last round of q and a. thank you very much. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> lucy hayes was the first first lady to earn a college degree. opposing slavery, she influences her husband rutherford b. hayes to switch from the wig party to the republican party. lucy hayes. this sunday night at 8:00 p.m. et on c-span's original series "first ladies." examining the women who filled the position of first ladies and their influence on the presidency. sunday at 8:00 p.m. et on c-span3. each week, american history tv

sits in a lecture with one of the nation's college professors. you can watch it next, brooklyn college professor benjamin carp talks about the advantages and disadvantages for british and american forces during the revolution. he describes how individual personalities, supplies, and timing influenced the outcomes. this class is one hour and 15 minutes. benjamin: hi, everybody. today's lecture is going to be on military aspects of the revolutionary war in the north and south. next week, when we have our guest speaker, she will be talking about the western campaigns in more detail. there are other aspects of the war, financing the war, women's participation that we will not

get to today that we will be leaving for future classes. i wanted to start by talking about one of the best recent books on the american revolution called "the men who lost america." he argues that british generals are described as incompetent, in decisive, but he argues that these were competitive men in the midst of accomplished professionals, and the reason why they failed was not due to a character flaw, but because they faced insurmountable obstacles fighting a war in america. i will lay out some of those

obstacles. the first thing is diplomacy. in the seven years war, britain had allies. during the war for american independence, they found themselves relatively alone, fighting france in 1778. spain joins in 1779, the dutch is against them. prussia and austria are like i'm getting my hair done that day, they are not participating. britain is relatively isolated. that will become a problem for them as they get more enemies, making it difficult for them to put all of their attention on the americans. the second thing is the british political system.

the british political system at home was making it difficult for them to centralize their strategy. the king has to work to get majorities in parliament and parliament is a bunch of loose factional coalitions that cannot always get it back together to coordinate and act as one. the secretary of state is supposed to be in charge of the war but he has no direct control over the navy or transporting supplies or provisions or men so this is a problem. george washington faces administrative problems, too but he is not facing these problems from 3000 miles away. this is another inherent disadvantage for the british. the third factor is logistics. the journey from great britain to north america takes anywhere from 2-4 months. this is an army that needs to be fed.

the british army consumed about 37 tons of food and, with horses, 30 more tons of oats. that does not include the women, children, refugees, slaves, that they are responsible for. you can grow some food here in brooklyn and long island, but most of that food and supplies are all coming from back home. on top of that, the british government is trying to hold down costs so that it doesn't become a revenue nightmare in the have to try to defend the west indies, the mediterranean africa. with all of that, they are trying to wage these campaigns successfully in america? extremely difficult. after 1778, britain has fewer troops and a smaller navy than it did in 1776. it is not as if they were

putting more and more money into this, they were putting less and less into the fight. the fourth thing, the revolutionary movement is popular in america. a counterinsurgency is always going to be difficult. the american insurgents controlled governments, the press, the militia, and the militia was often used to punish loyalists. even when the british succeeds in some campaigns, that makes the americans angrier and helps achieve success. the fifth factor, if the british are going to try to win support, it is tough to win support and use force. an invading army creates unpopularity wherever it goes. it does not help that they are using germans and blacks and indians and allies. this is the kind of thing that is angering white americans on

different levels. every time the british do it they are making more enemies. the british are having this tricky problem. they would have been able to overcome these difficulties if they had a solid base of loyalist support. this is what the british are constantly hoping for. every time they launch a campaign, they are not -- in the middle colonies or south, they thought the loyalists would rally to their banner. this never happens. the loyalist units that develop in america develop slowly and never get the initiative. to compensate for the lack of manpower, the british are never able to do that. they are constantly overestimating the amount of

support they are going to see. the loyalists were probably never more than 20% of the total u.s. white population. they do little for the loyalists when they show up. they treat them to martial law turtle when the british leave, the loyalists are basically hung out to dry. they are surrounded by patriots who hate them. the wakes confiscate -- the wigs confiscate their property and many are driven away. these are difficult disadvantages that the british are laboring under. for these reasons, and 1778, having won the saratoga campaign and in the process of building the french alliance, america decides that things are looking up, although the winter at valley forge was no picnic. valley forge, washington is in a terrible mood. there are rumors that he will be

sacked. his men are suffering due to that transportation and logistics. congress cannot compel anybody to provide any supplies. things gradually get better for the americans. there are some bright spots in valley forge. one made them into a more disciplined fighting force. secondly, nathanael greene becomes quartermaster general. these are two key figures that emerge valley forge. some historians argue that the americans who were suffering in the snow bonded over this. and the fact that they didn't -- it says something about their commitment.

