actions suggest it still considers itself a cause, a revolutionary power whose identity in fact may be even the domestic survival has to be drawn from a narrative of unrelentless hostility between itself as the legitimate agent of shiaize lawmaker and the rest of the world. we put these two issues aside years ago when we decided to isolate and focus on iran's nuclear ambitions. i get that. i understand that decision. diplomacy is the art of the possible, not the art of the ideal. during the bush administration, we too focused on iran's nuclear efforts but we need to understand that nukts focus doesn't -- nuclear focus doesn't make the other realities go away and even if we get to a successful conclusion of nuclear negotiations, those other issues remain and indeed there is a possibility that the nuclear result will make those other issues even more difficult to

deal with. to over simplify just a little bit, the issue is not just iran's nuclear program, the issue is iran. and we need to be careful that our efforts to resolve this issue doesn't worsen the other dimensions of the problem. now let me focus on the nuclear portfolio per se. if i were here with a butcher paper or something and drawing a pert chart as to how do you get from here to there with there being a nuclear weapon on the part of the iranians i would have three critical paths. one path would be delivery vehicles. the iranian ballistic missile program. another path would be weaponization, making a device small enough and rugged enough and confident and reliable enough that you put it in a nose cone. and the third path is material, the things you need to actually have a bomb. we have chosen to bet the farm

on blocking one path. we have chosen to bet our future here on blocking the path toward the creation of missile material. the other two paths ballistic material, delivery systems and weaponization are effectively off the table. and even here in this one path, this missile material i think we have really reduced the margin for error. as mr. deutsche and mr. chairman, senator leiberman have already mentioned when this all began, secretary kerry was claiming we had not conceded the right of enrichment to the iranians and of course we had. that was the premise -- the price to -- we paid to get the iranians to the negotiating table. let me just point out too that the iranians claim they need to nuclear program for the event production of electricity. coming from a nation so rich in fossil fuels i think we have a right to question that.

but let me not question that. let me concede that. even conceding that point, does not create a prima facie case for iran to be allowed toen itch uranium. today there are 20 countries around the world that rely on nuclear power that do not produce their own material. to drive home this point, we have put considerable pressure on a responsible and trusted government in south korea not to do what this nuclear agreement allows the iranians to do. similarly, mr. chairman, as you've already mentioned, the president said that iran didn't need the heavy water reactor to rock, the facility at fordow. and even though it suggests these facilities have been modified, we need to see the fine print. they continue to exist. over all the iranians get to

keep 5,000 centrifuges of an older type which the administration said is part of a package that always keeps them 12 months away from having enough fis ill material for a weapon. but i'm concerned about how much r&d, research and development, the iranians can do on centrifuge technology. we all have to look at the fine print of the agreement. but the last public announcement by our side has been the phrase limited r&d, which could mean an awful lot of things to many people. i'm also concerned about our failure to demand an accurate accounting for the dimensions of the iranian program. mr. chairman, this really has special significance. it is not just what they may have done in the past to position themselves with regard to weaponization. the iranians have been stiffing the iaea for years on this issue.

and now we are going to rely on the iaea for verification of this new agreement after seemingly having taught the iranians that if you stiff these guys enough the requirement to concede will go away. given past uranium behavior and deception will the agency be conduct anywhere any time inspections. that is always a concern and already been well-handled. i know we have to look at the fine print to see what managed inspections are like mr. chairman. but let me give you a way that i've begun to think about this. inspections should have been at the technical level. inspections should have been driven by an iaea decision that this international body had a technical reason for visiting facility a., b. or c. the managed inspection program puts that decision at the

political level. and i just don't see a happy outcome that would evolve out of that kind of -- that kind of arrangement. there is an awful lot to talk about mr. chairman. i don't want to belabor all of these issues some of which have been raised. but i do want to bring up one point n. discussing the new agreement, many have tried to bring in the pattern of inspections that we agreed with the soviets under the start feety and the salt treaty. one of the administration officials said that we don't insist on being able to get into every military site because the united states of america wouldn't allow anybody to get into every site. that is just not appropriate. mr. chairman, that suggests an equivalency here, the kind of equivalency we did have the soviets because after all we were entering into a volunteer

armed program with them. this is iran trying to get out of the penalty box for violated multiple u.n. security council resolutions. this isn't a neutral playing field. the burden of proof should be on the iranians that they are adhering to an agreement, not on us to prove that they are not. so again as i said, inspections managed looks at the political level not wise and this sense of equivalenty i don't think is an accurate reflection of what is really going on here. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you general hayden. ambassador burns. >> thank you, mr. chirm, congressman deutsche, members thank you for the invitation to be here. i'm here with friends and people i respect very much. mr. chairman i think we all start from the presumption, all of us who have looked at this issue for a long long time it

is in the national security interest of the united states to deny iran a nuclear weapon. both president bush and president obama have taken the position they will use any means at our disposal including military means to accomplish that. the route taken by both and obama administration doesn't sought there. bush administration sought negotiations and iran turned us down and that led to sanctions. the obama administration with the help of the congress and i would say the leadership of the congress pushed for stronger sanctions that really made a difference on the iranians. the obama administration has come back with an agreement for your consideration. i say two things about it. this is among i think the most difficult, complex agreements that any of us can hope to judge. it is filled with very painful tradeoffs. there are risks in acting and following this agreement and there are risks in not acting. and i certainly agree with senator lieberman from my

perspective, this is one of the most consequential and important votes your members take in the time of office. i was trying to think this morning through our diplomatic history you may have to go back to the league of nations vote in 1920 for an agreement where congress will play such a central and directing role as to whether we go forward or whether we don't go forward. i worked on iran policy for president bush and secretary rice for three years as under secretary of state. i helped to sanction iran. i believe we have to contain their threat in the middle east and we have to stop them but i also believe that president obama's policy is worthy of your support. i'm going to support it because i think it is the best alternative. if i could have designed a perfect alternative, it would be 100-0 victory for the united states and submission of iran. that alternative is not available to the united states. and whether we oppose it or whether we support it, we've got to think in the real world about

what the alternatives have been. here is the alternative that president obama and secretary kerry have followed. they think this agreement will effectively freeze iran's nuclear program for the next decade. it will deny a nuclear weapon because it won't have the fis i'll material that general hayden talked about for the next decade it. closes out the route toward fisil material. the plutonium reactor at farrock will be put offline and the core and fuel spent out of the country. they won't be able to develop a nuclear weapon through plutonium. the enrichment program at fordow and natons fordow will be closed and natons they still have 5,000 to 6,000 centrifuges but of a lower power than the advanced for the next ten years but the store of enriched

uranium will be at 3.67% at 3 kilometers and that is not weapons grade. that he will not have the weapons grade necessary because of the restrictions at the plant. right now the administration said they may be two to three months away from a nuclear weapon. with this deal and there is no dispute about this, for the next ten years as the program is frozen, iran will be a year away from a nuclear weapon. so i think the administration can make a case whether you agree with them or not on the ultimate deal, that the program is going to be frozen the plutonium and uranium enrichment program and that is a very important at tribute of this deal. second, iran is subjected to inspections that it has never been subjected to before. 25 years under the additional protocol of iaea inspections. third, should iran cheat i

assume they'll try, given their past record where they've lied to us to the united nations in the past, then we have the ability to reimpose sanctions congress would. and the united states would have the opportunity any future president, to form a coalition much like the present coalition to sanction them. fourth, this does give the united states a chance to resolve this problem diplomatically, peacefully through a tough-minded negotiation. and i don't say that lightly. because i'm someone who believes that we should keep the threat of force on the table and that any american president would be justified using it if we felt iran was close to break-out, close to a nuclear weapon. but we are not at that point. no one anywhere in the world are contesting that the iranians are close to a nuclear weapon and so the use of force is really right now not pertinent to this discussion, although it is an option for us in the future. if we have a chance to avoid a third major conflict, in the

middle middle east since 9/11 and if we can stop iran in the process. >> i think that is a good course for the united states. but mr. chairman let me tell you, i don't think this is a perfect deal. and i've had trouble just as a private citizen trying to weigh the risks on both sides and weigh the pros and cons. if i were a member, i would want to focus on the questions that senator lieberman and general hayden have focused on because i agree with their skepticism. i would want to look at the fact that the iran program will be suspended or frozen in echkt in moth balls for ten years but when that ten years is over the superstructure of the program will be in tact. iran would have the theoretical right to build back up a plutonium or uranium route to a new weapon. that is the weakness of this agreement. that is a tradeoff. this was a real-world negotiation where we received some benefit freezing of their program for ten years but that

