in the ecosystem. traditional knowledge can traditional knowledge can be a rich source of clues and information that perhaps we can use currently to help solve some problems. we don't want to lose track of that. >> throughout the weekend, american history tv is featuring, lincoln nebraska. our staff recently traveled there to learn about its rich history. learn more about lincoln and other stops on our tour. you are watching american history tv all weekend, every weekend on cspan3. >> coming up next, the former national security council and state department officials from the nixon administration discussed the president's efforts to normalize relations with china in the early 1970's. they detail national security advisor henry kissinger's 1971

secret trip to china and richard nixon's official visit a year later. the national archives and richard nixon foundation cohosted this 90-minute event. david: good morning. i am the archivist of the united states. it is a pleasure to welcome you here today. a special welcome to our c-span audience joining us from around the country and around the world. today, we have the latest in an ongoing series of nixon legacy forums. when asked about his library when it was being planned, president nixon said i have insisted that the nixon library and birthplace be not a monument to the career of one man but a place where visitors and scholars will be able to recall the events of the time i served as president and to measure in

-- and weigh the policies my administration pursued. i hope the library and birthplace will be different, a vital place of discovery and rediscovery, of investigation, of study, debate and analysis. those words will be our touchstone as we begin a major renovation of the permanent exhibit at the nixon library this year. except for the recently opened watergate exhibit, the nixon library has been relatively unchanged since it opened in the summer of 1990. over the past 24 years, there have been many changes in techniques and technologies and in the volume of material now available. it will be an invigorating exercise in bringing in the 37th president into the 21st century. today's forum is the 29th in the series. youthe idea is simple to

reunite them with the papers they wrote and engage them in discussion about what it was like to be there working in the next white house. the documentation at the nixon library, regarding the opening of china, the papers and tape recordings are particularly rich. these forums are not intended to be the definitive of any of the -- definitive history of any subject. they are meant to be the building block of in history. they are a unique opportunity to provide first-person for current and future scholars and citizens who want to understand how the nixon policies were really made and how history really works. dean acheson famously named his papers "the creation." we are at the creation of the most momentous events in the last century. today's forum is a case in point. the opening of china today, few

events are truly as transformational as president nixon's determination to end what he called china's angry isolation and to restore america's relations with the world's most populous nation. america and the world were transfixed with vivid images of the week that changed the world when president nixon went to china in february 1972 and secretary of state clinton recently remembered renting a small t.v. set when they still had adjustable rabbit ear antennas so she could watch the coverage in her room at the yale law school. she said that calling the week that went to china the week that change the world was an understatement. the world was truly different the day nixon left for china than it had been when he arrived. today, distinguished panelists all worked at the nixon national

security council and helped prepare the momentous and transformational trip. ronald walker, the chair of the board of the richard nixon foundation, will introduce today's distinct moderator and panelists. please welcome ron walker. [applause] ronald walker: good morning everyone. the panel is going to come out. it's my pleasure to welcome everyone along with david. it is nice to see all these lovely faces out there. those of us on the white house staff in the 1970's remembered a young lady named catherine. she was on the nsc council at 18

years of age. she worked at night during the night to work on the briefing. she would write her bicycle from george washington university to the white house and worked in the situation room. she went on to serve in the national security post or president ford and president reagan. in 1984, she wrote the secretary of defense's memorandum "the , uses of military war." she received the department's highest civilian award for the work she did in the reagan administration. today, she is a fox news security analyst and she hosts the foxnews.com. "defcom 3." she will introduce the panel.

god bless. [applause] >> thank you, ron. [applause] ron walker is much too modest to mention it but he played an essential role in nixon's opening to china. he did all the advance work and was ground breaking in every way. it was the first time a primetime presidential trip event happened in prime time. it was the first time american people saw china in a generation and the first time a handful of americans had been into china. ron is not a part of this panel today. if you want to get a real behind-the-scenes look at the trip to china, you can read the book his wife wrote called "china calls" by ann walker. this is the second in a series of forums about the nixon administration's national security policy. it was five years that nixon was in office and this was

considered one of the most fruitful times in american foreign policy and the golden age of foreign policy in the 20th century. foreign policy and decision-making was restructured and focused in the national security council and in nixon's hands personally. we will have future forms that will focus on arms control and the u.s. peace accord and a final forum on the lasting legacy of the nixon-kissinger era. this one is devoted to the opening of china. it is a similar event that changed the world. i will introduce you to the gentleman who helped make it happen. joining us today, winston lord. winston lord joined the nsc staff at the beginning of the nixon administration. he was one of henry's closest advisers and he works on every aspect of american foreign-policy. he was in and out of kissinger's office several times a day.

he helped plan henry kissinger's secret trip to china in 71. he played a central role in the trips to china and the subsequent unfolding of american chinese foreign-policy. he went on to become president of the foreign relations secretary of state and u.s. ambassador to china. next is dr. richard solomon he was a university of michigan professor. kissinger tapped him to join the national security council staff in september 1971. he had a phd from m.i.t. he was a senior scholar at the prestigious rand corporation and spoke fluent mandarin. he accompanied kissinger and out hague -- al hague on numerous china trips and he was in nixon's 1972 trip to china.

he held senior positions, has written numerous books, and remains one of america's leading signologists. he is now the senior fellow of the rand corporation. next to him is ambassador nicholas platt. unlike our other analysts, ambassador platt was not on the national security council staff. nick was a career foreign service officer. he was one of the state department's senior psychologist -- signologists. he was the staff assistant to then secretary of state william rogers. he went on to hold senior positions at the department of defense and after leaving government he dealt extensively with the chinese through the last 40 years.

finally is admiral jonathan howe, who was a young commander on kissinger's staff. he was kissinger's military assistant trade he was one of the only military officers on the staff and the only naval officer. then a lieutenant commander, he spent most of his time at sea as a submariner. he went on to a very distinguished career in the navy. became a four-star admiral. he was also president george h.w. bush's deputy national security advisor. these were men who had distinguished careers before they joined up with henry kissinger and continued to be on the forefront of american foreign policy going forward. i'd like to get right to it. i want to ask each of you how you happened to be associated with henry specifically. how did henry find you? >> i was a foreign service officer working in the pentagon in 1968. the first person that kissinger

asked to join him on his staff was the head of the policy planning staff in the pentagon where i was working. he went over to join kissinger and asked me to go with him. i had a quick interview with henry and i guess i passed. the first year, i was on a mini policy planning staff. we were sending memos to henry. many were criticizing what he was doing and that is why i got his attention. then i became a special assistant in february of 1970. i was involved in this and the vietnam negotiations and in russia and the middle east. >> how did henry find you? >> i was recommended by the council of foreign relations. david rockefeller had arranged a fellowship program. in march or april of 1971, i was recommended to kissinger because he was taking scholars or

recommendees on the council. it was the second year of that program. i got a letter in the spring of 1971, before the secret trip saying that i would be welcome to join the staff for a year as an academic in that context. i was teaching the summer of 1971 at michigan in preparation for taking the year's leave. i was shocked as the world was when president nick the less henry kissinger got on television and announced that kissinger had already been to china secretly. immediately, i started getting phone calls from my colleagues in the state department. boy, are you lucky. you will be in the middle of a lot of interesting things. i showed up at the end of the summer. from that point on, i became a member of that team. it worked out well enough so that i was asked to stay beyond the first year and ended up working for kissinger and thence