on the british side, and 1778, the british in philadelphia learned that henry clinton has become the commander in chief for british forces. they are order to pull out of till adelphia. -- philadelphia. there are lines of march is 12 miles long, plus civilians who were traveling with them. the british have a miserable time. they find bridges destroyed. stifling heat. there were 600 desertions along the way.

it was a terrible march for the british. washington's army is following behind them looking for an opportunity to fight. they get that opportunity on june 28. henry clinton holds it together. the americans miss an opportunity to do extensive damage against the british but they still brag about having succeeded in the attack. the british make it back to new york and essentially after two years of fighting with all of the engagements in princeton and saratoga, everybody is back where they started. the british are in new york city and the americans are in new jersey. washington still has not won a major battle by this point. clinton is writing back to

london asking for more men but his orders require him to send 10,000 british troops away to st. lucia, saint augustine, and canada. clinton gets fewer than 5000 new troops to make up for those losses. his manpower is too indolent over the course of the war. after 17 said -- in terms of naval support -- after 1778, they never get more than 13% of the british navy because they have other things to do, in gibraltar, the english channel india, they are going to be -- they have other fish to fry. in 1778, it ends up being a dud here. -- dud year. one campaign i want to make sure we talk about is the 1779 sullivan campaign. one group of british allies we want to talk about are the

indians. both sides are courting the iroquois and the iroquois need to decide who is going to respect their land claims? one key figure is joseph brant a mohawk who has traveled to england. he is really pushing for the iroquois, particularly the mohawks, to side with the british. in july, a number of iroquois agree to fight with the british and the two groups end of fighting one another. the british-supported iroquois made guerilla raids on settlements, which involve the slaughter of american women and children. this makes the white americans infuriated and so the response is going to be washington's plan to raid iroquois. he also was to attack new york city but he would've had to coordinate with the french to do

that in the french and up going back to france to do other things. that doesn't work out. washington is fantasizing about attacking new york city. he sends general john sullivan to enter the iroquois homeland and unleash devastation on their villages and cornfields. washington says, the immediate objects of the total destruction and devastation of their settlements in the capture of of as many prisoners as possible. it will be essential to ruin their crops and prevent their planting more that the country may not be nearly overrun but destroyed. he says, here is your tactic rush on with fixed bayonets, nothing will terrify them more than this, you will not by any means listen to any talks piece until the total brew went of -- root of their settlements. it is likely that their fears it

if they are unable to oppose a spoken help them to offer peace. our security will be in their inability -- the distance to which they are driven in the terror with which the chastisement they receive will inspire them. so another words, we are going to terrify these guys, push them as far away as possible, and make it impossible for them to attack us back with the idea that washington is thinking long-term that this will make upstate new york safer for white settlement. as part of this campaign americans destroy 40 villages and sent them fleeing to niagara. in 1790, the seneca leader was negotiating with washington and says, when you enter the country

of the six nations, we called you town destroyer into this day when your name is hurt our women look behind in turn pale. this is the effect of the revolutionary war in indian country, although obviously there are other stories we can tell about that. clinton was expected to somehow take charleston, s.c., advance the hudson valley, attack new england, and defended new york. he does not get all of those things down. he captures stony point which we read last time that the americans retook after the british had taken it and he also takes planks point on the hudson referred -- meanwhile the last governor of new york goes into fairfield and burns them so the british are doing something but no major engagements in 1779. and what we see happening as the work progresses from sullivan's campaign is that the war is becoming more violent. a historian named patrick griffin road, some communities devolved into crucibles of

unspeakable violence, pitting neighbor against neighbor. he argues that 20% of americans were loyal but only 30% were patriots, where does that leave everybody else? in the southern backcountry, there were complex politics. we have read about some of these things. they are different groups of people trying to settle scores with their neighbors, torture, executions, violence desecration of corpses, killing of prisoners. griffin argues that order was restored and local communities in part because there were leaders that were able to come back into power and also because for whites, the fear of slave revolt ended up tamping down other disagreements. so that is what we kind of see beginning to happen in the south and that will help to find the

