years after the war. and a congressional briefing on internet defamation lawsuits and their impact on freedom of speech. this aoefrbt the shanghai institutes for international studies. it is 90 minutes. good morning, everybody.

welcome to center for american progress. we're glad to see folks here on a rainy monday morning. i'm vice president for national security and international policy here. i would like to welcome our distinguished guests from shanghai. they have both managed to get to washington despite a typhoon that disrupted all air operations out of shanghai. so we're extremely happy you're here safe and sound. we hope the jet lag won't keep you from raising strong arguments and lively discussions this morning. back in february 2014, the china u.s. change institution and shanghai institute neuer international studies discussed a report on a new model for

major power realizes. it stressed it needed to be more about avoiding conflict. they needed to look at forward-looking actions and cooperations to tackle joint problems like counterterrorism and climate change. at a private dinner following that launch of that report some months before i joined, i hear a lively discussion taking place in the middle east. from energy security to countering violent extremism. it seems clear there were common interest. it was not clear whether the two nations wanted to work together or could figure out a way to do so. the culmination of a year of research and exchanges between the two organizations. it started with that dinner and

continued through a series of video conferences and high-level dialogue in beijing, china in march of this year. both sides viewed the regions as an incredible promise but marred by uncertainty political risks. they asked whether the u.s. and china could find areas of win-win corporation far afield while managing regional concerns and growing tensions in asia itself. they looked at egypt's prospects for future stability the legacy of the arab spring, and the ideas for coordination between the u.s., new silk road and china's belt and road concepts. longstanding issues in the u.s./china relationship remain moving in a positive direction and some significant areas towards greater tension. but today we look for common ground in a volatile region that

is important to both countries. the united states and china have a special responsibility over global influence. before we kick off the panel discussion, it's my great honor to welcome alan wong, of the exchange foundation for opening remarks. alan has been a vital partner facilitating and coordinatoring dialogue with the shanghai institute and others. it's a great pleasure to have him again. alan? >> thank you very much. welcome to this panel discussion. i note that very soon the world will celebrate 70 years

anniversary of world war ii. it reminds me somehow how fortunate my generation that we have seen no major conflict of that magnitude in our times. but it also reminds me, you know, we shouldn't take this for granted. there are plenty of predictions that an emerging power like china will inevitably come into contact with an established power like the united states. my colleagues from cap and international studies want to believe otherwise. that there is preordained about this. and we always believe we should grant every opportunity and

create the necessary conditions to improve mutual understanding to expand strategic trust and help establish an even stronger violation for u.s./china bilateral relations, which is the most important relations of our times. the high-level people-to-people exchange has just taken place recently. i was going through the lists of accomplishments of both and was quite pleasantly surprised and encouraged by the breadth and depth of the items listed. in the sebd alone, there were 127 items listed.

and despite what we read and hear every day about the disagreements between two countries, south chinese seas and the new national security laws of china, et cetera. overall relations have been on an upward steady trend. again, we must also must look beyond our bilateral relations and explore possible means of cooperation in other parts of the world. we are prejudiced to be a part of it. we join our close and very capable partners led by deleon and also of course international studies by professor yang to explore the cooperation in the middle east, which is the most

volatile region in the world. through their unrelenting efforts for more than a year, they have produced these studies. and i'm very much looking forward to the panel discussion and their conclusions. so once again, all of the colleagues in siis on behalf of my organization, a nonprofit organization based in hong kong to moat u.s./china relations, thank you all very much. [ applause ].

and thank you all. thank you all for being here. i'm really excited to have this great group with us. this is one of the more innovative things we have done. people don't think about the u.s. and china in the middle east. but the fact is both of us have vital strategic interests in the region. clearly a lively dinner set off a year of back and forth and dialogue and culminated in being able to issue a report today. i'm just going to quickly let you know who is on the stage with us. immediately to my right is a senior fellow shanghai institute and deputy director of the department of american studies. dr. wu is focus said on china/american security relationship and arms control and nuclear deterrent issues very relevant in the middle east as we speak right now. immediately to her right is rudy

deleon senior fellow here at the national security team at cap. he's been at cap since 2007. many of you know rudy well. former deputy secretary of defense for the united states. he has been very deeply engaged in u.s./china relations. among the people here he probably splits his time between the middle east and china more than anyone else. he is perfectly suited for this job today. immediately to his dr. is senior fellow shanghai institute for national studies. and looking at the middle east. and finally ryan is senior fellow here and runs the middle east program at the center for american progress. well-known to many of you.