program is not being entirely dismantled and we have to understand that. second, i think it is important that the aiea has -- will have 25 years of in sight into iran's program. but will they have a clear line of sight. will they have unfettered access. what in practice does managed access to a nuclear plant mean? i think it means that iran will write some of the rules about how its plants are inspected and certainly questions have to be asked about that as well as military dimensions. third, would we actually be able to reimpose sanctions should iran cheat or fundamentally violate the agreement? none of us know. because we are talking about a hypothetical perhaps some years into the future but it would require a tough minded president, whoever we elect in 2016, it would require us to assemble a coalition it took ten years to build. i think the europeans will be with us but i wonder if the

russian and the chinese will. these are real tradeoffs. this is not a perfectly designed agreement. we had to compromise and we had to give and that is why, as general hayden has described it and i agree with him, that is where we made the compromised. but mr. chairman, i would say this, i think the only way to look at this is what is the ideal solution because the ideal solution is not available to us, is this the best alternative? president obama and secretary kerry's route. i can think of two other alternatives. one, which a lot of people have talked about should we have just walked away. should secretary kerry as our lead negotiate said this is not good enough and left the negotiations and withdrawn american support for the negotiations? we could have done that. but as someone who helped to put the p-5 together and the sanctions and the bush administration i think i know what would have happened. our coalition which is global

and contains every major country in the world would have frayed and ultimately dissolved. countries would have gone their own way without the leadership of the united states. i know what would have happened against the sanctions. that is the leverage with iran, that is what brought them to the table, it would have dissipated over time because the chinese would want to go for energy contracts and the indian government would want to import more oil from iran and our friends in east asia, our allies would want to go back to a normal trading relationship. so the no deal option that we walk away and sanction further, the united states can sanction all it wants and i respect what congress did and it was very important but what got iran to the table was the global sanctions. it was japan and south korea and india not buying as much oil and gas. it was the european oil embargo and the european financial sanctions. if you walked away and the coalition dissolved, there goes the leverage of the sanctions. so for me, if i had to weigh

that walking out no-deal option versus president obama's option i favor president obama's option. one more option available to the united states, we could have gone directly to the use of military force. general hayden would be a far greater authority than i would on this issue, as a military person. but i believe the united states has the capacity to effectively destroy iran's civil nuclear facilities. that might buy us three or four years. i don't know what the numbers are. that might give us a great period. but you can't bomb the scientific knowledge that their engineers and their scientists have. they know how to mine uranium and they know how to convert it and enrich it and assemble a nuclear warhead we think we fear. and so that is not a strategic option, it is a tactical option. it buys you time. well president obama's option buys us ten years where we can be reasonably assures that the

program is frozen. so i don't think the other options work for the united states in the real world of international politics and international diplomacy and that is why, as i look at the alternatives, i think president obama is worthy of your support and i certainly am going to support him. mr. chairman two quick points. at the same time that the obama administration will pursue this very difficult agreement with iran, on the nuclear issues, i think we're going to have to push back against the iranians in the middle east. because they are on a terror. they have become the king maker in syria. they are unfortunately the most influential country in iraq. they are running arms ho hamas and gaza to hezbollah in lebanon and instigating the houthi tribes in yemen that have tore the country apart. if you will, they are making a big play for power in the heriot of the sunni world.

that is against the arab friends and israel and the united states. so i think we're in the position, i certainly am, of suppose porgt a nuclear deal and yet hoping and believing that president obama needs to push back through a strong coalition with the arab countries against iranian power. and i would hope that president obama and the obama administration in general would make up with israel, would end the war of words between the white house and the israeli prime minister. to reinforce our military relationship with israel as well as the gulf states so that we can contain iranian power in the middle east. i think that is a very important imperative that is racing right alongside the debate on the nuclear issue as we speak. and finally let me say as someone who served in both democratic and republican administrations, i would hope we could have a bipartisan debate in our country among citizens and on capitol hill. will are obvious differences

between the bush and obama administrations but both sought negotiations. both wanted to have a negotiated outcome. that is what we were aiming for in 2006 and '07. when iran denied it to us we turned to sanctions thanks to the congress for those sanctions. very important. but we need bipartisan support and unit and support for our president to detain and defeat this threat by iran that is in front of us. thank you very much. >> thank you ambassador. doctor takei. >> thank you chairman royce, ranking member deutsche for inviting me back to this particular forum. as a junior man on the table i'll stay with my allotted time especially since i don't judge would cut me off -- the ever vigilant judge poe i should say. since the nuclear crisis in 2002, two principals have guided

the united states negotiating position. those two positions were what kind of civilian nuclear program iran is entitled to and the position was given the practical needs and iran has no practical needs for enrichment it should be a symbolic program and that would allow the leadership to save face and at the same time there would be assurances that such a symbolic program would not be used for military purposes. the second position that guided the united states policy from 2002-2013 was that iran can rejoin the npt community once it established the trust and confidence of the international community. these were positioned of the obama administration endorsed and embraced and persuaded the five plus one company to accept. it is these two principals in

2013 [ inaudible ], for the framework and caliphate in the recent plan of action. the notion has been replaced by something called a one year breakout period with acknowledgment that it has been made that the one year is now static and will alter to zero in the concluding stajts of this agreement and the notion and trust and confidence of the international community has been replaced by a substantive clause whereby an arbitrary time clock will decide when iran can proceed to an industrial sized program. industrial sized program similar to japan, should they want one. japan can be trusted with technology. iran does not. japan doesn't want a bomb, iran does. all issue as side the deal and the issues have to be articulated in the changing nature of the foreign policy. it is important to note that the supreme leader today stands as

the most successful persianist. he never had control of iraq or commanding influence in syria and lebanese factual politics alluded him and [ inaudible ]. today as nick and others are suggested, the islam republic has a commanding position in iraq and deep penetration of the deep state. it is the most significant external power in sear through hezbollah. it has a lethal proxy that can play in lebanese politics and in france and the middle east and of course in the gulf and in other aspects of america's fracture alliances give iran ample opportunity. and there is a debate, what would the islamic state spend their money on. some of the money undoubtedly will go to the imperial opportunities that are out there. but i do believe that the administration has one case. some of the money will ub

doubtedly be spent on domestic concerns and domestic needs. rowhani belongs to a wing of the politics that are interested with the china model where you can purchase domestic assent by offering economic opportunity. so in that particular sense you can make a case, and i think a rather plause ubl one, that the rowhani administration has been one of the most oppressive and iran burdened citizens would require some sort of relief and along the china model the idea is by granting them a measure of economic rewards you can purchase domestic consent. and it is particularly the case because the islamic republic is haunting by the green revelation of 2009. so to have hope, rowhani needs an arms control agreement as much as the islamic impeeralism. in the end this deal may not

rest on trust but it does rest on hope. the hope that a decade from now that the islamic republic will be a different regime, in power, inclined to live at peace with neighbors rkt a power that is no longer fuel by anti-americanism and anti-designism that -- zionism. after watching the iran in its own idiom and language, it is a hope that i have difficulty sharing. thank you. >> thank you. would you like to just go -- i would like to just go to the question of the arms embargo. and this was -- doctor, this was a last-minute addendum to this agreement. a demand in the negotiation that the u.n. lift the arms embargo as it related not just to conventional weapons that iran

could better armasad and hezbollah with. but it also goes to the issue of iran's capability to get access to the international technical assistance that it seeks to improve their icbm program. and last week secretary of defense carter and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff dempsey both sounded the alarm about what this would mean if they get this capability to have an icbm reach the united states and clearly the russians stepped in, in the last minute of the negotiations and clearly russia wants to transfer this technical assistance to iran. this is the most recent issue that i think caught us by surprise. and i think the other element of surprise was the discovery that in the middle of this negotiation, about a month ago, that iran had committed to transfer to hamas not just the

funding to rebuild the 35 tunnels that had been built before under israel, but also a new generation of rockets and weapons and then most recently the additional discovery or announcement that iran was going to transfer precision guidance systems to the 100,000 rockets and missiles that hezbollah has at its disposal aimed right now at israel but not quite effective as the iron dome, as they could be if they have the precision guidance systems. the fact that iran is willing to do this in the middle of the negotiation, and to demand the up-front payment of the signing bonus, which evidently they are going to use for this purpose is something that really drove the attention here of a number of members of congress over the

last few days as this information is surfacing. and i would like ray, your comments on this, or general, you might have some insights as well. >> nick can talk about the conventional prohibitions in the u.n. because they were negotiated in 2006 and it is my understanding they had to do with the regional behavior and not the nuclear dispute going on at the time. irrespective of the arms embargo and unfortunately it will not be sustained but they have additional money that they use that can enhance if terms of illicit procurems and so forth so there is always a problem of iranian transference of missile technology and other forms but obviously under this particular prohibition, once it expires they have access to more

sophisticated technology. >> and now it goes both ways. now only can they export their technology that they've developed more easily to their allies but they are also going to be able to import from russia and china, the technology they need for icbm's or surface to air weapons and so forth. >> ambassador burns? >> mr. chairman, there is no question that iranians were trying to split the p 5 with this negotiation and .1. and .2, there is no way we could have accepted this. so i was trying to dive through the details coming over here. if we can maintain the u.n. weapon embargoes for 5-8 years that is good for the united states -- >> hold on. five to eight years. in ten years they're going to have the capability for undetected nuclear breakout ten years plus under this agreement.