southern campaign. in america, we will talk about this next time. there are a number of threats from within. one of these threats arises from the civil -- the fragility of the civil government. their currency is a disaster. the value of the continental dollar in relation to the pound fell to 700/1. so that makes it difficult -- it is becoming increasingly worthless and makes it difficult to get men and supplies and as we see in the formation of the constitution, american nationalist are going to remember this and it is going to help them make the argument that a scattered government confederation government of states cannot work and that some sort of more nationalized

government under the constitution is going to be needed. another internal problem with the americans is there famous act of treason, benedict arnold who had been an american hero had initially approached clinton about defecting in may, 1779. he thought the rebellion was collapsing. many of his officers were discussed at the incompetence of the continental congress. he had been passed over for promotions to radio been accused of corruption, felt unappreciated. he needed money. his wife posh family had loyalist and sympathies, clinton did not want arnold to spy -- he starts bickering over the money and buy the summer of 1780, they have figured out a plan because arnold was in command of west point which would have been a fortress of real value to get to the british -- arnold asks to be with the senior officers of the british sent john andre, 30-year-old spymaster

essentially for the british. he sets out on september 27, he disobeys his orders by going behind enemy lines. by getting something in writing from arnold and by disguising his uniform -- all things he does as a spy -- andre walks into a bunch of american men that she things they are loyalists and says hey, it's me he is captured by the enemy and said that andre has been captain realizes that the game is up and so he escapes from west point and makes his way to new york city. andre, though, is an american hands -- asks to be shot which is a more honorable death then hanging with the americans decide to hang him and he will later be reinterred at westminster abbey.

arnold does not end up inspiring many other defectors but, this was obviously a big story at the time for the american side. benedict arnold is sort of the american -- one of the brightest stars of the american army who turned treason. there were also several mutinies in the continental lines in 1779, 1780, in 1781, the men are complaining about -- not getting paid the fact that they don't have enough clothing to get to through the date. -- day. there is an incident in 1783 were some of these military companies are going to begin marching on philadelphia so it is actually quite chaotic on the american side. there is also officer discontent on whether they are going to be paid pensions for life. there is a conspiracy -- a conspiracy that officers are angry or how ungrateful the civilian government is and is even a shadow talk of maybe we should just have a military coup and take over the united states but washington makes a famous speech that brings his officers to tears and he says, no, they will honor their obligations to us. he is able to combat down.

-- calm that down. let's talk about what the british decide to start doing in 1779. they have failed in new england, the middle colonies, they are going to make an attempt on the south. this will enable them to keep an eye on the west indies, attract loyalists, create a domino effect and hit a bunch of southern ports and work their way north. controlling saint augustine, savannah, charleston. the french and the americans try to take savannah back. that ends up being a disaster although there are some future heroes of the haitian revolution that fight as part of his franco-american alliance. that is an interesting side note. it is a failure and so the british control savanna and they launch their expedition against

charleston and 1779. after a grim siege, charleston falls to the british in 1780. 3300 americans surrender. so another big disaster, really disastrous campaign for the americans. but what the british then immediately find out is just because you control the coast does not mean you the back country. clinton leaves for new york city, leaving everything in the command of charles cornwallis. clinton is hoping to be near washington but he is still like it the reinforcement that he needs and so cornwallis is down south in charge of british forces, he once to big victory early on in 1780 at the battle of camden against horatio gates, the hero of saratoga, where there are over 1000 american casualties.

the southern part of the continental army is shattered. cornwallis is supported by a loyalist at calvary regiment the british legion. under the command of somebody who massacred in south carolina and advocated -- nothing will serve these people but fire and sword so he was part of a faction of british officers that wanted to be more ruthless toward the americans. britain eventually suffers reversal at a hands of a combination of things. the militia and a resurgence of the continental army. the wake militia -- the big -- the wig militia is fighting patrick ferguson who gets himself surrounded and killed. over the following months, there will be american commanders who emerge from the carolinas -- the swamp fox, francis marion, thomas sumter, they all have great nicknames -- leading units

against the british and the allies. it is a nasty war of murders and executions in harsh treatment toward civilians. the british general charles o'hara says, the violence of the passions of these people are beyond every curve of religion and humanity. they are unbounded in every our exhibits a dreadful mischiefs, murders, and violence is every kind unheard of before. so the british and americans both end up experiencing extremely savage warfare in the backcountry of the south. and then nathanael greene of rhode island emerges as the commander of the continental army in the south and what he does is he keeps fighting cornwallis -- he loses most of the battle but he sees to it

