today, less than 3% are being lost. so the careful planning of months bears fruit and men who knew the battlefield but a few short hours back, knew the pain and suffering, now know the care and comfort and hope that the best in modern medicine can bring. >> each week, american history tv sits in on a lecture with one of the nation's college professors. you can watch the classes here. next, barred college -- bard college professor sean mcmeekin

discusses woodrow wilson and the treaty of her sigh -- treaty of her sitversaille. prof. memeekin: thank you for coming. i believe we left off at the negotiations of lenin and trotsky. you will recall the western allies did not come to these negotiations because they viewed lenin as a german puppet government. the negotiations were dragging on. to some extent, this was beginning to annoy wilson that this was taking so long. the bolshevik had come into possession of a secret treaty

pertaining to the partition of the ottoman empire. we have to peel back and understand the role of the united states in the war and postwar settlement. an enigmatic role to say the least because the united states did not enter the war in 1914, nor when the united states entered the war did it do so with a clear sort of territorial war aims that most of the other neutral powers did. essentially bargaining their belligerence in exchange for territorial gains, the italians coming into the war 1915 because they have designs on hungarian territory in the south triestae. the u.s., partly because of wilson's own rhetoric, the u.s. entered the war for very different reasons.

that in itself was quite interesting. we have to go back a little bit further to see who president woodrow wilson was and how he came to play such a dominant role in this story and in the postwar settlement. he had been elected back in 1912 for the first time. an election, for people of my generation remember the election of 1992 when bill clinton was elected due in some part two a split in the republican vote. he entered the white house with somewhat of a duality. this is unlike for example barack obama winning with the vast majority. in 1912, there was another

republican on the ballot theodore roosevelt. roosevelt was remembered for many things. some of his nicknames were the bull moose. he was a very strong president when it comes to foreign policy. he saw the u.s. as having more of a traditional type of approach to foreign policy. he also had the rare honor of essentially choosing his successor in 1908. he chose to not run for election when taft was elected.

he was a bit disappointed in taft which had a lot to do with domestic policy. roosevelt, partly because he was disappointed in taft, decided to jump back into the ring in 1912. it was an interesting campaign. he gave a speech in new hampshire shortly after being shot. he showed the entry wound and the blood to the public and said something to the effect of it takes more than that to kill a bull moose. he didn't win the election. wilson was elected with this plurality. he had a working majority in the electoral college and enough influence in congress to get through much of his legislative

program. when it came to reelection, he was a little bit weaker than he might have otherwise been. the reason this mattered in terms of geopolitics was that the united states then had a large germanic population in the midwest. although many influential movers and shakers in the eastern capital cities tended to sympathize with the powers and the war, particularly the financial community, many of the wall street bank, in 1916 some of them have even begun extending loans to russia. despite all of this, wilson remained aloof. even when the lusitania was sunk

although to this day there is debate as to how much it function as a war cruiser we know that it was carrying lots of munitions and was being used to guard the british ocean liners -- everyone on board was a civilian and almost everyone drowned. wilson eventually distinguished between what he saw as the behavior. the united states was neutral, but it was neutral to some extent with a rooting interest. britain, by blockading germany was violating the freedom of the seas. she was also violating property rights. she was restricting the freedom of trade.

the germans, by sinking commercial vessels, were violating human rights. wilson did not like that, but did not want to go to war and gave a speech saying the united states was too proud to fight. in 1916, he was reelected to some extent on this notion of keeping the u.s. out of the war. this particular refrain echoed down through the decades in american history. franklin delano roosevelt assured everyone he kept the united states out of the second world war. it didn't work out that way. in 1916, wilson was still neutral. it is true that financial interests were pushing the united states closer and closer together with the powers. some of this was by accident

because of the british blockade. the united states could not trade with the central powers of europe. the united states was not involved in funding their operations. the germans, keen to keep the united states out of the war changed some of their own policies regarding the sinking of ocean liners and merchant vessels. they had become much more circumspective. they created their own u-boats. they were not like today's submarines. they could really only dive on the attack. for the most part, they were surface vessels. they were rather vulnerable to

enemy fire. by forcing them to give warning to any ship suspected of carrying weapons, it gave enough time for women, children, and even men to make a rush for the lifeboats. they made it more difficult for themselves to sink any ships. in 1916 and 1917, whether we are looking at germany, russia, or even turkey, it was a really brutal winter. i think we can appreciate that today with yet another snowfall yesterday. it was cold everywhere. in russia, there were bottlenecks and transportation because many of the rail lines were covered in snow and had to be constantly shoveled out. it was so cold which exacerbated the fuel crisis. this would eventually become the riots and the february

revolution. this was referred to as the turnip winter. that's because the germans were being starved out by the british blockade. there seemed to be a direct in -- connection between british naval policy and the suffering of germans. it's partially exaggerated but it was real to some extent. germany was being cut off of world markets. there was also a strategic argument to be made.