why would we want to agree to five years lifting and eight years for the russian transference of that capability? why would the united states sign off on such an agreement bast? >> and i'm not here of course to represent the administration, i'm just a private citizen. this is a painful tradeoff. i would have hoped we could have defeated it completely. it is a tradeoff that apparently our negotiators felt they had to make. so how do we work once the embargoes are lifting, five, six, seven eight years from now, we'll use the power of the united states to prevent the sale to iran because iran has been violating the other part of it, selling and giving our arms to insurgent groups throughout the middle east. >> let me ask general hayden. >> very briefly, mr. chairman, i find it incoherent. in my prepared remarks i tried to describe going from the broad to the specific. we have a lot of complaints about broad iranian behavior that is the arms embargo.

there is ways of stopping a nuclear program. we've dismissed the ballistic missile part and focused on the nuclear. so to get iran down to this agreement we've taken things off the table that we legitimately could have included. and now we get to the agreement and the iranians are walking back up that ladder and including in concessions to them things that they had refused to discuss with us when we went into the negotiations. i don't understand why the ballistic missile sanctions or the conventional weapons sanctions are in an agreement on the nuclear program. >> general, as i mentioned in my opening statement here the administration was once on the same page as congress on this issue of anywhere, any time inspections. but the iranians pushed back very hard. i remember the deputy handed the iranian revolutionary guard corp boasting they will not be permitted to inspect the most

normal military site in their dreams. so now we're signing up for something called managed access. and a report overnight says that inspectors will get access to critical sites only after consultation with the iranians with the russians, with china and other world powers in this negotiation. we wanted to get this within 24 hours. that was the original idea. inspectors could get in within 24 hours. this agreement, if we're lucky, would get inspectors access in 24 days, after all of the steps that iran has insisted on. but that is only predicated on the yoidia we have cooperation -- idea we have cooperation from russia and china in backing the access. so my question here, as you said

in your testimony we never believed that the uranium at the iran declared facilities would ever make its way into a weapon. we always believed that that work would be done somewhere else in secret, as you said. so how confident are you in any sort of managed access process that includes iran on the committee that determines whether or not we have access? >> mr. chairman, i've got several issues i already mentioned one about the conventional arms the snapback sanctions, i'm not sure how that happens. but this is the one i'm most concerned about because again we've eliminated our margin for error and it is all about fisil material. so i would never come to you and tell you that american national needs will be sufficient for this agreement without an in vasive inspection regime, i

would not while in government or now tell you it is okay, we'll know enough to give you sufficient warning. so that really puts the weight of effort on the iaea's ability to go anywhere at anytime. and as i suggested in my remarks, mr. chairman, we have taken that from the technical level that this international body has an issue it just needs to resolve all right. we've taken it from the technical level and put it at the political level. and i just think that is a formula for chaos on advice case ambiguity and doubt and finally we cannot tell you for sure where the iranians are. >> thank you mr. lieberman, final comment? >> thanks mr. chairman. very brief here. this question really in my opinion highlights the greatest specific weakness of the agreement announced today. we're dealing with a country that has proven over and over again that they will not play by international rules.

they have constantly deceived and delayed international inspectors from the united nations, not from the united states. so now we're taking a risk of making this trade where we end sanctions on them, in return for them essentially temporarily freezing the nuclear program if they for the first time in the last three decades, actually do honestly what they say they will do and the one guarantee or hope that we could have that they would do it was the any time any-where air tight inspections. the agreement that came out today is the greatest disappointment in this regard because it sets a highly bureaucratic process that goes aft least 21 days during which iran can remove anything covert and in violation of the agreement that they want to. so i think this is the point -- i urge members of this committee

and members of congress focus in on the section of this agreement on access. this is one that iran won hands down and the consequences for this overall agreement are really devastated. >> thank you, senator. mr. ted deutsche of florida. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first i want to thank the witnesses for a thoughtful presentation and i think the establishment of a really important tone for what i hope will be a very meaningful and serious discussion over the coming weeks ab months about this -- weeks and months about this critical vote. and i raised my concern about access, mr. chairman and i appreciate the exchange that just took place. but ambassador burns i would like to ask you you walked through -- i think you gave an excellent presentation on what the negotiators were able to accomplish and the tradeoffs they needed to make and the

skepticism you have about somewhat of is in this agreement. and i want to focus on one in particular. the goal in all of this, the goal of diplomacy is to reach -- reaching a dip row mattic -- diplomatic force. and what i'm trying to grapple as we get into the details of this agreement is what that looks like over time. initially, you said that it is really important that at the same time that we move forward with these -- with this nuclear deal that we push back against iranians in the middle east and you detailed the many ways in which they've looked to exert their influence throughout the region, the spread of their terrorist infrastructure. and i would ask, getting back to the issue of resources when they satisfy the terms of the nuclear related conditions and

have access to their frozen assets, whether it's a billion dollars or 50$50 billion, if we acknowledge as doctor said they will invest in their own economy but clearly some portion of the money will be used to support what they are doing in the region. if the goal is peace short-term is it likely that the infusion of additional money will lead to less peace and more violence through their terror proxies? >> thank you very much, mr. deutsche. and i would say that the goal here for the last ten years has been to deny them a nuclear weapon through diplomatic means, negotiation solution, if possible and if not we resort to milt means. i think that is what both the bush and the obama administrations have tried to do. it is a peaceful solution but one in our interest where we think we earned enough at the

negotiating table so it is worth doing. that is how i understand what the president obama's logic is here and that is why i support it. you've asked a good question. the problem we've got is we're dealing with two different iranian governments. we have -- i think genuinely the reformist, in their context, prime minister rowhani and the genuine reformer in their context in zarif, the foreign minister, the government in vienna and there is another government, the commander of the revolutionary guard corp and that is a hard bit and aggressive and assertive and violent corporation. they are the people pushing into the middle east. and i assume as the doctor does that some of the money there sanction relief will go to economic problems. they have to rebuild the infrastructure in the country. it has withered away under

sanctions. some will go to arms an supporting terrorist groups and as the same time it is in our interest to pursu the nuclear agreement, it is definitely in our interest to strengthen the coalition with israel and the arab kurns and to push back on the iranians. >> so let me ask you this. you talked about two different governments, have we spent all of this time negotiating with one to get to an agreement only to see that government then hand off responsibility going forward to the other government that is wreaking havoc throughout the region. doctor, let me ask you that? >> i'll touch on this in the following way -- i often hear that you can transact an armed control agreement and maintain your pressure on iran. i'm not sure if that is possible. and if you want to bring out the soviet-american experience i'm happy to go into that as well. the principal means that the united states tries to

discipline iran has been through economic sanctions. we never use military force against them and so on. this agreement stipulates that over a period of ten years the united states will unwind its principal course of instruments. so central bank sanction. in this agreement central bank sanctions are to be waived. that is a terrorist or a human rights sanction but it is a sanction that will be waived. the course of menu that the united states has for doing what nick burns wants to is going to lessen and diminish, the soviet american was 1973 assault one and assault two and juan the best aggressive decades in history culminating in invasion of a country outside of the perimeter of soviet influence afghanistan. revolutionary countries that are beneficiaries of arms control are more aggressive and the ability of the united states to

enforce, contain and reverse the aggression tends to diminish. >> so just finally, dr. k., i want to understand, the reference to our negotiations with the soviet -- the negotiation of arms control treaties with the arms you suggest we should view it more as a warning sign? >> yes. i challenge the theat is -- theat is you can maintain peace with an islamic state. >> thank you. i would like to remind my good friend ambassador burns while he said there are two governments rowhani and the hardliners, both were very much active this past friday when they were chanting death to america, death to israel. so we like to talk about these two separate entities the hardliners and the moderates, they have one goal in mind and they say it. death to america. death to israel. but we ignore that.

