aea even before they start building any nuclear facility. this eliminates kind of a loophole where one could do something covertly and say, oops we were planning to notify before we bought nuclear material. they must do this now in the planning stage so it's another thing that we have beyond 25 years. the iaea will be permitted to use advance the technologies, including things like real-time inreachment monitoring which is a technology developed by our laboratories, in this case by the way oakridge played a major role, mr. chairman. if the international community suspects iran is going to cheat they can request access for inspection, and much has been made about the 24-day inspection period where they could get access, and i did say the words anytime anywhere, and i many a

pleased that yesterday a member of your caucus acknowledges however, the full sentence was anytime, anywhere in the sense of a well-defined process with a well-defined end time so i am pleased that we have established that. in fact, the iaea can request access to any suspicious location with 24 hours notice under the additional protocol which iran will implement. the deal does not change that baseline. the issue if an agreement is not reached then when the iaea requests access the 24-day clock will start. this is a new tool a finite time, a new tool for resolving disputes within what we think is a short period of time and short is defined because of our confidence in environmental sampling that we will be able to have to implement to detect

microscopic traces of materials even after attempts are made to remove the evidence of activities with nuclear material. in fact, iran's history provides a good example. in february of 2003, the iaea requested access to a suspicious facility in tehran, and it was denied and negotiations dragged out for six months but even after that long delay environmental samples taken by the iaea revealed nuclear activity even though iran had made a substantial effort to remove and cover up the evidence, and we have an addition conducted our own experiments to verify the ability to detect very very small traces of uranium. the agreement will be implemented in phases, as has been said already. some 10 years 15 years, 20 and 25 years, and then the key transparency measures that stay

beyond 25 years, of course as long as iran is in the npt and if they were not in the npt, every alarm bell would go off and appropriate actions would be taken. in closing i want to acknowledge the tireless work of the negotiating team led by my colleague, secretary kerry and the u.s. multiagency delegation worked together seamlessly, and the e3 ue plus 3 played a big role in the endeavor. the u.n. security council is crucial to making sure iran come replies. i just want to say again, the deal is based on science and analysis because of its deep

grounding and exhaustive technical analysis carries odd by our doe scientists and engineers, and it's a good deal for america and our allies and global security. iran will be thwarted from a nuclear capability with rather than without this agreement. thank you for the opportunity to be here. look forward to the discussion. >> thank you very much. secretary lew. >> thank you mr. chairman. members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to speak today about the joint comprehensive plan of action. a foreign policy decision of this significance deserves a thorough review. i am confident a full and fair debate on the merits will make it clear this deal will strengthen the u.s. security and that of our allies. these measures have clearly

demonstrated to iran's leaders the costs of international law cutting them off from the world's march etc. and crippling their economy. today the iranian economy is 20% smaller than it would have been had it remained on a pre-2012 growth path. the united states government stood at the forefront with the bipartisan support of congress and this committee. we established a web of far reaching international ansanctions to come to the table. the world's major powers have been and remain united in preventing a nuclear armed iran. that unity of purpose produced four tough u.n. security council solutions and sanctions in many countries. the point of the sanctions was to change iran's nuclear

behavior while holding out the prospect of relief if the world's concerns were addressed. accordingly, once it's verified iran's provided key steps and extend its breakout time to at least one-year phased sanctions. there is no signing bonus. there will be no immediate changes to u.n. eu or u.s. sanctions. only if iran fulfills the sanctions, sanctions that target third-country parties doing business with iran. we must guard against the possibility iran does not hold up its side of the deal so if iran violates the commitments once we suspended the sanctions we can snap back both u.n. and u.s. sanctions. since preventing the snapback

requires an affirmative vote from the u.n. security council united states has the ability to reinforce the sanctions. our primary u.s. trade embargo, with very limited exceptions iran will continue to be denied access to the largest market and maintain powerful sanctions targeting iran's support for terrorists groups such as hezbollah, and its missile program and its human rights abuses at home. just this week, treasury sanctions hezbollah leaders building on designations last month targeting the facilitators. some argue that sanctions relief is premature until iran ceases

these activities and i understand the concerns, but iran's ties to terrorists groups are exactly why we must keep it from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon. the combination of those two threats would raise a nightmare scenario. a nuclear armed iran will be a far more menacing threat. if we cannot solve both concerns at once we need to address them in turn. jcpoa will address the nuclear danger freeing us and our allies to check iran's regional activities aggressively. by contest walking away from the deal would leave them with a short and increasing nuclear breakout time. we must measure realistic and what sanctions relief will mean to iran. iran's $100 billion in restricted foreign reserves which many fear will constitute the country's long-term savings

and not the budgetary allowance. after sanctions relief iran will only be able to freely access about $50 billion, and that's because over $20 billion are donated to china where it cannot be spent and additional funds are to iran's energy and banking sector. iran can't spend the usable resources as they will likely to be needed to meet international obligations for external net and imports. moreover president rawouhani, he faces over $500 trillion500 half a

trillion dollars. backing away from this deal to escalate the economic pressure and try to obtain a broader kau pitchlation from iran will be a mistake. even if one believed that extending the sanctions pressure than resolving the threat of iran's nuclear program, that choice is not available. our partners agreed to impose costly sanctions on iran for one reason to, put a stop to its nuclear program. we could be left with neither a nuclear deal nor effective sanctions so it's unrealistic that sanctions would force iran to toelgly capitulate.

the joint comprehensive plan of action is a strong deal with phased relief only after iran fulfills its commitments to roll back a nuclear program and a powerful snap back later if they break the deal. it blocks iran's path to a nuclear bomb. that's an overriding international security priority and should not be put at risk not when the prospects of an unconstrained nuclear program are such a threat to america and the world. thank you and we look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you very much. senator cardin. >> it has been stated many times the united states maintains its ability to impose sanctions relative to support terrorism and human rights violations and ballistic missile issues. i have read the jcpoa and there

are several paragraphs that give me concern. let me just read one. it's paragraph 29. the parties will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly or adversely affect normalization of trade and economic relations with iran. secretary lew, i want to get your assurance we have full ability to use the tools of sanctions against iran for its support of terrorism, human rights and nonnuclear type of activities which include congressional action that congress might want to take? >> senator cardin, it was a matter of extensive discussion in the negotiations. we made clear in the negotiations that we retained the ability and we were going to keep in place sanctions on terrorism on regional destabilization and human rights violations. in fact, we are not lifting

sanctions that are based on those authorities and we are not designating entities that were designated for those reasons. we also have made clear we reserve the right to put additional sanctions in place to address concerns about terrorism, human rights -- >> when you say we that includes the congress of the united states? >> congress has authorities in this area, and i know there is legislation pending regarding hezbollah, and we would work with you on legislation. the thing that we can't do is we can't just put it right back in place everything that was part of the nuclear sanctions and just put a new label on it. we reserved our rights to put sanctions in place that address those continuing malign activities. >> the iran sanctions act expires at the end of 2016. we will still be in the jcpoa period of time where a snap back of sanctions a viable hedge

against iran's cheating. congress may well want to extend that law so that that power is available immediately if iran were to violate the agreement. is that permitted under the jcpoa? >> i think if it's on expiration it's one thing and well advanced it's another. coming out of the box is very different than what you do when it expires. >> let me ask -- the question is why would that be, it's either allowed or not allowed and we will get to that, but the 24 days you referred to and i appreciate your explanation, but there are three types of activities that could place in violation of the jcpoa by iran, and they could be using material in violation and you have already addressed that issue as far as the 24 days, but it could involve weaponization or it could involve research not using

nuclear material. would the 24-day delay compromise our ability to determine if iran is in compliance with the agreement. >> with the nuclear material, i think we addressed and is quite secure. clearly when it goes into weaponization activities, even there there is a spectrum, for example, working with uranium metal is something that would involve nuclear material and i think we would have very, very strong tools there. when we go to other activities without getting into too many specifics, they will still be a variety of signatures for example, my secretary priority on the weaponization list would be explosively driven neutron sources, and i think there are -- there are certainly tell tale signs that we would have access to, and all the