there was a certain argument that was made that the war must be brought to a firm conclusion as soon as possible. they basically said that if they took the gloves off of the u-b oats and began sinking more ships, they would cause such devastation in the british that they would be forced to bring peace. they would probably than let their enemies out to dry. such was the thinking. the germans were clever enough to realize that there were risks in this strategy. in fact, this might bring the united states into the war. to forestall that possibility, the foreign office concocted an

ingenious or perhaps idiotic plan to try to get the united states even more deeply embroiled in mexico's revolution. the united states was already involved pursuing the president. the german idea was that if the mexicans went to war, that would distract the americans and be unable to send troops to europe. in due course, possibly delayed one year or two. the germans decided to try to lure mexico into the first world all of the belligerent powers were playing footsie with

neutrals and trying to entice them with promises of territory. for mexico, this territory was the american southwest. the germans had some fuel to play with. the way they played with it was about as dangerous a matter as you could possibly imagine. they sent this proposal to mexico city by way of the u.s. embassy cable. they sent it to the mexican ambassador in washington dc. what the germans and americans did not know was that the british were reading this cable traffic. the british had broken the german codes. that in and of itself was a story. some of the codes had then broken because a german agent --

some of it was just the skill of british cartographers. long story short, they were able to decode this telegram. they were then presented a dilemma. if they revealed this potentially explosive information to the americans they would also have to reveal that they were reading u.s. cable traffic. they did not want to let the americans know that. they basically contrived a way to resend the exact same telegram so the americans could read it and would think they discovered it themselves. this bombshell helped galvanize public opinion against germany and the united states. it seems like an inevitable thing that the united states will join the coalition against germany.

in neither case was this close to an inevitable. fdr was far more keen to get into the war in the second world war than wilson was for the first world war. he was hamstrung by public opinion and congress. this was back in the old-fashioned days where the wars fought by the u.s. were adjudicated by congress. there was actually a formal procedure by which war was declared. this was still taken seriously. the congressional prerogative to declare war in addition to the prerogative held by the senate to ratify treaties. these were both taken very seriously. wilson knew that any foreign policy that he wished to pursue would ultimately rest in congress and public opinion. wilson began making the case. some of it was simply wilson making up his own mind that

there was a distinction to be made between the violation of property rights and the freedom of the seas or commerce represented by the british blockade of the southern powers, and the german murder of -- sinking of mercer vessels and the murder of civilians for the sinking of the lusitania. that along with the general outrage prompted by the telegram allowed him to make up his own mind to make an address to congress. one lesser-known factor was the intervening event in russia. the february revolution in russia in the early euphoric stage before everything had gotten bogged down with the bolsheviks, it was still the early euphoric days. russia was a democracy.

no one was quite sure what russia's new government was. it was a bit confusing. you have this provisional government and the electoral committee of the petrograd soviet. no one was quite sure what the form of the new russian government would be. it was a people's government. wilson could now make the claim that the allies stood for democracy. this claim was echoed back in a kind of mirror imaging in russia . there were problems with the new rhetoric about a war for democracy, various ideals which

is the way wilson wanted to sell it. the allies had, after all, agreed amongst themselves to dispose of enemy territory. those treaties were still secret. wilson himself was not privy to them. he may have suspected something of them which is part of the reason why he had always been a little loathed to commit the united states fully to the alliance. the united states was not an ally, but rather an associated power. in practice, this meant that the united states declared war on imperial germany, seeing germany as the instigator of the aggression, particularly in the atlantic.

united states did not declare war on austria, hungary, for another eight months. even then, it was rather difficult for the americans to figure out exactly how they would engage austria, hungary on the battlefield. reminiscent of a story i alluded to earlier whereby, in the second world war, hungary is one of the satellites of hitler germany. after his declaration of war on the united states, the hungarian ambassador was forced to admit that he was at war with america. the response was yes, very well, and, where is your country?

the united states and heritage, so to speak, the enemies of its associates. that does not mean that the u.s. declared war on all of them. the u.s. did not declare war on the ottoman empire. a seemingly accidental fact which actually has huge consequences which lasted this day. american-turkish relations have always rested on a fairly sound footing. the countries were not actually at war in the 20th century. if you were in turkey recently i've i was, you would notice a serious difference between how turkish people feel about brits and americans. they may resent americans, but they really resent the british.

we have a question? , i do not understand why we declared war on germany but i don't understand why we declared war on austria-hungary. professor mcmeekin: to some extent, the british and french would have liked the united states to declare war on the ottoman empire, but they could not convince wilson to do this. there was a security concern related to the declaration of holy war by the ottoman. the united states had missionary colleges in beirut and istanbul.

to some extent, that represented a major american interest in the ottoman empire. the united states was in an anomalous position regarding the ottoman empire. eventually this comes together in the fortnight -- 14 points. point 12 of the 14 points stipulates the dismantling of the ottoman empire. a country with which the united states was not at war. wilson did not think of the 14 points all at once. part of wilson was getting at was his own resentment that lenin had stolen his thunder. after all the united states was this archetypical constitutional democratic republic in a way that wilson believed.

wilson was a professor of political science. he was deeply versed in the nature of the american founding and all of its ideals. along comes lenin who was a kind of usurper who had no democratic mandate for the future of power. after the bolsheviks took power in petrograd, they published the so-called secret treaties. trotsky took over the foreign ministry and they immediately began sharing this information pertaining to the war aims of the powers, particularly in the ottoman empire. these treaties along with all those related to the disposition of colonial territories were leaked to western reporters.

