1,237 the desks. but we could grow to -- well, we go to 1487. then 1771. >> that breaks out the scope in the current project and the nine and ten. that's the 1200 and # 00 if you combine them with existing facilities. >> i appreciate the report. people don't understand that i guess the revenue in the country is $2.5 billion and the budget in the entire country is $7.2 billion. the rest is given money isn't that correct, for afghanistan? >> i don't have the exact --

>> i do. that's the exact figurersment the scope of the project is $2.2 billion. the em if a sis is on desks. isn't it by the end of the year rethe administration is supposed to have all the troops out? do you know? >> by the end of ethics year we'll have probably one of the best arrays of desks you have ever seen in any post. i was over there and some of the foreign ministry folks. are are we going to be buddy 3-1? does anyone know? >> if i may this refers back to the point i head that we have tried to be flexible and responsive in terms of staffing. >> i know. but again, a desk would suppose a person is sitting there. vacant desks are another

matterer. we are building -- this is a 2.2 billion dollar project. it's probably the biggest infrastructure project if the history of afghanistan. in a country that has revenue of about $2.5 billion coming in. we are going to have this massive complex of desks. this will be will be the taj pa hall of desks and the complex the taxpayers are getting ripped off for. your company is british-basedment. >> we have a u.s. subsidiary.

>> we are also quartheadquartered in mclane. >> are half from afghanistan and half from where the u.s. or other countries. >> of the project? >> 1400. 300 are from afghanistan. >> the rest are brought in. >> yes, sir. a little over 600 nuclear weapon leez and 400 u.s. >> i was out with some of the troop it is if helmut province. they were looking at a school building and said this is the joke of the province. the americans pay three, four times what it would cost for this. we appreciate that but it was the joke of the province. what would youest hate the premium you are paying for.

the locals told me we are getting -- the american taxpayer is getting ripped off on the projects. >> we are not doing that kind of work. >> finally, i do have a letter, mr. chairman. i visited one of the posts recently. a major post in western europe. mr. issa and i worked at the end of his tenure going on post benghazi visits to some of the complexes. trying to avoid another benghazi. one of the simp things we found, that's a huge project. a money pit. one of the simple things we found was the lack of surveillance cameras. and their ability to have are high definition. and get those replaced.

when i visited within the last two weeks one of our major posts of western europe. i found one of the facilities didn't have those surveillance cameras. they said -- i said was the reason money. they said, no it was the bureaucrat tick acquisition process. i want to talk about the small things that make a big difference in security. >> i will recognize the -- >> i will answer the question for you in writing if you would like. >> i would like that. >> we appreciate to seeing that. we'll recognize mr. lynch who is traveled extensively to afghanistan. spent quite a bit of type there. appreciate his efforts and sacrifice. he's now recognized for five

minutes. >> thank you. i know a lot of members have been in and out of kabul and afghanistan afghanistan. one of the traveling aspects of our people working there is not so much the security and embassyimportant. but from my experience in and out has been the challenge. going from bag ram to kabul airport getting to the embassy. is there any plan to have a helo pad? we'll have are 1500, 1700 desks. a lot of contractor tors, a thousand employees. i'm concerned about shg going sideways where the embassy might be over done.

we have had incidents. the airport where my security staff had to push people away from the suburban i was in. they were up set about something. i couldn't figure it out. tlgs a danger going from the airport to the embassy. we had a convoy. and a vehicle borne ied recently. i have given up counting how many attacks on the kabul airport by the taliban. they are focused on that corridor. if the we are taking any precaution at all about getting people in and out of that area and again do we have an evacuation plan if things get bad there and we have to get our people out?

>> congressman, thank you for the question. part of our job -- and we do it everywhere in the world is to make sure we have adequate evacuation plans for personnel and not a single type of evacuation plan but multiple different plans. we could do short draw downs of certain personnel. we could lower our presence or they go to -- >> let's talk about kabul. >> we work closely with the department of defense. >> okay. >> we are many the mids of upgrading because of the surge and the number of people left behind in the military leaving this large part. we are in the midst of another revision of the evacuation plan. the ne o plan, we call it. we will ensure we have the ability to get our people out of that country given the size it won't be overnight. this is not like evacuating a 200-person embassy.

we are exception that willy aware of the danger of the route ta particularly white between the embassy and airport. we have been using a mix of air 57bd ground movements by appropriate. the embassy reviews how to move people and the safest way to do it. we have i think because of our efforts not suffered the same types of attacks yet. we will do our best and use a mix of air and ground movements. >> i would say given the history here we should expect further attacks on the embassy and on the airport as well. we are spread out between kabul airport. we have properties there where we are spread ott. the distance is two taf miles i

think, at least. probably longer from the u.s. embassy to kabul airport. the roads aren't good. i i'm concerned about getting peep out of there. practical stuff. i don't have enough time to go over the contract issue. i think we need to get back on the ground in kabul and go over the documents and figure out what the cost increase the delta between what we expected to see and what we are seeing thousand in terps of cost. i'm not assured by the statements that the quality of the work is good and we are on schedule and under budget. we heard from general williams about the baghdad situation. the quality of the work was good. we are under budget on

schedule. and then when he was gone the budget went from -- i'm happy it's done but in the meantime we lost some good american ss electrocuted because of cold violations and electrical systems that weren't grounded. things like that. i'm concerned that we are having a repeat performance here. and we did let the contractor know this was in afghanistan. afghanistan has never been a peaceful environment. we shouldn't be shocked that war broke out. there's been a war for 10, 12 years.

beyond that what it's always been a tough environment. when we get a bid we expect it to be baked into the cost. this is a difficult environment. i appreciate you helping the committee with the work. i will yield back. >> now the gentleman from michigan i for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks to the panel. since in afghanistan and kabul several types. mogs recently was late 2010. i remember staying in trailererers and having meetings and shipping containers and temporary facilities. i assume these are still at the embassy and in use.

>> that's the case. >> how secure are they? >> i would tell you they certainly don't come to the same level of security as a permanently built building. we have taken steps to surround them with either concrete barriers to limit shrapnel. we have predetonation shields so the more morer tar or rocket predetonates and sandbags catch shrapnelment we have over a hundred feet of set-back from the perimeter walls. high perimeter walls around them well guarded and reinforced. we have bunkerers. to the extent we have to use the temporary temporaries we are aware of the vulnerabilities they come with and do what we can to mitigate them until we can bring permanent buildings online. >> mr. courts i understand gao

recommended the state establish security standards for the temporary facilities and they did not accept the recommendations. is that correct? >> the state department partly concurred with the recommendation. they didn't fully accept it. >> what were the problems with fully accepting it? >> the state department would argue the office of security policy board standards apply to all facilities overseas including permanent and temporarier facilities and those are the standards that they hold themselves to. in practice they would tell you the only buildings that meet the standards are permanent structures. as we noted when state contracted for the temporary buildings, they contracted for buildings that had differing levels of security and didn't have overhead cover. el i would note in 2008 the state department notified the congress that they needed additional funds because the threat in kabul required overhead cover for the temporary

facilities that in 2009 they contracted for temporary buildings that didn't specify the need for overhead cover. >> let me give an opportunity for ms. munoz or mr. starr to answer from your perspective on the question of not accepting all standards and with where you're at now. >> the recommendation to have different standards for temporary structures struck us as very strange. >> they are different facilities. >> well, the problem is invariably when i have seen standards for temporary structures or interim facilities it's a lowerering of the standard. what i'm afraid of oh is by virtue of the fact that a trailerer is a trailerer we'll is have lower levels of standards rather than striving

to meet the real standard. an example is for many years all we had is construction trailererers. we have developed a heavilier armored trailerer we can now ship into faces. we are using them in adonna and peshower which allows us to reach the permanent standard. it is our goal to are meet permanent standards to the extent we can and not water down the standards for lower level standards for interim structures. >> ms. munoz. i noticed you moved and i don't want to cut you off. i would assume that in 2009 i'm told state acknowledged that personnel should be housed in permanenter hardened facilities. we are dealing with reality.

