and they will compete, and some you may know, men and women and they are extraordinary representatives, and they can manage the tools on the ground. nobody can manage the tools in the united states, i understand that, and i am talking about on the forward end of all this so the president has the ability to know as best as possible what is happening and make decisions that is in the best interests of the united states and its people. >> thank you. >> david you are one of our nations leading journalists and involved in social media, and you see how robust that field is and you understand messaging and how can you counter 90,000 messages a day, that are disseminated by supporters and stimulate the worldwide movement? >> part of the puzzle in your

question is the word "we." how is this counter messaging going to be organized? to what extent is it going to be spontaneous? does it represent the youth of the region? my friends from the arab world keep insisting to me that as powerful and intimidating as is i.s. messaging is, what is dominant in arabic is what i call the freedom spirit, the square statement i am connected and i am not going to take it anymore, and i won't take it from an authoritarian leader and i am going to live in my own

world. somehow that message that spirit of connectiveness, i think, of free citizens, which is still there and we get too depressed about the arab winter sometimes, and it's still there and that has to become more of the dominant narrative. it probably needs help from governments, but i worry in the post snowden age about swallowing the poison pill. i worry about steps that seem sensible in terms of messaging that end up limiting the message, or undercutting it. i think this is an area where it's crucial to get it right, but one thing that i think the u.s. has learned is the united states is not a credible messenger in telling young muslims what islam is, how they

should live and who their right enemies and allies are and that has to come from the region and has to be mobilized quickly. there are lots of smart people i know, who could help do this tomorrow, but the pathway for them to do it that doesn't end up, as i say, undercutting their efforts in the future is very complicated. >> judge webster and i had lunch a few weeks ago and we discussed the video showing the burning of the jordanian pilot and how something like that can resonate with people around the world and the discussion we had focused on the fact that it resinates with so many of these young men that are marginalized and who see an opportunity for mobilization and a sense of purpose and a mission, and in a video like that which is awful and unbelievable for all of us, a meeting out of justice and somebody who flew a airplane and

bombed civilians and pays for deeds in the same way they did, and that messaging is difficult to defeat. i agree with you, young men, especially those under 40 there is no mainstream message for them to latch on to. they already rejected that. they already have been pushed to the margins. i don't think there is a message that can reach a lot of them, that small number. a broader audience perhaps, but i am afraid that when a video comes out like that and it's accepted by so many people we're in tremendous trouble here. steve, i want to take advantage of your background in intelligence here, which is impressive to say the least. you touched on a few of these things before, but can you talk about the intelligence challenges here, and before you answer i will say when we had live troops on the ground, and i am not suggesting we do it again, but when you have 100,000 troops on the ground, you have a huge station active in places like baghdad and to have a lot

of people forward a lot of opportunities to network with people on the ground citizens of a country like iraq to develop the kind of sense and situational awareness that can enable your operations. what are the intelligence challenges with such a small footprint on the ground and also given an addversary like isis? >> let's divide it into technical and human, and in this environment, intelligence plays a role which is an influence role which is supportive of u.s. policy with groups and others who they are in contact with but let's think about it for a second those categories. there are forward platforms in which you can launch and the closer you can get to the target, the easier you can

recruit to collect intelligence. in iraq, significant possibilities from which they can launch, and there is -- it's my understanding some solid collection. never good enough, but it's collection that is solid. now, remember, and i do it for my soapbox. in the intelligence business there are secrets and then there are also mysteries. my example is always remember the young fruit vendor that set himself on fire in tunisia, and there is nobody on the universe except god going on in his head when he set himself on fire. their ability to close their ranks, and once again i use my example that is only known by two, three or four people. don't forget that espionage is still in all countries punishable in many cases by

prison, and by isis, it's punishable by deaths. understand it's not that easy to step right up and say whatever you want united states, i am happy to help. always keep that in mind when you are thinking about intelligence collection. syria becomes a more difficult challenge. remember assad's father actually constructed what some could call a state in terms of security services and they can control and sawuppress the people and so as a result you already highlight the difficulties of the collection problem. the collection problem is also compounded because moving forward in syria you have to spend just as much time trying to stay alive as you do trying to figure out how to collect things. as a result i would identify at the moment the syrian challenge is probably greater than the iraqi challenge because we still

have long-standing relationships in iraq that are quite productive, and i would offer at the moment, that relations are not as efficient as four or five or six years ago, and there has to be a reliance on partners. i would like to compliment the jordanians. they have stepped up and put their people in harm's way to assist. some of the other services are doing the best they can and in some cases the best they can is really not very good or certainly not good enough. as a result and i am certainly not looking for the united states to lead everything. all i am talking about in this arena that you asked about the united states has the ability to lead and guide in a way that could be effective and so as a result the relationships with foreign countries become very important in trying to persuade them and convince them this work with us is effective for them, too. one comment i would like to make

in reference to the messaging piece, the advent of social media and the ability to put stories out quickly the abilities to spread fabrications greater than it has ever been so as a result of intelligence officers is becoming increasingly difficult because the one question you ask yourself is has what i just received or heard, is it true? i have a sense now that mr. lennon's famous sentence was if you say a lie often enough it becomes the truth is actually becoming more and more prevalent in the middle east as well and god knows the middle east has created conspiracies in the last 500 or 600 years and it's not a matter of collecting the information and saying this man said this because he was there, and it's also a matter of before it goes to the president saying is this actually true, did this happen? there used to be something called afghan math, and john will remember this, and we just attacked the soviets and killed 400 people.

wait how many did you kill? 200. slow down there. how many people? >> maybe about four guys in a jeep. my point to that is in the current environment these things become important because what you don't want is a president making bad judgments and you are so anxious to deliver the information you have not done what you need to do. it's the ruthless applications of methodologies and is it true. i think there is more opportunity for success on the syrian side and it becomes more difficult and it will rely, i think, on a great deal and efficient assistance from the middle east that have capabilities on their own. >> we have been focusing on isis and we touched on syrian and the intelligence side, and the big act we have not gone into in great detail yet, and that's iran, and with regard to isis

and what is going on in iraq and syria, it cannot be divorced certainly from the perspective of the iranians, and is iran playing offense or defense? are they more afraid of isis coming in and creating a state in iraq or are they trying to take advantage of this, or both? >> i think they are being opportunistic as always so sometimes that is offense and sometimes defense, and most of the time it's a combination. i should just note before focusing on iran something we have not talked about but is important when you think going forward. although the u.s. has not been successful overall, it has had great success in working with its friends in kurd astan.

i travelled all the way from the west and down into tpheuf asrau province with the peshmerga a few months ago and saw how the peshmerga working quietly with elements of the u.s. and coalition power have pushed isis back, and they have held their own, and there's sort of a continuing battle between the forces there and the main isis camp, and i think it's called huh we jaw to the southwest. that's a success, and it would be a mistake not to note it in this discussion and not to think, how do you build on it? you know the question has been should you send weapons directly

to them? can they get weapons to the kurds quickly enough that that option is not discussed anymore. the iranians the iranians when you think about how the kurdish forces were rocked in their bill in august and september, how their lines really cracked how dangerous it was that it was threatened and who was the first in. they were supplying ammunition and supplying i am told individual people you know, to help and bolster the lines to work with the peshmerga to get new people in to get their command stronger. the bill was saved and the u.s. came in after and our help was also crucial, but the iranians have a -- they have been working the same network of sources and

assets for 20 years or more. they know the terrain, and they know the shia landscape, obviously, and they know kurdistan with meticulous detail. in the iraqi war, never again will we allow iraq to threaten our fundamental security and they do everything they can to prevent it. one more comment about iran. as i have watched the iranians and their proxies the shia militias, i see they have an ability to start fights and not to finish them in part because of the areas they are fighting are typically sunni areas where they're not sufficiently welcome. so in tikrit, the shia militias