it began in december 1917. third terms were published -- the terms were published in a number of newspapers. it was deeply embarrassing for the alliance. the bolsheviks at this stage were even talking about the possibility of self-determination. they didn't use that phrase yet. they were talking about it. they were talking about a universal peace. they were talking about the need to move beyond this world of imperialist aggrandizment. we now know that the bolsheviks, stall and most prominently

pursued a fairly imperialistic government of his own. but the bolsheviks had now captured the moralistic feelings of the world. wilson again like most in the west no rumors -- knows rumors about lenin. that they were somehow in cahoots with the germans. they did have informal liaison with their government. trotsky, having defined this

ingenious policy of no war and no peace. russia would not continue the war against the central powers but wouldn't surrender either. she would make a grand show of demobilizing her army to show the world who the real aggressors were but allow the germans to do their worst. in practice, the germans did just that. they did it with a twist. while they were still negotiating, wilson first revealed to the world his 14 points. they were later buttressed by the four principles and by the five particulars. with basic arithmetic, there were actually 23 points. they are most known to history as the 14 points. you can see them in front of you. the phrase you usually hear to describe these points was self-determination. that phrase does not appear. a lot of these things are

misremembered by history. eventually, wilson did start talking about self-determination. at the time if you look closely , at them, idealistic as they sound with all this talk about questions of sovereignty over colonial territories must be settled with the interests of the population's concern having equal weight with the equitable claims that the government -- this sounds very just and noble. if you look closely, nearly all of them are pertaining to the central powers. the united states is already at war, so the u.s. is mostly talking about dismembering enemy territory.

that is there in point 12. it stipulates that the turkish portion of the ottoman empire should be assured sovereignty, but the other nationalities should be secured an undoubted security of life. nationalities implied armenians possibly kurds. he is talking about effectively the territorial dismemberment of the ottoman empire. wilson was also trying to split hairs on the notion of with whom the united states was at war. one of his most famous statements following the declaration of war on germany initially was that the americans have no quarrel with the german people. the idea is -- who with the quarrel be with then? see if we can figure it out.

>> the government. the kaiser. professor mcmeekin: so it's with autocracy then. so that you have become system of government. on the one hand, this sounds less ambitious. the united states is not really at war with the german people. in other words the united states is at war with their government which kind of implied that a negotiated peace might be difficult. in fact the germans might get that her peace terms if they do what? >> do more similar form of government to america's form of government here it professor mcmeekin: depose the kaiser, the depose the kaiser and they make a big show of becoming democrats.

us is an interesting negotiating strategy, if that is what it is. if you talk about wilsonian ideals, that is the essence of it. it is a little bit like the democratic peace theory. the idea that everyone embraces these values and you will not have any more or. >> what was the german popular opinion of the kaiser as opposed to the russian popular toward bizarre? was he as unpopular? professor mcmeekin: i think it tended to end and flow with the course of the war. this was not true just of the kaiser but more broadly of what we might call the ruling classes. that is to say their procedure was still intact as long as the war was being one. this was the inverse of land's theory, that true revolutionaries must actually seek the defeat of their own government.

because of course the war prosecuted successfully will enhance the prestige of the government prosecuting it. it was the fact that russia's war was not going well in eastern europe that seem to undermine the prestige of the tsar and lead to his downfall. the same will eventually happen in germany as well. it was a little bit of a chicken of just a chicken or the egg question. to the extent that we know, the kaiser was relatively unpopular there certainly were critics. there didn't seem to be any generalized critique of his government. in the ottoman empire there was , a movement eventually once it looked like the war was going to be lost to remove that government in order to get better peace terms.

to some extent it becomes a bit , of a self-fulfilling prophecy. but it echoes down through the ages. if you look at the second world war fdr was a little more , explicit about this. an important corollary was that the governments themselves needed to be destroyed and the population reeducated. fdr went a little bit further saying that the war was with the people. he wants to have a different sort of war. a war to end all wars. a war to make the world safe for democracy. not a war in which the u.s. actually has any territorial objectives. that was kind of the strange part about it. here wilson is adhering to the old american tradition. it is notably -- better described that the united states stands for something different.

on one hand, the u.s. is not party to the treaties of its allies. on the other, the united states is seeking universal claims. it is almost the inverse of isolationism. >> is it fair to say fdr was more concerned with traditional power politics of preventing a gemini darren wilson was? professor mcmeekin: yes, although i would say he was not really a traditionalist. he was closer to that because he was a bit more hard-nosed. here again the cardinal example is theodore roosevelt who really did see the u.s. as a more traditional power after all over so our u.s. expansion sending , troops to places like cuba the dominican republic to ensure the security of the panama canal. that is the u.s. behaving as an imperialist power like the others. in fact, tr said had he been

present, the u.s. would have gone into war immediately on the side of britain and france, not because of some moral argument related to german war guilt or aggression or violation of belgium. rather because it was in the u.s. interest to ensure balance of power on the continent. this being a more traditional british view of the power balance -- power balancing. you could say that he was effectively acting in the same way as a traditionalist might have, in terms of british poor and policy interest. fdr saw his gold -- saw his goal was to eradicate the people government that had arisen in not the germany and japan. militarism along with the theology of the nazis with its racial tones and so on. the u.s. had to eradicate those things.