and he focuses on the middle east and south asia. this is his opportunity to get exposure to china and think about how the two major powers could potentially cooperate in the region. what i'm going to do is ask each of our panelists to give a few introductory remarks. we will go into discussion and open it up to the audience for questions and answers. >> thank you very much is. good morning, ladies and gentlemen. it is my great pleasure and a privilege to be here. and? china we say if you want to play a role you have to be through the grilling of people in the

united states. i'm a little bit different from some people. they try to emphasize on the question problems of the china/u.s. relations. very often i would like to play the role of aeu most beautiful part of the china/u.s. realize. now, what my thinking about the project are china/u.s. cooperation on the middle east affairs. i think there are three reasons why we embark upon this very

meaningful profit. first of all the strategic importance of the middle eastern region. and this is the concentration of all the difficult conflicts relations of country to country, major power, religions et cetera. if you want to understand how the international affairs are working, you must understand how it works. secondly, some people say now we reduce the dependence of united states on the middle east oil and the gas of the shale

revolution et cetera the united interest is on the wane but i don't think so. this is very superficial. and the understanding, they the most of their money, manpower, political will. and just look at the secretary of state, john kerry. how many times he is doing on the middle east affairs. and also this is a place where china and the united states could complement each other. the united states is the most strong strongest and influential country in the region whereas china maintains

good relations with all the conflicting parties. and also china's dependence on middle east not only the energy but also others are increasing. and final is becoming from a regional power to a global power. so china needs a more proactive role. we can discuss and work together. the united states and china do not necessarily see eye to eye on everything. however, we could work under the

overarching concept of new model of major power relations between china/united states to tackle with this very serious challenges. and this is why and how both parties come together thanks to the china/u.s. exchange foundation in hong kong. and i'm very pleased this is what you have in your hand. thank you. >> thank you, doctor. i'm going to turn to rudy for a few minutes for opening remarks. >> thank you very much. once again, the two of us were co-owners of this project. it did again, as vikram noted, in 2014 when we were having the discussion on new major powers relation.

this was a chapter in a very recent book. it looked at rising powers and established powers from the perspective of germany and britain. and i think for no other reason but many others the fact is in the 21st century the united states and china will be setting a different course. one vastly different than traditions out of europe. and i think it's reflected in the audience here today where we see many friends many engaged voices in the debate. both across the pacific but also some of the leading experts on middle east policy here in attendance as well. so when we had our discussion more than a year ago, we note said that in fact working together means working together as two countries on areas where there can be win-win. but more important to have a

dialogue where there are issues of disagreement. now, as we press forward and as we look to a summit meeting in washington that is coming between president obama and president she in the september time range, we know there will be working together as highlighted by the most recent strategic and economic dialogue that just occurred but also know there are other issues of disagreement, most predominantly the cyto question which is front page news and has been front page news as well as some of the issues of the south china sea. but in these video conferences and dialogues in the discussions that brian vick ran and i and dr. hart our other cap colleague and john were able to participate in march we were looking at how we might forage a better relationship on critical issues in the middle east.

it's the energy center. but finding ways to make a constructive response in dealing with extremism, we have seen the consequences of extremism to the west, that was 9/11 and some of the attacks in europe and france in particular. the fact that all of our security forces were on vigorous alert over this fourth of july weekend to deal with some of the extreme threats coming from the middle east. we know that these are issues that are not going away. and we know that there are other stakeholders in the region, including china. and that one of the things that is extremely important is where there is common ground. can the u.s. and china work together. and more importantly, not be played off against each other among all of these constituencies. so in our discussions both in

the video conferences i'll let brian discuss egypt and the middle east geo-political issues, as well as dr. w. but one area on the new silk road. one belt one road. the chinese term for the same issues, we looked at this how we might use economic strategy to find complimentary and consistent ways of working together in central asia collaborating in complimentary ways looking to expand local economic growth through connectivity in a very, very critical region. the silk road, the one belt one road really takes us to pakistan, which is an avenue both for trying to work in a constructive way but also recognizing that pakistan was the origins of the al qaeda in

afghanistan as well. and so how can these two common interests of the u.s. and china in finding a better path forward in the middle east work together in central asia in pakistan, in afghanistan, in a complimentary and consistent way. collaboration is important because this is one of the least integrated, least developed areas of the world. and that they suffer from an insecurity that can push forces into the west, as well as east. and so we also know that this is a region with rising youth bulges and that they are projecting to face increasing unemployment. similarly, the ability to meet the sustainable security goals in this region is one that will require political and diplomatic attention as well as an economic

focus, if we are to find a constructive path going forward. i'd like to thank our colleague add cap vie, harding muck tar awwad, all part of our developing these issues and putting forward the report today. but i think it's interesting when you talk with people as we have cap and the shanghai institutes that you can find framing the question and starting a discussion putting words down on paper can actually lead to a constructive path forward. we'll have our differences. we'll have issues that are of critical divide. but that there are common interests and that it will be important for the u.s. and china to work together on these issues of central asia, on these issues of the middle east as we move forward. vikram, thank you for hosting