but according to reports the white house seems to have caved on almost every one of iran's demands. blowing past its own red lines on enrichment, on centrifuges, on verifications, on inspections, on sanctions relieve and in coming clean on past nuclear ambitions and military dimensions and along the way the administration has made excuse after excuse justifying every uranium violation of this interim deal in order to continue negotiations providing billions of dollars in sanctions relief and is set to provide billions more. and now we know that iran -- what will it do with the additional sanctions relief and the influx of international investment that it is going to receive from this deal? it is going to continue funding its hedge monnic ambitions

throughout the middle east and support for terrorism throughout the world just as it has been doing in lebanon and sear and iraq and as reported this deal is a far cry from every red line that the white house itself imposed. and it is a lower threshold than the six u.n. security council resolutions and i look back on and read these resolutions and i think, wow that is a fairy tale, once upon a time the world powers kbot together and said this is what we are going to demand. the administration kept lowering the bar time and time again defending the violations of the iranians every step of the way, going legacy shopping here is another item off the shelf the iranian nuclear deal. people will be worried about whatever else is gooding on in their -- in the -- going on in the music and the film industry nobody will pay attention. let's look at the shiny keys. the administration has also

reportedly said that it would only lift nuclear-related sanctions, even though officials would never describe exactly how that was defined. but now reports indicate that the administration has caved to the iranian claim that all of the sanctions are nuclear related. do you believe that the u.s. and the u.n. should be lifting sanctions imposed on iran for the human rights record and the ballistic missile program and support for terrorisms including the arms embargo and following up on chairman royce's exact point, general hayden has pointed out that the iaea must be allowed to suspect the suspect locations military sites, et cetera. but you had told us and your colleagues believe that weaponization would never occur at declared facilities, it would be done in the secret facilities. it is now reported that the deal

would allow suspect sites to have access only after the p5+1 consultation with the iranians. sect kerry -- secretary kerry has stated that inspecting the iran military sites and coming clean on possible military dimensions isn't even necessary because the u.s. has full knowledge of iran's activity but many in the intelligence community, including dia director michael flynn have argued that the limits, the real limits on u.s. intelligence in iran, it makes this impossible. how can we trust iran to give u.n. inspectors access to suspect sites after consultation with p five plus one countries how hard is it to gather intelligence in iran, how can we have full knowledge of iran's activities without access to all of the sites, and finally mr. chairman, many supporters of the iran deal have been floating the fantastic idea that iran will

change its behavior as a result of this agreement, become a better neighbor and a more stable middle east. how will lifting the sanctions and influx of new money from sanctions relief change iran's involvement and influence throughout the middle east? it will have more money to be involved in its hedge monnic ambitions. there are not enough time to answer all of the questions that i have. and not only these sanctions that the u.n. supported once upon a time, we're done with that. we might as well just rip that one up. that is not happening. and what about our u.s. sanctions? mr. chairman we talk about what sanctions we will lift but there are some within our control. but there are so many executive order sanctions that the president can lift. so many provisions that he can waive. i know that i'm out of time, but

i'm greatly saddened, sickened and frustrated over this deal. thank you mr. chairman. >> mr. brad chairman of california. >> thank you of the let me first set the record straight. the sanctions, especially the secondary sanctions are the only reason that iran made any concessions at all. those sanctions were imposed by congress over the objection of the executive branch for 30 years congress had it right and the executive branch had it wrong. except for those occasions when the house had it right and sent bills over to the senate and then the president blocked them in the senate. i'm disappointed in this deal for all of the reasons that have been brought up. the arms embargo was not a nuclear sanction yet it is being waived. the iran sanctions act will be waived even though there are basically nine reasons cited in the agreement -- in the act as to why we imposed it. only one of them is nuclear.

and these sanctions relief is so complete we're going to import things from iran. not oil, but the things we don't need and they can't sell to anybody else. dr. deckay i think you are right in saying they are going to spend a big chunk of the money they are going to get for domestic purposes but in addition they'll spend it on graft and corruption, they're good at that. they're going to kill a lot of sunnis. some of them have deserve it and many of who do not and then much left over to kill americans and israelis and work other mischief. a number of people have talked about the hope and the change in the government. keep in mind, we imposed sanctions to change the government. on the theory that if you deprive a government and its people of economic benefit, you put pressure on them to change. now we're going to shower them with money, okay, it is their own money, but in any case they

are going -- economic benefit is usually not the way to cause a government to loose its grip on power. general hayden brings up missiles. i'll simply point out you can missiles. you can smuggle a nuclear weapon inside a bail of marijuana. it's not the classy way to do it. they have one reason for creating them deliver nuclear weapons. political pun dents are asking is it a good deal did obama do a good job? they're their job. they can be politician or politician-want-to-bes. we're in the real world. we have full support of american president and also p5+1. imagine going and telling them

eni should not invest in oil fields even though problem tells them we should. we'd have good wine but i don't think have the purpose. we're in the real world. we can reject or is accept this agreement. we could refuse to endorse it or refuse to reject it which is probably what we're going to do. but i should mention this deal does have some good points. the good points are in the first year. 90% of stock piles are shipped out. two-thirds of the centrifuges are moth balled. if we don't take action in the first year we get the benefits and detriments in the first year of the deal. tenth year of the deal is absolutely terrible. iran has free access to ten times as many centrifuges or 100 times centrifuges, each ten

times more efficient than the ones built so far. our focus needs to be, what do we do to prevent year ten? we can pass a resolution. we could bring up resolution of approval. it would be voted down overwhelmingly. then in the future, congresss and presidents would be free to take action, hopefully before year ten. that would be the strongest statement against the agreement. what's more likely to happen unfortunately is we'll have a resolution of disapproval. it will pass. it will be vetoed. the veto is likely to be sustained. think it will be sustained. so we reach the same position which is congress declares it doesn't like the agreement, doesn't approve the agreement. we do so in the weakest and most pitiful way, the final vote being a victory for those that support the agreement when we don't get two-thirds to override. so i think this deal is going

to go into force. what i'd like -- i realize i've left time. hopefully chairman will be indulge indulge ent. what advise do you give presidents next can decade to prevent iran from having industrial-sized enrichment program where in the words of from president obama their breakout time would be almost zero. i'll start with general hayden. >> i'm sorry mr. chairman. i don't have a good answer to that question. this deal guarantees the reality you just -- >> this deal is not binding on the american people or future american presidents. let's say iran kind of lives within the deal for the next five years, is economically stronger. another president can say all options are on the table. what can a president do to make

sure that this terrible year ten does not go into force? any other witness have a response? senator libberman. >> thanks congressman sherman. first thing i want to say as respectfully offer somewhat different viewpoint about the outside what will happen here in congress. i'm not prepared to say, based on conversations i've had with members of both chambers and both parties that this agreement will be approved or disapproved and a presidential veto will not be overridden. people's minds are open. people are concerned. they're going to look at the agreement. i myself have said whether congress override the veto by the president would depend on the specific terms of agreement. now we've seen the agreement. the fact it legitimate mizes iran as a nuclear weapons power and even more important in the first instance the access, the inspections provisions are full

of holes and don't give us any hope this country which is constantly cheated in international agreements will bide by the agreement here. i think it's can definitely possible that this agreement will be rejected by congress and president overridden. to me that would be the best of all results. if not, the latitude of future presidents i suppose will be expanded if there is an initial rejection of the agreement and not t president vetoes it and veto is not overridden because of future president can look back and reopen negotiations and perhaps re-ask for sanctions. the premise congress will upset is that a majority of members of both houses voted to reject the

agreement. >> can i say one thing about this congressman sherman? on page three of this agreement it says upon expiration iran will be treated as any other nuclear state like japan. you don't like that. >> you have to have a president that demands that and puts options on the table. >> i think one path would be and unfortunately not in this agreement has to be renegotiated, is to suggest after ten years all parties to this agreement 5 plus 1 and iran vote whether to extend the restrictions. there's press sent called mpt. when it recently expired, all members voted to extend the particular provisions permanently. that has to be renegotiated in this particular agreement. >> the answer to your question in my view is that president obama and his successor do three

things. vigilance on inspections number one. three, retain the right to use military force if necessary. there is a strategy here where this agreement can be implemented. >> thank you for holding the this timely hearing and for distinguished witnesses. not only has the iranian government just orchestrated death to america demonstrations just a few days ago, they can't to hold americans. we've had hearings on that. they still are incarcerated subjected to cruel treatment by this regime. thousand a deal with them. senator libberman, your comments how this falls far short more risks to america. ambassador burns you mentioned this is not a perfect deal.

who expected a perfect deal? that's a strawman argument with all do respect. the whole issue of enrichment was a premise of a deal is off the table. now there will be enrichment allowed. again, i think that was a major major mistake. in a statement of what i consider to be bad faith president obama vowed to veto, block congressional move to block this agreement. this is day one. he's already talking veto. if it's such a good deal, why not persuade congress by extension of american people about its contents. instead veto card goes up red guard, not going forward. one of several achilles. sheels. how does that apply on a nuclear arms race? we all want peace. nuclear weapons are the not peace.