they had to reeducate the population. in wilson's case, he did not see the u.s. goal to reeducate the population of these places but he was split as to what he wanted to achieve. that if the united states want to help the allies win the war but did not share their goals. britain and france in turn are forced to adjust to wilsonian rhetoric and principles. the most favorite -- the most famous example was with the mandates they decided upon eventually called league of nations mandates instead of colonies, which is more or less what they actually were. so that they wanted wilson to become complicit in their design partly by changing the terminology but it was also because wilson had come to be seen all-powerful. not necessarily because the u.s. army's war world leaders.

they were seen as a little bit ocean and inexperience. in terms of equipment and war material, they relied largely on the french. they have not figured out the types of equipment needed and war. the orbital brothers had to some extent and jilted the airplane -- invented the airplane. the united states was not necessarily the decisive factor as far as battlefield experience in helping to turn the tide. in material terms and in terms of reinforcements, the u.s. by raising an army of potentially 4 million -- you have a delicately poised struggle on the western front with both sides virtually at equal strength. this would inevitably have an impact, which is one of the reasons the germans were in such a rush to end the war. we see a couple things are in the air.

lenin and the bolshevik had taken the moral high ground. they want copycat revolutions to break out across europe. they want these universal principles of international socialism to triumph. pacifism is not the right word but they do want for the imperialist war to be transformed into civil war or civil wars with socialists and the working classes topping -- toppling the ruling establishments. the germans, once they hear about wilson's 14 points and they were also responding to trotsky's on rhetoric, the germans came up with their own genius strategy for carving up the russian empire according to wilsonian principles here it what the germans decided everyone is going to talk about self-determination. imperialism is out of fashion even though it is still there. no one wants to call it that anymore.

what the germans decide is they will take the former minority populations of the russian empire and invite them to declare independence. most prominent among these was ukraine. it was quite interesting. ukraine at the time was in the middle of a civil war and what the bolsheviks were one of many factions. hungarian troops are beginning to pour in from the country from the west. a government of student aged socialists that appointed itself the parliamentary of ukraine. they had a number of representatives invited. trotsky's retort to this was quite amusing as his retorts often were. he said they represented the territory no larger than that of the hotel rooms the germans had

rented for them. however, the germans did not care. they signed a treaty with independent ukraine in which the rada brought in the troops to expel the bolsheviks. it did not work terribly well for the germans. they turned out to be incapable of governing the ukraine as trotsky had intuitively known. the germans ended up going the other direction and ended up appointing a dictator who happen to be not just a tasrist empire of a descendent -- initially, they embrace some determination. they allowed the baltic states self determinations. they could

all become independent german satellites. in this way they actually detached most of the provinces of european russia from the russian empire. their terms were so onerous, the bolsheviks did not want to sign them. despite the rumor that they were just acting as german agents, things got so tense tween them that the germans began bombing petrograd to get the bolsheviks to sign. a little-known episode -- it was for this reason that the bolsheviks moved the capital for petrograd to moscow to the kremlin, which was out of the range of german military aviation. that is why the capital moved to moscow. they did eventually sign. mostly by the social revolutionaries led never really recognized.

it bought time for the bolsheviks. a lot of it because lenin himself had gone so whole hog in signing with the germans. once the germans lost the war, this helped to make its position impregnable because he had effectively been right all along. the no war, no peace policy i spoke about was trotsky's. in the same way the resolution to seize power had been trotsky's. lenin had just wanted to sign. in the end that is what they were forced to do, although largely against their will. the germans have now torn the mask off. they made it clear what their real war aims are. dismembering russia. a lot of corollary terms

regarding financial reparations which is interesting because the germans endlessly bellyached in the 1920's and 1930's about the reparations they were forced to pay. they actually forced reparations upon the russians. that said, despite this rift in march between the bolsheviks and germans who had originally sponsored lenin's returned to russia, the relations improved over the course of the year. some of this has to do with a rather bizarre saga inside the area when the detachment of czechoslovak prisoners of war rose up and seized most of the trans-siberian railway and the gold reserves. this in turn was a part of the larger story towards the end of the war. all questions seem to be on the table. the reason the prisoners of war were left go so they could fight on the western front. this was negotiated between the western allies and trotsky.

in fact, it was during that. of tension when the germans were bombing at your grad that trotsky actually invited allied troops into russia. this will later be endlessly denounced in soviet propaganda as the great imperialist intervention in russia which it did eventually turn into to some extent. but in the initial rush, they were invited in to protect the bolsheviks from the germans. in may, the czechoslovak's who were keen to reach the western front so they can make a claim for their own independence they basically got in an argument with a bunch of hungarians who were going the other direction because they were pro-german. eventually, they took over siberia. trotsky ordered them and realized they had more men under arms than he did. there was nothing he could do about it. by august, things had gotten so serious in the other direction

that if tensions between the bolsheviks and the other powers that the bolsheviks invited german troops in to help them expel the western allies. although it is little-known to history, one of the last operational orders which originated at in belgium was for the germans to send troops to petrograd to overthrow the bolsheviks. there was actually an argument in the german government about the bolsheviks. it was quite an interesting one. the foreign office all along had been proponents of what we might call the lenin card. basically the view of the foreign office was that lenin will keep the russians busy and they will not threaten us and russia will descend into chaos and that is fine. we don't have to deal with this. the military had never been