us. thank you for co-editing this paper and for always being on the video conferences, which when they are 12 hours time difference one side is getting up very early in the morning or staying late in the office. we thank those folks and alan long and the china exchange association for partnering with vikram as well. >> thanks rudy. your thoughts? >> thank you very much. i'm very glad to be here and have this opportunity to join the discussion on china/u.s. cooperation on middle eastern affairs. i read the report and i share with many opinions of colleagues presented in the report. i think that -- i totally agree that china and united states have actually many common

interests in the middle east. the two countries can cooperate with each region. and another thing i want to mention here is that actually chinese and american scholars share a vision what is happening in middle east now. they both notice there is a great transition, transformation in the middle east now. it is just opening. and it is just in the process of the transformation. and china and the united states to some degree have to adapt to that kind of change. that is a very big change in the middle east. it seems that the united states is bringing a strategy to the middle east and trying to build up kind of a new balance in the

region, to bring a relationship in that region. of course the united states is a major player in middle east. china at current stages still not as active as the united states. but just like the professor said just now, china should be and will be more active in the region. so the two countries have to consider how we cooperate with each other. it is kind of a big change in that very important region in the world. and the third thing i want to say is about the project of china and the united states. i do think they are subparts. the two countries can cooperate with each other. very interesting they are

overlapping geographically in this region. especially afghanistan. central asian countries and south asia, india pakistan. so that's one of the ways they can cooperate. and the other thing is they pay a lot of attention to economic development in this region. and i think that is the way to some degree to stabilize the region and contribute to the stability of the region. so it is possible for china and united states to coordinate on that kind of concrete project. and of course on that project, china and the united states need more dialogues, discussions.

because the two projects designed from different departments. for example, each other basically is how to say, in charge by the state, and development committee. so it is basically about the economic tkwolt. development. so how to carry out that dialogue between the governments. and it will be important to push forward. >> thank you so much. it's great to have you here. and we're finally going to turn to brian. brian explored some of the trickier areas. as he was saying in the introduction, common interests are pretty clear. how the interests are prioritized and how you approach countries going through dramatic challenges and how we approach

countries that have internal problems but we would like to help them move different directions. profoundly differently. we have looked at egypt in work and also in pakistan where there are interesting new areas we can have discussion. >> thank you. thank you all for coming. thank you, dr. wu and dr. yang. we appreciate the dialogue. we at the center of our middle east work have had an extensive dialogue with key actors in the middle east, the region, and obviously with our friends in europe about what to do at this time of change. and doing this project i think was essential to try to look ahead with a longer term perspective of where things are going in the region and what are the possibilities. i thought i would make one overarching comment about the u.s. china cooperation in the region and talk about three issues. one, the issue of silk road

second egypt, and third iran briefly. although our reports don't address iran, it is a very important day. quite obviously today in the middle east the snapshot is key countries and a lot of nonstate actors are in a fierce competition for power and influence. in some parts like iraq and syria, we have seen the tearing down of governance and stability. if there's one message from the package of or reports and dialogue is that the u.s. and china as two great global powers should avoid picking sides in the many different sides of the conflicts of the middle east. it would accelerate the process of fragmentation. and i come out of this dialogue and this report hopeful that there is a basis for discussion but also mindful that there is a lot of work more that needs to be done between the and you say

china. we may have long-term common interests in the broad sense of things. when it gets down to the details of what we do it's very difficult. the u.s. remains the dominant military power in the middle east. for the very loose talk, some of our closest allies of the u.s. being disengaged, no other outside power has the networks and capabilities that the u.s. does. and other actors as we know including china, benefitted from this overarching strategic umbrella we have used for decades. it's framed. it's changing in the middle east. and i think the u.s. is just at the start of repositioning its overall strategy to the region. at the same time, i think this is where we'll get into this broader point, china has had a long-term strategy not only in the middle east but around the world of nonintervention. not taking positions essentially on a region that actually wants

outside actors to choose sides. in essence, i see china's role to develop favorable economic relationships while avoiding many conflicts of the region. in some ways i thought about this. what the obama administration tried to do in broad strokes in 2013, when you think bit of trying to use diplomacy to engage the israelis and palestinians. trying to engage diplomacy with the syrians. and the four-point plan in 2012 all of these things led bisect kerry they tried to do in the middle east, is very much what i think china would like to do. as we see from 2014 and the lesson of 2014 that the region taught us, especially groups like isis and daish taught us, all of those aspirations of trying to just use diplomacy without the other tools of security measures, it's harder i think to achieve results. and here we are in 2015.

