and i'm excited to see you're going to be continuing in this role. on the point on funding, the point is in the grow america act you included $800 million for commuter rail systems to help them speed up the implementation of ptc, correct? >> right. >> it's not just amtrak we're worried about we're worried about all kind of commuter systems that won't have money to do this on time? >> correct. >> amtrak is the only one who has their act together on this, right? >> they are the only one that has their act together and metro link is also in good shape and septa is impressive. >> one of the great tragedies about the accident, amtrak is in the best position of all of the major rail systems we're concerned about to implement this life saving technology and there are real and important questions about what happened here and why. but among them is not some issue of amtrak lagging behind other systems in its implementation of ptc, isn't that right?

>> that's correct, they are ahead of everyone else. >> isn't it therefore beside the point to talk about what amtrak keeps doing with respect to the federal funding, the point is that the federal funding is absolutely critical for the other systems like metro north, where despite not the crash we know would have been prevented by ptc. i want to thank you again for approving a billion dollar, $960 million loan for metro-north to get that system moving faster with the installation of ptc. you worked with this closely on my legislation, including the passenger rail bill with the assistance of mr. dunham and others to make explicitly clear that funding is available for all systems because money is the issue, right? >> correct. >> and of all of the people who ought to be apologizing for these accidents that keep happening because we don't have the safety systems in place, the united states congress maybe ought to be at the top of the list, wouldn't that be fair to say? >> i think that would be fair to say. >> and i think when mr. boardman comes in here, who's clearly

heart sick over this episode and doing everything he can and it will meet this deadline and expresses his heart felt regret, it might be nice somebody on this committee express the heart felt refwret of the united states congress not having its act together in this area and so many others. isn't that fair to say? >> yes. >> thank you. and we've got 30 accidents and 69 deaths and 1200 injuries and this is the first one on amtrak because we haven't had one on amtrak in a quarter century. isn't that right? >> that's right. >> where the funding is most needed where most of the deaths and injuries are occurring. isn't that correct? >> that's right. >> thank you. so much for whether funding matters for safety. i have a couple of specific questions, mr. boardman, maybe you can help me out. northbound trains approach at 80 miles an hour at this junction and southbound at 110 miles an hour.

they install the system where they knew they had to slow down to get to the derailment speed of 98 on the southbound side. isn't it a fact that the required speed through the corner 45 miles per hour when you slow down, you don't just slow down to a speed equal to or less than the derailment speed, you go down about half of it, right? >> go down to 50-mile-per-hour speed for a safety measure from the 98. >> can you help me understand if that's the case, the recommended speed going northbound even though the approach is below the derailment speed, it's not recommended that you take it at 80, right? >> we've been going around that corner since the '30s in the same construct is there without this code -- >> it was speed? >> 50 miles an hour. >> northbound. >> 50. it was just an oversight not to put the atc system there to force the reduction in speed to 50? >> no, what had happened because

of the back bay incident, the entire community of safety folks, along with regulator looked at what was reasonable for us as an industry to do. what was reasonable is to make sure we put in six locations a code change because the only code change you could do was down to 45 miles per hour and that was where you were approaching at a speed that would overturn the train in the corridor. >> i see. that's what we're working on now. we'll close that gap. last question and couple of seconds left. can you tell us again in plain english why we don't know whether this operator was on the phone three weeks after the accident? you said it was a time zone issue? can't we just get the records? do we have the records? if so, wouldn't we know whether he was on the phone? >> the engineer was very cooperative and gave us the password to his cell phone. we have all of that, we found more and more complicated issues relating to the fact that the text is on one time zone and

voice on another time zone the carrier has all the time zones and it turned out to be more complicated than anybody anticipated. >> you were able to determine? >> yes, you can coordinate that with the number of different time sources to verify the accuracy. it's crucial to get that right. >> thank you, sir, for the extraordinary work your agency does, i've seen it up close and it's real extraordinary how professional and efficient you are. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to follow up on that. after three weeks i'm very frustrated we don't have a time line today in any way, shape or form into the limited extent we have one indicates the train departed at 9:10 and the crash is at 9:21. in terms of the phone records to follow up on that, since the