that cornwallis gains nothing from his victories and he forces to british to kind of chase them around the south and keep retreating to the coast and back to their supply lines. this is what enables him to eventually when the campaign. daniel morgan beats charleston and 1791, cornwallis was a tactical victory at the courthouse on march 15, 1780 one but he loses a quarter of his men in a brutal battles of the americans are finding ways to bleed the british as they are marching through the south. eventually, cornwallis and says, rather than continuing to cling to the coast, i'm going to cut my supply lines, i am going to drive toward virginia it so he wins -- again -- tactical victories on april 25 -- and on september 8, and his soldiers make it from it still and they tromp through monticello but cornwallis by this point has lost a lot of men and sir henry clinton back in new york predicted that this would turn out to be pointless if the

british have not won the american posh part in clinton says, i fear this cannot be expected in virginia -- we may conquer but we shall never -- indeed what happens to cornwallis as he winds up trapped on the peninsula. this is clinton's fault and cornwallis', they have not communicated well in months. clinton believes cornwallis disobeyed orders by going into virginia and he initially ordered cornwallis to return to new york city with the army but then it is very difficult for london to keep tabs on things from 3000 miles away. clinton orders cornwallis to fortify and defended deep water port in the chesapeake and wait for help to arrive third cornwallis later claims that clinton had assisted on your cap -- insisted on yorktown pick clinton is going to wind up being blamed for the failure of the army even though he has never approved of the strategy in the first place.

when rochambeau arrives, washington decides he will go south and meet the british their so so 6000 soldiers and 7000 french surround cornwallis by land and sea and he is trapped for three weeks running out of men and supplies and on october 17, 1781, cornwallis is also forced to surrender and british soldiers laid down their arms in an enormous surrender. yorktown isn't quite what wins the war. after that, there are still 20,000 british troops in america and the british still have command of saint augustine charleston, new york city.

brinton start losing battles in the mississippi valley against the spanish they decide to cut their losses in order to save the empire perilous have the americans.? they have one by not doing anything which i said at the outset was going to be a strategy. the american posh greatest triumph may have been at paris in 1783. henry lawrence are all on hand to figure out how to make peace among the various european powers and a european countries all want different things. france and america both want access to the fisheries off of what is now canada, being able to fish in those waters was extremely valuable. spain wants the western part of america and they want gibraltar and they want the united states to be as weak as possible. france wants great britain to be as weak as possible and britain once the united states to be pretty decently strong to stand up against the french and

spanish and also be a kind of dependent trading partner of the british. what the americans do is they take all of these interests, they play them off one another in a take advantage first of british politics and then of british successes against france and so they ignore their treaty with france, ignore instructions in congress and they make a separate peace with britain and then france is forced to go along with. they get axis of the mississippi river and fisheries -- spin gets of florida and supposedly, the british were supposed to protect all of the states -- congress was asking the states to protect all british -- loyalist properties, pay back any british debt, return any cop is get a property greatest this turns it to be little bit difficult. it is supposedly part of the treaty provision. we still has mother things to

-- many other things to discuss in future days but just to conclude for now, i want to argue that the american revolution demonstrated the strength of americans commitment but also the weakness of its government. it demonstrated the hopelessness of the british counterinsurgency campaign in the face of logistical difficulties and world war. so those are really the main themes that you want to keep in mind in order to -- in order not to pay too much attention to the myths and think about the progress of the revolutionary war. that's a kind of quick tour through the final years of the war. i want to spend the rest of the

time just answering your questions and figuring out what else we want to know about the campaign, sorry, about westchester county, and its article that we've read by professor kim up at suny albany. his article is entitled the limits of plitization in the american revolution. so what i'd really like to hear is some of your impressions, you know, of what you've learned about the revolutionary war, questions you have about the campaigns i've introduced, and these articles that we've read over the last two sessions. >> i thought it was ironic that -- >> wait. go ahead. >> i thought it was kind of ironic that it mentions him early in the article because the early writings sounded like an early national identity and tended up being his homeland that was so ravenously ripped apart during the war. >> literary scholars get interested in him for that reason because he has this famous quote "what is this new man, this american?" and he is contemplating this. but he was more of a loyalist than a patriot. yeah.