inspectors more precisely would have access to. clearly as one gets into other areas, such as computer modeling and that's a different kind of detection challenge, and in all of these cases to go to undeclared sites we will rely upon our intelligence capabilities and those of our partners to be able to point the iaea to suspicious activities. but there are nonnuclear signatures, but it does get more complicated. >> secretary kerry i want you to elaborate a little more on the capacity after the time limits and iran's obligations after the time limits on its nuclear enrichment towards weaponization of a nuclear weapon. i understand they still have obligations under their nonproliferation treaty and they still have obligations with the additional proceeded calls under the nbt but can you tell us how

much lead time we will have, what a breakout looks like after the 15 years and what assurances do we have that we will be able to detect and take action before iran becomes a nuclear weapon state after the 15 years? >> first of all, senator, after -- throughout the entire life of the agreement, the additional protocol provides for the right of access, and that is where the 24-hour notice access comes from and they have to respond to it. so if we had any intelligence regarding a suspicious activity or suspicious site i might add among many, israel, countries in the region, we will have an incredible amount of sourcing for this and we would be able to put the ask to them and they

have to respond to that and if they don't respond to that we have the ability to convene and vote and put back in place sanctions or to take other actions if we deem that appropriate. >> after the 15 years? >> yes. yes -- but let me just fill out for you, we also have a 20-year component which allows us televised tracking of their centrifuge production of the wroters and bell yos on the centrifuges centrifuges, and we have access and monitoring tracking of the life of the uranium cycle, so from the mining and the mills and the gasification and the centrifuge out into the waste, we will have an ability the iaea will have the ability to appropriately monitor that every step of the way. if we have x amount of uranium

coming out, or in the mill, if there is x amount of milling taking place and something is diverted and we don't see it go into the place it's supposed to go to we will have extraordinary insight into this. under the iaea process for civil nuclear programs, all of the facilities are declared because it's a civil nuclear program. as such, there is literally 24/7 visitation in those sites. they are not even requests sort of situations and it's only for the undeclared facility that you have a suspicion that you have to go through the other process. we will have amazing insight because they are living by the nbt, or allegedly they will live by the nbt, and that's what we have to make sure they are doing. they have day-to-day insight to that. i might add to all of the

colleagues, under the interim agreement, which by the way a number of people called a historic mistake and tragedy and you heard all of the same rhetoric now, and those same people asked for us to keep that in place two years later because it has worked. the fact is iran has lived up to every component of that over the course of the last year, they reduced the 20% uranium and undid iraq and so forth and so forth. i won't go through it all now. we will have a level of insight that is not being examined enough and understood enough, and nothing ends at 15 years. simply, the size of the stockpile limitation ends and the enrichment they can enrich further, but we will have insight to that enrichment. 5% is the high end of it. if you start to enrich higher up around the 20%, you are talking

about the tehran research reactor or a few other things. there is no rational whatsoever for something bigger. we would be all over it, and able to respond. we would actually have months to respond, to be honest with you. so the fact is the breakout team never goes down to a level below which we have an ability to respond, and i think earnie can speak to the full breath of the scrutiny. >> mr. chairman, may i ask one footnote because it's what could be a collateral benefit of this agreement is that going to the uranium supply chain, the safeguards, i just want to add this is something the iaea really wants to have something more broadly so this would be a first in moving towards cradle to grave safeguards.

>> i might add there are other firsts that unfortunately we cannot talk about relative to some of their procedures which i eluded to, and i would say to mr. secretary, yes people have said that they would rather keep that in place and that doesn't mean they liked that in the first place but it's on comparison, and i wanted to just clarify. we really need to leave emotion out of this, and i couldn't agree with you more, and it should be done in a nonemotional way but that doesn't mean we have to leave common sense out of this with all due respect. we have gone from the mantra of no deal is better than a bad deal and i have heard everybody say that a couple few weeks ago, and now we have gotten to the point where, well you have to

accept this or else it's war. the mantra has changed dramatically. all i can say is after reviewing this, and even in a cursory fashion, anybody who believes this is a good deal really joins the ranks of the most naive people on the face of the earth. when you are dealing with the people that we are dealing with here, with the history they have of cheating and everything else, anyone who can say this is a good deal -- i know the justification is well, it's not perfect, but it's not even close to that. i join the chairman in this in a closed hearing yesterday, we have been told we have no choice in this because we have gone from the position where we started, where we had iran isolated and they were viewed on the world stage as a poria, and if we don't go along with this, we're told, the other

negotiators are going to go along with this and the united states will be isolated on this issue and we will be the poria on the national stage. just think about that. where these negotiations have taken us from a situation where we had iran exactly where we wanted them to now if we don't go along with this then we are going to be the isolated poria character on the national stage. well, look, the other thing that was so important in this was verification. we have to have verification. everybody said this is the number one thing on verification. well, everybody here knows that there is a site called parchin, it was designed -- i heard the secretary say that we are going to insure that their nuclear ambitions are only for peaceful purposes. how in the world does parchin fit that. it was designed and operated as

an explosive detonation place and they designed a detonation trigger for a nuclear weapon. that stays in place. does that sound like it's for peaceful purposes. let me tell you the worst thing about parchin, and you agreed to not even taking samples there. they are going to be able to test by themselves! even the nfl wouldn't go along with this. how in the world can you have a nation like iran doing their own testing? i know secretary moniz who by the way, one of the brightest guys i know, he says we will watch it on tv and there's a good chain of custody for the samples being taken and are we going to trust iran to do this? this is a good deal? this is what we were told we were going to get when we were told that don't worry, we're going to be watching over their

shoulder and put in place verifications that are absolutely bullet proof. we're going to trust iran to do their own testing? this is absolutely ludicrous. the one thing that bothers me incredibly about this is the billions of dollars that iran's going to get. we have been briefed on the fact that while they have been in the horrible financial condition and we have gotten them to a horrible financial condition, one of their national priorities has been to support terrorism. they have supported hezbollah, hamas, the houthis with every kind of aid there is and everything we are trying to do in the world has their fingerprints on it trying to do us in. these billions of dollars will be put back in their hands in i'm told, about nine months. and it doesn't matter what we

do, congress go ahead and do your thing, it doesn't matter, because we don't have control over this matter, and it was the other people sitting at the table that have control over the money and no matter what we do they will release the billions of dollars. well, i got to tell you, this is a very heavy lift when you sleep at night and you say, well i am going to vote to release, and people are trying to kill our allies. to say -- to be able to walk away from this and say that this is a good deal with ludicrous. with all due respect you guys

have been bamboozled and the american people are going to pay for that. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator boxer. >> can we respond at all to any of that? [ laughter ] >> my time is up, mr. chairman. i suspect we will hear lots of responses. >> isn't there time built in for answers or comments? >> i want to make sure this gets a full and fair hearing. >> let me start at the beginning here the comment was made that -- what is it naive if you think this is a good deal. this is an article from the "washington post." i urge you all to read it. how the iran deal is good for israel according to israelis who know what they are talking about. i urge you to read it. it says here a host of prominent security establishments came out

in support of the obama administration's efforts. in an interview this week with the "daily beast," the former head of israel top security agency suggests israel politicians were playing with fears and a fearful society and he praised it as a measure to curb the iranian threat. i don't think he is tphaunaive. he praised the former chief of israel's spy agency hailed obama's victory. folks, you can throw it around, and senator you said we had them exactly where we wanted them 19,000 centrifuges and enough materials for 10 to 12 bombs? is that where we wanted them? what was the purpose of the sanctions? >> to dismantle their operation. >> i was chairman when we passed those sanctions and our purpose was to bring them to negotiations so we negotiated.

i guarantee you, the first 15 years you have unbelievable restraints that make it impossible to even think about making a bomb. they can think about it but can't do anything about it. so at the end of 15 years, you have every option that you have today. your decision is whether you want those 15 years to be right now or take the 15 years and figure out whether or not this is going to work. that's really the choice. i don't know what you mean by we had them right where we wanted them. to what end. >> giving you a talking point with the 19,000 sepbcentrifuges, ten of which are operating, but we all know they are antiques. >> they are antiques. >> we all talk about the number of centrifuges but this deal lays out their ability to

continue research and development on the hour sixes and eight, and year eight they can industrial that -- >> for a peaceful program. >> let me finish. i let you talk. they said the ir 8 is their future, and ir 1 doesn't operate most of the time and it's slow and they want to get rid of those. they did a masterful job to get the west and other countries to focus on something over here that is of no use to them while they are able to draft them an agreement that allows them a pathway so they could put in a covert facility and enrich in levels and pace they never can imagine. with that, secretary boxer. >> mr. chairman, if i may add, i must say every element of the rnd program is rolled back in

time. the fact is they right now -- they are very active in all of these areas and it's significantly delayed. that's a fact. >> and it is a fact in year eight they are given that time -- >> in year eight, and that's why the president said in year -- >> it's an incorrect characterization, and i apologize, but in year eight they are in industrial activity and it's a small cascade they can start to do years after their current plans. >> and many people thought it was going to take that long to have the capacity to do that. as i mentioned from a standpoint there, they have been brilliant.