-- and then for scull croft for five years. >> i was thrown together with henry when we were coordinating the papers for the trip. rogers asked me to pull the papers together. i had been working with the secretary and i had some idea how to do this and i had been working on china. i brought over the papers to discuss them with henry himself. henry was very anxious that we all be singing from the same sheet of music. i was showing them at our sheet of music to make sure it was the same as his, and it was. that was how we met. >> what about you? >> i had just finished two years of graduate school. i took kissinger's last course

that he taught at harvard on national security. that was a large seminar. he did not know me from that. i had orders to be on a submarine. i got a phone call from the navy saying come to washington. we cannot tell you why, just come. and don't go back to new london right now. so i came, obviously, and that turned out to be an interview with hague and kissinger, etc. i was very worried about wanting to go back to submarine and sort of bargaining. when they finally brought me over, they said this could be two years. four and a half years later, i got back to the navy. i had an enjoyable experience. the only reason he knew about me was professors unbeknownst to , me, were advisers on my thesis

etc., had written to kissinger and said this is somebody you ought to have. i never saw the letter. they never said anything to me at all. it was totally out of the blue. but that is the reason they learned who i was. >> i would like to start off now setting the stage for the historical record. where was the united states in the 1960's? you think now about china, it is hard to think about a time when china wasn't a central player in the world of politics and with the united states. but that was not the case in in 1968 when nixon ran for president or when he took office. set the stage for the historic perspective of the situation. >> well, here we are in a world 2014 that has been totally transformed since the era of the nixon initiative. we are almost half a century

away from president nixon making the first move to establish contact with the chinese. today, the soviet union's history. china is approaching certainly number two if not number one in the world economy. it has emerged, risen as an international force in no small measure because of the opening that president nixon and chairman mao initiated. but let's go back briefly to what the world look like when the soviet union and china had allied themselves. chairman mao had established a strategic alliance with the soviet union. eurasia, from eastern europe to the pacific ocean was controlled, dominated by a hostile alliance. it was a fundamental threat to american security. and that threat persisted. it was certainly one of the motivations for the vietnam war involvement.

as the 1960's progressed, there were signs of real tension between moscow and beijing. and mr. nixon who was at that point out of office and would have been aware of these tensions. he was also very much aware of the degree to which the vietnam war had undermined political support for the lyndon johnson administration. it got so bad that president johnson decided not to run for a second term. in the second half of the 60's, mr. nixon anticipated that he might run for office. he started thinking, how can i prevent my administration from being entrapped in the vietnam quagmire? he made a trip through asia in 1967 and he wrote a really fascinating article in the journal "foreign affairs," that

hinted not only at the desire to get out of vietnam -- the title of the article was "asia after vietnam" -- but he hinted that it was important to draw china into the international community so this was very much in his head. he was saying, how do i construct a policy to deal with this situation? the brilliance of what he put together was he could see the tensions between the two communist states. he thought that might be the basis for splitting the alliance. and he was looking for a way to accelerate or gain some leverage on getting out of the vietnam situation. as he prepared to run for office, he was talking publicly about he had a secret plan to end the vietnam war. he did not mention china but there was more than a little gaffawing on the michigan side.

but he really did have a secret plan to get out of vietnam. his game plan is one of the great strategic maneuvers in american foreign policy and i would say in international politics of the 20th century because what finally transpired the breakthrough to improve relations with china and all that followed fundamentally transformed the political dynamic of the cold war, certainly to america's advantage. it put the soviet union on the defensive and laid the basis for china's international engagement that played out for decades, not only after ,apmao. >> when you are on the national security council, you are already kissinger's assistant. did they talk to you about this? did you know that that was in nixon's mind from the beginning? >> yeah.

i got fully briefed when i became the assistant in in the 1970. first week of nixon's term, he sent a memo to kissinger saying let's get in touch with the chinese. let me follow up on what he said on the impulses of both sides to get together after 22 years of mutual hostility and isolation. in addition to the foreign scene, there is also the domestic scene that nixon inherited. 550,000 troops in vietnam, a nuclear rival in the soviet union. no contact with 1/5 of the world's people, and a home, you had riots and people being disillusioned with executive power and particularly the vietnam war. the first impulse of nixon opening to china was to show the world and the america people that we were not bogged down in vietnam, that our diplomacy

could flourish despite the incredible context he inherited and to break out of the mold that the united states could no longer be a world leader despite vietnam. he knew that any exit from vietnam was going to be messy and ambiguous. he thought if he opened with china, this huge country, the drama and the importance of dealing with that giant would put in perspective a messy exit from vietnam. let's not underestimate the breakthrough for foreign policy and what he did for the american people's morale. but more specifically number one, he wanted to improve relations with the soviet union. the best way to do that was to get their attention by going to china. number two, he wanted help in ending the vietnam war. he figured if he opened with china and russia, hanoi would see that it was being isolated

by two big patrons interested in relations with us. he also wanted greater stability in asia generally. those are his objectives. on the chinese side, they are concerned about their polar bear neighbor with clashes along the river. they saw the brezhnev doctrine take over czechoslovakia. they were concerned about the soviets. they were totally isolated . because of the cultural revolution, they withdrew all but one of their ambassadors from abroad. here is a classic case where both sides achieved their goals essentially. within weeks of the secret trip and nixon's announcement, moscow agreed to a summit meeting with nixon as well. they had been dragging their feet for years.