there is some irony in that he becomes this kind of very famous, early literary commentator on american life and, yet didn't agree with the project. i haven't reread him in a long time but he's often quoted by historians because he seems to be such an astute observer and makes the observations not just about upstate new york but also nantucket and he goes to the carolinas. he was well traveled. and so he has a lot of interesting observations about various parts of america. >> i found it interesting that the revolution was fought because the americans had issues with property rights being taken from them and being violated and then all of the people whose property they stole on in the midst of battle they stole all this cattle and the grains, all the things that were taken and pretty much never really compensated people for that. that's an interesting contradiction that came out of the war.

>> yeah. it's funny. when you do archival research on the revolutionary war, if you read enough letters you start to think that the entire war was about cows. if that's all they're talking about is like where are we going to get cows from to feed our troops? it is an entire war over cows. amazing. right. the argument the americans are making obviously is because the loyalists are so timid and because they're treasonous to the ideals of the revolution that their property doesn't deserve to be respected, right, because they're enemies of their country in that way. so this is what can be sometimes very dangerous about wars for ideology is that you can say well these people aren't playing along with our ideology. therefore, we can strip them of all their rights. that can often be something of a dangerous game in times of revolution. so that is an interesting irony. >> i was curious about the native american that traveled to britain and what differed in

that situation that the natives weren't really connected and didn't communicate all that well with americans at the time especially i would think with great britain. >> we get the impression that native americans and whites weren't communicating sometimes but in fact there is over a hundred-year history of very intimate communication -- trade, sexual relationships, diplomatic relationships, you know, we'll often point to the fact that whites seem not to have understood native americans, and that was definitely true of some whites but there were others who understood native american cultures quite well. and yet joseph brand was not the only indian to travel to london. as early as the 17 teens there were delegations of native americans who went over to great britain to meet with delegations.

they were obviously an object of curiosity to the british people. one of the things that i talked about when we did my lecture on indian disguises in the boston tea party was that for fancy masquerade dress for a fancy ball you could dress up as a native american and any number of other things. today we would call that kind of minstrel theme and it would be a little sketchy. back then this was a common thing for fancy british people to do. you know, they knew about native americans a little and white north americans knew about native americans a lot because they had been living alongside native americans for a long time. there are ways in which native americans get written out of history which is why we're left with that impression. and of course madely before the american revolution there were a lot of white newcomers from scotland and northern ireland and england who didn't have that familiarity. and so there is some ignorance and fear especially, app most of those newcomers were the ones who moved out on to the frontier settlements near the native americans. so what you're seeing is different populations with different levels, different white populations with different

levels of familiarity with native americans. joseph brand was not alone. there weren't a ton of native americans who went to england to visit but there were some throughout the previous century. what else can i refine? gabby. go ahead. sorry. right behind you. >> i know that new england was very on fire for the revolution during this time period, and it pretty much was talking about essentially westchester county in general was pretty much indifferent and so were their leaders. was that part of the reason why it was so easy for britain to come in and take over that area because they were just politically indifferent? >> that's a good question. that raises a tough problem, which is that when the british army makes it somewhere in north america successfully, is that

because strategically they had the advantage and they were able to kind of get someplace very quickly, or is it because they're finding a politically friendly environment or they know they are going to find a politically friendly environment and that's what motivates them to get there? i don't have a perfect answer to that question. i mean, westchester is just up the river, easily navigable from new york city. so it's not difficult for the british to get to. strategically it's an important place for them to sit because it's in between connecticut and new jersey, and so, you know there is some high ground you'd want to occupy for certain military advantages. but you're right. i mean, it may be one of those things that lulls the british into thinking, oh, this is where

we're going to be able to find loyalists because we didn't see these guys as full throated, red blooded, declaring for the american patriotic cause. they seem like they're more apathetic. that mate mean they were just biding their time until the british army came to their rescue and ah ha. all the loyalists will come out of the woodwork. the experience in westchester must have been something of a disappointment for them. did they find loyalists? of course. but what kim is arguing is yeah. it doesn't end up looking like the mirror image of new england for them. you know, i'd like to hear from you folks a little more about why kim is saying that's happening. go ahead. >> one of my interpretations of the reason why westchester county was, the situation there