and i think the fundamental challenge that the u.s. and china that to round out this overall point faces in trying to explore the avenues for cooperation is to try to avoid the mistakes that were made in previous decades in the last decade by other outside powers. the way i see the middle east in its fragmentation in certain key countries like yemen, the u.s. and china need to avoid the mistakes made by other outside powers of just extracting value of a region without helping the region produce its value. we can think of models present day and previous ones where outside powers went into regions and essentially took what they needed for their economy without helping those regions build up the structures. and i think a key lesson of today's middle east is very much the problems of the middle east are borne out of the extremism

of today and the mistakes of the previous decade. rudy mentioned it and others have too, it is essential for key countries of the region in the middle east where there is a lack of trade and transportation within the region itself. if you go to egypt regularly you go to some of the lesser developed parts of the region, not the gulf countries, there is extreme need for the types of investments that i think china is capable of doing. the u.s. i think is capable, is less willing after the last 15 years or so given the costs. and there is a complimentary perhaps. energy development quite obviously. china is becoming more dependent on the energy resources of the region. to help the middle east become

this hub to link asia africa and europe is a long term project where we should continue the discussions and see where it maps up. again, this point of creating value within the region while we do that is essential. value meaning how does the u.s. and china help create jobs and job growth in places like egypt if our countries come in with countries that don't address the youth bulge and things like this. the type of extremism we have seen on full display in the middle east will only grow. so if we have an extractive approach one that doesn't foster institutions, that will be very difficult. second on egypt. and i think at a time when everybody is focused on iran and giving the next deadline on talks, and isis, and given we have a program tomorrow with general allen on isis it is the

most populous country in the entire region. i think for the last four years it has teetered on the brink of political and economic and social collapse. i think it is still in a very tenuous phase at this point. and when we talk about adopting or adapting the new silk road to place like egypt, there's obvious places where it feats in. with the attempt to build the second suez canal and help egypt become a much more place to link countries together. we may have differences of views. and we can talk about this. how is the best way for egypt to approach the extremism and terrorism problem. as we see in the last few weeks, this problem is not only gotten worse, it has made things much more difficult in places not only in the sinai peninsula but cairo proper. and this is where, again i think not only what type of

inclusive economic growth we want to try to promote to help the societies establish value but what type of politics do these societies actually have. what's sustainable. in my view egypt today is on the brink of not only islamists but not allowing them to be the space that creates a sustainable security. everyone though our reports don't mention it, and we wisely didn't mention it because of the uncertainty in the iran talks throughout this whole period when we had these dialogues. because you get into this business of analyzing something that is just not complete. this is quite good at that. we are about to do more of that. deal or no deal we will divide into camps and things for the rest of the summer at least about what happens here on iran. i think though we didn't talk much about it in the papers we

had discussions on the sidelines. to me obviously u.s. and china had a shared interest in preventing iran from getting a nuclear weapon. but the devil was in the details. deal or no detail to analyze that. but if there is a deal, both of our countries have a responsibility to be very careful how we implement on what that deal looks like. people talk about snap back of sanctions. we didn't discuss whether they could be translated into mandarin or chinese. but it will be essential. and i think china going back to my overall comments, nonintervention in foreign policy becomes much more difficult when you have an agreement than when you don't. how do we figure out the best way to cooperate. china is iran's largest trading

partner. it affects them in a different way than the united states. china, as we also know from its history, has had a history of weapons sales in the region and around the region. and i think we need to stay focused on that. and china i think no matter what happened, deal or no deal on iran will have the difficult balancing act of how to maintain positive relationships with saudi arabia and riyadh and a working relationship with tehran as well. i'll close by potentially saying the middle east is obviously in a period of equilibrium. what we are trying to do is the outside powers, the great powers of the united states and china, should try to be as constructive as possible in adjusting the equilibrium. if we make a mistake by choosing sides, say iraq or in seay on different sides, rather than try to foster some common goals there i think would be very

difficult. but i think in conclusion though, it's harder when you get into the details of cooperation. the u.s. has its own views. it actually believes i think still on balance that it needs not solely a military approach but a different type of political engagement and diplomacy and in some ways the toughest is with our closest friends. so i'll close there. >> thank you. thank you very much, brian. a lot of food for thought from all of you. and i want to make sure it's time for members of the audience to get questions too. but i do want to get to a few important issues. while i have the chair. the first thing i want to ask about. i think i'll ask both our chinese friends to help us think through. how does china view this emergence of isis? and specifically this unfolding

and metastasizing of global terrorism and extremism? i ask in light of the justice weekend of uighurs being transported back from china to turkey. and this sort of seems that china is starting to be affected by terrorism and extremism much more in a way a that western countries have felt they are being affected by it and now facing similar challenges. how do you both ensure you are addressing the concerns and needs of a domestic population and preventing a move to extremism and participating with other countries encountering these global networks. i think it's not clear for many americans what china see its role as an international coalition against isis and how