requirements say it should be turned off and stored, do we know if the phone was turned off and stored during that 9:10 time frame. >> we know there was use of the phone on that day, may 12th. we don't know -- that's what we're trying to narrow down to get specifics of your question. >> i just texted back my daughter, yes i can babysit on friday 11:42. that's on my phone now. if it was in california phone, it might say 8:42 then figure it out. three weeks ago, why can't we take those 11 minutes and have a time line for the victims and their families to have that type of information? i don't understand what the hold up is. >> we had no idea it would be this complicated when we started down this path either. it's been far more complicated than any of us anticipated to not only get the records but verify with the other -- >> was the device turned off? >> we don't -- >> if the device was turned off

you could not have used it between 9:10 and 9:21. >> we're determining -- one of the things we'll determine in the time line is when was the device turned on and off. >> given the three hours in california, your time line would have certain limits. if you had to use the phone within certain hours, you would know whether it's possible or not -- like if my phone said 8:42 instead of 11:42 then you would know there's an issue. if it said 7:42, you would know it's not possible. i'm trying to understand why this is so complicated. >> we found discrepancies within the carrier's own time systems where it didn't even agree with itself. we've got a lot to work out -- >> how much would it cost us to not allow an engineer to have a phone in the cabin? >> i couldn't speak to that. >> would it cost anything? >> we don't deal in the cost.

>> my understanding is the regulations have the railroads can implement their own string ent rules. can't we say we're not allowed to have devices in the cabin, period, why can't we do that today? >> i would defer on that question to ms. feinberg. >> railroads can put that into place. >> that would not be a cost issue? >> i don't think so. >> would you all feel safer if someone didn't have a device we wouldn't three weeks later tell people whether someone had a device and using it? >> it would make our investigation easier if we didn't have to look into it but we do -- >> if we implemented a policy that said don't have devices in there period, if you need to use a device, you step out of the cabin, use it when you're stopped but it cannot physically go in there. is there an issue about why that

isn't done? >> again, i have to defer to the regulators on that. >> does anyone think there would be a cost related to removing personal devices from the cabin? >> use of the devices is already prohibited. you're talking about an additional prohibition that the ntsb would investigate compliance with that prohibition. >> what kind of compliance issues are there? >> what kind of spot checks to know whether or not someone is using their phone or texting during their time in the cabin? >> certain locomotives are equipped with cell phone detection -- >> did this cabin have that? >> i don't know the answer to that at this point. >> it seems like the no cost safety solution here is today to say don't bring them in. >> what's detectible is the signal in and out and what's

not detectable was somebody manipulating the phone but not sending a signal at the moment. >> but you did find the cell phone was in the cabin that day? >> yes. >> and was it turned off or not? >> do not know the answer to that. >> does anybody know whether it was turned on or off? how can we not know that at this point? that's the regulation. if it was on, that was a regulation by -- >> i don't know if that's not known. i don't know it at this moment. >> anybody here with the witnesses today know that? >> i would say that as the ntsb leads the investigation, we partner with them and also do our own investigation. there has not been a concern that we wont figure it out. it's a little complicated. >> i understand the complication. this is something so easy to find out quickly, then we could know -- this action could have been taken the day after. until we know, we know there was a cell phone in there, why don't we just say you're not going to bring your cell phone in the cabin anymore.

unless someone can tell me a safety concern -- my grandfather worked on the railroads for 40 years without a cell phone. i'm trying to figure out is there a cell phone issue here that you need to have it in the cabin for safety purposes? >> the gentlelady's time expired. we will present these questions in writing as well. [ indiscernible ] >> no cost issues -- >> we will develop a very precise time line.

>> gentlelady's time has expired. you're recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank all of our panelists today for your hard work. as a representative from connecticut, i have to say that the folks i represent are concerned. and we're talking about thousands of people in my district who ride the lines every day to get to work. and so it is in our shared interest for their safety and also for the integrity of the system. i mean, we talk about numbers of deaths confidence in the system is vital. so i want to start in part with that and again extend my congratulations to you, you've been exceptionally responsive and helpful and i hope the senate moves rapidly on your confirmation. there's been a lot of things that have been talked about at today's hearing and i want to make sure we're getting clarity on the record, particularly because of this issue about positive train control and lines owned by amtrak as well as the