particularly fond of lenin. they saw him as dangerous and they may have been right. it is one of those interesting stories not adequately researched but that is the slow -- the flow of bolshevik war propaganda into eastern germany which did eventually undermine the morale of the german army. trotsky in fact was literally which it -- witness, tossing out antiwar leaflets from the train. the bolsheviks were not above being quite in-your-face about their antiwar propaganda. people were playing all sides in russia. eventually, russia's tragedy is that the civil war does become internationalized although you you might say the tragedy with the side supporting those were trying to topple the bolsheviks in the end were given somewhat halfhearted support whereas the bolsheviks mostly because they inherited the central arms depot and were able to raise a red army from a much larger

population base and ultimately were able to triumph. that's to the u.s. the u.s. is slowly wrapping up its armed forces. they see their first combat in the spring. by august, some units are battle hardened, they are thrown into action. they equipped themselves with fairly well. they are a part of the story of the turning of the tide in the western front. u.s. army casualties in the first world war were actually much a smaller than not only the second world war but less than 60,000 dead. overall casualties, maybe 200,000. these are significant numbers in american history but of course they were nothing compared to the losses suffered by the other allies. russia had 2 or 3 million dead in war. millions of prisoners of war. france losing upwards of one and a half, 1.8 million soldiers in the war. the germans losing that number

and probably more. that is in terms of the shedding of blood, the american involvement was not decisive. in terms of finance, the u.s. was decisive. by 1918, the u.s. was singly financing the allied war effort. this in turn created problems, problems that would go on down into the 1920's and great depression. effectively what happened at first was that britain was the only power capable of funding the war efforts of its allies so they all went into london. most largely france but also the lesser allies as well. the british found they cannot finance their own war. so they ended up going in hock to the americans to the tune of $7 billion. they were colossal debts. the u.s. was on the hook for all the allies. they wanted to be paid back.

this is an interesting and sometimes underappreciated factor in military. if you look at the spanish civil war, an interesting difference is that stalin and arming the republican side insisted on advance payment in gold which may have made him less keen than -- that his side actually win whereas franco bought his arms on credit which meant the germans would want him to win so he could pay them back. the united states had a vested interest, in addition to the possibly moral strategic interest in the victory of the associated powers. this helped the impression that wilson was all-powerful. that along with 14 points comes the generalized rhetoric of , peace without annexation which was not necessarily to the liking of the associated powers in britain and france who had rather extensive war aims in the ottoman empire. however once it became clear to

the germans in september 1918 would probably not win the war those 14 points -- it is a bit confusing but the four principles and five particulars went into a little bit more depth about the notion that the u.s. saw justice for its enemy as well as its associated powers. the germans, if you just read the 14 point and could not have seen they would get much out of it. the four principles and five particulars of just that the u.s. would not necessarily have some kind of punitive fees that the germans would not be unduly punished even if there was an implication that certain areas inhabited by minority populations like the poles might be detached from germany. the germans hoped that was not the case. as did the ottomans who petitioned americans for peace. as for what decided the work -- the war that is a vexing

, question that military historians still debate. the u.s. intervention in terms of morale probably did have a serious impact on german soldiers who did begin surrendering and larger numbers than ever before in august and september of 1918. that said, french army sources say the germans were still fighting savagely and they were conducting an orderly retreat. even if morale had been damaged, the germans were still in french and belgian territory. this is the source of this discord in german politics where many of the generals and opportunistic politicians like hitler would concoct the stab in the back legend that the german army had not really been defeated. it had been defeated but that said, it was still on foreign territory.

there was actually a breakthrough in of all places -- let me see if i can find it on this other map. just barely. you can see on our map regarding the ottoman empire way over on the edge above greece. it was part of the back story of the first world war. in addition to being the birthplace -- the city that the bulgarians and greeks raced for in 1912 and the greeks and the bulgarians there by one day. it played a role not just to the origins of the first war but it's conclusion. it had become the scene of a vast and accidental deployment in 1915. when the british decided they would need greece to enter the

war so they decided that the way to convince greece to join them was by taking some troops and sending them. all of that convinced the greeks that they were not serious about winning. greece did not enter the war in 1950. the deployment was initially for divisions and metastasized accidentally. the british look at this in may of 1917. and they concluded that there was no strategic point to the deployment except that evacuating the troops would be more risky and costly than simply keeping them there. so they kept them there. a couple months later, greece joined the war because they were promised territory in turkey. you have something like an extra nine divisions there. well initially this is not enough to overcome bulgaria was

a key component of the central powers. the bulgarians felt like they have been betrayed by their own allies. bulgarians are sort of like the world's smallest violin. they keep wanting to gain territory and losing because their own allies keep getting up on them. in 1918 they wanted this territory. the turks and germans would not give it to them so they got better so they decided they would not fight any longer. suddenly, seemingly out of nowhere in september 1918, you had a breakthrough with an army of 250,000 now poised and ready to basically march up through the balkans and threatened vienna and berlin. if you read ludendorff's on papers, this is what convinced

him he could not win before -- the war. not necessarily the american intervention, although it made things much harder for him and may well have been determining factor to the breakdown of morale of the german troops on the western front here it the deployment and breakthrough in macedonia is what finally did it. the ottomans sued for peace and the ottomans were quicker to perceive with the macedonian debacle meant then even the germans. they were actually on a train and they witnessed the deployment coming back from berlin and he immediately turned to one of his aides and said "we have just eaten that." we have eaten excrement. we are done. they sue for peace.