>> i don't think there is one person involved that doesn't believe iran is a bad actor, and so that's why i believe we need to curb their nuclear ambitions. i think it's essential. i don't think the american people want another war and at the end of the day i know some disagree with this. i think that's -- at the end of the day, that's really the option. which everybody tiptoes around. now, you know -- i support the right of my colleagues to say anything they want but you have sat there and you have heard two of my colleagues go after you with words that i am going to repeat. you were fleeced. one said. the other said you have been bamboozled. so putting aside the fact that i

think that's disrespectful and insulting, that's their right to do. there are other ways to express your disagreement, but that goes to your core as a human being and your intelligence, and i think you are highly intelligent. let me ask you, and if you could answer yes or no and i know it's hard for you, secretary kerry for you to do so because we're senators and it's not our way and then i can get through the rest of my list. so my colleagues think you were fleeced and bamboozled and that means everybody was fleeced and bamboozled, everybody, almost everybody in the world. i want to ask you does the united kingdom, our strong ally support this? >> yes. >> does australia, one of our strongest allies support this accord? >> yes. >> does germany support this accord tphao yes.

>> does france support this accord? >> yes. >> does new zealand support this accord? >> i have not seen their statement. >> they are on the security council, and they voted for it. >> oh, in the vote, yes. >> either by voice support or a vote. did jordan voice its support in their vote? >> yes. >> did spain, did nigeria and lithuania? >> yes. >> you get the drift. if you were bamboozled, the world has been bamboozled. that's ridiculous and unfair and wrong. you can disagree for sure with aspects of this agreement but i think we need to stay away from that kind of rhetoric. now, i have the agreement right here and i have read it and one thing that i was surprised as i sat down to read it i thought you know, will i be able to

understand this document. it's very understandable. i want to say -- cite a couple things in here. iran reaffirms under no circumstances will iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons. that's one phrase. another one is and -- that's -- this one is number 16. iran will not engage in activities including at the rnd level that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device including uranium or plutonium and that's in this accord. so one of the things i want to do is send out a message to iran. not to the people of iran, who i think are really good people, but to those folks there that are so dangerous, and that is you said it real clearly, and if

you don't live up to it, i guarantee you the consequences will not be pretty and i think that's an important message that has to go out, because they signed it and they said it and the whole world is watching them. secretary kerry i authored the u.s. israel strategic partnership act, and president obama signed both. it means that we stand shoulder to shoulder with our closest ally and we know israel does not like this agreement. i am very glad you read those comments of the paper. i would hope as somebody who has stood so -- i was going to say

tall, but it's hard for me to say that. stood so tall for this relationship with israel. at the end of the day, i think this relationship is going to be even more strengthened. i want to get your view on that, because i know that ash carter went to israel. do you have anything to report about that meeting and how that went? >> well secretary carter went with the intention of laying out and beginning a dialogue in great detail, which he did with the defense minister of israel. they had, i think, almost a day-long meeting in which they discussed the many ways in which we are prepared to work with israel understanding the obviously understanding the very dangerous dynamics of the region right now. and secretary carter, in fact, went up to review with them what the threat is currently from

isil, daesh, and so forth. these are all things we are prepared to push back on in any number of ways, and we also believe there's the potential of a kind of new alignment in the region, and i will be going to speak speak. >> i want to press you on that, because we were reading about saudi arabia's words today in the press and i just -- i don't -- i have not had time to check it out and i wanted to ask you, do you believe the saudis are supportive now despite the fact they review iran as aversaryadversary. >> i met with the foreign minister a few days ago and he indicated to me they were prepared to support it if certain things are going to happen. those things i believe are going to happen. i anticipate that.

senator, sorry to divert but i forgot the quote and i don't want to be accused of being a person saying the choice is military or otherwise. anybody who followed the events in iran has to admit truthfully that he never believed iran would ever agree to discuss these issues let alone agree to the measures imposed on them by the world powers. the alternative would be military strikes which would plunge the region into deeper insecurity and would likely not be successful he said. so we're not alone in describing that.

this does not end the possibility of a confrontation with iran, obviously, depending on the choices they make. >> i want to say, thank wendy sherman for me personally. donald trump said something why don't you bring women into the negotiations, it would go much better. she is fantastic and wish she was here. >> she is absolutely spectacular. she did an extraordinary job. we would not be where we are without wendy and jack and an incredible team, a team, by the way, all across the government of the united states experts whose life is spent analyzing iran and analyzing nuclear prolive nation that came from the energy department and intelligence community and from the state department elsewhere, all who worked together, and believe me they're a savvy group of people and nobody pulled any wool over their eyes. >> thank you. senator rubio.

>> thank you, thank you all for being here today. secretary kerry the administration publicly stated that you expect this deal is going to be rejected by majorities in both houses of congress, and you said while winning approval of congress would be nice your goal is to basically convince enough democrats so you can override a detail so as far as the administration is concerned this is a done deal. as far as american sanctions are concerned this is a deal whose survival is not guaranteed beyond the term of the president, and i hope the next president is somebody that will remove the national security waiver and reempose the congressional sanctions passed by congress because this deal is fundamentally flawed. i believe it weakens our national security and makes the world a more dangerous place and throughout the process by the way, this administration in my opinion repeatedly capitulated

on important items and the examples are endless, and it allows what we were pressing about inspections. i understand all the disputes about the terms but clearly there was a perception created among my colleagues and both sides of the i will that we were pressing for anytime anywhere inspections, and then the snapback sanctions are also hollow. we have a complicated 24-day iran will test and exploit over and over again. they know that once the international sanctions are gone they will be impossible to snap back. quote, once the sanctions collapse it will be impossible to reconstruct it and he bragged earlier this week that violations of the agreement would not be prosecuted. no matter what happens iran will keep the more than billions of dollars its going to receive up

front as a signing bonus, and iran will be allowed to continue to develop long-range ballistic weapons for nuclear warfare. all of these promises that they are making about never pursuing a weapon and they are all revealed as lies when they are looking at making a long-range rocket to put a nuclear war head on them. and it allows the arms embargo to end. on terrorism, this deal provides possibly hundreds of billions to a regime that directly threatens the interests of the united states and our allies and nothing holds iran to account for human rights. quite the opposite. the regime is being rewarded for its atrocious human rights record. i know you said you brought up the american hostages in every

negotiation, and we thank you for that, but this deal brought no new information regarding loved ones' whereabouts. and in fact, you personally met and negotiated with an iranian official who impressed on jason's case and lied to the world and lied to the world by saying we don't jail people for their opinions. this deal does nothing for the marine corps charge who dictated a letter from the prison that said, quote, secretary kerry sits politely with the iranians and shaking hands to save them from economic meltdown, unquote as iran adds hostages and does nothing for the pastor whose only crime was practicing his religion. the only people this deal does anything for directly are the iranian officials that want to continue to jail and execute their people and who hate israel

and hope to wipe them from the has not planet and want to help assad slaughter people. secretary kerry i do not fault you for trying to strike a deal for iran, i don't. i do fault the president for striking a terrible deal with iran. i hope enough of my democratic colleagues can be persuaded to vote against this deal. the iranian regime and the world should know this deal is your deal with iran i mean yours meaning this administration and the next president is under no legal or moral obligation to live up to it. the iranian regime and the world who know the majority of the members of this congress do not support this deal and the deal could go away on the day that president obama leaves office. in that realm, i wanted to ask about this. if you today, are a company

