screeria -- nigeria. - christopher

hart and federal railroad administration head sarah feinberg. this is just over three hours.

>> the committee will come to order. today's hearing will focus on the tragic amtrak accident that occurred philadelphia on may 17th. we have all heard some of the preliminary information surrounding this terrible event. an amtrak northeast regional train en route from washington to new york derailed on a curve in philadelphia. the national transportation safety board has reported that the train was traveling at 106 miles per hour despite a 50-mile-per-hour speed limit on that portion of the track. eight passengers tragically lost their lives and approximately 200 were injured. we were not aware of any defects or issues identified to date with respect to the track, the locomotive or other infrastructure. today we will get an update from the ntsb on where their investigation stands and any additional information they can provide on the cause of this

accident. since the accident, the federal railroad administration and amtrak have taken several steps to improve safety along the northeast corridor. amtrak is assessing the curves along the nec to determine if additional speed restrictions should be imposed and amtrak has announced it will be installing inward facing cameras to gain a better understanding of how incidents occur, and they've also committed to finish implementation of positive train control on the northeast corridor by december of this year. today i want to review what actions amtrak took on passenger rail safety before this accident and particularly why fra didn't mandate the review of severe curves sooner. finally this accident heighted the central role of the northeast corridor plays in moving people along the northeast coast. the nec represents 2% of the nation's land mass and 18% of the population and the gdp. hundreds of people use the corridor daily to get to work

and travel between some of our largest cities. when the corridor is out for just several days there is a real and significant impact on people's lives and the economy. this committee is committed to focusing resources and improving the northeast corridor including in the bipartisan amtrak reform bill that passed the house just a few months ago. i look forward to working with my friends in the senate to get that reform bill enacted into law. in closing i look forward for hearing from our witnesses regarding these important issues and i would like to recognize ranking member defazio for an opening statement. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thanks for holding this hearing today. i certainly agree with you about the extraordinary importance on the performance of the population of the east coast on the united states on the use of this corridor on a daily basis. in terms of the number of people that use it and the contribution to the economy and what happens

when that corridor goes down, and i also agree that this committee does have a long-term commitment to amtrak and other infrastructure needs of the united states. unfortunately, that is not shared by your republican colleagues on the transportation, housing, urban development subcommittee. in fact, on the day of the accident, they cut a $251 million, is it? or $290 million from the capital budget of amtrak. the capital budget goes to things like positive train control. it also goes to things like the 140-year-old tunnel if that collapses or becomes unusable, the system will totally be out of use for an indefinite period of time or many of the 100-year-old bridges that need repair or replacement along that line. any cuts to the budget of amtrak which has a $21 billion, a $21

billion backlog on critical infrastructure investments and maintenances investments and things that do include positive train control and do include bridges and bridge safety and do include signal systems and other things that are so outmoded and i don't think they're using vacuum tubes and they're sort of before that era. this is not okay. and to further reduce that budget is going to jeopardize minimally the operation of this corridor or even worse, cause an accident directly with the tunnel collapse or bridge collapse or failure of the signal system. we can't point to this accident and say it was directly caused by a lack of investment. that's true. we still don't know what happened and we're looking forward to the ntsb, but we do know that the ntsb first in 1969 proposed that we should move

forward with positive train control and we have something called the most wanted list in 1990 and the first edition of the most wanted list said we needed positive train control and since that time quite a number of people have died in preventable accidents around the country because of the lack of positive train control. yes. human error. that's what positive train control is designed to prevent. human error. we still don't know if it was a mechanical malfunction. it's a relatively knew train set, but we don't know yet. the point is ptc could prevent accidents like this. it could have prevented many other accidents over the last two decades since it was first recommended by ntsb and we need to move forward with all due dispatch in installing that system on commuter railroads and passenger or other passenger railroads or the entire amtrak system or on those required

critical freight lines and particularly those carrying hass douse materials and broken areas. i'm pleased we are here today to try and understand better what caused this accident and what to do to prevent it in the future and i don't think we'll get to a definitive point, but for me the bottom line is we can no longer ignore a $21 billion backlog. we can't ignore we're running trains over 100-year-old bridges of dubious stability. we can't ignore that we're running trains through 140-year-old tunnels that need total rehabilitation. we can't any longer ignore the fact that we have signalization systems that are, you know, pre-vacuum tube era that are trying to link into more modern, sophisticated systems. so there is much to be done, and