our concerns today are the basis of the questioning of how this is been a cost over run and continues the length of the process. but we have a large number of american personnel using temporary facilities in kabul. i appreciate the answers that you want to go and strive toward the permanent level. but these aren't permanent. today seem to be existing an awful long time. i guess i have heard your answer that you don't plan to develop standards for temporary housing. so knowing my time has expired mr. chairman, i would contend that the biggest question is how do we finish this project, complete it on time and make sure it meets the standards necessary? i yield back. >> do either of you want to respond to that? the over use of temporary

facilities is a deep concern. >> mr. chairman, at the time ta the department and the administration needed to surge people in. at the particular start of the period in 2009 and 2010 some are not what we are facing tau. we have had other buildings around us that grew in height. that presented a different type of fret. we started surrounding buildings with cement walls and sandbags. we had not been subject to incoming fire either morer tars or rockets. even today it is a very infrequent type of attack. infrequent or not we have taken counter measures by putting overhead power on temporary facilities building walls around then. putting bunkerers in. making sure we have a radar system that's a duck and cover

warning system to give people the most amount of time. it goes to the point that we have to serve this certain places and. we had to go in with trailerers and offices. we modified them to try to mimic our permanent standards give them set-backs bullet resistance, shrapnel resistance. at a certain point we have no choice but use temporary structures while awaiting permanent structures. >> the only problem i have is that's not true and it was in these report ares. i can go into specificity but for you to suggest you have done those things in afghanistan that ain't true. it is not true. >> we try to do it as best we can. >> but you didn't. you did not.

no. i beg to differ. believe me. if we get these two, myself you and whoever else. that's not true. i will show you. they have pictures. >> think this goes to a bigger policy. how to win and keep afghanistan. >> now recognize the gentle woman from new jersey for five minutes. >> thank you. thank you for your indulgence in the time allotted to get through some of the interesting questions. thank you to the panel. what's the condition of the wall that was a subject of a report i read last night? is it complete?

is there a portion left? >> i will turn to my colleague mr. starr. ta wall is on design. and will be executed in the context of the larger construction contract. i appreciate the question. the issue are of a request for modifications to the wall came up in the i.g. report are. and the question about why this couldn't be done immediately. the committee and folks need to understand we have an active construction project that included construction of a wall. >> i understand that. >> in the context of the larger project. >> i understand. >> those modifications will be made in that context. >> the wall was considered significant in keeping them safe and secure. i have not been there. what's keeping that facility and that compound safe? >> there is ale wall. there are existing walls

composed of things like barriers that are 11, 12, 13 feet high. cement walls, steel panels. there is to area around the facility that doesn't have a wall. there were interim security measures in place. >> not easily compromised at all. we believe there are newer and better only thes available today. >> thank you. i appreciate you speaking to me first. i have a question to both of you. ms. munoz, what's the role of the overseas building. the real property manager for the u.s. department of state for all of the facilities overseas. so we design build buy lease

sell and obviously construction is if our rel of responsibility. tluz we kpe cute based on two important factors. one is the number of desks or beds. the number of people who will be if the faft. we worked with our colleagues to understand the security situation and make sure think building we develop meets all the security standards they require. >> what's your overall responsibility? >> i am the assistant secretary for diplomatic security. i advise others in the department on the levels we must have have. there is a security and law enforcement organization responsible for visa fraud, violations and the security of

personnel domestically and abroad. >> with regard to security issues, who has the final say? who has the final say in do this because it will secure facilities that are being built. is it obo or you? who breaks the tie if there is a disagreement? >> if there is a disagreement i would say i win. >> you win okay. my understanding is from the i.g. report that there's been a tension between o.b.o. and your entity. where arer we on that? i understand there's been a senior level study group or seen senior level task force in place to address these. what does that mean? how is it working? >> i think we'll divide that question up. the tension you describe is a natural tension. the obo project director on the

ground is trying to execute a project that's been agree ared to with all the parties which has already been confirmed to heat all the current security rierpts. to the degree that in the execution uh of the billion dollar project changes are are recommended throughout. the teams have to work closely together to understand the impact of the kaengs will have on the execution cost and schedule of the long-term project. i would say at the working level there is tension because on the d.s. side they are thinking this is what we need. do et now. on the obo side we are thinking, okay we have it to work if the larger project. the working groups and toes things are really worked out and decided at the higher level. if we see tinges moving forward, urgent security that needs

resolution but there isn't perfect clarity about which we should do and when. that's when i sit down with assistant secretary starr where casey jones sitting with his colleague wayne ashbury and we work these things out. >> the time of -- >> may i ask -- >> your time has expired. >> thank you. assistant secretary starr while i have you here i'm concerned about the state department's proposal to build their own training facility in fort picket in blackstone virginia. i want to know in georgia there are 91 different agencies. why is that not sufficient for the state department security service?

>> we try to do the type of training we want. we want to train. it is not -- >> they have ex pressed willingness to make accommodations. they said they would build the driving courses, mock embassies state department have primary compare over that. there is an acknowledgment it would need to be done. that could be done at half the cost of what you are proposing to spend to have a facility in blacksburg, virginia. isn't that the case? >> thors. >> that's two different

thingsment me and people on the committee concerned about the state department being good stewards of the taxpayer dollars, we see a cost discrepancy. so you can disagree but i think we see it's there. so you were going to continue. >> there is a gao report coming out that will talk to the numbers that we have put down and how they have been carefully verified and the fact that the numbers haven't been as carefully verified. more importantly sir, it is a question that we need something in this area are. we will be moving thousands of people which can take the type of weaponry we are required to use as was seen in our defense of the consulate in harat and other places. it is not the type of training fletsy does. we are more closely aligned to

the military and what we must do in many cases than law enforcement. we believe that fort picket is the better answer. >> why being close to washington. the other agencies presumably would like to have people close. why can't people train in georgia if you had what you needed. seems to me that wouldn't be a big deal to put people on a course and come back. they are not commuting from the department. they would do training and get back. >> the training is for officers, diplomatic security agents. most importantly it allows us to train with partners such as the

u.s. marine corps battalion and do what we need to do together. they will have a difficult time getting down to georgia to do the training exercises. fletsy doesn't currently on their space they have not acknowledged this. they cannot handle the weapons we use. they are looking at getting another military facility 30 or 60 miles ss fletsee georgia in order to use weapons. >> that would not be worth doing it. >> i would suggest looking at the gao study. >> i will look at that. >> we don't believe -- >> right thousand what's your cost that the state department has provided about how much the cost fluctuated a great deal. so what will be the cost of the taxpayer for fort picket? >> $413 million.

>> okay. so that's gone from $460 $907, $960. now we are back down. how long has that been the estimate? >> independentest pats conducted by gsa are building contractor have brought it if at $the 413 million. >> we will be conducting oversight over this. there's been examples. several billion dollars of state department not accounted for during secretary clinton's tenure. we want to make sure we are getting bang for the buck for the taxpayer. i yield back. >> now we recognize the gentlewoman from the server gin islands for five minutes. >> thank you. good morning, everyone. uh i had a question about the surge and the pill tear civilian personnel. and the need it created for immediate office space in the

time we were having the surge. i know this presented a challenge for the state department requiring the necessary amount of space to be built quickly, safely. not doing the over runs and the mess take made in iraq where we had a huge compound that was built and we immediately down sized the number of personnel that was there. in ta instance we would be having a hearing about cost over runs. in this instance we are having a hearing about something else. potentially. so ms. munoz do you agree the state department needed to be careful not to over build when planning for the kabul embassy? >> i would agree but i would argue we have been careful not to over build. in the end we will not have over billed. we will have built the to the number of desks and beds, the requirements that we need.