that after this deal is signed and go into iran and build a manufacturing facility and the next president of the united states lifts the security waiver or iran violates the deal do the sanctions supply against that facility going forward? if a company goes into iran after this deal and builds a manufacturing facility of any kind, car batteries, and iran violates the deal and the sanctions kick back in, will that facility be able to continue to operate without facing sanctions? >> senator if a company acts to go in and do business with iran while the sanctions are lifting that would be permitted. if iran violates the deal and the sanctions snap back they would be able to continue to -- >> the reason why it's important, it's important for companies anywhere in the world to know that whatever investment they make in iran they risking it, and they are betting on the

hope that iran never violates the deal and they are also hoping that the next president of the united states does not reimpose u.s. congressional sanctions by which they would become a sanction entity. one more specific question about the deal. there's a document that states those that negotiated the deal are prepared to cooperate with iran on the implementation on nuclear security guidelines and best practices and 10.2 reads cooperation through training and workshops to strengthen iran's ability to protect against and respond to nuclear security threats including sabotage and physical protection systems. here is my question. if israel decides it doesn't like this deal and it wants to sabotage an iranian nuclear program or facility, does this deal that we have just signed obligate us to help iran defend itself against israeli sabotage

or the sabotage of any other country in the world? >> the -- i believe that refers to things like physical security and safeguards all of our options and those of our allies and friends will remain in place. >> well, i guess that's my point. if israel conducts an air strike against the physical facility does this deal, the way i read it, does it require us to help iran protect and respond to that threat? >> no. >> it does not? >> no. >> the purpose of that is to be able to have longer-term guarantees as we enter a world in which cyber warfare is increasingly a concern for everybody that if you are going to have a nuclear capacity, you clearly want to be able to make sure that those are adequately protected. but i can assure you, we will

coordinate in every possible way with israel with respect to israel's concern. >> if israel conducts a cyber attack against the iranian nuclear program are we obligated to help defend them? >> no, i assure you that people will be coordinating closely with israel as we do on every aspect. >> that's not how i read that. >> i don't see any way it's possible we'll be in con confluctuate with sbralisrael with what we want to do there. i listened to your long list of objections about it, but there's no alternative that you or anyone else has proposed. >> i sure have. i have secretary kerry. >> i'm confident the next president of the united states will have enough common sense if this is being applied prop ir lyerproperly,

they're not going to arbitrarily -- they might want to engage and if there's a way to strengthen or do something. i can't imagine someone arbitrarily deciding let's go back to where we are where they are free to do whatever they want, without any inspections without any restraint or insight. i don't think any president would do that. >> before you signed this deal, iran was already in violation of existing mandates and restrictions, including things they signed on to. >> and this deal brings them back into compliance. if they don't live up to it, every option we have today is on the table. so we don't lose anything here. the way we lose is by rejecting the deal because then you have no restraints no sanctions, no insight, no inspectors, no

reduction of their stockpile. if you want to conveniently forget the fact they had enough fissile material to build 10 to 12 bombs, that's the threat to israel. if you go back to that without any alternative other than what you know, most people think is going to be the alternative, which is confrontation. nobody has a plan that's articulated and reasonable as to how you're going to strengthen this do something more when the supreme leader of iran and president of iran and others think they've signed an agreement with the world. the rest of the world thinks it's a good agreement. if you think the ayatollah will come back and negotiate again with an american, that's fantasy. you're never going to see that. we will have proven we're not trustworthy. we have 535 secretaryies of state. you can't deal with anybody. that's going to do a whole lot

to people that matter in the world. that's what's at stake here. >> mr. secretary just to ensure that i have appropriately addressed the situation i want to refrain and say we have been fleeced and not make that thing that's directed at an individual. one of the way we brought them into compliance is that we have agreed to let them do what they are doing and actually agreed to let them do it on an industrialized basis. so i will have to say that's how we brought them into compliance. >> senator this is a very important point. we're not alone in this. the bush administration proposed the exact same thing. this is not something that president obama just sort of dreamed up and thought was a good idea. june 12th 2008 president bush, through condoleezza rice, who

signed the memorandum with the p5+1ed so said that in return here's what we were ready to do. recognize iran's right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. treat iran's nuclear program in the same way as any nuclear state in the npt once the peaceful nature is restored. protect financial assistance for peaceful nuclear energy, including state of the art power reactor, support for r&d and legally binding fuel guarantees. improve relations with iran and support iran in playing a constructive role in international affairs. think about that. work with iran and others in the region on confidence-building measures and regional security. reaffirmation of the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force. cooperation on afghanistan.

steps toward normalization of trade. civilian projects civil aviation cooperation. assistance in iran's social and economic development. all of that was offered by president george w. bush june 12th 2008 but didn't happen because iran was not -- >> the one element that you left out that they did not agree to was -- >> enriching. >> allowing them to enrich. senator menendez? >> thank you mr. chairman. let me start off by saying that i appreciate the enormous work and arduous quest that you have been in pursuit of. and i think that no one would want to be applauding you more than i who has been following iran since my days in the house international committee nearly 20 years ago. as one of the authors of the sanctions regime that are recognized to bring iran to the

negotiating table. however, i am concerned that the deal enshrines for iran and in fact commits the international community over time to assisting iran in developing an industrial scale nuclear power program complete with enrich. while i understand the program will be subject to iran's npt, it fails to look at iran's history of deception in its nuclear program and its violations of the npt and it will in the long run make it harder to demonstrate iran's program is not being used for peaceful purpose because iran will have legitimate reasons to have advanced centrifuges and enrichment program. we'll have to demonstrate if, in fact, that's the case, that its intention is dual use and not justified by the nuclear power

program. that's a much more difficult burden. mr. secretary, you've always been skeptical about sanctions. when you were chairman of this committee in a hearing on sanctions legislation that i was authoring, when the administration was vigorously arguing against it your comment was to wendy sherman and david cohen, so what you are really saying is this is a very blunt instrument which risks adverse reaction as opposed to a calculated effort. in that hearing i remember i had to come back because i didn't expect that even the question of the amendment was going to come up. and they were there trying to excoriate the effort. it passed 99-0 and subsequently was embraced as the reason iran has come back to the negotiating

table. so let me ask under the sanctions heading paragraph 26 says, and i quote the united states administration acting consistent with the respected roles of the president and the congress will refrain from reintroducing or reimposing sanctions specified in annex to, the sanctions this committees and congress passed, that has ceased applying. so secretary lew, i read that to mean we cannot reintroduce or reimpose the existing sanctions that congress passed into law. is that right? >> senator, we have been very clear that we retain our right and we will if we need to reimpose sanctions for reasons that are not nuclear if they live with the nuclear agreement and violate -- >> i'm talking about existing nuclear sanctions.

if snap-back provisions of the sanctions are to be an effective deterrent as the administration has suggested of iranians breaking the agreement, will the administration agree to support the reauthorization of the existing sanctions that passed the senate 99-0, and which expire next year. yes or no? >> let me be clear that the sanctions that are being lifted if iran complies if they comply, we said we would not reimpose nuclear sanctions if they live with the nuclear agreement. >> my point is this. if you're going to snap back, you have to snap back to something. if you aren't snapping back -- >> senator, let me -- >> mr. secretary -- >> don't eat up my time. i'm sorry with all due respect. don't eat up my time. if the sanctions which exist that you all heralded and said brought iran to the table expire

next year 2016, and we don't reauthorize it, there is nothing in that context to snap back to. so why won't you simply say that the administration supports under all the same provisions including the prltesident's waivers, the reauthorization of those sanctions so the iranians know if they violate that the snap back will also include snap back to what the congress passed. >> what i said earlier was that right now the sanctions remain in effect. we have a regime in effect. if iran complies, we will lift sanctions and it's premature to talk about extending a law -- >> this expires next year. iran's obligations go out at least eight years before the rat ratification of the new protocol and that's only if congress lifts the sanctions. i don't understand how we have a credible belief that snap-back

means something if in fact you'll not have the ability to have those sanctions in place. let me ask this to the secretary. is the president willing to make a clear and unequivocal statement, not nat all options are all the table because iran does not believe that's a credible military threat. under no circumstances will iran be permitted to acquire a nuclear weapon. secretary kerry? did you hear my question? >> i apologize. >> is president obama willing to make a clear and unequivocal statement, not that all options are on the table because they'll say iran does not believe there's a credible military threat that iran under no circumstances will be permitted to acquire a nuclear weapon. >> absolutely. he has said that. >> he said all options are on