i wish that all our colleagues in congress shared our commitment to infrastructure investment. with that, mr. chairman, i yield back the balance of my time. >> thank you, gentlemen and they will now recognize the subcommittee chairman on railroads, pipelines. >> thank you and good morning. first, let me thank you for holding this hearing and obviously, very important. i also want to thank the ranking member capuano for quickly going up to philadelphia and really surveying the situation and it was important to understand specifically some of the things that were happening, but let me -- let me talk a little bit

about my frustration. we went up there to immediately assess the situation. individual was already making definitive statements and now three weeks later while we had a brand new locomotive we can't confirm whether or not there was a malfunction with that locomotive and even though ntsb made definitive statements still cannot defend whether or not there was an operator error, cannot identify whether or not there was an engineer that bypassed the system. the engineer has been working with ntsb, but still cannot verify that the cell phone that was in use whether it was texting or using cell phone service during that time. it's my understanding the engineer has given his password and we still can't identify whether or not there was an

issue. >> the ntsb came out and made an immediate statement a couple of hours after the accident and three weeks later is unable to identify any of these issues around it. i think this committee expects answers. i think these families are owed answers. i think the american public is looking to make sure that rail safe across our entire nation. we're also looking for solutions. i'm looking forward to seeing ptc implemented in a very, very quick manner and i ask that you take a look at this emergency proclamation that was put out, emergency order that was put out by fra. my concern is a year and a half ago when we had metro north, one of the worst accidents this country has ever seen and almost the exact same emergency order was put out a year and a half ago saying ptc was important and

that we still don't have ptc on that area of track either. now a new emergency order saying we will have amtrak on the northeast corridor by the end of the year. obviously, we have concerns. we are looking for solutions. i think the families deserve to hear what those solutions are and more importantly, those solutions are put into place. with that, i yield back. >> we recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, mr. capuano. >> thank you, mr. chairman. welcome to the members of the board. i'm looking forward to your testimony. we want answers and more than anything else, they need to be right and not just speculation. i also want to comment that i know many people along the northeast corridor and particularly those in philadelphia, my friend congressman brady and my friend are watching this closely and they want answers, as well and they'll be keeping a close eye on this. i guess i'm looking forward to

the specific lessons we learned and also the lessons that congress has learned and what should our priorities be. we talk a good game, are we going to fund this or are we not going to fund this? ptc is not new and not limited just to amtrak. positive train control issued across the country of every rail line in this country. are we going to require it or are we not? everybody here knows we don't want to talk about it and there are proposals floating around congress to delay it even further and we all understand the realities of the costs involved and those are questions we need ask in a serious basis how much responsibility will we as a member of congress take on our shoulders the next time an accident happens and we look in the mirror. have we done everything we can

reasonably do? reasonably do to prevent it, and i think i'm not looking for scapegoats. i am looking for answers as we all are, and i have full faith that the ntsb along with the fra and amtrak will find those answers and again, i want them quickly, but more importantly, i want them right. i appreciate you being here i appreciate the chairman calling this hearing very much. i yield back. >> thank you. with that, i would like to welcome our panel of witnesses. thank you for being here today. first, the honorable christopher hart is the chairman of the national transportation safety board. next, joseph boardman, the president and chief executive offer of amtrak, next miss sarah feinberg, for federal railroad administration and just been nominated and congratulations as

you go through that process. good luck. >> the brotherhood of local employ nears and train derailment. i ask that our witnesses' full statements be included in the record and without objection, so ordered since your complete written testimony will be in the record i'll ask you to keep it to five minutes, your statement and with that we'll start with mr. hart, please proceed. >> thank you and good morning. chairman schuster and ranking member defazio and members of the committee, thank you for inviting the ntsb to appear before you today. earlier today we released a preliminary report and it's a summation of facts reviewed up to this point and i would like to review these facts with you this morning. at approximately amtrak regional train 188 derailed north of philadelphia's 30th street station. >> can you pull your mike closer? >> yes. i'm sorry. >> as the chairman mentioned, the ntsb is determined that seconds before the derailment,

the train was traveling at 6 miles an hour heading into a 50 mile per hour curve. the train slowed to 102 miles per hour before the data recording ended. sadly, eight people were killed and more than 200 people were injured as a result of this accident. on behalf of the ntsb i would like to offer my sincerest condolences to those who lost loved ones and our thoughts remain to those still recovering. briefly, areas we will explore include track recorder, mechanical, signals, operations, human performance, survival factors and medical. much work remain, but there are few facts that i can report to you today. we know a properly installed and functional positive train control or ptc would have prevented this accident. ptc is technology that is designed to prevent overspeed derailments as well as train to train collisions and they worked protection zones and proceeding through misaligned switches. the accident we have investigated have shown us that we need technology that can step in when humans fail due to distraction, medical conditions or other factors. as a result, the ntsb has called for train control technology for decades as was mentioned since