moved to tikrit and got stalled and the u.s. air power moved in and finished the fight, but tikrit still, from what i know, is largely unpopular and they have not moved people back in to get the hold and build part going. you could argue the same in anbar province. iran's strategy, whatever it is you know iran shares in the terrible setbacks in the loss of anbar province. how the u.s. and coalition operations with iran will be shaped in the period after a nuclear deal is reached assuming that in the next couple weeks by july 9, that could be done and i think that's one of the real challenges for the u.s. and iranian officials. it is going to be possible to

have some more effective alliance that draws in sunni countries. saudi arabia will have to be comfortable with that. is that going to be possible after the deal? i don't know, but i sure will be trying to find out. >> a comment? >> i have been a long believer and david knows this, with engagement in iraq. i don't think we can go through life and not have engagement with a country like iran and as a result i am hopeful there is some agreement to be worked out, but whatever happens what i don't want to see is a disconnection, again n. a way. i am aware of the comments about dealing with the devil. i get that. but i would like to offer sharp criticism of saoul money. he is a killer of americans and he is responsible for the death of americans and i don't want anybody to leave this room

thinking he issaves the day. keep in mind keep separate the differences between strategic engagement with iran which is important with u.s. security and highlighting what some people are suggesting as the most wonderful and significant and contributing person in the middle east. thank you for the soapbox moment. >> steve, you have had to deal with a lot of pretty unsavory regimes in the past in order to further national security goals. two years ago we wanted to get rid of assad but i think we had a hands off policy in order to one, not bring about a new libya or even a somalia as far as chaos, and number two, i think because as we negotiate a nuke deal with iran we want to keep that issue comfortable with the

iranians and not pull a leg out from the stool they are sitting on. how do we deal with assad now? >> i will sound like what i am a. former cia officer. it's my experience to engage with people and part of it because we learned early on if you are not engaged eye to eye you have no chance of influencing your behavior. you were kind enough to refer to the libyan experience. i would use that as an example, and once you get engaged with people unsavory, if you want to influence them you have to stay engaged. that's why the intelligence organizations are built to do that sort of thing. i don't know if there's engagement with the syrians. i hope there is some discussion being taken place to so assad he has two choices to figure out a exit role of some kind or to die

in syria, and maybe like mr. gadhafi, maybe that's his plan all along but he doesn't strike me as the same type of person. we have to use whatever tools are available to engage them in a fashion that tries to prevent this from creating even a greater opening and even greater vacuum if bashar al assad is destroyed inside damascus, because my concern is that without some sort of assistance in shaping that future, there is nothing that can help you predict what group, what other sort of organization might take over inside syria and it could be far more radical than what we are currently dealing with. it's so uncertain at the moment there is something we should think about doing to try and shape the future and shape the exit regardless of who we have to do it with. now, i will admit to you and i know some people are quite capable of this, but it takes a certain sort of person to hang

in there on this because it's really unpleasant work, because you will be face-to-face with people you hoped you would never meet. but the point is, if you don't engage you have no chance of shaping, and they will get in through second and third and fourth parties to try to interpret what is going on in the united states and it's a very difficult task but very important. >> dealing with our adversaries and enemies is complicated, and also dealing with our friends. let's think about turkey. a nato ally sharing a huge border with syria, and this has been a difficult relationship over the past four or five years. there is clear evidence of these groups operating from the turkish side of the border here. how do we deal with turkey that

has different strategic goals than we do when it comes to this region? >> that has been a puzzle the administration has not been able to solve. we have had the confusion of the turkish parliamentary elections and it's not clear how they want to play that in terms of whether the ak party will try to govern alone or call elections again soon or seek a coalition partner, and it was not clear as of last night. you could argue that the turks are now living with their own inability to make good policy decisions in that one of their nightmares is happening. the pyd, the syrian kurdish militia supported by kurdish forces from turkey and iraq is sweeping across northeastern

syria in one of the most effective campaigns in this war, and when i talk to people, they say to me peshmerga, good fighters in iraq, and the pyd, really good fighters, tough tough fighters. nobody likes to say so but they are trained by the pkk, which has been a mortal enemy of the turkish government and considered by the turks as a terrorists group. from turkey's standpoint you have this beennd south of their border increasingly controlled by a group trained and to some extent regarded as dangerous fundamentalist. they will have to make choices with us about their security and ours.

i guess would come back to the basic puzzle here with syria, which is getting buy-in from all of the key players. russia, who is directly threatened by the collapse of the assad regime. turkey, which has a ragged unstable border, and newly embolded kurdish militias, and saudi arabia that wanted to overthrow bough shar no batter what. now, jordan says hold on. at some point these various powers need to work together to identify the elements of a new

government that would include people from the army, and people who are acceptable figures from the old regime and people who are members of the opposition who were willing to sit down as part of a new government of transition, and clan leaders who have power in the mountains in the northwest and somehow that has to be done, and that's -- it's going to happen, it's just a question of whether people come to their senses or another 100,000 die before it happens. with each of these things you know how it's going to turn out. you just don't know when people will get the political clarity to make it happen. that's what i hope we will get more of from washington. finish up with the question on foreign fighters.

i think it's clear that a lot of young men and some young women from around the world to see it as a state, and they not only want to fight but clothe people and provide food and work in the sharia courts and there's lots of state building in their minds and they see it as a place to live out their lives but no doubt about it among the 20,000 plus foreign fighters some will return and be incredibly skilled and motivated. what is more of a threat in your mind and getting back to your point upstairs earlier, what are some of the challenges with regard to values? >> i think you have to work it from the objective backwards. if there are young men who are in the united states for example, who are inspired today

to carry out a terrorists attack of equivalent of what took place on the beach in tunisia recently obviously that is more dangerous. however there is nothing quite as dangerous as a seasoned combat veteran who returned home with the intent of overthrowing his own government. as a result i think there is a new thing that has to take place here a new evolution of counterterrorism work that focuses on this in a way that we have not had to before. i mean the numbers of foreign fighters are unbelievable. i remember in the days of the early part of the iraq war before the united states lifted we would talk about foreign fighters on a daily basis, but the numbers were only a tenth of what we are talking about now. as a result it focuses the businesses of the services in a way where at this moment they are strapped because of the resources necessary to focus on them. it brings up the question, and i

offer it as a question and i don't have the answer, and i only have experience some good and some bad, and let us say the number of 30 or 40,000 foreign fighters are correct and they survive and make their way back home, and what do we do to find them? france changes legislation to allow modern things like never before, and do we visit the question of how do we stop people trying to kill your friends and brothers and sisters, and i think we will be faced with that, and you will have -- it has evolved the connection between security and law enforcement services to make sure information moves quickly and effectively to try and head off terrorism attacks. now, i will take one last minute and say i think our government and many other governments have

become quite skilled at finding and stopping real-live terrorists on the move to the target. what i am more worried about is our inability to stop the recruitment of people to fill the next wave, and, of course you know my theory john, i think one of the greatest counterterrorism tools is jobs, jobs, jobs here and all these places overseas. as a result, that's the piece that second tier of support that worries me as much as stopping the terrorists that says i am on the move and going and i am going to do x objective, and here we go. >> comment david? >> just briefly to try and sum up. as we think about the year since the surprise overrunning of mosul as the director of national intelligence clapper

said our underestmation of isis' capabilities and will a year later essentially we did the same thing we underestimated their ability with a relatively small force to roll through ramadi and the government forces picked up and left, so i have concluded from this that we don't know enough about the adversary. there are enough problems that we talked about in terms of the u.s. and coalition strategy, but at the top of the list with all deference to steve that understands this in a way an outsider can't, and my sense is we don't have good enough intelligence, and a part of that are the people that went to school on the collections capabilities and are smarter and u.s. technology companies are making it easier for them and adding new layers of encryption