it analyzes the connections between the global extremist movements and what's affected china directly. and dr. wu if you would like to chime in. >> thank you. this is a very good point. china hopes that the emerging and the worsening of the isis, and they have a lot of other names, the extremism and terrorism is a great challenge to the whole international community. and we think we should not only tackle with the symptoms but also the courses which could be

traced into the local development, domestic politics stagnation of economics and religious sectarianism, et cetera. so this is a real new challenge to the world to the united states, to china and others. secondly this is even more serious challenge than let's say the 9/11 or the others because in the year 2001, these terrorists were still disbursed and also intangible. but now they even created the

so-called estate. they are there. anti-houstonitys, et cetera. and this should never be allowed. this is why china and the united states and other countries join others in condemning isis. because china and the united states have different practices. for instance, you have your airlines, coalition of the winning and able et cetera. but china has other ways of thinking and implementing. thirdly, china itself is a

victor of terrorism and extremism. for instance, the single of china, the heart of the country, was attacked by the terrorists. just like an attack against the white house or something of the same battle. and now we found thousands of terrorists and extremists smuggled out into syria iraq to

fight and to gain experience and the few of them smuggle said back. so these are the real anti-human challenges. and china wants to work with the united states and others to do that. so is in china we pay greater attention to the harmonization of society. we try to eliminate the poverty. one of the soils for breeding this extremism and this terrorism. of course sometimes like the strong to kill a cancer, they have the side effects. some occurred because we do not

know what is the battle way. some could be soft or improved in the course of development of the medicine. and so we also need to learn from the united states and other countries. so i think i am better to stop here and dr. wu. >> i just want to adhere a few points. there might be many reasons for the rising of the terrorism and extremism. but very important reason is that the balance of power the original balance of power in the middle east to some degree broken and now we need a little bit to resume that kind of regional order or kind of system.

but it consumes time. i mean the united states and other countries maybe make efforts to that kind of direction. but important force have to form the meeting of countries in the middle east for their development. to some degree we still need some kind of patience in that kind of process. and the second thing i want to say is that the countries like china and the united states really need to exchange our cooperation. especially with that kind of border on that kind of border protection and issues. also, i think the countries need major powers outside the region need to create some kind of atmosphere for the region to

stabilize their relationship. and also of course china/united states maybe need to invest more to that kind of society building which is conducive to that kind of stabilizing the situation. so there are a lot of different areas china and the united states can cooperate not just on the military side but the social, financial and other areas. >> if i could add, i mean again, the root causes i think are essential in looking at the region holistically is important. and the idea of harmonization within societies is a great idea for a place like syria or iraq. but we're a long ways off from that. i think, again, whatever happens with the iran nuclear talks the aspiration of trying to help the middle east achieve some sustainable equilibrium is the right one. two areas that i think one that

may be a longer term prospect and one that's a little more mundane and concrete, one is both u.s. and china discussing with the regional powers quite candidly that their support for support proxies, whether iran or our friends in the arab gulf is deeply unhelpful whether it's in yemen, syria or iraq, that is it contributing to the fragmentation of these societies. if there's one fundamental to explain what's going on in the middle east today, it's hard because it's so complex. but the one thing is that countries that have more resources quite off from oil resources are deploys those in proxy fights throughout the region. and getting to at least a cease-fire in some of these fronts, if not all of them, i think is essential to do that. and that part is more candid talk i think openly and quietly from the u.s. to key partners in the gulf region. matter what happens

with this iran deal there's still a worrisome role that it plays with its proxies and extremists too. i think sending that signal that we need to be serious about the asymmetric threat that it has posed is not helpful to the broader ring general. so that's sort of i think a longer-term fight. i think the second and more mundane are things like when we get to the details of implementing an economic agenda in the region. ly think of egypt i think of a country that has so many different problems, but one thing that it hasn't done yet, which is a reform of energy subsidy systems, this is something, a problem that many countries in the region have had. pakistan had it as well too. president sistersy took one half step in the right direction. it's essential because without energy subsidy reform these societies are eating up so much of its own resources, its own budget, that is necessary to do infrastructure development, to actually set the framework for long-term stabilization and

prosperity in egypt. and those sources of things aren't as ambitious but i think are very tough to do because of systems that have been in place for decades. so if we actually had a meeting of the minds and talked about the details of how to help egypt move through its next phase, i think we'd agree on many things including the need for bureaucratic reform, better governance. but i think the u.s. and china might disagree on the style of governance, maybe, i don't know, about what sistersy's using right now. so those -- i think there's a lot of work to be done. and i close by saying, the outside powers of the u.s. and china can do much to set the table but ultimately i think we all agree it requires leadership within the region, it's tore stay the hand of vengeance on these sectarian battles or to push through on very historic difficult economic reforms like the energy subsidy reform in egypt. >> vikram let me make a few brief points. one, i should have noted that our report is available online