>> around the world in afghanistan, most u.s. government employees not only work at the embassy compound but they live there. right is this so all the support services that we take for granted on a daily basis here in the united states must be provided on that embassy compound as well in order to support the employees that have to remain in that compound. correct is this. >> that's absolutely right. whether it's dining cleaning facilities. everything that you would do in a small city is done essentially on the same compound. >> okay. to meet the increased requirement in the fastest way possible, hence you have the temporary facilities. correct? >> correct. >> what benefits do the temporary facilities provide? does it better -- my sense is i

would think it would help you plan better for the permanent because you have something in which people are which people are living in and functioning in on a temporary basis so you can accurately plan for the permanent structure. >> i think that's right but i think fundamentally it provides facilities in which all of the staff can live and work until the permanent facilities are done. >> okay. and i'd like to hear from some of the other witnesses, if they think that's correct or not correct. mr. gulino? >> i do believe it's correct. >> mr. starr what are your thoughts on that? >> yes, i think it gives us an idea of whether or not we can support the platform. i would say that we don't get the efficiencies out of the temporary structures that we can get out of our permanently built structures and i think that's

one of the things obo factors in their planning. >> in building the permanent structures to house all of the additional personnel and planning that properly, was using the temporary facilities a mistake? >> i would argue that it wasn't an option not to use those temporary facilities. it's the basic assumption that bias based on national security priorities the u.s. government needed to be in afghanistan at the levels at which the administration has agreed -- >> on the date they agreed to have them. >> exactly. the use of temporary facilities was an inescapable fact. the second priority was continue to build the permanent facilities as quickly as possible. those were the two things that we were doing. >> so the express concern about gao and the ig regarding the use of the temporary facilities you would say what to that?

>> i think we all have concerns about using temporary facilities. but as director muniz has said when faced with the situation that we need to surge people, it was our choice, and i think we all have concerns about the length of time that we use temporary facilities. but this particular project, because we were having to build on the same site essentially as using them, was very complex. >> so the challenge is to build temporary facilities but to move quickly into the permanent ones at the right period of time in the challenged environment in which you are in afghanistan? >> exactly. >> okay. thank you. i yield back the balance of my time. >> we'll now recognize the gentleman from georgia for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. courts, i'll start with you. in planning projects such as this on this scale, are value

engineering studies important? >> yes, they are. that's a very well-established practice that both the federal government and the private sector have used for decades to redo cost while still maintaining the quality and the performance of this project, especially one of this size. >> and so it is required by omp? >> yes, it is. >> let me ask you. value engineering studies are sometimes referred to as cost containment studies because that's what they're intended to do maintain costs and to make sure we don't have cost overruns, correct? >> yes. >> mr. starr it's my understanding that the state department overseas building operations didn't follow cost containment policies in this project. is that correct? mr. starr? >> i think director muniz would have a better answer to that. my understanding is that certain ones were done.

certain ones may not have been. >> i'm the director of bobo. >> i understand that. and congratulations. >> thank you. as i mentioned in my testimony, we conduct those. they're valuable. we did not conduct it in the 2009 project. >> but you agree they are valuable? >> yes, absolutely. >> thank you, thank you. mr. starr, can i get back to you? my colleague from florida earlier talked about the proposed facility being built near ft. pickett, georgia instead of utilizing the facilities that already exist at fletc and glenco georgia. is that correct? >> yes. i do feel duty bound to say we were brought up to discuss afghanistan. >> but what we're brought up to discuss is these cost overruns

and the state department. as all of us know, when you're in a hole, you stop digging. we're in a hole here and we need to stop digging, and we don't let -- we don't need to let happen what has already happened before. we want to learn from our experiences. now you said earlier that the cost of this new facility would be $413 million if it were built in ft. pickett is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> how did it get down to 413 million? >> the department of state started this project looking at a hard skills training site only. at some point the department also asked a question should we -- instead of just using it for hard skills -- combine all security training soft and hard skills? gsa was asked to look at that and gsa told us in order to do both it would cost about $900 million or more.

we went back after that and said that's not supportable. we don't require the colocation of hard and soft skills. concentrate solely on the hard skills security training. that's when the costs were revised and it is now $413 million. >> it's been said that the greatest threat to our national security is our national debt and i believe that to be true. and i'm very concerned about that. you say you're not here to discuss this but you're here to discuss kabul. well we're here to discuss cost overruns and the waste of taxpayers' money. there's no better example of this. you have a facility in fletc that trains over 91 agencies, yet you're saying you have to have one of your own. you can't utilize that. i have trouble understanding

that when fletc says they can do it at half the size. >> a, we don't believe they can do it at half the cost. the secret service has its own higher skill training facility than fletc offers. the air marshals have higher skills training centers. the u.s. marshals have higher skilled training centers than what's offered at fletc. >> you believe that you can spend $416 million and built another facility, a stand-alone facility, yet we already have one that's available. is there a report by omb about this? >> omb has looked at this. >> can you provide me a report with them? >> the gao report is coming out very soon. >> will there be a report with omb? >> i'm not omb. i can't answer that. >> would you work with me to

request that from omb? >> we have made a decision it is in the best interest of all of us to move ahead with ft. pickett. a request for omb would have to come from -- >> mr. starr, i'm not going to accept that. i'm going to continue to fight this because i think you're wasting taxpayers' money. i think you have a perfectly fine facility that be utilized without wasting taxpayers' money like the state department has done time and time again. >> i do not ever want to waste taxpayer money, sir. we have to build 90% of the facilities that we would have to build -- would have to be built in georgia as well as fort pickett pickett. georgia does not have the facilities that we need. >> they have shown they can do that at a lower cost.

>> no, sir they have not. i think the outcoming gao report will show that. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield the remay understandinder of my time. >> thank you, mr. chair and to the committee that's speaking here today. ambassador hays, according to the 2014 report egis billed the government without required documentation and with inadequate invoices. what steps has the state department taken to make sure the logistic steps are taken before the issue-- >> i can't speak to the findings of that team, but i certainly

can get back to you through our legislative assistant and give you the information that you require. >> so you have read the audit? >> i have not read that audit, no. >> are there any other -- who reads the audit once it's issued? >> the senior staff of the oig. individual teams don't read each other's audits unless they're conducting an inspection of that specific area. >> ambassador, let me go to a statement that you have said. you highlighted in your statement the lack of coordination between the bureaus of diplomatic security and overseas building operations

together a management oversight team between the senior staff of obo and ds. to the best of my knowledge, they have done the latter. director muniz has said what she has done on the first issue. >> if i could add on the master planning, i'd like to clarify a point that was brought up earlier by the oig about the recommendation for a master plan and the fact that that recommendation remained open.

we have a master plan for kabul. the recommendation is still open because we are waiting for funding approval from congress. we notified the oig of that fact in april of this year, so the plan is complete but the execution of the plan will not be approved until we receive that approval from congress. i just wanted to clarify on that issue. >> i thank you for that. i want to go back to you, director muniz. i really want a sense of assurance. there has been, and you must admit, some concern about the operations in the past. moving forward, are you positioned and empowered to ensure that these concerns about lack of documentation master planning -- because that's a

concern. what i'm very passionate about right now is in your role -- and you've identified a couple of times that you are the director and you have this responsibility. where do you see us correcting these things of the past? and you can't just keep doing the same things in expect a different result, so i really want you on the record saying as the director, how are you going to correct these concerns that we have? >> thank you for the question. i think that we have very strong master planning programs, and i've argued that we have planned, designed and built on those master plans in kabul. my argument in kabul is simply that in these environments that are ever changing, we have to have a different approach, and we do have a different approach. we can't develop a master plan at the beginning of the project that was awarded in 2009 and expect that that master plan remains static. what we are building in kabul on

the embassy compound is what we need, and we have evolving requirements that reflect later phases of a master plan so i think we have in place the planning mechanisms and the budgeting mechanisms to let congress know the direction that we're going in in such a kinetic environment, which is so unusual. >> earlier, the director had agreed to give us the original plan and then the most updated plan. what's a reasonable time that you'd provide those to us? >> let us get back to you after this. those plans exist, so in theory we could get it to our folks in the department to get those to the committee, but i know there's a long queue of documents making their way to you, but we'll try to get those to you as quickly as possible. >> that would be great.