other lines that we have passengers riding on, particularly in the northeast corridor. is there anything else that is needed to get positive train control on all portions of the northeast corridor regardless of who owns the track? we know we've got funding for a commitment by amtrak to meet that but we have lines owned in connecticut, substantially, a bit in new york, a bit in massachusetts. is there anything else in terms of funding or authorities that is necessary for that? >> well, in terms of funding, there are funding struggles throughout the system on ptc. in terms of authority, we're concerned that some railroads will miss the deadline and we'll lack the authority to force them to implement interim measures that will raise the bar and safety between that moment and when they actually have ptc implemented. we asked congress for that

authority and we think that's appropriate. if the deadline is going to be missed, we want to make sure that railroads are taking steps to raise the bar in safety before they implement ptc fully. >> if you can follow up with us on the specific authority you need, i have commuter lines dropping down from danbury and waterbury through new britain, these are really important for us to check. >> we will do that. >> following up on the question from chairman shuster, and it's a similar question, is there any action you need from congress to follow up on evaluating the safety of these curves? obviously we want high-speed rail in. if we're getting derailments well below the acela i take from time to time is running, is there additional authority that you believe you need from us to make that possible? >> i don't believe we need additional authority on the curves, amtrak has supplied us with the curves they are focused on. we're taking a look at that

list. we'll go back and forth with them and make sure we agree on actions moving forward on those specific curves. we are continuing to work on next steps that go beyond amtrak on curves and speed. we will have more to say on that in the coming days. i think there is -- going back to chairman shuster's question some frustration could more have been done following the metro-north incident? again, you know i'm not sure that comes down to authority so much as regulators we have very few tools and sometimes the tools we have are sometimes blunt instruments. emergency order thought is incredibly narrow and can't be as broad as we want. safety advisories are recommendations and don't have to be followed. and rule making process takes years so -- >> thank you. and for you, mr. boardman i have some concern given the importance of these accidents so much emphasis being placed just on ptc.

i'm looking at billions of dollars in infrastructure upgrades and in particular if you could talk about how are you going about prioritizing the bridges that are 100 years old and more that the northeast corridor runs across these bridges every single day. what if any help, in addition to the additional funding which i joined my colleague and not only seat mate, but adjacent districts with mr. maloney that we need a lot more funding to address this backlog of infrastructure, which is also safety. if a bridge goes done when a train is attempting to cause, that's also a safety concern. can you talk about the prioritization --? >> certainly, i think one of the most important things that occurred was in the commission that was established in the northeast of all of the states, federal government and amtrak to look at what projects need to be done, what the backlog was and how we needed to prioritize for the future. a lot of that conversation that's occurred has really identified projects that need to

be done. a lot of them bridges and tunnels and the major impacts we need to get done. they have been identified in one particular case, we have ready to build the portal bridge, which would be a -- about a billion dollar project. our priority is there for these infrastructure improvements which will also improve safety. it's in place. >> thank you. >> you're recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i was on the route 24 hours beforehand. i represent new york one on the east end of long island. some other members were traveling with me as well and i would be remiss if i didn't offer my thoughts and prayers to the families of those whose

lives were lost. those who were injured. it's a terrible tragedy that took place. i kind of wish that congress had been willing to all of the entire of congress would be willing to allow us and the families to mourn for amtrak and for the employees of amtrak, everyone impacted by it. i wish there was more time dedicated towards mourning. unfortunately the next day, and i think it's pretty shameful and disgusting, that not even 24 hours go by and we have an entire party here in congress that was blaming a potential future funding cut on an accident that happened yesterday. i mean, i've heard of spin, but this is a first for me. i mean, literally you wake up the next morning and instead of dedicating your day towards mourning the loss of those -- i mean families that were so greatly impacted, you come onto the floor throughout these halls and you stand in front of the

cameras and without saying my heart goes out to the family or offering up any type of emotional remorse, immediately you're blaming a potential future funding cut on an accident that happened yesterday. i would challenge anyone to find an example of this in history. couldn't even wait 48 hours to start the politics. it started the next morning. the engineer was obviously traveling over twice the speed limit and that's the reason why there's an investigation. it's very important to amtrak that they finish the project of getting ptc operational specifically on the northeast corridor. i know that this body passed legislation being from the northeast and knowing how profitable the northeast corridor, acela trains are, it's good we see that money get reinvested back into the system. i have colleagues in other parts of the country who may think otherwise and that's okay.