will this begin or fullment a nuclear arms race in the region? perhaps senator libberman you can touch on that. burns, you talk about how this bides five years. if sanctions were not aggressively or as aggressively implemented there are always caveats allowed including oil to china which was a lifeline. now we have a situation they're going to get huge infusions of cash which will hurt obviously the region. it will be a multiplier effect for terrorism. that is a very serious problem. the external existential threat. one question is whether the partners can be trusted to punish iran or pro actively

acknowledge violations of the agreement as they are likely to occur. what will happen? are we going to submit it to a committee and nothing happens? >> thanks very much congressman smith. let me just respond to the question about non proliferation. this is going to be an ironic and i think painful result which is that an agreement presumably to reduce the presence of nuclear weapons in the middle east because it eventually allows a radical state like iran to get nuclear weapons will in fact encourage other powers within the middle east to investigate in nuclear weapon capability. that's a -- that makes the middle east, which is already boiling with various kinds of conflict even more literally explosive. look the saudis officials this the saudi government have

already said to people if an agreement between the p5+1 enables iran to become a nuclear weapon s power, they're not going to wait until that happens. they're going to build up their own capacity for nuclear weapons. the fact that -- i looked at this in my opening statement from the point of view of america. i said this agreement has much more risks for america and much more reward for iran than it should. it's not the good deal that we all wanted. governments in the middle east are also making the same calculations throughout the arab world and of course israel. they're going to take actions based on that calculation. if we think it's a bad deal, i think they're going to think it's a terrible deal because it's their neighborhood. the result will be exactly the opposite of what was hoped for here which is a more peaceful hidel east.

it's going to be a much more violent and potentially explosive middle east. >> very briefly mr. smith. the more the administration argues it's this deal or vote for war the more you take off the table the ability of the united states to use military power to course the iranians. i don't think anyone believes that is a realistic option at the moment. frankly i don't think they believe that for a year or two going back. that does actually weaken our position in order to get the kind of behavior we want from the iranians. >> let me just briefly ask about in the report itself this is the agreement. there are an exes none of us have seen yet. it says iran tends to ship out all spent fuel for research of nuclear powers. doesn't say requires.

intends is pretty weak. >> i understand that's a requirement. >> why would they put intends? >> i don't know. that's part of the deal. >> i'd say it's a good question mr. smith and one that i'm sure you and the committee will get answered when the administration comes before you to support this. >> thank you. >> okay. we go to mr. gregory meeks of new york. >> thank you mr. chairman. let me first ask -- i was listening to ambassador burns' testimony. during his testimony, one of the things that he highlighted was if the united states had walked away we just said no. and the other partners were trying to strike a deal -- i guess my first question to general hayden.

do you think we should walk away even if that meant the disillusion of p5+1 and unity we have had for the last 20 months sm would you walk away from such a deal? >> mr. meeks i think what's happened, if we did that today it would dissolve the unity of p5+1. we would be blamed for it. that's a corner we have painted ourselves into. >> right now though you would agree then it would make it quite difficult to hold the coalition together if we walked away. we could get blamed therefore the sanctions that have brought iran to agree to negotiations when i think it was also ambassador burns testimony that the bush administration tried to get iran to agree to negotiations. they would not at that time.

so there's been a tremendous -- there's been a change from what took place at the end of the be bush administration because we didn't have this outside unity with the p5+1. if we did not have that -- that could relieve pressure on iran and for me, the only thing i'm looking at in these negotiations is what is the opportunity to stop iran from having a nuclear weapon? >> i understand perfectly. i think the russians and the chinese peel off immediately because they don't want -- they didn't want to be there in the first place. it was actually quite a high level of skill to get them into the circle to pressure the iranians. i think there's greater hope with the eu french british although again, we have painted ourselves into a corner by accepting the things we're questions now. for us to undo those would make it difficult -- >> the problem is which i tend

to find out is why negotiations were going on and who was saying who to what, we weren't in the room. how those negotiations took place and who was demanding what in the p5+1 is important. i think it's important for members of congress before we make a decision to try to talk to our colleagues and p5+1 to find out what their feelings are. to find out where they are on this. what's important. it's important to talk to scientists, not just the politics of it. to talk to iaea to go to vienna. i suggest members of this committee travel to vienna and talk to them and see if they can do the inspections. will that prevent in their opinion as scientists not politically, but scientists as much as we can. from my viewpoint, having had -- this is -- i agree with senator

libberman, this is a very important vote. i can't leave it in a vacuum. i had another important vote. that was back when we decided -- we were talking about iraq. are there was questions then of whether or not we should have diplomatic relations. should we debate, go further, have verifyicationverification. what happened at that point we said no. there was imminent danger of iraq having weapons of mass destruction. they had them. i can remember the case went to u.n. we took the case to u.n. that there was weapons. we're still -- i don't want to go back -- but we're still -- i think we should learn a lesson because we're still paying for that. we didn't do everything that we could first. because if we did everything we could first, and they still had escape withes, we could have done what we did any way. so here we are again with the

opportunity. i agree that this is not perfect. i don't know any perfect bill that has ever been made in this united states congress. ever in the history of our country. not one. i'm not looking for a perfect bill. >> no, no i agree. the correct question you just framed it. is this deal good enough that we should avoid sliding from that position into a position that any deal is better? >> i agree, but we also got to keep in context that we're not dealing by ourselves or doing it unilaterally. everything i hear -- most saying is -- just us. forget about the other five partners to this deal. this is what the can -- there's other negotiations. i think leadership applies. leadership keeping this group together. that's leadership to get to this point. because otherwise, we don't get here and don't have any choices. this at least gives us a choice

a chance. shouldn't we at least look at it talk to scientists? this deal was struck this morning for god's sake. we haven't talked to any scientists. we haven't gone to iaea and seen -- gone to vienna and talked to partners in this negotiation. that's our responsibility as congress don't you think? as opposed to us making a decision today what we're going to do. >> no. i think the position all of us have here is the fine print here really matters. there is little or no margin for error. >> let's -- shall we go to mr. dana rowbach of california. >> thank you mr. chairman and again mr. chairman and rank ago member engle who's not with us today. both of you provide great leadership on this issue and other issues of great significance. let's note that the agreement

being discussed today is being held with a government entity that holds four americans illegally hostage. let me note that my staff is preparing legislation that would permit our president to take non diplomatic iranian officials into custody until their government and click returns these americans who they're holding illegally. now, of course, we won't do that because we don't want to make the iranian regime angry by doing something like that. in fact we have refrained. they have already won a great deal by this elongated negotiation because for all of these years, we have been refraining from supporting the democratic elements in iran

against them if fear it would upset negotiations in the deal. we've been a loser before this supposed agreement. what i'd like to ask does anyone in the panel know whether or not this agreement includes an iranian agreement not to obtain a nuclear weapon from another source rather than building one of their own? >> i think this agreement stipulates that iran member of npt, it has forgone a nuclear weapon option. >> so -- so the answer is yes, part of this agreement is iranians agree not to obtain a nuclear weapon from someone else. >> it says iran will become a member of npt.

if it becomes a member in good standing, it forgoes the option of having a nuclear weapon. it forecloses the option as a matter of principle. >> if i may just add -- >> yes -- >> it seems to me that iran has developed a lot of nuclear capability it has today in violation of its obligations under the non proliferation treaty. so, i'm just offering that as more evidence that it's right they shouldn't do this under mpt. they violated it wantingly years before. >> in other words, if we expect the same type of behavior with that they made with other agreements, with this agreement, they could easily -- even with all these other inspections we're talking about, they could obtain, let's say, a nuclear

weapon from an illegal source. now another question for the panel. we have people who know about u.s. intelligence et cetera with us today. are there nuclear weapons that some countries or groups might be able to obtain on the market rather than having to build their own weapon? >> of course. >> of course. >> always watching the north koreans. we saw north koreans build a plu plutonium reactor in the desert, detected at the last minute. to spin off what senator libberman talked about with regard to sunnis and how they'll respond to this. one very possible scenario is that saudis will then go to the pakistanis in order to get nuclear devices to balance what they view to be the iranian threat. >> so what we have is basically a situation where we have not

refrained from supporting the democratic elements in iran which is the real solution. getting rid of the regime and getting a democratic government in there that doesn't seek to possess nuclear weapons. of course we have actually undermined that opportunity by over these last six years. in fact this agreement may undermine it further. i thank you all for your testimony today. i think that you've given us a lot to think about. i would hope that all of us here do our duty and i don't think it is a tough decision. i think it's very clear that this is a rotten deal. we'll keep an open mind to see if we can be convinced there's some other benefits to it. thank you. >> thank you. mrs. bass of california. >> thank you mr. chair. i had a few questions that focus on the process and also the

consequences of our actions. so a couple of people have asked questions about our partners from the other countries. so i was wondering about the p5+1 and wanting to know if they have a similar process where they're voting in legislative bodies, what happens at u.n. and maybe you could put it in sequence ambassador burns? >> thank you very much. this organization -- the p5+1 group was put together by u.s. and britain in december 2005. it's been the core of the international effort. one of the reasons i'm supporting the president's initiative, i think if you keep this group together, that's the leverage point and pressure point through sanctions, inspections on the iranians. if the group dissolves, we lose our leverage. it's a group. french germans british have to go back and report to two parliaments on this deal. they're can democratic countries. i'm very strongly assured that