i'm trying to look for a specific date. at what point do we say, hey you're not fulfilling what you said you were going to do? we've had these challenges in the past. i'm just trying to get you to agree to some sort of date. you pick it but i want it to be somewhat reasonable and timely. >> why don't we get those documents to you within the month? >> by the end of july, is that fair? >> within a month. it's the 9th of july. it would mean the 9th of august. >> okay. by the 9th of august and we'll invite you as well. >> thank you. >> thank you. i will now recognize the gentleman from oklahoma mr. russell, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. starr, you're a smart man with a lot of security knowledge. as

is a footprint more secure if it is smaller or larger? >> a footprint, sir? >> uh-huh. >> a larger one is going to require a lot more resources to secure not necessarily more secure or less secure. our consultate we have protected. >> the embassy in kabul, it was a secure building. it had to be breached by the roof. when we went in there in the early days i recall seeing george bush's picture on the wall with mr. shultz the secretary of defense, calendars on the wall. i guess this notion that we have to have 5500 people on a

compound is just a mystery to me. how do you justify that? >> sir, allow me to turn to my counterpart. i'm the one that's given the task to secure them. >> we appreciate ms. muniz and she has been gracious to allow us to beat up on her in previous testimony, but she has also stated clearly here in this hearing that in a dispute, which the gao and the ig have laid out, on security matters you went. it's a deferment. so now what i see is this no desire to streamline infrastructure. we see a support of the support and then the more support comes in, it has to be supported and then it has to be secured and the logistics of that and now we

have 5500 people and we're guarding them with gerkas. a lot of respect for them. we have created a situation where this thing is massive. you, by your own admission in talking about herrat, how can we justify this enormous footprint? >> sir, i think the point is that we obviously have a different set of requirements for professional staff in kabul than we did in harrat. we had ten or a dozen. in kabul we of course have a much larger direct population of people who are doing the work of diplomacy and development. you're going to have the

security cooperation office come under the embassy umbrella. you have other agencies that are going to stop being self-supporting in a current stage. in the current situation in kabul, if you have 700 people doing professional work, you're going to have thousands more that are providing the life support services of a small security, who are providing movement security. >> in the early days all the way up to 2009 we had an embassy there that was secured by a marine security company. by the way, they do that. that's part of their mission the marines. they secure embassies. i mean this is no revelation to anyone on this panel and yet we're talking about this in insatiable need for size and girth. i guess my question -- you stated in your own testimony, mr. blanc, that the department

of state needs to be expeditious expeditious. >> i think there are a few things. first of all, there are a number of security challenges in afghanistan that are obviously not normal -- >> i'm aware of them. i lived in a safe house in kabul. i'm very familiar with the security structure and the dangers in afghanistan. >> the security situation has evolved over time. when i first lived in afghanistan in 2002 the situation was very different. now the security requirements for movement, we talked about the road theo the airport, the situation is very different, and so inherently the support requirements have also changed. i would though challenge, sir, the idea that we have an insatiable need for girth. the surge is now drawing back.

it's going to be growth from other agencies coming in under the state department umbrella so i believe that the support services that we have, both life support and the security support, are necessary. i don't think that they can be replaced in kabul at this time. >> but they're self-perpetuating. they're self-perpetuating. the larger you increase the footprint, the more need to increase the footprint. at some point -- it's easy to see how it's happened. there's not been this strategic master plan. then we hear from ms. muniz you said we can't develop such a plan. my reply to that is nonsense. develop the plan and then adjust it. we do that all the time at state, in the military in congress. i know that's shocking to some people that we actually planned. >> i argued that is precisely what we did. i did not say that was not

necessary or possible. >> you had mentioned that the regular plans, that the standard plans, were not applicable. you said that the international construction and safety standards needed to be taken into account. how can those possibly be any better or different -- or we've not seen these international construction and safety standards. how would that deviate from standard embassy designs and then you enhance it later? >> i'm not sure which document you're referring -- >> i'm not. i'm picking from your testimony today and i quote international construction and safety standards. i'm as baffled as it by you are. what would those be? >> i actually chair the overseas security policy board with the heads of the other agencies that work overseas. i would say that in our normal

buildings that we build around the world, and we incorporate those standards in every building that obo builds, we're in a situation where we've been asked to stay in what is essentially a war zone. and that presents challenges even on top of the regular overseas security policy board standards. these are some of the things we've had toed adjust to as the-- >> i'm sorry. >> thank you to all the panelists. i just want to talk really about the security concerns that we have in high-threat kabul. the embassy has consistently remained one of the most

high-threat environments for our overseas personnel. and in february in 2014 a vehicle borne explosive device devesicleddevice device killed two department of defense employees. so i'd just like to ask mr. gulino your employees are on the front lines every day in this area. can you give us an overview of the security services your personnel provide to the embassy in this high-threat area, and can you explain how egis personnel maintain a secure environment with changing and very challenging to say the least, political dynamics? >> yes, i'd be pleased to. let me first say the security strategies, the strategic plan

for security, is developed by our customer the department of state. we hire the very best people and we deploy them according to the plan, which is ever-evolveing, every changing based upon the conditions in kabul at any given time. the services we provide are primarily in six areas. we provide static security, which is like going through a gate when you come into the building here. we provide mobile security which is assisting in movement of people. we provide convoy protection. we have aeds that are handled by trainers. we provide elu, which is basically elite protection for people like yourself that come in. we have teams that provide protection to them. and then lastly and importantly

we have emergency response teams, and those teams are positioned at strategic locations. and they're typical in a vehicle, and they have a combination of emts as well as guards, security personnel. importantly, we train our people so that there's someone on that team who is responsible for command and control and makes the decisions as to what the appropriate response should be based upon a call or a situation that comes in, so those are the six areas that we provide services. i want to just say that we do have a mixture of the three groups that i mentioned. they are quite good soldiers. i would like to be able to say duty of care to our employees is of utmost importance.

yes, we did have some posters up initially, but we take care of them. when that earthquake hit the first thing we did was pull all of our employees. we give them phones. we give them contact back to nepal. for the ones that were in training in jordan, we gave them phone cards so they could call. we determined that there were a few people that needed to go out immediately. fortunately, there were no lives of family members lost nor of employees on leave. we raised over $30,000 to give to those in employees to repair their homes. >> good. i'd like to ask ambassador hays and mr. courts, given what you have learned in your investigations in your oversights, i'd like to hear what security recommendations would you put forward? what ideas do you have that we could improve our security in

this area? ambassador? >> the dynamic in a war zone is extremely difficult. the changing numbers of people going in and out the policy dynamic effecting the personnel in country all of these play into the need for solid planning or worst-case scenario planning for very close collaboration between the policy and the implementers of both construction and security. we believe that it is important to have long range dynamic planning. that means that not only do you have a plan out there, but you also are working with others that are involved in this constantly to make sure that that plan meets all the requirements on the ground and that you put security first. >> my time has expired.