we had the berlin agreement, the arms agreement we made major , breakthroughs with the russians. it did help us put pressure on vietnam but that was a much longer operation. but certainly in terms of american diplomacy, it showed that we were a major act on the world stage again. it enhanced nixon's popularity. it achieved all major objectives. the chinese concern got some security against the soviet union and they broke out of their isolation. they knew if we opened up with them, then japan, which had been holding back, and europe to go with normal relations, it would get into the united nations in october 71. this was a major move for the region. it is a win-win situation. >> who were the losers? our relations with china were with taiwan, not red china as it was called at the time. were we selling china out?

the china which was taiwan? >> we were sticking straightly domestically -- we were sticking strictly to the policy of supporting taiwan. i was in the china desk when the transition between johnson and nixon took place. one of my tasks was to write a history of johnson's achievements in china policy. this was a slim volume at best. [laughter] but it gave me a chance to look in the files and see all of the different initiatives we had worked on, sent forward to dean ross that were then sent back. the change when nixon came in was palpable. we were asked by the secretary's office to brush off various initiatives we made on cultural

exchange sports and education , and so on. so we sent them forward. and they disappeared. and they must have gone to the white house. we didn't have a clue what was going on. >> the state department was kept out of what was broiling out the state, at the pentagon. >> we were not privy to what nixon, kissinger, and lord were cooking up. [laughter] >> these were crucial for the trips. there were a lot of holdouts. we relied a lot on some of the background and papers that were sent to us even though they didn't know why they were sending them. [laughter] >> we were doing our job when we sent them. those of us who had read the nixon article and those of us who were sensitive to these different vibrations realized that something was up. we didn't know what it was but

something was up. of course, there was a lot of intelligence and analysis going on. i spent some time doing that. particularly in the context of the clashes between the soviet union and china along the border. >> this was in 1969. >> we wrote our reports and the policy implications were that they were going to improve the atmosphere for china and the united states to get together. this began the period of winking that went on. there were some very public aspects to nixon's policies. there was relaxation of trade

and travel restrictions and things like that which laid the groundwork for what was going on behind the scenes. >> let me just add that the university of michigan campus was in turmoil through the late 1960's. tremendous fear of getting drawn into another war with china is -- as we had in the korean war period because of the vietnam conflict. so there was tremendous tension building over whether we would get involved in another conflict with china. there was an organization set up as i began my teaching career in 1966 called the u.s. committee on u.s.-china relations. the academic community was trying to find ways to avoid another clash with china. so the public mood was sort of primed for some breakthrough that would relieve that fear

that tension that we would be drawn into another war with china. >> i'd like to talk about the steps leading up to -- make you talk about some of the signals being spent. you talked about the fear that the united states would drift into another war with china after the korean war. in 1969, 1970, china was one of america's arch enemies. the world was shocked when nixon went on television in july 1971 and said henry kissinger had president nixon would himself visit china several months later. we didn't have to phonetic relations. you couldn't pick up the phone and say, we would like to come visit. talk us through the steps. >> we had a double challenge,

knowing we wanted to move toward china. first, there was the public signal that had to be sent, both that china would pick up the signals and that our public and the countries would get used to the idea we were moving in a different direction. as was pointed out the trade and travel restrictions -- we did all the things. the president used the phrase "people's republic of china." no president have used that phrase before. we made certain references in the annual policy reports, which came out in february every year in which we indicated a further direction. so the beauty of this, they were unilateral. they did not require a response from the chinese. we were not negotiating in public. problems getting them.

we began to look for a secret intermediary, because we had no direct contact. we thought of france briefly. we tried romania, which got fairly interesting for a while. we tried various channels, to see which ones the chinese or most comfortable with, and they settled on pakistan, a close friend of theirs that was close to us in the cold war. we began to condition the public', and then we had a secret channel. >> talk to me about the secret channel. did you say to the president of pakistan, we would like to get in touch with the chinese? >> the president of pakistan came on a state visit. the way it would happen joe and i would write a message, get into the pakistanis, and they would send it to the ambassador. i was always there with a handwritten note, a typed note. we would go back the same way.

what was important and this was not only to converge on an agreement about the trip and decide who was going to go on the trip, it ended up being kissinger, with great reluctance, of course -- [laughter] >> a number of his staff members are here, which is why you're getting that chuckling. >> the key issue is that china wanted to talk about taiwan. another thing, we tried to get our ambassador to run down to the chinese ambassador in warsaw , and he could not catch up to him. that was another signal. we had to make sure that if anybody went to china, which was a very risky year political gamble, that the agenda would be a lot broader than the very sticky issue of taiwan. what we worked at in private was to make sure the agenda was brought in. -- broader. i will make one last comment and i want my colleague to weigh in.

the famous ping-pong diplomacy -- the timing was crucial. we had gone back-and-forth through the pakistani channel, but we had not heard back from the chinese. the beginning of 1971, we had not heard anything for three-month. we were beginning to get antsy. then you had the american ping-pong team in the world championship in tokyo and the chinese invited them to the mainland. this was mapo's personal idea . it told the world, not to mention his domestic audience that he would reach out to the u.s. more suddenly -- subtly than the ping-pong initiative. secondly, it was a public answer to our private channels, which we had not heard back from. thirdly if we don't engage with him, he can put pressure on us

through public opinion. we got the picture. two weeks later, we got a crucial message in late april through the pakistani channel setting up the kissinger visit. >> let me just add that the chinese have put out their own signal in october of 1970. chairman mao invited edgar snow, who became famous for his book written during the civil war period, "red star over china," invited edgar snow to meet with him and appear for the national day parade. edhargar snow wrote an article that appeared in "life" magazine in the following 1970. my understanding is the message didn't really get through. the mindset of all sides was so negative. then probably because of the internal turmoil in china, the cultural revolution, there may have been a period of pullback.

>> other signals going on, we suggested that the warsaw talks be moved to the embassies. they had previously taken place for years -- >> what were the worse off talks -- warsaw talks? >> talks we had with the chinese for decades about prisoner exchanges, mainly. our only direct contact with the chinese during those years. and they had been in a abeyance for some time. they were also very public. they were in a palace which was eminently bugganble, and the gossip was that a taxi going by could tune into the warsaw talks. the suggestion was that we move the warsaw talks into embassies. one month in one of the sea, one month in another. that process began.