they sue for peace trying to get a good deal from wilson which was not necessarily stupid. he had made all of these promises including lack of tutorial dismemberment. turkey was not at war with the u.s. so it didn't really make sense. the germans are suing for peace on the same reasons. this misunderstanding is born where the germans have something of a case to complain they had been misled by wilson. because in fact wilson and some of his aides have already come to a tacit agreement with france and britain that german territorial integrity will not be respected in the postwar settlement. he did not make this clear to the germans. you cannot necessarily blame him for not making this clear. had he made it clear, they probably would not have surrendered. he is usually accused of being an excessively idealistic and unrealistic politician. at times, he was. in this case, he was playing machiavelli.

the germans thought they would get a better deal and they would get a negotiated peace. in fact they got nothing of the , kind. they got an unopposed piece -- and i'm dutch proposed -- opposed peace. we will have a lot of time to go through the particulars. german minority populations left stranded outside germany's borders, all the nuts and bolts of interwar diplomacy which would revise. for now, the basic misunderstanding is the germans thought they would get a deal and they got a deal on the principles of the french. now the other part of the settlement which was being negotiated in versailles which also had outside consequences,

related to reparations, that is the idea that the germans would be forced to pay war damages. effectively, they already agreed to this. ludendorff was sending out to be americans, he agreed in principle that germany would contribute something to pay for damages caused by the war. this was probably a tactical mistake on his part. i think ludendorff at the time -- his basic plan was that he would convince the kaiser to step down and invite these socialist politicians to take over. they could all take the blame to the debacle which followed. this allowed and enabled the creation of the stab in the back legend. it was concocted by ludendorff himself and germany did have a revolution. a revolution which began with a fleet, and this mutiny itself was quite interesting. you may remember germany had thrown all of these resources into building a high seas fleet

to match the british at their own game. most of them had spent the bulk of the war sitting in port doing nothing. the admiralty of course concocted a scheme that as the war was ending for them to go out and die in a blaze of glory. the sailors did not want to die in a blaze of glory. they rose up and this mutiny spread to the army. not everywhere but particularly in some of the rear areas of north germany. eventually this revolution spread to both area -- area and then to berlin. germany had their own revolution and also their own version of the soviets which began spreading like mushrooms in russia. in germany, the worker and soldier soviets were not as radical. they voted themselves out of existence when i finally convened voting to cede power.

the leader of the majority socialist faction will later take over and become president. it was he and his associates who did bear the brunt of the scapegoating because they were the ones were forced to swallow this treaty. the versailles treaty, which of course ends up being a real sore point for german nationalists. so they were given a take it or leave it real, a treaty that was not negotiable. article 231 established the principle of german war guilt. the germans were guilty or responsible for starting the war, which was the justification for paying these reparations which were not simply to pay off war damages, but to offset the colossal debts paid by the allies.

this problem dovetails with the image of inter-ally debts. what is interesting was the united states was in a position and some solace that the united states could have say -- could have staved off a knot of -- could have staved off a lot of problems, in particular with the british because the british were owed so much money by her allies that if britain for gave her debt then the united states could forgive the money britain owed her. that would make the french a little less keen on forcing the germans to pay those -- to pay for the economic damage in northern france were the damage had been located. the man who saw this best of all was john maynard keynes. i just read the title of his

pamphlet published as a book. this was the book that made him famous not the general employment on interest and money, the one he is known for among economists and economic historians. this is the book that made him a global celebrity. he was something of an insider and work for the treasury in the war and had served in surveying capital inflows, what was going on in the subcontinent and so on. he was practiced and experienced and new much in the theory sense but also economic practice. he understood matters by trade and the reparations they were demanding would be devastating not just for germany but the entire european economy. it would also fuel that very

paranoia and poverty and the scapegoating and blaming of minorities and so on. he was thinking problem lee at that time about socialism and communism. everyone would probably be thinking the same thing about the fascists and nazis. he saw the outlines of a political crisis emerging. he thought economic recovery was the most important thing. he was enumerating the ideas that would delay the marshall plans -- that would outlay the marshall plans, the united states becoming the world's creditor nation to see the economies of europe and help them recover from the war. to be fair to the americans, the americans were doing a lot to alleviate poverty, hunger and suffering in europe. the aleve -- the american relief administration had taken over much of the distribution of food supplies and belgium and would

later do the same in the balkans and hungary and do the same during a great famine of 1921. the americans are not doing nothing to alleviate these problems, but the larger argument was americans should have taken a more global and humane view of things. feeling lucky that they had been spared the worst horrors of the war, a war born in blood by most of her allies. this is nothing of the losses of written, france and her allies. but maybe they should forgive the word that -- the war debts. wilson was not particularly interested in economics and keynes bitterness was about the establishment. >> i was wondering -- in the book, he goes off against wilson