for those that are watching on c-span and elsewhere on the video. if you go to the cap website, the report is posted today and it's available to all. building out because i think just the fact that we started this conversation with our china friends is important. but one of the things that we have come to know is that the middle east is not a single issue. it is the security and another point is when president obama talked about the rebalance to asia, there was this view that somehow the u.s. was losing its interest or its commitment to the middle east. i think we have completely disproven that, not only in our dialogue by finding mutual goals for the region but reflected by the administration's hard efforts to continue to focus on the security of not just simply a single issue, the defeat of isis, but the security of

israel, the free flow of energy out of the persian gulf to deal with the prevention of extremism in individual countries other than in iraq and syria and that moving forward, if we want to broaden and get into the questions of economic strategy and diplomatic strategy, it's going to have to be more than just simply what we've seen in the past. skin in the game is an american colloquial term but it means participation in hard issues where, for the united states there's not necessarily a win-win there. we're doing it because of the importance of creating stability stability. alan wong in his opening comment noted for 70 years asia has been able to see this peaceful rise because it has not been consumed with regional rivalries but instead, everyone can focus on

economic development. that is unfortunately not the case in the middle east. and so we see a variety of tension points coming together. and so as we try to move beyond just simply the security questions but to the questions of, can diplomacy in the impasse in syria or can there be a prom program that actually does prevent an iranian nuclear weapon, let alone the regional issues they're going to require a cooperation that is consistent with the major powers' model. and i think is one where the u.s./china dialogue is in its initial phase. certainly these will be good issues to put on the agenda for washington as well as the economic, the cyber the other immediate issues in the u.s./china dialogue when we get

to september. >> let me see if i can press any or perhaps all of you on this. three of you have said that, the rebounds to asia, america's increasing energy independence, don't mean anything about changing u.s. strategic interest in the middle east. the united states will continue to be as interested, will continue to be as focused. and there are voices on the left and the right certainly of the political spectrum. so across the -- in the united states, that would not only say that's wrong they would say the united states should really take a big step back and that china is -- and the rest of asia are enjoying the benefits of american security for their energy supplies and letting america do the heavy lifting against terrorism and regional fragmentation, and that the only way to get others to step up more would be to step back a bit. so do you really believe that

u.s. interests will stay the same? i think there's a broad center in the united states that thinks that's vite because the u.s. should play a leadership role in the -- in ensuring there's a better world. most of us probably agree with that. but do you really think there's no prospects for a change in how the united states in the next decade or two actually looks at the middle east? >> well i said, almost parenthetically, i said i think we're at the start of a shift in the u.s. strategy to the region. i think we've begun it. almost no matter who becomes president in 2017, i think the lessons that have been learned over the last 15 years of first going into the iraq war, getting more deeply engaged and built on sort of a framework of u.s. engagement that essentially began decades and decades ago but got deeper after 1979. the whole security footprint that we've had in the region.

i actually think it's change is as we discuss it. and obama is unique in the fact that he's reflecting, i suspect where the next administration might go. which is not full disengagement. i was saying no other outside power has the presence that the u.s. has. but when you look at and your question left, right, just the general consensus here, i think there's a general view that the u.s. need not bear all of the burden, that we need to figure out ways to build partnerships first within the region, and that's where i think the coalition that the obama administration started to assemble against isis is the makings of something that may have some potential. there's some common interests there amongst all of the different actors. the notion that other countries like china have been already involved in maritime security and other things. how do we actually welcome this in a way that the u.s. still remains present? we're not disengaging but we're changing the nature of our

engagement. i suspect in the 2020s no matter what we'll still have a unique relationship with israel. i think no one else has done this and will continue to do it. but throughout the region, i think we really would welcome, a, first who are the partners that are most reliable and capable from within the region? then b, who else can help? because my main point is that the u.s. whether it's a republican or democrat, right or left, in 2015 they're looking at the middle east and scratching their heads and wondering what more can we do differently? we got hyperdanlged and we're involved in places like iraq. we pulled back and things seemed to get worse in certain places. now we're back in a little bit. i think one of the lessons is we can't do it all. that's where -- maybe others disagree, but i don't think the u.s. is going to step back completely. but i do think we're at the start of defining, how do we help the region, a pathway for it to become much more integrated with itself and then

with the rest of the world? and the u.s. can't do that by itself. >> i think the strategic importance of the middle east to the united states remains there. however, the focus and emphasis of the u.s. strategic attention might be changing. along with the course of the developments. for instance the united states for a long period of time focused on arabic and the palestinian vis-a-vis the israeli. but now at least you have got three, the palestinian, israel, the confrontation is still there. but we have the gulf region and the east coast and the west