1969. present law requires implementation of ptc by the end of this year and seven years after the mandate was signed by congress into law. we know most railroads will not comply with this law. those railroads that have made the difficult decisions and the safety enhancement should be commented for this leadership. it much have a trance parents accounting of the steps that have been taken to meet a new deadline. regulators and policymakers need that information to make important policy decisions and the traveling public deserves that accountability. rail car crash worthiness is another area that we'll investigate. as you can see from the picture, the survival space in the first passenger car was severely

compromised. we will fully document and analyze the damage to this car and other cars and make recommendations that the ntsb determines are necessary to improve crash worthiness and improve on recommendations in this area. we have received full cooperation from the crew and their interviews and follow-up conversations. as you know, we are evaluating the engineer's cell phone records to coordinate the timing and voice activity with the accident time line. this process involves reviewing the time stamps from the phone

records which are from different time zones with data from other information, such as the locomotive event recorder and the outward facing camera and radio communications and surveillance video. when we have clarity on this time line we will release this information to you and to the public. additionally, the ntsb has called for inward and outward facing video and with audio recordings on trains. since amtrak uses outward facing cameras at the time of this accident. these cameras can provide critical information with the ntsb as we work to determine ways to prevent future accidents. in this case the engineer states >> thank you, mr. hart. with that, mr. boardman, please proceed. >> thank you. i'm going to start this morning by offering my heartfelt regret for the recent derailment at frankfurt junction. it was amtrak's train on our railroad and we're responsible for the incident and its

consequences. i regret it deeply, and based on the conversations i've had over the last three weeks that sentiment is shared by everyone in our company. everything we've done since the accident has been driven by a sincere hope that we can do something, however small, to mitigate the suffering and loss that everyone endured as a result of this terrible accident. we've been greatly helped in that effort by the people of philadelphia and i would like to thank all of them, but particularly mayor nutter and the staff of the hospitals thank you for everything you did on behalf of the passengers and employees. >> we want to do everything we can to support the ntsb's investigation. i'll refrain from addressing matters that are still under investigation. we'll be working closely with both the ntsb and the regulators and the fra to ensure that we address the root causes of this accident and to you, ladies and gentlemen of the committee and to our passengers and employees. we run a safe railroad and safety will continue to be our top priority. the northeast corridor in particular has an excellent safety record and this is so shocking because it is so unexpected. in no other place in the country is the comparable volume moved. the last fatal accident on the

northeast corridor occurred 28 years ago. >> the northeast corridor's safety systems are the best in the country. we operate a layered signal system that provides it with multiple levels of protection. >> there is an alert that engineers are awake. there is an automatic cab control system to prevent train collisions and stop the train if the crews fail to acknowledge or comply with signals and there's the enforcement system, amtrak, that's amtrak's positive train control system. to stop trains that engineers have failed to comply with authorized speed limits. at points between washington and new york were trained to exceed 125 miles an hour. it's installed in the amtrak that operate the northeast cor door and should be to apply in december 31, 2015. this stops people responsible for safe movement of the trains.

we operate an oversight and coaching system from the crews. our engineers and conductors are required to pass an extensive fra-approved training program and to develop a high level of familiarity with the route. probably millions of train movements negotiated a curve at frankfurt junction safely since amtrak took over the northeast cor door in 1976. the system works because generally speaking we've put together a series of layered nets each guarding the previous layer. we rely on these systems where we have not been able to completely eliminate the risk of human error. there is also a risk of a gap in the most tightly woven net. the train 188 derailment revealed one such hole in the safety net and in the weeks since the derailment people have asked a seemingly simple question. why didn't the track have some kind of safety feature involved

to force the engineer to slow the train? this is the right question to ask and i'll address it directly while providing you a necessary background information to understand the answer. in 1990 an amtrack train derailed on a sharp curve in back based station in boston and collided with an oncoming mbta train. it failed to slow before the curve. shortly thereafter industry operator reviewed the nec and other places where the approach speed of a train was greater at which the speed might derail in the curve. if an engineer failed to slow down. at those points we modified the system by installing a code if

an engineer -- a code change point to force engineers to slow down. the southbound tracks at frankfurt junction were one such place. the derailment speed at frankfurt junction is 98 miles an hour. it approached that curve at 80 miles an hour while the southbound train approaches at 110 miles an hour. so in short, when a train approaches from one direction, but doesn't slow down there's no risk of derailment, but if a train comes from the other direction and doesn't slow down for whatever reason there, is a risk of derailment. we, therefore, apply the modification to the southbound tracks so the trains approaching from the north at speeds of 110 would receive the signal indication from the cab just before the curve forcing them to slow at 45 miles an hour so that they can pass through the curve