was far more complicated than i found in a lot of other places especially places closer to new york or closer to philadelphia where the congress was being held, it speaks also to the distance that this war is being fought over just in the americas. they're stressing a locality as opposed to a nation. these places are, though there may be supporters of the revolution, though there may be some political activity in these places, they are localities. they are concerned and responsible for what's happening in their areas and not so much concerned or affected by what's going on in philadelphia or in saveb or elsewhere where the war is being fought. so just one of the ways i interpret it. >> the question of nationalism has always been one that really interests me. and the question of space is also an important one. in the united states those things, those questions are often tied. the story in david potter many

many years ago, once said of american nationalism, one fights for the joy of his peanuckle club when he is said to fight for his country. the idea that the nation is so big and abstract and because there wasn't really such a thing as the american nation yet in 1776 it's a little vague what people think they're fighting for. they know their neighbors. they know they're fighting for their own property and their own communities and often militia units or continental army units would all kind of just pick up from the same community and then move to the battle field. so they're feeling like they're fighting along side their own neighbors. given that southern, we know that southerners and new englanders and middle colonnists are all so different from one another, can't we make the argument that americans, the

americans who were fighting for the patriot side, that they are fighting for something bigger than their own locality? are they fighting for a nation? right? so that is a question. what is it that makes the nation? the continental army seems like a viable national force. it's drawing units from maryland and pennsylvania and connecticut and massachusetts and rhode island, etcetera. the continental congress? that's a pretty weak national government. so, you know, there are people like alexander hamilton and james madison who are going to look at congress and be talking about this a bit next month, look at the army and look at congress and say, this is a disaster. we can't get the states to cough up any money for provisions. we're printing money that we're not backing with taxes. you know, we've got a pretty good diplomatic unit over in france and washington seems to be holding it together but otherwise like we really have a

nation here? and so this is the kind of thing that can lead to apathy in the absence of strong national government and it was something that even after the war was over, the group of american nationalists who start, end up scheming to create the constitution, become extremely worried about the failures of the nation they had seen during the war. so this is something that we'll be talking about a little more. the other issue that i think you bring up that's really interesting is the issue of space. north america is big and diverse. i always think about the american revolution vs. the french revolution. right? in the french revolution, yeah. there are things happening out in the countryside but paris is so central that you kind of tell an easy story and figure out who's on what side in some ways. the american revolution always seems like it's much more difficult to build a narrative out of it because there are seven different things happening in seven different places all at the same time and the

differences are hundreds of miles apart. and again, the continent is going to represent -- it represented a challenge for the british to control and it's going to be a challenge for the americans to control as things develop further. >> the article kind of leaves us with, you know, like not too far after the war it's kind of just talking about washington bemoaning how apolitical people have become. was there any effort from people in the valley to be recompensated for any damages or anywhere really post war? like on the home front as far as settling up things that were damaged? >> yeah. in every state there will later be claims. you know, if the continental army gave you a piece of paper saying we promise we'll pay you back you could use that as a basis to get your money back. if the british came along and torched your stuff you could try and use that as a basis for

getting your money back. the loyalists, and we'll talk about the loyalists a lot more on wednesday, there's a whole archive in london of the audit office records of loyalists' claims that were put forth in 1784, 1785, where the loyalists were kind of saying, hey, we supported the king. now i'm utch in canada or back in london. all my estates were seized. they do ask and a lot of them get compensation from the british government. not all that they asked for but the british government spends a ton of money compensating these folks for their losses. that's the part of the war that nobody talks about. the accountants coming in afterwards and trying to settle all this. in theory the american states were supposed to give everything back to the loyalists but that's not what happened. and there are big fights about that especially in south carolina and in new york. alexander hamilton actually advocates for the loyalists being able to come back to their property. he wants to see the trade relationships between -- he wants to see these kind of men of capital

restored to new york politics and he wants the trade relationships with great britain to resume. that's why the more frankophile jeffersonians become his enemy because they see him as a little too angliphilic. go ahead. >> did you see that the large trust that existed in westchester at the time trying to perpetuate the system? >> yeah. this is one of the things that kim has written about at great length and other very famous scholars have tried to puzzle out in the broader history of new york state. yes, there are some large manors like phillipsburg in westchester but if you go further up the river you also have livingston manor, then portland manor, you know, so other huge tracts, some as big as counties essentially where it's just one