coast. they are opposing each other. and the third one is about the transition. started from tunisia. now to many countries. so the missions are changing. and the united states means are changing. and secondly, the mechanisms, the ways of dealing with the complex situation are changing as well. for instance, the united states used to rely very much on the so-called quartet. which excluded china from that. but now with this iranian nuclear issue, we've worked together for p5+1. and this also shows china wants to play a role though the

united states is still the first fiddle. and china is the third one. the second one is the europeans. but we are learning. we are still in internship. to have a digression you have your american university in beirut for more than 100 years. and you have american university in cairo. we even don't have many confucius institutes there. so you can help us for that. the third one is there are emerging, new overlapping interests in cooperation. like our cooperation against piracy piracy. navigation safety security. and our cooperation on the

chemical weapon issue of syria. et cetera. so i still believe the united states is the most important factor. but you will change your ways of thinking and practicing. thank you. >> you mentioned quartet versus p5+1. brian spoke insightfully on the fact that the p5+1, if a deal is done, the first question becomes can it hold together in enforcing and supporting a deal? then another question starts to emerge which is, can this sort of a structure be the basis for a different kind of forward-looking cooperation? do you see that as something -- is that a mechanism that can do more than just one deal, and should we be looking at it that way? and a corollary question is that's the diplomacy question.

the corollary question is the defense and security question. you know rudy i think the united states is of two minds on welcoming and expecting china to build its military capabilities, but then feeling great doubt about how china may choose to use it. great if it's for counter piracy. maybe not so much if it's for enforcing disputed claims in the south china sea, right? so the -- where do you see that going? and is the middle east a different kind of an opportunity compared with other areas? but first this diplomacy question. everybody seems like they want to jump in. >> well, let me start. i think we're coming out of a period where it's been dominated by the security questions for the last 15 years. and really since the 9/11 attacks, afghanistan then we've certainly had a full -- we've had major elections focused on the wisdom of iraq. but there are some enduring

issues, some enduring objectives for the region, that i think don't expire. and where if we can use the economic and the diplomatic that's to our advantage. but the security issues still remain. so this is a resolution of the palestinian question but security for israel. it's the economic path for egypt going forward as it deals with population bulges and an economy that used to have a vigorous middle class that no longer does. then to the gulf side. it is the security of energy supply globally. we're in a global environment where the right to navigate in international areas becomes important, whether it's the south china sea or the straits of hormuz. so those things are not likely to change. and i think america will continue to lead, but if we do want to move and solve problems

and not just simply go with the musks lar approach, then i think we need to have -- be on the same page with our allies. and i think china's no longer rising, it is, in fact, a global stake holder. and so their engagement becomes very critical.holder. and so their engagement becomes very critical. >> what about the p5+1 question? can it do more? >> i think p5+1 is not a one-shot. this is already a process that all the major countries in the world have been cooperating on the nonproliferation issue. and for this i think gradually evolve into a more lasting or permanent mechanisms. on the other china is learning.

and china is working hard. for instance at the one time the differences between the united states and iran was so big. and they could not any longer to continue the discussion. and china used its diplomatic wisdom, okay if we could not continue talk at this level we propose we have the working group, lower level just to make it to survive. and now our foreign minister, mr. wong yi, is shadowing that kind of force. and they kept good and regular

contact between chinese foreign minister and other foreign ministers, including secretary of state john kerry. and also, china wants to have the outcome ss. we are a stakeholder. for instance, because of the iranian issues china was being sandwiched between the two sides. and we could not make long-term project in our political diplomatic, and economic relations related to iran. and it also hurts our relations with saudi arabia and other gcc countries. so the outcome and the a stain

ability of the outcomes are in the benefits of china as well. thank you. >> madam wu could you speak to the enforceability of the deal and other things beyond that? >> i think p5+1 is a good format to discuss and even to enforce that kind of outcome of the dialogue. and a very important feature of the p5+1 is actually the multiism. so it will be good to unite the countries, the stakeholders, on the issue to work together, to push forward the process. but of course, iran nuclear issue, a little bit of space because it is kind of a nuclear issue. it's very critical, that kind of weapons system is very special. other issues like, for example,

afghanistan or other issues maybe we need to involve more regional countries in that kind of a multi lateral process. because the regional countries have more interests in that kind of issuelateral process. because the regional countries have more interests in that kind of issue those kind of issues. maybe in afghanistan -- some of my colleagues think we need to consider about that kind of multilateral dialogue also on that kind of afghanistan issues. so we can apply that kind of p p5 -- that's modeled to other areas. >> i would say we shouldn't count chicken before it hatches. a real test will be whether this iran agreement a, if there's an agreement, b if it sustains itself. as we speak here today there's still i think not concluded discussions on things like the u.n. security council arms embargo. we know i think where russia stands on this. but this is i think a terribly important issue to highlight.