the table. >> the president has said very clearly under no circumstances will they be allowed to get a nuclear weapon and, in fact ash carter reiterated publicly very specifically. can i just -- >> no, i'm sorry -- i have limited time. you've been with the iranians two years. i have seven minutes. >> it's worthy. >> mr. secretary i'm seriously concerned about the lifting of the arms embarringgring -- embargo that creeped its way into this. the ban on iranian missiles has been lifted. the new security council resolution is clear. iran is not prohibited from carrying out ballistic missile work. the resolution says iran is called upon not to undertake such activity. now previously in security council resolution 1929, the council used mandatory language

where it said, quote, besides that iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. why would we accept inferior language that changes the mandatory shall to a permissive call upon. we often call upon a lot of countries to do or stop certain action in the u.n. but it doesn't have the force of shall not which has consequences if you do. can you answer simply is iran banned from ballistic missile work for the next eight years? >> they are -- >> no. >> do you want to answer it senator? >> i will. >> that is not accurate. the exact same language in the embargo is in the agreement with respect to launches. and that is under article 25 of the u.n. and that is exactly where it is

today in the language. but in addition to that iran did not want it and we insisted on it. they are restrained from any sharing of missile technology, purchase of missile technology exchange of missile technology. work on missiles. they cannot do that under article 41, which is chapter 7 and mandatory. and it does have the language still. >> it seems -- i'm reading to you from the security council resolution that was adopted codifying the -- >> the security council resolution. >> and that security council resolution -- i'm reading you explicit language. iran is called upon -- >> correct. >> -- not to undertake -- >> that's the article -- >> that's far different than shall not. >> senator, that's exactly what it is today. it's the same language as it in the embargo now.

we transferred it to this and that's what it is. >> not the same language as security council resolution 1929. i don't know why you wouldn't just keep the same language which is that you shall not. because there shall not exist there are consequences if you do. mr. chairman, final question. i heard the senator -- i don't know whether that's true or not -- though whole purpose of understanding the military dimensions is not for iranians to declare culpability but to understand how far they got along in their weaponization efforts. general hayden the cia director said we have estimates, but they're just that. is it true that the iranians are going to be able to take the sample he set because chain of custody means nothing if at the beginning what you are given is chosen and derived by the

perpetrator. >> as you know senator that's a classified component of this. it's supposed to be discussed in a classified session. we're perfectly prepared to fully brief you in classified section with respect to what will happen. secretary moniz has had his team, red team that effort and he's made some additional add-ones to where we are. it's part of a confidential agreement between the iaea and iran as to how they do that. the iaea has said they are satisfied they will be able to do this in a way that does not compromise their needs and that adequately gets the answers they need. we've been briefed on it. >> my time is up. if that is true that's would be the equivalent of the fox guarding the chicken coop. >> we're confident the iaea has the ability to be able to get the answers they need and secretary moniz may speak quickly to that.

you want to say anything? >> sure. yes, as secretary kerry said, this is a road map worked out between the iaea and iran. they have -- we do not have the -- those documents that are, as is customary confidential between the country and the agency but clearly, they have -- they know that they must have and be able to articulate a process with integrity in terms of making the measurements and being able to analyze them through their own laboratories and the network of laboratories including u.s. laboratories that do the analysis of these kinds of samples. >> let me just say burning up part of my seven minutes, you

need to go down and have that meeting, and it will take about five seconds okay? you need to go down and meet with secretary moniz and get that answer. i'll also add that we as a nation don't even have a copy. senator cardin and i have asked for this. we don't even have a copy of the agreement to even understand. you'll understand this very quickly in about five seconds for the secretary, but we don't have a copy of the agreement to ascertain on behalf of the american people whether the iaea process, which again, you should go look into this part of it, has any integrity. it's very disappointing. i know senator cardin -- >> this is a very important

point. the documents in question are traditional between the country and the iaea and are kept confidential between the country, in this case iran, and iaea, but it is part of the jcpoa in regards to possible military dimensions, which are critical for us to have base line in order to deal with moving forward. so it's a very important part. and from what we can tell if we can get eyes on that document it may answer some of our questions. secretary moniz has raised questions and he's greatly respected in that regard. i think transparency could help us all better understand that. i hope in a confidential setting there would be an opportunity to review those documents. >> we're going to move on. senator johnson, thank you. >> how can that be confidential? and why would that be classified? okay. i can see iaea having those confidential agreements with

normal powers. iran is not a normal nation. largest state sponsor of terror and we rush to the united nations, had this deal approved and we don't even understand how those samples are going to be collected and the chain of custody. it's unbelievable. secretary kerry, i've heard this deal described as historic. i won't use vice president biden's full terminology but this is a big deal correct? this is a big deal? >> it's an important agreement. >> during our unfortunately limited debate on the iranian nuclear agreement, i tried to offer a third amendment. one was to deem this a treaty. i think it's such a big deal that two-thirds of the senate should approve such an historic deal. unfortunately, that amendment failed. i never got a vote on my next

step. leet deem this a congressional executive agreement where at least both chambers would have to affirmatively approve this with a simple majority vote. the third amendment i tried to offer reflected what we end up getting in this convoluted process. a congressional executive agreement with a low threshold approval of only 34 votes. the parliamentarian said that's out of order. that's very unconstitutional. yet, that's what we have. my question is if you were so confident this is such a great deal, why wouldn't you have been supportive of allowing the american people to be involved in the decision through their elected representatives, as to whether that was by just allowing both chambers to have a simple vote of approval, rather than this convoluted process.

you are quite confident you're going to win this. you've run to the united nations security council. convince me this what we're going through right now isn't just a big charade because i'm afraid that's what it is. why wasn't this administration if you are confident it's such a great deal why didn't you allow this body, this congress the ability to affirmatively vote, too prove this deal. >> it wasn't my decision. >> the administration certainly did not offer any kind of support for a more robust review process. you circumvented this congress by undermining our review process by having the security council approve this. >> on the contrary. this is a long time honored process for several centuries of executive -- of political agreements between countries. >> this is way more than a political agreement. i want to go on. secretary moniz if iran wants a

peaceful nuclear program, there's no reason for them to have to enrich uranium is there? >> well i think, clearly there is uranium available on the international market. but it's also the case that's many countries support their nuclear program with enrichment. >> if they wanted a purely peaceful program there's no need to enrich uranium. in the past when south africa and libya gave up their nuclear programs to be welcomed into the world of nations in a more normal fashion like iran supposedly wants, they completely gave up their enrichment. they dismantled that. that's what we demanded correct? >> i believe so certainly with southd africa. they had a weapons program that was dismantled. >> if i may add the documents the iaea in south africa in a

full nuclear weapons dismantlement program, remained confidential. >> are you familiar with the emp commission's 2008 report? >> no, i am not sir. >> you're not? do you know what emp is? >> you'll have to explain it to me. >> etloerkal magnetic pulse. >> no, i'm not sir. i'm just not. i apologize. i can respond for the record if you have a question there. >> i'll send you a number of questions. the recommendations were for the department of homeland security and department of energy. we just held a hearing. are you familiar with a dr. richard garwin. >> yes everyone is. >> he testified before our committee yesterday in combination with cia former director james woolsey about the

threat of emp. and one of the reasons i called that hearing is what i believe -- nobody knows how this is going to game out. the inevitable conclusion is eventually iran will have aure in clearnuclear weapon. are you familiar that they've practiced ship launch using scud missiles? they've done that according to dr. peter vincent frey. an emp attack would be conducted by somebody like north korea or iran and conducted from a ship off our coast using a scud missile and the fact that you as the secretary of the department of energy were not even aware of the 15 recommendations, basic recommendations. things like evaluating and implementing quick fixes in the threat of an emp attack. for literally $20 million to $70 million we could protect 700

critical transformers that could help us recover from something like that. i'm highly concerned. as you, secretary of energy, not even aware of these recommendations that were made public in 2008. seven years later, we have done nothing, virtually nothing to address these 15 recommendations by the commission. >> first of all, i don't know that report, and the -- clearly many of them must apply to dhs and the dod. however, on the transformer question, if you look at our quadrennial energy review published in april we identify owe emp as a risk to transformers. >> seven years later we've done virtually nothing to protect ourselves. my point being we'll provide a number of questions on the

record to take some action to provide some protection. my final comment is we've heard $50 billion to $100 billion $104 billion in our terms doesn't seem like much. but that's 13% of iran's economy. if for example the american economy had interjection of 13% of our economy that would be $2.4 trillion. this isn't chump change. we've already seen what kind of actor iran is on the world stage. i can't predict this whole thing out but what this deal does is interjects tens of billions, 13% up front of iran's economy into the economy of the largest state sponsor of terrorism. and so when the senator said we have them right where we want them, i agree. we certainly didn't want them with centrifuges but this deal puts them in a far better position. this strengthens their hands and

from that standpoint i'm highly concerned. >> can i respond to the point about the iranian assets. let's be clear what those assets are. it's not money we're giving to iran. it'su ran's money that setitscountries that were locked up to bring them to the table for a nuclear agreement. we've gone through analyzing what that is. that's not us giving them money. if there's a nuclear agreement that meets the criteria the sanctions were designed to achieve, that was the season they were locked up. there are competing demands for that, whatever it is. we think it's about $50 billion. there's at least $500 billion of domestic demand. they can't possibly scratch the surface of that need. we've never said there isn't going to be a penny going to maligned services. they've managed to find money to put into maligned purposes.