but it was interrupted. i think the interruption, which winston has been talking about came about as a reaction to the invasion of cambodia, which in fact put things on hold. >> we called it the "incursion" at the time. >> call it what you wish. >> in any case, the chinese side as a reason to slow down. >> you were in the military at the time. how did you see at? >> i want to underline one thing. i think there was a serious chinese concern about the russians, and what was happening on their border, the buildup of civilian troops and so forth some clashes that were occurring. in mao's mind, the chinese leadership mind, they felt this was a serious threat to them. so getting along with the

americans, they did not feel we were territorially ambitious as the russians would be. so this was a motivating factor to keep this spark, keep it going, keep this contact and see what might be possible. >> we think of the triangular diplomacy of the united states, soviet union, and china.we think we were running that game but you imply that the chinese were looking at the triangle to see if they could find a new alliance. >> and the u.s. might be someone they could depend on more than the russian part of the triangle. >> the russians made it over to nixon and kissinger and said why don't we gang up on the chinese? >> when was this? before the secret trip? >> the summer of 1969, when they had these tensions along the border. >> there were national security memos being circulated and talked about within the bureaucracy, talking about

relations with china and relations with russia. they were hotly debated. there was also a big argument within the community, the intelligence community, which i was involved in. discussing the question of whether or not the nuclear castration of china was possible by russia. that's how serious it was -- >> a sino-russian nuclear war. >> ever love our -- several of our top people, geogrrge kennan and others, said we should not move precipitously toward china, that it would hurt relations with russia. of course, nixon knew that the best way to get russia' his attention was to move toward china, which of course is what happened.

>> let's explore a little bit of the trying to a diplomacy where the u.s. was playing one against the other. >> i don't know how explicitly this was conceived at the moment, but what emerged as the diplomacy unfolded was that we were in the so-called swing position where the russians and the soviets and the chinese started, if you like, competing for good relations with us. they had bad relations between themselves so we were in the favorable position where we could respond to their interest and improve relations with the united states in a variety of ways. winston touched on this -- related to the vietnam situation, to trying to activate nuclear diplomacy with the soviet union. so the strategic triangle, as it emerged out of the nixon initiative, put the united states in a very favorable

position. it is interesting today to say well, is there a new dynamic to these triangle relations? maybe it's the chinese who will be in the stronger swing position. >> that's for another panel. >> when you were working on these internal memoranda with this very small group of people, for you looking at that as, this would be our opportunity to get to the things we wanted, opening to china as well, arms control with the soviet union, ending the vietnam war? >> absolutely. he was crucial in playing the soviet dimension with the chinese. he could get into that, and he showed. our strategy was make the russians anxious and nervous about our opening to china, but at the same time demonstrate to the chinese that we have more actual business with moscow than we do with beijing.

a more normal relationship. we could have agreements, we could have principles of international relations so the chinese were little antsy at the same time. we would go out of the way after the moscow summit, the russian encounters, to brief them. as a courtesy, to reassure the chinese, but also to make them a little nervous about the amount of business we had with them. then we shared our views on soviet military strength. that's where john should come in. >> what was the relationship between the united states and soviet union? we will talk about that in a subsequent panel, but where were the pressure points? what were we doing with the soviet union, arms control vietnam? >> obviously we were in the cold war. the soviet union was the main reason that there was a cold war going on. at the same time, we were trying

to open relations with the soviet union. arms control agreements. all sorts of agreements about how we can operate in this semi-hostile world. a whole bunch of things were going on to try to improve that relationship, and i think what is unusual is, or amazing, when you think about 1972, and i will get to that, you have a presidential visit to china and a few months later you have a presidential visit to russia. meetings at the highest level, agreements, success in both areas. this was an amazing buildup, and the china trip was certainly the first part of it.

so the russians were the big providers on vietnam. vietnam obviously was a huge issue. nixon had run the presidency -- run for presidency, i will end that war if i get elected, and here we were. we got to 1972, and the vietnam war was not over. the agreement was not there, and so forth. this was really a dynamic era when you look at it. when you think about all the different things that went on, it is significant. i think what winston was trying to get to, we were provided information once this relationship started on these trips, to let the chinese know specifically what the russians were doing. obviously they have their own intelligence, to let them know through our satellites what the

alignment was. we try to give it very accurately and honestly. it was a significant buildup and they were concerned about it . >> keep going, guys. >> specifically -- he was explaining to them, this is all unclassified now -- one other quick point on the summits. we asked the soviets for a summit throughout 1970, and we were still asking them. hague called the soviet ambassador and gave him one last chance to agree to a summit. we would have gone to moscow first. once again they were not quite ready for it, and we had left word with hague to call us.

leading up to the secret trip, we were in southeast asia and south asia. the idea was to talk about this agreement. i got on the phone in either thailand or vietnam. he gave me some code language. a six-year-old could figure out what he was saying. [laughter] it was not very subtle. the russians had turned it down. so we went to china first, and the russians agreed within weeks to a summit afterward. >> meanwhile, back at the state department -- >> let me say that the campaign to get the chinese into the u.n. was gathering momentum, and the state department saluting -- was mounting a massive campaign against this. in favor of taiwan. that was also what was going on. in the meantime, i was asked as

the head of the china watching part of the state department, to write a memo on what kind of a member of the u.n. china would make. there are all these different currents. [laughter] >> that was the real title of a memo. >> let's switch to the trip to china. winston, you said you were doing these various initiatives to try to find somebody from the chinese government. you had secret memos going back-and-forth on a piece of paper. what happened? how did kissinger get to china? >> he was scheduled for a public trip to vietnam thailand, india and pakistan. in a small plane -- i will never forget this -- we had three

different briefing books. a briefing book for the people going to china, but also a couple more for those who were not going to china, but had to know what was going on to cover up where the hell we were. we were supposed to be in pakistan. and then there was a briefing book for the people who had no idea we were going to china. we had three different briefing books. i updated it, went to sleep, and kissinger would make me redo all three of them. that was a lot of fun. my colleagues are going to grown here, but i have to -- going to groan here, but i have to explain that kissinger was not the first person into china. i was the first. [laughter] it's true. it's absolutely true. kissinger admits it in his memoir. >> that's because kissinger thought some of the be shooting when they walked out of the plane. [laughter] [applause] -- [laughter]

>> i will leave you in suspense. the idea was when we went to pakistan kissinger would get sick with a stomach ache, go to a hill station and while he was supposedly their we would sneak up to beijing. when we got on the plane kissinger got a real stomachache. [laughter] so we had to pretend he wasn't sick. [laughter] then we get there -- by the way we interviewed a couple pakistani doctors to make sure they could take care of the so-called kissinger, being impersonated by secret service men in this hill station. i asked one doctor, do you know what kissinger looks like? of course. wrong doctor. [laughter] so we get on the plane and they meet us. no american had been there, no official for 22 years. i pakistani plane, so everybody in the front was pakistani and i was in the back of the plane with kissinger and a group of others. as we headed into chinese

airspace i went to the front of the plane. henry was in the back, so i was the first person in china. [laughter] he elbowed me aside when we got out of the plane, but i was still number one. so we spent 48 hours -- the picture you are seeing is the first night, at dinner during the secret trip. on the american side, on the lower left you have john, who was absently crucial. henry himself, and our vietnam expert. we spent 48 hours there in total secrecy, essentially examining what the agenda might look like, whether we could in fact have a meaningful presidential trip. and also, a shared announcement announcing the trip by both sides. that got to be difficult because the chinese wanted to make it look like nixon was dying to china.