every other week so somehow that intelligence gap is going to have to be made up. in iraq something the u.s. did of enormous power it was the night raids, and people would arrive and there would be firefights and maybe they would capture people if they could, and they would capture intelligence that would drive the next night's raids and the next night's and the next night's and you gather momentum because each raid feeds the information you don't have. it's said the sigh kwraf raid the only kind we have seen in syria to capture and turned up the wife of the chief financial officer of isis was effective in terms of giving lots of leads. i don't see this problem being

managed, and i include the foreign fighter part and the internal fight part without better intelligence and i don't see how you get that unless you had an increased operations tempo like what we have seen in other cufflings. >> thank you for the great comments. we will open it up now. please identify yourself and your affiliation. >> john mcgaffelin? >> i would like to raise what i call the problem of the conflict between the issue of the state and the amoeba and we have been having a lot of discussions almost exclusively except for steve towards the end on the state problem how much kinetic forces are appropriate to use against the state and what kind of resources will they have to operate as a state, and that's a legitimate discussion and that's the way the discussion in

washington is focused. what i wonder if we are paying enough attention to is the amoeba part of that, and by that i mean the ever increasing, seems to me attacks abroad that tom it rated at the beginning, and it does not move the geopolitical needle at all. is there a possibility, whatever progress we make against the state, the examples of the amoeba presidenting out to wherever that isn't a state that doesn't have borders, will it be a problem for us, you haven yes ma'am -- you have yemen and hreba and beyond. >> states like to think about

the other world as the states part. this is not a sales pitch but i will make it anyway. there's a wonderful group of people at the cia called the pitf political instability task force that have been in business for a number of years and are doing brilliant work on this question, discussing the idea of how the united states must begin to look not just at state adversaries and the nonstate adversaries developing significant influence in places we did not see before, and isis and the caliphate is some areas, and boko haram is there. it's relatively new thinking if you will, and certainly it's a post 9/11 type of thing, but it's very real and there is interest in it, and good professional work being done on it, and it's a difficult of a collection challenge in who are

these people, and let's collect it and what do we have? we have to make it up so people in the policy staff say this is real. they can see how in afghanistan al qaeda had influence but beyond that they had enough influence to hide but not change the government. you are correct and it's not a routine part of considerations yet, and i think they will be forced to consider it. ambassador faily? >> good morning, gentlemen. when you see the coalition forces and the talk about isis, do you feel there is a sense of urgency aligned between the countries of the region and the united states, or do you still think that intellectually people

make it but practically the steps are there? >> i would say, mr. ambassador, the sense of urgency is surely greater today than it was last thursday because of these attacks on three continents. you have a picture of a threat that is ma tsa sizing, and a threat that has to be addressed in iraq and syria, so this coalition will have to go into a different gear in terms of its activities and it has been interesting that prime minister abadi went to the g-7 meeting and is trying to be a presence among other coalition members but somehow that has got to move into something more aggressive. these last few weeks are demonstrating that this threat

is ma tsa sizing. libya is a nightmare because it's falling apart as a country and who do you work with. the coalition need to ask for help and then do the fighting. it's not going to be a possible for america, america and france and america and france and britain, and they will not solve the problem but they will help. >> i think it's a very important question, mr. ambassador, and everybody has accepted it intellectually, and the pieces that the coalition can manage properly are the nonmilitary pieces. everybody in harm's way is to be compliments and encouraged but what i am talking about is the coalition allies in the region are the ones best positioned to try and discuss in arabic the political and economic and

ideological and the tkepl strafdemographic changes that need to take place and dare i call it a marshal plan so when the fighting stops you can begin in a way that is more effective. i don't think that is taking place at the moment. as a result i am afraid you are correct, intellectually we are there, but the more practical piece has not cut up. >> there in the third row. >> i am colonel isaac in the united states army, and i served in iraq and i was a security adviser. what is missing from the discussion is -- i am originally from the city of mosul, and what is missing is the power of religion. if you look at history the movement in libya in the 18th century, and this element of

radical islamic state is not a recent issue. what is disheartening to me is the united states not responding to -- we don't have population-based outreach to disarm this agenda. i wanted to see what your comments are. you touched bases on some of the political issues and we have not seen that. it's very frustrating for people like us to see this ideology as prpl permeating and we don't have an answer to that and i wanted to see what the distinguished gentlemen thought about it. >> i am happy to start. i think you are absolutely right. i think somehow -- now, remember, now, everybody, this is citizen kappes talking here. we have become embarrassed to talk about religion even our

own. as a result we have a tendency to drawback from the questions, and i believe isis are fighting well but for a horrible cause and we have the unwillingness to discuss with them or assist in the discussion of the fact that what they are doing is not in line with their own religious beliefs and to more importantly say that with clarity in saudi arabia and egypt to encourage them to have the discussions where we need to cast doubt in the people doing this and we cast doubt in our own minds but why can't we organize it in a way in a fashion that is so appropriate. century after century of these discussions and in 2015 we are too embarrassed to discuss it or don't want to have somebody misunderstand. you are right on the mark. these are men fighting at the moment that have woven their re

religion religion into every element of their day, and we have to see how they are visualizing their goals. i think you are on to something big and i think that's extraordinary difficult for the united states government to do. >> lady in the front, please. >> hello i am the kurdistan regional government representative to the united states. one thing that has been missing from the discussion, except i have to admit i arrived a little late so i apologized if you touched on this at the beginning. what i have not heard is the discussion of the humanitarian crisis. 3 million iraqees are displaced and millions of syrians are displaced and the kurdistan region alone we are looking after 1.8 million syrians and

fellow iraqis. their education is going to pot, and their health care is almost nonexistent. we incurred kurdistan, we don't want the camps where radicals can be formed and this is another crisis brewing for the future and i would like to hear this touched on as well. thank you. >> thank you for bringing it up. no doubt about it that millions of refugees and displaced persons, and we have been to the camps on the field visits and half of iraq is displaced and turkey is hosting 1.8 million refugees, and it's a truly humanitarian disaster and hundreds of thousands murdered or killed otherwise, and lack of education and income distribution and housing inyesterday blg and a set of

issues important to the counterterrorism side as well. >> i would just say that with this, as other aspects of this nightmarish problem the u.s. needs to lead its partners in the region and internationally in stepping up the effort so it's closer to the level of the problem. i mean we have -- again we have declare tory policies about humanitarian issues but there is no follow-through. people make pledges where they never deliver. i looked at camps in kurdistan, and i remember seeing the sea of tents last year in northern jordan where the syrians have come and i have seen that the camps in turkey, and if you want to really think about it the nightmare, think about all those young men in those camps very

little to eat, you know and very little jobs money, but, you know radical preachers, people talking to them about settling scores. it's a formula for not just you know, another four or eight years of trouble but a generation a nightmarish problems, and we saw when the palestinians went into camps and had radicals banging on them every day about the struggle. i think it's already -- i fear it's already too late to have caught that in the deradicalization phase, so you are now going to have to think about harder edge ct measures, but surely getting those people back into syria, you know, a settlement is you areurgent in syria,

and i think you have to get people back to their homes and to reasonable lives so their kids can go to school again. >> we're many, many years away from that. all the way in the back in the blue shirt. >> marcus lee with the government accountability office. for the u.s. training and advising mission simply what would success look like for both -- i am sorry, for the iraqi security forces and the peshmerga and what would you say the milestones or matrix to show success? what are your thoughts on reports that some iraqi citizens believe the u.s. itself is funding and supporting isis to attack against iraqis for the counter measure part of that? >> on the train and assist the benchmarks are always difficult. first of all, and i compliment secretary carter recently for talking about the fact that the

shortage of iraqi recruits for the training parks and i think you have to have a series of benchmarks, and numbers of recruits, the quality of the training and how many you train successfully but the ultimate test, the metric is the success on the battlefield but they can't do that in many cases when you are training them from the ground up, and they have to have the support only the united states can provide which is command and control support, because whether we like it or not we still remain the best on the planet, and as a result you have to have those measuring sticks. i think the other part here, and i am not suggesting anybody is not being honest about it but i say you have to be terribly honest about it, and if somebody says it's going well and then you find out it's going well is not what you thought it was when