i would not exaggerate how much that's going to change things. the assessment that we have that our intelligence community has is that it will not be a change in direction. it will be on the margin not the kind of increase you're describing. >> by the way -- >> before moving to senator shaheen, while we haven't lifted our sanctions on the irgc which has the nuclear file and is the entity that carries out all of the terrorism on behalf of iran what we uniquely did was we lifted saunkss on all the financial institutions they deal with. they'll be the number one beneficiary of the sanctions lifting. we didn't lift sanctions on them. it's looikike not lifting sanctions on a holding company but on the entityies that feed them the money. through economic growth and shipment of money and all the

things they do will empower them. this is almost chump change compared to what will happen over the next decade. senator shaheen? >> could i just respond? we are not lifting sanctions on a bank that was sanctioned for reasons related to terrorism. we've retained the ability -- >> but many other banking entities and others they rely upon have. >> if they violate the terms of our sanctions and regime for sanctions on terrorism could be sanctioned. we have not said that any of those institutions are protected. and in terms of the step back, the point senator menendez concluded is not correct. we have enormous tools to snap back sanctions through the ndaa sanctions on oil and financial sanctions. >> i would just like to move to senator shaheen by saying they disagree with that. great britain disagrees, germany disagrees, france disagrees.

the eu disagrees. the tools that we have through the nuclear file are not available to be applied. senator menendez tried to pursue that. most of the most accurate assessment of this deal from what i've been able to read has been coming from oohiran. >> if iran violates it could come back on nuclear and if they violate sankss we have the ability to sanction on other grounds. it's not a fair conclusion that institutions that's continue to engage in funding terrorism or regional destabilization are im immune from those kinds of sanctions. it's just not correct. >> i stand by assessment as do the other countries who negotiated the deal with you. >> the other cannotountries -- >> senator shaheen. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and ranking member cardin.

thank you to our witnesses for your testimony today and to the negotiating team for the tremendous effort that it took to get us to this point. before i ask my questions, and i do have questions. i just want to say that i don't think it's to the benefit of this committee this congress or the american people for any of us to impugn the motives or intellect of anybody involved in this discussion. i think people have strong views about how they feel, and it's appropriate to express those views, but to -- because someone disagrees with you to suggest that their motives are not in the best interest of this country or that their intellect is questionable i think does not advance the debate in a way that it should be advanced. so, mr. chairman, i appreciate you and the ranking member and

hope that we will keep this debate in a civil discussion. i also want to point out for the record that everybody voted for the nuclear review act of 2015. was unanimous. while all of us had concerns about everything, some of the provisions that were in it it was voted for by the committee unanimously. now to go to my questions, i want to -- secretary moniz follow up on the issues raised with respect to the possible military dimensions of the past iranian nuclear activities. because that's an area where i certainly am not clear about, how we can be confident the iaea is going to be able to get the information that it needs to complete its investigation. can you speak to that a little bit and talk about why you believe that we're going to have

the information that we need? >> again, senator all i can say is the iaea is very strong technically. i might add every inspector since like 1980 has been trained at los alamos national laboratory. they have a very strong reputation, which frankly, they need to guard to make sure that they have a process with integrity. it is their responsibility. there's nothing unusual here. there's no cite agreement. this is the way it works. the iaea negotiates with the country. we have achieved in the negotiation to get iran to the table with them because without satisfying their requirements by october 15th to satisfy the agency, they will not be any agreement going forward. that's very clear.

so after years of stiffing them, to be perfectly -- to use a technical term -- we've forced them to the table. they went to tehran not just the director general but the senior people who do safeguards et cetera and they came back and feel they have a process with integrity. in this environment i can only say the -- and i will say flat out, i personally have not seen those documents the chairman referred to. had something of an oral briefing, general one. with that we have assembled a national lab team to think through the kinds of process that we anticipate and to recommend steps that might mitigate any risks. but again, ultimately, we rely upon the iaea. they will make a report. the director general has committed to trying to get that out this year this calendar

year. and that report is then where one will see that what their conclusions are and what the basis for their conclusions are. >> and -- >> can i get this to you somehow? this is the iaea board of governors road map. it's a letter we've submitted with all the documents that lays out the agreement between iran and -- betweenu ran and the iaea as to what they are going to do and when and how. >> that would be helpful. could we have it introduced for the record? >> i would like that very much. >> once either before or after that report is produced will the intelligence community either hear or our other partner countries weigh in and assess whether they believe that that report reflects an accurate discussion of iran's past activities? >> well, i would have to defer to the intelligence community for their reaction.

i can assure you that our d.o.e. experts are going to be looking over this very very carefully. >> thank you. secretary lew, can you commit there will be no sanctions relieved -- i think you've said this, but to be clear again -- until iran has provided the iaea with this information and the access that's required? >> absolutely. untilu iran has completed all of its obligations we'll not be relieving any of the united states sanctions or the international sanctions. >> i don't know who wants to respond to this but at the time we began negotiations, what was the best estimate of our intelligence community about the time for iran to break out with a nuclear weapon? >> the best estimate was two to three months. >> was there agreement among our intelligence agencies about that estimate? >> by -- yes pretty much.

there was a disagreement with a couple of other countries but not disagreement inner intel community. >> and as we look at -- if this agreement goes into effect, is there an estimate from our intelligence community about how long it might take to get to a nuclear weapon at the end of this agreement if iran decides to pursue that option at the end of -- >> there's a distinction senator. the breakout time as it is used in this negotiation is a hybrid of the traditional understanding of broadcasteakout time. breakout time in arms control is the time it takes to get a weapon. we have been dealing only with the amount of time it takes to get enough fissile material to produce one weapon. you still have to produce the weapon and most people don't guesstimate that a country is going to be satisfied with only

one weapon and enough fissile material for one. there's a lot of time beyond that. we've been operating with a huge safety cushion here, and we'll have one year of broadcasteakout time for one fissile weapon for at least ten years and then it begins to tail down, but not as a cliff. it begins to tail down as we go through the next five years and thn we're arriving at a point where iran has, hopefully, achieved normal status in the npt. i say hopefully because if they haven't, the agreement hasn't worked in the sense they've violated it and we go back to snapback and have the sanctions back in place. >> can you answer whether all of our intelligence agencies are agreed on that particular breakout period? or is there a difference of opinion? >> our intelligence community and the energy department and everybody worked this very, very hard. and it's a very precise formula which feeds in the most rapid

possible rate by looking at the numbers of centrifuges. the amount of enrichment, the capacity for enrichment. all of the many factors that come into it. it's a complicated formula. and everybody is in agreement as to where we are. >> it also includes capacity to rebuild all the infrastructure they are taking out. i might just add beyond the 15 years where there are very severe constraints in terms of visibility, for 20 years there is still the containment and surveillance activities for any centrifuge sensitive parts manufacturing. they'll all be tracked, labeled, tracked, et cetera. and for 25 years the iranian transparencey transparency. it's like follow the iranian and the centrifuges. >> thank you. my time has expired. >> the president was really