thank you. thank you for your service. >> thank you. i will now recognize the gentleman from north carolina for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. madame director i'm going to start with you to say thank you. the last time you were here i think mr. russell talked about the fact that it could be contentious, would be maybe an adjective or verb to describe what went on that particular day, but i also want to acknowledge the fact that after that hearing you made a personal attempt to come and not only brief me and my personal staff but to follow up in a time when all the headlines are about a lack of cooperation, so i just want to say thank you. >> thank you. >> so mr. courts let me come to you because mr. starr is

characterizing your new gao report as going to be giving him an a-plus is kind of the direction -- from his testimony a few moments ag. would you characterize the new report that you're going to be putting out as something that we want to publish, i guess? let's put it that way. >> congressman we have not released that report yet to our original requesters, and i can't discuss it until that report is actually released. >> mr. starr knows what's going to be in that report? >> he has seen what's in a draft report, yes. >> would you characterize his testimony as it being a-plus and as being accurate? >> congressman i can't comment on that as a result the report has been released yet. >> all right. when will that be released? >> we're still working that out with our client. >> mr. starr let me come to

you. you've seen the report or you've at least seen your draft. is your characterization of it giving you a glowing report? is that accurate? >> i think the report is fair and balanced report, sir. i don't think it's an a-plus for anybody. i think that it's best that we wait until the report come out and judge where we're going on the merits of the report. >> so your reference to it was only referencing a short portion of that as it relates to your ability to provide a secure location. was that your testimony? i guess here's what i'm buying we have all kinds of testimony going back and forth, mr. starr. as mr. russell was talking about, we've got this big footprint. we're bringing people in in helicopters into the facility currently. is that correct?

because it is too dangerous, other modes of transportation? >> yes. >> if it is indeed that dangerous and the core mission of the state department is to diplomacy, how do you reconcile the two? i mean because if it is so dangerous that we can't get out and do our diplomacy are we not just building a military structure in afghanistan? >> congressman, that's a very fair question. jared, i think has some comments on this as well, but i will say one thing. the responsibility to protect our people at our embassy -- >> i don't deny that. the director knows i'm with her on that particular -- >> that's one portion of the mission. >> but that's not the core mission, though, mr. starr. >> exactly. the core mission is to conduct

diplomacy. beyond securing the embassy, we have to have programs that get people out. we have to get them to these meetings. >> do you understand how the american people have a real hard time with this? we're spending a billion dollars to build a facility that we have to helicopter people in and out of and they're saying why are we doing that. why would we do that, mr. starr? >> i would argue that we are conducting diplomacy. >> that is exactly the point. we are conducting diplomacy. there are some routes that get more and less dangerous and our colleagues take very good care to make sure we have the best of security in those instances, but i can assure you that our people get out. >> give me the top three diplomatic success stories you can share then. what would be the headlines in

"the washington post" tomorrow? >> first and foremost i would say it's the successful transition from president karzai to the new president. >> that was not diplomatic in its nature. >> yes, sir, it was. >> so that had everything to do with the embassy? >> the united states embassy was deeply endangeredjnger -- engaged in that success. >> all right. what are the other two? >> again i don't think either of those countries would deny that the united states and our embassies in both of those countries have played critical facilitying role inging inging -- facilitating roles. we have made a substantial long-term success in terms of some of those things i mentioned in my initial testimony of helping create a sustainable

afghan government, which is able to provide core services for its people, which is standing up its military, which is obviously a department of defense role but also an embassy role, which is providing educational services, which is providing health services. >> we'll follow up. my time has expired, but i would welcome your follow up. >> i recognize the gentleman from virginia. >> thank you, mr. chairman. welcome to our panel. mr. blanc, i'm going to ask you to pull the mic closer so we can hear you. obviously it's a balanceingeing act, security and diplomacy. on the other hand sometimes security can circumscribe our ability to carry out our mission

in a country because security can become so tight. would that be a fair characterization from your point of view? >> sir, i think that's absolutely a fair characterization and we're constantly looking for that right balance. >> that's going to vary from country to country. is it not? >> yes. our challenge in kabul, afghanistan, is different from month to month. >> speaking of which, when mr. lynch and i traveled together to kabul several years ago, we stayed on the compound but i think there were like little wooden buildings that we stayed in, but they certainly weren't reenforced. we were on the embassy compound. at least at that time we weren't overly concerned about our

personal security. there had been some lobbing of grenades or rocket shells into the compound as i recall, but not while we were there. either that or maybe the embassy wasn't overly concerned about congress. has the situation deteriorated so much that that's what we're concerned about now? >> the situation in kabul has substantial changed over time. starting in 2002, where it was relatively permissive to a number of years it is a different stage right now. the government of afghanistan at the end of last year took full responsibility for the security of their country. they are exercising that responsibility quite well. they are standing in the face of

a vicious onslaught, but there is still a real, you know, result in terms of everybody's personal security americans, afghans, as that transition settles in. yes, sir, the situation has changed. >> actually the verb i used deteriorated? >> deteriorated, yes, sir. >> you would agree with that? okay. >> taliban networks have shown themselves to be dedicated to trying to attack western and afghan institutions in kabul starting a couple of years ago and it has reached quite a crescendo. the numbers of attacks and the different types of attacks have been very difficult to handle. in some cases they have been very successful. in many cases they have been

unsuccessful either through efforts of the kabul government kabul security forces. sometimes it is western security forces like ours that have protected the people and made sure their people were safe, but it is undeniable that the number of attacks has grown tremendously in kabul. >> thank you. i think that's something that these two underscored in terms of the environment we're facing in kabul. ms. muniz, mr. courts in his testimony today recounts the comments of a state department official explaining the challenge bewe faced with the surge in afghanistan. state was not going to act on any recommendation that would delay getting the contracts awarded and the facilities built. is that a fair statement from your point of view?

would you elaborate? >> i think that's a fair statement. i would qualify only that we wouldn't do -- i think you used the word or the quote used the word "any." >> that's right. >> there are some recommendations that we might have considered worthwhile to delay the award of a project. i would put security among the highest requirements but the goal has been to press forward with the construction of the facility. >> my time is running out too. the security situation has deteriorated in kabul not just for us, but for everybody. that's tragic and needs its own examination. in your view, ms. muniz the decisions we made and executed is the compound more secure today than it was, say, when i was there back in '09, '010?

>> i believe it is significantly more secure. the ability to move 900 people into safe office buildings is a huge milestone. in november nearly 300 into another residential facility, so i would say yes. >> thank you. my time is up, mr. chairman. >> thank you. now i recognize the gentleman from tennessee. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would like to place a few comments on the record. first of all, i want to say that i strongly agree with mr. micah in talking about how ridiculous the waste of all this is the excessiveness of all this is and he mentioned the taj mahal and the fiscal times reported this year the state department allocated 1.11 billion to cover the 2009/2010 construction costs. the embassy will have 1487

desks. this is in a country, that according to another publication, says we're reducing our afghan presence from 32,000 troops to 9800 by year's end with half that number remaining in 2015, only a small force to protect the kabul embassy. i mean, we're practically all leaving, but we're spending almost 2.2 billion. this is in a country that has a total gdp of just slightly over 20 billion. 20.3 billion. 30 million population. the people over there have to get by on an average of less than $2 a day. they must just be astounded.