toward the end, saying he was the most disgraced president by the end of his term. how does he get from this all powerful force in the versailles negotiations to this impeach the president -- >> yes, he is writing very high when he goes to versailles. he does make it interesting tactical point which is his biggest mistake was going to versailles. had he stayed home being all-powerful and not got rap up in the nitty-gritty of dried borderlines in new york and adjudicating claims and so on, he could have ruled it for a long time, that is help to mediate disputes. instead, he ended up becoming one negotiator amongst the others, outranking them in terms of the new president and in

other terms, he was just squabbling like the rest. an example of the way wilson to some extent allowed himself to be manipulated and corrupt did -- they are not allies the towers with which the u.s. is associated, if you look at these zones of occupied turkey or the former ottoman empire, these secret agreements have come to fruition. russia has dropped out and italy and greece have made these elaborate claims. i've showed you this map once before -- the amusement being the italian zone was in fact one of the largest of all the zones and the claim was political or in terms of self-determination the weakest.

it was obviously absurd and absurd to wilson himself. it was in this accidental moment when the italians have walked out in protest and there were supposedly for powers adjudicating. it was down to a big three staging kind of a temper tantrum because they wanted this territory that had been given to yugoslavia. the greeks and lloyd george was very close to the greek delegation and explain to wilson was going on that italy has this absurd claim and wilson is convinced this is an outrage that must not stand, city gives the green light to the occupation of smirnov, that is is mere. troops land there and within 24

hours, there are 400 dead in the streets. about 300 muslims, mostly turkish, and about 100 greeks. they had nearly gone to war in the third balkan war which did not happen because of the first world war and now the third war resumes with a vengeance and you see massive waves of ethnic cleansing as the greeks make it nearly to ingres. -- nearly to ingres. lots of burned villages and most famously, the turks, no one is entirely sure who, somebody set fire in armenia and the burning in 1922 was kind of the 9/11 of his day. everyone are mean -- everyone rumored the scenes of all the

bodies in the water and this horrific scene, for which wilson was somewhat responsible. not alone responsible but he is actually the one who is in a position to make a decision and the decision he ultimately made was this claim for self-determination of the greek people for the ottoman empire, although his figures about who lives where were not entirely accurate, this helps fuel yet another devastating war. the principle of self-determination was potentially a useful one if applied in a careful way, but it could also potentially lead to all kinds of carnage and chaos. in europe, with the mixed populations, even to some extent imperial germany. with all the checks and slovaks now they are being given their own new states post world war with their own minorities to the

press. serbia, this is maybe the greatest violation of the principles -- soviet -- low via was giving an empire for which it could oppress all of its people. wilson, by getting involved in his worst trading ended up getting involved with all of this and compounding his failure to achieve some kind of reconciliation which would have been a tall task -- it was developed creating the league of nations. if you read in need johnson book, he claims the idea was concocted by these british pacifists. but wilson did not suddenly just long on to it. it's in the original 14 points if you read right down to the end. bad idea comes to dominate his thinking in the last days of

versailles and as part of the reason he gives in. as long as written in its will agree to this lead, everything else will sort itself out because the powers will cooperate instead of compete and you will get collective security. the french want them to make a security guarantee not unlike what would happen with nato and wilson says we can't do that but we will give you collective security in the league of nations. he even says you must trust us, we will protect you from the germans and so when he comes back to the united states and tries to sell the league of nations, he has to sell the versailles treaty which is harder because the versailles treaty has all of these bugaboos related to minority populations and german complaints and so on, but he tries to sell at all as a package and in doing this, what

remains of his health actually collapses. he has his first stroke when he's back in paris and that's probably another reason he should not have gone to paris, because of his health. it was while he was aren't storming the country that he had another series of strokes that largely incapacitated him. for nearly 17 or 18 months, the last part of his term before the inauguration of harding, he is effectively an invalid. was he actually incompetent to rule, we don't know for sure. he would be examined and seem like he is reasonably cogent but for all intents and purposes, it was his wife running things and making decisions. he would sometimes scribble down orders in semi-legible handwriting because he would have a series of strokes and his mind and handwriting were not quite right. all we know for sure is that he instructed to the -- to the extent he was able to, the

democratic allegation of the senate to reject the compromise terms by the republicans and they were voting down wilson's own version of history. it -- the republicans were isolationists and they blocked wilson, but they did not vote in favor of wilson asked treaty. that actually failed pretty badly. the draft treaty failed 38-53 in the senate. she wasn't exactly educated. she apparently dropped out of school after a couple of years so she was semi literate. it's not because she was unintelligent. she was not learned and bookish. wilson got his phd in political science from johns hopkins professor at princeton president of winston university, his wife may have had a native

intelligent but she was not educated. henry cabot lodge, you could look back at this area and he had a phd from harvard. we are talking about a couple of intellectuals here, dueling intellectual titans. henry cabot lodge in the senate republicans, the ones known as the irreconcilable's, hiram johnson was probably the most extreme proponent who wanted no compromise and they did not want the u.s. to be involved in soviet russia and wanted all the troops to come home. the majority republicans were skeptical about the treaty as a whole, partly because of the enunciation that had begun to cut some ice with public opinion in the united states. they felt the treaty was unjust and not this league of nations was unrealistic and did not want the u.s. to be bound by it to go