you heard about it the first time. there are cultural differences and training differences and things we assume here in the united states in training military that are not assumed in other parts, and it requires a certain type of trainer and somebody that has patience that many in this room do not enjoy and training effectively requires the trainers to stay with it and stay with it and stay with it and not just going home and saying, okay, you know how to shoot a rifle see you later. that does not work and that's part of what makes it so difficult. >> many people questioned and raised conspiracy theories in the past that the united states supported isis. >> the problem with the theory that we helped form al qaeda is that it has elements of truth

so it's a little tough to rebut that one. it is amazing to me that in the face of evidence of american inability to achieve results through a projection of our power that people continue to believe that we are all powerful. you know if the americans couldn't get the electricity going in iraq, they must have had the plan not to get the electricity going in iraq, because they are the americans and of course they could do it. that has been extended. people look at isis and they think how the heck did -- you know teenagers, 23-year-olds running rampant across our country and the army runs away and they capture american tanks and how can they do that? the answer is well it must be an american plot because americans

wouldn't let that happen they would be crazy to let that happen. you can argue this is our last remaining element of genuine national power is that the way the world thinks that we can accomplish anything and we have given them you know, a decade -- more than a decade of evidence that that ain't so but people still seem to think it and maybe that's a way to use it. >> convince me, david. in the green shirt? >> i am based in beirut, lebanon. >> following what mr. ignatius was saying but in a different way. there's a reality in the region about the seriousness about the u.s. and coalition to fight. is it really priority for the

united states and its key allies in the coalition region to fight d.a.s.h. as the primary danger, the serious danger, the priority, or the potential influence of iran as a region or power, and the context of what is going on in the region, there is two camps the sunni and she shiite camp are fighting, and that's the reality about that. so is the united states capable of advancing fighting d.a.s.h., isis or al qaeda who has been forgotten in yemen now over turkey, saudi arabia qatar, others, where they have their priority to settle in the region against iran or removing the assad regime? who is driving the policy now?

>> i will take a first quick shot. that's a great question, and it goes to the heart of the u.s. problem. we're trying to mobilize sunni allies fight isis daesh, who are more motivated to fight iran and shia power. and that is the basic problem of our strategy. i talked earlier about some ideas about how you deal with that. but i think you've identified the core not here. this is not a top priority for a weary united states, and it also isn't a top priority for our sunni allies. >> ron marks? >> thank you, gusys. this is a wonderful session. you wrote an article on homeland security.

given what's happened in terms of the attacks overseas how comfortable are you that we have the wherewithal and understanding at this point about what kind of recruitment is going on in the u.s. from isis and what kind of actions might be taken here? >> i'm very uncomfortable. i don't want to be alarmist. when i've asked the fbi and the intelligence community in the last days whether they are concerned about specific threats in the july 4 period the answer has been no. we have no credible specific threat. but just read the messaging. the appeals to lone wolves go out dozens of times a day and manifestos about how to make weapons, disguisior communications, how to hide, how to kill. it's all out there. and the fbi has been lucky in catching people who seem infected but really nothing

where you can say. just know this problem is getting worse, and you're all sort of waiting. at some point, some tunisia is going to happen in britain or france or america. who knows. we know it's coming. >> there's some people who have extraordinary skills in finding terrorists in our government now. but sometimes -- and the american people have a right to assume they'll be defended against this sort of thing. the american people need to understand there's a grind of counterterrorism work that is important. never letting go working with the information, being aware. if that ever faulters then i'd be more afraid than i am now. the united states is a big place and there are several communities i now travel through in which i see people that i've

never seen there before. i'm not suggesting they are terrorists just because i thought they look like a terrorist. the ability to find someone in the united states is not as easy as someone thinks. there used to be -- one of the reasons you can't find somebody is because they are hiding. as a result that grinding work the fbi is doing to just keep after it is extraordinarily important to try to contribute to what hhs and jeh johnson are doing every day. >> go ahead. we'll end with judge webster. thank you. >> my question is one about perseverance. and i can't help but think back to the early days of desert shield when we had to beg for permission to land troops to help the -- our friends, the

saudi arabians who said you land and then you always leave. in that highly tribal area, i'm wondering where we stand on their sense of our perseverance and when we come into help in the sort of piecemeal way and avoiding issues like boots on the ground and others issues of this kind. do we still have this problem and what can we do about it if we really want to lead them out of this. >> thank you. >> judge, you sound like you might have been a director of the cia at one point. that's an incredibly important point and question. the engagement with people that i made reference to before must be beyond the turnover of offices we have so frequently in the united states and our government in washington. it must be an expression of a commitment that -- and we in the ci cia do this all the time because we stay all the time. you know that. it's important for many of these

cannot countries to know, no matter how bad it gets we have the guts to stay with it. we haven't been good at that over the paftsst several years. some of that was in the president's camp david accord attendance. i don't think you can understate the importance of every now and then a president, in a discreet channel, reassuring the head of that nation, that congress that monarch, that prime minister. we know this is getting bad. publicly these things may happen, but we're not going away. if i was asked once, i was asked 50 times by pakistani's president, when are you leaving? i always had to say i'm not going anywhere. the cia never goes anywhere. but i wasn't able to be that confident with the united states government. every single army officer

remembers the famous pressler amendment that broke it off for an amendment. you have hit on something that's important to the united states that we must continue to encourage in our people our new people in government, reencourage in the people more mature in government. >> dafrdvid, how do we do that when the general public and the president are allergic to -- >> i'm talking about contacts and commitments that does not mean 100,000 u.s. troops. i'm talking about the appearance of people to say, can we help or we need a favor from you. those go far longer than trying to show up with 100,000 troops. >> no one is discussing 100,000 troops but we have to deal with a u.s. public, apart from those elements steve and congress, part of it and an administration and potentially a next

administration that doesn't want to make a commitment on many levels. >> i've been encouraged that the president who passionately wanted to get out of this period of involvement in places like iraq and syria realize that it's impossible. and as i said at the beginning has basically the right policy. i said he's allergic but he's trying to work with prime minister abadi, talks with ambassador faily in an attempt to coordinate policy. i'll close by remembering something that a syrian foreign minister said after president reagan, our model of a strong president, decided to pull american forces out of beirut in 1983 '84.

and he said the americans are short of breath. and i think that is when that idea first began to settle into the minds of people in the middle east. and each subsequent instance of shortness of breath reinforces it. and each moment where despite shortness of breath, shorter breath than barack obama. he doesn't want to be there, but he is there. maybe over time we're more resistant than people think. i hope so. >> i'd like to thank david and steve for giving us tremendous insight on a very difficult topic. i hope we can have you back some time. [ applause ]

here's some of our featured programs for this weekend on c-span networks. the upcoming release of harper lee's new novel "go set a watchman," book tv focuses on the prize-winning novelist. we talk about the impact of lee's book "to kill a mockingbird" and the events that led to the discovery and publiication of her new book. also at 10:00, hugh hewitt on hillary clinton's second run for president. on saturday at 8:00 eastern, congressional commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the vietnam war. and sunday evening at 6:30, gop presidential candidate carly

fiorina visits with new hampshire voters. on american history tv saturday on lectures in history, steve vogut on the factors that led to the great depression and president roosevelts actions to help the people and the economy. and sunday evening general sherman, the burning of atlanta georgia and columbia south carolina, and why sherman is not the villain of popular legend. get our complete weekend schedule at c-span.org. this week on "first ladies." we learn about lecretia garfield. she was an educated woman and a believer in women's rights. when her husband was assassinated, she returned to ohio and ensured his legacy by making their home into an early version of a presidential