clear in year 13 there's zero brack breakout and begin industrialization at -- >> i never heard that carc characterization, mr. chairman. >> i hope you'll take these questions in the spirit they are given. i've been supportive of these negotiations. i commendio all for the hard work that's been done. there's some disagreement here with the text of the agreement as we read it and the explanation that's given. let me just cover a couple of these points. number airteight, on adoption date in the annex for the implementation plan, iran will inform the iaea that iran will apply the additional protocol pending its ratification by the parliament. the iranian parliament and will

fully implement the code 3.1. we tacklked about the agreement, although it's voluntary to live by the additional protocol. what is the time table that's required for the parliament to address the additional protocol? >> they have, senator they have to live by the additional protocol for -- >> rndunderstood, but going forward -- >> they have eight years to adopt it formally. but they are in material breach as of adoption day if they do not live by it. and it is fully understood by everybody that would be a material breach. >> but there is no time table where the parliament -- >> they have to do it within the eight years. >> that's the time table. >> which is before the sanctions are lifted. so you have the snapback

capacity as a result of them not doing it or living by it. >> understood. december 2011 the president signed into law the ndaa that included sanctions on iran's central bank. these sankss penalized foreign financial institutions that were doing business with iran's central bank. these sanctions will ultimately be suspended because of the jcpoa. what i'm trying to understand, and this keys off a question asked by senator cardin and others, we -- according to the agreement, the u.s. administration acting consistent with the respective roles of the president and congress will refrain from reintroducing the imposinge inginge inging saunkse inging sanctions in annex two. this is what a lot of us are having trouble reconciling here.

what would constitute reintroduce, reimposing sanctions specified existing sanctions, if because iran didn't violate the nuclear part of the agreement but, for other reasons, committed edted terrorism abroad abducted citizens. could we impose sanksctions on iran's central bank because that would mimic or be similar to what was done before but in a different context. would that be allowed or would that lead to some violation on our part of the agreement? secretary lew. >> i'm going to take a stab at this because we've been going around on it and i want to, if i can, answer it. first of all, we will not violate the jcpoa if we use our authorities to impose sanctions on iran for terrorism, human rights missiles or any other

non-nuclear reason. and the jcpoa does not provide iran any relief from the u.s. sanctions rnd any of those authorities or other authorities. and i'll go through some of those other authorities. what we have committed to do is quite specific. iran was fearful that having witnessed the hot desire in congress for more sanksctions, that even if we cut an agreement you folks might just turn around the day after and say, too bad. we're coming back with all the sanctions and then the president is in veto status or over ride status. we're not going to reimpose the specific nuclear related sanction provisions as specified in annex two to the jcpoa contingent on them abiding by the commitments of the

agreement. so it's really simply a clarification to them that we're not going to come back and just slap a bun again. that doesn't mean we're precluded from sanctioning iranian actors sectors or any actions if circumstances warrant. so all of our other sanctions remain in place. and iran only said if you read what it says that they would treat the imposition of nuclear-related sanctions as the grounds to cease performing. but they are clear, and we are clear that we have all other kinds of authorities. it's specific for this whole debate to be clear. even with the lifting of sanctions after eight years of missiles or the u.n. sanctions it's only the u.n. sanctions. we still have sanctions.

our primary embargo is still in place. we are still sanctioning them. and for those things that we want to deal with in terms of their behavior. hezbollah. there is a u.n. resolution 1701 that prevents the transfer of any weapons to hezbollah. that will continue and what we need to do is make sure we're enforcing it. >> i think we've got that. i want to make sure if we say, all right what was effective on iran. what's brought them to the table are these sanctions on the central bank because it's more difficult for rshussia, china and other actors to help them evade these sanksctions. if we impose sanctions on their central bank that that won't be a material breach of the accord. >> it will not. >> one other question on a broader topic. assuming this goes into effect

we're going to desperately need a regional security framework that you have touched on and some discussions are already going on. i would just encourage you that i understand the problem with 535 secretaries of state. can't have that. but i'd encourage you to reach out to the relative committees as the fromwork is put in place to make sure it can endure longer than just the first couple of years of the agreement. to have the international fortitude to move ahead, it's best to have congress involved. and there's -- there are many points between 535 secretaries of state and proper consultation with the relevant committees, at least, of jurisdiction here. >> i couldn't concur more. i think you're dead on. we agree. and, by the way i think in the

course of this negotiation prior to the passage of the requirement for the 60 days which we understand, and joined in with working with the chairman, and we're grateful to the chairman for the cooperation on that. but there were a huge number of briefings and hearings and telephone calls n meetings and so forth literally in the hundreds. i couldn't agree more about this new arrangement. we're tacking about arms transfers, special operations training, about counterterrorism counterin counterinsurgency. we have a need to build capacity in many of those countries. the gulf states spend about $130 billion a year on their defense. iran spends $15 billion. yet you see a disparity in terms of what's happening in that region. that has to be addressed, and that's the purpose of our initiative.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you senator. i appreciate you joining in about an hour and a half before that vote on our agreement. senator udall. >> let me echo what everyone said. i appreciate the negotiators and the team and especially give a shoutdout to wendy sherman. i'd also like to recognize our colleague senator angus king who has been sitting here from the beginning. back in their office or here to stay involved in this designation. this is a very important deal, one based on verification and sound science. those two areas are what i'd like to focus on today. the national labs in tennessee new mexico and california have played an important role, and i think it's important we do the

best job we can to explain to the american people why this meets the scientific rigors for preventing iran from developing a bomb. secretary moniz, can you say what the half life of uranium and plutonium are and what this means about how long we can detect its signature in nature and why that's important. >> you are creating the need for a 50-minute lecture. the half life of uranium is roughly the age of the earth 5 billion years. and that's why we still have it in the ground,ranium 235 is a factor of maybe ten less which is why it's a major isotope now. plutonium is much shorter. 20,000 years probably. which is why we don't have any

of it naturally and have to make it in reactors. >> iran cannot create a facility or enrich uranium or plutonium out of the thin air. the laws of physics are clear. energy and math must be conserved and through the iaea we'll bible to detect illicit use due to extensive monitoring. do both of you believe that's correct? >> yes. >> yes. >> and with regard to the 24-day for undeclared sites. given the half life of uranium and plutonium and a parallel enrichment capability, is it possible to hide such work within 24 days and do you believe we have the technical capabilities to determine if enrichment is being done outside the jcpoa? >> we have the historical

example of 2003 of precisely that happening after six months, easily finding uranium despite efforts to disguise it. we'll have all the containment of all the sensitive parts of every machine they make. >> so people that have used the analogy in a drug crime you flush it down the toilet and it's gone and won't be able to find it, that has in fact been proven out? >> if they try that, we'll find it out. >> our experts at oak origin, los alamos lawrence livermore have given technical support throughout these negotiations. are they confident these verification measures, both enhanced measures and those in the additional protocol will enable the iaea to detect and attempt to break out in time for the international community to react. >> the international lab

scientists, they were heroic, on constant call for hours turn around in the negotiating sessions. i've alaudluded to the fact that los alamos played a huge role in the detection arena. those people have invented many of the safeguard technologies that will be employed here. >> so it sonds to me like iran could break the rules of this agreement but cannot break the rules of physics. the international community has the know-how and expertise to determine whether iran is abiding by this deal and the nonproliferation treaty but into perpetuity under the nonproliferation treaty. would you agree with this assessment and would the panel agree if necessary the u.s. and

p5+1 would have the ability to snap back sanctions and deal with the violations as appropriate in order to prevent them from acquiring a nuclear weapon? >> yes. again, we'll have much greater transparency from day one to forever than we would have without the agreement. that's a fact. and then the sanctions i'll venture the answer is yes. >> thank you. and then just finally secretary kerry, one of the keys. implementation. how are we going to do implementation. i ask in the broadest possible way, how is it going to be done? who is going to be in charge? how are we going to make sure that we really do what needs to be done to make sure this is a success? >> we already have created an implementation office. and we have somebody managing

that at this point. it's teamed up. but will be even more so as we go forward. this will be a full-time operation. it's not going to be left to a normal bureau. there will be a full-time iran agreement implementation effort with experienced and competent personnel staffing it. >> and i would just add that under that umbrella of the administration, we will have our own implementation team and there will be some major jobs. in annex one you'll see alluded to a working group of the p5+1 on theu iraq reactor redesign. we anticipate obviously playing a leading role in that group and making sure that the new reactor does only what we have laid out. and the parameters are in the material you have. >> good. and i just -- i can't emphasize