president putin doesn't really have to worry about it too much. >> do you have sense of france and britain? >> my sense of politics in europe is that in the main, parliaments and publics are strongly supportive of this deal. i think that's true in europe almost across the board. the interesting country is russia. we're sanctions russia over ukraine and deservingly so. we have to work with russia to keep them on our side. the weakest is china. they're motivated by commercial purposes. that we have to be worried about because we worry about law and order in the middle east. it's a difficult coalition will. behind it you've got the major purchases of iranian energy. japan, south korea india, very

important we keep them in this cocoa ligsalition as well. >> there's no question part of the implementation disagreement will be that there will be a new security council resolution to put this agreement in force to take away sanctions, at least those voted on by the nations. if all the many members are in agreement, they need the vote. they need nine votes to carry the resolution. it's pretty sure they'll win that particular vote. >> do you have concerns those countries would exercise veto power? >> no. i think the deal worked out that they all agree they will not exercise the veto. they're going forward. there's 0% probability any country would use the veto. if we turn this down and override the sorrowveto, how does it play out on the national arena? there's reports of people that want to go over and make

business dials with various countries. if we override the president's veto, what happens then? >> if the president vetoes the vote of disapproval and then overridden, i think you'll see break down around the world of sanctions, commercial impulse with countries to do business with iran. it will take over. iran will be in the position of getting sanctions relief effectively from most of the world. they also won't have constraints on their nuclear proomgram. >> if we back out, it's not us holding them accountable. how will the rest of the world and p5. it won't be plus 1. >> iran won't be accountable. they will be able to proceed on an enrichment program they haven't been in 14 months. we all try to define what the

question. what's the best alternative and option for the united states? we're in the real world, in the middle of 2015. i think it's this deal. we can't go back and design a better process five years back. i disagree respectlyively on one question. if we're worried proliferation that saudis and others may compete with the iranians, the scenario for that is break down of this deal that leaves the iranians without constraints on their nuclear program. the way to resolve the proliferation problem and reassure the gulf arabs and lock and freeze in the iranian program the next ten years. >> if we overrode the veto also -- you said sanctions would break down. let's say we wanted to bring sanctions back again. how would you be able to bring them back? >> if that happened hypothetically, obviously the president and secretary of state would want to reassemble

sanctions regime with iran. if iran broken the agreement and proceeded with nuclear research. >> one last quick question -- zblp it would be difficult to do. >> so whether it's ten year at the end can -- if we get to year eight and nine -- i'm asking you this based on previous experience. it kind of comes across like ten years happens and everything goes back to normal. wouldn't a new agreement begin to be negotiated around year eight or nine or do you sit and wait until ten years is over? >> if you still have radical government in teheran, you'd have to put together i think another sanctions regime pressure points on iran threaten them. reserve the right to use military force if they sought a nuclear weapon. you'd be back in that game. >> thank you mr. chair. >> thank you. we go to steve of ohio. >> thank you mr. chairperson. senator libberman i'll begin with you if okay. as already mentioned, prime minister netanyahu referred to

this agreement as a mistake of historic proportions. what position does this put israel in? >> thanks congressman. obviously prime minister netanyahu and leadership of israel is better prepared than i am to make a statement. this is a room of supporters of israel. it's very clear based on the violent antiisrael rhetoric of iran based on support by iran of terrorists that now threaten israel including israel, the idea iran would have nuclear weapons, assuming they keep the promises of first ten years is threatening to israel.

i think we'll lead the israeli government to make decisions about what it can do to better protect itself. the israeli political system is quite lively, a lot of opposition. from what i see, the feeling about the -- this agreement and worry about it in weeks prouding ing -- weeks proceeding it is share add in a broad spectrum. to be more specific. the leader of the opposition has basically said the same things about a bad agreement on nuclear weapons with iran that netanyahu has said. >> general hayden let me turn to you. when you combine lifts of arms embargo and this agreement,

isn't it -- shouldn't it be greatly concerning to us our security that the concern that intercontinental ballistic technology and information goes from russia to iran and that puts us directly in harm's way here from a nuclear armed iran somewhere down the road? >> it certainly puts us in a position of being more threatened by a more capable iran with or without a nuclear device. the senator talked about israel and position on nuclear weapons and how this really frightens israelis. i think there's another element to it. yesterday iran was international outlaw. today they're not. and that will allow the normalization of a host of relationships as you're suggesting that will allow the iranians to grow in strength.

the comment about we need to work hard to make sure that doesn't happen because they are engaged in egregious behavior throughout the region is true. this is welcoming an iran that is not changed back in the nations. that's problematic. >> thank you. >> two questions to you if i can. one is isn't it likely this deal that you're going to see a pretty significant reaction by the gulf states and the saudis that they have to counter much stronger iran now that ultimately is going to have nuclear weapons in all likelihood as a result of this? you're going to see in essence an arms race there. secondly, given two weeks notice before you can inspect, you can move a lot of incriminateing

evidence with two weeks notice and negotiations after that as well. >> whether this lead to proliferation, my guess is saudis and gulf states are going to try to match iran's capability. ambassador burns said this would happen in absence of a deal. it hasn't happened because trust and confederate those countries had in the united states and in intentions to severely iranian nuclear program. that intention is no longer in practice. this agreement said iran will be treated as mpt. i have never heard defense of the sunset clause. i've heard if it's about to expire, we'll try to not have it expire. that's not a defense of the sunset clause. if you defend this agreement, you defend why it should expire in ten years. in terms of verification

demands. the procedure will be in places once iaea has something suspicion happening in the non declared site. it will ask the government to deal with that. in annexes i've seen, i don't know what that means in terms of inspecting the facile is -- facility. it's not obviously to me. if there's dispute it goes to dispute committee. once that committee says iran is wrong and should -- iaea should have access iran says no it goes to security council. ambassador burns knows about the security council. security council does a lot of things. security council cannot impose sanctions on iran. it can recommend national measures, but those national measures have to be negotiated on case by case by the united

states government as one done for the past ten years when american diplomats went to europe and elsewhere trying to restrict congress. >> during the long period of time you've set out, there are no inspections. >> in that particular side no. >> thank you. >> all right. we go to mr. william keety of massachusetts. >> thank you mr. chairperson. i'd like to thank the witnesses for tone in this hearing, thoughtfulness, as well as my colleagues. i hope this is a harbor for the way we're discussing this going forward. it's indeed one of the most serious issues we'll have. i speak for most congress we're just beginning to digest this. many comments have been thoughtful. i share many of them. that being said is i want to go back to a few areas of interest.

ambassador burns talked about how the coalition is likely to unravel. we'll lose strength in terms of sanctions. there's another area that might change if this is stalled or if we walk away from this. that's the issue that we're negotiating with iran before they have the nuclear program in place. what would the negotiations be in your mind after they have that? how much more difficult would it be? how would they be limited if we wait? that's an important question that hasn't been asked. ambassador burns. >> may i take this opportunity to say sooim one of your constituents from west point massachusetts. thank you for representing us in congress. >> i'm definitely glad i commended all of you. >> i am too. >> we've had a bitter experience with north korea that we've all been involved many. once north korea obtained

nuclear weapons, it's become almost impossible to negotiate with them. they've got the leverage now and protection from china as well. i think president bush and president obama have been right to try to go at this in a more direct way and try to stop free negotiations, iranians, before they cross the nuclear threshold. what president obama has been able to do in my judgment is buy us ten years. i agree with ray and everyone else. we can't hope the iranians will change. i bet they don't. we'll have to go through the ten years with a lot of vigilance toughness and maybe replay all this ten years from now. we bought ourself ten years. we do have international unity. in the end, someone as cynical as president putin doesn't want iran to become a nuclear weapons power. he's in an interesting sort of way -- the russians have not

broken consensus despite the fact we're sanctions them on ukraine. i think this is the time for negotiations. i think reflecting on post 9/11 era, we should exhaust diplomacy. if it fails, and this could, we have the military option to rely on. >> i'm trying to get in a couple of questions. one of my concerns was raised by ambassador burns. doctor you addressed your opinion on this. the idea that if this agreement would result in saudis and gulf states just moving forward -- they're at the one yard line. there's no doubt in my mind they're going 99 yards. they're going to go do that. if they're going to get that any ways, wouldn't any decisions by the saudis or other countries can -- wouldn't they have done that any way? aren't they going to do that?