library. chester arthur, a widower becomes president and his sister fills the role of first lady and establishes white house social etiquette used by future first ladies for decdecade. this sunday night at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span's original series "first ladies -- influence and image." examining the role of women who filled the role of first lady from martha washington to michelle obama. sundays at 8:00 p.m. eastern on american history tv on c-span3. now the heritage foundation hosts a panel discussion on the threat of isis and other terrorist groups in the middle east and ongoing regional and international efforts to combat them. introductory remarks getting under way. live coverage here on c-span3. >> india, afghanistan and the other nations of south asia. she has served on the professional staff of the senate

foreign relations committee. she's also been a senior adviser in the state department south asia bureau, central intelligence agency as a political analyst on south asia and for a period of four years was also in the political officer to the embassies in islamabad and new delhi. join me in welcoming lisa curtis. lisa? >> thank you john, and thank you all for joining us today for our program. a view from the front lines of islamist insurgency. two weeks ago today terrorists massacred 38 tourists at a beach resort in tunisia attacked a factory in southern france beheading the owner, and conducted a suicide attack at a kuwait kuwaiti shiite mosque. while these events may have not been directly connected, they are indicative of the

pervasiveness of the terrorist threat we face today. the most immediate threat comes from the islamic state in iraq and syria in which muslims are flocking to syria to fight with the islamic state. the state department terrorism report that was released in april highlights the fact that there were 16,000 foreign fighters from over 90 countries that had joined in the fight in syria, exceeding the rate of foreign fighters that had gone to afghanistan, pakistan iraq and yemen in the last 20 years. although the u.s. has degraded core al qaeda leadership in the tribal areas, we still face an al qaeda threat. it has evolved. we face more of a threat from al qaeda affiliates throughout the middle east and north africa. and here i would like to note a

heritage foundation publiication from four years ago "a counterterrorism strategy for the next wave" which drew attention to this evolution of al qaeda. this report came out at a time when the white house was trying to downplay the global terrorist threat and diverting resources from that fight. so in that report we call on the administration to step up the fight, to be proactive and develop a strategy that matched the evolving strategy of the terrorists. one major question is what does the rise of isis mean for the future of al qaeda? what is the impact on u.s. policy given that these two groups share the same deadly anti-west ideology. for now they are competing for ideological influence, recruits and financial resources. but is it possible they might merge in the future? or will one subsoon the other?

to answer these questions and discuss other issues we have a very distinguished panel of experts with us today. furst, dr. sebastian gorka. he serves as the major general matthew c. horner distinguished chair of military theory at the marine corps university. previously associate dean of congressional affairs and relations to the special operations community at the national defense university. a graduate of the university of london and former fellow at harvard's kennedy school of government, he's an associate fellow with the joint special operations university and adjunct professor with georgetown university. he's also a regular instructor with the special warfare center in ft. bragg and for the fbi's counterterrorism division as well. he's testified before congress and also briefed on several occasions the cia, odni and octc. then we have ms. sarah carter.

sarah is an award winning invest investigateive reporter. formerly with the los angeles news groom, "washington times" and washington examiner she worked along the southwest border covering for the documentary "for the record." sarah spent more than seven months in afghanistan and pakistan since 2008. she's won awards for her work on afghan women and children and she's also embedded with u.s. troops on afghanistan's border with pakistan and travel to pakistan's tribal areas with the pakistan army. she's the recipient of two national headliner awards. one for a story on a child born into the mexican mafia and a multiple part series that

involving grond ground breaking on national security. our third panelist miss kathryn zimmerman. she's a research fellow at the american enterprise institute and the lead analyst on al qaeda for aei's critical threats project. her work is focused on the al qaeda network particularly al qaeda in the arabian peninsula and al shabab. she's testified before congress about the national security threats emanating from al qaeda and she's briefed members of congress, their staff and members of the defense community. with that, i'm going to turn the floor over to our first speaker dr. gorka. >> good morning. or good afternoon. it's a real pleasure to be back here at heritage, an institution that's always a real pleasure to

speak at. today i -- truth in lending, i'm not going to address the topic because i'm not coming back from the front lines. this was advertised as an assessment from the front lines. i'm going to tell you what the people who have been to the front lines have told me. i've worked closely with our green berets and marines and i'm going to report to you a very abbreviated summary, especially of the work we've been doing for u.s. army special operations command. i also have a company called the threat knowledge group. we've supported command in general charles cleveland who has just retired as the commander of the green berets and we've compiled two reports on the use of irregular warfare by groups like isis but also nation state actors such as iran

and russia and an in-depth study on the central of gravity of isis. i'm going to talk briefly about those reports and the doctrine, the strategy that isis is following on the ground today. what is the current threat environment? the current threat environment is a very very ugly one. whether you are a christian girl in nigeria kidnapped against your will because of what you believe, whether you are a yazidi off a mountain top by isis or someone in syria oru rack who got on the wrong side of isis and had to be crucified or was decapitated. this is your reality. and it isn't just, of course, a reality thousands of miles away with garland texas and all the current cases the fbi director

has admitted we're investigating. this is a threat to the united states as well. let's go straight to the analysis of isis. this is the report that we compiled for general cleveland. if you want to have a copy, we have permission to release this. you'll see my e-mail at the end of my presentation. what's the base line analysis? this is all unclassified. based upon four metrics, isis is much more dangerous than al qaeda. i'm not peter bergen. i'm not going to tell you aq is dead. but isis is a graduate level threat. far more dangerous than al qaeda for four reasons. it's its own self-generated fully fledged transnational insurgency. al qaeda was a parasitic terrorist organization that attached itself to indigenous

insurgency, whether it was al shabab or taliban in afghanistan, it didn't generate its own mass base of mobilization as a true maoist insurgency would. isis is its own self-generated insurgency. the big difference is an insurgency holds territory in daylight. this we know now isis holds more territory than the territorial expanse of the united kingdom. what we don't talk about, it is the world's first transnational. what is international? international foreign support or foreign fighters. this is one that operates and holds territory in at least three countries. in the 20th century insurgencies were always about taking control of the country within the insurgent group.

whether you are mao in china or farc in colombia. next will be jordan then saudi arabia and on and on. with boko haram now technically boko haram territory nigeria is also under the control of abubaka. they control territory more than one nation in the middle east and now also west africa. second completely open source it's the richest threat of its type in history. let's leave out the kidnapping and everything else. just two events in the last year. after the second raid, isis netted $823 million in cash.

$823 million. if we look at the 9/11 commission report, 9/11, the whole operation, state houses flight school training, cost $500,000. isis has the equivalent of 1,600 9/11s. that's a very large threat. thirdly, the adjective of staggering. the recruiting capacity of isis is mind boggling. you just heard in our presentation that we have a figure that if in historic perspective we've never seen before. 19,000 foreign fighters in nine months. these are the kind of figures al qaeda had wet dreams about and isis made it a reality. last, most important of all is the declared caliphate

successfully. the taliban's was never really a caliphate. this is a real caliphate. for 90 years, the extremists have been demanding a re-establishment of the caliphate, whether it's the muslim brotherhood or aqsl. this puts it at the pinnacle of the extremist threat. and it has no clear competitor. unfortunately, everybody in this room knows it's easy to estimate. the number of insurgencyies was zero. air power prepares the ground for ground troops to take back the territory. therefore, we will never defeat isis with air strikes. somebody has to take it back. i'm not saying the 82nd airborne has to deploy tomorrow but

somebody has to. egypt, jordan, iraqis themselves, kurds. why is isis so successful? a lot of it has to do with its name. in d.c. we have an argument. is it the islamic state of iraq and syria or islamic state of iraq in the levant. when you do your intelligence preparation for battlefield you start with what the enemy calls themselves. you're not permitted to make up your own labels. we wouldn't call the soviet union misguided democrats, would we? the islamic state of iraq and al shama. hugely important. al sham is a very powerful term in islam. it relates to the story of end times, of judgment day, just like in christianity the plains

of magido are expected to see the final wars between the antichrist and the believers. the final holy war before the end of the world and all humans are judged by allah will occur on that territory in al shaum. the final -- think about what that name says as an information operations tool to all those 17-year-old muslims around the world looking for meaning. not only did he name it after al sham, he captured al sham. the clock is ticking. come on down. this is the only way too explain more than 20,000 recruited in less than a year because of the

significance of the territory and the name. the problem is bigger than iraq and syria. this is from the isis twitter feed. this was the visual splashed all over the internet. their game plan is a little larger than iraq and syria. it's not just about assad or maliki's corruption. it's a global caliphate. the last thing i want to do is get you inside the mind of isis today and give you their play book. the beautiful thing about the enemy we face today that unless you are looking for the gps coordinates of a high value target, everything you need to know about the global jihadist movement is available on that superclassified system called google. it really is stunning. there is no tssci with polygraph at the strategic level for isis.