safely at 85 miles an hour. they didn't have the same protection installed because the approach speed was 80 miles an hour which was slow enough that a train could round the curve at that speed without derailing if the engineer failed to slow down. at that time, the notion that an engineer might actually accelerate into the northbound curve was not a circumstance we anticipated and thus, we didn't mitigate for. it was a reasonable decision reached by reasonable experts under reasonable circumstances and since this and similar change points were installed in 1991, the application of this policy successfully prevented overspeed derailments throughout the northeast corridor for about 25 years. that clearly changed on may 12th. the proper response now is for us to figure out what happened and to narrow or eliminate the gap so that this accident cannot happen again. the full implementation of ptc later this year will be a major

step forward in this regard until it is full ney service and we're working now to implement the measures called for in the emergency order to ensure the safety of the trains and passengers. the most important thing we can do, however is to implement ptc. amtrak is the nation's leader in ptc, we were the only company to have a system approved for use for speeds up to 150 miles an hour. no other class 1 railroad in the united states, not one, is as far along in installing ptc as amtrak is. my belief and the importance of ptc predates my arrival at amtrak. as the federal railroad administrator i worked hard to secure the passage requiring ptc installation on the railroads. i still believe the single greatest contribution that my generation of railroaders can make to this industry is to implement ptc as rapidly as possible, and i promise you that

by the end of this year this system which will dramatically enhance safety will be complete and operational on the nec. thank you. thank you, with that, ms. feinberg, proceed. >> chairman schuster and ranking member defazio, thank you for the opportunity for discussing issues related to the amtrak accident in philadelphia, pennsylvania and the safety of passenger rail. we extend our deepest sympathies the victims of this accident and to their loved ones, and i can assure them that we will take every step we can to ensure an accident like this cannot happen again. i also want to thank the city of

philadelphia, its mayor and first responders for their heroic and incredible response to this accident. their leadership was truly remarkable. let me say at the outset, all of us at the fra are heart broken about this tragic accident. the driving mission of our organization is to keep the public safe and so while every accident matters to us, this accident in particular which appears to have been preventable and which took so many lives and left so many injured is truly painful for the fra family. we continue to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident. while it will take time to complete the investigation, we have not and will not wait to take actions that will improve the safety of amtrak as well as other passenger rail operations. on may 16, four days after the accident i directed amtrak to take several actions to resume north of philadelphia. i followed those directives with an emergency order on may 21st. amtrak has complied with those directives thus far and amtrak

will follow through to implement them. when we released the may 21st emergency order we stated we were considering taking additional steps to direct similar orders at other passenger railroads that may have similar curve and speed issues. we continue our work on those directives and we plan to release additional information about that work in the coming days. and while the cause of this accident has not been officially determined, we do know that speed was a significant factor and speed, simply put s what we refer to as a human factor. a factor based on human behavior. human factors remain the leading cause of all rail accidents and they are also the most difficult to address, but today i want to announce that fra is preparing a package of actions that we will finalize in the coming weeks and months aimed at addressing just these kinds of factors, human factors, factors such as speed,

distraction and training. these actions may include additional emergency orders, safety advisories, rule makings, agreements and other initiatives and again, beyond just those next steps, i want to assure you that the fra is firmly committed to continue taking additional actions, as many as it takes, that will mitigate the risks and hazards identified in the ongoing investigation. now there has been significant amount of public discussion about what, specifically, would have prevented this accident, which specific technology and which new regulation, but the reality is if we believe that the cause of this accident was speed it would have been prevented by positive train control. as this committee is aware, positive train control is the single most important technological development in more than a century and it is absolutely necessary to ensuring the kind of safety that we expect on our rail system. per the congress' mandate, railroads are required to

install ptc on all passenger routes and certain freight routes by december 31, 2015, seven months from now. fra has been actively pushing the railroads to have ptc fully implemented by the deadline. we have met with the railroads for years on this issue. we have hired staff to assist and oversee the implementation of this technology. we have earned the submission of ptc safety and implementation plans and we have inquired with individual railroads and with the aar about their progress and we have worked with the ecc with the spectrum. we have also urged year after year for more funding to be connected at commuter railroads and amtrak to implement positive train control. for the past two years as part of the grow america act, fra has requested $825 million to assist commuter railroads with the implementation of ptc as well as additional funding for amtrak's implementation of ptc.