they must be laughing at us on how much money we've been spending over there. you know, i've seen for years the easiest thing in the world to do is to spend other people's money. i remember edward rindell who later became governor of pennsylvania and later became the national democratic chairman, when he was mayor of philadelphia, in testimony before the house ways and means committee many years ago, he said government does not work because it was not designed to. there's no incentive to save money so much of it is is squandered. there's no incentive for people to work hard so many do not. that was his quote and certainly this seems to me that mega hundreds of millions have been squandered and are still be squandered over there. last month david keen, who spent 27 years as head of the american conservative union and is now

the opinion editor of the "washington times," he wrote this at our failed attempts at nation building. he said, as a result of our wars and our attempts of nation building in the middle east, there is a generation of young americans who have never known peace, a decade in which thousands of our best have died or maimed with little to show for their sacrifices. our enemies have multiplied and our national debt has skyrocketed. and i think that all of the people who have any responsibility or role at all in going along with the construction of this massive project in afghanistan should be ashamed. i think it's very sad what we've

heard here today. and i just wanted to place those comments on the record. thank you, mr. chairman. >> we'll know recognize the gentleman from illinois. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'd like to ask about the inspector general's report from october. mr. chairman i'd like to request that the report actually be entered into the record. >> without objections, so ordered. >> thank you. thank you for being here today. in this report from october the inspector general raised a number of problems and i'd like to get your responses to some of these. the state department's contract requires egis to maintain documents of training and security clearance. 49 required personnel training or investigation documents. can you explain why the

documentation was missing? >> early on when we took that contract over, there were -- took an existing work force over and it took a little bit of time to get all the documentation and the records right. the entire program up to wps standards, which ewe did. we worked in concert with the state department. all of our records are up to date. the state department comes in and addudits our records. the same exact record that exists in kabul exists in our washington office. they found one discrepancy in a document. it was added in after that. so the documentation that's complete now. there's nobody that goes out to afghanistan that doesn't have a clearance and doesn't have the

appropriate training whether they're u.s. or tsn, third-country nationals from nepal. >> their report actually says seven citizen employees working in various positions in kabul had no documented security clearance investigations. >> yes, it's either when we assume the work force from another contract, that documentation didn't exist or we got it up to standards. we have no further problems in documentation or clearances. >> they questioned about 8 million -- let me just quote the

amount. about 4% of the contract. they said those invoices 57 invoices, are possibly -- of those invoices 8% or 57 were possibly unallowable or not supported in accordance with contract requirements. do you know what those invoices were for? >> they were either for labor or for reimburseable items. we have provided -- we work with state department. we provided all the documentation required to have the appropriate back up for those invoices and we've worked with them since that audit was out. independent of the ig audit, egis conducted its own audit of the first year of the contract on its own with its own people and presented all of the discrepancies and clarified all the discrepancies.

we looked at over 71,000 line items and compared a document to an accounting program. we are now proceeding on auditing the contract on our own without any requests from the government or the aig. >> do you know how much was allowed or disallowed? >> i'm not aware of any disallowances at this point. we presented all the documentation to the state department, and they have not come back to us with any disallowances to the best of my knowledge. if there were, it has to be minor. the audit that we conducted verified that. >> so you're saying the gaps in the billable hours in some of the issues with those invoices were partially as a result of you taking over the contract and you fixed those problems? >> right. that's part of it.

when you take a contract over in -- in any instance where you take an existing work force over, the scope of work changes. in a situation like afghanistan, we went into and state department understandably said we don't want those posts anymore. we don't want those posts. we want these. so move the people around, change the classifications. it took awhile to get that up to speed and properly invoiced. we found that approximately 75% of any discrepancy occurred in the first four months of the contract and we have a good process controlled documentation system now so that does not occur again. >> thank you. ambassador hays, i'd like to

know the ig's view of the status of the outstanding findings particularly with respect to those questions of costs. would you help us schedule a follow-up to make sure those fixes have taken place? >> sure. >> do you have any idea whether or not those problems have been fixed and those processes in place are adequate? >> i conducted inspections of those facilities in february of 2014. i did not participate in the audit or the compliance of that but i can pass on concerns to the ig himself and he will get back to you. >> out of time. >> i now recognize the gentleman from wisconsin. >> thank you. i guess this will be for mr. starr. first of all how many buildings

are in this compound total? about when we're done in kabul? >> so there was an existing chancery built in 1971, which was the starting point. another annex building was built and completed in 2005 with three residential facilities. the 2009 and 2010 projects will provide for another unclassified annex and another classified annex and three more residential buildings, in addition security, utility, and support buildings are also included in the scope of the project. >> so at least ten-plus, whatever? okay. how many people are in these -- are going to be based in these facilities when you're all done? >> the program that drove the facilities is 14087 desks and 800 beds. >> so how many --

>> basically the delta is between the u.s. direct higher staff that sleep on the compound and those who work in those buildings but don't necessarily sleep on the compound. >> how many total people are based or work in the compound? >> let me turn that over to jared and to greg. obo builds to the sort of hard facility requirements, but there are many support workers and security who don't have desks in the facilities, but who work around the compound. for a comprehensive number, i would turn to them. >> in broad numbers, there would be 5,000 people on the compound between direct hires and security staff. there's still planning decisions being made about the future security cooperation office and other agencies that will come under the embassy umbrella.

>> just kind of hits me as high that's all. of those 5,000, how many are afghans themselves? >> i don't have locals -- >> guess. >> about 850, 900. >> okay. about 1/5. could we get -- we don't have it right away today but just because it hits me as a high number. what do these people do? >> sir we can provide that. it's the smaller portion that are direct hire u.s. staff that are doing the work of what we think of as diplomacy. the larger portion are the people necessary to support the staff given the very unique circumstances in kabul whether that's the security staff or the life support staff especially as the military mission draws down and we lose some of the services that the department of defense has provided and need to provide

for ourselves. services, to be blunt the embassy can't provide on the economy to provide, it has to provide for itself. >> of the 5,000 how many are military personnel? >> right now of the 5,000 the number is pretty small. that number is likely to increase over the out years because as the military mission changes, there will be a security cooperation office that will eventually be part of the embassy that will oversee the assistance we provide the afghan national security forces. those decisions are being made right now. >> just a guess. you told me there 5,000 total. 100, 200, 300? just guess wildly. >> maybe 100. >> we have almost 5,000 civilian personnel that we anticipate having in afghanistan? is that the deal? >> you're combining what's the case right now and what will be

the case over time. over time, that percentage will be a larger number because of the cooperation of the security office. >> okay. okay. then we have a question for, i guess -- i'm running out of time. well, was a risk assessment done at the kabul site and if it wasn't, why not? that's the final question. >> risk assessments are always done before the award of a large-scale project, so our team goes out and understands with the contractor what are the risks that we might encounter. a formal risk assessment, the way we lay it out as a separate assessment, was not done

>> 50? >> five zero. >> to clarify, page 16 of the report says between the 2009 contract and the 2010 contract states should have conducted four cost containment studies and six risk assessments. however for the 2009 contract, state confirmed it did not conduct either type of assessment. because of the value of the 2009 contract, two separate cost

containment studies would have been required. also no risk assessments were performed and no risk mitigation plan was developed, so your answer is a little shy of the reality, at least according to the gao correct? >> i would argue that the policy that the gao is referring to and that narrow interpretation of a separate risk assessment being conducted during or before award of a project, that is true. but risk assessment, when you look at it on its face is going to the post understanding what the risks are, how are you going to get materials in, are there changing situations on the ground that are going to impact your project those are all things that are analyzed and are known and are included in the cost development for these projects. and that was done with the 2009 project. understand that the budget for the 2009 project was developed

in advance of knowing there was going to be an increase in staff. any number of-- >> mr. courts, is that what happened? >> well i would again just point that the risk assessment and cost containment study that they did in 2010 did point out some of the risks that eventually materialized and by the way one of those was difficulties with the land transport of materials, so some of these risks were known in advance. state predicted them in the 2010 study. if they had done the 2009 study perhaps they would have had more time to develop some mitigation strategies. >> and perhaps we would have delayed award of a contract that is getting people into safe facilities as quickly as possible. >> they weren't safe. now they're way overbudget. we're missing over hundreds of millions of dollars. the overall project is coming in three years late.

it was supposed to be done last year and now it's not supposed to be done until 2017. what's the case to be made that you've made bypassing all the bureaucracy. you've put people in a better situation, because you have two independent people who've come in and looked at that and i think disagree with that analysis, and as regards to the security on page 17 of the report, ds officials were not sufficiently involved in the cost containment study, and it goes on for a full paragraph. that's the frustration. just reading this, this is why we're having a hearing you would get the impression that they're not even talking to the diplomatic security. we addressed that a little bit earlier, but that should be part of before you do 2009. it should have been part of 2010. but it evidently wasn't done according to the report. am i wrong? >> i believe you are.