because with the iranians bringing it up at this moment and we also know any arguments that say for instance, that iran would need more weapons to fight isis doesn't make much sense because the arms embardo does not include small arms and things hike this. so i think potentially i would never disclose or cut off the possibility of p5+1 cooperation on other issues but first things first. even if a deal is inked in the next hour or two, that's just when the real work begins. can outside powers help stay the hand of vengeance? i think extremism in the kind of isis we're in agreement comes out of sectarianism which wealthy actors in the region have invested in and those investments actually have yielded negative returns for all of us for the cause of global

security. so deal or no deal on the iran nuclear front this framework is good. it's important. but maintaining the cohesiveness and getting into the details of whether these things work is essential. >> i'm going to have two more questions from up here and then kick it over to the audience. the first will be on -- the overall macro dynamic of the region which is at some level the sunni/shia divide, the heart of the conflict it makes it difficult for china, it makes it complicated. but you do, unlike the united states have relations with both. and increasingly deep relations, especially with saudi arabia. does china see any kind of

constructive avenue for engagement with countries that are essentially trapped in proxy wars and these sorts -- this sort of major -- this major competition that is, on balance bad for all of us? or does that just seem like it gets too much into internal affairs or other issues that are insoluble? >> i think it is very challenging to china but still china can walk on a very thin line because as you said, china maintains relation ss with both iran and the gcc countries. so that is to say china is in better position to talk to each other and to understand that their mentalities, their

concerns, and also we can work together with them. and thirdly china and the united states now already have the strategic dialogue on the middle east affairs. so we can work together. the most important thing is that for the major issues major concerns, and propositions china and the united states should compare our notes first. not at the end. and also we would like to let the other parties know. and so this is very important. and china still believes in noninterference in those affairs fundamentally speaking belong to the internal affairs.

so there is still the margin that china can be flexible and have reinterpretation of these long persistent principle. >> my final question is actually back to pakistan where brian has spent considerable time and we were speaking about it a little bit. china has embarked on actually an endeavor with pakistan. the china/pakistan economic corridor. which is very much in line with what u.s. policy on the proactive constructive side has been with pakistan over many years, which is to help pakistan and say, in essence invest in its people its infrastructure energy, water, the things it needs to be a thriving society and a little bit less on the military side of things. that seems like the area where you could see a link between a

new silk road and chinese projects. i think there's always concern and ambivalence in the united states. so you -- do we welcome an aaib do we welcome a major initiative with pakistan, are we worried about it? i'd just like any of you to maybe comment a little bit on this particular investment in pakistan and then the potential for, potentially, for cooperation there? >> i'm not an expert on pakistan issue. but i think pakistan can play a very important role in especially issues related to afghanistan situation. so china generally have a very good relationship with pakistan. so i think, actually, i think from the chinese perspective through economic cooperation, we

can join today with pakistan to play some kind of constructive role in the afghanistan issue. but of course at current stage it seems that the u.s./pakistan issues relations, have some problems. but if we look at the history we usually find that usually, united states has had quite good relationship with pakistan. so it seems that maybe to some degree, united states and pakistan can still a little bit readjust their relationship and have a kind of more balanced relations in south asia and can unite both pakistan and india to input constructive role in how to say dealing with that kind

of afghanistan issue. so that's a kind of general thinking, i think in chinese research circles. of course, include that kind of economic cooperation, have a balanced relationship with pakistan, india and then can unite all the positive elements in the region to deal with that kind of terrorism or other difficult issues in afghanistan. >> if i could say three points. first, the political talks under way, the diplomacy between the afghan tall lan and the afghan government with the involvement of pakistan. inner pages of the newspaper but not top of mind amazing alreadiry are think china's role, quietly, the u.s. being involved with this, this is something even john and steve hadley when they did joint pieces two off three years ago, it was politically fraught here back at home.

now the fact that this diplomatic engagement is essential for trying to put building blocks in place. second on the new silk road in pakistan, i'd restate what i said before. to the extent that all of these things are helpful in generating job growth in pakistan, to create what we call at the center inclusive prosperity and create sort of an opportunity for the economy of pakistan to open up and flourish, that's great. if the approaches are more along the line of league basic investments that facilitate trade but making these countries fly over regions for other part partsthink it doesn't address it. finally on the broader -- we'll get to questions -- u.s./china cooperation, i think -- we've seed it before but it's essential to underscore it. i think it makes it very difficult for the u.s. to talk about cooperation with china and pakistan or in the middle east, when there are all these big