enough in terms of the national laboratories especially the two in new mexico but all of them, that they have worked on this these kinds of activities and studied nuclear issues since the creation of the atomic bomb. and that's why they are in such a position to be able to give the technical advice to make -- >> if i could just reinforce that, it's very important. this is a pitch for the national labs. this is not the capability you invent overnight. it has to be a consistent investment in our core capability. >> people like me who obviously don't have that background, understood our limitations and there isn't any decision made in this agreement, none, where we didn't go to our teams. in fact there were days we were

delayed because we had to go back to the laboratories. get the laboratories' inpult, our experts input and make a judgment as to, whether whatever judgment we made would result in what we were seeking and be sustainable. there isn't one technical decision within this agreement that hasn't been worked through the entire system in that regard. >> thank you. >> senator, i can be proud of your outstanding labs. i've visited them and they are playing a huge role in this. senator gardner. >> thank you, mr. chairman and to the secretaries today for your time and testimony. i wanted to start with the secretary lew talking about a number of individuals who will, by 2023, and companies removed from the u.s. saunksnctions list. what can you tell about mr. fakerzadi. is it correct to describe him as the father of the iranian

nuclear program? >> i'd defer to secretary moniz who is the father of the iranian nuclear program. >> that term certainly has been applied to him. >> what about mr. abassi? they blacklisted him for allegedly being an aid to fakerzadi and working onu ran's nuclear and missile programs? >> senator without commenting on each individual if you go through the names of people involved in iran's nuclear program, any step to remove sanctions that are related to the nuclear program will involve individuals and organizations that had been involved in iran's nuclear program. >> okay. and so a german engineer gerard weiser. he supplied to the aku khan

black market? >> i'm reluctant to get into individual names. >> why they are listed in there. why would you be have the same characteristic. >> which is what? >> which is they were designate the because of nuclear activities. >> and now they have their sanctions relief by 2023? >> to the extent that iran keeps its agreement, we will be relieving nuclear sanctions, if they don't keep their agreement, we won't be relieving nuclear sanctions what messages do you see to end proliferators around the world? >> i think the message is, if you violate the rules and develop nuclear weapons and we and the world take action against you, we'll have significant consequence. but if you reach an agreement and you unwind your nuclear program, that will also have consequence. >> so, cue please provide a list or names of americans who have been released as -- from sanctions or imprisonment as a

result of these negotiations? there are none. >> we're happy to follow up with you on lists you might want. >> thank you. so secretary lew again, following up on, i believe senator menendez's questions if that act were simply to be extended, the date changed to 2018 the national security waivers would still be in place by the president. is that something that congress would pass changing the date to 2016, 2018? is that acceptable under the jcpoa? >> we've gone back on that a few times. the reimposition of nuclear sanctions is if they comply with the nuclear agreement, has a very different character than if they don't comply. right now they've agreed to take serious actions. we need to work toward the implementation of the agreement. what i was trying to say after the back and forth with senator menendez we have a host of very

powerful sanctions. we have tools that are not just -- >> i heard you explain that to secretary menendez -- or senator menendez. if you don't mind, we're running out of time. if congress were to pass an extension to 2018 obviously the national security waivers under this deal would still be in place. would the president veto that legislation? >> i think this is not appropriate time to be discussing extending a law before we've even had the implementation period begin on this agreement. >> do you think that makes the snapback provisions weaker or stronger -- >> that's what i was trying to get at. i think the snap-back provisions are extremely powerful. our oil sanctions, financial sanctions, have independent -- >> you're prepared to have a snap back without the iran sanctions in place? >> i think the snapback would be very powerful with or without it. >> secretary kerry n your testimony, you stated that u.s. sanctions related to human

rights terrorism, ballistic missiles will remain in place. how do our sanctions slow down their ballistic missiles program. >> regrettably they've been pure suing things without recourse and one of our determinations is to up -- i think the president said this in the east room during his press conference the other day, for instance, they've been transferring weapons for 20 years to lebanon, to hezbollah, and there may be as many as 70,000 to 80,000 rockets. now, we all know that are a threat to israel. we need to, all of us be engaged in a stronger effort to prevent the movement of these weapons. >> by lifting -- >> no no. >> is israel safer under this with the ballistic embargo

lifted? >> absolutely no question that israel is safer -- >> with the embargo lifted, israel is sacher? >> with the -- we're not lifting -- >> i can read you -- >> well, we still have the -- see, what you're not looking at, senator, and what everybody needs to take note of it is, we have separate u.n. resolutions that apply to all those other activities, and we have separate regimes that on reply to them. the security proliferation -- >> i understand. i'm running out of time. >> i know. if you want a question without an answer -- >> with the united nations language, do you believe israel is safer eight years of the embargo lifted -- >> no question in my mind because we have the ability to put all kinds of other sanctions in place as well as enforce existing u.n. resolutions that apply to missiles and other things. >> you mentioned an article in the washington post, how the

iran deal is good for israel. do you believe prime minister netanyahu is highly critical of this deal, knows what he's talking about? >> prime minister -- look i respect and know prime minister netanyahu very well. i consider him a friend. and he and i talk regularly. we're still talking even in the midst of this disagreement because we have a lot of things to talk about. i completely understand the prime minister of a state like israel which has been under siege and existentially threatened all of its life that this is also a big challenge. i understand the expressions of concern he has voiced. we just happen to disagree about the impact of what is going to happen here. and our ability to be able to safeguard israel going forward through the mechanisms that have been put in place. there is absolutely no question, whatsoever, indisputable, you can't argue, that taking a

breakout time from two months to a year, taking a 12,000 kilogram stockpile to zero -- >> secretary so you -- you did not include him in this list -- >> i mean, you've got look at that. maybe you have -- >> you believe prime minister netanyahu knows what he's talking about? >> i slumgts -- i disagree -- >> but he knows what he's talking about. >> he knows as prime minister the fear he's expressing, absolutely. >> secretary moniz, aillialihunanan, we have talked about the agreement aiea has entered into the agreement not disclosed to the committee or the public with iran, he stated in "the new york times," quote, a 24-day adjudicateda adjudicate indicated timeline detecting undeclared facilities and materials. is he wrong?

well the 24-day thing is explicitly for undeclared territories. i expressed use of nuclear materials in those facilities. we have to know where to look. that's the traditional role of intelligence, ours and those of our allies and friends. >> thank you. >> senator murphy. >> thank you very much chairman. thank you for spending time with us here today. one comment on this issue of nonnuclear sanctions and then two questions. the iranians are worried we're going to reimpose nuclear sanctions under the cover of some other excuse. thus your discussion about the sensitivity of when we may reauthorize the iran sanctions act. i just note that what we're talking about here is motive. whether or not we are genuine in

imposing sanctions for a nonnuclear reeld activity or whether we are doing it under the cover of trying to get around the agreement. i don't think there's any way to avoid the fuzziness of that section of the agreement. but i think we all have to understand there is going to be a lack of clarity on that question, given the fact that the dispute ultimately is not going to be about the letter of the law that we pass, but about the motive that stands behind it. i think that we can certainly defend instituting new sanctions on nonnuclear activity. but there's going to be a difficulty in trying to define that motive. my question, though, is -- first question is continuing on this subject of inspections. iranians made a commitment they're not going to engage in any research and development

that quote under item 16 could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device. we've talked about the eyes on ft. natan, the eyes on the full supply chain, but there are a host of nuclear-related research activities that could kir at other research sites that don't involve material that runs through the supply chain. how dough do we have an assurance there are no r&d activities occurring given the fact there are going to be sites that we won't even be asking about, frankly, and there are research activities potentially that can happen that don't involve that nuclear material we see in the supply chain inspections? >> well, as i said, there are a number of activities that are listed there, which are out of bounds that will not involve

nuclear materials. clearly, again, almost by definition for any undeclared site, it becomes a question of intelligence acquired in one way or another. and we have obviously nationally a lot of means as do others. once we have the right pointer, then it's a question of getting in there and there can be some smoking guns, in some cases. for example, around neutron initiators that we would detect. other cases it will be more in the context of the declared activities don't kind of make sense with what we see in there. these all become additional indicators for our intelligence. but, you know i think our intelligence people will say very straight forwardly that clearly in the end these nonnuclear activities will be more of a challenge than the nuclear materials activities over which we'll have very, very