if you want to know what they are doing in syria, iraq libya and elsewhere you need to read this book. this is from an egyptian that we killed a few years ago or the pakistanis killed a few years ago. it's called "the mastery of savagery." if you know your u.s. military doctrine this is the anti-petraeus. this is exactly what they are using today to run their operations. if you're interested in the book, send me an e-mail and i'll send you an unclassified english language translation. the operations undergoing now in the middle east and north africa are three phases. to beat the infidel you just break your operations down into phase one. classic war far where you do a dramatic irregular war far

attacks. not the scale of 9/11 but dramatic attacks that's prepare the ground for phase two. phase two is the spreading of savagery. this is where you coordinate your irregular warfare attacks with dislocating the local government from its capacity to govern. challenging the syrian government iranian government, saudi or jordanian government from being able to govern its territory. and if it's true and reports i have received that on the day ramadi fell, they were in excess of 200 vehicle-borne ieds on that day. that means they are following this textbook and are on phase two. the last phase is consolidate and expand. consolidate held areas. here the purpose is to unite the populations fighting force to

implement sharia law. and here's the real value added of naji. what he's doing in the final phase. this phase can last for a century. in this phase they are creating a giant forward operating base which can be used as the platform from which they deploy more phase one operations. this is the hybrid caliphate. the big difference with naji is prior jihadi strategists said use violence to achieve the goal of the caliphate. naji says yes, you want to achieve the caliphate but you can't just click your fingers. there has to be a transitional phase. it's this phase three where you act like a quasi state. this unfortunately, this works.

as we have seen. most important question, what does this all mean? isis is far more successful and deadly than al qaeda. it's not magic. there's no voodoo involved. number one, it understands irregular warfare. it's read the right books. they follow the gavarist model of irregular warfare. he ended up dead at the age of 39. they understand that to win you have to outgovern the government. right now they are advertising for less jihadists online and more engineers and nurses. that tells you they've read it. they have an exploitation of a mobilization across the internet and social media.

everybody in this room knows the facts. we are having our lunch eaten every day by isis on social media. we aren't even scratching the surface of what they are doing in terms of information warfare. the caliphate will continue to grow unless it is challenged on the ground and in the ideological domain. to say it's all about economics and jobs for jihadis, it's like a bad "snl" skit. i'm glad the president made some noises in this direction this week, but i want to see proof we're prepared to talk about the ideology being used to mobilize. the enemy threat must be better integrated. i don't think it's integrated at all. mft be integrated into the strategic response or we'll be condemned to whack-a-mole. if we don't start countering the

element of this war, your children, my grandchildren will be killing jihadis 100 years from now. i wrote an article on the center of gravity for the green beret magazine. it's on that scribbling. if you want the real graduate level analysis, an organization my wife was associated with, they published this book called "fighting the ideological war." this is the book that's the only book president obama needs to read to defeat isis in "the new york times." we took the best strategists from the cold war, the reagan administration in undermining the soviet union and put them in the room with the best experts on jihad. this is the book that came out of it. if you'd like any of the reports we've done please contacted me on my g mail. my twitter handle is just my name. everything i do for public

consumption is on my website or my lectures videos and articles. our commercial site that supports the government is threatknowledge.org. and my wife has a not for profit that maps the growth of the jihadi ideology which is counterglobalsecurity.org. thank you to heritage. it's been a real pleasure. >> okay. next sarah, i think she'll address us from her seat. >> i didn't want to trip on my way to the podium. i'm not going to go over what seb just spoke about. my focus has been mainly south asia and isis for this discussion. the potential that isis will encroach in this region is growing daily. i'd like to read something to

you. a document that i obtained in the region, an isis document. i'm going to read one portion of that and i think it will fit into what seb spoke about. al baghdadi is very focused on the hadids of the end times. his folk sus on estatology. his moond-ind-set is to launch this final battle with the west, with the refltst of the world to see a fundamental change between not necessarily in the way a christian might see armageddon, but a change and shift in the world powers and system. that is his ultimate goal. here is a little piece of what's been floating around in the fatah recently. talking about al baghdadi. he's his blessed brilliance shines through his practical

life. he is filled with the honor of god and is informed approach to matters of faith is unparalleled. before the u.s. attacked iraq he acted as a sermonizer and scholar in various mosques. he was also highly regarded in academic circles. the purpose of life was to purify one's self for which it was essential to follow the fundamentals of prayer establish the caliphate and wage jihad and warfare until all faith is oriented to allah. this is the important part. although he was primarily focused on inciting slaughter. this isis document is so significant because it gives us a look into the mund of baghdadi and what his intensions are. you'd say well south arbia, what is he trying to do there? he's looking for more recruits.

he's looking to gain and spread the caliphate wide enough that it spreads us so thin that we'll be incapable of tackling on all these fronts. it's a brilliant strategy. he built up his financial base got his recruits. and if you believe what they are doing, 16000, i think that's even minimal. i think it was 20,000 plus foreign fighters that have gone into syria. in ramadan alone according to some of my sources last year, more than 6,000 and from the documents i've seen from the united states, from chechnya from europe across north africa, in the month of ramadan alone 6,000 fighters. in afghanistan, the situation is obviously very tenuous. you have fractured taliban

groups. you have certainly the united states and pakistan in a geopolitical situation that is seemingly never ending. but you also have pockets inside the region that isis is now encroaching on. and this isn't just hypothetical. this is a fact. it may not be widespread yet but they do have aye plan. if i can go back really quickly and read one more thing. you talked about the name and how important that is. for him, islamic state caliphate. the islamic state caliphate was the transformation on june 29th last year when abu bagrab baghdadi walked on those steps and i've been talking about his

mannerisms and how he moved and what he did. he was very methodical and knew what he was doing as far as reaching the muslim populist. those disenfranchised sunnis who feel there's nowhere for them to turn to. that the world is somehow working against them. he uses that to his benefit and the benefit of his movement. and like seb said and i'm sure like you'll be talking about the war and this is coming from a reporter who has been on the ground in the war zone quite a bit and who spent some time in pakistan and had been able to experience the fatah region. it's not something you can win with drone strikes alone. the commanders on the ground when you talk to hold mujahadin fighters, they'd say, you're not going to win this with a drone

strike. you're not going to win this battle by trying to build a state at the same time you're fighting a war. this is a never-ending battle that's going to evolve. a lot of people didn't listen to them. we're going to wrap up the war, leave afghanistan, tie up a bow on iraq and walk away. this is about an ideology. unless we understand this ideology and this leader and those leaders underneath him, we will never be able to defeat him because you can't defeat an ideology unless you're able to exploit it. you have to understand where he's coming from in order to teach something different to deliver a different message. for me looking at -- back to afghanistan and the region in itself one of the things i know is coming out from the sources

i'm speaking to in pakistan is the fear isis may conduct operations in the region. whether that be in india afghanistan. recently we saw just yesterday there was a drone strike. killed approximately eight isis members and the leader in that region right now. there's definitely a concern among u.s. intelligence officials that i've had the privilege to speak to as well as pakistani officials. mostly their government denies isis presence. i've spoken with the foreign secretary. he says there's no isis here and we've basically disseminated the taliban. that's not what i'm hearing from the region or the people. we've seen isis encroach in undia. indian officials have been monitoring that trying to garner recruitment and establish some sort of presence there.