it was grant the authority to review, approve and certify ptc safety plans on a railroad by railroad basis. they asked for this authority in order to ensure that railroads would be forced to work with safety regulators to take other and equivalent actions to raise the bar in safety even prior to full ptc implementation. we believe it is important that even those railroads that fail to meet the congressionally mandated deadline be required to improve safety in the interim. despite the many challenges facing full implementation of ptc, the fra's role is to carry out the enforcement of the deadline mandated by the congress and to ensure that railroads implement ptc as quickly, safely and efficiently as possible. so on january 1, 2016, the fra will be prepared to take necessary enforcement actions against railroads that have failed to meet the deadline. safety will be the fra's priority and we appreciate the

attention and focus to issues related to the passenger train accident in philadelphia. again, i want to express our deepest sorrow for the victims and their families, we will make the american rail network as safe, reliable as possible. i look forward to your questions. >> you may proceed. >> hello, ranking member schuster and the teamsters rail conference they represent, thank you -- >> can you pull up the microphone closer. >> okay. thank you for the invitation to speak today. i first want to express our sincerest condolences 188 and their family. it's a sadly familiar territory for me because i've had to convey the sorrow to the families of 11 members since i became national president five

years ago, and i fear that this will happen many more times. it's even more tragic when technology could have prevented a death and positive train control could have saved five of those lives. the ntsb has confirmed that excess speed contributed to the derailment. these facts implicate the railroad industry. >> crew size, fatigue, inward facing cameras and the expectations for amtrak. the small percentage of americans who are working locomotive engineers and all railroad operating employees are among the most highly skilled, highly trained and highly regulated professionals in the nation. but today's workforce or workplace often creates task overload for engineers and when too much is expected of any system, man or machine a breakdown is inevitable. one of the questions before us now is what level of risk we're willing to accept knowing all of that. most of the industry and not

amtrak or vnsf seeks a blanket five to seven-year extension of the deadline. although not on the nec, there have been peripheral problems with the spectrum and fcc radio tower approvals and those must be addressed and they do not justify a blanket delay and i urge you not to be stampeded for one. we must remember that ptc is no silver bullet. it's not designed to prevent any accident and any claim that ptc renders the second crew member unnecessary is plainly put, not true. ptc cannot replace the second crew member because it doesn't do the work of a second crew member. it isn't the second set of eyes and ears to monitor the left side of the train for defects, stuck brakes or observe the left side of the highway rail crossings for highway rail grade incidents or to separate the trains when we have first

responders that need to get access. we urge you to take up the hr-1763 addressing those concerns and we think the time may have come to reconsider the 1981 language that eliminated the second crew member on northeast corridor locomotives. while we do not know whether fatigue played a part in amtrak 188, fatigue should be a major concern to all of us. to be frank the 2008 overhaul of the rail hours of service has produced very little progress towards mitigating fatigue. work schedules are far too variable and unpredictable and instead of dealing with all issues, some have settled on single issues like sleep apnea. i am here to tell you that c. machines won't address fatigue, caused by variable and unpredictable work schedules in order to get the benefit. we must redouble the benefits to fatigue in the railroad industry. i urge for inward facing cameras

because it gets louder by the day. cameras can be an accident investigation tool, but they create a false sense of security if more than that is expected. cameras don't slow or stop trains, positive train control does and that's the plainest way to put it. our privacy concerns with cameras are what i would call america's privacy concerns. many railroads insist on leaving cameras on continuously even when trains are stopped on a siding for hours on a time with crews captive on a locomotive that comprises of 65 square feet of space. constant surveillance like this we view as un-american and it does nothing to improve railroad safety. the truth is that some railroads have shown more interest to use camera data to punitively attack employees and that is just unacceptable to us. finally some things do come down to dollars and cents at least for amtrak which cannot continue to rely on the funding it receives.

>> what we spend on passenger rail is embarrassing when compared to china france, uk, russia and turkey. we cannot expect amtrak to run a first-class railroad when it's funded at third world levels. we cannot expect reliable performance that is 75, 100 or 125 years old. our transportation infrastructure is crumbling around our feet including amtrak yet amtrak is a good investment, a necessary resource and short changing amtrak creates other costs elsewhere. i strongly urge you to provide the resources to amtrak to thrive and grow and not just limp along. i appreciate the opportunity to address you today and we have accomplished much and i look forward to implement the lessons of 188. i'll answer any questions you may have. >> thank you very much, mr. pierce. we'll start with a round of questions and i would encourage all members to -- there's a lot