to war in some far-off place because of some human resolution. they amended the treaty. what locke supposedly said was if you could make this more realistic so that congress does not forfeit its role, we can support this. this amended version of the treaty with certain reservations about versailles was voted on in the senate and this one past by a majority of 49 to 35 but it was short of the two thirds majority for senate modifications. by about seven votes, the united states about out of the collective security system, so the u.s. was not a party to the versailles treaty, nor was it a member of the league of nations. even if it had not been wilson's idea it was his baby, you might say. wilson and that being discredited, so there's a lot of

reasons why wilson in retrospect has less a reputation now. of course, the over racism and segregation of the white house. wilson at the time had been revered to the point where he went to versailles and got involved in all that horsetrading. if you read johnson, he very hard on canes and said this is unfair and becomes a self filling prophecy. you could also say that the man was a prophet. he said this semi-carson jenny and he's treaty with reparations where you are going to ruin germany and not be able to milk her, this will ruin europe's economy and be a breeding ground for war. of course he was entirely right. no one really comes off with great credit in the story.

the republicans that take office when you look at harding and coolidge, although they did renegotiate in 1924, they renegotiated some of the quadrants related to reparations, allowing germany to make realistic installment payments. they never did forgive those debts. as coolidge put it -- they hired the money, the didn't they, they should pay it back. that's a justifiable position to take but maybe not the wisest if you look at everything in a providential life. the united states could have forgiven these debts and wilson could have ensured the versailles treaty was not quite so -- they say it was not really unfair just needed to be enforced and you could make that argument and say if they were going to commit to peace, they needed to make sure everyone

signed on. the problem was france had been so devastated by the war that she did not have the morel or manpower to do this. france is the greatest creditor of the czars regime and has the greatest way to overthrow it. whereas written, because canes has affected public communication and lloyd george's going the other way as far as the ottoman settlement and don't want france to have syrian settlements, the allies are beginning to split apart. the germans, despite being aghast at these terms can begin to point to divisions among their allies. france was basically ticked off that the germans were not paying

up and declared them in breach and sent troops to the area to seize in kinds and france was not backed up by britain, saying the alliance began to fray and fracture. the ultimate upshot was in 1941 france surrendered to hitler and the british responded by thinking me french fleet off the coast of algeria so that that that blood was already there in the early days after versailles. in a certain sense, that was inevitable. britain and france had been traditional enemies for centuries so maybe it made sense they were going to fall apart at the end. the sense of missed opportunity make sense because there's a lot of ones the united states could have stayed out of. united states could have stayed out saying we will back the terms and keep that army of 4

million to enforce them. or the u.s. could have done something along the lines but then insist on being generous to her allies. in the end, we might say everyone and it up with the worst of all possible treaties -- a versailles treaty that was not ratified and with the league of nations created at the urging of the u.s. president such that it ended up being a dead letter before was even created. do we have any questions? >> with the zinc would have different if wilson had not gone

for this? do you think the league of nations would have passed? >> i think he would have been more in tune to the american public's opinion and possibly what was going on in congress. had wilson been able to negotiate directly with his domestic opposition and without getting so wrapped up in the politicking in harris, i think there's a good chance some amended version of the treaty might have passed. the adulation, among other things, he was greeted as a savior. it is a classic case of hubris come before the fall. had he just been content to stay behind, i think he would have been more effective. on the other hand, who could resist the crowd lining up to see him, the great savior coming

across, the new world going to write the sins of the old. i do think you would have seen a different kind of treaty possibly ratified by congress, i think that is at least possible. any other questions? in the back? >> what do you think are the biggest holes in will sony and democracy? >> i suppose the central contradiction is the idea that the united states, if it is unique, the idea of exceptionalism that the united states is not a power like the others, you could take that to mean the united states should not get involved with the quarrels of the others.

he did not want the u.s. to get wrapped up in the power struggles of europe. that means the united states has a universal mission to lead not just by example but you can see what would become more or less the truman doctrine after the cold war. the u.s. now has a universal role to play. you can see the appeal of the idea and does undergird a lot of policy. it is interesting that tr nobody really sites him as much of a precedent in terms of foreign policy whereas wilsonian-ism lives. that's not necessarily the best foreign policy for any country

to have because i think it is ultimately dangerous. in the end come you have to call your shots but if you are committed to ensuring these ideas are practice universally in the world, there's no and your foreign policy could and. it sounds really expensive. that is ultimately where will sony and is him leads. talk about today's headlines and turkey or hungary or vietnam. you know the u.s. has a universal mission in foreign policy. any other questions?

thank you all for coming. i think we will wrap up right there. [applause] >> with live coverage of the u.s. house on c-span and the senate on c-span2, here on c-span3, we show you the most relevant congressional hearings in public event and on weekends, c-span3 is home to american history tv with programs that tell our nations story. including the civil war visiting battlefield and key events. american artifacts touring easy him's and sites to discover what artifacts reveal about america's past. history bookshelf, with the best-known history writers. the presidency looking at the policies and legacies of our nation's commanders in chief. lectures and hit -- lectures in history and our new series reel america, featuring archival