he made comments earlier in his life that he would like to go to china. and we wanted to make it look like the chinese were dying to have us come to china. that actually took several hours. we only had a few hours left to work out that actual brief announcement that nixon made in san clemente later on. so i will just end on that, except to say a couple amusing things on our trip. as we flew into china, you would think kissinger was worried about meeting the james bond aspect of the secrecy, the geopolitical earthquake -- no he was worried that he had no shirts. [laughter] his staff assistant forgot to pack any shirts. >> he was in his pajamas? >> henry was very upset. he called john, who is about 6'2" so henry is walking around looking like a penguin. [laughter] and his shirt had a label that said "made in taiwan." [laughter]

>> let me make one comment from the chinese point of view. what was not known, during the secret visit there was another there was an ally of communist china also in beijing kim il-sung. joe inen lai had the problem of dealing with kissinger and his party and dealing with their ally, north korea. the chinese leadership was really balancing, trying to do this with the united states against its alliance relationships not just with north korea but also with vietnam. so immediately after kissinger departed, he first flew back to pyongyang to brief kim -il-sung on what had happened, and then they communicated to the vietnamese, who were outraged.

they talked about the trail of the socialist movement. from the chinese point of view the diplomacy associated with this initiative was very complicated. >> let's explore what was going on in china at the time. the cultural revolution, the coup attempts. could only mao be the one to do this dea? they also had a lot of criticism among their own people. everybody jump in. >> there was an enormous political risk for both mao and for richard nixon. one would have to say nixon managed his internal politics more effectively. after the secret initiative, there was a coup attempt by a man we thought had been designated as mao's successor, the defense minister. we now know, i forget the

exact date, but after the coup attempt he got in a plane fearing arrest, and the plane crashed in my goalie. >> -- crashed in mongolia. >> there was a very heavy police presence. we didn't know why. >> it had already happened. >> we later got the intelligence reporting that there were poeople in the chinese leadership who were strongly opposed to this initiative. they kept referring to mao as the b-52, the heavy bomber of their politics. those included in what later became known as the "gang of four."m mao's wife and others were opposed to some of the developments that brought influence, worried about the future of the revolution. this gets beyond the immediate

story, but beginning around 1974, particularly after en lai was her place by deng xiaoping, the so-called gang of four had real influence on the dialogue with the u.s., and the mood turned a bit sour. one aspect of it, to link it to the comment about intelligence-sharing the chinese became and see that we were taking them for granted because we were trying to make them aware of the soviet threat. so they tried to say to us, don't worry about us, we can take care of ourselves. they developed a public slogan that the soviet union was preparing to attack in the east, toward china but they were

really going to attack in the west against american interests as a way to say to their own people, and probably do us, we can take care -- probably to us, we can take care of ourselves. >> the impact on other countries that resulted? >> was there a blowback? the secret trip was in july of 1971 and nixon didn't go until february of 1972. what was the blowback from our allies? japan, taiwan, any of the europeans? >> after the trip, after nixon's trip, our guys fanned out to various parts -- >> not before nixon's trip? like the japanese were particularly shocked, because we had not told them. we were the closest ally, and yet we had not told them. this was something very important for them, in their backyard. they got over it.

their immediate reaction was to immediately normalize their relationship with china. the coming kind of the major channel -- becoming kind of the major channel to china in subsequent years. i think the reaction of the right in the united states was very negative. >> this was the taiwan lobby? >> very negative. after the trip, warren christopher was given the task of going to taiwan and explain what we had done. his cargo pelted with eggs and other things -- car got pelted with eggs and other things. they were very upset.the blowback from the secret trip was initially shock. >> we paid a certain price for secrecy.

particularly with japan. but having said that, i think it was necessary. if there had been public signals in advance -- we did not know if this would be a success or not. this was uncharted terrain. we didn't want to raise its vacation's. if people knew in advance that henry was going to china, they would be lobbying. not only taiwan, but everyone else would be coming in, our allies and we would be constrained in what we could explore with the chinese once we got there. the decision was made. we had to keep it a secret. i think in that respect we might have sent a low person like me to japan to tell them, the prime minister, just so they could tell everyone they knew in advance. the problem with that, he would have to tell his cabinet so the chinese would fear we betrayed the secret. it was a tough trade, but the balance, despite the short term price we paid, was worth it.

>> what about the reaction of the vietnamese? >> they were shocked and concerned about it. after the president's trip had occurred there was some different reaction. vietnam really was a significant problem for us, for the president. there were negotiations going on. >> he had seen the previous president, lyndon johnson have his presidency on was destroyed by the vietnam war. >> right. in these conversations during the president's trip, if i can move to that, the last conversation, they had been, we had been talking about vietnam and chinese support for it, etc.

they made a diplomatic thing -- we would not meddle with that. so nixon said, you are not going to help with the the enemies? he said, yes. that path you will at least help us, won't you, in reaching a negotiated solution, not try to torpedo the negotiations as your russian friends are doing etc.? we were at least trying to so we were at least trying to say please encourage them to negotiate and president's and said negotiated solution is the only answer to it.

there is not a negotiated ending to it. it was left that way. the vietnamese were in shock that the president of the united states had been there. it had been back-and-forth, but they had their suspicions. they were very concerned. what did they do? they launched an offensive. this was the end of february. they launched an offensive in late april, and that caused us to respond by doing something that was very nasty in the russian standpoint. they were the main provider. a lot more intensive bombing in response to this major campaign that they started. they were negotiating. they were not impressed. i think they felt they had a campaign in mind, and that's why we responded.