of interest. this is an important topic so i would encourage you to keep to five minutes. if the interest remains high we'll consider doing a second round of questions, so again, please rich the five minutes and there are a lot of folks here they think will ask questions and i will be quick with the gavel so watch the clock. i'll start out. ms. feinberg, in december of 2013 with the metro north commuter train derailment it was a very similar circumstance. the train was going too fast and the accident required the -- the fra required metro north to put the codes into the atc system so the trains going at those speeds and now you've just issued an emergency order that literally cuts and pastes that order from two years ago to be put on amtrak. it seems that the next logical step, and i think you said this is right now you're going to look at all of the curves, but don't you think they should have

done that after that -- after the metro north derailment? should have put out an order for fra, and i know you weren't there at the time and wouldn't that have been the logical step at that time was to look at the northeast corridor and the curves. >> we put out a safety advisory urging commuter railroads to take a look at their curves and to see if there were additional steps that they should take. the emergency order that went out at that time was aimed at metro north, and i know as you know, emergency orders are very narrow. they cannot be particularly broad. they have to be legally sustainable and enforceable and at the time the fra looked at expanding that emergency order to many other railroads and to all commuter railroads and deemed that it would not be legally enforceable and we did not have evidence to show that

we had this problem elsewhere. as you may remember, metro north had a series of fatal and non-fatal accidents. they seemed to have a systemic safety culture problem and when we looked beyond metro north we did not feel that this was a systemic problem with other railroads. we were not seeing derail ams with other railroads and we were not seeing engineers at high speeds and we believe the emergency order aimed at metro north would only be enforceable to metro north. >> legally, you didn't think you had the ability to do the northeast corridor? >> that's correct. >> does the e.o. today, are you able to enforce it throughout the northeast corridor? have them look at it or do you have legal problems there? >> the e.o. that went out last week or -- i'm sorry, ten days ago was aimed specifically at amtrack. we are looking beyond amtrak to see if we would take similar or other steps at other commuter railroads and we went directly to amtrak and others beyond that. >> only amtrak. >> for the emergency order. >> does that mean you have the

authority to tell connecticut and massachusetts, are they able to be included with that. >> that would want work for the emergency order that's currently out, but that's what we're looking at right now for next steps. >> see if you can include them? okay. mr. boardman, positive training control. you said in your statement you're committed to getting it by the end of the year. the -- can you talk a little bit about the process that you've been talking to the last couple of months and i know you were talking spectrum and that was the last step of the equation and can you talk about the cost and the money? you have the money? can you talk about the spectrum? >> we, at this point in time do have the positive train control installed on the northeast corridor. all sections that we own on the northeast corridor is fine what we had learned along with the freight railroads is 900 megahertz system that exists

right now really wasn't providing the capability and high density areas. the decision was that we needed to go to a 220-megahertz radio system. that really provides a much better propagation of the signal and a much more reliable service. so what we've been doing is making sure that we finally received approval for the 220 megahertz system within the last couple of months and we have to test it. we have to get the data radios ready and that's what we're doing now. so that's where we are. >> and you learned that because you had ptc operation from boston, new haven to boston? >> that's correct. >> along with ptc. >> and the entire stretch from washington, d.c. to boston will be urn the new, increased

megahertz. >> >> for everything we own and control. >> what would massachusetts and connecticut with the state owned? >> there is a section between new york and new haven that's new rochelle to new haven that we don't own or control. that's owned by new york state and connecticut, under the control of metro north. >> thank you very much. seeing my time has expired and the five-minute rule, i turn to mr. defazio. >> thank you, mr. chairman. you implied and didn't expand upon it that you're going to look at the cars themselves, whether or not more resilient cars could better protect passengers in crashes, is that correct? >> that's correct. >> have you looked at that previously? >> yes. we've been looking at passenger car crash worthiness for several years. >> what can we design -- mr. boardman, i believe, these cars are what era? '70s? >> they started being delivered in about 1975. >> and have you asked to replace them?

>> we have a plan to rebuild these cars and we are replacing some cars at this point in time. the ones that were built in the '40s. >> in the '40s? >> yes, sir. >> and are you going to somehow improve their resilience in the case of crash? >> our expectation is to be able to use crash energy management which is something the entire passenger industry is beginning to do. >> but these current cars don't meet whatever -- >> they do not. >> and what would that take? >> in terms of dollars? >> yes. have you asked for this mono? >>. >> if we asked for replacement we would talk about $4 billion. >> have you made a request? >> we've made requests for rebuilding and some questions for replacing. >> okay. and what happened to those requests? >> the requests for replacing was a complex request because if they were long-distance trains or they weren't receiving enough