parochial in a way to my home state, my home region. i came here from new york state, state legislature, served on the transportation committee. the nta, which is the nation's largest mass transit system for that locality and heard metro north talked about and long island railroad. we found a way, republicans and democrats working together to try to create a second track between farmingdale for the long island railroad. there are infrastructure improvements all over the new york city metropolitan area with the involvement of people in new york city, up in albany, working with the nta and unions trying to figure out how to invest in the infrastructure. and it's also important to note that the amtrak legislation passed by the house discusses the rif component that allows

the mta to apply for the $1 billion in financing. but the investment can be made, it would be very nice if my colleagues on the other side of the aisle -- listen when we asked it's a great idea how are you going to pay for it? i want to be part of the discussion to figure out how we can invest in our infrastructure across the country. that's what i believe is a matter of principle. but with my final minute and getting back to you, just so i understand something, are there texts on the phone from 9:10 to 9:21. >> we know that there is text and voice activity that day. we're trying to narrow down to specifically what time that day. so we can compare it with -- >> but the phone itself, like when you look at the phone and scroll through texts, it doesn't show a text from 9:10 to 9:21. >> i don't have that answer yes. we will have a timeline of that. >> i understand the frustration.

it seems like something that if it gives you access to the phone, you look at the phone and you know the answer in like five minutes. >> we were surprised by the complexity of it ourselves and we're experts at this. >> the entire route, i know you are -- it has all these -- are your getting cooperation from the cell phone companies and all of the cell phone towers and pings on the towers. it shouldn't be that hard. for the families that the real advocacy, to try to get your answers and amtrak's efforts and all of you here for that cause, the frustration on our end too is on behalf of constituents and families who are eager. they understand when some things take longer than others but maybe they don't understand on this front why we don't have more answers as far as the engineer goes. i yield back the balance of my time and thank you for being

here. >> the gentlelady is recognized. >> thank you. i very much appreciate and support all of the efforts in the northeast corridor but i would like to shift to the mps for just a few minutes at 11:19 on june 24th, 2011, a tractor-trailer driving north on u.s. 95 slammed into the side of amtrak train number 5 on the california zepher line. that was at a railroad grade crossing, in a small town miriam out of navy. the driver of the truck was at fault and been on duty for nine hours and he failed to -- the train horn and went ahead and crossed the track. the impact created a fire and killed a driver and train conductor and four passengers and injured 15 other passengers and one additional crew member. ptc wouldn't have stopped that but the investigation that was done by ntsb outlined concerns about side impacts, strength requirements for passenger cars

and what happens with impact when it comes from the side. if you look at the report they issued two recommendations were to develop side impact crash worthiness standards, including performance validation for passenger rail cars. once the side impact crash worthiness standards have been developed to require that new passenger rail cars being built to this standards. i would ask you, we've had all of these studies about train to train collisions. has any research been done on these types of side collision impacts? >> yes, we're doing research now at the ntsb's recommendation, we're doing research now on the side impact. >> is that it? can you give me any more information what that entails or where you see that going or will you be making recommendations or changing regulations? >> that research is ongoing and

we can get your office a full report. apart from that, we have done a tremendous amount of work on grade crossings generally which continue to be a problem for many years and is on a slight uptick this year and we have a multi-faceted approach generally but on side impact collisions our research is ongoing. >> if i can ask mr. boardman, going back to the first question that mr. defazio asked about buying new train cars, if this study, whenever it gets done comes with the recommendation that new requirements should be made for train cars that meets some increased standards for side crashes, are we going to get any new cars? how many cars have we gotten? we heard they were 40 years old. you look at the pictures of the cars so crashed compared to the locomotive. would you elaborate on that a little bit more? >> these are the bilevel cars that have a much lower section and i went to that accident

site. >> i think you were the assistant director at that time? >> pardon me. >> i realize you were involved in the report -- >> i was ceo for amtrak. i went out there at that time and looked at what happened. it was a double tractor-trailer. the side impact is what killed our conductor but it was really a signal case that the back trailer came up and hit the top of the train that did the passenger death and injuries. there is a i think there would be -- i'm not an engineer, mechanical engineer, there is a huge problem at that particular location. it was a very strange crash. because there was total visibility for the truck that went into the side of the train. and if you were going to protect for that, by replacing the