so for lawmakers, as well as those in the academic field the focus is on iraq and syria and north africa. we shouldn't forget that south asia is going to play an enormous role and it plays an enormous role in the estatology. it looks at the islamic faith the belief. if you look at the writings of muhammad of muhammad's life the ones he focuses on the most are the ones of end times. those are his main focus. part of the final battle is a precursor battle that takes place in southeast asia. we're not going to get the final battle until the precursor battle in south asia actually happens. however that happens, it's definitely in baghdadi's plans.

and it's something that i think shouldn't be ignored and an area of focus we need to pay a lot of attention to. to wrap it up a lot of people think the taliban may never merge with isis, that they are two centric to their own area. i can tell you that based on the investigations that i've been conducting and the research i've been doing, isis is working day and night to move recruits into their fold. and there is this conception that isis and al qaeda, which is true now, are continuously butting heads. well what i found to be very interesting was that baghdadi has been preaching among his group. look al qaeda and islamic state, we had different ways of achieving things, but that doesn't make us enemies.

that's just allah's will. that's how he willed it. so now is the time to look at what we've accomplished and join us. and the message is reaching people in the fatah. it's reaching and we can see people have been joining them. the small factions breaking off and joining with them. this message is holding true to them. i really truly believe there definitely needs to be more focus in the south asia area. we were surprised by isis' rise in iraq and their ability to take that territory from the iraqi military as well as from us and what we have tried to put into iraq and the syria region. we should definitely have our eyes set on south asia. i think they can make us surprised once again if we're not paying attention. thank you. >> thank you.

>> i think it's always amazing how we end up being surprised by the growth of isis and al qaeda groups because we weren't paying attention to what they are doing at the local level. i don't want to rehashu isis' strategy. fundamentally, we cannot defeat the threat from radical islam without actually tackling both isis and al qaeda. it's not sufficient to defeat al qaeda ine rack iraq and syria. it's doing well in areas it's remained strong and there isn't that strong challenge from isis today. at the same time we found just focusing on al qaeda leading into 2013, 2014 allowed for isis to grow back and resurge in iraq. what al qaeda tries to do is it

sees itself as uniting the jihad. it looks for radical islamists to educate them to correct them and enable them to be more powerful than they would be at a local level and bring together the muslim world under a single unified banner of fighting for this. al qaeda does not see governance and state building at the immediate level as the priority. we can see this again in al qaeda documents where leaders are told do not call yourself a state. if you call yourself a state, the people will expect you to take away their garbage, to provide water, to provide food, to keep electricity running. what you should do instead is be effective in the areas where you can, provide security when it's not there. do provide water goods, services but do not call yourself a state because that builds up expectations and we

are not able to fulfill that nou. you saw al qaeda fail at thus in yemen, mali somalia. agone and again when it tried to replace the state, it failed. it's much more of a long-term vision of insurgency. the reverse of that is al qaeda is not directly attacking the muslim states today in the way we see isis really looking to break the iraqi state. al qaeda is looking to break the west first. it sees the objective as forcing the united states and other western partners to retreat from the region. some some degree it's been somewhat successful. isis has also helped them. i think the unwillingness to become engaged in the counterinsurgency fights in north africa and the rest of the middle east region and growing in south asia has enabled isis

and al qaeda to do very well in the last couple of years. but it is looking to call everyone to islam. when baghdadi declared the islamic caliphate you saw reaction from the al qaeda leadership from north africa into south asia that said we do support an islamic caliphate. we do not support the current islamic caliphate because it was not brought out the right way. i'm not going to argue either way. but the animosity with isis isn't over the fact it's isis. al qaeda sees isis as trying to do this the wrong way. isis killing other muslims, it is killing sunni and doing that very publicly. al qaeda will assassinate official who has acted out against it. it will do it off camera in general. al qaeda in iraq being the major exception and isis is the

successor to that organization. the al qaeda networks despite the challenge from isis, have remained cohesive. we haven't seen mass key leaders defecting from al qaeda. we still have a strong and resurgent in north africa, al qaeda network coming back. al shabab remains loyal to al qaeda. there are rumors that al shabab will move to isis because of finance and because it hasn't been successful yet in somalia and kenya with what it's doing. aqap al qaeda in the arabian peninsula and yemen is doing quite well. aqap might go to isis. we just saw their new leader come out and repledge their allegiance to zawahiri. so why am i arguing that al

qaeda is still doing well? it's not the most eminent threat to the united states. i think isis is the greatest threat. i think that al qaeda is an enduring threat and isis has raised the bar for intervention that it's dangerous long term for us. there's now a level at which al qaeda can operate with relative impugnnity because it's not isis. i mentioned the magreb system. that's focussed on nigeria and france. but what we see is the resurgence of attacks in mali. it's not thatm portent to the united states but aqam has convinced and facilitated edd movement of fighters across the area. there's a smuggling network. there's a major boon to any organization that is trying to enter europe. we're looking at libya.

why isis has a presence there. it's also suffered setbacks in derna which was its flagship city it held in libya. one of the challenges isis will face is that libya is 99% sunni. isis has thrived in environments where there's a sectarian difference within the population. most sunni i'll characterize here, do not like living under isis rule and they'd find a softer hand, and al qaeda does have a slightly softer hand because it's not looking to build that state and implement sharia immediately a little more acceptably. let's look at east africa. al shabab has been said to be on the run, on in defeat. it's lost control of a state it once held. in 2009 al shabab controlled south central syria. it's been a success in that

sense but al shabab is not defeated. it's adapted and evolved and it's still exploitsing the challenges in somalia and in kenya and growing in that sense as an insurgency and will be automobile able to exist as a threat to the yoos. al shabab over the fourth of july weekend took back a series of military bases from afghan peacekeeping troops near mogadishu. as the groups try to deal with this new federal government that's finally recognized that has no actual sovereignty over the state of somalia. al shabab is exacerbating tensions in kenya. and it will continue to be able to exploit that scene. so i would look to that as a group that's going to continue to exist. it's not going to be able to attack the united states

homeland the way we see from isis, but it is a threat and enduring one because it has the east africa -- the horn of africa that it can access. looking at yemen i've been looking at yemen for 5 1/2 years. the conditions there are so fundamentalley different than in 2011 when we saw aqap having success in building its little emirate in the soth. aqap hasn't declared an emirate in the south but it is currently governing one of the port cities in eastern yemen, and there is no one fighting it. the al qaeda fighters are there. it is known they are there and influential in the governance of the city but they've stayed to the shadows except a few times where we've had drone strikes and taken out key leaders. it's extremely successful in yemen in tapping into the mass

mobilization that's occurring against the al huthi, president saleh connection. for those unaware, there's a major war being fought in yemen between powerful actors as to who controls the state. the al huthis not representative of all in yemen, are fighting and currently control the capital and the entire state of yemen because they hold the key unfra structure. they progress southward rapidly and hit a front line where you run into the sunni population of yemen. they don't see themselves along sectarian lines, similar to iraq in the early days of the second ooh rack war and they aren't seeing the fight today as sectarian. they are working alongside tribesmen and integrating themselves into the fight. this is similar to what was done in syria where now it's going to

be near impossible to separate nusra from the syrian opposition. al qaeda is trying to do that same thing in yemen. isis is probably strongest in yemen of all the places i mentioned, accepting what it's doing in libya. but it's capabilities are still limited. its most powerful demonstration has been the car bomb campaign against al huthi targets. it is trying to drive a sectarian war in yemen the way it drove it in iraq. there's a potential they'll see it as sectarian. the region itself is sectarian. the campaign against the huthis has created the conditions for saudi arabia and iranian proxy war inside of yemen. it's being cast beneeths sectarian terms in the region. there's potential for isis to