>> well, this is why we have this hearing. ds cited, this is from the report, ds is cited in the policy as an interested office according to the aten delist, no one from diplomatic security participated in the meetings related to the study. you have a pretty hard case to make that you were taking security at the top of your list and putting it in there when they weren't even invited into the meeting. >> they were invited to the meeting. >> so they were no-shows? mr. starr, your staff just said we're not showing up not worth our time? >> congressman i think our people decide at that one particular meeting that there weren't equities that we were necessary to be there. i want to emphasize something. le and i know that there are individual points that can be brought out and looked at by ig and gao.

and by many cases they bring very important things to our attention, and we correct those things, but i don't want to leave you with the impression that ds and obo don't work together very closely to ensure that the physical security the standards in our buildings are always --? she just said that your people don't show up at her meetings. >> at one particular meeting on -- >> that's not what this says. that's not hawhat this says. i didn't just make this up and say hey, let's pick on state. i'm reading a gao report which pretty much concurs with what the inspector general found. it's 27% over budget, you missed it by hundreds of millions of dplars there's no master plan, and it's the biggest expenditure we have in an embassy compound complex that we've ever had in the history of the united states of america. so you have a really hard case to tell me that we're doing things better and everything's good, just move on nothing to worry about here. that's a $2 billion expenditure,

and it's not yet finished! >> mr. chairman i would disagree with your characterization. >> tell me what you disagree with. >> that we are not providing safe and secure facilities. it is true that they are behind the original schedule but we are building safe and secure facilities. during the entire time that we were there in our temporary facilities, we have never lost a person on our compound. even with the temporary facilities. and we're building better ones today. can our coordination be improved? yes, the ig and the gao pointed out that there were problems and lydia and i have worked to ensure that those problems don't continue. there is always room for improvement, and i quite frankly, would wish that we could have brought these projects in faster because moving the people out of temporary facilities faster

gives them even better protection. we've been responsible for providing them protection during this entire time and i think we've done a very good job. but none of us minimized the problems that have occurred in this environment as we tried to struggle to bring these buildings in but i will tell you that you know, while we appreciate gao and ig and they do bring a lot of good things to our attention, not everything can be characterized as off base here. we are delivering, although you're correct, it is behind schedule and it is over budget. >> now recognize the gentleman from oklahoma yeah mr. russell. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and mr. muniz, i wanted to make a correction. it was mr. hays and his testimony that spoke about the international construction and safety standards, and this was causing some unnecessary delays

between obo and state. and so i would like to ask you mr. hays. you spoke to these international construction and safety standards causing these delays. what were those? >> well the international standards standards standards of construction which obo works to are the same that you would apply to embassy berlin or a building in downtown d.c. they require a building to be built in the way that is safe sound for a longer period of time. the dod regulations authorize more flexibility, especially in war zones, and we raised the issue that obo and ds should look into the department to find more flexibility to move quicker

in war zone situations. more expeditiously. dod has that authority. they have a work around for a number of international standards for specific areas like iraq and afghanistan. >> thank you. mr. blanc you spoke about a closed border and i can understand what that does in afghanistan or anywhere, what, though, if we should have something like this that happens again, with such a large footprint now. can you foresee a time where we would need to reduce a footprint and be streamlined to be more effective, because now we have these 5500 personnel, and if this happens again, which it's

not unlikely and certainly those routes get interdibted. what do we do about that? >> well, sir, i think if i could say two things. first of all, even during the interdiction of those routes they were able to use a whole variety of logistics. in the unfortunate event this happens again, we would again initially fall back on creative logistics. i think your question in principle, are there conditions under which we would look to draw down the diplomatic mission in kabul, the answer is of course. we are always looking at a whole variety of questions. the immediate security situation, how effective is the team being, what specific needs do we need to fill either in the professional diplomatic service or what might we no longer need to contract, what might we be able to do on the economy in afghanistan. those are all questions that we address on a -- >> i don't, i certainly, i

certainly don't underestimate the complexities of the problems. i guess my concern is we're seeing a pattern. we're seeing a pattern where we've become so cumbersome with it. it becomes cumbersome to get things there. it becomes cumbersome to secure things, it becomes extraordinarily expensive and wastes resources, and i would just think that a nation of 31 million souls with the types of problems that we have that we can be efficient, but i'm not hearing that. instead, what i'm hearing is in particular from mr. starr which, look, everyone at this table, i have no doubt is dedicated to this nation. i mean, look at your resumes. they're not only impressive but long-serving, and i have the highest respect for all of you and you've done it from administration to administration and for that i sincerely thank you. but i guess the pattern that we

are seeing now is just an increasing infrastructure where it just grows and grows and grows, and it requires more security and more security and more security. and the last question that i have is for mr. galeno. i have no doubt they can conquer anything they encounter language barriers. in a no-kidding combat situation, you have an american compound and now you have ger gerkas, how are you mitigating that? >> we have a gerka workforce. you're quite right. they're selected from a wide pool. >> i get that. but how are you mitigating the language barriers in a combat

environment? >> and they're vetted for language in nepal first and then when they go through training in jordan, amman jordan, we don't just train them and test their skills with weapons, we test their language understanding and their ability to speak english. >> so all of these gerkas are english speaking? >> yes, sir. >> so why do we need -- >> why do we need what? >> why do we need nepalese then? if they're all proficient in the language, why was this an issue? >> let me just say this. it's a requirement and not every nepalese gerka on our post can read the washington post from first page to the back page. i think that as a matter of policy and procedure and human

rights we should have the posting of passports in nepal. i don't question for a minute we should have it from day one. we will now going forward. anything we communicate to the nepalese we do it both in english as well as the nepalese including their contracts, their employment contracts >> thank the chairman for additional time, and i yield back. >> thank you. now recognize mr. cummings for five minutes. >> thank you very much mr. chairman. i'd like to discuss the examination of two construction contracts at the kabul embassy. the first one was in 2009 and the second was awarded in 2010 to a different contractor, that's correct? >> that's correct. >> can you briefly describe the two things that were contracted and their estimated completion dates? >> i believe the 2009 contract

was to construct a number of temporary offices and housing. it was also to construct an office complex that my state colleagues have referred to as well as some additional warehouses, some compound assets facilities. permanent security features and other things. in the end, that contractor ended up building mostly just the temporary offices and housing. and the rest of those requirements were transferred to the 2010 contractor. >> now what about the leasing what were the projected completion dates on the projects? >> i don't have the projected completion date for the 2009 project at my fingertips. >> and mr. muniz the state department partially terminated the 2009 contract, and i quote in part, due to concerns about contract are performance and schedule delays end of quote

can you please explain exactly the concerns were what they were and why was the contractor's why were they terminated? what was the performance issue and schedule delays? >> so the contract included both temporary facilities and permanent facilities, and we knew there was a follow-on contract that would be building on that base and adding permanent facilities. we had concerns that the first contractor was not meet being key milestones and would not be able to meet their original schedule, which was the end of 2012 in a way that didn't interfere with the execution of the fy 10 contract. so the government terminated that contract for convenience. >> and have you experienced challenges terminating this contract or other contracts due contractor delays? >> we do.