revenue for us to be able to pay back on. >> but the bottom line is were you allocated the congress or not? >> no, sir. >> so congress denied you the money? >> yes, sir. >> again, back to mr. hart, do you believe that we could either rehab these cars he's talking about in a way that would increase resilience and survivability or do you think they need to be totally replaced? >> thank you for the question. that's one of the things we've been looking into and we'll look at it here just as we are currently with the ramada accident with the crash worthiness of their cars. >> would you pull your microphone closer, please. >> i'm sorry. yes, both for this accident as we are with the ramada accident in terms of the crash worthiness of the cars. whether it will be new cars or whether these can be fixed. >> okay. when i look at photos, i mean, the locomotive looks pretty intact and, think, that's new construction and the engineer obviously survived yet that first car i've never seen and i heard some first responders say they've never dealt with anything like that before. so, i mean, that implies -- are there other in other nations or

elsewhere around the world where they have modern railroads, do they have more crash worthiness in their passenger cars? >> that will be part of our investigation is what other countries are doing in this respect is making sure that we're the leading edge of crash worthiness on the car. >> ms. feinberg,y i appreciate that you will push very hard. commuter railroads are one of the greatest laggards here and they've asked help of congress and they're at a loss now to get this technology installed. >> that's right. we've asked for $875 million to assist commuters, commuter railroads and implementing ptc. we've also opened up the riff program for railroads who are looking for loans that will assist with ptc implementation. so we just completed work on a $967 million loan to mta that will assist with ptc

implementation, and then as we approach the deadline, one of the things we have asked the congress for authority for previously is to work with railroads who absolutely won't miss the deadline. who absolutely will miss the deadline, to work with them to bring, to raise the safety bar in the interim. >> so they will dodge some sort of interoperating changes to compensate for the lack of positive train control. >> exactly. and they would have to go through an approval process and work with us. we continue to hold their feet to the fire to make sure they're working toward ptc implementation. >> and when you look at a step process, those that are really trying versus those who haven't tried at all? >> i would expect it would be merit based.

correct. is. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. what operations has amtrak made since the accident? what has amtrak made and will they be instituting others? >> we did the the code change on the northbound section of the frankfort curve as requested by the fra. we've been evaluating the rest of the curves as required by the fra, and also checking checking the entire northeast corridor to ensure we had speed limit signs along the way that all met the requirements of the emergency order. in terms of how we check on our engineers, we have a very robust and regular method that we check engineers. for example, just since january 1st of '14 until now, we've had over 16,000 speed checks of engineers along the northeast corridor.

so that's like 35 times a day do we check somebody along the northeast corridor to make sure that they're operating at the right speed. we have a recurring training program, a black training program that lasts for a week every year, and they have to be certified on a biannual basis. so we have -- we continue to do that. we continue any kinds of changes that occur. we continue to provide additional training for engineers. >> thank you. how many curves does amtrak now have after doing this audit that have atc how many do you still have that you want to implement the atc on?

>> after the back bay accident and the consensus for what they need to accomplish, they identified six curves. one of those was the northbound section of the frankfurt curve. since fra requested us to look at it under the new circumstances, we've identified at least four more at this point in time. we had 300 curves on the northeast corridor that could meet the newer conditions, and we're moving forward with those. >> one of the questions that has continued to come up -- we've we funded it fully out of this committee. what guarantees do we have that the northeast corridor profits will actually be used to implement new safety and ptc regulations? >> the way that we have worked with the committee on how we're

developing a program is to make safety decisions on safety issues, and funding decisions are really about the larger scale of infrastructure, not only for the railroads, but for highways and for aviation, which i've been talking about for several years at this point in time, and the necessity for increases in that way. safety decisions. we're making those decisions and making sure we provide safety decisions. >> i guess the fundamental question is when we pass a broad bill like that, what types of guarantees would there be on the priorities of the spending patterns? last year amtrak spent $350 million on new cars. that may be an important issue, but the question is it a priority of congress?

is it a priority of amtrak? and do the priorities align? >> we think they do, congressman. we work regularly with the staff of the committee. with work with all of those interested in both safety and the improvements along the northeast corridor. the sufficiency of funding to do all the things that we want to do, there's always scarce resources. so we have to make those decisions based on those scarce resources, but we don't reduce the idea that we need to have a safe railroad. we make safe decisions along the way. thank you. and my time is nearly expired. let me thank you for your efforts. mr. feinberg as well as the mayor of philadelphia all coming together for a very, very rapid response. i appreciate not only the collaboration, but certainly the timeliness. and i know speaking on behalf of

mr. capuano, working with you and helping to understand how we can resolve the problems in the future. thank you. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank the board, the panel for the testimony you've had. it's very thoughtful and very difficult decision to make. i would like to ask you, is the ntsb taking a look at the decisions on prioritization of the ptc, or is that beyond the scope of your normal activities? >> we would look at the specific event and determine what needs to be done to prevent that from happening again? >> but you wouldn't be in the business of determining whether the prioritization made by amtrak or others, ptc, let's assume everybody did ptc tomorrow, there can't be implements tomorrow. every rail company in the country would have to determine what do we do second, third, fourth, fifth?