capitalize on that. i don't see it in the near term and i don't think isis will find the same safe haven it's had in iraq and syria. but there is the potential. so rounding out, i just want to underscore in those areas that i mentioned, we have partnered forces fighting al qaeda. they're not winning al qaeda's -- against al qaeda's insurgency. and that's something to look for as we focus on the threat to the homeland. this is a long-term war and we need to be prepared to fight and support a long-term war. thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you to all of our panelists. that was an excellent discussion framing the overall terrorist threat we face. i'm so glad we had this discussion. i think if you look at this simplistically or on the face of

it. it's kind of luke capitalism the competition is fueling them both to be more brutal in their competition with each other and so unfortunately, this is not playing to our favor at the moment. obviously, if there was battle royale between both groups killing off each other, that would be a benefit. right now we see more of a competition. if you look at the establishment of al qaeda in the indian subcontinent which zawahiri announced last fall it was probably an effort to compete with the message that was something from isis. and i noticed that around 12 aqis members were arrested in bangladesh just this last week. so i would like to have our panelists address the isis

inroads into south asia. i think what sara said is really important. and even though right now they are competing, the taliban is clearly not happy with isis trying to set up camp, the taliban issued a letter telling them to back off. i think isis realizes it can't replace the taliban as the major fighting force. the taliban is just too established in that region. but will they try to make common cause with the taliban? this is what sarah was getting at. will we see emerging together of the two? and i think this would be very dangerous for the u.s. and if the speakers could address that issue because what we heard from dr. gorka was that isis is the graduate level. but, you know, does this really

hold up when you're looking at afghanistan? the taliban has been able to continue the fight there after 14 years. the taliban still has you know, sway in that region. i don't think it's going to be so easy for isis to make its inroads despite it trying. and if you look at how the idea of peace talks plays into this, just on tuesday the taliban engaged in peace talks with the afghan leadership in pakistan. quite significant. but what is their calculation? because on the one hand, maybe the taliban would favor peace talks so the afghan security forces and nato forces turn their guns on the isis camps in afghanistan. on the other hand, this could cause greater disention.

so we're really in a state of flux right now in afghanistan with regard to isis and the taliban. but i would like to hear the panelists' comments, what think, how they see this moving in the future. >> well the ladies with the real expertise on the ground with these issues, but let me share with you maybe a macro perspective. it's an analogy my wife hates but my viewers on fox love it, so i'm going to use it anyway. think of soft drinks for a second. and for 14 years al qaeda was that red can with the white logo. right? it was coca-cola. it dominated the jihadi brand and then two years ago this little upstart breaks out and it's a kind of tab cola. most of you are too young to

even know what tab cola is, but it's a very junior coke. and in the space of less than two years it is isis that has become coca-cola. that's what we're talking about. don't focus on individual groups. focus upon who has successfully become the ideological brand leader because today it is the islamic state that dominates the narrative. i hate the word but let's use it. it dominates the international narrative. today al qaeda is really relegated to being the rc coke of koeg colaal coca-cola. what they have right now is a prestige question. can they swallow the bitter pill of seeing their upstart poor cousin now being their brand leader and am i going to, say, i'm going to stay outside i'm going to try to claw my way back. i don't have the social media

capabilities but i'm going to do it anyway because i was here first, or are they going to say, okay guys, it's -- you know, if you can't beat them join them? that's only decisions. >> zawahiri can make. right now the brand leader with the shiny red can is isis. >> and i think you brought up, if i may, a point there with zawahiri. if you look at baghdadi, his relationship with osama bin laden was, he respected him. he exalted him. it wasn't that he looked at bin laden as a threat to what he was creating. they had disagreements on how they were going to achieve kind of the same goal. it was really in the first phase of the war against the west. i mean, everybody knows this line.

zarqawi, he was trained to believe they got to take down the nation states. those countries like saudi arabia and jordan, who were working diligently with the west, they believed, and with the israelis and who had these relationships that were anti-muslim. that they weren't even connected. baghdadi would say himself why do you need a passport to travel to egypt or jordan if you're a muslim? we should be one state. and so then -- and then you had bin laden who was like okay, this guy you know, i'm going to -- i respect him. he and i can work together. for some time until the passing. and when the baton was passed to zawahiri, i think and from what i've been reading and from what i've been learning baghdadi was

like this guy is completely different. we don't need to deal with him. he doesn't allow us to go after the shia. i mean, they're the heretics. he doesn't even want to say the word. if you look at writings of isis, they don't even use the word shia. they use the word heretic. it's like they don't even exist. all of their writings already seem like they've won. they talk about this future, this grand future, in a sense in the present tense. not in the past. not in a hopeful sense. so, when you think about the message he's delivering inside south asia he's saying, look, i'm not opposed -- in fact, he respected the taliban. if you really delve deep into baghdadi, he thought the taliban did the most marvelous job. they stood up against the west. they stood up against the united states. the u.s. came in. osama fled from tora bora.

there were you know -- and the taliban never backed down. never backed down. not even to pakistan. so, he delivers a message that's appealing to them. obviously, they don't want to give up their power. but i believe, like lisa said, the possibility of saying, okay let us sustain our kingdom here and then maybe we can work together. and the common purpose being to push the west out to push nato out, to re-establish an emirat in afghanistan and basically go after, like the peace talks the pakistani government, which the taliban really has no time for. these peace talks are just to fill in a void, for them in my opinion, and buy time. that's just my opinion. >> great. i would like to open the floor

to our audience. if you have a question please raise your hand. somebody will bring a microphone to you. if you could state your name and affiliation and then ask your question. so, we have somebody right here in the middle. >> i'm with in defense of christians. my question is for you, dr. dr. gorka, you mentioned the air strikes are really doing nothing to isis' caliphate or what they're trying to do. so, in your opinion, how should the united states look to address the kurds, who are actually the most effective in fighting isis? >> great. thank you. i'm impressed with the kurds. they're not quite as impressive as they like to think they are, but they're impressive, but

they're not going to defeat isis. you hear a lot of -- how shall i say this politely? there's a lot of clamoring on the hill to make the kurds you know, the silver bullet. i've even heard people tell me that it's 100% sure that kurds will wipe up -- wipe out isis in non-kurdish territory -- of iraq. and that's the big challenge. this isn't fundamentally a military challenge, it's a

political one. most constitutial elements of iraq don't even believe in iraq anymore. not even the shia that run them out of tehran. it's a little attachment to their country. it's a little bit they stuck on the edge of the house. so, we have to be part of the political solution that convince them iraq has a future. and i don't think actually despite the sectarian history and the desire for blood feud and revenge, i don't think that's a hard argument to make on one foundation. if you really take emotion out of the equation, there is not one actor in iraq who by themselves can defeat isis. it's just a fact. i don't care who you are. i don't care whether you're a good sunni whether you're a shia, whether you're a kurd, whether you're a yazidi. only by coming together can that happen. but it has to happen with our troops imbedded as advisors.

that's the only reason mow sul fell. the iraqi army was 900,000 men in uniform. 900,000. a couple hundred thousand took mosul. that's absurd. all the tribes could run home to momma because we weren't there to shame them, as i'm sure you're aware perform the culture of the region especially for men, revolves around shame and honor. shame and honor. if there's nobody there to be embarrassed about, you're running home. then you will run home to your tribe, because that's the entity that has protected you the best for the last 300 years or 400 years or whatever it is. so, we have to be part of the problem -- part of the solution. we have to sell the concept of a functioning iraq and we have to really jettison once and for all, but the enemy of the enemy is an enemy of my friend, is complete complete hogwash when

it comes to iran. the idea this iran, because they're killing sunni extremists are our friends? you have to be smoking something and it's not tobacco to believe that. all right? >> thank you. we have a question over here. >> yes. i'm nate madden with the 21st century wilbur force initiative. and i was wondering if the panel could speak a little more to understanding this ideology. dr. gorka, you mentioned how the narrative of -- the information warfare is that we're putting out, that the west is putting out, is completely insufficient to combat what isis is doing on social media. how can the narrative be better influenced to counteract that? and is it going to require just simply educating people in a very secular context that