it's a challenging circumstance. so we want to require contractors to perform. and we want to encourage them to have a track record of serious performance. it's actually under the excellence initiative one of the thins that we've pushed is going to best value awards as opposed to lowest cost, because we can hold contractors accountable based on past performance. it's complicated, and we always weigh a termination and the length of restarting with trying to push through with current contractors. in the instance of the 2009 contract without going too much into it, we just had concerns that in the much longer term it was going to become a challenge for our '10 contract and it would be most effective to terminate it with just the temporary facilities built and transfer the permanent facilities to the 2010 contract. >> now mr. courts according to the gao's report, the rest of the contract was shifted to the

second contractor who was working when the 2010 contract at that point, is that correct? >> yes, that's correct. it also reveals that the estimated completion date of the expanded 2010 contract has been pushed out more than three years until 2017. >> that's correct. >> mr. courts, would it be accurate to say that part of this additional three years is due do the termination uh ofone of the contractors and subsequent transfer of one of the contractor elements to the other? >> i don't think there's any question that that did add time. >> were all of these modifications new? or did some have to do with the prior 2009 contract? >> i believe there was a mix of both. >> are you familiar with this? would you know that incident? >> which modification? >> this was the, this, i guess

this would be the 2009 contract. le then they had some modifications. would that have been the contract, mr. courts 2009 the modifications, that's right? >> both the 2009 and the 2010 contract had modifications. >> that's accurate. both had significant modifications. modifications. >> and how did those modifications come about? what happened? >> those were due to the increase in desk requirements. and, again, this is driven by national security priorities and the increase in staff. >> well, i'm going to unfortunately have to get to it in another meeting, but i think there are a lot of concerns here, and i go back to something that mr. duncan said and maybe you all can answer this for me, because i think he said something that seems to be so accurate. he questioned what is the incentive for saving money? do we have any, mr. courts?

in other words, it seems like we spend and spend and spend. the chairman has been very clear that we haven't, we probably could do better. so what is the incentive? and i got to ask you this mr. galeno, take one out of the we were just talking about this. what do you pay these nationals, by the way? >> salaries for the -- >> yeah, the nationals, the ones that you hold the passports up for, those, those folks. >> they're paid in the $40,000 to $50,000 range a year. >> $40,000 to $50,000? >> yes, sir. >> that's quite a bit of money for somebody over there isn't it? >> i think it's competitive with the, with the requirement -- >> no, i mean i'm glad to hear that, and i'd like for you to give us some verification. i'd like to see the

documentation. you have contracts with these people? >> yes i'll send documentation, i'll get back with you on that to confirm the rates. >> and do they have benefits? >> they have insurance benefits yes, they get a bonus payment at the end of their one-year contract. they get a bonus payment. >> and are they doing the same types of jobs as other folks who are not nationals? >> yes, sir. and you're telling me that the rates would be the same comparable for people who are doing the same work whether they are nationals or not? is that what you're telling me? >> the rates are different for ex-patriots. for u.s., performing certain types of work or slightly higher, because it's a market-driven thing. we can't hire u.s. person -- >> i understand that. but i'm trying to make sure. i'm just trying to figure out what you are paying. and i guess, if you're using our dollars, which you are. >> right.

>> i'm trying to maybe sure you -- i want to know what you're paying, and i want to know, i want detailed information about that. >> sure. be happy to have our staff provide that to you. but the premise is this. if you don't need to hire all u.s. personnel, and you can usefully-qualified third-country nationals to that operate in the same kinds of jobs with weapons, that drives the cost down. >> i'm trying to make sure we don't have a situation where we've got people making peanuts who don't, yeah. >> no, sir, we don't. >> let me finish. and then we've got contractors, stockholders and others who are making millions. and i just want to make sure we i read all, i read your statement and you talked about reputation integrity,

compliance and all this kind of thing, and that's good. but i want to see some records as to what you're paying these people, all right? >> yes, sir. we'll provide it. >> thank you very much. >> i got to wrap up with a few different questions, and then we will conclude this hearing. appreciate your patience. been here a long time. mr. hays, part of what mr. cummings and i have discussed and we will formalize is we're going to request of you that we look at the contracts, really suggesting we do each and every market, but find a way to look at how these security contracts work for the security, it plays such a vital role and we have had some feedback in some countries that these people are not being paid very well. i'm not suggesting that is at all the case with aegis i'm not suggesting that at all. i'm just saying we would like to look at it and feel more comfortable with it and we'll

formalize something with you. there are two recommendations where there seems to be a bit of conflict, and you'd like to clarify that. and if there's still conflict there's still conflict. but recommendation two on page 50 says gao recommends the secretary of state consider establishing minimum security standards or other guidance for the construction of temporary skruk tours egg personally those used in conflict environments. second says ds does not support separate standards for temporary structures. why not? >> it's still a disagreement, sir. we still maintain that our goal is to try to meet the permanent standards, the highest level standards as best we can. and if we can't then we have to look at what risk that entails. we may have to give exceptions or waivers but it is our goal to try in those situations to meet the highest level security

standard we can. >> and mr. courts, why did you make that recommendation? ? >> well, let's just point to the osb standards that mr. starr pointed to as the goal that they're trying to achieve. in reality, the only buildings that can actually meet those standards are permanent structures. they do have the waivers process that mr. starr referred to. that's supposed to be a process where mitigation strategies are proposed and considered as a condition for granting the waiver and then a very conscious and explicit acceptance of the risk considering all of those factors. in actual practice we found that the state doesn't always follow that policy we found a number of instances in kabul with temporary facilities that did not have those required waivers, so that process that was just described wasn't followed there. so we think something's not working in establishing some sort of standards, state is

really uncomfortable with the word standards or other guidance, and they propose perhaps some template or lessons learned document that takes the lessons learned from the experience that we've already had in kabul and perhaps provide some information to those providing temporary facilities in the future, and if they follow through we could meet the intent of our recommendation. >> i think part of the concern, at least high concernmy concern, is that some of these temporary facilities end up not being so temporary. many are there for a decade if not longer, and it is much more convenient, a lot easier and less paperwork to deem it a temporary facility. therefore you don't have to comply with all these other standards. so i think this is part of the problem we got ourselves in libya. this is part of the problem in some of these other places. and granted, they're very difficult, tightly-configured

situations, but to say that there ought to be some minimum standard or guidance, it seems like a reasonable request. we're not solving that here, but it's something that's on our radar that we do need to solve. on page 51 recommendation three, we may have exhausted this but develop a kabul strategic facilities plan, such a plan should comprehensively outline existing facilities, and we'll go through this as we give the staff briefing. so appreciate you doing that. i don't have another question about that. and director, have you issued any official policies or directives related to obo's use of design excellence? >> we've revised many of our policies and procedures to reflect our trying to do work in different ways again to

include doing best-value awards as opposed to lowest cost. i believe that we have revised probably the last two or three years over 30 p and pds. we could get you exact numbers on those. >> i guess if you have issued directives related to design excellence, is it reasonable by the august 9th meeting that you would provide that? i'm hoping this is just a photo copying exercise. i'm not asking you to create anything new. i'm just trying to get a snap soth of where are you at right now here today? ? i guess in my mind ex-lens is just a way of approaching our work and us trying to do our work in the best way we can, there isn't one policy written about excellence it sort of permeates through all of our policies. so if the request is for acopy of all of our revised

policies -- >> we had embassy design which was put forward by secretary powell. design excellence was change the by secretary clinton. there was a new direction a new approach it's new, it's different, but what we haven't seen is what is that directive? what is that plan? what is that strategy? i've seen bits and parts of it, but it's not just some nebulous, hey, this is just a theory we want to be great in everything we do. it was a concerted effort to change the way we were building embassies into a new design excellence plan. >> absolutely. so when you ask, is there one policy that reflects that i could give you general documents that highlight what the excellence program is. we could go to all of the policies and procedures that have been changed to reflect that. we could go to the standards, which are basically a flexible set of standards that we