my point is it's not the agreement that's going to all of a sudden make them go forward with their own nuclear programs, but in the absence of agreement, they're going forward any ways. at least i believe that. so i think it's kind of a moot point about other countries going forward. i understand doctor what you said. any other panelists have a view on that? >> gulf states have not moved forward. >> if this becomes reality, one way or another that's your consensus. >> i'll have a very quick view. right now they really haven't. they haven't because we go in the huddle with them. we're part of their team. there's a perception that we've not quite switched sides. we've gone to the league's commissioner office. we're no longer playing on their squad. >> if i could -- i want to get one more question in. i'm very sensitive to going to league for sanctions, being a

fan of the new england patriots. that's another issue. quickly, at least i'll raise the question. i think the real concern too is that if the coalition unravels that creates a problem. if iran violates how easy will it be to recontinuestitute that for sanctions again? that's my concern. >> i should roadway sure you i have more confidence in tom brady. that goes without saying. so -- it's been great to have the p5+1 together. it's strengthened our position. i think we have to talk about trade-offs which ambassador burns has spoken of. i'd rather have us reject a bad deal than risk the p5+1 dissolve and accept a bad deal to compromise our security and that

of our allies in the middle east. in my opinion, part of what's been lost here is that the iranians needed this agreement more than we did. it didn't seem like that, but they're in a lot more trouble than we are. certainly economically. they benefit a lot from this. if for some reason the p5+1 coalition falls pafrtapart, we're still the economic super power of the world. access to our banking system is still necessary for economic growth. we have capacity ourselves to reimpose sanctions on them. >> thank you. i've gone over my time. other members want to talk. thank you all. >> mr. chairman i yield back. >> thank you mr. chairman. i'm grateful for chairman roy and members. in addition, i'm grateful for the panel being here today. you're making a difference

explaining this to people. i am disappointed the president made dangerous concessions when negotiating with iranian regime. this regime sponsors americans to attack families and openly cause for deaths to americans and allies especially israel. this bipartisan concern, i believe, has been express sod well today by the courage of senator joe libberman. your testimony today this is a bad deal which should be overridden. thank you for your courage. foreign policy initiative board member william crystal wrote today, quote, it is obviously a very good deal for iranian regime regime, very bad deal for america. congress should pass disapproval, override the president's veto and return america's iran policy from dealing from a position of strength rather than supplement supplementation

supplementation. in an effort to achieve political gain, president obama ignored congress and the american people and i believe establishing sad legacy of a murderous regime with nuclear ballistic missiles targeting american families. i agree with prime minister netanyahu, this is a mistake of historic proportions. with that in mind, senator libberman, it should be remembered that the secretary of state can designated iran a state sponsor of terrorism january 23 1984. over 30 years ago. this was in response to the october 1983 bombing of the u.s. marine barracks in beirut killing over 300 marines. this was perpetrated, people need to remember, by the iranian regime. keeping that in mind has there been change of course by the iranian regime leading up to the negotiations that have occurred today? or been agreed to today.

>> thanks congressman willson. this is a very important point. it's i to get focused on today and forget tomorrow. tomorrow tells us who this agreement is with. let me be explicit about it as you have been. this this iranian government has the blood of a lot of americans on its hands. the marines at barrack in beirut soldiers at colbert towers, and i could go on and on. hundreds of american soldiers were killed in iraq by shia militias that were trained in iran by the irgc. so your question is a good one. has the government changed? there's no evidence of it. somebody said before and i've heard before iran has two governments. i don't think so. iran has one government and two faces. the government in power is the irgc. the face they put out

occasionally is prime minister rouhani or president rouhani and now in negotiations the foreign minister zrkszarif. does anybody think zarif and rouhani are representative of their government? no, not in final analysis. as you consider this agreement, you've got to remember who you're making the agreement with. it's very important. >> in additionally, the ied explosive device thaszs that killed uns in iraq and afghanistan -- i had two sons serve in iraq and another in after kbanghanistan. they effaced iranian weaponry. for this to be disregarded -- i want to bring up the government sponsored newspaper in teheran. people need to know the exact quote. they predicted the u.s. quote will one fine day cease to be

visible on the map of the world, end of the quote. goodness gracious, what are we facing? by lifting economic sanctions, what will this do to our efforts to stop the degrading of terrorism in -- what wha does this do to stability of iran, syria, yemen? >> congressman it just increases iranian capacity across the board. that is an unavoidable consequence of this. it maybe something we're willing to pay the price for. i don't think so because of the nuclear portfolio. unavoidable, iran is more capable of continuing the policies it has been following for the last several decades. will there's no evidence this agreement or anything else is going to make the iranians change this course. >> thank you very much. >> we go to david of rhode island. >> thank you mr. chairman. i too want to thank the witnesses for your thoughtful testimony and is for insisting us in what will be a very consequential decision not only

for our country but for the security of the world. so thank you. i want to start by saying i think the objective of these negotiations at least as presented to me was always preventing a nuclear iran. that it is important as we decide to support or disapprove this agreement, it should be measured against that objective. there's lots more work to do and lots of action and pushing back that needs to take place. nobody should have imagined this agreement would solve all challenges we face and result in a complete transformation of ideology, behavior intentions of iran. if that's the test, there's no question that the agreement fails. the question is does it achieve a non nuclear a ran. senator libberman, you testified it allows iran to be a nuclear weapons state and makes it inevitable. the president this morning in describing this agreement said and i quote, it's a

comprehensive long term deal with iran to prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon. who's right? the if the objective is prevent a nuclear iran. the senator says it's inevitable. the president says it will not happen because of this agreement. that's the question we have to decide. >> i respect senator libberman's position here. he spent decades on this issue. i don't want to take issue with him in all in this sense. i don't think it's possible to say that this agreement l-1will definitely 100% achieve. i think it gives the greatest probability of preventing that. i see the down sides. i think congress will have to struggle through what we've all talked about this morning. will the inspections be strong enough? can you reimpose sanctions? right? what's the nature of this regime? i'm convinced we have to try

this first and be vigorous in trying to implement it. if it works, we're ahead of the game. if it doesn't we have other options. we do have stereo options. i don't think -- i also say -- if you're opposed to this deal -- i think if the deal unravels iranians are smart enough they won't go to the nuclear threshold. they'll go -- there will be some ways behind that that would not invite a military response. i think the rhetoric if you're against it you're going to get a war. if you're for it -- you can assure the american people will there will be no nuclear weapon. i think the reality is very complex between the two. >> and building upon that ambassador burns, much of the argument has been made even today, that what this agreement attempts to do is buy a decade. by this period of peace or period of at least iran not

moving toward a nuclear weapon, the argument being of course that at the end of the period, some argue iran would be stronger. they'll have greater economic success. they'll be able to withstand the position of sanctions better than they are today. our argument on the reverse side is that we'll know more about the nuclear program than ever before as a result of intrusive inspections. seems to me that's one of the questions we need to struggle with. where do we end up? presumably according to the agreement, no options are off the table at the end of that period. military options and all options available today, remain available. what's the difference in the strength of our positions? >> right. i think one way to look at this analytically, there's a lot of risks here going forward. there's a lot of risks not going forward and disproving. you have to weigh the risks on both sides. i think there's a legitimate case to be made. ray knows more about this than i

do. there's a possibility this regime is going to change, become less aggressive. we can't bank our strategy on that. hope cannot be the basis of that strategy. we have to be fromprepared for either outcome. we have to be tough in ten years from now this regime hasn't changed and tries to back. >> you said you challenge the position to challenge a revolutionary state and have arms agreement which is what this proposal attempts to do. why do you think we can't do both of those things? >> in the context of u.s. relationship -- what i was suggesting congressman is it's difficult to maintain arms control agreement as well as course of leverage because the principal course of leverage we have exercised on iran is economic. we have never responded to military attacks on u.s., iraq

and elsewhere. the course of leverage of economics, this agreement commits the united states and international community to unwind economic sanctions on iran over a decade. your course of menu shrinks. once it shrinks from economic instruments, you have military at your disposal. i don't think there's military solution to this. if you pressure iran and historically we have pressure through sanctions. that is becoming less available as you're committed to unwinding sanctions. >> general hayden one last question of you and senator libberman. what do you think happens if the deal is disapproved by congress veto is sustained? what do you think happened next? >> we're in absolutely unchartered waters congressman. it would depend on the strength of american argument willingness of the administration to go to allies and explain why we've chosen a new course of action. the senator pointed out we're a

powerful nation on our own. we can impose powerful sanctions on a variety of fronts across the iranian economy, particularly the iranian banking system. as ambassador burns points out r more international consensus we get, more pressure we can bring. >> one response. if this is rejected by congress nobody can predict what will happen, but i would say i hope the administration would try to regather p5+1 and basically go back to iran and say we couldn't sell it. we've got to do a better deal here. again, i believe that iran needs a deal much more than we do. the other thing is that at that point, we probably would want to look at increasing sanctions to give them motivation to come back and making credible president and congress we're prepared to use our military power if our intelligence tells us that they have actually