equipment, you would have major engineering that would have to occur and i'd have to see whether any such thing could happen. >> you disagreed with the recommendation they need to look at side -- >> no, i don't disagree with the recommendation at all. i think it would be a very difficult thing -- we can't retrofit, so talking probably 450 of the bilevel type cars and $3.5 to $4 million a piece for each much those cars. it would be a substantial cost to doing that and take us probably ten years to make those kinds of changes and deliver new equipment. >> what about if you buy new cars. >> we haven't bought new cars in some time. >> we've heard a lot about spending money for the signalling system and we've heard money about infrastructure, but what about all these old cars?

what's the plan there? >> the plan right now what we did with single level cars and with the locomotives, we're paying for that out of fares that we receive in the northeast corridor. on the long distance train there's no additional revenue. it is completely deficit operation and we don't have those resources to borrow money on the rift program or any other way to replace those cars. >> that seems to me to be a problem. >> yes, ma'am. >> thank you. >> mr. davis. >> thank you, mr. chairman and to the witnesses being here today. my first question, mr. boardman going back to earlier statements we made during the q and a, you mentioned there were six, possibly ten, if i'm doing to math right, vulnerabilities identified to what we saw in northeast corridor, the northbound train going toward the curve.

you mentioned these types of curves existed and have you installed code change points at those curves and if so was there a cost to do so? >> if you have to go back to the back bay incident, 1990 and when that occurred the safety community got together the operators got together to look at what needs to be done to protect ourselves in that case. what they identified was six curves in the northeast corridor that they needed to treat. it included the north side of the frankfurt -- the frankford curve because the entrance speed at 110 was greater than what the turnover speed was in the curve itself. >> correct. >> so they put a code change point in there. on the south side there was not

a need to do that because the approach speed was 80 miles an hour. therefore even if that engineer failed to slow, they wouldn't overturn. there was six places along. >> total of six? >> there is a moderate cost to do anything. it's not a major cost. >> what's the moderate cost? >> i don't know. the automatic train control system really provides an idea whether there's something in front of you on the tracks. the way you do this code change sue really have a bit of fiction here. you say there is something at the curve and so that's when you point -- you put the code change point in. it wasn't built to do positive train control. >> okay. >> the other four where you added up six and four, what we

looked with the fra and emergency order is the change that occurred here and the conditions that exist on the and there was what conditions -- or what curves meeting that condition need to be changed, and that's what we told fra we would work to do. >> okay. i -- i don't have a lot of time left, but i have a lot of questions, but if you could have your staff get back to me on if you found any other amtrak corridors with the same issues, and when you estimate you'll be done identifies and installing code changes on areas identified as vulnerable? >> only on the northeast corridor on the emergency order. >> i mean i have corridors in my state of illinois. any other as a rule nernlts there? >> they are all over the united

states. we're mostly on host railroads that depend on expertise of the engineers and how the system works or if there's no signaling at all, and there's locations across the country where that occurs. they depend on what we call a form d control point, a control system. >> moving on to another subject. in a 2012 general inspector report, amtrak was criticized because despite legal requirements to do so, they did not fund financial requirements as requested in the plan and annual budget requests. this is directly from the i.g. report here. they could not explain the critical critical omission, can you? >> what we saw in the report in 2012, they were looking for us to have come to congress to specifically ask for ptc service.

that was not what we operated with with congress. it was a block grant of capital projects. we identified -- i identified as soon as i got over there what it was going to cost for us to meet this requirement by december of 2015, and it was about the safety of that, not about the dollars of that. >> okay. i'm reading the report here, and further, transportation official stated that his department's purposely omitted installation costs on host railroad lines from the five-year plan in annual budget requests and cited the belief including costs in the budget weaken the negotiating position with the host railroads et cetera. that -- that's concerning to us but i appreciate the job you do. thank you for being here and thank you to all the witnesses. i yield back the balance of my time. >> thank you. >> thank you. i'm going to try to make the comments brief because i separate him and you from lunch

and you guys -- and gal have been most generous with your time. i appreciate it. i associate my comments with what comes from what was said a moment ago with regard to indeed mourning for the loss of life, a very sad day but what i think is important in the wake of any sad day or any tragedy is to go into -- do the investigation make sure it was going to weigh as a society we do not overreact in ways in which that would make the system less sustainable from a financial stand point or the american republic individual liberty or overreact in ways in which that are so constraining so the effect people say, well, i'm walking. it's, you know, i guess it's the safest of all mechanisms would be to put people in things you