the summit with the russians was already scheduled. he knew they might cancel that whole summit, which would have been a blow in many directions. the difficult decision was made, and it was contested among the -- among those who knew about it , the joint chiefs, etc. were , pushing for it. president nixon decided we are going to do this and if it means the russian summit is canceled that's fine. we went ahead and did it. minor blowback from the

russians. i think they really wanted to have the summit as well on their side. the chinese complaint, but not too seriously. we are talking big things. we've got big plans together. >> nixon did not want to go to moscow with this tremendous offensive. it was very weak in terms of what was happening in vietnam. secondly, he was about the only one. kissinger and others thought the russians would cancel the summit. i remember flying in a helicopter with henry up to camp david to start writing the resident's speech on the hanoi moves. we were bemoaning the fact that all this preparation would go down the tubes. he said no, the russians will go ahead. that is to his credit. with the chinese, the basic pitch was, we knew they had problems with vietnam historically anyway. you don't want us to be

humiliated on the way out of vietnam. that is not going to help us. tell hanoi to settle for a military settlement only. we are willing to have a cease-fire, get all of the troops and prisoners back. we are not willing to overthrow the saigon government. that is not in your interest. lean on your friends to be more reasonable for a military solution only and you can tell them verbal affect time is on their side if they waited out. there is evidence that others did press hanoi. was evidence that the russians did. >> let's switch foot forward to the nixons trip. it's difficult sitting today to understand what a profound and significant affect this had not just on the world, but the american people, chinese people. nixon's weeklong trip in

february of 1972, nixon himself called the week that changed the world. even secretary clinton has said, that was an underestimation of the profound significance of it . before the trip, we were their enemies and after the trip, they were our friends. all four of you were on the trip to china. what happened? how did it end up with nixon sitting down with archenemy mao zedong, when nixon had spent his entire career as anti-communist? >> i have governed lots of summits and lots of presidents. i have never seen anyone work as hard or as brilliantly for a summit as nixon did for this trip. he knew its significance, with a great help of the state department and military and cia, we had six big briefing books. i was in charge of orchestrating them all. i swear to god nixon marked up , almost every page of all six volumes.

as we were flying out there, we stopped in guam and hawaii and all the way on air force one he was sending memos to the back of the plane, saying i want more information on this. we get to china and we are in the guesthouse. joe comes over and says mao once to see nixon right away. usually they leave this to the end of the trips. it was very important. to my eternal gratitude, henry asked me to go along with him. the secretary of state was not invited. >> i stayed with the secretary of state while he was not in that meeting. [laughter] k.t.: great consolation, i'm sure. mr. lord: let me talk about the meeting. you have a temptation when you know someone is a great historical figure to say, this guy has magnetic strength.

if we walk into a cocktail party and you did not know who he was he would still command your attention. after the hour-long meeting, we were somewhat disappointed. initially, and we meeting kissinger and me. nixon kept trying to talk about substance and policy. mao would say that is up to them and would give a brush stroke or two about the russians, taiwan japan. he would not engage the president. we thought this was a little disappointing. as we went to the next few days, we realized just how subtle mao had been, but he had gotten from one topic to another and given just enough guidance and framework for a subsequent discussion. we really appreciated the meeting afterwards. >> wasn't there the expectation of a follow-up meeting? 2 --

mr. lord: yes. certainly the secretary of state would have been invited to that. very quickly, this picture is proof that i was there. at the end of the meeting, they came in with this picture and communiqués about the three of us being there from the american side. nixon turned to joe and i and said, i was never there. they cut me out of the pictures and the communiqué. it is embarrassing enough for the secretary of state not to be there, but to have some 30-year-old punk there as well and he's not there, it was over-the-top. a year later, the chinese gave me that picture to prove in fact i was there. k.t.: what were the rest of you doing while winston was with joe and mao zedong? >> i was sitting with secretary rogers because he did not know what was going on. we went to a shopping district

of beijing and i saw everybody huge crowds of people, all moving around the display cases where they were showing the pieces. that is the way people got their news and that's the way people in china were informed as to how they were supposed to think. there was nixon and mao shaking hands. it was an electric moment. everybody was very quiet, but they were taking it all in. i may be jumping the gun here, but this trip was very carefully planned by the white house and the chinese to have maximum public impact on the american people. the rhythm of each day is you had a telegenic event in the morning, a telegenic event in the evening, and you did old -- -- you diddleddid all the work and

talking in the middle of the day. the american people got nixon on the great wall, or at the opening banquets, or other things at prime time, breakfast or evening. the impact of that week was to change american attitude towards the opening to china. mr. lord: i went to double back to the public 1971 trip after the secret trip. the chinese were accustomed to their own people to this dramatic breakthrough. we started out in small meetings. then we went to some cultural event for the cadres kissinger

others. then we went to the summer palace and toured with ordinary chinese tourists there. they were gradually, they after day in october, estimating -- a custom-made -- accustoming the chinese audience to what was coming. meanwhile secretly, we were negotiating the shanghai communiqué. we finished most of that except for a slight exception of the taiwan issue. almost everything else we worked out then. it shows you how smart joe and i were on mao. in october, we give them a draft of a possible communicate looking towards february 1972. it was a typical draft kumbaya. we are friends getting together, and progress. there was some progress. we were not stupid. it was a fairly ordinary diplomatic -- we gave it to joe. he comes back and almost throws it on the floor in contempt.

he says, this is ridiculous. we fought each other in korea, we hate each other, and suddenly we love each other? come on. this will make our allies suspicious, upset our domestic audiences. let's have a new kind of communiqué. let's agree to have differences stated on each side, in philosophy and ideology and on specific issues. then when we can agree, those , agreements will stand out as being more credible and the exceptions. on the one hand, it was good news, bad news. we realized the brilliance of this idea. the bad news we had about 36 , hours before we were leaving. semi-panicked, semi-exhilarated, kissinger asked me to do a redraft. we could not do the chinese position. and where we might agree. i stayed up until 3:00. he redrafted it. the chinese came back and we got the communiqué done on that october trip as well as important public stuff that other white house staff did to

set up the public and logistic aspect of the trip. k.t.: by the time the president had gone, the communiqué -- mr. lord: except for taiwan, which was a major problem to be decided during the president's trip. k.t.: john, during the president posture, you are there is a military officer. what negotiations were you having? ret. adm. howe: it was more of the same, briefing about the threats they had from russia primarily. k.t.: sharing the american challenges the chinese. ret. adm. howe: we did some of that. got to go on the great wall, etc. which speaks again to these pictures that appeared in "life" magazine, which was big then and so forth, the communication of all those events that occurred. like everybody else, i was