family owns all of the land and you've got all these tenant farmers working on it who really kind of would rather not be someone's tenant. would rather be small land holders themselves. and so there's been a lot of disagreement among historians, to what extent is the revolution, does it have characteristics of a social revolution of some of these ordinary farmers trying to get more equal distribution of land in new york or to what extent do we see a perpetuation of existing, social inequality? that's something i'm not ready to get at at this time but it is something that kim becomes interested in. and i think he's arguing to some degree that these kinds of class differences may have helped to depoliticize westchester and put a damper on more ideological polarization. but we should spend some time talking about what kim's basic argument is so that we know we're all essentially on the same page. what is the story that kim is telling before we start asking

some of these more interesting questions about what's really going on in westchester. anyone want to take a crack at the basic argument here? john, go ahead. >> -- in the sense that no matter what side we choose you're still like in a bad situation. he said that it didn't reach until after the war, i wondered in the midst of the war they couldn't do it but after the war -- i'm not sure what they, what that means. >> i'm sorry. i must not have heard the word. >> they said while it was going on it was so glorified they were gaining their independence. >> he uses a term there, rage militare that he puts in y tailics. -- italics. that is in part a phrase that

comes from charles royster's book a revolutionary people at war. what royster basically argues is that in 1775-1776 the americans are all in for the revolution, right? like they think it might be over really quick. they're all behind the great documents. you know, they're forming up in minute men companies and gathering a round boston and you read a lot of very high flown, patriotic rhetoric about we have to win this war for our posterity, etcetera, etcetera. but that as the war goes on, and people find out how unpleasant the war really is, that some of this rage militare starts to fade and you start to get the troops distrusting civilians civilians distrusting the troops, and that things don't look as patriotic from the perspective of 1783 as they did in 1775-1776. so that's the argument that he's referring to. but i also want to talk about what you mentioned at first, which was his comparison of westchester to his own experience in korea. what did people think of that?

that's not something you see in history articles on the 18th century very often, people kind of comparing them to their personal experience. every once in a while students will be kind of shocked by this and not really very comfortable with it. they're looking for some sort of mythical objectivity from their historians and they don't want their personal experiences. i'm curious to hear whether you guys had any particular reaction to this. gabby or jen? jen, go ahead. >> okay. so the political involvement, he said that westchester had little political involvement before the war, and i'm assuming that korea didn't have too much political involvement prior to the korean war. >> what he's trying to talk about is the relationship between a war and politics. does a war make you more politicized because it gets you inspired? right, all of a sudden there are soldiers out in the field and

so maybe you'll remember like world war ii propaganda or something, right, it becomes all for one and one for all kind of thing. alternatively, if there is an enemy walking through your back yard that's going to politicize you because all of a sudden you are so angry at the british because you're like, well, i was so neutral before but now i hate those guys because they took all my cattle and were bothering my wife. so that was the argument that john shy had made that kim is responding to directly, that the war politicizes americans and so they're going to come out of it on the other side, more politicized than they had been. but kim is like, well, actually lived through a war and that really wasn't what the experience was like for me. instead, war is horrible and it actually makes you want to have nothing to do with politicians ever again because it leads to things like this. and so he has that beautiful long quote by timothy dwight where timothy dwight is haunted by the memory many years later of what westchester county looked like in 1777. still pretty early in the war

and these people were just living in fear and they seemed like they were kind of just psychological wrecks from having been the site of campaigning in 1776. the article really packs an emotional punch i think and so kim was drawing on his own emotional experiences to some extent to make that argument. >> it seems like what happened here, a precedent was kind of set in how we should not militarize the public at times but at least engage them. i'm thinking of the home fund movements and things like that. >> yeah. look, the americans do that. not just common sense but in his series of pamphlets on the american crisis thomas payne is all over this. these are the times that try men's souls. we don't want summer soldiers

but soldiers who are going to be in it for the duration. who are going to be part of this thing for the whole year. we need everybody behind this. so there are american propagandaists at work throughout the war trying to, there are american propagandists at work behind -- throughout the war trying to keep americans engaged but the reality of a poorly supplied army, you know, civilians who are annoyed with troops wandering through their back yards, the reality is that all of the propaganda and ideology in the world, you know, if it's up against this kind of situation he's not saying that all of america is like westchester but what he is saying is that more parts of america were like westchester than we think and that it's not all -- that if the only image we have in our mind is lexington and concord on