that would not be in the normal purview of the ntsb? >> that would be correct. exactly how we would lead that to the implement. >> that's fair enough. that's what i expected. miss feinberg, do you agree with mr. boardman's comments that amtrak will reach the december 2015 deadline to get ptc in the entire northeast corridor? >> we see no reason they will not meet the deadline. >> and do you have an estimate of time frame for the rest of the corridor? >> well, beyond the fortheast corridor, other than in michigan, the amtrak decision will be dependent on freights implementing ptc. so that could take some time. >> do you have any estimate on

the cost of that? >> the cost is in the billions. billions have been spent. they have billions further to go. >> multiple billions of dollars to the rest of the amtrack system? >> yes? >> and what about the rest of the class one freight railroads? how much would that cost? >> i actually thought that was the question you were just asking. so again billions. >> what about the short lines? are they implementing positive train control or just for the class ones at amtrak? >> it's for class ones and for passenger railroads. >> so the short freights will not be doing it? >> we are working with the short lines a bit separately. >> what about commuter rail? will they be doing it? >> yes. >> what about subway systems? i would hope the fta would be working with you on that. >> we work closely with fta, and they work closely with their organizations. >> so even under the best case scenario, that the government was flush with money, it would

take multiple billions of dollars and many years to get from where we are to where we want to be on positive trade control across the line. is that a fair assessment? >> i would agree with you on multiple billions with a "b." in terms of multiple years, i worry we are approaching that position. but we believe there is a congressionally mandated deadline. we intend to enforce against it. this is not a new requirement for railroads. >> mr. hart, have you taken a look at the accident, whether the seat belts would have helped or not? >> it is part of passenger surviveability investigation. >> so that will be part of the final report when you have one? >> yes. >> because i just road the train up to philadelphia. there are no seat belts on the train. yet i flew down here today from boston. i had a seat belt on the entire time. and it would strike me that -- i don't know.

i have no idea and i'm looking the forward to your report, that seat belts would be something that should be considered both to prevent death and injury. >> we will be looking at that as part of the surviveability aspect. >> if they recommend seat belts in passenger trains, is that something you would pursue? >> it would certainly be something we would look at. there are different opinions about the requirements of seat belts on trains. >> different opinions? >> yeah, well i recognize that seat belts might seem like a accident, there are also people who tend to be up and walking around between cars during an accident. the fact that you would have to harden the seats in order to put seat belts into the seats. >> i understand about the current figurations but i would suggest talk to them about automobiles, about planes.

i understand the current configuration might have to be addressed over time, the concept of seat belts, i was under the impression it was no longer debatable that seat belts in an accident at any speed, preferable to no seat belts. if that's the case, maybe i'll take mine out of the car too. >> we would certainly work closely with the ntsb, just as we do on every recommendation. but there is belief of hardening of the seats required to put seat belts on trains would cause more injuries in an accident. >> so we're back at it again. it is cost benefit analysis how many people will have to die or get injured before we take the next step. the same questions we've had with automobiles. the same question with planes. >> no, sir. not a cost benefit issue. simply how do you keep the most people inside the car safe. thank you, with that mr. duncan is recognized for five minutes. >> miss feinberg, last week secretary of fox appeared to

agree that this accident was not necessarily caused by lack of funding. in fact, his exact quote was i don't think you can categorically say that more funding would have changed things. do you agree with that statement? >> i think he was referring to the behavior of the engineer. i do think there are consequences to funding issues, yes. >> mr. boardman, i noticed total operating revenues of amtrak have gone up from $2.4 billion to $3.1 billion, about 700 billion increase in funding. and on top of that, the government has given you $1.4 billion in additional funds each year. and i'm assuming that you felt that amtrak was moving fast enough in installing positive

train control because you said in your testimony that you were ahead of every other railroad. is that correct? >> we are ahead of every other railroad. >> and i'm also assuming that you were shocked by this accident because you testified that it's been 28 years since you had a derailment caused fatality, or fatality caused by derailment. so railroad passenger travel is still about the safest method of transportation. is that correct? >> we believe that, yes. >> and did you ever tell this committee or the congress that you didn't have the funds to move fast enough on installation of positive train control? >> we did not. >> all right.