strap into at a public fair -- i mean, you're locked in, but from the practice call fact, you can't use a laptop talk on the phone, and go to another mode of transportation, and with that in mind, it seems to me in the course of the hearing, two ideas that came out this i think are dangerous in terms of overreaction to the tragedy you dealt with. one is the idea of seat belts. you know, if you think about it there's a reason there's is thes on airplanes, which is you have all kinds of vertical and horizontal considerations based on air lift that's well outside control of the pilot. we've been in thunderstorm moments, like, oh my goodness, what happens next? that does no occur on a train and what we all know is that when a plane crashes, a lot of people die a lot ofsame with school

busses. there's not is theseat belts for the kids. i want to hear thoughts if you impose seat belts as reaction to this real world tragedy? i think it's a step too far. the other is directed to you, mr. pierce, and that is this notion of moving to two men in the front of the train. it seems to be an extra burden that's already strained and if you look at the whole notion moving towards train control, the idea to take out the possibility of human error which would not be eliminated if you do -- move to a two man system up front. i think it is important what you have done at amtrak level to move to this motion of inward facing cameras. i mean, i think that watches out

for human error, but that's a step too far as well and i apologize -- that was my sister. any thoughts on either one of those two as steps too far? she's relentless. yeah. >> i mean -- we are moving ahead with inward facing cameras. to be clear this is something my predecessor was moving ahead with prior to his departure. this committee has many times urged the fra to make sure we make use of the committee process, and we asked them to take action on inward facing cameras, and unable to come to a conclusion, and we said we were moving ahead. you agree on seat belts or two men in the front? >> is thesseat belts, again, how i've

been briefed on it, the need to harden the seats in order to put seat belts in is more dangerous to passengers than belting passengers in, so i -- if that is -- you know if they feel differently, we'll engage in conversations with them, but that's my understanding of why seat belts may not be the best move on a train because it's dangerous. on two-person crews you know -- >> and i just go back to markets as well. when i traveled in new york the son that works there, i used to work there reality is people are up and moving and that's why you take the train opposed to getting on an airplane. you can be on the phone. you can be having a small group meeting with a couple other folks, and you take that out, i think you lose market share, and that much further relative to plane travel. the other though, sorry? >> on two person crews we've been looking at that closely. to be clear less relevant because there's people in a

crew, and on this particular train, it's discussed separately, but following the incidents, what we require is for the engineer to be in constant conversation with the conductor to ensure they are talking back and forth signals and ensure the conductor had access to an emergency break another good approach. >> i hear the chairman's ever so gentle tap, tap, tap. i get the message, sir. >> i'd like to thank the gentleman for yielding back so much time. >> thank you, mr. chairman last, but not least, hopefully. thank you, witnesses, for your time and effects as we try to reach answers to the great tragedy that occurred in the northeast corridor. it's been interesting to listen to the lines of questioning. it's hard to imagine why it's so complicated to get the answer to whether the engineer was

utilizing a cell phone at the time of the crash. seems like it should be just a simple answer simple endeavor to find out exactly if, as ms. comstock in her line of questioning, hey, during this period of time, did he text, use the phone? it should be there. hard to figure out why that's not true. in terms of further investigation, there was a news report, several of them, that stated that amtrak regional 188 had a fist sized area of severe damage on its windshield. possibly consistent with that of being struck by some rock or object. 20 minutes before the crash of 18 8 a regional commuter train in the same area had to stop service after its window was hit by an object. finally, also around the same time, amtrak 2173 was apparently

also struck by an object while traveling southbound in the very same area. there's an old saying that while once is an accident, twice is a coincidence coincidence, and three times is a pattern. do you think, mr. hart that that applies here? >> that was part of the process before leaving the station. we are confident the damage occurred after leaving the station, but we don't know if it was before the accident or after the accident. we know it was not a weapon fired, the fbi helped us determine that. we know that. we know rocks are thrown all the time, and it often cracks the wind windshield windshield, but it could be post accident damage as well. >> there's been no revelations or findings during the investigation of individual