turned the corner and are beginning to nuclearize their program. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> michael mccaul chairman of homeland security committee. >> thank you chairman. we thank the witnesses. i in some respects feel the train has already left the station. even if we disapprove of this, this is vetoed and reover ride this goes before the security council. unless the administration exercises leadership of those sanctions will be lifted regardless of what we do in the united states. then i think that's maybe something we haven't discussed here today. then from homeland security standpoint, that means we have billions of dollars being restored to the iranians that can then go into terrorist operations. we know they control five capitals now. really arguably teheran,

baghdad, damascus beirut, sanaa, yemen. that's what greatly concerns me. i don't know if we can turn the block back on this now. now that the p5+1 agreed to this. when i was in europe you're absolutely correct ambassador, they're very supportive of this deal. primarily, i think because they have a lot of money to be made on this. so i don't know what we do to stop it. i can tell you what i'm concerned about. the last minute arms embargo being lifted which can lead to russian technology and sanctions against the force being looked at as well. not to mention, you know, when you look at the track record of iaea and whether they can truly perform this mission with unfeathered access -- i highly doubt the iranians are going to

give us access. what are they giving us access to? nuclear facility sites. that doesn't include military facility where arguably where a lot of this could potentially take place. and lastly the intercontinental ballistic missiles they can mass produce. general, as you know intelligence estimates indicate by the end of possibly early as next year could have capability to hit the united states of america. there's only one reason you produce these things to deliver a nuclear war head. so all these things put together in addition to rhetoric, i think i agree with senator libberman, it's more risk for america and more reward for iran. i want to end with this because this is probably the worst. when i was in saudi i think senator you mentioned they asked why are you negotiating with iran?

why are you doing that? i met with netanyahu. why are you doing this? this will result in a nuclear arms race in the middle east. you indicated saudis are already taking steps now working with pakistan, to produce their own nuclear capability. then turkey is going to want that. egypt is going to want it. and on and on. that's one of my biggest concerns with this backfiring and not a great result. senator, general, if you could both comment on that. >> it's good to see you. of course i agree with you. all your concerns are questions about what happens at the united nations if we were -- if congress rejects the agreement and president's veto is overridden. that's an interesting question. in the most direct sense, you think the deal therefore would be dead and so there would not be a basis for going to united nations. based on having read it one and a half times morning, i'm not

sure i could swear to that under oath. it's a really interesting question. again, i come back to what i said before. let's never underestimate our power. we're a military and economic powerle and if we continue to deny sanctions, and to our banking system, it will effect the iranian economy. and let's never forget that. >> general haden? >> very briefly, mr. chairman. i'm trying to play catch up with the agreement and read the fine print this morning. it is not at all clear this will not be resolved in new york before the congressional review period has expired so we may have the administration going to one deliberative body before this body has a chance to vote. >> i don't know the answer to that either. if the hume ab security -- human

security council approves this before congress has a chance to vote on it, then are the sanctions lifted by our international partners irrespective of what the united states does. i don't know the answers to this, as this agreement just came out. but i think that is something we need to take a look at. >> mr. chairman, if i may say so -- take the liberty there is an interesting question, and maybe as one of the points as you start deliberation for bipartisan agreement on is asking not to go to the united nations before they come to congress. it seems to me our constitution requires that kind of respect first for congressional consideration. >> i agree 100%. i yield back. >> let's go to lois frankle of florida. >> thank you, mr. chair. first of all, i want to thank you gentlemen for this very

anxiety-producing discussion. i know we all agree that iran should not get a nuclear weapon. it would put the most danger weapon in the hands of the world's foremost sponsor of terror and most likely lead to a proliferation of nuclear weapons in the middle east region. and i want to say this. i think because of the seriousness of this issue that we have to all take a very objective, nonpartisan scrutiny of this issue and this perspective deal. and i think mr. meeks made a point also that i wanted to echo which is you know not knowing what went on in the room with our partners makes some of the deal ununderstand -- not understandable to me.

because one of my -- and i don't mean to simplify a 70 page agreement that has taken so many literally years to get this to point and this is one of my biggest anxiety points and which has been raised which is we're going to give iran billions of dollars to continue to their terrorism all over the world, and then at the end of 15 years they're allowed to continue to enrich. so this is the part i don't understand. what happens in 15 years? i know we will -- i suspect we'll know more which is a good thing. but is iran going to be nicer or are they going to be less susceptible to economic sanctions? that's to me that's a sticky

point. and then on the other side of the coin though, to me, another anxiety point is if we walk away and we went to let's put more sanctions on, do you think an us versus them approach, in other words, i know we need our partners to help us with the sanctions, do you think they would be amenable to -- you have to be with us or they'll be other economic consequences from the united states. so those are my two questions if someone wants to take a shot at it? >> i would be happy to. i would just say that i think all of us agree on iranian support for terrorism on the american hostages. these are vital issues. but there is a reason why both the last two administrations have focused more on the nuclear issue. it is the greater immediate danger. and so in government as you

know, you have to make those choices and i think the choice is right to have this negotiation. we have to pressure them on the other issues but you have to go at this issue first and foremost. second i don't believe that sanctions -- u.s. sanctions alone can work. i agree with senator lieberman we're the biggest economy in the world and we can do damage to the iranians but what tipped the balance and drove them to the negotiating table is that the rest of the world got involved too. and if congress just disapproves and the sanctions resolve, you've lost thur leverage. and third in that scenario and a previous member asks my colleagues to the right if there is disapproval what will the united states do? we could go back to the p-5. i don't they russia and china would want to form the same coalition, stepping back ten years ago and pressure the iranians. i think we would be without leverage and our president would

be weakened and the work of the last ten years would be under cut. an that is why i'm strongly for it. despite the misgivings and tradeoffs that i see, strongly in approval of this agreement. >> but iran will most likely be stronger in 15 years, especially economically? >> well i would assume they would be stronger economically. we don't know what kind of country they will be like in terms of their behavior because we can't look no a crystal ball. so we can't build the policy on hoping they'll change. and this has been too much talk i think from some parts of the administration that for some reason it will be a honeymoon and iran and the united states will become partners in the middle east, i don't see if if you look down the issues that we have discussed. >> and senator lieberman, do you think we could get sanctions back on the table? >> i think if the congress rejects this agreement, i think the first step would be to try to go back to iran and urge them to come back to the

negotiations. and again i repeat, just practical politics the administration would say we tried our best to sell it and we couldn't sell it. those people in our country, the constitutional republic said no. we don't go with it. if they are recalcitrant, we to go back to sanctions. can we get some of our allies? i hope so. i don't know. and the other point is very important. look, i would love to have this a good deal to close the door as we originally said we would to iran becoming a nuclear power and that would have allowed us to end our sanctions on them that would have had a very tough air-tight inspections regime which you have to have with a country with such a record of cheating and deceit and delay. this is not it. and that is the problem. and therefore they're going to get money. chris, we never know what iran will look like in ten or 15

years but i think ratifying this agreement will make it more likely than the radicals in charge of iran will still be in charge of iran. why? because they will use the money they get saz a result of lifting sanctions to strengthen their position inside of the country let alope what they'll do to expand what they've done through terrorists and others in the region generally. but they'll have money to use to make people in iran happier than they are now and it will be harder for the opposition -- which is there, not supported by us or anybody else, but is there to have a chance to over throw the extremists. >> we're going to ted poe of texas. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you all for being here. i appreciate your expertise on this very sensitive important subject. i look at the ruling party the ayatollah, as a wolf in wolf's clothing. he's made it clear that he wants death to america. he said that numerous times.

and now it seems to me that the wolf has made a deal with the sheep, not to eat the sheep for ten years. and then what? supper? we don't know. my concern is was there ever any discussions that there needed to be free elections in iran? and let the people decide who should rule over them? do any of you know of any discussion about that in this deal that has been taking place for sometime? senator lieberman? >> i don't. i assume it was off the table and wasn't mentioned. along with the other things that boernl us about -- bother us about iran's behavior and their support of terrorism incarceration of americans and deprivation of human rights of their own people and we could go on and on. >> mit cal hang -- public hangings of political opponents.

>> exactly. >> do you agree that the best hope really for world security and iran is they had a regime change with peaceful elections. senator leiberman? >> i certainly do. that is the ultimate answer. and we haven't tried or done very much to bring that about. and during the cold war, making arms agreements with the soviets, we were supporting eastern europe. we were supporting the ref use nicks in russia so there is a precedent for that. >> does this deal -- the open and this deal -- the hope and this deal, based on the premise that we will trust the iranians to comply? >> well, as i've said here already, congressman i don't think there is any basis in iranian behavior in the last three decades to trust