april 19, 1775, and we kind of skip ahead to york town, yeah. that makes the american revolution look really heroic and great and like everyone was behind it. but the reality is, you know the violence that patrick griffin describes in the southern back country, and this type of violence and disorder that kim is seeing in westchester as well. go ahead. >> what was the american logistical plan for supplying and feeding their soldiers? i understand with the british, you know, some things don't happen because of coordination. britain is pretty far. and sometimes they have to rely on the kind of back-up plan, the colonnists, or sometimes just downright plundering but what was the american strategy, were they going in and, like, okay. we're just going to take what we can find, or did they actually have something? >> you know, when it's the continental army, give it a second and then i'll answer your question. for washington at least and the continental army, they really tried to pay for stuff where they could. you know, the americans are growing tons of crops, right but the issue is can it be paid for?

if all you're offering is worthless continental currency you know, you might find a merchant saying, yeah. that was the price back when you know, the dollar was worth something. now i'll have to charge you $700 if you want some of my wheat to feed your army. so that's going to create tension because merchants are looking for a fair price. the army needs to get fed. and it's really congress's fault that the money isn't worth anything. eventually, you know, the americans try to kind of centralize everything and get things on a better financial footing. for americans, the supply problems, i mean, there are certain things they just can't get themselves. gun powder, right? it takes time to make gun powder. it doesn't grow naturally in america. there are things that they do have to import and they have to run past british blockades and whatever. they can do that. they've got privateers out there

assaulting british ships and what not. but if they're going to get stuff from their own home merchants they need ready money in order to do that. so franklin is spending the entire war over in france like begging for loans and begging for cash because that's really the americans' problem is that they don't have enough of a tax base in order to pay for the supplies that they need a lot of the time. gabby? yeah. give it a second. >> i found it interesting in the beginning of the article when he was talk about pretty much there was no political movement in the county and then the loyalists and everybody just comes in and they're kind of like just standing on their soap boxes pretty much and they pull westchester to find some, to choose a side, because they just kind of

like they threw up their hands like okay. you guys have told us your side. you've told us your side so many times and you are acting -- the words he used were they were acting as if the war was going to be won based on the amount of people that they can convert and get on to their side. and the quote from governor morris was actually really interesting. when he said, not one month ago wiggins was branded with infamy. now each person strives to show the excess of his zeal by his actions. like for a county that was so politically dead it was like a quick switch. >> yeah. well, i mean, it's easy to be -- probably like for a lot of americans the best thing that you could be was an opportunist, right? if there is an army in your back yard, you're going to want them to treat you well and so you're going to say what they want you to say, right? so we'd like to believe that you know, principle trumps

everything and people would kind of stay consistent with their ideas. but the people of westchester don't really have that luxury and so while it might have disappointed patriot leaders like governor morris that the people of westchester turned out to be faithless, you know, it was common sense, probably. you have a followup? wait one second. okay. >> yes. i found it interesting that the new york committee of inspection drew a hundred principled freeholders and then this loyalist committee comes with 400 as if almost you can pretty much see the political temperature of what that county is going to have after the fact. which is weird. >> yeah. i mean, one of the things that historians would love to do is have a perfect measure of how much loyalists support vs. patriot support there was in the given county and the closest

we can get are documents like that, that we know are imperfect because they have to do, well, what was the timing, right? which army was nearby. who was asking the question of sign here, please. you know, and we can make guesses based on what we know about people's religious backgrounds. we can make guesses, you know, based on ethnicity and a few other things. but we don't, you know, have the kind of scientific polling we have today. we also know that this is the midst of a civil war and it's right on the front lines of a civil war. and so there's going to be tunism involved. opportunism involved. there's going to be, you know, people's answer to how patriotic are you is by definition going to be contingent. these are all great questions. trying to think, i didn't think my overall overview was going to be so short. we got through that stuff really quickly. do people have other -- we're doing great on kim and i'm happy

to talk about that further but do people have questions about anything else about the broader campaign? go ahead, jen. >> i realized that a lot of people were staying neutral or like, leaning toward loyalists. was it in part because they had the british pension? did the americans have a pension? >> you're asking about, well, so pension is a military thing. there are crown officers at the beginning of the war might've expected some kind of pension either now or later. that is a very small portion. pensions were for officers and not for ordinary soldiers.