sweating out the taiwan issue. this was a real crisis for those of us in the staff. k.t.: talk a bit about -- what was the situation with china? it was a naval issue. china had -- talk about what was , the significance of taiwan? we had a relationship with taiwan, then we didn't. we had a treaty with taiwan. ret. adm. howe: they had the seat at the u.n., which the prc would take, etc. mr. lord: they took it as we were leaving in the october trip. we got news of the u.n. vote which was not the greatest ending to our trip. ret. adm. howe: no exactly. but taiwan has always been a major issue for the u.s. navy. there have been a series of taiwan crises, near war in 1958 . particularly for navy people in the seventh fleet, which i was associated with quite a bit, we really -- we always had the war

plan etc., etc. how was taiwan going to work out, the chinese wanted us to remove our forces in taiwan, and if the president was willing to do that if he had a vietnam agreement. they are there to support you known -- vietnam problems. mr. lord: giving incentive for the chinese to lean on the vietnamese. ret. adm. howe: as you know it , finally came with the formulation that everybody seemed to like, including people in taiwan and china. chinese on both sides. k.t.: one china, two china. ret. adm. howe: exactly. they recognize there was one china. we had a defense treaty -- k.t.: with taiwan. ret. adm. howe: it is not totally resolve the at but taiwan is the biggest trading partner with china.

there's a lot going on intercommunication. >> during that week there were three sets of talks going on. one was nixon and joe discussing the world. one was kissinger discussing the actual wording of the shanghai communiqué. one was rogers and his counterpart, the chinese foreign minister. that was all about what we call the nuts and bolts of the relationship. trade, travel, immigration legal issues, education etc., etc. k.t.: which is all new because we had none of those agreements. mr. platt: we did not know anything. we had talked a little bit. i remember during one of those talks the chinese were saying, you are still requiring us to be fingerprinted when we go to the united states.

we said no, that's finished. they said no, it's not finished. roger said, you go find out. i rush out. there's a white house telephone in the great hall of the people. very discreet. i call up. it's a wonderful connection white house switch. they get me the state department operations center. ok, operations center comes on 3:00 in the morning. i say, wake up whoever is responsible and find me the answer to this question, which they did. then i went back in and roger said to the chinese, we do no longer require that you be fingerprinted, but isn't it good that we have good communications now? [laughter] in any case the nuts and bolts , were being discussed. it was a popular forum because all the people who could not get

into a meeting and wanted to take part came and took part. >> they're going to talk about the taiwan issue. that was a crucial thing we have to get over. >> [inaudible] [laughter] >> it worked beautifully. >> it wasn't bugged. mr. platt: what is really significant is that on the secret trip, it's my understanding that you were there, kissinger laid out our position on taiwan and joe said fine, now we can talk about the rest of the world, and it was sort of brushed aside. during the mao meeting, and then subsequently reiterated by chairman mao, his position is, we don't need to resolve the taiwan issue right now. we can resolve it after 100 years. we may have to fight at that point, but we have many more important issues to deal with in

the short run. the taiwan issue was put on the back burner. we can get off onto the follow-through. the reality is that the cooperation was on these broader strategic issues. there was a kind of gradual letdown on the taiwan situation with the de-recognition occurring in the carter administration. which we say, we still maintain a relationship with taiwan, we have our internal law, the taiwan relations act, which says we will help them defend themselves. i would say the play out was favorable in terms of larger strategic environment being the focus, and the way the taiwan issue played out was not the

sharp abandonment of the long-term. mr. lord: taiwan said for 20 years, we won't talk to anybody except taiwan. we moved in the secret channels so we had a bigger agenda. the chinese were willing as long as they got certain principles like both chinese on either side of the strangely there is one china they were willing to put , off other awkward elements. we were refusing to give them up, namely diplomatic relations with taiwan or security treaty with taiwan, the fact their troops in taiwan. will say that kissinger and nixon made these great concessions on taiwan. they went from say you can't talk about it to tolerating the president united states while we we were selling arms and had

troops in taiwan. i think both sides were intent to move ahead on the broader issues, like in the shanghai communication in reference to the soviets. we did not give up diplomatic relations or the treaty until president carter normalized in 1979. imagine this -- when kissinger gave a press conference on february 28 explaining the shanghai communiqué, he reiterated our defense commitment to taiwan. we could not put it in the communiqué. we told joe the night before we were going to do that and he managed on chinese soil to reaffirm that. the chinese as well as the americans showed great wisdom and courage on this issue.

mr. platt: the threat this initiative elicited -- taiwan should not be underestimated. these are the things that were not on the radar screen. beijing sent a delegation to new york when they entered the u.n. one of their cooks was poisoned. we assumed it was an intelligence operation. in hong kong there was a publication of the shanghai communiqué. lo and behold, one of the key paragraphs dealing with taiwan was not included in this publication. there were games being played on both sides that reflect the sensitivity and threat of this initiative. as win was saying, it reflected the determination and courage of the two senior leaders to follow through on this despite a lot of the unhappiness going on on the sidelines.

k.t.: talk to me about japan. the united states had been a core ally of japan, and yet japan knew nothing about -- mr. lord: japan was very upset and they went ahead immediately and had been holding up to normalize relationships. it was interesting in our discussions with the chinese when we first went there kissinger would tell joe and i about the value of the u.s.-japan alliance. if they are worried about japan reviving world war ii themes their best bet was let japan relax under our security efforts. in the initial talks the first couple of trips, joe and i rejected this and said no, you are making japan fat and happy and you ought to get rid of this alliance. discussions can really change people's minds. over time, joe and i admitted that kissinger was right, this was good for china at least for the time being.

mao in one of the subsequent meetings, we had five that i was in, scolded nixon and kissinger for hurting relations with japan. he told kissinger, you come here all the time. why don't you go to tokyo? it was an interesting change in their outlook. k.t.: evolution. mr. lord: one last point on taiwan. thanks to eighth successive presidents of both parties there has been bipartisanship on this. i think we have managed the taiwan-china equation extremely well. tensions, ups and downs. we have gone ahead with this comprehensive, major, positive negative, sweet and sour relations with beijing. at the same time, taiwan has , primarily because of their own people entrepreneurship, and good leadership, has become first an economic heavyweight, then a democracy showing the chinese like freedom as well and they have had security with our umbrella.

we have done this balancing act and taiwan has prospered. we have this relationship with china. it is a major success story. k.t.: some people have said, it was going to happen anyway. it wasn't because of the james bond kissinger secret trip, it wasn't because of nixon's strategic vision. this was just inevitable, it was going to happen. what do you guys think? i will start with you, john. i'm going to ask you all the same question. was it going to happen anyway? ret. adm. howe: i don't think so. these individuals, we owe a lot of thanks and respect for their wisdom in pursuing it. presidents differ, and nixon had this rich background or understanding of foreign policy. he worked, he studied it, and he had his own thoughts. frankly, even the kissinger-nixon relationship was interesting to watch.

they needed each other. isn't it was brilliant and a great thinker, etc., but nixon had a lot to add, hard questions. the two working together was a great partnership. as far as the chinese are concerned, we were lucky. mao was sick already and did not have much time left. joe and i, it was a critical person. we always learn in foreign policy about the handshake would not shake his hand at a conference, so we all shook hands with him. their member winston -- i remember winston it was , kissinger, joe and i, you and me, and an interpreter for a dinner, but there was a wisdom there, a long view. mao himself was smart.

i think we were very lucky, and then of course, circumstances of the russian pressure and other things that made this a possibility. it would not happen in all situations for sure. k.t.: mr. diplomat? mr. platt: there's nothing inevitable about history. ultimately this would have happened, but you had to have a combination of political will and diplomatic skill. nixon and mao had the political will and they were powerful people in their own communities and their own body politics. nixon and kissinger -- joe and i and kissinger had the tactical political, diplomatic skill to make it happen. those kinds of constellations

don't come into alignment all that often. we were lucky that that was what it was. k.t.: changed history? >> leaders to make a spectacular difference. this is totally speculative, but let's say hubert humphrey had won the 1968 election, and i have the interesting experience of leading a congressional delegation a couple years later that the co-head was hubert humphrey. my view was that there wasn't the kind of experience the richard nixon brought to his presidency. he had been eisenhower's vice president. he knew these leaders. then he lost the 1960 election but continued to travel around the world during the 1960's, when he formulated this approach with all this personal experience.

hubert humphreys' experience was much more in domestic politics. how would he have handled the situation where the great fear was that the united states would be drawn back into a conflict with china because of the vietnam war? you can say he would not have had the broader soviet element and strategic context that nixon brought to the initiative. that's totally speculative, but leaders to make a difference. k.t.: only nixon can go to china? mr. lord: i agree with my colleagues, this is not inevitable. nixon's right flank was protected because he was a known anti-communist. his party people, some of who might have suspected or not liked what he was doing, had to be loyal, although there were still holdouts who were angry no matter whether he was there

president or not. democrats were more apt to be sympathetic in some respects. the old cliché has truth to it namely that nixon could go to china, it would be a lot more difficult for a democrat. if humphrey had tried to do that, he would have been hammered by the republicans. nixon could quiet things down. i remember flying back, and nixon and kissinger and those who were not so enthusiastic like pat buchanan and so on, all wondered about what the reaction was going to be in the united states. we were not aware of these dramatic pictures of nixon and joe and i toasting each other on the great wall. we did not realize how popular it was. there were some who were upset. war era and so on -- the cold war era and so on. it just shows you that even then, after the trip and we're flying back, there was concern about the impact. it showed you the political courage it took.

i would underline what my colleagues said. mr. solomon: let me add one brief thing. when mao and nixon had their discussion, mao said to nixon, i like to deal with rightists because they follow through on what they promise. that was only some flattery or however you might want to put it -- mr. lord: i think he was sincere. clearly, balancing the soviet union was important to him. k.t.: i think we have a few minutes left for final thoughts. final thoughts about not only the opening to china, but the significance of it. ret. adm. howe: it was huge. in history, certainly in our relationship, and building for what we have now in terms of china is a very different country. this was a very important, very tricky, and amazing year in which it wasn't just this.

it was the work with the russians as well. vietnam was still going on, and winston can talk more about those excruciating efforts that were made to try to get them to sign up and make a treaty. i can remember we were bombing the b-52s on christmas day in 1972. soon afterwards we had an agreement, and you can say, what happened then? in any case -- this was a very important juncture in our foreign policy, i think, developing it and maturing our approach to the world. mr. platt: i think the nixon trip was a cataclysmic diplomatic event.

what it led to was an extraordinary meeting between the chinese and american people. i was in the liaison office when we set up 14 months later. that began the meeting of chinese and americans, traders bankers, students, we watched all these delegations come in. we put them together, and the same thing was going on in washington. it was all the nuts and bolts, really. we laid the groundwork. the breakthrough had occurred, but now these two peoples were beginning to figure out how to work with each other. those relationships have become so huge. they really actually run the relationship. in 1989, the soviet union collapsed. >> dick?

mr. solomon: i think it's worth reiterating that the nixon-mao initiative was probably one of the most transformative diplomatic initiatives certainly in the 20th century. it really transformed the dynamic of international politics and great power relations. one way of looking at it from today's point of view, you had a generation of leaders on both sides that were very worldly in the sense that they had been the cold war, the vietnam context and that generation now is gone. one of the things looking at the world today 2014, is we don't seem to have the experiential leaders who have that sense of international affairs. that may be unfair to leaders today, but one has to be impressed by the vision,

experience, and ultimately initiative that was taken by president nixon. we can get off into mao's motivation, which was complex also. it was a world changing initiative. mr. lord: in addition to the u.s.-china relationship, it shook up the international landscape in ways we don't try to go into now. it was genuinely transformative. the last point i make is on the evolution of u.s.-china relations. as we meet today, there has been the latest summit between american and chinese leaders in beijing. if you look at decade by decade, you can see how this relationship has evolved. in the 1970's it was mostly balancing the polar bear, the soviet union, and conceptual discussions because it was not real content and the state

department. there was not there because we did not have diplomatic relationships. in 1979, we have diplomatic relationships. the 1980's was spent trying to flesh out this relationship in addition to the continuing anti-soviet aspects, which was crucial. in 1989 and 1992, things happened. tiananmen square elevated human rights in our relationship with china and complicated it and the , fall of the berlin wall and the disappearance of the soviet empire, you did not have that glue for a relationship. we spent the 1990 sorting out these problems and establishing a new relationship. since 2006, the issue has been china's growing economic military, diplomatic power and how we relate not a rising power, but how do you relate them to the established power and not repeat the historical examples of 11 out of 15 of these phenomena have ended in conflict.

we have now the most important relationship in the world and the most complex relationship in the world. i would end on that famous headline that happens to be true. this was the week that changed the world. k.t.: i think this is a profound example of the people who really did work for the men who change the world, and where the giants of american history. the significant impact you have had individually, collectively on not just the united states but on the world is something we should all applaud. it is so significant that i think we will ask them back to do another panel to talk about the relationship of the united states after the nixon presidency. although nixon left office in 1974, he continued to travel to china. he continued personally to write about it, think about it, and expand the relationship. for now, i want to thank admiral john howwe, ambassador